query large_stringlengths 39 1.7k | ground_truth_code large_stringlengths 26 116k | severity large_stringclasses 3
values | vuln_type large_stringclasses 95
values | report_name large_stringclasses 16
values | audit_firm large_stringclasses 7
values | report_date large_stringclasses 10
values | source large_stringclasses 10
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
HIGH severity: 18_deploy_RollupRevenueVault.ts – Deployment Script Leaves Contract Uninitialized; fallback Does Not Enforce msg.value > 0. The deployment script for the RollupRevenueVault contract attempts to call a non-existent zero-parameter initialize() function, which causes the call to be routed to the fallback fu... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR MIT
pragma solidity 0.8.30;
import { AccessControlUpgradeable } from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/AccessControlUpgradeable.sol";
import { IERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";
import { L2MessageService } from "../messaging/l2/L2MessageS... | HIGH | CWE-691|CWE-705|CWE-584 | Linea - Burn Mechanism _ Consensys Diligence.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
MEDIUM severity: RollupRevenueVault - Deployment and Initialization Flow. The RollupRevenueVault contract implements two initialization functions: an initial 'initialize' with the 'initializer' modifier and a 'reinitializer(2)' function intended for upgrades. However, the use of a reinitializer that becomes immediately... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR MIT
pragma solidity 0.8.30;
import { AccessControlUpgradeable } from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/AccessControlUpgradeable.sol";
import { IERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";
import { L2MessageService } from "../messaging/l2/L2MessageS... | MEDIUM | CWE-691|CWE-362 | Linea - Burn Mechanism _ Consensys Diligence.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
HIGH severity: Potential for Arbitrary Application in Message Verification. This vulnerability allows an attacker to manipulate the application identifier during message verification. The issue arises because the broadcast message does not include the application address in its hash, despite the `source` field in the p... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.26;
import { IAttester } from "../../../interfaces/IAttester.sol";
import { LibAddress } from "../../../libs/LibAddress.sol";
import { MessageEncodingLib } from "../../../libs/MessageEncodingLib.sol";
import { BaseInputOracle } from "../../../oracles/BaseInputOracle... | HIGH | CWE-693|CWE-345|CWE-346 | OIF Broadcaster Audit.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
HIGH severity: Prover Copies Cannot Be Updated. The `updateBlockHashProverCopy` function in the `Receiver` contract fails to update prover copies due to a revert when attempting to read the version from the zero address. This occurs because the `_blockHashProverCopies` mapping is initialized to address(0), and the func... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.27;
import {IReceiver} from "./interfaces/IReceiver.sol";
import {IBlockHashProver} from "./interfaces/IBlockHashProver.sol";
import {IBlockHashProverPointer} from "./interfaces/IBlockHashProverPointer.sol";
import {BLOCK_HASH_PROVER_POINTER_SLOT} from "./BlockHashP... | HIGH | CWE-703|CWE-755|CWE-248 | OIF Broadcaster Audit.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
MEDIUM severity: Custom Fees Settable up to 100% in fulfillFastRedeems Can Seize Redemptions. The fulfillFastRedeems function allows a caller with the FULFILL_MANAGER_ROLE to specify a customFees array. While the code checks that the fee does not exceed 100% (feeBps <= BASIS_POINTS), it lacks a stricter, more reasonabl... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Terms: https://liminal.money/xtokens/license
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {IERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";
import {IERC20Metadata} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol";
import {SafeERC20} from "@openzeppelin/c... | MEDIUM | CWE-707|CWE-20|CWE-1284 | cantina_liminal_oct2025.pdf | Cantina | 2025-10-12 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Unsafe Type Conversion for Refund Recipient Can Lead to Funds Lost to 0xdead Address. In the lzCompose function's catch block, the logic to determine the refund recipient contains an unsafe type conversion. The code extracts a bytes32 value (extractedRecipient) and checks if it is non-zero before conve... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Terms: https://liminal.money/xtokens/license
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {SafeERC20, IERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol";
import {ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable.sol";
i... | MEDIUM | CWE-707|CWE-20|CWE-179 | cantina_liminal_oct2025.pdf | Cantina | 2025-10-12 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Critical Oracle Parameters Lack Timelock Protection. The setPriceId and setPriceIds functions in PythPriceOracle.sol, which configure Pyth price feed IDs and decimals, are only protected by PRICE_MANAGER_ROLE and lack timelock protection. A compromised or malicious price manager could instantly change ... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Terms: https://liminal.money/xtokens/license
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {AccessControlUpgradeable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/AccessControlUpgradeable.sol";
import {IPriceOracle} from "./interfaces/IPriceOracle.sol";
import {IERC20Metadata} from "@open... | MEDIUM | CWE-693 | cantina_liminal_oct2025.pdf | Cantina | 2025-10-12 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Oracle Manipulation Enables Attackers Unfair Share Minting and Inflated Redemptions. The protocol uses spot prices from PythPriceOracle for asset valuation, making it vulnerable to price manipulation via flash loans or other means. Attackers can exploit this during deposits (to mint excessive shares) o... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Terms: https://liminal.money/xtokens/license
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {AccessControlUpgradeable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/AccessControlUpgradeable.sol";
import {IPriceOracle} from "./interfaces/IPriceOracle.sol";
import {IERC20Metadata} from "@open... | MEDIUM | CWE-707|CWE-20 | cantina_liminal_oct2025.pdf | Cantina | 2025-10-12 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Timelock Admin Can Instantly Change Delays, Bypassing Governance Safeguards. The VaultTimelockController's setFunctionDelay and setDefaultFunctionDelay functions are protected only by DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE without any timelock, allowing immediate changes to delay periods. This undermines the entire purpos... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Terms: https://liminal.money/xtokens/license
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {TimelockControllerUpgradeable} from
"@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/governance/TimelockControllerUpgradeable.sol";
/**
* @title VaultTimelockController
* @notice Enhanced timelock controlle... | MEDIUM | CWE-693 | cantina_liminal_oct2025.pdf | Cantina | 2025-10-12 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Privileged Role Can Arbitrarily Set NAV and Drain Instant Redeemable Funds Due to Circumventable & Missing Safeguards. The NAVOracle contract allows the VALUATION_MANAGER_ROLE to call setTotalAssets and directly overwrite the Net Asset Value (NAV). While a maxPercentageIncrease check exists, it can be ... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Terms: https://liminal.money/xtokens/license
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {AccessControlUpgradeable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/AccessControlUpgradeable.sol";
import {Math} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol";
import {IERC20Metadata} from ... | MEDIUM | CWE-693 | cantina_liminal_oct2025.pdf | Cantina | 2025-10-12 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Incorrect Performance Fee Calculation. 1. **Description:** The collectPerformanceFee function in the FeeManager contract fails to differentiate between actual yield generated by the vault's investment strategies and new capital deposited by users. This leads to inaccurate performance fee calculations.
... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Terms: https://liminal.money/xtokens/license
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {AccessControlUpgradeable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/AccessControlUpgradeable.sol";
import {ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/ReentrancyG... | MEDIUM | CWE-682 | cantina_liminal_oct2025.pdf | Cantina | 2025-10-12 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: High-Water Mark Logic Penalizes Performance Fee Collection. The collectPerformanceFee function in FeeManager updates the lastSupplyForPerformance state variable before minting fee shares. This causes the high-water mark to be set pre-dilution, so the next fee calculation interprets the dilution as a pe... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Terms: https://liminal.money/xtokens/license
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {AccessControlUpgradeable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/AccessControlUpgradeable.sol";
import {ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/ReentrancyG... | MEDIUM | CWE-691|CWE-670 | cantina_liminal_oct2025.pdf | Cantina | 2025-10-12 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Client-Identified Flaw in Performance Fee Calculation Under Rework. A flaw was identified in the performance fee calculation logic in FeeManager.sol where the high-water mark is updated before minting fee shares, leading to incorrect performance tracking.
The root cause is the same as in finding 4.1 — ... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Terms: https://liminal.money/xtokens/license
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {AccessControlUpgradeable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/AccessControlUpgradeable.sol";
import {ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/ReentrancyG... | MEDIUM | CWE-691|CWE-841 | cantina_liminal_oct2025.pdf | Cantina | 2025-10-12 | FORGE-Curated |
HIGH severity: Missing access control on unlockCallback(). The unlockCallback() functions in LikwidLendPosition.sol, LikwidMarginPosition.sol, and LikwidPairPosition.sol lack access control, allowing any external caller to invoke them with arbitrary data. This occurs because the contracts do not inherit from Uniswap v4... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Likwid Contracts
pragma solidity ^0.8.26;
// Local
import {Math} from "./libraries/Math.sol";
import {BasePositionManager} from "./base/BasePositionManager.sol";
import {PoolKey} from "./types/PoolKey.sol";
import {PoolId} from "./types/PoolId.sol";
import {Currency} from "./typ... | HIGH | CWE-284|CWE-285|CWE-862 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
HIGH severity: There is a incorrect marginTotal reduction on liquidation. During liquidation in MarginPosition.sol, the close() function reduces positionValue by rewardAmount before calculating releaseAmount. However, the subsequent marginTotal reduction logic assumes releaseAmount represents the full proportional shar... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Likwid Contracts
pragma solidity ^0.8.26;
// Local
import {BasePositionManager} from "./base/BasePositionManager.sol";
import {IMarginPositionManager} from "./interfaces/IMarginPositionManager.sol";
import {IProtocolFees} from "./interfaces/IProtocolFees.sol";
import {IVault} fr... | HIGH | CWE-682 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
HIGH severity: There is a incorrect reserve accounting in liquidateBurn function. In LikwidMarginPosition.sol, liquidateBurn() uses releaseAmount from the close() function to update reserve deltas, but close() already reduces releaseAmount by rewardAmount. The true amount withdrawn from lending reserves is releaseAmoun... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Likwid Contracts
pragma solidity ^0.8.26;
// Local
import {BasePositionManager} from "./base/BasePositionManager.sol";
import {IMarginPositionManager} from "./interfaces/IMarginPositionManager.sol";
import {IProtocolFees} from "./interfaces/IProtocolFees.sol";
import {IVault} fr... | HIGH | CWE-682 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
HIGH severity: Health check inconsistency between position creation and liquidation. The checkLiquidate() function uses truncated reserves (lagging prices) for health checks, while position creation functions (_executeAddLeverage and _executeAddCollateralAndBorrow) use current pair reserves. This creates a discrepancy ... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Likwid Contracts
pragma solidity ^0.8.26;
// Local
import {BasePositionManager} from "./base/BasePositionManager.sol";
import {IMarginPositionManager} from "./interfaces/IMarginPositionManager.sol";
import {IProtocolFees} from "./interfaces/IProtocolFees.sol";
import {IVault} fr... | HIGH | CWE-435 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Slippage is not checked when result amounts are zero. The _processDelta() function in BasePositionManager.sol fails to enforce slippage checks when delta.amount0() or delta.amount1() is exactly zero. This occurs because the slippage validation logic is only triggered when the delta is strictly less tha... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Likwid Contracts
pragma solidity ^0.8.26;
// Openzeppelin
import {ERC721} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol";
import {ERC721Enumerable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/extensions/ERC721Enumerable.sol";
// Solmate
import {Owned} from "solmate/src/au... | MEDIUM | CWE-693|CWE-424 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: The old pairReserves is used for margin level checks in the margin. In the _margin() function of LikwidMarginPosition.sol, the _checkMinLevel() function is called using the pre-swap value of poolState.pairReserves, even after _executeAddLeverage() modifies the reserves through a leveraged swap. The roo... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Likwid Contracts
pragma solidity ^0.8.26;
// Local
import {BasePositionManager} from "./base/BasePositionManager.sol";
import {IMarginPositionManager} from "./interfaces/IMarginPositionManager.sol";
import {IProtocolFees} from "./interfaces/IProtocolFees.sol";
import {IVault} fr... | MEDIUM | CWE-691|CWE-670 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: The borrow level check blocks positive margin adjustments in the modify function. The modify() function in LikwidMarginPosition.sol enforces a _checkMinLevel() using minBorrowLevel() regardless of whether the user is adding or removing margin. The root cause is the unconditional application of the stri... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Likwid Contracts
pragma solidity ^0.8.26;
// Local
import {BasePositionManager} from "./base/BasePositionManager.sol";
import {IMarginPositionManager} from "./interfaces/IMarginPositionManager.sol";
import {IProtocolFees} from "./interfaces/IProtocolFees.sol";
import {IVault} fr... | MEDIUM | CWE-691|CWE-670 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: The deadline check is missing in the increaseLiquidity and removeLiquidity functions. The increaseLiquidity() and removeLiquidity() functions in LikwidPairPosition.sol do not include a deadline parameter or validation, unlike the swap functions. The root cause is the absence of time-based transaction v... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Likwid Contracts
pragma solidity ^0.8.26;
// Local
import {BasePositionManager} from "./base/BasePositionManager.sol";
import {PoolKey} from "./types/PoolKey.sol";
import {PoolId} from "./types/PoolId.sol";
import {Currency} from "./types/Currency.sol";
import {BalanceDelta} fro... | MEDIUM | CWE-707|CWE-20 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Ignored closeAmount in the liquidateBurn function causes user funds loss during liquidation. In the liquidateBurn() function of LikwidMarginPosition.sol, the closeAmount returned by position.close() is not accounted for, even though it represents residual value from the liquidation swap. The root cause... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Likwid Contracts
pragma solidity ^0.8.26;
// Local
import {BasePositionManager} from "./base/BasePositionManager.sol";
import {IMarginPositionManager} from "./interfaces/IMarginPositionManager.sol";
import {IProtocolFees} from "./interfaces/IProtocolFees.sol";
import {IVault} fr... | MEDIUM | CWE-664|CWE-669 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Inconsistent level check when modifying margin position. The modify() function in LikwidMarginPosition.sol uses _marginLevels.minBorrowLevel() for validation, even when modifying leveraged positions that should be subject to minMarginLevel(). The root cause is the use of an incorrect threshold for marg... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Likwid Contracts
pragma solidity ^0.8.26;
// Local
import {BasePositionManager} from "./base/BasePositionManager.sol";
import {IMarginPositionManager} from "./interfaces/IMarginPositionManager.sol";
import {IProtocolFees} from "./interfaces/IProtocolFees.sol";
import {IVault} fr... | MEDIUM | CWE-691|CWE-670 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: The lack of restriction when margin with leverage = 0 can cause DoS of operations. The _executeAddCollateralAndBorrow() function restricts borrow amounts to 20% of real reserves per transaction but does not enforce a cumulative limit. The root cause is the absence of a global check on mirrorReserve gro... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Likwid Contracts
