| ---[ Phrack Magazine Volume 8, Issue 52 January 26, 1998, article 08 of 20 | |
| -------------------------[ Steganography Thumbprinting | |
| --------[ The HackLab (http://www.hacklab.com) | |
| Steg`a*nog"ra*phy (?), n. [Gr. covered (fr. to cover closely) + | |
| -graphy.] The art of writing in cipher, or in characters which are not | |
| intelligible except to persons who have the key; cryptography. | |
| i. Introduction | |
| While this may be a general description of cryptography, steganography has | |
| come to describe not only the act of encrypting data, but also of hiding its | |
| very existence. Steganography (or "stego") uses techniques to store a | |
| "message" file within a "container" file by altering the container file in | |
| such a way as to make the original file _appear_ unchanged. The resulting | |
| file can be referred to as the stego file and contains the message file | |
| enclosed in a close approximation of the original container file. Several | |
| tools exist (mostly for DOS/Windows/NT) which automate these functions using | |
| DES, DES3 or IDEA as encryption methods and BMP, GIF, JPG, WAV, VOC and even | |
| ASCII files as containers. Using these tools, data can be hidden within | |
| images, sounds, and even other data files. However, these tools do leave | |
| perceptible traces on their container files and do not offer nearly the | |
| level of obfuscation the user assumes. | |
| This article will provide the reader with a fundamental understanding of | |
| basic stego techniques and will highlight some of the "thumbprints" left by | |
| modern steganographic toolsets, specifically on graphic images. Not intended | |
| to challenge the cryptographic strength or perceptible mathematical variances | |
| of current steganographic techniques, this article will give the reader a | |
| basic understanding of stego and suggest low-budget methods for detecting and | |
| cracking basic steganographic techniques. Also presented is a program which | |
| can be used to brute-force two of the most popular stego toolsets. | |
| I. Basic Steganography | |
| Simply put, steganography involves the hiding of messages. While there are | |
| many techniques employed by the various tools, the least common denominator | |
| amongst most toolsets is the modification of some of the Least Significant | |
| Bits (or LSBs) of the container file's individual bytes. In the simplest | |
| example, consider the following binary representations of the numbers 20 | |
| through 27: | |
| 10100 10101 10110 10111 11000 11001 11010 11011 | |
| By modifying the LSBs of these binary digits, we can hide the binary | |
| representation of the number 200 (11001000) across the above bytestream: | |
| 10101 10101 10110 10110 11001 11000 11010 11010 | |
| By reconstructing the LSBs of the above bytestream, we recover the number | |
| 200 (11001000). In the above example, the original bytestream of the numbers | |
| 20-27 is the container, while the number 200 is the message file. This is a | |
| very poor basic example since the resulting stego file is not an accurate | |
| representation of the original file. After modification to include the | |
| message file, the numbers 20-27 now read: | |
| 21 21 22 22 25 24 26 26 | |
| However, in most stego applications, the container file does not contain | |
| bytestreams which are rendered useless by modifying LSB information. | |
| Instead, container files typically contain various levels of "noise" at the | |
| level of the LSB's which when viewed apart from the rest of the byte can | |
| appear random. A sound (.WAV) file, for example contains mostly inaudible | |
| background noise at the LSB level. An 8-bit graphic file will contain minor | |
| color differences at the LSB level, while a 24-bit image will contain color | |
| changes which are nearly imperceptible to the human eye. A very common | |
| container format is a 256 color, 8 bit image such as a GIF or BMP file. | |
| II. Stego Techniques | |
| In an 8-bit image such as a GIF or BMP each pixel is described as a number | |
| from 0 - 255 which refers to an actual color in the "color lookup table" or | |
| palette. A common misconception is that all images simply contain strings of | |
| bytes that describe individual colors, and that the graphic file simply | |
| lists these colors in left-to-right, and top-to-bottom fashion. This is | |
| only partially true for 8-bit images. The palette lists every color that is | |
| used in the image (and extra colors, if less than 256 total colors are actually | |
| used in the image), and the image data itself is stored as a series of digits | |
