| ---[ Phrack Magazine Volume 8, Issue 52 January 26, 1998, article 14 of 20 | |
| -------------------------[ The International Crime Syndicate Association | |
| --------[ Dorathea Demming | |
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| = = | |
| = ICSA = | |
| = = | |
| = International Computer Security Association = | |
| = = | |
| = or = | |
| = = | |
| = International Crime Syndicate Association? = | |
| = = | |
| = = | |
| = by = | |
| = = | |
| = Dorathea Demming = | |
| = = | |
| = = | |
| = = | |
| = (c) Dorathea Demming, October, 1997 = | |
| = = | |
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| This is an article about computer criminals. I'm not talking about the fun | |
| loving kids of the Farmers of Doom [FOD], the cool pranksters of the Legion of | |
| Doom [LOD], or even the black-tie techno terrorists of The New Order [TNO]. | |
| I'm talking about professional computer criminals. I'm talking about the | |
| types of folks that go to work every day and make a living by ripping off | |
| guileless corporations. I'm talking about the International Computer Security | |
| Association [ICSA]. The ICSA has made more money off of computer fraud than | |
| the other three organizations mentioned above combined. | |
| ICSA was previously known as National Computer Security Association [NCSA]. | |
| It seems that they finally discovered that there are networks and gullible | |
| corporations in countries other than the United States. | |
| In this article I will inform you of the cluelessness and greed of ICSA. | |
| Instead of telling you, I will let them tell you in their own words. | |
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| Lets look at what the NSCA has to say about it's history: | |
| "the company was founded in 1989 to provide independent and | |
| objective services to a rapidly growing and often confusing | |
| digital security marketplace through a market-driven, for-profit | |
| consortium model." | |
| This is where the ICSA differs from real industry organizations like the IEEE. | |
| Non-profit organizations like the IEEE can provide independent and objective | |
| services, for-profit organizations like ICSA cannot be trusted to do so. | |
| The goal of the NSCA is profit, nothing more and nothing less. | |
| Profit is a desirable goal in a business. However, the ICSA pretends to be | |
| an industry association. This is a complete and total fabrication. ICSA is | |
| not an industry association -- it is a for-profit enterprise that competes for | |
| business directly with the companies it pretends to help. | |
| =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= | |
| Let's look at the ICSA's knowledge of computer security: | |
| "Early computer security issues focused on virus protection. " | |
| This is where the ICSA accidentally informs us if their true history. No one | |
| with half of a clue would claim that "Early computer security issues focused | |
| on virus protection." In reality, early computer security issues focused on | |
| the protection of mainframe systems. Virus protection did not become a | |
| concern until the 1980's. We can only conclude that no one at the ICSA has a | |
| background in computer security outside of personal computer security. These | |
| folks seem to be Unix illiterate -- not to speak of VM, MVS, OS/400, AOS/VS, | |
| VMS or a host of other systems where corporations store vast amounts of data. | |
| Focusing primarily on PC security will not benefit the overall security | |
| posture of your organization. | |
| =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= | |
| Let's look at another baseless claim of the ISCA: | |
| "ICSA consortia facilitate an open exchange of information among | |
| security industry product developers and security service | |
| providers within narrow, but well defined segments of the | |
| computer security industry." | |
| According to the "security industry product developers and security service | |
| providers" that I have spoken with, this is complete hogwash. The word on the | |
| street is that the ICSA folks collect information and then give nothing useful | |
| in return. My response is "How could they?" No one at ICSA has any | |
| information to offer. You would do as well to ask your 12 year old daughter | |
| for information about computer security -- and you might even do better, if | |
| your daughter reads Phrack. | |
| =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= | |
| Let's look at what the ICSA has to say about their Web Certification program: | |
| "The ICSA Web Certification materially reduces web site risks | |
| and liability for both operator and visitor by providing, | |
| verifying and improving the use of logical, physical and | |
| operational baseline security standards and practices." | |
| "Comprised of a detailed certification field guide, on-site | |
| evaluation, remote test, random spot checks, and an evolving set | |
| of endorsed best practices, ICSA certification uniquely | |
| demonstrates management's efforts to assure site availability, | |
| information protection, and data integrity as well as enhanced | |
| user confidence and trust." | |
| What really happens is that ICSA sends out a reseller to your site. The | |
| reseller then asks you if you have set up your site correctly. You tell the | |
| reseller that you have, and then the reseller tells ICSA that you have set up | |
| your site correctly. Very few items are actually verified by the reseller. | |
| ICSA then runs ISS (Internet Security Scanner) against your web server. If ISS | |
