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| What's Wrong With The Computer Crime Statute? February 17, 1992 | |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
| By Thomas A. Guidoboni (ComputerWorld)(Page 33) | |
| "Defense and prosecution agree the 1986 Computer Fraud | |
| and Abuse Act is flawed but differ on how to fix it." | |
| It has become an annual ritual, since the birth of the Internet worm, for | |
| Congress to consider amendments to the 1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. At | |
| this point, the U.S. Department of Justice can be expected to advocate three | |
| things: an expansion of the federal role in the investigation and prosecution | |
| of computer crimes, the creation of new categories of offenses, and harsher | |
| penalties, including perhaps the current darling of the department, forfeiture | |
| of property. | |
| Since the law is of recent origin, was substantially revised in 1986 and proved | |
| more than adequate to prosecute and convict Robert T. Morris, there seems | |
| little justification for expansion of its coverage. | |
| Nevertheless, if Congress is determined to review and revise the provisions of | |
| the act, there are several narrow, but significant, amendments that are clearly | |
| warranted. Of primary importance is the definition of terms. The core of the | |
| law suffers from a lack of clarity. Offenses are described by reference to | |
| "authorized" or "unauthorized access," yet these terms are not defined | |
| anywhere. | |
| Perilously Vague | |
| In a universe that consists of broad computer networks, bulletin boards, E-mail | |
| and anonymous file-transfer protocols, and one in which permissions and rights | |
| are established by custom, usage and private understandings, a person is left | |
| to speculate at his peril as to what conduct is permitted and what is | |
| prohibited by this vague language. | |
| The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act should be amended to give precise content to | |
| the concepts of "access" and "authorization," thereby providing fair warning of | |
| illegal conduct. | |
| A second change for the better regarding the act would be to create a | |
| distinction between those computer intruders who unintentionally cause a | |
| monetary loss and those who maliciously cause such harm. | |
| The present law, as interpreted in the Morris case, recognizes no such | |
| distinction. This is contrary to long-standing notions of fairness in our | |
| system of criminal law, which acknowledges that between two persons who cause | |
| the same harm, the one who intended that result is more culpable than the one | |
| who did not. | |
| A third part of the statute that needs revision relates to computerized medical | |
| records. It is too broad because it includes as felonious conduct the | |
| unauthorized access to such records that "potentially modifies or impairs" | |
| medical treatment or care. Virtually every unauthorized access to computers | |
| containing medical records carries this potential. A better solution would be | |
| simply to make any "unauthorized access" of computerized medical records data a | |
| misdemeanor, with the intentional modification or destruction of such data | |
| designated as a felony. | |
| Amend, But Don't Expand | |
| These slight but important amendments would serve to clarify and improve a | |
| basically sound law without stifling the creativity of persons akin to those | |
| who have been responsible for many of the advances in computer technology in | |
| this country. More expansive revisions are ill-advised, as they may | |
| unnecessarily encroach on evolving privacy and free-expression interests. | |
| A broadening of federal involvement is also inappropriate. Nearly every state | |
| has enacted laws against computer fraud and abuse and, as Congress recognized | |
| in 1986, federal jurisdiction should be limited to cases where there is a | |
| compelling federal interest. This might include instances where computers | |
| belonging to the federal government or to financial institutions are involved, | |
| or cases where the crime itself is interstate in nature. Furthermore, other | |
| computer crimes should be left to prosecution by the individual states, as is | |
| presently the case. | |
| In sum, the 1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act would benefit from some | |
| clarification, but expansion of its coverage and wholesale revisions are both | |
| ill-advised and unnecessary. | |
| Note: Thomas A Guidoboni is an attorney with Bonner & O'Connell in Washington, | |
| D.C. He represented Robert T. Morris in the Internet virus case. | |
| _______________________________________________________________________________ | |