pragma solidity ^0.8.26;
// Local
import {BasePositionManager} from "./base/BasePositionManager.sol";
import {IMarginPositionManager} from "./interfaces/IMarginPositionManager.sol";
import {IProtocolFees} from "./interfaces/IProtocolFees.sol";
import {IVault} fr... | MEDIUM | CWE-664|CWE-400|CWE-770 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: User can close position even when below liquidation level. The close() function in LikwidMarginPosition.sol allows users to fully close their margin positions without verifying whether the position is above the liquidation threshold. The root cause is the lack of a liquidation state check before allowi... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Likwid Contracts
pragma solidity ^0.8.26;
// Local
import {BasePositionManager} from "./base/BasePositionManager.sol";
import {IMarginPositionManager} from "./interfaces/IMarginPositionManager.sol";
import {IProtocolFees} from "./interfaces/IProtocolFees.sol";
import {IVault} fr... | MEDIUM | CWE-693|CWE-424 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Incorrect mirror reserve restriction during leveraged margin addition can cause DoS of operations. The _executeAddLeverage() function in LikwidMarginPosition.sol checks mirror reserve limits using the condition Math.mulDiv(borrowMirrorReserves, 100, borrowRealReserves + borrowMirrorReserves) > 90. The ... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Likwid Contracts
pragma solidity ^0.8.26;
// Local
import {BasePositionManager} from "./base/BasePositionManager.sol";
import {IMarginPositionManager} from "./interfaces/IMarginPositionManager.sol";
import {IProtocolFees} from "./interfaces/IProtocolFees.sol";
import {IVault} fr... | MEDIUM | CWE-682 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Missing maximum leverage validation in _margin function can cause liquidity risk. The _margin() function in LikwidMarginPosition.sol uses params.leverage directly without validating it against the protocol's maximum leverage limit (max_leverage = 5). The root cause is the absence of an explicit bounds ... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Likwid Contracts
pragma solidity ^0.8.26;
// Local
import {BasePositionManager} from "./base/BasePositionManager.sol";
import {IMarginPositionManager} from "./interfaces/IMarginPositionManager.sol";
import {IProtocolFees} from "./interfaces/IProtocolFees.sol";
import {IVault} fr... | MEDIUM | CWE-707|CWE-20|CWE-1284 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Missing validation between poolId and tokenId allows mismatched pool assignments leading to permanent locked lend position. The exactInput() and exactOutput() functions in LikwidLendPosition.sol accept both poolId and tokenId as user inputs but do not validate that the provided poolId corresponds to th... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Likwid Contracts
pragma solidity ^0.8.26;
// Local
import {Math} from "./libraries/Math.sol";
import {BasePositionManager} from "./base/BasePositionManager.sol";
import {PoolKey} from "./types/PoolKey.sol";
import {PoolId} from "./types/PoolId.sol";
import {Currency} from "./typ... | MEDIUM | CWE-707|CWE-20|CWE-1288 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
HIGH severity: The implementation of setStageLeavePart is incorrect. The setStageLeavePart function in MarginState.sol is intended to clear a 24-bit field in a packed storage variable before inserting a new value. However, the masking operation uses incorrect constants (STAGE_SIZE and STAGE_LEAVE_PART) instead of the p... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
type MarginState is bytes32;
using MarginStateLibrary for MarginState global;
/// @notice Library for getting and setting values in the MarginState type
library MarginStateLibrary {
uint24 internal constant MASK_24_BITS = 0xFFFFFF;
uint8 internal const... | HIGH | CWE-682 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: The mirrorReserve is not updated by total interest, causing cumulative debt mismatch and reserve discrepancy. In InterestMath.sol, the updateInterestForOne() function updates mirrorReserve using only the net interest after deducting the protocol fee. The root cause is the incorrect accounting of intere... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import {FeeTypes} from "../types/FeeTypes.sol";
import {Reserves} from "../types/Reserves.sol";
import {MarginState} from "../types/MarginState.sol";
import {Math} from "./Math.sol";
import {FixedPoint96} from "./FixedPoint96.sol";
import {FeeLibrary} from "./Fee... | MEDIUM | CWE-682 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
HIGH severity: Protocol fees extracted from interests are not accounted for. In InterestMath.sol, the updateInterestForOne() function calculates protocol fees from accrued interest using ProtocolFeeLibrary.splitFee(), but fails to store or return these fees. Although the fees are subtracted from the user's interest, th... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import {FeeTypes} from "../types/FeeTypes.sol";
import {Reserves} from "../types/Reserves.sol";
import {MarginState} from "../types/MarginState.sol";
import {Math} from "./Math.sol";
import {FixedPoint96} from "./FixedPoint96.sol";
import {FeeLibrary} from "./Fee... | HIGH | CWE-664|CWE-221|CWE-223 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
HIGH severity: Default protocol settings are not persisted. The setDefaultProtocolFee() function in ProtocolFees.sol computes a new fee value using the setProtocolFee() method but fails to write it back to the defaultProtocolFee storage variable. This makes the function a no-op—despite emitting an event that suggests t... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import {FeeTypes} from "../types/FeeTypes.sol";
import {Currency} from "../types/Currency.sol";
import {IProtocolFees} from "../interfaces/IProtocolFees.sol";
import {PoolKey} from "../types/PoolKey.sol";
import {ProtocolFeeLibrary} from "../libraries/ProtocolFee... | HIGH | CWE-664|CWE-221|CWE-223 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
HIGH severity: Truncated reserves bypass price safety mechanism when no interest accrues. The price safety mechanism in PriceMath.sol uses truncatedReserves to limit rapid price changes by gradually converging toward actual reserves. However, both updateInterests() and getCurrentState() bypass this mechanism when no in... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Likwid Contracts
pragma solidity ^0.8.26;
import {Math} from "./Math.sol";
import {SafeCast} from "./SafeCast.sol";
import {PerLibrary} from "./PerLibrary.sol";
import {Reserves, toReserves} from "../types/Reserves.sol";
library PriceMath {
using SafeCast for *;
using P... | HIGH | CWE-693|CWE-424 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
HIGH severity: Unused setMarginFee function causes margin fee to remain hardcoded. The setMarginFee() function in Pool.sol is defined but never called, causing the protocol to rely on a hardcoded defaultMarginFee value. This renders the margin fee immutable after deployment, preventing dynamic adjustments based on gove... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import {BalanceDelta, toBalanceDelta, BalanceDeltaLibrary} from "../types/BalanceDelta.sol";
import {FeeTypes} from "../types/FeeTypes.sol";
import {MarginActions} from "../types/MarginActions.sol";
import {MarginState} from "../types/MarginState.sol";
impor... | HIGH | CWE-664|CWE-1329 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
HIGH severity: Protocol fees are included in the reserves. During swaps in Pool.sol, protocol fees are split from LP fees and included in the amount added to reserves. However, protocol fees should be tracked separately in protocolFeesAccrued and not contribute to liquidity reserves. Including them in reserves inflates... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import {BalanceDelta, toBalanceDelta, BalanceDeltaLibrary} from "../types/BalanceDelta.sol";
import {FeeTypes} from "../types/FeeTypes.sol";
import {MarginActions} from "../types/MarginActions.sol";
import {MarginState} from "../types/MarginState.sol";
impor... | HIGH | CWE-682 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Inconsistent update of interest state. The updateInterests() function in Pool.sol conditionally updates state variables based on the 'changed' flag returned by updateInterestForOne(). While most state variables like mirrorReserve0 and pairReserve0 are updated only if result0.changed is true, borrow0Cum... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import {BalanceDelta, toBalanceDelta, BalanceDeltaLibrary} from "../types/BalanceDelta.sol";
import {FeeTypes} from "../types/FeeTypes.sol";
import {MarginActions} from "../types/MarginActions.sol";
import {MarginState} from "../types/MarginState.sol";
impor... | MEDIUM | CWE-664|CWE-372 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Zero truncated reserves on first liquidity addition enables dynamic fee bypass. When a pool is initialized, truncated reserves are set to zero and remain unchanged during the first liquidity addition within the same block. The root cause is the failure to update truncated reserves immediately after liq... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import {BalanceDelta, toBalanceDelta, BalanceDeltaLibrary} from "../types/BalanceDelta.sol";
import {FeeTypes} from "../types/FeeTypes.sol";