| from 0 - 255 which reference an entry in the palette. In this way, the image | |
| can be reconstructed by performing palette lookups to determine the color to | |
| insert at that pixel location. | |
| In order to hide data within an 8-bit GIF or BMP container, most existing | |
| tools use one of two techniques which I will term LSB palette reference | |
| modification and RGB element LSB modification. | |
| LSB palette reference modification involves changing the LSB(s) of a | |
| _palette_reference_ (0 - 255) in order to hide the data contained in the | |
| message. Remember that a palette reference simply contains a number from 0 - | |
| 255 which references a color, or entry, in the palette. In order to hide | |
| data, a program utilizing palette reference modification may decide which | |
| color to point to based on the color's LSBs. This type of program will pay | |
| no attention to how similar the colors are, only whether or not the LSBs | |
| serve its purpose of data hiding. If the adjacent colors in the palette have | |
| dissimilar LSBs, they are well suited for data hiding and become good | |
| candidates for storing hidden text in the final stegoed container. If a 0 | |
| (zero) is meant to be hidden, the stego program inserts the palette index | |
| reference of the color with the LSB of 0 (zero), and vice versa for hiding a | |
| 1 (one). | |
| RGB element LSB modification involves modifying the pixel's _actual_color_ | |
| by changing the LSB of the Red, Green or Blue elements of the color in the | |
| color table. For example, the color "white" is represented by the RGB values | |
| 255,255,255 which in binary equates to: | |
| 11111111 11111111 11111111 | |
| listed in RGB order. By altering the LSB of each color in the RGB element, | |
| we can hide data by making almost identical copies of colors such that only | |
| the LSBs are different. Since the color is only changed by one or two LSBs, | |
| the resulting colors are very close, perhaps undetectable to the human eye. | |
| The result of this change to the colors in the table enables nearly identical | |
| colors to be referenced by multiple table entries. This becomes extremely | |
| obvious when the palette is viewed and sorted by luminance (relative | |
| brightness)in a product such as Paint Shop Pro. These similar colors will be | |
| grouped right next to each other in a luminance-sorted palette. Using this | |
| technique, a binary 1 in the message file can be represented in the stego file | |
| by replacing a color in the container file with an altered version of that | |
| color whose RG or B element ends with a binary 1. Likewise, a binary 0 in the | |
| message file can be represented in the stego file by replacing the original | |
| color in the container file with an altered version of that color whose RG or | |
| B element ends with a binary 0. | |
| III. Steganographic Thumbprints | |
| Several tools are available that apply these techniques to files on | |
| several different platforms. I will focus on two specific toolsets; Steganos | |
| and S-Tools v4.0. Steganos is perhaps the most versatile and powerful of the | |
| toolsets, while S-Tools seems to be the easiest and most widely used (not to | |
| mention the fact that I like S-Tools; it's been around for a long time and | |
| is very well done). Other available toolsets include similar functionality | |
| and hiding techniques. In order to discover what the tools actually do when | |
| they hide data, it's best to use a simple BMP container file. The RGB BMP | |
| file utilizes a palette scheme identical to that of a GIF for the purposes | |
| of our tests, and all the reviewed toolsets can use BMP files as containers. | |
| For example, consider a container image which is 50 pixels by 50 pixels and | |
| contains only black-colored (0,0,0) pixels. This image references palette | |
| entry 0 (zero) as its only color. I will use a freeware painting program Paint | |
| Shop Pro V4.10 (PSP) to create and analyze the base images. When creating | |
| this image, PSP used a default palette with 216 unique palette entries and 40 | |
| "filler" entries at the end of the palette all of which contain the value | |
| (0,0,0) or pure black. | |
| Our message file is simply a text file which contains the phrase "This is a | |
| test." | |
| A. S-Tools | |
| When the message file is hidden using S-Tools, the resulting 8-bit image | |
| appears identical to the human eye when compared to the original. However, | |
| there are perceptible oddities about the file which are revealed under closer | |
| scrutiny. | |
| Since S-Tools uses RGB element LSB modification as its hiding technique, | |