| Private Social Security Data Sold to Information Brokers February 29, 1992 | |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
| By R.A. Zaldivar (San Jose Mercury News) | |
| Washington, D.C. -- The privacy of 200 million Americans with records at the | |
| Social Security Administration is threatened by an illegal trade in pilfered | |
| computer files. Computerization has dramatically improved our ability to serve | |
| the public," Social Security Deputy Commissioner Louis Enoff told a Senate | |
| panel. "However, it has also made confidentiality more difficult." | |
| Two executives of Nationwide Electronic Tracking, a Tampa, Florida, company, | |
| pleaded guilty to conspiracy charges in January for their part in a national | |
| network selling Social Security records. Twenty-three people, including agency | |
| employees and police officials, have been indicted in the case -- the largest | |
| known theft of government computer data. "Information brokers" will pay Social | |
| Security employees $25 for a person's earnings history and then sell the data | |
| for as much as $300. Their growing list of customers includes lawyers, private | |
| investigators, employers, and insurance companies. | |
| Social Security records contain a mother lode of information that includes not | |
| only a person's past earnings but names of employers, family history and even | |
| bank account numbers of people who receive benefits by direct deposit. The | |
| information can be used to find people or to make decisions on hiring, firing, | |
| suing or lending, said Larry Morey, deputy inspector general of the Health and | |
| Human Services Department. | |
| "Here we have a large-scale invasion of the Social Security system's | |
| confidentiality," said Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, D-N.Y., chairman of the | |
| Social Security subcommittee. | |
| Information from other government data bases with records on individuals -- | |
| such as the FBI's National Criminal Information Center -- is also available on | |
| the underground market. All a broker needs is the cooperation of a clerk at a | |
| computer terminal. | |
| Congress may revise privacy laws to increase penalties for illegally disclosing | |
| information in the private files of individuals. | |
| Enoff said Social Security is studying ways to improve computer security, as | |
| well as keeping closer tabs on employees with access to files, and stressing to | |
| its workers that unauthorized disclosure of information is a federal crime. | |
| - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - | |
| Related articles can be found in Phrack World News, Issue 37, Part One: | |
| Indictments of "Information Brokers" January 1992 | |
| Taken from The Privacy Journal | |
| SSA, FBI Database Violations Prompt Security Evaluations January 13, 1992 | |
| By Kevin M. Baerson (Federal Computer Week)(Pages 1, 41) | |
| _______________________________________________________________________________ | |
| Back to Act I March 3, 1992 | |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
| Taken from Communications Daily (Page 2) | |
| "Supreme Court Lets Stand Ruling That FCC Ban On Indecency Is Unconstitutional" | |
| FCC's 24-hour ban on indecent programming is unconstitutional, U.S. Supreme | |
| Court ruled in refusing to consider unanimous U.S. Appeals Court, D.C., | |
| decision. Supreme Court action also effectively overruled December 1988 rider | |
| to Senate appropriations bill directing FCC to ban all indecent programming. | |
| Last summer, en banc Appeals Court had refused to reconsider May decision by | |
| unanimous 3-judge panel that FCC ban is unconstitutional. | |
| FCC, with support of Justice Department, had asked Supreme Court to reconsider | |
| case. Coalition of 14 intervenors, including Action for Children's TV (ACT), | |
| had opposed FCC in Appeals Court and Supreme Court. En banc Appeals Court said | |
| that none of 13 judges who participated "requested the taking of a vote" on | |
| whether to rehear case. On Supreme Court, Justices Sandra O'Connor and Byron | |
| White voted to reconsider case. FCC's definition of indecency: "Language or | |
| material that depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by | |
| contemporary community standards . . . sexual or excretory activities or | |
| organs." Agency has fined several stations for indecent programming in the | |
| last year. | |
| With loss in Supreme Court, FCC official told us "we don't have any choices | |
| left" but to permit such programming to be broadcast. "We're back to Act I." | |
| Source predicted, and other FCC officials agreed, that agency soon will issue | |
| rulemaking to make a ban on indecent programming later than 8 p.m. Same | |
| sources expect Congress once again to take up issue. | |
| ACT President Peggy Charren said: "It's very exciting for ACT to have won one | |
