| ==Phrack Magazine== | |
| Volume Four, Issue Forty-Four, File 4 of 27 | |
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| PART II | |
| ****************************************************************************** | |
| <Retyped From an Actual SWBT Handout> | |
| SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE | |
| Computer | |
| Security | |
| Guidelines | |
| Computer Security is YOUR Responsibility. | |
| These guidelines are designed to help you know and meet your corporate | |
| obligation. | |
| Prepared by: Information Systems | |
| Computer Security Administration | |
| One Bell Center 22-H-8 | |
| St. Louis, MO 63101 | |
| For Users | |
| --------- | |
| Keep your logon and password information private. | |
| Do not write down passwords, but if you must, keep them in a locked place. | |
| Do not store your password in the computer. | |
| Make sure no on sees you enter your passwords. | |
| Pick non-obvious, non-guessable passwords. | |
| Do not share your logons or passwords. | |
| Change passwords periodically, at least every thirty days. | |
| Open new computer logons for computer resources only when you have a | |
| real need. | |
| Close computer logons you no longer need. | |
| Make sure you have proper protection settings on sensitive computer files. | |
| Do not send confidential information through electronic mail or computer | |
| news systems. | |
| If you suspect security violations, tell management immediately. | |
| Be sure that use of computing resources is for company approved purposes | |
| only. | |
| Do not access any information that your management has not authorized you | |
| to have. When in doubt, ask! | |
| Logoff when you leave your terminal. | |
| If you dialed in, disconnect when you are finished working. | |
| For Managers of Computing Facilities | |
| ------------------------------------ | |
| Provide procedures to control access to computing resources. | |
| Provide facilities to let users protect proprietary information from | |
| disclosure to unauthorized persons. | |
| Be sure that connection of a computer to any network does not diminish | |
| the control a user has over programs and data. | |
| Provide appropriate security facilities and procedures to protect | |
| computing hardware against damage. | |
| Provide facilities to protect user's data and programs from undesired | |
| changes or destruction. | |
| Ensure that computing resource use has been authorized by a member of | |
| supervision. | |
| Make sure that computing resource use can be tracked to individuals. | |
| Report to managers regularly on the extent of computing resource use. | |
| Provide appropriate backup facilities for data and programs. | |
| Provide audit trails which identify violations and security breaches | |
| and examine them regularly. | |
| For assistance in coordinating computer security activities, contact the | |
| Computer Security Administrator. | |
| For Managers | |
| ------------ | |
| Make sure you authorize all use of computing resources and that you require | |
| separate logons for each individual. | |
| Make sure that the user of computer resources understands responsibilities | |
| with respect to proper use and security consciousness. | |
| Review computing resource usage reports and the security practices of the | |
| users for which you are responsible. | |
| When a user's employment or need for access ends or changes, make sure | |
| access to computer resources is promptly changed by notifying your | |
| System Administrator. | |
| Report security violations to the General Security Manager and to the | |
| Computer Security Administration Group. | |
| For Information | |
| --------------- | |
| The Information Systems Organization provides security and disaster recovery | |
| services to establish, monitor, and audit computer security standards. | |
| If you have any comments or questions regarding computer security, please | |
| contact the Computer Security Administration. | |
| ******************************************************************************* | |
| RBOC ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTURE | |
| Compiled By | |
| Phrack Magazine | |
| In an effort to assist the hacking world in their understanding of the | |
| organizational mess created by our fabulous friends at the RBOCs, we have | |