| the palette has distinct and very obvious characteristics. Many of the | |
| palette's colors are offset by a single bit in the R,G or B element. This is | |
| very obvious when the palette is sorted by luminance (brightness) and viewed | |
| with PSP. The first sixteen (and only original) colors in this palette are: | |
| (51,1,1) (51,1,0) (50,1,0) (51,0,1) (51,0,0) (50,0,1) (50,0,0) | |
| (1,1,0) (1,1,0) (0,1,1) (0,1,0) (1,0,1) (1,0,1) (1,0,0) (0,0,1) (0,0,0) | |
| Notice that the offsets of the RGB elements are only 1 bit. This is an | |
| imperceptible color change, and is a very wasteful use of the palette. | |
| Remember, there are only 256 colors to work with. Most 8-bit image creation | |
| programs are very careful when deciding which colors to include in the palette, | |
| and almost all use standard palettes which contain all the most commonly used | |
| colors. To see a palette with this many _nearly_ identical colors is odd. | |
| Also, the palette has been adjusted to contain less colors. The standard | |
| colors selected by PSP have been replaced by some of the colors listed above. | |
| As is typical with this type of hiding, the slack space at the end of the | |
| palette has been reduced to make room for the new copies of existing colors. | |
| This type of hiding will always make itself obvious by using single-bit | |
| offsets in one or more of the LSBs. Since this type of thumbprint is so | |
| easily identifiable, we will concentrate our efforts on the harder-to-detect | |
| palette reference method used by Steganos. | |
| B. Steganos | |
| Steganos kindly reminds you that 8-bit images don't make terribly secure | |
| containers. It's a good thing, too, because when the message file is hidden | |
| using Steganos the resulting 8-bit image has a major anomaly- the stego | |
| image is completely different than the original! As opposed to an all-black | |
| image, the image now resembles a black-and-blue checkerboard. However, this | |
| difference is only obvious if you have access to the original image. Since | |
| an interceptor will most likely not have a copy of the original image, we | |
| will examine other methods of detection. When the palette of the image is | |
| checked for single-bit offset colors (as in the stego image created with | |
| S-Tools), none can be found. Also, there is no more or less slack space at | |
| the end of the palette than existed in the original palette. Steganos does | |
| not alter the palette in any way when hiding data. It uses the LSB palette | |
| reference technique described above. However, there are very distinctive | |
| ways of determining if this technique has been used to hide data, specifically | |
| by looking at _how_ the palette's colors are used. In this simple case, a | |
| histogram will show exactly the type of modification we are looking for. | |
| In the words of the PSP Help documentation, | |
| "A histogram is a graph of image color values, typically RGB values and/or | |
| luminance. In a histogram, the spectrum for a color component appears on the | |
| horizontal axis, and the vertical axis indicates the portion of the image's | |
| color that matches each point on the component's spectrum." | |
| In a nutshell, this simply means a graph is generated showing how the | |
| color(s) are used in an image, and how similar (in shade) they are. When | |
| viewing the "blue" histogram for the Steganos-hidden file, we see something | |
| like this: | |
| 100= X X | |
| - X X | |
| 90 = X X | |
| - X X | |
| 80 = X X | |
| - X X | |
| 70 = X X | |
| - X X | |
| 60 = X X | |
| - X X | |
| 50 = X X | |
| - X X | |
| 40 = X X | |
| - X X | |
| 30 = X X | |
| - X X | |
| 20 = X X | |
| - X X | |
| 10 = X X | |
| - X X | |
| 00 = X X | |
| . ! . ! . ! . ! . ! . ! . ! . ! . ! . ! . . . | |
| 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 2 | |
| 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 | |
| 5 | |
| The X-axis shows the spectrum for the color blue (from 0 to 255). The | |
| Y-axis shows the number of pixels in the image that match that color. When | |
| displaying a histogram, the 100 on the Y axis is not percentage, but a MAX | |
| value (in this case 1272) which indicates the greatest number of pixels used | |
| for _any_one_color_. Since there are really only two colors _used_ in this | |
| stego image, there are only two vertical bars. These bars indicate that in | |
| the Blue color family there are really only two colors used; one with a blue | |
| value of zero, and another with a blue value of approximately 50 (51 to be | |
| exact). Upon examining the color table for this image sorted in | |