| for the First Amendment. We always knew it's preposterous for the FCC to try | |
| to ban speech at 3 o'clock in the morning to protect children . . . It's very | |
| satisfying to have this particular [conservative] Supreme Court agree with us." | |
| NAB (which also was intervernor in case) Associate General Counsel Steve | |
| Bookshester said Supreme Court "correctly" acted in not reviewing lower court | |
| decision: "Now, it's up to the Commission to adopt new procedures to determine | |
| when such material is permitted to be broadcast." Washington attorney Timothy | |
| Dyk, who represented intervenors, said: "I think it's a very happy result . . . | |
| The Court of Appeals decision is exactly where it should be in terms of a safe | |
| harbor." | |
| _______________________________________________________________________________ | |
| Drug Enforcement Data Are Vulnerable Through Phone Lines March 4, 1992 | |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
| Taken from Communications Daily (Page 5) | |
| Classified information in computers of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is | |
| at risk, General Accounting Office (GAO) said in a report. It said DEA doesn't | |
| provide adequate protection of classified information because too many people | |
| have access to computers that store data, and computers with classified | |
| information are hooked into nonsecure telephone lines, making them vulnerable | |
| to outside intrusion. | |
| Report, Computer Security: DEA Is Not Adequately Protecting National Security | |
| Information (GAO/IMTEC-92-31), said it found several instances of lax physical | |
| and electronic security at DEA computers in several locations. Although there | |
| are no known instances of security breaches, "these disturbing security | |
| weaknesses pose serious risks that could potentially hinder DEA's mission and | |
| threaten the lives of federal agents," the report said. The report found that | |
| DEA isn't complying with standard security guidelines outlined by National | |
| Security Agency. | |
| In preliminary findings, GAO was so concerned with security weaknesses that it | |
| called in Department of Justice on January 9 and furnished it with a "limited | |
| official use" version of its report to give DEA time to correct problems, said | |
| Rep. Wise (D-W.Va.), chairman of House Government Operations Subcommittee, who | |
| ordered the investigation. He said other government agencies should be wary of | |
| sharing information with DEA until security problems have been eliminated. | |
| Calls to DEA on progress of follow-up security procedures weren't returned. | |
| Findings are "indicative" of typical "apathetic security attitude" that the | |
| government has, said David Banisar, security expert for Computer Professionals | |
| for Social Responsibility. | |
| GAO investigators found DEA couldn't adequately identify what computers used | |
| classified information. "DEA cannot ensure that adequate safeguards are in | |
| place for protecting national security information," report said. In spite of | |
| federal guidelines, GAO found that DEA hasn't "completed a risk analysis" of | |
| computer system. Some classified computers were found to be operated in areas | |
| where contractors -- with no security clearances -- moved around with no | |
| restrictions. No computers were found to be "tempest" hardened, meaning | |
| electronic emissions from keyboards can't be picked up. | |
| In light of concern on outside intrusion from "hackers," GAO found several DEA | |
| computers were connected by phone lines "that are not encrypted" -- which it | |
| described as clear violation of national security guidelines. The report said | |
| "unauthorized individuals can intercept or monitor information emanating from | |
| and transmitted by" the agency without being detected. Classified information | |
| was found to be stored on hard disks in an "inadvertent" manner, allowing for | |
| the possibility that computers, when resold, still might hold data. One such | |
| occurrence, recorded by GAO in its report, occurred last year when sensitive | |
| grand jury information on informants was left on surplus computers sold by DoJ | |
| at a public auction. | |
| The report said that DEA has acknowledged weaknesses "and is taking action to | |
| correct them." | |
| _______________________________________________________________________________ | |
| BBS Controversy Brews Close To Home March 1992 | |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
| Taken from Puget Sound Computer User | |
| Special Thanks: Peter Marshall in Telecom Digest | |
| In a case before the Public Utility Commission of Oregon, US West is | |
| maintaining three phone lines connected to a free-access BBS in a residence | |