| compiled a list of the various organizations, what their functions are, | |
| which centers they are made up of, and which computer systems they use. | |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Planning and Engineering | |
| Defines network resources available for assignment | |
| Functions: | |
| Long range and current planning for outside plant, wire centers, | |
| interoffice network, special services, interexchange access | |
| services, and message trunks | |
| Exchange network design | |
| Coordination of activities connected with installation and/or modification | |
| of exchange network components | |
| Centers: | |
| DSPC | |
| SCPC | |
| WCFPC | |
| CAC | |
| IFFPC | |
| IFCPC | |
| TEC | |
| MEC | |
| DSDC | |
| EEC | |
| CSEC | |
| Systems: | |
| LEIS | |
| NPS | |
| FEPS | |
| LSRP | |
| INPLANS | |
| INFORMS | |
| DFDS | |
| SSFS | |
| PICS | |
| LATIS | |
| CAMIS | |
| CUCRIT | |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Service Provisioning | |
| Allocates assignable existing network resources | |
| Functions: | |
| Circuit design and routing | |
| Verification and assignment of network elements | |
| Controlling and tracking orders during assignment process | |
| Centers: | |
| CPC - Circuit Provisioning Center | |
| LAC - Loop Assignment Center | |
| Systems: | |
| TIRKS | |
| SOAC | |
| SWITCH | |
| COSMOS | |
| WM | |
| LFACS | |
| LOMS | |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Network Operations | |
| Controls installation, maintenance and testing of circuits | |
| Functions: | |
| Coordination and performance of the activities required to provide service | |
| Surveillance and control of network equipment and facilities | |
| Analysis, sectionalization, and repair of switching and transmission | |
| facilities | |
| Status reporting on service order and/or service restoration activities | |
| Centers: | |
| CRSAB | |
| ICC | |
| MC | |
| NAC | |
| RCMAC | |
| SEAC | |
| SSC | |
| FMAC | |
| STC | |
| DNCC | |
| FCC | |
| SCC | |
| Systems: | |
| McTE | |
| GDS | |
| LMOS | |
| EADAS | |
| TAN | |
| RSA | |
| CRAS | |
| CIMAP | |
| NDS | |
| SEAS | |
| MAS | |
| MIZAR | |
| SARTS | |
| TCAS | |
| CAROT | |
| NMA | |
| NMPS | |
| SCCS | |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Customer Services | |
| Direct company contact with customers | |
| Functions: | |
| Service negotiation with customers | |
| Creating and routing associated service orders | |
| Creating and maintaining customer records | |
| Reporting the provisioning status to customers | |
| Initiating billing and collection processes | |
| Handling billing and general service inquiries | |
| Centers: | |
| RSC - Residence Service Center | |
| BSC - Business Service Center | |
| ICSC - Interexchange Carrier Service Center | |
| Systems: | |
| BOFADS - Business Office Force Administration Data System | |
| PREMIS - Premises Information System | |
| SOP - Service Order Processor | |
| CABS - Carrier Access Billing System | |
| BOSS - Billing and Order Support System | |
| CRIS - Customer Records Information System | |
| BRIS - Business Revenue Information System | |
| CLAIMS | |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Quick Breakdown | |
| Process Center System | |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Planning & Engineering | |
| IOF IFCPC IFFPC IOF/EDC FEPS NPS-F | |
| Switch SCPC WCPC EEC LSD&F LSRP NDS | |
| TNDS/EQ NPS-W | |
| Distribution DSPC DSDC LATIS LEIS NPS-D | |
| Service Provisioning | |
| IOF CAC TIRKS | |
| Switch LAC COSMOS | |
| Distribution LAC LFACS | |
| Network Operations | |
| IOF FMAC CAROT CIMAP TCAS | |
| TNDS/TK | |
| Switch NAC RCMAC SCC EADAS NDS MAS MIZAR | |
| TASC CIMAP NMA NMPS | |
| SCCS | |
| Distribution ICC MC GDS CRAS LMOS/MLT | |
| PREDICTOR TAN | |
| ******************************************************************************* | |
| -IS- Blue Boxing Dead? | |
| Australia Direct 800-682-2878 | |
| Austria Direct 800-624-0043 | |
| Belgium Direct 800-472-0032 | |
| Belize Direct 800-235-1154 | |
| Bermuda Direct 800-232-2067 | |
| Brazil Direct 800-344-1055 | |
| British VI Direct 800-248-6585 | |
| Cayman Direct 800-852-3653 | |
| Chile Direct 800-552-0056 | |
| China Direct 800-532-4462 | |
| Costa Rica Direct 800-252-5114 | |
| Denmark Direct 800-762-0045 | |
| El Salvador Direct 800-422-2425 | |
| Finland Direct 800-232-0358 | |