import {MarginActions} from "../types/MarginActions.sol";
import {MarginState} from "../types/MarginState.sol";
impor... | MEDIUM | CWE-664|CWE-665|CWE-1419 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Truncated reserves calculated with stale pair reserves. The updateInterests() function in Pool.sol calculates new truncatedReserves using outdated _pairReserves instead of the updated pairReserve0 and pairReserve1 values returned by updateInterestForOne(). The root cause is the use of stale data in the... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import {BalanceDelta, toBalanceDelta, BalanceDeltaLibrary} from "../types/BalanceDelta.sol";
import {FeeTypes} from "../types/FeeTypes.sol";
import {MarginActions} from "../types/MarginActions.sol";
import {MarginState} from "../types/MarginState.sol";
impor... | MEDIUM | CWE-682|CWE-1339 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
HIGH severity: Checkpointed state used in LikwidMarginPosition differs from the core implementation. The StateLibrary.getCurrentState() function used in LikwidMarginPosition diverges from the core Pool.updateInterests() logic, particularly in how protocol fees are loaded. StateLibrary.getSlot0() retrieves fees directly... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import {PoolId} from "../types/PoolId.sol";
import {IVault} from "../interfaces/IVault.sol";
import {IMarginBase} from "../interfaces/IMarginBase.sol";
import {Slot0, Slot0Library} from "../types/Slot0.sol";
import {Reserves, ReservesLibrary, toReserves} from "..... | HIGH | CWE-664|CWE-372 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
HIGH severity: Unused borrowAmountMax parameter allows excessive borrowing beyond user’s expected limit. The borrowAmountMax parameter in the CreateParams struct is intended to cap the maximum borrow amount during leveraged position creation, serving as a slippage protection mechanism. However, this parameter is never ... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
pragma solidity ^0.8.26;
import {PoolId} from "../types/PoolId.sol";
import {PoolKey} from "../types/PoolKey.sol";
import {MarginLevels} from "../types/MarginLevels.sol";
import {IBasePositionManager} from "./IBasePositionManager.sol";
import {MarginPosition} from "../libraries/Mar... | HIGH | CWE-707|CWE-20|CWE-1284 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Potential overflow when applying delta to Reserves. In Reserves.sol, the applyDelta() function performs unchecked additions when delta values are negative (i.e., adding liquidity). Specifically, lines 104 and 118 add uint128(-d0) and uint128(-d1) without overflow checks, which can wrap around due to th... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import {Math} from "../libraries/Math.sol";
import {FixedPoint96} from "../libraries/FixedPoint96.sol";
import {BalanceDelta} from "./BalanceDelta.sol";
/// @dev Two `uint128` values packed into a single `uint256` where the upper 128 bits represent reserve0
/// ... | MEDIUM | CWE-682|CWE-128 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Inconsistent margin level calculation allows unfair manipulation. The marginLevel() function in MarginPosition.sol uses different formulas depending on whether leverage is zero or greater than zero. For leverage = 0, it uses liquidity-based valuation, while for leverage > 0, it uses spot price to estim... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Likwid Contracts
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import {Math} from "./Math.sol";
import {Reserves} from "../types/Reserves.sol";
import {CustomRevert} from "./CustomRevert.sol";
import {SwapMath} from "./SwapMath.sol";
import {PerLibrary} from "./PerLibrary.sol";
import {SafeCast} from... | MEDIUM | CWE-682 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Wrong use of mulDiv during debt updates. The update() function in MarginPosition.sol uses Math.mulDiv to scale debtAmount and margin amounts based on cumulative interest indices. The root cause is the use of integer division with truncation (rounding down), which introduces small rounding losses (dust)... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Likwid Contracts
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import {Math} from "./Math.sol";
import {Reserves} from "../types/Reserves.sol";
import {CustomRevert} from "./CustomRevert.sol";
import {SwapMath} from "./SwapMath.sol";
import {PerLibrary} from "./PerLibrary.sol";
import {SafeCast} from... | MEDIUM | CWE-682|CWE-1339 | Likwid - Zenith Audit Report.pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-13 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Unsafe transferFrom() may make the deployer not have to provide the initial liquidity. The vulnerability arises in the createPool function of ALTBCFactory.sol, where the contract uses an unsafe IERC20.transferFrom() call to transfer the initial liquidity token (xToken) from the deployer to the newly cr... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
pragma solidity ^0.8.24;
import "lib/liquidity-base/src/common/IErrors.sol";
import {ALTBCPool, FeeInfo, IERC20} from "src/amm/ALTBCPool.sol";
import {ALTBCFactoryDeployed} from "src/common/IALTBCEvents.sol";
import {ALTBCInput} from "src/amm/ALTBC.sol";
import {FactoryBase} from "... | MEDIUM | CWE-703|CWE-754|CWE-252 | Forte - Zenith Audit Report (October).pdf | Zenith | 2025-10-24 | FORGE-Curated |
HIGH severity: Share price manipulation attack in Box.flash() callbacks. The vulnerability arises because the Box.flash() function caches the Net Asset Value (NAV) at the beginning of the flash operation, freezing totalAssets(), while allowing deposits and withdrawals that modify totalSupply(). This creates an inconsis... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED
// Copyright (c) 2025 Steakhouse Financial
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {IERC4626} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/interfaces/IERC4626.sol";
import {ERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol";
import {IERC20Metadata} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/exte... | HIGH | CWE-664|CWE-666 | cantina_steakhouse_nov2025.pdf | Cantina | 2025-11-03 | FORGE-Curated |
HIGH severity: Incorrect Execution Context for Transfer on Core When Finalizing a Swap. The `finalizeSwapFlows` function in `HyperCoreFlowExecutor.sol` attempts to transfer final tokens from a `SwapHandler` back to the user by calling `HyperCoreLib.transferERC20CoreToCore` directly. However, this call is executed from ... | //SPDX-License-Identifier: Unlicense
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import { AccessControl } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControl.sol";
import { IERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol";
import { SafeERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol";... | HIGH | CWE-691|CWE-670 | Sponsored Periphery Audit.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
HIGH severity: Incorrect Token Index Prevents Asset Rescue. The `sweepOnCoreFromSwapHandler` function in `HyperCoreFlowExecutor.sol` is the only administrative mechanism to withdraw assets from a `SwapHandler` on the HyperCore layer. However, it incorrectly uses a market-specific `assetIndex` instead of the required to... | //SPDX-License-Identifier: Unlicense
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import { AccessControl } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControl.sol";
import { IERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol";
import { SafeERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol";... | HIGH | CWE-682 | Sponsored Periphery Audit.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
HIGH severity: Partial Conversion of Initial Token Leads to Stranded Funds. The `_executeFlow` function in `ArbitraryEVMFlowExecutor.sol` uses balance snapshots before and after a multicall execution to determine the outcome. It assumes that the `initialToken` is either fully consumed or fully refunded, and only accoun... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import { IERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";
import { SafeERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol";
// Import MulticallHandler
import { MulticallHandler } from "../../handlers/MulticallHandler.sol";
... | HIGH | CWE-691|CWE-670 | Sponsored Periphery Audit.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
MEDIUM severity: Incorrect `finalToken` in `HyperEVMFallback`. In the `_initiateSwapFlow` function, if a user's HyperCore account is not activated and the swap is not sponsored, the flow diverts to `_fallbackHyperEVMFlow`. However, the `params` object passed to the fallback still contains the user's intended `finalToke... | //SPDX-License-Identifier: Unlicense
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import { AccessControl } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControl.sol";
import { IERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol";
import { SafeERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol";... | MEDIUM | CWE-691|CWE-670 | Sponsored Periphery Audit.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
MEDIUM severity: Stranded `baseToken` Dust in `SwapHandler` Contracts. The `HyperCoreFlowExecutor` transfers the entire `baseToken` amount to a `SwapHandler` for external swaps. Due to exchange precision limits (e.g., tick size, fees), small amounts of `baseToken` dust may remain in the `SwapHandler` after a swap.