| should be billed at business rates. Because of the similarities in tariffs | |
| >from state to state and US West's position in the case, many are predicting | |
| that if US West prevails, the company will be authorized to raise all Oregon | |
| BBS lines to business rates and try to raise rates for BBS lines in US West's | |
| remaining 13 states. | |
| The case started when Tony Wagner, a Portland system operator, received a | |
| letter from US West in October, 1991. In the letter, Communications Consultant | |
| Sandi Ouelette said "Bulletin board services are considered a business, | |
| therefore, subject to business rates ..." | |
| One Seattle attorney interested in telecommunications said these attempts by | |
| the phone companies to raise rates for BBSes are "just another attempt to swipe | |
| people's communication." | |
| _______________________________________________________________________________ | |
| 1-800-54-PRIVACY March 10, 1992 | |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
| Taken from Communications Daily | |
| American Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA) President Cathleen Black asked | |
| American Paper Institute to support the newspaper industry's fight against | |
| RHCs, warning that the market for paper could drop if phone companies are | |
| allowed to expand activities into information services. Increased electronic | |
| classified ads and other services could lead to cutbacks in demand for | |
| newsprint, Black said. Newspaper producers, traditionally allied with ANPA, | |
| said they would study the matter. | |
| Meanwhile, full-page newspaper ads placed by ANPA and allied Consumer | |
| Federation, Graphic Communications International Union, National Newspaper | |
| Association, and Weatherline have generated thousands of calls to an 800 number | |
| >from readers concerned about potential invasions of privacy by telephone | |
| companies. The latest ad ran in the March 7 Washington Post, under the | |
| headline: "Unless they're stopped, the Bells will know more about you than | |
| even the IRS." The ad advised callers to dial 1-800-547-7482, referred to in | |
| the telephone message as "1-800-54-privacy." | |
| Gary Slack, of the Chicago PR firm Slack, Brown & Myers, which is coordinating | |
| the 800 campaign, said that the angle in the ad has become an effective weapon | |
| against RHCs because "there are a lot of people concerned about privacy." | |
| Callers are sent a 4-page letter signed by Black and "action guidelines" for | |
| asking legislators to support bills by Representative Cooper (D-Tenn.) | |
| (HR-3515) and Senator Inouye (D-Hawaii) (S-2112) that would restrict RHC entry | |
| into information services. ANPA has argued that, through data on telephone | |
| bills, information can be collected about callers. | |
| RHCs didn't have the incentive to use that data before, but now with the | |
| ability to offer information services, they do, ANPA said. ANPA generally | |
| doesn't pay for ads, but offers them to newspapers to run when they have space, | |
| a spokesman said. Pacific Telesis Vice-President Ronald Stowe said ANPA ads | |
| "show desperation and questionable ethics." He said ANPA is using some of same | |
| tactics it has accused RHCs of using, including collecting information on | |
| subscribers. ANPA ads are "really sewer-level stuff," Stowe said: "There are | |
| enough legitimate issues that ought to be debated." | |
| *** Editor's Note: For more information on this story, please see "Standing Up | |
| To Fight The Bells" by Knight Lightning in this issue of Phrack. | |
| - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - | |
| Missouri Bulletin Board Case Settled March 24, 1992 | |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
| Taken from Communications Daily (Page 6) | |
| Southwestern Bell in Missouri has filed a new tariff with the Missouri Public | |
| Service Commission (PSC) to allow computer bulletin board (BBS) operators to | |
| use residential lines. The tariff would take effect April 10 if there are no | |
| complications. Under proposal, the BBS operators at homes would be allowed to | |
| continue to use residence lines if they don't "solicit or require any | |
| remuneration, directly or indirectly, in exchange for access" and use 4 or | |
| fewer residential lines priced at flat rates. | |
| BBSes that don't meet those requirements would be required to use business | |
| lines. The tariff, negotiated between SWB and representatives of BBS | |
| operators, defines a BBS as "a data calculating and storage device(s) utilized | |
| as a vehicle to facilitate the exchange of information through the use of | |
| Southwestern Bell Telephone Company facilities." BBS language is part of a | |
