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| 1 |
+
---
|
| 2 |
+
language:
|
| 3 |
+
- en
|
| 4 |
+
license: cc-by-4.0
|
| 5 |
+
task_categories:
|
| 6 |
+
- tabular-classification
|
| 7 |
+
- time-series-forecasting
|
| 8 |
+
size_categories:
|
| 9 |
+
- 1M<n<10M
|
| 10 |
+
tags:
|
| 11 |
+
- fraud-detection
|
| 12 |
+
- payments
|
| 13 |
+
- synthetic
|
| 14 |
+
- SEPA
|
| 15 |
+
- anomaly-detection
|
| 16 |
+
- finance
|
| 17 |
+
- tabular
|
| 18 |
+
pretty_name: SynSEPA — Synthetic SEPA Instant Payment Fraud Dataset
|
| 19 |
+
|
| 20 |
+
configs:
|
| 21 |
+
- config_name: default
|
| 22 |
+
data_files:
|
| 23 |
+
- split: transactions
|
| 24 |
+
path: data/synsep_full_dataset.csv
|
| 25 |
+
- split: accounts
|
| 26 |
+
path: data/accounts.csv
|
| 27 |
+
|
| 28 |
+
dataset_info:
|
| 29 |
+
description: >
|
| 30 |
+
SynSEPA is a synthetic SEPA Instant Credit Transfer dataset containing 1.84M
|
| 31 |
+
transactions across 10,000 accounts, with 4 APP fraud typologies injected
|
| 32 |
+
following EPC 2025 definitions. Calibrated against EBA-ECB 2025 fraud statistics.
|
| 33 |
+
features:
|
| 34 |
+
- name: transaction_id
|
| 35 |
+
dtype: string
|
| 36 |
+
- name: account_id
|
| 37 |
+
dtype: string
|
| 38 |
+
- name: persona
|
| 39 |
+
dtype: string
|
| 40 |
+
- name: timestamp
|
| 41 |
+
dtype: string
|
| 42 |
+
- name: sender_iban
|
| 43 |
+
dtype: string
|
| 44 |
+
- name: beneficiary_iban
|
| 45 |
+
dtype: string
|
| 46 |
+
- name: beneficiary_country
|
| 47 |
+
dtype: string
|
| 48 |
+
- name: country_type
|
| 49 |
+
dtype: string
|
| 50 |
+
- name: amount
|
| 51 |
+
dtype: float64
|
| 52 |
+
- name: remittance_category
|
| 53 |
+
dtype: string
|
| 54 |
+
- name: remittance_text
|
| 55 |
+
dtype: string
|
| 56 |
+
- name: hour_of_day
|
| 57 |
+
dtype: int64
|
| 58 |
+
- name: day_of_week
|
| 59 |
+
dtype: int64
|
| 60 |
+
- name: is_weekend
|
| 61 |
+
dtype: int64
|
| 62 |
+
- name: time_since_last_txn
|
| 63 |
+
dtype: float64
|
| 64 |
+
- name: is_new_beneficiary
|
| 65 |
+
dtype: int64
|
| 66 |
+
- name: is_fraud
|
| 67 |
+
dtype: int64
|
| 68 |
+
- name: fraud_type
|
| 69 |
+
dtype: string
|
| 70 |
+
splits:
|
| 71 |
+
- name: transactions
|
| 72 |
+
num_examples: 1839560
|
| 73 |
+
- name: accounts
|
| 74 |
+
num_examples: 10000
|
| 75 |
+
---
|
| 76 |
+
|
| 77 |
+
# SynSEPA: A Synthetic SEPA Instant Payment Dataset for APP Fraud Detection Research
|
| 78 |
+
|
| 79 |
+
[](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
|
| 80 |
+
[]()
|
| 81 |
+
[]()
|
| 82 |
+
[]()
|
| 83 |
+
|
| 84 |
+
---
|
| 85 |
+
|
| 86 |
+
## Overview
|
| 87 |
+
|
| 88 |
+
**SynSEPA** is the first publicly available synthetic dataset specifically designed for
|
| 89 |
+
Authorised Push Payment (APP) fraud detection in SEPA Instant Credit Transfer payments.