| _palette_order_, it is evident that these two referenced colors are only | |
| similar since they are placed right next to one another in the palette. The | |
| two colors are (0,0,0) and (0,0,51) or black and very, very dark blue. The | |
| image mostly has black hues, and Steganos probably picked the very dark blue | |
| color (00110011) as the 1 for some hidden data, and black (00000000) as the | |
| 0 for some hidden data since these colors are _right_ next to each other in | |
| a palette-index-order color table listing. Although they reside next to each | |
| other in the palette, the colors are not very similar which makes the final | |
| stego file appear discolored. Steganos does not modify any of the colors, | |
| but it modifies how the original palette is used by making nearly equal | |
| references to a color and its neighbor (when sorted by palette index). | |
| Bottom line: this image uses neighboring palette colors nearly an identical | |
| number of times. 1272 pixels were used for black and 1228 pixels were used | |
| for the dark, dark blue. This would not be unusual if not for the fact that | |
| the colors are palette index neighbors. If the designer of the image were | |
| using some sort of shading effect, there would be many more than just two | |
| shades involved in this 256 color image, and the shading offsets would be | |
| greater. These two colors don't even appear as shades of one another when | |
| placed side-by-side. | |
| A skilled interceptor will know immediately that something is not quite | |
| right with these images. They both display typical signs of data hiding. | |
| IV. Real-World example | |
| Intercepting a single-color image and determining that it is stegoed is a | |
| trivial task. Increasing the number of used colors within the boundaries of | |
| the 256-color palette could (so the reader may think) obfuscate the hidden | |
| message file. However, by applying a few simple methodologies, a pattern | |
| emerges which can increase the odds of detecting a stegoed image. For | |
| example, if a two-color image is created using only the colors black (0,0,0) | |
| and white (255,255,255), and data is hidden in the file by using Steganos, | |
| the results would show that Steganos not only used black and white, but two | |
| more colors from the palette are used with values of (0,0,51) and | |
| (255,255,51) respectively. These newly-used colors adjoin the original two | |
| colors in the palette listing, have differing LSBs, and are referenced | |
| nearly as much in the new image as the original colors are. A similar | |
| situation evolves when a 6-color image is created. After Steganos hides the | |
| data, the original 6 colors and their palette neighbors will be used in | |
| the new file. The 6 new colors become alternate representations of the | |
| original 6 colors in terms of their LSBs. This methodology holds true all | |
| the way up to images containing 256 different colors. By understanding these | |
| patterns, all 8-bit Steganos images can be detected without access to the | |
| original image. | |
| When attempting to detect the use of steganography in 16 or 24-bit images, | |
| a great deal of pattern analysis must be used. 24-bit stego detection is not | |
| for the faint of heart, but it can be done. Standard "randomization" solutions | |
| fall quite short of solving this problem since LSB data in image creation | |
| programs is hardly random. It follows a pronounced pattern when viewed as a | |
| part of a whole: an 8-bit number. Most standard graphics effects do not use | |
| random data, they use patterns to create and maintain a certain graphic | |
| illusion. Inserting "random" data, even at the LSB level can become fuel for | |
| the analyst's fire. In many 24-bit stego programs, bits in the secret text | |
| are generally inserted with average spacing between them, then random "noise" | |
| is added to make the secret bits seem less obvious. The random "noise" would | |
| (should!) have a random interval between differing bits. The contrast of an | |
| average spacing against random spacing may be enough to not only alert an | |
| analyst, but to point out where secret bits start and random bits begin. The | |
| bottom line is that 24-bit detection is doable, just not practical for an | |
| amateur- yet! | |
| V. The Future | |
| Steganography is in it's infancy, but several new technologies are emerging | |
| including selection and construction methods of data hiding and continuing | |
| research in the area of random distribution. | |
| Selection involves the generation of a large number of copies of the same | |