| France Direct 800-537-2623 | |
| Germany Direct 800-292-0049 | |
| Greece Direct 800-443-5527 | |
| Guam Direct 800-367-4826 | |
| HK Direct 800-992-2323 | |
| Hungary Direct 800-352-9469 | |
| Indonesia Direct 800-242-4757 | |
| Ireland Direct 800-562-6262 | |
| Italy Direct 800-543-7662 | |
| Japan Direct 800-543-0051 | |
| Korea Direct 800-822-8256 | |
| Macau Direct 800-622-2821 | |
| Malasia Direct 800-772-7369 | |
| Netherlands Direct 800-432-0031 | |
| Norway Direct 800-292-0047 | |
| New Zealand Direct 800-248-0064 | |
| Portugal Direct 800-822-2776 | |
| Panama Direct 800-872-6106 | |
| Philippines Direct 800-336-7445 | |
| Singapore Direct 800-822-6588 | |
| Spain Direct 800-247-7246 | |
| Sweden Direct 800-345-0046 | |
| Taiwan Direct 800-626-0979 | |
| Thailand Direct 800-342-0066 | |
| Turkey Direct 800-828-2646 | |
| UK Direct 800-445-5667 | |
| Uruguay Direct 800-245-8411 | |
| Yugoslavia Direct 800-367-9841 / 9842 | |
| This file brought to you by The Phone Company | |
| ******************************************************************************* | |
| ***************************************** | |
| * Step-by-step Programming Instructions * | |
| * For the EO Cellular Module * | |
| ***************************************** | |
| 1. Unbox and attach the EO Cellular Module to the EO Personal | |
| Communicator 440/880. | |
| 2. Once the EO Cellular Module is attached turn on the EO Personal | |
| Communicator 440/880. | |
| 3. Open EO Phone. | |
| 4. Tap "Options." | |
| 5. Tap "Authorized Dealer." | |
| 6. Write Dealer Code in space provided. Dealer code is *12345678#. To edit | |
| mistakes, draw a small circle around 2 or 3 of the numbers entered. | |
| This will bring up an edit box and allow easier entry of the number. | |
| Once you have made your corrections, tap "OK." | |
| 7. Tap "OK" on the "Authorized Dealer Code" pop-up. | |
| 8. Wait approx. 30 seconds and programming screen will appear (The "busy | |
| clock" will appear on screen). | |
| 9. If invalid code entry screen appears, the programming screen will be | |
| blank and the "Apply" and "Apply and Close" buttons at the bottom | |
| will be greyed out. Close the programming screen by tapping on the | |
| upper left blacked out corner of the screen. Re-do steps 4 through 7 | |
| (refer to the TIP below for a guaranteed method of accurate entry). | |
| A common problem is to enter an "l" instead of a "1" because they appear | |
| to be very similar. To make sure that you have entered a one, check to | |
| see that the character is the same height as the other numbers. The | |
| letter "l" will be slightly taller. | |
| TIP: To insure that you have entered the correct digits (one versus letter | |
| "l" problem above) you can use the accessories keyboard. To use the | |
| keyboard for the Dealer Code entry do the following (replaces steps | |
| 4, 5, and 6 above): | |
| a. Tap Accessories in the lower bookshelf. | |
| b. Tap Keyboard. This will bring up the pop-up keyboard. | |
| c. Tap Options at the top of the EO Phone window. | |
| d. Tap Authorized Dealer. This will bring up the Dealer Code pop-up. | |
| e. Tap on the line in the Dealer Code box. A dot (or character) will | |
| appear and now entry from the keyboard will appear in the Dealer | |
| Code box. | |
| f. Now use the keyboard to delete the dot (or character). The Delete | |
| key is the upper right most key on the keyboard. | |
| g. Now use the keyboard to enter the dealer code - *12345678# | |
| (the * and the # keys can be found by tapping the shift | |
| (up arrow) keys.) | |
| h. GO TO STEP 7 and continue. | |
| NOTE: When programming the following entries always use the circle gesture | |
| to change the entry. In other words, circle the existing entry | |
| to bring up the edit combs. Then correct each digit by writing over | |
| the existing digit. This will insure that the number of digits for | |
| each entry is correct. If an entry has an incorrect length then | |
| none of the programed entries will be accepted. | |
| 10. Enter the assigned telephone number in the first field. Use the | |
| circle gesture to bring up the edit combs to edit the existing | |
| telephone number. Change each digit by writing over it in the edit | |
| combs. When complete tap "OK." | |
| 11. Use the same procedure in step 10 to enter the appropriate SID | |