The... | //SPDX-License-Identifier: Unlicense
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import { AccessControl } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControl.sol";
import { IERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol";
import { SafeERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol";... | MEDIUM | CWE-664|CWE-404|CWE-772 | Sponsored Periphery Audit.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
MEDIUM severity: Native Tokens Are Irrecoverable. The `ArbitraryEVMFlowExecutor.sol` contract has a `receive() payable` function, allowing it to accept native HYPE tokens. However, there is no mechanism to withdraw these native tokens once received.
The cause is a missing administrative function for native token recov... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import { IERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";
import { SafeERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol";
// Import MulticallHandler
import { MulticallHandler } from "../../handlers/MulticallHandler.sol";
... | MEDIUM | CWE-664|CWE-404|CWE-772 | Sponsored Periphery Audit.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
MEDIUM severity: Unsafe ABI Encoding. The codebase uses `abi.encodeWithSelector` in multiple locations, which is not type-safe and can lead to incorrect calldata encoding if the function signature does not match the intended target. This is used in functions such as `_buildMulticallInstructions`, `receiveMessage`, `lzC... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import { IERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";
import { SafeERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol";
// Import MulticallHandler
import { MulticallHandler } from "../../handlers/MulticallHandler.sol";
... | MEDIUM | CWE-707|CWE-20|CWE-1287 | Sponsored Periphery Audit.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
MEDIUM severity: Unchecked Return Value of `transfer` Call. The `sweepErc20` function in the `SwapHandler` contract calls `transfer` on an ERC-20 token but does not check its boolean return value. Some ERC-20 tokens return `false` on failure instead of reverting, which would cause the transfer to fail silently while th... | //SPDX-License-Identifier: Unlicense
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import { IERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";
import { HyperCoreLib } from "../../libraries/HyperCoreLib.sol";
import { FinalTokenInfo } from "./Structs.sol";
contract SwapHandler {
address public immutable parentHandler;
... | MEDIUM | CWE-703|CWE-754|CWE-252 | Sponsored Periphery Audit.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
MEDIUM severity: Finalize Swap Flow Lacks Configuration Check for Final Token. The `finalizeSwapFlows` function in `HyperCoreFlowExecutor` reads `FinalTokenInfo` from a mapping without validating whether the token is configured. If an unconfigured token is passed, the `swapHandler` will be address(0), leading to a bala... | //SPDX-License-Identifier: Unlicense
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import { AccessControl } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControl.sol";
import { IERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol";
import { SafeERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol";... | MEDIUM | CWE-707|CWE-20 | Sponsored Periphery Audit.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
MEDIUM severity: Application Payloads Lack Versioning. The system uses custom-encoded payloads (`composeMsg` and `hookData`) to pass data between chains, but these payloads do not include a version number.
The root cause is the absence of a versioning mechanism in the payload structure.
If the payload format is changed... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
pragma solidity ^0.8.23;
import { Quote } from "./Structs.sol";
import { QuoteSignLib } from "./QuoteSignLib.sol";
import { ComposeMsgCodec } from "./ComposeMsgCodec.sol";
import { IOFT, IOAppCore, SendParam, MessagingFee } from "../../../interfaces/IOFT.sol";
import { AddressToBy... | MEDIUM | CWE-435|CWE-436|CWE-115 | Sponsored Periphery Audit.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
MEDIUM severity: Inconsistent Storage Layout Pattern. The contracts use a hybrid storage model combining Solidity's default state variable layout with a namespaced storage pattern using EIP-7201.
The root cause is an attempt to manage contract size while minimizing refactoring, leading to mixed patterns.
This complexit... | //SPDX-License-Identifier: Unlicense
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import { AccessControl } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControl.sol";
import { IERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol";
import { SafeERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol";... | MEDIUM | CWE-435 | Sponsored Periphery Audit.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
HIGH severity: Not Forwarding The Exact OFT Messaging Fees. The `deposit` function in `SponsoredOFTSrcPeriphery` forwards the entire `msg.value` to the LayerZero messenger without validating it against the calculated fee, which may cause reverts if the amount is not exact.
The cause is lack of input validation and fee ... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
pragma solidity ^0.8.23;
import { Quote } from "./Structs.sol";
import { QuoteSignLib } from "./QuoteSignLib.sol";
import { ComposeMsgCodec } from "./ComposeMsgCodec.sol";
import { IOFT, IOAppCore, SendParam, MessagingFee } from "../../../interfaces/IOFT.sol";
import { AddressToBy... | HIGH | CWE-707|CWE-20|CWE-1284 | Sponsored Periphery Audit.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
HIGH severity: Incorrect Spot Price Decimal Conversion. The `_getApproxRealizedPrice` function assumes a fixed 8-decimal precision for spot prices from HyperCore, but the actual precision depends on the asset's `szDecimals`.
The cause is hardcoded decimal assumption without accounting for asset-specific scaling.
Price ... | //SPDX-License-Identifier: Unlicense
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import { AccessControl } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControl.sol";
import { IERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol";
import { SafeERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol";... | HIGH | CWE-682|CWE-1339 | Sponsored Periphery Audit.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
HIGH severity: Incorrect Market Index for Limit Orders. The market index for limit orders is incorrectly set to the asset index instead of `10000 + asset index`, as required by the HyperCore system.
The cause is logic error in the `submitLimitOrderFromBot` and `cancelLimitOrderByCloid` functions.
Limit orders will be s... | //SPDX-License-Identifier: Unlicense
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import { AccessControl } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControl.sol";
import { IERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol";
import { SafeERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol";... | HIGH | CWE-682 | Sponsored Periphery Audit.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
HIGH severity: Incorrect Handling Of The Sponsored Account Activation Fee. The `activateUserAccount` function incorrectly transfers the activation fee directly to the user's HyperCore account instead of having the sponsor's account cover the fee during activation.
