| ==Phrack Inc.== | |
| Volume Three, Issue Thirty-one, Phile #7 of 10 | |
| COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL | |
| INTERIM MEMORANDUM | |
| SUBJECT: TYMNET SUPPORT FOR CUSTOMER'S DATA SECURITY | |
| PURPOSE: This document provides background, and general procedures | |
| and practices used to support customers with suspected security | |
| problems. Field Sales is the intended audience but is a general | |
| document and may be useful to other customer support personnel. | |
| Currently, this document is in a final review. Meanwhile, it is to | |
| retain the status of an internal proprietary document. | |
| BACKGROUND: BT Tymnet Inc, and its Network Systems Company, | |
| believe information integrity is vital to ourselves and our | |
| customers. One way TYMNET insures integrity is by providing good | |
| security. TYMNET has a baseline security of user name, password, | |
| and user access profile available for all customers. Further, there | |
| are two security products. One permits the customer to limit | |
| password life (password automatically expires after a customer | |
| elected time period) and the other permits the end user to change | |
| his/her own password. Since we do consider security a key issue, | |
| we continue to develop other security features. Also, we work with | |
| Security vendors to certify their security products on our network, | |
| thus permitting customers to add such products, should they so | |
| desire. | |
| We have established Network Systems Company Policies which provide | |
| a framework for the information contained herein (see NSC Policy | |
| 121 and 122. More policies are in distribution as of this | |
| writing). It is highly recommended that these policies be reviewed | |
| since they represent the framework of this document. | |
| Legal considerations are another key issue in any security case. | |
| Support, other then providing the customer with related security | |
| data, can only occur if law(s) have been broken. The | |
| legal issues are complex and only a minimal information is | |
| provided herein. At at the heart of this issue is the fact that | |
| the customer is the injured party, not TYMNET. Patience and good | |
| communication may be required to get the customer to understand | |
| this fact. The customers must act for themselves to obtain | |
| law enforcement support. TYMNET will support that activity, and | |
| help to the degree possible, much as a "friend of the court". | |
| THE SUPPORT: We provide security support as a responsible | |
| network service provider. The first step in that support is for | |
| the field sales representative to act as a security consultant to | |
| the customer, at least to the extent explained below. | |
| The customer is well advised to plan in advance "what to do | |
| when Captain Midnight strikes" -- contingency planning, pure | |
| simple. First there are two basic alternatives to choose from: | |
| PROTECT AND PROCEED | |
| OR | |
| PURSUE AND PROSECUTE | |
| "Protect and proceed" means 1) determine how the incident | |
| occurred, 2) plug the security leak/hole, and 3) go on with | |
| business as normal. | |
| (Do we want written notification of the Intent to "Pusue and | |
| Prosecute" from the "Injured Party?"). | |
| "Pursue and prosecute" is just that. The first step is having | |
| the customer obtain legal support, and both we and the customer | |
| continue to gather evidence until the suspect is apprehended. The | |
| next step is the prosecution in a court of law. (The final step is | |
| to return to the first alternative, e.g., now protect and | |
| proceed.) | |
| The customer needs to judge each case on its own merits, but | |
| generally the first choice is the wiser one. The second choice | |
| involves considerable effort, mostly by the customer and law | |
| enforcement agency(s), possible negative publicity for the | |
| customer and does not necessarily result in successful prosecution. | |
| Good contingency planning also includes becoming familiar with the | |
| laws and the local law enforcement people. | |
| The starting point is a suspected incident. Herein, we will address | |
| the case where the customer has identified a suspected intruder. | |
| Generally, that occurs by a customer's detailed review of billing | |
| or host based security exception reports. | |
| At this point it is essential the field sales representative open a | |
| ticket containing at least the following: 1) customer name and CID, | |
| 2) host(s) involved, 3) incident start and stop times, and 4) the | |
| customer's objective. Add any other information deemed helpful. | |
| Other support may be an on-line trace of the call, if the | |
| suspect is currently on-line. Field support should do this trace, or | |
| alternately, this same help can be obtained by calling network | |
| customer support and/or NetCon. In any case it must be done while | |
| the suspect is on-line. Such trace information should be | |
| included on the ticket. | |
| Based on the customer's position; the case will fit either | |
| "prevent and proceed" or, "pursue and prosecute". The former is | |
| straight forward, in that TYMNET security will research the | |
| incidents(s), and provide data (generally user name and point of | |
| origin(s) to the customer via Field Sales, with recommendations | |
| on how to prevent any further occurrence. We do provide this | |
| service as a responsible vendor, although strict interpretation | |
| of NSC policy 121 precludes it. However, we do apply the policy if | |
| a customer continues to ask for data without taking preventative | |
| action. | |
| The "pursue and prosecute" case is complex, and is different for each | |
| situation. It will be explained by using a typical scenario. After | |
| the first step (as above), it is necessary to gather data sufficient | |
| to show a pattern of intrusion from a single TYMNET access point. | |
| With this information, the customer (the injured party) must contacts | |
| law enforcement agency(s), with the one exception noted below. | |
| If that intrusion point is through a gateway from a foreign | |
| country, for all practical purposes, the customer can do little to | |
| prosecute. The law(s) of the foreign country will apply since | |
| extradition is most unlikely. Therefore, action will have to be | |
| have to be initiated by the network service provider in the | |
| foreign country. In this case, TYMNET security will have MIS | |
| research the session details to obtain the Network User | |
| Identifier, and External Network Support (Jeff Oliveto's | |
| organization) will communicate that information to the foreign | |
| network for their action (cases involving U.S. government computers | |
| may get special treatment - see for example - Communications of the | |
| ACM, May, 1988, article on "Stalking the Wiley Hacker"). | |
| Most all security incidents on our network are caused by international | |
| hackers using X.121 addressing. Frequently, our customer is unaware | |
| of the risk of X.121 addressing, and permits it. BE SURE YOUR | |
| CUSTOMERS KNOW THAT THEY CAN CHOOSE FULL TYMNET SECURITY FEATURES, | |
| THEREBY PRECLUDING SUCH INTRUSIONS FROM X.121 ADDRESSING FROM | |
| FOREIGN NETWORKS. | |
| For the domestic case, the customer gets law enforcement (attorney | |
| general at incoming call location, secret service if credit card | |
| fraud is involved, or possibly the FBI, depending on the incident) | |
| to open a case. Note, damage in estimated dollars is usually | |
| necessary to open a case, and many agencies will not take action on | |
| small claims. For example, as of December, 1988, the Los Angeles | |
| Attorney will not open a case for less than $10,000 (they have too | |
| big a caseload at higher damages). | |
| Assuming legal support is provided, a court order for a wire tap | |
| and trace will be obtained, thereby determining the caller's phone | |
| number (this step can be very involved and time consuming for long | |
| distance calls). The next legal action occurs after the calling | |
| number is identified. A search warrant is obtained for searching the | |
| facility housing the phone location. Normally, this search will | |
| gather evidence sufficient for prosecution. Evidence is typically | |
| the necessary terminal equipment, printouts, diskettes, etc. Then, | |
| at long last the prosecution. Also note, again at the time the | |
| calling number is identified, the injured party should use the | |
| "protect and proceed" plan. | |
| For further information, contact Data Security, TYMNET Validations, | |
| or Ontyme NSC.SECURITY. | |
| _______________________________________________________________________________ | |