| high-grade Information Terminal Service originally aimed at business users with | |
| computers, but interpreted by BBS operators as targeted at them. SWB | |
| originally had wanted to make the new service mandatory for computers with | |
| modems, but the new proposal, submitted March 11, makes it optional. | |
| *** Editor's Note: For more information, please see the numerous articles on | |
| this topic in Phrack World News, Issue 37, Part 3. | |
| - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - | |
| In a surprising turn of events, the April 14, 1992 issue of Communications | |
| Daily reports that U.S. West in the state of Washington has decided not to | |
| follow the example of Oregon attempt to raise rates for electronic bulletin | |
| board (BBS) hobbyists. | |
| Patsy Dutton, consumer affairs manager for Washington Utilities & | |
| Transportation Commission (WUTC), asked U.S. West about its policy after | |
| receiving request from BBS operators. | |
| In a letter dated March 31 to system operator Bruce Miller, Dutton said she had | |
| reviewed U.S. West tariff and had talked with company representatives as to | |
| current and future plans for BBS service: "The company indicates it has no | |
| intention of changing its current procedure." Residential service would be | |
| available for hobbyists, with business rates applying under other conditions. | |
| An Oregon PUC law judge is currently considering complaint against U.S. West | |
| for raising rates of bulletin board operators there. | |
| _______________________________________________________________________________ | |
| Congress Explores Dropping Subsidy of Federal Science Network March 13, 1992 | |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
| Taken from Communications Daily (Page 6) | |
| "Fairness For All Is Urged" | |
| In hearing, Representative Boucher (D-Va.) questioned National Science | |
| Foundation (NSF) on its management policies and future direction of NSFnet, | |
| national research network. He said it's "essential" that NSFnet be structured | |
| so all commercial providers of network services "receive equal treatment" and | |
| that government policy for managing the network "not favor any provider" or set | |
| of providers. | |
| The current process of using federal money to subsidize NSFnet is "obsolete" | |
| said Mitchell Kapor, representing Commercial Internet Exchange (CIX) | |
| Association, a consortium of commercial network services suppliers. Although | |
| federal money was necessary in the "early stages," when technology for building | |
| the network still was "experimental," now that the network is in place, | |
| government subsidy should stop, Kapor said. He said CIX members can provide | |
| "any level of service" needed by the same community served by NSFnet -- | |
| research and education. Kapor said CIX members could build and service | |
| national backbones with "off-the-shelf" technology; however, he said, because | |
| federal money goes to support the current network backbone, NSFnet users are | |
| allowed on the network free and don't have an incentive to use commercial | |
| services. | |
| William Schrader, president of Performance Systems International (PSI), said | |
| government could level the playing field by providing money directly to | |
| individual universities and letting them choose, on a "free-market" basis, | |
| which network service provider to use. That system, he said, would provide | |
| incentive for several suppliers to upgrade networks in efforts to corral most | |
| customers. Kapor said it also would "push the envelope" of technology to an | |
| even greater level. With the current system in place, the technological level | |
| of the network will evolve more slowly because there would be no incentive to | |
| provide a higher level of service, he said. | |
| Current users of NSFnet spoke against changing the status quo. Michael | |
| Roberts, VP-networking for Educom, a task force of 48 universities, said that | |
| removing funding for the network would be "horrendous." By requiring | |
| individual universities to seek out their own service providers, he said, | |
| government would have to institute another level of bureaucracy, creating | |
| "thousands of entitlements," which would be impossible logistically. Douglas | |
| Van Houweling, speaking for NSFnet manager Merit, said removal of funding most | |
| likely would upset the networks' level of stability, leading to disruption in | |
| service that "millions of users" have become accustomed to. By letting "any | |
| number" of commercial providers supply network services, there would be no | |
| guarantee of level of service, which is a "vital" mission of research labs, | |
| universities and federal agencies now using the network, Van Houweling said. | |