The cause is misunderstanding of the HyperCore account ... | //SPDX-License-Identifier: Unlicense
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import { AccessControl } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControl.sol";
import { IERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol";
import { SafeERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol";... | HIGH | CWE-435|CWE-436|CWE-437 | Sponsored Periphery Audit.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
HIGH severity: Lack of Access Control Can Lead to Loss of Contract-Held Funds. The `handleV3AcrossMessage` function in `HyperliquidDepositHandler` is external and lacks access control, allowing any caller to trigger a bridge of the contract's token balance to a user on Hypercore.
The root cause is the absence of role-b... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import "../interfaces/SpokePoolMessageHandler.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts-v4/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts-v4/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts-v4/security/ReentrancyGuard.sol";
import ... | HIGH | CWE-284|CWE-285|CWE-862 | Sponsored Periphery Audit.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
MEDIUM severity: `HyperliquidDepositHandler` is Susceptible to Funds Griefing. The `HyperliquidDepositHandler` contract allows user account activation via `_depositToHypercore`, which unconditionally withdraws an activation fee from a `DonationBox`. An attacker can repeatedly call `handleV3AcrossMessage` with a zero am... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import "../interfaces/SpokePoolMessageHandler.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts-v4/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts-v4/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts-v4/security/ReentrancyGuard.sol";
import ... | MEDIUM | CWE-284|CWE-285|CWE-862 | Sponsored Periphery Audit.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
MEDIUM severity: Lack of Event Emission. The `addSupportedToken` function in `HyperliquidDepositHandler` modifies state by adding a new token configuration but does not emit an event.
The root cause is the omission of an event emission after a state-changing administrative action.
Off-chain systems such as monitoring t... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import "../interfaces/SpokePoolMessageHandler.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts-v4/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts-v4/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts-v4/security/ReentrancyGuard.sol";
import ... | MEDIUM | CWE-664|CWE-221|CWE-223 | Sponsored Periphery Audit.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
MEDIUM severity: Misleading and Non-Authoritative Whitelist Events in `PermissionedMulticallHandler`. The `PermissionedMulticallHandler` contract emits custom events `CallerWhitelisted` and `CallerRemovedFromWhitelist` via wrapper functions `whitelistCaller` and `removeCallerFromWhitelist`. However, these events are em... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import { MulticallHandler } from "./MulticallHandler.sol";
import { AccessControl } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControl.sol";
/**
* @title PermissionedMulticallHandler
* @notice Extension of MulticallHandler that restricts access to whi... | MEDIUM | CWE-693|CWE-778 | Sponsored Periphery Audit.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
MEDIUM severity: Unnecessary `payable` Fallback Function. The `fallback` function in `BaseModuleHandler` is marked `payable`, allowing it to receive native assets, but the target logic in `HyperCoreFlowExecutor` does not contain any `payable` functions.
The root cause is the inclusion of the `payable` modifier without ... | //SPDX-License-Identifier: Unlicense
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import { AuthorizedFundedFlow } from "./AuthorizedFundedFlow.sol";
import { HyperCoreFlowExecutor } from "./HyperCoreFlowExecutor.sol";
import { HyperCoreFlowRoles } from "./HyperCoreFlowRoles.sol";
// Note: v5 is necessary since v4 does not use ERC-7201.
i... | MEDIUM | CWE-693 | Sponsored Periphery Audit.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
HIGH severity: Payments before the first redemption block can be challenged. 1. **Description:** Previously, an agent could submit a redemption request before the underlying payment was proven illegal, allowing them to exploit timing by anticipating the required payment reference and making transfers on the underlying ... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.27;
import {IBalanceDecreasingTransaction} from "@flarenetwork/flare-periphery-contracts/flare/IFdcVerification.sol";
import {SafeCast} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/SafeCast.sol";
import {AssetManagerBase} from "./AssetManagerBase.sol";
import {Reentranc... | HIGH | CWE-707|CWE-20|CWE-1285 | Flare FAsset Review - Zellic Audit Report.pdf | Zellic | 2025-10-16 | FORGE-Curated |
HIGH severity: The upgradeWNatContract function must now be called by governance or executor. 1. **Description:** The upgradeWNatContract function in AgentCollateralFacet.sol previously allowed any agent vault owner to update the WNAT contract address, creating a risk of inconsistent state updates between the asset man... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.27;
import {IERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";
import {SafeCast} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/SafeCast.sol";
import {ReentrancyGuard} from "../../openzeppelin/security/ReentrancyGuard.sol";
import {AssetManagerBase} from "./As... | HIGH | CWE-284|CWE-285|CWE-863 | Flare FAsset Review - Zellic Audit Report.pdf | Zellic | 2025-10-16 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Possible Cross-Contract Signature Replay Attack. The vulnerability arises because the `calculateClaimZBTHash` function does not include the contract's own address (`address(this)`) in the hash computation used for ECDSA signature verification. This omission allows a valid signature intended for one ins... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {Ownable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol";
import {IERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";
import {MessageHashUtils} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/cryptography/MessageHashUtils.sol";
import {ECDSA} from "@open... | MEDIUM | CWE-693|CWE-345|CWE-347 | ClaimVault Security Audit.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
HIGH severity: StakedTokenDistributor Immutability Breaks Claim Functionality. The P2pResolvProxy contract stores the StakedTokenDistributor address as an immutable variable, which prevents it from being updated after deployment. The StakedTokenDistributor contract uses an immutable Merkle root set at deployment, which... | // SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2025 P2P Validator <info@p2p.org>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity 0.8.30;
import "../../../@resolv/IResolvStaking.sol";
import "../../../@resolv/IStUSR.sol";
import "../../../@resolv/IStakedTokenDistributor.sol";
import "../../../p2pYieldProxy/P2pYieldProxy.sol";
import "./IP... | HIGH | CWE-435 | P2P.org Resolv Integration Security Audit Report.pdf | MixBytes | 2025-11-12 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: RESOLV Withdrawal Double Fee When claimEnabled is false. When withdrawRESOLV() is called while claimEnabled is false, the ResolvStaking contract returns only the principal, not the rewards. However, the P2pYieldProxy calculates accruedRewards before the withdrawal using _getCurrentAssetAmount(), which ... | // SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2025 P2P Validator <info@p2p.org>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity 0.8.30;
import "../../../@resolv/IResolvStaking.sol";
import "../../../@resolv/IStUSR.sol";
import "../../../@resolv/IStakedTokenDistributor.sol";
import "../../../p2pYieldProxy/P2pYieldProxy.sol";
import "./IP... | MEDIUM | CWE-682 | P2P.org Resolv Integration Security Audit Report.pdf | MixBytes | 2025-11-12 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Extra Reward Tokens from ResolvStaking Stuck in P2pResolvProxy. During a RESOLV withdrawal, the ResolvStaking contract may transfer multiple reward tokens to the proxy if multiple reward tokens are configured. However, the P2pYieldProxy._withdraw() function only tracks the balance delta of the primary ... | // SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2025 P2P Validator <info@p2p.org>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity 0.8.30;
import "../../../@resolv/IResolvStaking.sol";
import "../../../@resolv/IStUSR.sol";
import "../../../@resolv/IStakedTokenDistributor.sol";
import "../../../p2pYieldProxy/P2pYieldProxy.sol";
import "./IP... | MEDIUM | CWE-435|CWE-436|CWE-437 | P2P.org Resolv Integration Security Audit Report.pdf | MixBytes | 2025-11-12 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: _getCurrentAssetAmount() Uses effectiveBalance Incorrectly, Causing Wrong Accrued Rewards Calculation. The _getCurrentAssetAmount() function uses getUserEffectiveBalance(), which includes a time-based boost multiplier, to calculate the current asset amount. However, effectiveBalance is a virtual balanc... | // SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2025 P2P Validator <info@p2p.org>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity 0.8.30;
import "../../../@resolv/IResolvStaking.sol";
import "../../../@resolv/IStUSR.sol";
import "../../../@resolv/IStakedTokenDistributor.sol";
import "../../../p2pYieldProxy/P2pYieldProxy.sol";
import "./IP... | MEDIUM | CWE-682 | P2P.org Resolv Integration Security Audit Report.pdf | MixBytes | 2025-11-12 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: initiateWithdrawalRESOLVAccruedRewards() Withdraws Both Principal and Rewards Instead of Only Rewards. The initiateWithdrawalRESOLVAccruedRewards() function calls initiateWithdrawal() on ResolvStaking, which burns stRESOLV tokens (principal) regardless of intent. This means that even when the goal is t... | // SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2025 P2P Validator <info@p2p.org>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity 0.8.30;