|
| 90 |
+
|
| 91 |
+
No public SEPA fraud dataset previously existed. SynSEPA fills this gap by providing
|
| 92 |
+
a large-scale, statistically calibrated synthetic dataset grounded in official EU
|
| 93 |
+
regulatory statistics from the EBA-ECB 2025 Payment Fraud Report and the EPC 2025
|
| 94 |
+
Payment Threats and Fraud Trends Report.
|
| 95 |
+
|
| 96 |
+
The dataset is released as part of the **SEPAGen** research project:
|
| 97 |
+
*"Transformer-Based Generative Anomaly Detection for APP Fraud in SEPA Instant Payments"*
|
| 98 |
+
|
| 99 |
+
---
|
| 100 |
+
|
| 101 |
+
## Why SynSEPA?
|
| 102 |
+
|
| 103 |
+
### The Problem
|
| 104 |
+
- SEPA Instant payments settle in **under 10 seconds** and are **irreversible**
|
| 105 |
+
- APP fraud — where victims are manipulated into authorising payments — caused
|
| 106 |
+
**€2.5 billion in EU losses in 2024** (EBA-ECB 2025), up 24% YoY
|
| 107 |
+
- **No public SEPA fraud dataset** existed for training or benchmarking ML models
|
| 108 |
+
- Real SEPA fraud data is proprietary, privacy-sensitive, and inaccessible to researchers
|
| 109 |
+
|
| 110 |
+
### The Solution
|
| 111 |
+
SynSEPA generates realistic SEPA payment sequences with:
|
| 112 |
+
- **4 APP fraud typologies** as defined by the EPC 2025 report
|
| 113 |
+
- **4 customer personas** representing the EU retail banking population
|
| 114 |
+
- **Statistical calibration** against EBA-ECB 2025 fraud report benchmarks
|
| 115 |
+
- **Sequential structure** enabling sequence-based generative model training
|
| 116 |
+
|
| 117 |
+
---
|
| 118 |
+
|
| 119 |
+
## Dataset Statistics
|
| 120 |
+
|
| 121 |
+
| Property | Value |
|
| 122 |
+
|---|---|
|
| 123 |
+
| Total transactions | 1,839,560 |
|
| 124 |
+
| Normal transactions | 1,832,448 (99.61%) |
|
| 125 |
+
| Fraud transactions | 7,112 (0.39%) |
|
| 126 |
+
| Unique accounts | 10,000 |
|
| 127 |
+
| Simulation period | January – December 2024 |
|
| 128 |
+
| Countries covered | 10 EU/EEA countries |
|
| 129 |
+
| Avg transactions per account | 184 |
|
| 130 |
+
| Min transactions per account | 69 |
|
| 131 |
+
|
| 132 |
+
### Fraud Breakdown
|
| 133 |
+
|
| 134 |
+
| Typology | Transactions | Victims | Avg Txns/Victim |
|
| 135 |
+
|---|---|---|---|
|
| 136 |
+
| Romance Scam | 4,232 | 720 | 5.9 |
|
| 137 |
+
| Bank Impersonation | 1,440 | 1,440 | 1.0 |
|
| 138 |
+
| Invoice / Mandate Fraud | 900 | 900 | 1.0 |
|
| 139 |
+
| CEO / BEC Fraud | 540 | 540 | 1.0 |
|
| 140 |
+
| **Total** | **7,112** | **3,600** | **1.98** |
|
| 141 |
+
|
| 142 |
+
### Account Personas
|
| 143 |
+
|
| 144 |
+
| Persona | Accounts | % | Fraud Targets |
|
| 145 |
+
|---|---|---|---|
|
| 146 |
+
| Regular Employee | 5,054 | 50.5% | Impersonation, Romance |
|
| 147 |
+
| Student | 1,972 | 19.7% | Romance, Impersonation |
|
| 148 |
+
| Retiree | 1,519 | 15.2% | Impersonation, Romance |
|
| 149 |
+
| Small Business | 1,455 | 14.5% | Invoice, CEO |
|
| 150 |
+
|
| 151 |
+
---
|
| 152 |
+
|
| 153 |
+
## File Structure
|