| in the second field. | |
| 12. Use the same procedure in step 10 to enter the corresponding IPCH | |
| (0333 for the non-Wireline or A side provider; 0334 for the Wireline | |
| or B side provider) in the third field. | |
| 13. Leave the remaining fields intact as already programed from the | |
| factory unless instructed to change them by the cellular service | |
| provider. Use the circle/edit method to change any necessary | |
| entries. The factory defaults are: | |
| Field Title Default Value | |
| ----------- ------------- | |
| ACCOLC 00 | |
| Group ID 15 | |
| Lock Code 1234 | |
| SCM 1010 | |
| Security Code 123456 | |
| Emergency Code 911 | |
| 14. Tap the "Apply" button on the bottom of the screen. The programming | |
| information you have entered is now being saved in the EO Cellular | |
| Module. This will take approximately 20 seconds. | |
| 15. Close the programming screen by tapping the blackened area in the upper | |
| left hand corner of the programming screen. | |
| 16. Now set the approximate Roaming Option. | |
| 17. Tap Options. | |
| 18. Tap Roaming. | |
| 19. Enter Security Code. Default is 123456. | |
| 20. Tap "OK." | |
| 21. Tap next to appropriate roaming option. A check mark will appear. | |
| 22. Tap "Apply" button. | |
| 23. Close window. | |
| 24. Check status line in EO Phone for appropriate indications. | |
| 25. Tap "Keypad" tab on right side of EO Phone window. This will bring | |
| up a keypad display which can be used to place a voice call. | |
| 26. Make sure that the Cellular Icon is boxed (as opposed to the Phone | |
| Icon in the lower left hand of EO Phone.) | |
| 27. Tap the keypad buttons to enter the number to be dialed. The digits will | |
| appear in the dial box at the middle bottom of the EO Phone window. | |
| 28. Pick up the handset and tap "DIAL" button in the lower right hand | |
| corner of the screen. This button is just like hitting SEND button | |
| on a cellular phone. This will place a voice call using the number | |
| in the dial box. | |
| 29. When call is complete tap "Hang-up" (the DIAL button to "Hang-up" after | |
| the call is connected to the network.) This is just like pressing END | |
| on a cellular phone. | |
| 30. Close EO Phone. | |
| 31. Programming and testing is now complete. | |
| Helpful Information | |
| The EO Cellular Module contains an OKI 910 cellular phone housed in | |
| specially designed, plated plastics with custom connections into the | |
| proprietary port on the phone. | |
| All programming of this module is done via the EO Personal Communicator | |
| 440 or 880. All programming/configuration information for the phone is | |
| stored in the EO Cellular Module and not in the Personal Communicator. | |
| This means that once the EO Cellular Module is programed it can be removed | |
| from the EO Personal Communicator and reattached to any other EO Personal | |
| Communicator without re-programming. | |
| The ESN for the EO Cellular Module can be derived from the Serial number | |
| in the window on the bottom of the module. The cellular module ESN is 129 | |
| followed by the last eight digits of the serial number in the window. These | |
| eight digits will usually begin with 013. This eleven digit number should | |
| be provided to the people that will actually assign the telephone number | |
| and activate the EO Cellular Module on the cellular network. | |
| ******************************************************************************* | |
| THE HACKER CHRONICLES CD-ROM | |
| Well, he said he was going to do it, and he did. | |
| Scan Man put out a CD-ROM of info collected from the | |
| underground. I had kind of forgotten he was going to | |
| do it, but once I heard rumors of such a thing, I knew he | |
| had. | |
| At HoHo Con last year, Bootleg was very excited about | |
| compiling data from the community for the project he | |
| and Scan Man were working on. As things progressed | |
| however, Bootleg would soon find out that Scan Man | |
| had no intention of working with him, and cut him out of | |
| the project. | |
| This is how it was explained to me. I hope that it is | |
| not true, since Bootleg is back in jail and wouldn't | |
| have the ability to fly out to West Virginia and throttle | |
| Scan Man about the head and neck. | |
| [Description from the Jewel Box] | |
| WARNING! | |