import "../../../@resolv/IResolvStaking.sol";
import "../../../@resolv/IStUSR.sol";
import "../../../@resolv/IStakedTokenDistributor.sol";
import "../../../p2pYieldProxy/P2pYieldProxy.sol";
import "./IP... | MEDIUM | CWE-691|CWE-670 | P2P.org Resolv Integration Security Audit Report.pdf | MixBytes | 2025-11-12 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Profit Misclassification Due to Stale Rewards Calculation. The _withdraw() function calculates accruedRewards before calling the external withdrawal function. However, in the ResolvStaking contract, the withdrawal triggers a checkpoint() that updates and transfers newly accrued rewards to the proxy. Be... | // SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2025 P2P Validator <info@p2p.org>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity 0.8.30;
import "../@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradable/security/ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable.sol";
import "../@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol";
import "../@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Add... | MEDIUM | CWE-691|CWE-670 | P2P.org Resolv Integration Security Audit Report.pdf | MixBytes | 2025-11-12 | FORGE-Curated |
HIGH severity: Stale Total Assets Value During Flash Operation. The vulnerability arises because during a flash operation, the Net Asset Value (NAV) is cached to prevent read-only reentrancy, and totalAssets() returns this cached value. However, this cached value is not updated during deposit(), mint(), withdraw(), or ... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED
// Copyright (c) 2025 Steakhouse Financial
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {IERC4626} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/interfaces/IERC4626.sol";
import {ERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol";
import {IERC20Metadata} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/exte... | HIGH | CWE-664|CWE-666 | ChainSecurity_Steakhouse_Box_Audit.pdf | ChainSecurity | 2025-12-15 | FORGE-Curated |
HIGH severity: Funds Can Be Locked in FundingAave During Winddown. This vulnerability occurs when the Box has an open debt position on Aave during winddown. The Box.repay() function allows repayAmount to exceed the actual debt, but AaveV3 caps the repayment to the debt amount, leaving the excess funds stuck in the Fund... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED
// Copyright (c) 2025 Steakhouse Financial
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {IERC4626} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/interfaces/IERC4626.sol";
import {ERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol";
import {IERC20Metadata} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/exte... | HIGH | CWE-435|CWE-436|CWE-437 | ChainSecurity_Steakhouse_Box_Audit.pdf | ChainSecurity | 2025-12-15 | FORGE-Curated |
HIGH severity: Read-only Reentrancy. The swapping functions allocate(), deallocate(), and reallocate() accept an arbitrary swapper address, creating a read-only reentrancy vector. A malicious swapper can pull tokens out of the Box during a swap, causing the total assets to be undervalued when queried. If BoxAdapterCach... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED
// Copyright (c) 2025 Steakhouse Financial
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {IERC4626} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/interfaces/IERC4626.sol";
import {ERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol";
import {IERC20Metadata} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/exte... | HIGH | CWE-691|CWE-1265 | ChainSecurity_Steakhouse_Box_Audit.pdf | ChainSecurity | 2025-12-15 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Gas Griefing Problems. Multiple functions in the codebase are vulnerable to gas griefing attacks due to checks that require token balances to be zero before certain operations can proceed. For example, Box.removeToken() reverts if the token balance is non-zero, allowing an attacker to send a minimal am... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED
// Copyright (c) 2025 Steakhouse Financial
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {IERC4626} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/interfaces/IERC4626.sol";
import {ERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol";
import {IERC20Metadata} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/exte... | MEDIUM | CWE-664|CWE-400|CWE-405 | ChainSecurity_Steakhouse_Box_Audit.pdf | ChainSecurity | 2025-12-15 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Box Cannot Receive Native Currency. The Box contract lacks a receive() or fallback() function, making it impossible to send native currency (e.g., ETH) directly to the contract. Any attempt to transfer native tokens—such as skimming from a funding module—will revert. This limits functionality and creat... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED
// Copyright (c) 2025 Steakhouse Financial
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {IERC4626} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/interfaces/IERC4626.sol";
import {ERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol";
import {IERC20Metadata} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/exte... | MEDIUM | CWE-710|CWE-1076 | ChainSecurity_Steakhouse_Box_Audit.pdf | ChainSecurity | 2025-12-15 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Discrepancy in Cumulated Slippage Computation. There is an inconsistency in how slippage percentage is calculated depending on whether the system is in a flash operation. Normally, slippage is computed as 100 * PRECISION / (X - 100), where X is the totalAssets before the loss. However, during a flash o... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED
// Copyright (c) 2025 Steakhouse Financial
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {IERC4626} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/interfaces/IERC4626.sol";
import {ERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol";
import {IERC20Metadata} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/exte... | MEDIUM | CWE-682 | ChainSecurity_Steakhouse_Box_Audit.pdf | ChainSecurity | 2025-12-15 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Excessive Access Control for addFundingCollateral(). The function Box.addFundingCollateral() enforces both a timelock and requires msg.sender to be the curator. This dual restriction is overly strict compared to other similar addFundingXYZ() functions, which only require the timelock. Since the timeloc... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED
// Copyright (c) 2025 Steakhouse Financial
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {IERC4626} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/interfaces/IERC4626.sol";
import {ERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol";
import {IERC20Metadata} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/exte... | MEDIUM | CWE-710|CWE-657|CWE-637 | ChainSecurity_Steakhouse_Box_Audit.pdf | ChainSecurity | 2025-12-15 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Box Decimals Fixed to 18. The Box.decimals() function always returns 18 and is never overridden, even when the underlying asset has a different number of decimals (e.g., USDC with 6 decimals). This causes a 1:1 minting of shares relative to assets without proper normalization, leading to incorrect shar... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED
// Copyright (c) 2025 Steakhouse Financial
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {IERC4626} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/interfaces/IERC4626.sol";
import {ERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol";
import {IERC20Metadata} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/exte... | MEDIUM | CWE-682|CWE-1339 | ChainSecurity_Steakhouse_Box_Audit.pdf | ChainSecurity | 2025-12-15 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: BoxAdapterCached Can Be Arbitraged. This vulnerability arises from the caching mechanism in BoxAdapterCached, which stores the totalAssets value for up to 24 hours to avoid expensive recalculations. During this period, the cached value may diverge significantly from the actual value returned by Box.tot... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
// Copyright (c) 2025 Morpho Association, Steakhouse Financial
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {IERC4626} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/interfaces/IERC4626.sol";
import {IERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";
import {SafeCast} from "@openzeppelin/cont... | MEDIUM | CWE-435|CWE-1038 | ChainSecurity_Steakhouse_Box_Audit.pdf | ChainSecurity | 2025-12-15 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: FundingMorpho.depledge() Does Not Sanitize collateralToken. The depledge() function in FundingMorpho allows callers to specify any whitelisted collateral token, not necessarily the one associated with the market. If a different whitelisted token is provided, the function withdraws the correct collatera... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
// Copyright (c) 2025 Steakhouse Financial
pragma solidity 0.8.28;
import {IMorpho, Id, MarketParams, Position} from "@morpho-blue/interfaces/IMorpho.sol";
import "@morpho-blue/libraries/ConstantsLib.sol";
import {MarketParamsLib} from "@morpho-blue/libraries/MarketParamsLi... | MEDIUM | CWE-707|CWE-20|CWE-1288 | ChainSecurity_Steakhouse_Box_Audit.pdf | ChainSecurity | 2025-12-15 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Partial Swaps Can Lead to Permanently Locked Funds. The V3DexSwap contract is designed to swap ETH for LINEA tokens using a Uniswap V3-style DEX. It accepts a _sqrtPriceLimitX96 parameter that can cause a partial swap if the price limit is reached during execution. The root cause of the vulnerability i... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR MIT
pragma solidity 0.8.30;
import { IV3DexSwap } from "./interfaces/IV3DexSwap.sol";
import { ISwapRouterV3 } from "./interfaces/ISwapRouterV3.sol";
import { IWETH9 } from "./interfaces/IWETH9.sol";
/**
* @title V3DexSwap.