| 154 |
+
|
| 155 |
+
```
|
| 156 |
+
synsep-dataset/
|
| 157 |
+
├── data/
|
| 158 |
+
│ ├── synsep_full_dataset.csv ← Main dataset (1.84M transactions, ~298 MB)
|
| 159 |
+
│ └── accounts.csv ← Account metadata (10,000 accounts, ~3.9 MB)
|
| 160 |
+
├── code/
|
| 161 |
+
│ ├── generate/ ← Scripts to regenerate the dataset from scratch
|
| 162 |
+
│ └── examples/
|
| 163 |
+
│ └── sample_baseline.py ← Quick start: Isolation Forest baseline
|
| 164 |
+
├── README.md ← This file
|
| 165 |
+
└── dataset-metadata.json ← Kaggle dataset metadata
|
| 166 |
+
```
|
| 167 |
+
|
| 168 |
+
---
|
| 169 |
+
|
| 170 |
+
## Quick Start
|
| 171 |
+
|
| 172 |
+
```bash
|
| 173 |
+
pip install pandas scikit-learn matplotlib numpy
|
| 174 |
+
python code/examples/sample_baseline.py
|
| 175 |
+
```
|
| 176 |
+
|
| 177 |
+
This runs an Isolation Forest baseline on the dataset and prints AUROC, PR-AUC,
|
| 178 |
+
and a classification report at 1% FPR — a useful starting benchmark.
|
| 179 |
+
|
| 180 |
+
---
|
| 181 |
+
|
| 182 |
+
## Schema — synsep_full_dataset.csv
|
| 183 |
+
|
| 184 |
+
### Core SEPA Fields
|
| 185 |
+
|
| 186 |
+
| Column | Type | Description | Example |
|
| 187 |
+
|---|---|---|---|
|
| 188 |
+
| `transaction_id` | string | Unique transaction ID | TXN_00000001 |
|
| 189 |
+
| `account_id` | string | Sender account ID | ACC_000042 |
|
| 190 |
+
| `persona` | string | Account type | employee |
|
| 191 |
+
| `timestamp` | datetime | Transaction datetime | 2024-03-15 14:23:01 |
|
| 192 |
+
| `sender_iban` | string | Sender IBAN (synthetic) | DE89370400440532013000 |
|
| 193 |
+
| `beneficiary_iban` | string | Beneficiary IBAN (synthetic) | FR7630006000011234 |
|
| 194 |
+
| `beneficiary_country` | string | Beneficiary country code | FR |
|
| 195 |
+
| `amount` | float | Transaction amount (EUR) | 245.50 |
|
| 196 |
+
| `remittance_category` | string | Payment category | grocery |
|
| 197 |
+
| `remittance_text` | string | Payment reference text | Rent Mar 2024 |
|
| 198 |
+
|
| 199 |
+
### Engineered Features
|
| 200 |
+
|
| 201 |
+
| Column | Type | Description | Example |
|
| 202 |
+
|---|---|---|---|
|
| 203 |
+
| `country_type` | string | domestic / eu_cross_border / non_eu | domestic |
|
| 204 |
+
| `hour_of_day` | int | Hour of transaction (0-23) | 14 |
|
| 205 |
+
| `day_of_week` | int | Day of week (0=Monday, 6=Sunday) | 2 |
|
| 206 |
+
| `is_weekend` | int | Weekend flag (0/1) | 0 |
|
| 207 |
+
| `time_since_last_txn` | float | Seconds since previous transaction | 86400.0 |
|
| 208 |
+
| `is_new_beneficiary` | int | New IBAN never seen before (0/1) | 0 |
|
| 209 |
+
|
| 210 |
+
### Labels (for evaluation only — never used in unsupervised training)
|
| 211 |
+
|
| 212 |
+
| Column | Type | Description | Values |
|
| 213 |
+
|---|---|---|---|
|
| 214 |
+
| `is_fraud` | int | Fraud label | 0 = normal, 1 = fraud |
|
| 215 |
+
| `fraud_type` | string | Fraud typology | none / impersonation / invoice / romance / ceo |
|
| 216 |
+
|
| 217 |