| Federal agencies would rather have a stable network than improved service, said | |
| Stephen Wolff, director of NSF's Networking & Communications Division. He told | |
| Boucher that federal agencies didn't want the network open to competition | |
| because they feared it would degrade the quality of service. Wolff said NSF | |
| would proceed with its plan to commercialize network "within 5 years" as | |
| requested under the recently voted High-Performance Computing Act. He also | |
| said he had presented to universities the idea of providing them with federal | |
| money and letting them purchase network services in the free market. The | |
| proposal was "soundly rejected," he said, because universities didn't feel they | |
| were able to make such decisions. Instead, they supported NSF's current | |
| proposal of rebidding network management so that 2 network providers would be | |
| in place. The new system would operate on model of government's FTS 2000 | |
| program. NSF would grant awards for network services to 2 companies and have an | |
| independent 3rd party act as "traffic manager" to ensure one network provider | |
| wasn't favored over another. | |
| _______________________________________________________________________________ | |
| MCI and Sprint Take Steps To Cut Off Swindlers April 1, 1992 | |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
| By Kent Gibbons (The Washington Times)(Page C1) | |
| MCI and Sprint are cracking down on telephone fraud. | |
| The two long-distance carriers are tackling different kinds of swindles, | |
| though: | |
| * MCI said it will stop sending out bills for pay-per-call operators who | |
| promise help getting a loan, credit, a credit card or a job. | |
| * Sprint said it will offer large business customers a form of liability | |
| insurance against unauthorized use of corporate switchboard lines. | |
| MCI Communications Corporation of the District said it wanted to protect | |
| consumers who might be gulled into overpaying for some "900-number" services | |
| during economic troubles. | |
| But long-distance carriers are also guarding their own bottom lines by | |
| tightening up pay-per-call standards, said telecommunications analyst James | |
| Ivers. | |
| "They're acting fiscally responsibly because traditionally, these were the | |
| types of programs that created a high level of uncollectible" bills when | |
| ripped-off consumers refused to pay, said Mr. Ivers, senior analyst with | |
| Strategic Telemedia, a consulting firm in New York. | |
| Last September, Sprint Corporation, of Kansas City, MO, told more than 90 | |
| percent of its 900-number customers it would no longer do their billing. Long- | |
| distance firms cannot refuse to carry pay-per-call services, but most 900- | |
| number operators do not want the expense and trouble of doing their own | |
| collections. | |
| American Telephone & Telegraph Co., of New York, said it has set up strict | |
| guidelines for all 900-number firms, such as disclosing in advertising any fees | |
| charged for credit processing. | |
| AT&T spokesman Bob Nersesian said: "We still think there are legitimate | |
| providers of this kind of service and our guidelines keep the dishonest guys | |
| off the network." | |
| Sprint's switchboard-fraud liability protection is aimed at big customers, | |
| whose Sprint bills are more than $30,000 per month. | |
| For an installation fee (up to $5,000) and a monthly charge (also up to | |
| $5,000), Sprint will absorb fraudulent phone charges above $25,000 per | |
| switchboard. The customer pays the first $25,000. Sprint's liability ends at | |
| $1 million. | |
| Large and medium-sized companies can rack up huge bills if their private | |
| switches, known as private branch exchanges or PBXes, are broken into and used | |
| to make calls to other countries. | |
| In a recent case, more than 20,000 calls were made on a company's PBX over a | |
| weekend, with the charges estimated at more than $1 million, said M.R. Snyder, | |
| executive director of Communications Fraud Control Association, a Washington | |
| trade group. | |
| "It is certainly a fraud target that is ripe for being abused," Ms. Snyder | |
| said, especially since telephone carriers have improved their ability to spot | |
| unauthorized credit-card calls more quickly. | |
| Overall, telecommunications fraud costs phone carriers and customers an | |
| estimated $1.2 billion per year, although the figure is really just a | |
| "guesstimate," Ms. Snyder said. | |
| Company PBXes often have features that allow traveling employees, or distant | |
| customers, to call in and tap an outgoing line. With computer programs, | |
| hackers can randomly dial numbers until they hit security codes. | |
| Sometimes the codes are only four digits, so hackers don't even need a | |
