| ==Phrack Magazine== | |
| Volume Four, Issue Forty-Four, File 5 of 27 | |
| **************************************************************************** | |
| Computer Cop Prophile | |
| by The Grimmace | |
| The following file is something I thought of and did | |
| a LOT of research on before writing. It's something that | |
| I haven't seen in PHRACK and I've been a devout fan of | |
| this zine since the beginning. | |
| The "PHRACK PROPHILES" on hackers and phreakers give | |
| readers an insight into the movers and shakers of the P/H | |
| world, but how about a profile or profiles on the | |
| anti-hacker/phreaker establishment that seems to be | |
| growing by leaps and bounds lately? | |
| In the past years we've seen cops and feds who know | |
| nothing about computers and/or telephone systems bungle their | |
| way through search warrants and arrests and have had some good | |
| laughs at their expense. But now it seems that the "computer | |
| cops", the feds especially, are putting a big push on training | |
| agents in the "tricks of the trade" and their conviction rate | |
| is getting better. | |
| The primary source of this training is the Federal Law | |
| Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia, where they're | |
| teaching computer seizure and analysis techniques, | |
| computer-targeted search warrants, and telecommunications fraud | |
| investigations. (They're very accommodating about giving out | |
| information on the phone as long as you tell them you're a | |
| cop). The FBI Academy in Quantico also has a computer crimes | |
| course. | |
| On the technical side of things, there's an organization | |
| called IACIS which stands for the International Association | |
| of Computer Investigative Specialists based in Portland, | |
| Oregon, and which consists of members of both local law | |
| enforcement agencies nationwide as well as various and | |
| sundry federal agencies. This group teaches and certifies | |
| cops in how to get evidence from computer systems that can't be | |
| attacked in court (Of course, anything CAN be attacked, but | |
| getting the evidence squashed is not always a sure thing unless | |
| the judge is a computerphobe). | |
| As much satisfaction as we've gained at the expense of | |
| the US Secret Service from the Steve Jackson Games case, it's | |
| widely publicized problems may prove to be a double-edged sword | |
| hanging over our heads. Law enforcement learned a LOT of lessons | |
| from mistakes made in that investigation. | |
| Like most of you, I've spent a lot of years | |
| exploring computer systems (usually those belonging to others) | |
| and personally feel that I've done nothing wrong (know the | |
| feeling?). I'm sure others across the country also can | |
| conduct a little socially-engineered reconnaissance and | |
| get the lowdown on some of the people we NEVER want to see | |
| knocking on our doors with a sledge hammer in the middle of the | |
| night. | |
| This profile contains information on the ONLY computer | |
| crime cop I could identify in the Louisville/Jefferson County | |
| area after calling all the major departments posing as a writer | |
| for a law enforcement magazine doing a survey. Information | |
| about him was obtained not only from his department, but from | |
| sources in the local and federal court systems, Ma Bell | |
| Security, and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. Lt. | |
| Baker is *not* a potential donor to the CPSR or EFF to say the | |
| least. | |
| I'm currently compiling similar information on other | |
| law enforcement types in the Secret Service, Columbus Ohio PD, | |
| Dallas PD, Georgia Bureau of Investigation and members of Ma | |
| Bell's Data Security Group in Atlanta. Baker was just the | |
| closest to me so I started with him. If I can get the | |
| information I've requested, then future submissions will | |
| also include lesson plans furnished by FLETC on their training | |
| courses and analysis protocols suggested by the USSS...heh...heh. | |
| Yours, | |
| The Grimmace | |
| *-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-* | |
| COMPUTER-COP PROFILE I | |
| LT. BILL BAKER | |
| JEFFERSON COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT | |
| LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY | |
| INFORMATION COMPILED BY: | |
| ** THE GRIMMACE ** | |
| *-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-* | |
| NAME: Bill Baker | |
| RANK: Lieutenant | |
| AGENCY: Jefferson County Police Department | |
| 768 Barret Ave. | |
| Louisville, Kentucky 40204 | |
| AGE: 43 | |
| YEARS OF COMPUTER EXP: 13 | |
| YEARS AS A COP: 18 | |
| YEARS IN COMPUTER/ | |
| TELECOM CRIME: 8 | |
| TRAINING: Federal Law Enforcement Training Ctr. | |
| Glynco, Ga. | |
| - Telecommunications Crime | |
| Telecom Fraud | |
| Cellular Fraud | |
| PBX Fraud | |
| - Computer Crime | |
| Illegal Access Crimes | |
| Computer Crime Inves. | |
| Seized System Analysis | |
| FBI Academy | |
| Quantico, Va. | |
| - Computers in Narcotics Investigations | |
| - Computer Crime Investigations | |
| National Intelligence Academy | |
| Ft. Lauderdale, Fl. | |