+
---
|
| 218 |
+
|
| 219 |
+
## Schema — accounts.csv
|
| 220 |
+
|
| 221 |
+
| Column | Type | Description |
|
| 222 |
+
|---|---|---|
|
| 223 |
+
| `account_id` | string | Unique account ID |
|
| 224 |
+
| `persona` | string | Account type (employee/student/retiree/business) |
|
| 225 |
+
| `home_country` | string | Sender's home country |
|
| 226 |
+
| `sender_iban` | string | Account IBAN |
|
| 227 |
+
| `txn_per_month_min/max` | int | Transaction frequency range |
|
| 228 |
+
| `typical_amount` | float | Typical transaction amount |
|
| 229 |
+
| `foreign_txn_prob` | float | Cross-border transaction probability |
|
| 230 |
+
| `fraud_target_types` | JSON | Which fraud typologies target this account |
|
| 231 |
+
| `known_beneficiaries` | JSON | List of regular beneficiary IBANs |
|
| 232 |
+
|
| 233 |
+
---
|
| 234 |
+
|
| 235 |
+
## APP Fraud Typologies in SynSEPA
|
| 236 |
+
|
| 237 |
+
### Why these four typologies?
|
| 238 |
+
|
| 239 |
+
The four fraud types in SynSEPA were selected directly from the **EPC 2025 Payment
|
| 240 |
+
Threats and Fraud Trends Report** (EPC162-24 v2.0), which is the authoritative
|
| 241 |
+
classification of APP fraud in the SEPA ecosystem published by the European Payments
|
| 242 |
+
Council. These are not hypothetical categories — they represent the dominant, documented
|
| 243 |
+
patterns of Authorised Push Payment fraud occurring across EU/EEA markets today.
|
| 244 |
+
|
| 245 |
+
The selection criteria were:
|
| 246 |
+
|
| 247 |
+
1. **Coverage of the victim population** — the four typologies together target all four
|
| 248 |
+
account personas in SynSEPA (retail employees, students, retirees, and small
|
| 249 |
+
businesses), ensuring the dataset is not biased toward a single demographic.
|
| 250 |
+
|
| 251 |
+
2. **Diversity of behavioural signatures** — each typology produces a distinct statistical
|
| 252 |
+
footprint in the transaction data (amount level, timing, beneficiary geography,
|
| 253 |
+
sequence length), making the dataset useful for evaluating whether a model can
|
| 254 |
+
distinguish between fundamentally different fraud mechanisms rather than just
|
| 255 |
+
detecting one kind of outlier.
|
| 256 |
+
|
| 257 |
+
3. **Relevance to SEPA Instant specifically** — typologies were chosen where the
|
| 258 |
+
irrevocability and speed of SEPA Instant payments are part of the fraud mechanism
|
| 259 |
+
itself (e.g. impersonation fraudsters urgently pressure victims to transfer before
|
| 260 |
+
the bank can intervene; romance scammers exploit the ease of cross-border SEPA
|
| 261 |
+
transfers). Typologies that primarily exploit card networks or slower payment rails
|
| 262 |
+
were excluded.
|
| 263 |
+
|
| 264 |
+
4. **Volume calibration against EBA-ECB 2025** — victim counts and fraud volumes per
|
| 265 |
+
typology were set to reflect the proportions reported in the EBA-ECB 2025 Joint
|
| 266 |
+
Report on Payment Fraud, so the dataset mirrors the real EU fraud landscape.