| computer, said Bob Fox, Sprint's assistant vice president of corporate | |
| security. | |
| Along with the fees, customers must agree to take certain precautions. Those | |
| include using security codes at least eight digits long and eliminating the | |
| ability to tap outside lines through voice mail. In return, Sprint will also | |
| monitor PBX use every day, instead of the five days per week currently done | |
| free for customers, Mr. Fox said. | |
| MCI spokesman John Houser said his company will be watching Sprint to see if | |
| the program is a success. Spokesman Andrew Myers said AT&T offers fraud | |
| protection to some corporate customers, but is not considering extending that | |
| to cover PBX abuse. | |
| AT&T is currently involved in several lawsuits over disputed PBX charges that | |
| total "many millions" of dollars, Mr. Myers said. Sprint officials said they | |
| have not sued any customers to collect on PBX fraud bills. | |
| _______________________________________________________________________________ | |
| Sprint Offers Liability Limit For Corporate Phone Fraud April 1, 1992 | |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
| By Edmund L. Andrews (New York Times)(Page D4) | |
| The Sprint Communications Company, the nation's third-largest long-distance | |
| carrier, said that it would limit the liability of large corporate customers | |
| for the huge bills rung up by phone-service thieves who manipulate a company's | |
| telephone switching equipment and voice-mail systems. | |
| Typically, such thieves call into a company on one of its toll-free "800" | |
| numbers and then figure out the codes necessary to obtain an outgoing line that | |
| can be used to call anywhere in the world. These telephone "hackers" often | |
| sell plundered telephone codes to illegal operators who then sell overseas | |
| calls to hundreds of people at a time. Sprint officials said this sort of | |
| fraud approached $1 billion a year. | |
| The new Sprint plan would be available to companies that signed two-year | |
| contracts to buy at least $30,000 of international long-distance service a | |
| month and agreed to adopt a series of protective measures. These include | |
| installing longer telephone codes that are harder for thieves to crack and new | |
| limits on the ability of voice-mail systems to obtain outgoing lines. | |
| In exchange, customers would be held responsible for no more than $25,000 in | |
| stolen calls for each round of break-ins, and a maximum limit of $1 million a | |
| year. Although that is still a substantial sum, it is much less than many | |
| companies have lost in recent years from theft of service by telephone hackers. | |
| A Point of Contention | |
| Thieves broke into the switchboard of Mitsubishi International in New York in | |
| 1990, for example, and ran up $430,000 in overseas telephone calls. Procter & | |
| Gamble lost $300,000 in a similar incident in 1988. Had either company been | |
| operating under the new Sprint plan, its liability would have been limited to | |
| $25,000. | |
| Long-distance carriers and their corporate customers have long argued over who | |
| should bear responsibility for the huge bills caused by service theft. The | |
| carriers have maintained that their customers are responsible for these bills, | |
| even if fraud is undisputed, arguing that the thieves took advantage of | |
| weaknesses in the customers' equipment, rather than in the weaknesses of the | |
| long-distance network itself. | |
| But some corporate victims have argued that they had no idea their systems were | |
| vulnerable, while others contend that they incurred big losses even after | |
| adopting special security procedures. | |
| MCI Moves Against '900' Fraud | |
| In a separate issue involving telephone fraud, MCI Communications Corporation | |
| said it would no longer provide billing services for companies that use "900" | |
| numbers to offer credit cards, and that it would place tough new restrictions | |
| on the use of 900 numbers to sell job-placement services, contests and | |
| sweepstakes. | |
| The long-distance company said its decision was based on numerous complaints | |
| about abusive and fraudulent sales practices. Companies that provide | |
| information through the use of telephone numbers with the 900 area code charge | |
| callers a fee each time they call the number. MCI and other long-distance | |
| companies carry these calls and bill customers on behalf of the company that | |
| provides the information service. | |
| Pam Small, an MCI spokeswoman, declined to say how much revenue the company | |
| would lose because of the suspension. But she said the 900 services that would | |
| be affected represented a small part of its pay-per-call business. | |
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