| - Supervising Intelligence Operations | |
| Surveillance Techniques | |
| Electronic Tracking | |
| Electronic Eavesdroping | |
| Video Evidence Techniques | |
| - Telephone Systems | |
| Wiretaps | |
| Dialed Number Recorders | |
| Pager/Fax Intercepts | |
| Technical Telephony Course | |
| PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENTS: Patrol | |
| Criminal Investigations/Burglary | |
| Criminal Investigations/Homicide | |
| Crime Prevention | |
| Special Investigations/Vice-Intel | |
| MEMBER: Communications Fraud Control Association | |
| Washington, D.C. | |
| PUBLICATIONS: Various computer/telecommunications | |
| crime oriented articles for assorted | |
| law enforcement and computer industry | |
| magazines (i.e., POLICE CHIEF, DATA TODAY) | |
| Posing as a freelance writer from the "Law Enforcement | |
| Journal", I made calls to local police agencies all over this | |
| area asking about their Computer Crime Units and received | |
| replies ranging from "What are you talking about?" to "Maybe | |
| FRAUD handles that...hey, Charlie...do the FRAUD guys do | |
| anything with compoooters?". So much for the Louisville | |
| Division of Police...no fear there, right? | |
| But I decided to push on since Louisville, though not a | |
| hotbed of phreakers/hackers, IS the latest home of TAP MAGAZINE | |
| (a la Blitzkrieg BBS and the Predat0r) and has a smattering of | |
| "hometown" folks engaged in less than legal activities through | |
| the local phone lines. | |
| The call made to the Jefferson County Police got me a | |
| solid response of "You'll have to talk to Lt. Bill Baker. Hey, | |
| Charlie, where's Lt. Baker working now?" (This guy is so low | |
| key his own department doesn't even know where he works!) They | |
| finally decide he's someplace called "Adam Station" and | |
| through "various" contacts and a friendly local attorney who | |
| rarely pays for telephone calls himself, I managed to obtain | |
| quite a bit of information about Lt. Baker and his obviously | |
| misguided quest. | |
| Lt. Baker is fairly typical of the "new breed" of | |
| high-tech investigator currently being churned out by the | |
| various federal training schools. He's aggressive and, from | |
| talking to other members of his department, thought of as a | |
| "computer weenie" who was probably a hacker himself before he | |
| embraced the "dark side" of "the FORCE". (I personally believe | |
| that this may be more fact than fantasy after talking to him on | |
| the phone since he seems to know more about phreaking and | |
| hacking than one would think would be taught in the | |
| aforementioned federal institutes of higher learning.) | |
| I finally managed to speak with Lt. Baker on the phone | |
| and gave him my "writing about computer crime" rap which he | |
| bought with little suspicion. The following are excerpts from | |
| the recording I made of the conversation [comments in brackets | |
| are mine]: | |
| TG: How would you rate the progress of computer and | |
| telecommunications crime investigations in this area? | |
| Baker: There have been some good cases made here, but there's | |
| still a long way to go. The main problem is that there | |
| hasn't been a push from local businesses in this area to combat | |
| these types of crimes. Most of'em don't want to admit they've | |
| been hit from the outside. If there's no complaints, | |
| then the departments aren't likely to want to spend the money | |
| to dig up additional crime, right? | |
| TG: Of the hackers you've worked on, what kind of capabilities | |
| do they have and how good do you think they are? | |
| Baker: Well, hackers and phreaks are like any other cross-section | |
| of a criminal group...there are some that are very good | |
| and some that are pitiful. The best thing you can say | |
| about working hacker/phreaker cases is that a lot of them | |
| catch themselves. They have huge egos and tend to brag | |
| a good deal about what they've done and how they did it. | |
| TG: Does that mean that you don't think a computer crime | |
| investigator has to be as good as the criminals | |
| he chases...I mean, because a lot of these people leave | |
| so many clues behind? How would you rate your ability | |
| in this field? | |
| Baker: Nope...not at all. I think that as technology gets better | |
| so will the crooks. Let's keep the record straight here. | |
| Sure, there are bozos out there who read a how-to file in | |
| an old PHRACK and decide that they have the knowledge | |
| they need to nuke the phone company or ride a VAX like | |
| a Hell's Angel rides a Harley. Those are the easy ones. | |
| The ones who -write- [author's emphasis] the technical | |
| articles in PHRACK are the ones to worry about. There | |
| are some stomp-down [??] incredibly knowledgeable | |
| individuals in circulation blasting away with their modems | |
| at any target of opportunity. | |
| TG: You didn't mention your own ability for investigating | |
| these people. | |
| Baker: (Laughs) Yeah, well...let's say I know enough to get by | |
| and am smart enough to know that there are no absolute | |
| experts. | |
| TG: How would you comment on the Steve Jackson Games case? | |