|
| 267 |
+
|
| 268 |
+
### Typology Details
|
| 269 |
+
|
| 270 |
+
#### 1. Bank / Authority Impersonation
|
| 271 |
+
Fraudster poses as the victim's bank fraud team or a law enforcement agency, creating
|
| 272 |
+
urgency around a supposed security threat. Victim is convinced to transfer funds to a
|
| 273 |
+
"safe account" controlled by the fraudster.
|
| 274 |
+
|
| 275 |
+
- **Target personas:** Employees, Retirees, Students
|
| 276 |
+
- **Behavioural signature:** Single large transaction (3–10× the victim's normal amount),
|
| 277 |
+
new domestic IBAN never seen in history, urgent remittance text ("safe account transfer",
|
| 278 |
+
"security hold"), sent shortly after the last normal transaction
|
| 279 |
+
- **Why hard to detect:** Amount is large but the IBAN is domestic, and the timing follows
|
| 280 |
+
a normal inter-transaction gap — it does not look like an unusual payment channel
|
| 281 |
+
|
| 282 |
+
#### 2. Invoice / Mandate Fraud
|
| 283 |
+
Fraudster intercepts a legitimate supplier invoice (via email compromise or postal
|
| 284 |
+
interception) and replaces the beneficiary IBAN with one they control. The victim
|
| 285 |
+
pays what they believe is a routine business invoice.
|
| 286 |
+
|
| 287 |
+
- **Target personas:** Small Business only
|
| 288 |
+
- **Behavioural signature:** Amount closely mirrors the victim's typical supplier payment
|
| 289 |
+
(deliberately subtle), new IBAN despite a familiar-looking remittance reference,
|
| 290 |
+
business accounts only
|
| 291 |
+
- **Why hard to detect:** This is the most subtle typology — the amount is not anomalous,
|
| 292 |
+
the remittance text looks normal, and only the IBAN is new. A purely amount-based
|
| 293 |
+
detector will miss it entirely.
|
| 294 |
+
|
| 295 |
+
#### 3. Romance Scam
|
| 296 |
+
Fraudster cultivates a fake online relationship over weeks or months, then gradually
|
| 297 |
+
requests money under emotional pretexts (medical emergency, travel costs, investment
|
| 298 |
+
opportunity).
|
| 299 |
+
|
| 300 |
+
- **Target personas:** Employees, Students, Retirees
|
| 301 |
+
- **Behavioural signature:** 4–8 escalating payments to the same foreign IBAN over a
|
| 302 |
+
5–12 week period, emotional or personal remittance text, cross-border destination
|
| 303 |
+
- **Why hard to detect:** Each individual payment may not look anomalous in isolation —
|
| 304 |
+
it is the multi-week sequence of escalating payments to the same new foreign IBAN that
|
| 305 |
+
constitutes the fraud signal. This typology tests whether a model can detect
|
| 306 |
+
account-level behavioural drift over time.
|
| 307 |
+
|
| 308 |
+
#### 4. CEO / Business Email Compromise (BEC)
|
| 309 |
+
Fraudster impersonates a company's CEO or senior executive via email and instructs a
|
| 310 |
+
finance employee to make an urgent, confidential international transfer.
|
| 311 |
+
|
| 312 |
+
- **Target personas:** Small Business only
|
| 313 |
+
- **Behavioural signature:** Large amount, new non-EU IBAN, Friday afternoon timing
|
| 314 |
+
(when management is less available to verify), confidential remittance text
|
| 315 |
+
- **Why hard to detect:** The payment instruction appears to come from internal authority.
|
| 316 |
+
The fraud signal is in the combination of a large non-EU transfer on a Friday with a
|
| 317 |
+
new IBAN — no single feature is sufficient.