| cannot detect any security vulnerabilities remotely, you receive ICSA Web | |
| Certification. | |
| For grilling your staff with a series of almost meaningless questions, the | |
| reseller receives $2,975 US dollars. For running ISS against your web server, | |
| ICSA receives $5,525. For $19. 95, you can buy a copy of Computer Security | |
| Basics by Deborah Russell and G.T. Gangemi Sr. (ISBN:0-937175-71-4) and save | |
| your company almost $8,500. | |
| =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= | |
| Let's look at the ICSA's Reseller Training: | |
| ICSA states that every reseller that delivers their product is trained in | |
| computer security. In practice, however, this training is actually _sales_ | |
| training. The ICSA training course lasts for less than one day and is | |
| supposed to be conducted by two trainers, one sales person and one technical | |
| person. One recipient of this training told me that the technical person did | |
| not bother to show up for his training, while another recipient of this | |
| training told me that ICSA instead sent _two_ sales people and _no_ technical | |
| people to his training. | |
| =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= | |
| Let's look at what ICSA says about change in the "digital world" of | |
| firewalls: | |
| "The digital world moves far too quickly to certify only a | |
| particular version of a product or a particular incarnation of a | |
| system. Therefore, ICSA certification criteria and processes are | |
| designed so that once a product or system is certified, all | |
| future versions of the product (or updates of the system) are | |
| inherently certified." | |
| What does this mean to you? It means that ICSA is certifying firewalls | |
| running code that they have never seen. It means that if you purchase a | |
| firewall that has been ICSA certified -- you have no way of knowing if the | |
| version of the firewall product that is protecting your organization has ever | |
| been certified. | |
| =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= | |
| Let's look at how ICSA defends itself from such allegations? ISCA has | |
| three ready made defenses: | |
| "First, the ICSA gains a contractual commitment from the | |
| product vendor or the organization that owns or runs the | |
| certified system that the product or system will be maintained | |
| at the current, published ICSA certification standards. " | |
| So that's how ICSA certification works, the firewall vendors promise to write | |
| good code and ICSA gives them a sticker. This works fine with little children | |
| in Sunday school, but I wouldn't trust the security of my business to such a | |
| plan. | |
| "Secondly, ICSA or it's authorized partners normally perform | |
| random spot checking of the current product (or system) against | |
| current ICSA criteria for that certification category. " | |
| Except, of course, that an unnamed source within ICSA itself admitted that | |
| these spot checks are not actually being done. That's right, these spot | |
| checks exist only in the minds of the marketing staff of the ICSA. ICSA | |
| cannot manage to cover the costs of spot checking in their exorbitant fee | |
| structure. They must be spending the money instead on all of those free | |
| televisions they are giving away to their resellers. | |
| "Thirdly, ICSA certification is renewed annually. At renewal | |
| time, the full certification process is repeated for the current | |
| production system or shipping products against the current | |
| criteria. " | |
| Well here we have the final promise -- our systems will never out of | |
| certification for more than 364 days. If our firewall vendor ships three new | |
| releases a year -- at least one of them will go through the actual ICSA | |
| certification process. Of course, all of them will have the ICSA certification | |
| sticker. | |
| =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= | |
| Let's looks at what ICSA has to say about their procedures: | |
| "The certification criteria is not primarily based on | |
| fundamental design or engineering principles or on an assessment | |
| of underlying technology. In most cases, we strive to use a | |
| black-box approach. " | |
| Listen to what they are really saying here. They are admitting that their | |
| certification process does not deal with "fundamental design or engineering | |
| principles" or on an "assessment of underlying technology". What else is left | |
| to base a certification upon? Do they certify firewalls based upon the | |
| firewall vendors marketing brochures? Upon the color of their product boxes? | |
| Upon the friendliness of their sales staff? Or maybe they just certify anyone | |
| who gives them money. | |
| When you are clueless, every computer system must look like a "black- | |
| box" to you. | |
| =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= | |
| Let's look at how the ICSA web certification process deals with CGI | |
| vulnerabilities: | |
| "The Site Operator attest that CGIs have been reviewed by | |
| qualified reviewers against design criteria that affect | |
| security. " (sic) | |
| Let's take a close look at this. The #1 method of breaking into web servers | |
| is to attack a vulnerable CGI program. And the full extent that the ICSA | |
| certification deals with secure CGI programming is to have your staff attest | |
| that they have done a good job. What sort of employee would respond "Oh no, | |
| we haven't even looked at the security of those CGI bins?" The ICSA counts on | |
| employees trying to save their jobs to speed the certification process along | |