| container file that differ slightly. In the case of an image file, you may | |
| make minor adjustments in hue, saturation and RGB levels to the end that your | |
| secret message will eventually _appear_ in the LSBs of the data! Although | |
| difficult to generate, this type of data hiding is nearly impossible to detect | |
| since the image's characteristics are not altered at all. | |
| Construction simply involves modeling the characteristics of the original | |
| container when creating your message. In simplest terms, mold your message | |
| around the existing container instead of molding the container to your message. | |
| If, for example the original image were left unchanged, and a key was | |
| developed to create the message _from_ the image, detection would be impossible | |
| without the key. | |
| Several advances are being made in the area of random distribution, | |
| specifically by Tuomas Aura at the Helsinki University of Technology. His | |
| paper "Practical Invisibility in Digital Communication" presents a technique | |
| called "pseudorandom permutation", which brings steganography up to the | |
| technical level of cryptography and properly addresses the issue of | |
| randomness from a data hiding perspective. His paper is excellent reading | |
| and can be found at http://deadlock.hut.fi/ste/ste_html.html | |
| Interesting research (and proof-of-concepts) are being done to utilize | |
| stego techniques in reserved fields in TCP, UDP and ICMP packets. This | |
| research proves that steganography has merit and application beyond sound and | |
| image files. Unfortunately, using stego where there was nothing before (ie | |
| within typically blank reserved fields) can raise a flag in and of itself. Use | |
| encryption and compression to further protect data. It really doesn't matter | |
| if the secret data is discovered if the underlying crypto is secure. | |
| VI. Conclusion | |
| Detecting stego in an 8-bit image is fairly easy. Actually gaining access | |
| to the secret text becomes a bit harder yet a simple overlooked method involves | |
| bruteforcing the creating application (see S_BRUTE.WBT program below). On the | |
| other hand, 24-bit image analysis requires quite a bit of work. If you choose | |
| to employ data hiding techniques, use 24-bit images and compress and encrypt | |
| your message file, bearing in mind that 24-bit images can raise flags simply | |
| due to their size. | |
| When attempting to identify stego files in 8-bit images, keep in mind the | |
| following pointers: | |
| * Search for the obvious thumbprint of an RGB element. | |
| * In the stego file: single-bit offsets between colors in a palette sorted by | |
| luminance (this SCREAMS S-Tools!). | |
| * If no single-bit offsets exist between the colors in the palette, search | |
| for Palette Reference thumbprints which include the following: | |
| * Use of palette index neighbors a near-equal number of times either in the | |
| entire image (use a histogram) or in an area which should be primarily | |
| single-color only but contains a checkerboard effect (use zoom 11:1 to see | |
| individual pixels, and the eyedropper tool to quickly view the RGB | |
| elements in PSP) | |
| * Poor image quality (noise and snow are common side-effects). | |
| * For more detailed analysis the reader might consider using an MS-DOS | |
| program msgifscn.zip, available from Simtel mirror sites worldwide, to | |
| dump the entire contents of an 8-bit GIF image's palette to a file, which | |
| can be dumped into MS Excel for analysis (the analysis add-in in for Excel | |
| comes in REAL handy for binary conversions and data sorts.) | |
| * If you have a clue that the file you're looking at may contain stegoed | |
| data, it never hurts to brute force the application that created it! (see | |
| the S_BRUTE program listing at the end of this article) While this may be | |
| one of the slower methods of breaking stego, it is often easier to | |
| derive possible keyphrases from other sources than attacking the stego | |
| algorithm or the crypto. | |
| VII. The program | |
| The author of S-Tools sells the source code for his program, and Steganos | |
| makes available an SDK for hiding/decoding files using it's algorithms, but | |
| an option exists for programs that do not make their source available: | |
| bruteforce of the application itself. Although using the API and SDK's | |
| available would be significantly faster, there are times when this option | |
| just may not exist. | |
| To that end, included below are two files, S_BRUTE.WBT and S_BRUTE.INI. | |
| This program was written in WinBatch, which is a language that acts very much | |