|
| 318 |
+
|
| 319 |
+
---
|
| 320 |
+
|
| 321 |
+
## Generation Methodology
|
| 322 |
+
|
| 323 |
+
SynSEPA was generated using a 3-step pipeline (code in `code/generate/`):
|
| 324 |
+
|
| 325 |
+
### Step 1 — Account Generation
|
| 326 |
+
10,000 synthetic accounts assigned to one of 4 personas. Each account receives:
|
| 327 |
+
- A syntactically correct IBAN for their home country
|
| 328 |
+
- Behavioural parameters (frequency, amount ranges, active hours)
|
| 329 |
+
- A list of 5-20 known beneficiary IBANs
|
| 330 |
+
|
| 331 |
+
### Step 2 — Normal Transaction Generation
|
| 332 |
+
12 months (Jan-Dec 2024) of transaction history per account, with:
|
| 333 |
+
- Transaction frequency sampled from persona distribution
|
| 334 |
+
- Timestamps weighted by persona's active hours and day-of-week patterns
|
| 335 |
+
- Beneficiaries drawn 80% from known list, 20% new
|
| 336 |
+
- Remittance categories and text sampled from persona's profile
|
| 337 |
+
- All engineered features computed (time_since_last_txn, is_new_beneficiary, etc.)
|
| 338 |
+
|
| 339 |
+
### Step 3 — Fraud Injection
|
| 340 |
+
APP fraud transactions injected following EPC 2025 typology signatures:
|
| 341 |
+
- Victim accounts selected by eligible persona type
|
| 342 |
+
- Fraud transaction parameters derived from victim's normal history
|
| 343 |
+
- Romance scam sequences span 4-8 payments over 5-12 week periods
|
| 344 |
+
|
| 345 |
+
---
|
| 346 |
+
|
| 347 |
+
## Statistical Calibration
|
| 348 |
+
|
| 349 |
+
SynSEPA is calibrated against the following EBA-ECB 2025 benchmarks:
|
| 350 |
+
|
| 351 |
+
| Metric | EBA Benchmark | SynSEPA | Status |
|
| 352 |
+
|---|---|---|---|
|
| 353 |
+
| Fraud rate (volume) | ~0.200% | 0.387% | Within range |
|
| 354 |
+
| Cross-border rate (normal) | ~11% | 11.1% | Matches |
|
| 355 |
+
| Weekend transaction rate | <25% | 19.8% | Passes |
|
| 356 |
+
| Business hours concentration | >60% | 89.1% | Passes |
|
| 357 |
+
| Fraud cross-border rate | > normal | 96.4% vs 11.1% | Correct |
|
| 358 |
+
|
| 359 |
+
> Note: Fraud rate (0.387%) exceeds EBA's 0.200% volume benchmark primarily
|
| 360 |
+
> because romance scams generate multiple transactions per victim (avg 5.9).
|
| 361 |
+
> This reflects the multi-event nature of romance fraud as documented by the EPC.
|
| 362 |
+
|
| 363 |
+
---
|
| 364 |
+
|
| 365 |
+
## Validation Results
|
| 366 |
+
|
| 367 |
+
SynSEPA passed **41 of 42** automated validation checks covering:
|
| 368 |
+
- Basic dataset composition and size
|
| 369 |
+
- Fraud typology distribution
|
| 370 |
+
- Persona behavioural profiles
|
| 371 |
+
- Temporal patterns (hours, weekdays, time between transactions)
|
| 372 |
+
- Fraud typology signature verification
|
| 373 |
+
- Cross-border transaction rates
|
| 374 |
+
- Sequence integrity (ordering per account)
|
| 375 |
+
- Amount distribution shape
|
| 376 |
+
|
| 377 |
+
---
|
| 378 |
+
|
| 379 |
+
## Intended Uses
|
| 380 |
+
|
| 381 |
+
Appropriate uses:
|
| 382 |
+
- Training and evaluating unsupervised or transformer based anomaly detection models
|
| 383 |
+
- Benchmarking generative models (VAE, GAN, Transformer, Diffusion) on tabular fraud data
|
| 384 |
+
- Sequence modelling research for financial fraud
|
| 385 |
+
- Academic research in payment fraud detection
|
| 386 |
+
- Developing and testing fraud detection pipelines without real customer data
|
| 387 |
+
|
| 388 |
+
Inappropriate uses:
|
| 389 |
+
- Training models intended for production deployment without further validation on real data
|
| 390 |
+
- Any use involving real customer data or real SEPA infrastructure
|
| 391 |
+
- Commercial fraud detection products without disclosure of synthetic data origin
|
| 392 |
+
|
| 393 |
+
---
|
| 394 |
+
|
| 395 |
+
## Limitations
|
| 396 |
+
|
| 397 |
+
1. **Synthetic data gap** — All data is synthetic. Real fraud patterns may have
|
| 398 |
+
nuances not captured in EPC typology descriptions.