| Do you think the Secret Service set a lot of bad | |
| precedents? | |
| Baker: (Laughs) Noooooooo....sorry, pal. That's been jawed to death | |
| in every phreak/hack mag, legal journal, and Internet | |
| newsgroup in existence and I'm not about to stick my | |
| neck out on that one, OK? I will say that everyone learned | |
| a lot from that case and I seriously doubt if you'll see the | |
| same set of problems reoccurring in future cases. Maybe | |
| the CSPR or EFF hired guns can come up with a new group | |
| of loopholes, in which case we'll have to find new ways | |
| to circumvent those attacks. | |
| TG: You sound a little critical of the EFF and CSPR efforts | |
| in their defense of so-called "computer criminals". | |
| Baker: Well, I'm sure that they believe in what they're doing. | |
| They must to invest that much cash and energy. But I | |
| think there has to be some middle ground agreed upon | |
| rather than just whining about "all information should | |
| be free" and "if I can get into your system then I should | |
| be allowed to look around". I'm not going to launch into | |
| a diatribe on organizations that I don't agree with. I'm | |
| simply going to work harder at dotting every "i" and | |
| crossing every "t" to make my cases more secure. Stealing | |
| telephone service is a crime, defrauding businesses is a | |
| crime, gaining unauthorized access into someone else's | |
| computer system is, in most states, a crime, and even if | |
| there's no law on the books making it a crime, it's | |
| wrong. | |
| TG: Since by your own statement, you feel that high-tech | |
| crime investigation is still in its infancy, what groups | |
| or organizations would you say are in the lead in trying | |
| to combat this type of crime? | |
| Baker: The most significant two I know are the Federal Law | |
| Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia, and the | |
| Communications Fraud Control Association based out of | |
| Washington, D.C. FLETC [he pronounces it FLET-SEE] | |
| probably has the finest computer crimes training program | |
| in the country. They bring in acknowledged experts and | |
| don't cut the students any slack as far as learning to | |
| do things correctly and, most importantly, legally. The | |
| CFCA is the leader in Telecommunications security and | |
| provide training and assistance to telecom and computer | |
| companies along with law enforcement agencies all over | |
| the country. | |
| TG: Why do you think so few law enforcement agencies know | |
| anything about computer crime investigations? Are they | |
| going to leave the phreaks to the feds? | |
| Baker: Nah...I don't think you can simplify it that easily. | |
| Most departments don't have dedicated computer crime units | |
| because of lack of funds to support such a unit, lack of | |
| trained personnel, lack of understanding of the magnitude | |
| of the problem, fear of increasing their crime stats or | |
| any combination of those reasons. When I first got into | |
| this, there weren't any experts. John Maxfield and his | |
| BOARDSCAN operation got a lot of talk in the hack/phreak | |
| journals and there were a small handful of others, but | |
| no real standout authorities. I talked to an awful lot | |
| of people before I hooked up with Clo Fleming at SPRINT | |
| Security who helped me a lot. | |
| TG: Do you still trade information with SPRINT? | |
| Baker: I have contacts with all the major telecom carriers. | |
| The training I got at FLETC really helped make some valuable | |
| contacts. But I guess SPRINT and Clo Fleming would be | |
| my first choice simply because they were willing to help | |
| me when no one else would. You can't operate in this | |
| environment without contacts in the OCC's. It can't be | |
| done and the OCC's [Other Common Carriers] are a lot | |
| more willing to assist law enforcement now than they | |
| were in 1985. Of course, the telecommunications industry | |
| is taking a $4-5 billion hit a year from fraud and that | |
| has a lot to do with it. | |
| TG: Do you subscribe to the hacker/phreaker magazines? | |
| Baker: Sure...I subscribe to 2600 and get copies of some | |
| others. I think PHRACK's probably the best overall, | |
| but I can't afford the subscription rate they've imposed | |
| on government agencies since Craig Neidorf took the hit | |
| for publishing the "golden" E911 document. I've learned | |
| a ton of stuff over the years from PHRACK and wish it | |
| were still free, but they have a right to their info | |
| just like the people who own the systems attacked by | |
| hackers. It'd be kind of hypocritical for me to rip off | |
| PHRACK and then turn and prosecute some other guy for | |
| ripping off information from another source, right? | |
| TG: What problems do you foresee in the future in computer | |
| and telecom crime investigations? | |
| Baker: Jeez...why don't you ask me when we'll have world peace | |
| or something easy? OK, I think we'll probably see the | |
| larger departments being forced to play catch-up with | |
| the current trends and always being a little behind in | |