| like the UNIX language TCL/TK (or Expect), but operates in a Windows 95/NT | |
| context. Developed to control Windows applications, WinBatch provides a | |
| perfect vehicle for brute-forcing an application's password function (see | |
| http://www.windowware.com for the free compiler to run S_BRUTE). S_BRUTE is | |
| an application that will bruteforce S-Tools v4 and Steganos using a | |
| dictionary file in an attempt to determine the passphrase of a stegoed image | |
| (which will subsequently reveal the hidden text). The program selects which | |
| tool to use based on which executable you select, and the S-Tools portion of | |
| the program will not only bruteforce the passphrase, but will attempt all | |
| four algorithms available to S- Tools. Unfortunately S-Tools uses certain | |
| mouse-only operations, so you will effectively lose your mouse while the | |
| S-Tools portion runs. The dictionary needed by this program is simply a list | |
| of words or passphrases separated by newlines. Keep in mind that Steganos | |
| does not allow passwords shorter than five characters, so strip those out to | |
| save time. If you need to use a " (double-quote) in the word/passphrase, | |
| simply use "" (two double quotes) in the dictionary. WinBatch likes this. A | |
| log file is created as c:\output.txt which simply lists all the attempted | |
| words/passphrases. The output file can be reused as a dictionary since no | |
| extraneous information is written out. Two options exist for inputting the | |
| names of the Stego tool executable, the dictionary file and the stego image. | |
| The S_BRUTE.INI file format (see below) allows the variables exepath, dict | |
| and stegofile which allow the input of these full path names into the | |
| program. In addition, the program can prompt for the filenames manually | |
| using standard Windows '95 file boxes. In this case, pay attention to the | |
| box titles as they come up. These titles describe what file the program is | |
| looking for. A variable is also available in the INI file called | |
| STEGANOSDELAY. This value (listed in seconds) determines how long to wait | |
| for a passphrase error message from Steganos. The default is 0, but if you | |
| get a lot of false positives (your machine is SLOW!) set this value to a few | |
| seconds. Due to the speed of the bruteforce attack, this program is not | |
| always accurate as to _which_word_ actually worked if it finds a match. In | |
| this case, S_BRUTE will tell you which word it _thinks_ worked, but you may | |
| have to try the word S_BRUTE gave you plus one or two of the previous words | |
| in c:\output.txt (plus a few different algorithms if you're using S-Tools). | |
| Either way, you are only looking at about 12 combinations (not bad!). | |
| Note that S-Tools and/or Steganos must be properly installed prior to using | |
| this program. S_BRUTE was not designed to brute force the entire keyspace, but | |
| to give you a faster method of determining the passphrase if you have any idea | |
| what it might be. If the stego image is found on a web page, create a | |
| dictionary from words and phrases found on that site, and let S_BRUTE do the | |
| work for you. | |
| <++> sbrute/S_BRUTE.WBT | |
| ;; Steganography Brute v1.0 written by a researcher at hacklab.com | |
| ;; For new versions and support programs see http://www.hacklab.com | |
| ;; This little toy brute forces two very common Steganography utilities, | |
| ;; specifically Steganos (http://www.steganography.com) and S-Tools written | |
| ;; by Andrew Brown (a.brown@nexor.co.uk) | |
| ;; This program can be run using a free program called WinBatch | |
| ;; from http://www.windowware.com | |
| ;; | |
| ;; | |
| ;;Notes: | |
| ;; | |
| ;; 1) The program depends on the executable name being either "S-TOOLS.EXE" or | |
| ;; "STEGANOS.EXE". This exe name decides many things, including the | |
| ;; semantics of the brute force attack and which types of container files | |
| ;; to accept. (Remember that the tools accept different types of container | |
| ;; files.) | |
| ;; 2) The dictionary file is simply a text file with words or phrases separated | |
| ;; by CR(LF). If a " (double quote) must be used in the word or phrase, | |
| ;; use "" (two double quotes) instead. This is Winbatch's way of representing | |
| ;; the double quote in a string. | |
| ;; 3) Internally, this program converts all Windows LFN-formatted dir/filenames to | |
| ;; DOS-style 8.3 or short dir/filenames. If you have problems, finding/using | |
| ;; LFN files, you may want to manually convert them to a SFN dir/file structure. | |
| ;; 4) The S-Tools test requires certain mouse-only operations. During this part of | |