|
| 399 |
+
|
| 400 |
+
2. **No device/session signals** — Real APP fraud detection also uses device
|
| 401 |
+
fingerprints, session behaviour, and browser signals. SynSEPA covers only
|
| 402 |
+
transaction-level signals.
|
| 403 |
+
|
| 404 |
+
3. **Simplified IBAN structure** — IBANs are syntactically correct but do not
|
| 405 |
+
pass Mod-97 checksum validation.
|
| 406 |
+
|
| 407 |
+
4. **Single year** — Covers January-December 2024 only. Seasonal effects beyond
|
| 408 |
+
this period are not represented.
|
| 409 |
+
|
| 410 |
+
5. **Retiree cross-border rate** — Marginally exceeds 10% target (achieved 10.3%)
|
| 411 |
+
— a minor calibration artefact with no material impact on model training.
|
| 412 |
+
|
| 413 |
+
---
|
| 414 |
+
|
| 415 |
+
## Citation
|
| 416 |
+
|
| 417 |
+
If you use SynSEPA in your research, please cite:
|
| 418 |
+
|
| 419 |
+
```bibtex
|
| 420 |
+
@dataset{synsep2025,
|
| 421 |
+
title = {SynSEPA: A Synthetic SEPA Instant Payment Dataset
|
| 422 |
+
for APP Fraud Detection Research},
|
| 423 |
+
author = {Bajaj, Gaurav},
|
| 424 |
+
year = {2026},
|
| 425 |
+
publisher = {Kaggle / HuggingFace},
|
| 426 |
+
note = {Generated as part of the SEPAGen project.
|
| 427 |
+
Calibrated against EBA-ECB 2025 Payment Fraud Report.}
|
| 428 |
+
}
|
| 429 |
+
```
|
| 430 |
+
|
| 431 |
+
---
|
| 432 |
+
|
| 433 |
+
## References
|
| 434 |
+
|
| 435 |
+
1. EBA-ECB (2025). *Joint Report on Payment Fraud*. European Banking Authority /
|
| 436 |
+
European Central Bank. December 2025.
|
| 437 |
+
|
| 438 |
+
2. EPC (2025). *Payment Threats and Fraud Trends Report* (EPC162-24 v2.0).
|
| 439 |
+
European Payments Council. November 2025.
|
| 440 |
+
|
| 441 |
+
3. Lopez-Rojas, E. (2017). *Synthetic Financial Datasets for Fraud Detection*
|
| 442 |
+
(PaySim). Kaggle.
|
| 443 |
+
|
| 444 |
+
---
|
| 445 |
+
|
| 446 |
+
## License
|
| 447 |
+
|
| 448 |
+
This dataset is released under the
|
| 449 |
+
[Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
|
| 450 |
+
license. You are free to share and adapt the dataset for any purpose, provided
|
| 451 |
+
appropriate credit is given.
|
| 452 |
+
|
| 453 |
+
---
|
| 454 |
+
|
| 455 |
+
*SynSEPA was generated entirely from synthetic data. No real customer data,
|
| 456 |
+
real SEPA transactions, or real bank records were used in its creation.*
|