| This material is controversial in nature and may be offensive | |
| to some viewers. Not that the information in and of itself is | |
| not illegal. Quite often the usage of certain information is | |
| illegal. The Hacker Chronicles is for informative and educational | |
| purposes only. All documents and programs in this compilation were | |
| legally available to the public prior to his publication. None of | |
| these criminal acts described on this disc are in any way | |
| condoned or should be attempted. | |
| Over 12 YEARS in the making - this software package contains stories | |
| of how they did it, actual break-ins, arrests, and prosecutions. Most | |
| of the articles were written by the actual people who committed these | |
| acts. Access articles and software with an easy-to-use menu system. | |
| Areas of information include: PHONE PHREAKING (so called hobbyists | |
| who are into telephone technology of all types, well known for their | |
| ability to bypass telephone billing system), COMPUTER HACKERS | |
| (sometimes referred to as cyberpunks, interested in access to any on | |
| line computer system they can find), SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS | |
| (hobbyists who sometimes employed test software designed for dealers | |
| to defeat scrambling systems), "UNDERGROUND" GENERAL INFORMATION (many | |
| subjects all very technical in nature and explained in detail, such as | |
| ATM's, credit cards, voice mail, hypnotism, bugging, skip tracing, | |
| phone taps, cellular phones, lock picking, social engineering, | |
| virus's, chemical substances, explosives, editorials, legal issues, | |
| alarm systems, spies, hardware, signal interception, private | |
| investigations, security, computer ethics, underground BBS's, TV cable | |
| piracy, boxing and much more! | |
| ----- | |
| Uh, that kinda says it all, don't it? CYBERPUNKS, VIRII, WAREZ & STUFF! | |
| Uh, yeah. | |
| Seriously, the disk itself has a shitload of files. This | |
| is rather cool, since now EVERY bbs in the world can put | |
| OVER 650 MEGS OF G-FILES! Heh. | |
| The file on the disc that struck me the most was the | |
| intro written by Scan Man. He went talked about | |
| a lot of things he's done in the past with the scene, | |
| telephone companies, etc. I know Scan Man from WAY back. | |
| Pirate-80 was one of the first real Hacker BBSes I was | |
| ever on. (Remember when it was only up certain hours of the day?) | |
| Reading that file was pretty informing for me. It also | |
| made me smile to see that he's still pissed off at Craig | |
| for tearing him apart in a Phrack some years ago. | |
| Remember, this is by no means a complete collection. | |
| Thankfully, the CD does not have any issues of Phrack | |
| magazine past issue 41 (or else, I would be enjoying | |
| a piece of the revenue :) ). It also, oddly enough, | |
| does not have any LOD-TJ other than 4. It DOES however | |
| have a large collection of CUD, NIA & CDC. Go figure. | |
| The files do represent a neat history of our community | |
| and for the curious neophyte, the nostalgic old-timer, or | |
| anyone with 39 bucks, it might be something worth picking | |
| up just to say you have it. I mean, you never know when | |
| you will need to find issue 12 of LOL, or plans for a | |
| urine box. It will save you the trouble of downloading. | |
| The Hacker Chronicles - A Tour of the Computer Underground | |
| should be available from any outlet that carries CD-ROMS. | |
| Or hell, call P-80. I'm sure Scan Man will sell you a copy: | |
| 304-744-7322. | |
| ******************************************************************************* | |
| Packet Switched Data Networks | |
| An Introduction and Overview | |
| By: Cosmos | |
| The abundance of networks both private and public has given the hacker | |
| an almost infinite playground. A popular type of network is the | |
| packet switched network like SprintNet (TELENET) that allows local | |
| users to access non-local machines. These WAN's usually serve as | |
| the backbone for many large corporations. Understanding the way | |
| in which they operate can aid many aspects of the hacker's knowledge. | |
| Packet switching is a data networking technology in which user data is | |
| segmented into small units (packets) and transmitted from the sending | |