| ;; the program, it's best to leave your machine alone. Otherwise the mouse will | |
| ;; be all over the place. Sorry. | |
| ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; | |
| :main ;; | |
| ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; | |
| Intcontrol(12,4,0,0,0) ;;controls abrupt endings | |
| if (winmetrics(-4) < 4 ) | |
| error="This program runs on Windows NT or Windows '95 only!" | |
| gosub bail_error | |
| EndIf | |
| cr=Num2Char(13) | |
| lf=Num2Char(10) | |
| crlf=StrCat(cr, lf) | |
| progname="Steganography Brute" | |
| STEGANOS=0 ;; Flag for Steganos | |
| STOOLS=0 ;; Flag for S-Tools | |
| text1='This program brute forces Steganography programs.' | |
| text2='Including S-Tools v4.0 and Steganos. Do you wish' | |
| text3='to continue?' | |
| ;q = AskYesNo('%progname%',"%text1% %crlf% %text2% %crlf% %text3%") | |
| If (AskYesNo('%progname%',"%text1% %crlf% %text2% %crlf% %text3%") == @NO) Then Exit | |
| text1="It is easiest to make all file settings through the" | |
| text2="S_BRUTE.INI file in this directory. If you do not use" | |
| text3="this file, you will be manually prompted for the files." | |
| Text4="Do you wish to use the INI file?" | |
| q= AskYesNo("%progname%"," %text1% %crlf% %text2% %crlf% %text3% %crlf% %text4%") | |
| if (q == @NO) Then gosub prompt_for_files | |
| else gosub set_files | |
| if (STEGANOS) | |
| gosub steganos | |
| else | |
| if (STOOLS) then gosub stools | |
| EndIf | |
| error="Passphrase not found!" | |
| gosub bail_error | |
| Exit | |
| ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; | |
| :steganos ;;; | |
| ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; | |
| Run("%exepath%", "%stegofile%") | |
| WinWaitExist("",10) ;;; Steganos' first window has no title. | |
| ;;; If you have problems, | |
| SendKeysTo("","{ENTER}") ;;; comment out these two lines... | |
| ;TimeDelay(10) ;;; and uncomment... | |
| ;SendKey("{ENTER}") ;;; these two lines. | |
| WinWaitExist("Steganos for Windows 95",30) | |
| SendKeysTo("Steganos for Windows 95","{ENTER}") | |
| dictgrip=FileOpen("%dict%","READ") | |
| fn1="c:\output.txt" | |
| handleout=FileOpen("%fn1%","Append") | |
| stitle="Steganos for Windows 95" | |
| START_TIME=TimeYmdHms() | |
| word=0 | |
| while (word != "*EOF*") | |
| word = FileRead(dictgrip) | |
| if word =="" then continue | |
| if word =="*EOF*" then break | |
| ClipPut("%word%") | |
| SendKeysTo(stitle,"^v{ENTER}") | |
| TimeDelay(STEGANOSDELAY) | |
| test=strsub(MsgTextGet(stitle),1,22) | |
| if test=="" | |
| text1="I think we have a match!" | |
| text2="Due to the speed of the brute force attack, check c:\output.txt" | |
| text3="to see the last few words used, but I think the passphrase is:" | |
| text4="%word%" | |
| success="%text1% %crlf%%text2% %crlf%%text3% %crlf%%text4%" | |
| gosub bail_success | |
| else | |
| if test=="This password is wrong" | |
| SendKeysTo(stitle,"{ENTER}") | |
| SendKeysTo(stitle,"!B{ENTER}") | |
| FileWrite(handleout,"%word%" ) | |
| endif | |
| endif | |
| endwhile | |
| STOP_TIME=TimeYmdHms() | |
| FileClose(dictgrip) | |
| FileClose(handleout) | |
| Return | |
| ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; | |
| :stools ;;; | |
| ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; | |
| Run("%exepath%", "%stegofile%") | |
| if (WinWaitExist("Welcome to S-Tools",5) == @TRUE) | |
| SendKeysTo("Welcome to S-Tools","!C") | |
| EndIf | |
| winplace(0,0,400,400,"~S-Tools") | |
| WinWaitClose("Please Wait") | |
| SendMenusTo("~S-Tools", "Window Tile Horizontally") | |
| text1="S-Tools requires certain mouse-only operations." | |
| text2='After clicking OK, position the mouse within your' | |
| text3="image in the S-Tools window and click the left button." | |
| message("Setup mouse for S-Tools","%text1% %crlf% %text2% %crlf% %text3%") | |
| while (mouseinfo(4)!="4") | |
| magic=mouseinfo(2) | |
| endwhile | |
| magicx=( ItemExtract(1,magic," ") ) | |
| magicy=( ItemExtract(2,magic," ") ) | |
| dictgrip=FileOpen("%dict%","READ") | |
| fn1="c:\output.txt" | |
| handleout=FileOpen("%fn1%","Append") | |
| START_TIME=TimeYmdHms() | |
| word=0 | |
| while (word != "*EOF*") | |
| word = FileRead(dictgrip) | |
| if word =="" then continue | |
| ClipPut("%word%") | |
| ;;; write to the output file | |
| if word!="*EOF*" | |
| if (FileWrite(handleout,"%word%" ) >0) | |
| error="Unable to open file %fn1%." | |
| gosub bail_error | |
| EndIf | |
| Endif | |
| for dumnum=1 to 4 ;; for all the algorithms | |
| MouseMove(magicx, magicy, "","") | |
| MouseClick(@RCLICK, 0) | |
| SendKeysTo("~S-Tools","r") | |
| SendKeysTo("~Revealing","!P^v!V^v!E") | |