| this area. I also think you'll see more officers losing | |
| cases and being sued, a la SJG, until they get the | |
| specific training required to handle these cases the | |
| right way. Turning seized systems over to the local | |
| "computer guy" in the department is going to cost'em in | |
| the long run because every lawyer who gets one of these | |
| cases is going to compare it bit by bit with the SJG | |
| case to see if there's anything there he can use for | |
| his client's defense. | |
| TG: There has been a lot of discussion about whether or not | |
| computer systems should be seized rather than just | |
| making copies of the data for evidence. What is your | |
| policy on equipment seizures when working cases like | |
| this? | |
| Baker: First of all, I don't go on fishing expeditions with | |
| search warrants. If I have enough to convict a guy then | |
| I get the warrant. I take everything that's there and | |
| do the analysis. I've had cases where the defendant has | |
| requested copies of data he needed for various reasons | |
| and I've had no problems with furnishing them as long | |
| as the request is reasonable. I ask for forfeiture of | |
| the equipment if I can link it to the crime because the | |
| law says I can. If I can't link the computers, then I | |
| give them back...simple as that. I think it's kind of | |
| interesting that most hackers or phreaks will refuse to | |
| take a guilty plea for a reduced charge, even if I have | |
| them stone cold and they're looking at a 99.999999% | |
| chance of conviction in a jury trial, if it means | |
| they'll lose their equipment in the deal. It makes good | |
| leverage in certain situations. | |
| TG: Did you have any part in Operation Sun-Devil? | |
| Baker: Nope. Though I'd have liked to. I was on a lot of the | |
| systems taken down in Sun-Devil. | |
| TG: You said you were on some of the systems busted in the | |
| Sun-Devil operation, are you still on phreak/hack | |
| boards and would you name any? | |
| Baker: (Laughs a lot) I think I'll pass on naming systems I'm | |
| on, OK? That'd be cheating. (Laughs again) But I get | |
| around enough to know what's going on. There are lots | |
| of investigators out there calling the boards. | |
| TG: I appreciate your time, Lt. Baker, and would like to ask | |
| one last question. What motivates you in these cases | |
| since the alleged "theft" involves pretty intangible | |
| property? | |
| Baker: Motivation? Hmmmm...I suppose you could say it's the | |
| chase that motivates me more than the catch, though | |
| the catch is pretty good, too. These cases tend to | |
| be more one-on-one than some other types and the | |
| adversaries can be very good at covering their tracks. | |
| Hell, I probably have more in common with the people | |
| I target than they'd like to believe. As for the | |
| "intangibility" of the stolen goods, well, that's why | |
| we have court systems, isn't it...to define those | |
| little details. | |
| TG: A lot of computer crime investigators would rather stay | |
| in the background, but you don't seem to have taken that | |
| position. Why not? | |
| Baker: Well, like anyone involved in anything relatively new, | |
| as opposed to the old standard type crimes like murder | |
| and armed robbery, it's to my benefit to have anything | |
| printed informing people of the problems created by | |
| this type of activity. We all pay the price for telecom | |
| fraud, credit card fraud, data loss due to illegal | |
| access to computers and all the rest. But the people | |
| involved in these crimes, for the most part, don't | |
| exhibit the same profiles as the so-called "violent" | |
| criminals. In fact, I've had some very friendly | |
| conversations with a number of phreaks and hackers. | |
| Investigators who have problems would probably have | |
| them no matter what crimes they were investigating. | |
| I never assume that I'm smarter than anyone I'm | |
| chasing and I don't rub their noses in it when I make | |
| a case. Just like I don't lose sleep when I just can't | |
| seem to get that last piece of the puzzle and one gets | |
| away. It's hide-and-seek in cyberspace. Pretty good | |
| game, actually. | |
| For what it's worth, there it is. The interview printed here | |
| doesn't contain a lot of the bullshit that was thrown back and | |
| forth during our conversation, just the relevant details which | |
| tend to give an insight into this guy. | |
| Frankly, I was impressed by the fact that he didn't seem | |
| anything like I had expected after reading horror stories about | |
| other agencies and investigators. This guy was personable and | |
| maybe that's an indicator that he's dangerous. Never, ever | |
| underestimate your opponents -- even if they do sound like | |
| "good ole boys" and talk to you like you're the best friend | |
| they ever had. Always remember that COPS INVENTED SOCIAL | |
| ENGINEERING! | |
| My next "computer cop" profile will deal with a rising star in | |
| the U.S. Secret Service and his connections to the Guidry | |
| Group, a consulting organization working for the cellular phone | |
| industry in combating cellular fraud. | |