| user to the receiving user over shared communications channels. Each | |
| individual packet also holds additional information that allows the | |
| network to correctly route the packet to the correct destination. The | |
| size of the packet is limited to a maximum number of characters set by | |
| the individual sender. Packets are measured in octets, which are 8-bit | |
| bytes. User data that exceeds this amount is divided into multiple | |
| packets. | |
| The difference between packet switching and circuit switching | |
| (regular telephone lines) lies in the use of virtual circuits. | |
| These circuits are given the term "virtual" because: | |
| 1) they are made up of bandwidth allocated on demand from | |
| a pool of shared circuits | |
| 2) no direct physical connection is made on a packet network | |
| 3) the connection is a logical one | |
| Due to these facts, packet networks are commonly denoted as connectionless | |
| networks. There are three types of packet networks: public, private, and | |
| hybrid (a combo of the two previous ones). | |
| A packet switched data network (PSDN) has five major components: | |
| 1) local access components (LAC) | |
| 2) packet assemblers/disassemblers (PAD) | |
| 3) packet switching nodes (PN) | |
| 4) network links (NL) | |
| 5) a network managment system (NMS) | |
| LOCAL ACCESS COMPONENTS | |
| To transmit data through a PSDN, the data must first move from the | |
| end-user to a packet assembler/dissasembler (PAD) or to a packet | |
| switching node with a built-in PAD function. In order to achieve | |
| this, three local access components are required. First is the | |
| end-user data terminal, or more plainly, your computer. Secondly, | |
| an end-user transmission device such as a modem. Thirdly, a | |
| local access facility or physical line (Telephone Line). There are | |
| three types of physical lines: switched analog lines (dial up), leased | |
| analog channels (private lines), and leased digital channels (DDS circuits). | |
| PACKET ASSEMBLERS/DISASSEMBLERS | |
| All data travelling through the PSDN must be routed through a | |
| Packet Assembler/Disassembler (PAD). The PAD's primary function | |
| is to translate user data into network packet format and conversely to | |
| convert network packets into user data. Basically, a PAD serves | |
| as the network translator between the user and the PSDN. Other functions | |
| performed by the PAD include: physical line concentration, call setup | |
| and clearing functions, protocol conversion, code conversion, protocol | |
| emulation, local switching functions, and local call billing functions. | |
| PACKET SWITCHING NODES | |
| The primary component of a packet switching network is the packet | |
| switching node (PN). The packet switching node ensures that each | |
| packet is routed properly through the network. Commonly, PN | |
| configurations are installed in a redundant configuration. This | |
| provides for a convenient backup for network traffic. Other functions | |
| include: call billing, internal network diagnostics, support of | |
| direct host computer access., and inter-network gateway connections. | |
| NETWORK LINKS | |
| Network links are the physical components that connect packet switching | |
| nodes together. Several transmission technologies can be employed | |
| in network linking, including: analog circuits, digital circuits, | |
| microwave systems, and satellite systems. The most common network | |
| link technologies used are Digital Dataphone and other similar | |
| interexchange carrier services, and point to point analog private | |
| lines. Speeds on network links range from 9.6 Kbps to 56/64 Kbps. | |
| Network links are commonly denoted as the "backbone layer" or | |
| the backbone packet network. The local PAD's are termed the | |
| "access layer" or access network. | |
| NETWORK MANAGEMENT SYSTEM | |
| Basically, the network management system (NMS) controls and monitors | |
| the PSDN. It primarily stores and performs maintenance on the | |
| network database. This database is the master copy of all the software | |
| and configurations in each network node. If a node fails or is | |
| not functioning properly, the NMS can download backup information through | |
| the various network links to solve the problem. Thus, a unattended | |
| network is formed. | |