| if (dumnum==1) then SendKeysTo("~Revealing","I") ;; IDEA | |
| if (dumnum==2) then SendKeysTo("~Revealing","D") ;; DES | |
| if (dumnum==3) then SendKeysTo("~Revealing","T") ;; DES3 | |
| if (dumnum==4) then SendKeysTo("~Revealing","M") ;; MDC | |
| SendKeysTo("~Revealing","{ENTER}") | |
| ;childlist=WinItemChild("~S-Tools") | |
| numchilds= ItemCount(WinItemChild("~S-Tools"), @TAB) | |
| if (numchilds>2) | |
| text1="We have an extra window in S-Tools! Possible passphrase match." | |
| text2="Due to the speed of the brute force attack, check c:\output.txt" | |
| text3="to see the last few words used, but I think the passphrase is:" | |
| text4="%word%" | |
| success="%text1% %crlf%%text2% %crlf%%text3% %crlf%%text4%" | |
| gosub bail_success | |
| endif | |
| next | |
| endwhile | |
| FileClose(dictgrip) | |
| FileClose(handleout) | |
| return | |
| ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; | |
| :set_files ;; | |
| ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; | |
| fname=IniReadPvt("Main", "exepath", ".\S-TOOLS.EXE", ".\S_BRUTE.INI") | |
| gosub path_clean | |
| exepath=fname | |
| gosub determine_tool_type | |
| fname=IniReadPvt("Main", "dict", ".\DICT.TXT", ".\S_BRUTE.INI") | |
| gosub path_clean | |
| dict=fname | |
| fname=IniReadPvt("Main", "stegofile", ".\STEGO.GIF", ".\S_BRUTE.INI") | |
| gosub path_clean | |
| stegofile=fname | |
| STEGANOSDELAY=IniReadPvt("Main","STEGANOSDELAY","0",".\S_BRUTE.INI") | |
| gifname= ItemExtract( (ItemCount("%stegofile%", "\")), "%stegofile%", "\") | |
| Return | |
| ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; | |
| :prompt_for_files ;; | |
| ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; | |
| msg = "Enter the Steganos error delay 0-60" | |
| STEGANOSDELAY=AskLine("%progname%", msg ,"0") | |
| types="Dictionary Text Files|*.txt|All Files|*.*|" | |
| dict=AskFileName("Select Dictionary Filename", "C:\", types, "dict.txt", 1) | |
| dict=FileNameShort(dict) | |
| types="Steganography tool Executable|*.exe|" | |
| msg="Where is the S-Tools or Steganos executable?" | |
| exepath=AskFileName(msg, "C:\", types, "", 1) | |
| exepath=FileNameShort(exepath) | |
| gosub determine_tool_type | |
| if (STEGANOS) | |
| types="Stego File (with hidden message)|*.bmp;*.dib;*.voc;*.wav;*.txt;*.html|" | |
| else | |
| types="Stego File (with hidden message)|*.gif;*.bmp;*.wav|" | |
| endif | |
| text1="Select Stego Filename (containing hidden message)" | |
| stegofile=AskFileName("%text1%", "C:\", types, "", 1) | |
| stegofile=FileNameShort(stegofile) | |
| gifname= ItemExtract( (ItemCount("%stegofile%", "\")), "%stegofile%", "\") | |
| Return | |
| ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; | |
| :path_clean ;; | |
| ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; | |
| switch FileExist(fname) | |
| case 0 | |
| error="File %fname% not found!" | |
| gosub bail_error | |
| break | |
| case (2) | |
| error="File %fname% in use!" | |
| gosub bail_error | |
| break | |
| endswitch | |
| fname=FileNameShort(fname) | |
| Return | |
| ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; | |
| :determine_tool_type ;; | |
| ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; | |
| exename=(StrUpper(ItemExtract( (ItemCount("%exepath%", "\")), "%exepath%", "\"))) | |
| if (exename == "S-TOOLS.EXE") then STOOLS=1 | |
| else if (exename == "STEGANOS.EXE") then STEGANOS=1 | |
| Return | |
| ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; | |
| :bail_error ;; | |
| ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; | |
| STOP_TIME=TimeYmdHms() | |
| Message("%progname% Error!","%error%") | |
| SECONDS=TimeDiffSecs(STOP_TIME,START_TIME) | |
| Message("%progname%","Finished in %SECONDS% seconds.") | |
| Exit | |
| ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; | |
| :bail_success ;; | |
| ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; | |
| STOP_TIME=TimeYmdHms() | |
| Message("%progname% Success!!!","%success%") | |
| Message("%progname%","Time Started: %START_TIME%%crlf%Time Finished: %STOP_TIME%") | |
| Exit | |
| <--> | |
| <++> sbrute/S_BRUTE.INI | |
| [Main] | |
| EXEPATH="C:\Program Files\Deus Ex Machina\Steganos\Steganos.exe" | |
| DICT="C:\win\desktop\dict.txt" | |
| STEGOFILE="C:\win\desktop\steclouds.bmp" | |
| ;STEGOFILE="C:\win\desktop\s-tclouds.gif" | |
| STEGANOSDELAY=0 ;; Set this higher for false positives. | |
| ;; (Steganos does not use different names for its | |
| ;; windows, so this program makes negative result | |
| ;; checks (ie bad passwords) based on an error dialog. | |
| ;; This timeout controls how many seconds to wait for | |
| ;; an error. Default=0 | |
| <--> | |
| ----[ EOF | |