| to it's conclusion. | |
| =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= | |
| Let's look at what ICSA has to say about it's own thoroughness: | |
| "Because it is neither practical nor cost effective, ICSA does | |
| not test and certify every possible combination of web sites on | |
| a web server at various locations unless requested to, and | |
| compensated for, by Customer. " | |
| We all know that security is breached at it's weakest link, not it's | |
| strongest. If we choose to certify only some of our systems, we can only | |
| assume that attackers will them simply move on and attack our unprotected | |
| systems. Perhaps if ICSA did not attempt to extort $8,500 for a single web | |
| server certification, more customers could have all of their web sites | |
| certified. | |
| =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= | |
| Let's look at how much faith ICSA puts in their own certifications: | |
| "Customer shall defend, indemnify, and hold ICSA harmless from | |
| and against any and all claims or lawsuits of any third party | |
| and resulting costs (including reasonable attorneys' fees), | |
| damages, losses, awards, and judgements based on any claim that | |
| a ICSA-certified server/site/system was insecure, failed to meet | |
| any security specifications, or was otherwise unable to | |
| withstand an actual or simulated penetration. | |
| In plain English, they are saying that if you get sued, you are on your own. | |
| But wait, their faithlessness does not stop there: | |
| =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= | |
| Let's look at how the ICSA sees it's legal relationship with it's | |
| customers: | |
| "Customer, may, upon written notice and approval of ICSA, assume | |
| the defense of any claim or legal proceeding using counsel of | |
| it's choice. ICSA shall be entitled to participate in, but not | |
| control, the defense of any such action, with it's own counsel | |
| and at it's own expense: provided, that if ICSA, it its sole | |
| discretion, determines that there exists a conflict of interest | |
| between Customer and ICSA, ICSA shall have the right to engage | |
| separate counsel, the reasonable costs of which shall be paid by | |
| the customer. " | |
| What you, the customer, agree to when you sign up for ICSA certification is | |
| that you cannot even legally defend yourself in court until you have "written | |
| notice and approval of ICSA. " But it's even worse that that, ICSA then | |
| reserves the right to hire lawyers and bill YOU for the expense if it feels | |
| that you are not sufficiently protecting it's interests. Whose corporate | |
| legal department is going to okay a provision like this? | |
| =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= | |
| Let's look at how much the ICSA attempts to charge for this garbage: | |
| =========================================================== | |
| | Web Certification | | |
| | | | |
| | 1 Server $8,500 | | |
| | 2-4 Servers $7,650 | | |
| | 5 or more Servers $6,800 | | |
| | | | |
| | 6-10 DNS $ 495 | | |
| | 11 or more DNS $ 395 | | |
| | | | |
| | Perimeter Check | | |
| | | | |
| | up to 15 Devices $3,995 | | |
| | additional groups of 10 Devices $1,500 | | |
| | bi-monthly reports $1,000 | | |
| | monthly reports $3,500 | | |
| | | | |
| | War Dial | | |
| | | | |
| | first 250 phone lines $1,000 | | |
| | additional lines $3/line | | |
| | | | |
| | Per Diem | | |
| | | | |
| | Domestic $ 995 | | |
| | International $1,995 | | |
| | | | |
| =========================================================== | |
| Certifying one web server will cost you $8,500. I have seen small web servers | |
| purchased, installed, and designed for less than that amount. | |
| If you tell the ICSA that you have 15 network devices visible on the Internet | |
| and they discover 16 devices, they will bill you an additional $1,500. This | |
| is what you agree to when you sign a ICSA Perimeter Check contract. In | |
| effect, when you sign up for an ICSA Perimeter Check, you are agreeing to pay | |
| unspecified fees. | |
| To dial an entire prefix the ICSA will charge you $30,250. I wonder if these | |
| folks are using ToneLoc. I wonder if these fools are even using modems... | |
| I will leave judgement on the per diem rates to the reader. How much would | |
| you pay for a clown to entertain at your daughters birthday party? Would you | |
| give the clown a daily per diem of $995? Why would you feel the ICSA clowns | |
| might deserve better? How do you spend $995 a day and still manage to put in | |
| some work hours? | |
| =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= | |
| These are just a few excerpts from some ICSA documentation I managed to get my | |
| hands on. I do not feel my assessment has been any more harsh than these | |
| people deserve. I am certain that if I had more of their literature, there | |
| would be even more flagrant examples of ignorance and greed. | |
| ICSA feeds on business people who are so ignorant as to fall for the ICSA | |
| propaganda. By masquerading as a legitimate trade organization, they make | |
| everyone in the data security industry look bad. By overcharging the | |
| clientele, they drain money from computer security budgets that could better | |
| be spent on securing systems and educating users. By selling certifications | |
| with no actual technical validity behind them they fool Internet users into a | |
| false sense of security when using e-commerce sites. | |
| ISCA is good for no one and it is good for nothing. | |
| Dorathea Demming | |
| Mechanicsburg, PA | |
| 10 Oct, 1997 | |
| ----[ EOF | |