| This is all one needs to understand for a general knowledge of | |
| a packet switched data network. Additional topics can be | |
| pursued further for increased knowledge but are not essential. | |
| You might want to research some info on the standard X.25 protocol, | |
| and other OSI stuff. Anyways, I hope this brief intro article can | |
| be of use in the general knowledge of computer networking. | |
| Cosmos | |
| ******************************************************************************* | |
| Stacker Security. | |
| How to Hack a Stacker disk that is password protected! | |
| The 'Stacker' Software increases the space on your hard disk by using | |
| on the fly compression on the data on the disk. It does this by creating | |
| a file called Stacvol.dsk on the hard drive. All of the information that | |
| is put on the disk is compressed and stored in the stacvol.dsk file. | |
| When Stacker is installed on a hard drive, say C: all of the data on | |
| the disk is compressed and stored in the stacvol.dsk file, which is | |
| assigned as a virtual disk C:, the 'real' drive is then assigned D:. | |
| The swapping taking place a boot time. | |
| The Stacvol.dsk file is therefore stored on the D: drive and usually | |
| takes up most of the drive. (ie: a 40M C: drive contains the stacvol.dsk | |
| file of size around 5-39M the disks are swapped at boot time and | |
| the C: drive that the user 'sees' is really the contents of the stacvol.dsk | |
| file on the D drive assigned to C:, everything on the C drive (stacvol.dsk) | |
| is compressed, thus obtaining an increased disk space.) | |
| The point is this, at boot time the owner of the machine can set passwords | |
| to allow the user to have no access, read/write or read-only access to | |
| the C drive/stacvol.dsk file, if a wrong password is entered the stacvol | |
| file is not mounted as the C drive and all a DIR will get you is a directory | |
| of C:\ which will have a few files such as command.com etc, nothing | |
| of any real interest. | |
| So now for the interesting bit, how to get in without a password, | |
| or getting read/write privs when you've only got read-only. | |
| First, boot the computer and go through the password routine. | |
| Get it wrong (you may as well try something like password though just in | |
| case.) | |
| The Stacvol.dsk file is hidden so change its file attributes so you | |
| can edit it. (You'll need a floppy now with a utility such as Norton | |
| diskedit on it) | |
| Load in the diskeditor and get it so that you are editing the stackvol | |
| file in a HEX mode. The first bit of Hex just contains the usual sort of | |
| boot record type rubbish, not too interesting. | |
| The interesting bit is the bit which starts at offset 74 | |
| Now the information starting at 00040 is the interesting bit, | |
| on a disk with a password set it will look like this.... | |
| 00040 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 | 20 20 2D 2A 2D 0A 0A 1A | |
| 00050 72 AA 91 9C 0F 66 9A ED | AB 18 6E 6D E2 C3 2B 8B | |
| 00060 5E CD EF A9 37 1B 53 E2 | C6 F0 E8 9C A4 49 F6 9D | |
| 00070 4C F0 AB 32 21 47 FC 91 | 7E 8C 58 D8 D9 D7 DB D3 | |
| (All figures obviously in hex.) | |
| The data from 0004B to 0004E is a flag to the device driver to tell | |
| it that a password is required. | |
| From 0004f to 0005F are the encrypted passwords. | |
| (the rest just being data) | |
| NOW, for an unpassworded file this looks like | |
| 00040 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 | 20 20 20 20 20 0D 0A 1A | |
| 00050 49 F6 9D 4E EC B1 26 3D | 0F 6B B2 24 41 07 7B 92 | |
| 00060 XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX | XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX | |
| 00070 XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX | XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX | |
| Now all you have to do is take a copy of the data in this section | |
| on the stacvol.dsk file you are hacking so that you can return it back to | |
| its original state! | |
| Patch the code above into the corresponding positions into the | |
| file you are hacking, leaving the code denoted by XX alone, this is version | |
| code and depends on the machine so leave it alone! | |
| Save the changes and reboot the machine, it will no longer ask for a | |
| password and you now have full access. | |
| Afterwards re-patch the original code that you noted and if you've used | |
| your common sense then the owner will never know you were there. | |
| (By common sense I mean don't forget to restore time/date stamps etc.) | |
| D2A [D | |
| ******************************************************************************* | |
| UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS ONLY | |
| Computers are becoming an integral part of our everyday existence. They are | |
| used to store a multitude of information, from credit reports and bank | |
| withdrawals to personal letters and highly sensitive military documents. | |
| So how secure are our computer systems? | |
| The computer hacker is an expert at infiltrating secured systems, such as | |
| those at AT&T, TRW, NASA and the DMV. Most computer systems that have a | |
| telephone connection have been under seige at one time or another, many | |
| without their owner's knowledge. The really good hackers can re-route the | |
| telephone system, obtain highly sensitive coporate and government documents, | |
| download individuals credit reports, make free phone calls globally, read | |
| private electronic mail and corporate bulletins and get away without ever | |
| leaving a trace. | |
| So who are these hackers? Just exactly WHAT do they DO, and WHY do they do | |
| it? Are they really a threat? What do they do with the information | |
| they obtain? Are hackers simply playing an intellectual game of chess or | |
| are hackers using technology to effectively take control of corporate and | |
| government systems that have previously appeared omnipotent? | |
| Our group is in the course of filming "Unauthorized Access", a documentary | |
| that will demistify the hype and propoganda surrounding the computer hacker. | |
| We will expose the truths of this sub-culture focusing on the hackers | |
| themselves. This will be a view from inside the global underground. | |
| We intend to shoot in the United States, Holland and Germany. | |
| This documentary will be of the highest broadcast quality and is | |
| intended for international television, festival and theatrical distribution. | |
| We are currently looking for additional financial backers interested in this | |
| project. For more information about "Unauthorized Access" or if | |
| you are intrested in providing any information or support, please contact | |
| annaliza@netcom.com. | |
| ******************************************************************************* | |
| Mitnick's Soliloquy | |
| Intruder, or not Intruder: that is the question: | |
| Whether 'tis more likely the system suffers | |
| The misuses and malfeasances of outrageous crackers | |
| Or that some user behaves anomalously | |
| And, by so doing, causes false alarms. To alert, to audit; | |
| No more; and by an audit to say we find the attack, | |
| And the thousand failed login attempts | |
| That are seen on the network, 'tis a consummation | |
| Devoutly to be decrypted. To alert, to audit. | |
| To audit, perchance to detect, ay, there's the rub. | |
| For in that detection of attack what false alarms may come; | |
| When we have dumped a million packets | |
| Must give us pause, the analysis | |
| That makes use of long CPU hours and many gigabytes | |
| For who would bear the whips and scorns of time | |
| The analysis by hand, the tired SSOs eyes sore, | |
| The pangs of innocent users, the law's delay, | |
| The insolence of phreaks, and the spurns | |
| That patient merit of unworthy takes | |
| When he himself might his quietus make | |
| By a disconnected ethernet? who would fardles bear | |
| To grunt and sweat under C2 standards | |
| But that the dread of worm after worm | |
| The undiscovered bug from whose bourn | |
| No Vandal turns, puzzles the testers, | |
| And makes us rather ebar those ills we have | |
| That crash the system and erase the hard drive? | |
| Thus intrusion detection makes abusers of us all, | |
| And thus the native hue of normal use | |
| Is sicklied over with the red light of intruder, | |
| and jobs of great size and duration | |
| With this regard their patterns out of normal parameters, | |
| and lose the name of legal system policy. | |
| After Hamlet's Soliloquy, | |
| By JJ | |
| ******************************************************************************* | |