* @dev A contract for swapping tokens on a decentr... | MEDIUM | CWE-664|CWE-404|CWE-772 | Linea Burn Mechanism Audit.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
MEDIUM severity: Unprotected Reinitializer Function. The RollupRevenueVault contract is an upgradeable contract using the OpenZeppelin Initializable pattern. It includes a reinitializer function (initializeRolesAndStorageVariables) intended for use during version 2 upgrades. The vulnerability arises because this functi... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR MIT
pragma solidity 0.8.30;
import { AccessControlUpgradeable } from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/AccessControlUpgradeable.sol";
import { IERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";
import { L2MessageService } from "../messaging/l2/L2MessageS... | MEDIUM | CWE-284|CWE-285|CWE-862 | Linea Burn Mechanism Audit.md | FORGE-Curated | ||
MEDIUM severity: The function finalizeWithdrawERC20 does not implement the logic for forwarding data. The function finalizeWithdrawERC20 in L1ERC20GatewayValidium.sol includes a parameter `_data` intended to be optional data forwarded to the recipient. However, despite the comment indicating this functionality, the fun... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity =0.8.24;
import {ClonesUpgradeable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy/ClonesUpgradeable.sol";
import {IERC20MetadataUpgradeable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20MetadataUpgradeable.sol";
import {IERC20Upgradeable} fro... | MEDIUM | CWE-710|CWE-1068 | Cloak V1 - Zellic Audit Report.pdf | Zellic | 2025-10-16 | FORGE-Curated |
HIGH severity: Front-running the encryption-key–registration transaction can deny service to function finalizeBundle. The function registerNewEncryptionKey in ScrollChainValidium.sol is called after contract deployment to register the first encryption key, which is associated with a specific message index. However, bec... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity =0.8.24;
import {AccessControlUpgradeable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/AccessControlUpgradeable.sol";
import {PausableUpgradeable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/security/PausableUpgradeable.sol";
import {IL1MessageQueueV2} from "../L1/r... | HIGH | CWE-691|CWE-841 | Cloak V1 - Zellic Audit Report.pdf | Zellic | 2025-10-16 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Flawed ETH/USD routing. The vulnerability arises in the OracleRouter contract's getPricesAndDecimals function, which reverts when the requested quote denomination (ETH or USD) does not match the configured primary quote for either token in a pair. This flawed logic prevents the use of an ETH/USD bridge... | // SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2024 Lido <info@lido.fi>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity 0.8.23;
import {Math} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol";
import {IERC20Metadata} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol";
import {Ownable} from "../Ownable.sol";
import... | MEDIUM | CWE-703|CWE-755 | ackee-blockchain-lido-stonks-2.0-report.pdf | Ackee-Blockchain | 2025-11-17 | FORGE-Curated |
HIGH severity: Missing receive / fallback, ERC721 & ERC1155 token accepting hooks. The Atlas.sol contract lacks a receive or fallback function, which prevents it from accepting Ether during execution of calls or batch operations. This causes transactions sending Ether to the delegated address to revert. Additionally, t... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity 0.8.30;
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/cryptography/ECDSA.sol";
interface IAtlas {
event CallExecuted(address indexed sender, address indexed to, uint256 value, bytes data);
error InvalidSigner();
error ExpiredSignature();
error Unauthorized();
... | HIGH | CWE-691|CWE-431 | cantina_byzantine_dec2025.pdf | Cantina | 2025-12-06 | FORGE-Curated |
MEDIUM severity: Signature replay due to shared storage in EIP-7702 context. The usedNonces mapping in Atlas.sol uses standard storage slots that reside on the delegating EOA in an EIP-7702 context. When a user switches delegations (e.g., Atlas → OtherImpl → Atlas), the intermediate contract may overwrite the storage s... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity 0.8.30;
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/cryptography/ECDSA.sol";
interface IAtlas {
event CallExecuted(address indexed sender, address indexed to, uint256 value, bytes data);
error InvalidSigner();
error ExpiredSignature();
error Unauthorized();
... | MEDIUM | CWE-435 | cantina_byzantine_dec2025.pdf | Cantina | 2025-12-06 | FORGE-Curated |
LOW severity: Unnecessary parameter amount in withdraw function. **Severity:** Informational
**Description:** The function `withdraw()` has a parameter `amount` but we don't understand the necessity of this parameter.
At line L67, the amount is required to be the same to the whole deposit amount. This means the user d... | DepositVault.sol
59: function withdraw(uint256 amount, uint256 nonce, bytes memory signature, address payable recipient) public {
60: require(nonce < deposits.length, "Invalid deposit index");
61: Deposit storage depositToWithdraw = deposits[nonce];
62: bytes32 withdrawalHash = getWithdrawal... | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
MEDIUM severity: TRST-Calculation of the new emissions amount is not 75%/25%/5%. **Description:**
The calculations of the emissions directed to SatinVoter.sol, VeDist.sol, and the treasury are
done on top of the weekly emissions instead as part of it, resulting in a different percentage
distribution. The calculations... | uint _weekly = WEEKLY_EMISSION;
WEEKLY_EMISSION =(_weekly * _WEEKLY_EMISSION_DECREASE) / _WEEKLY_EMISSION_DECREASE_DENOMINATOR;
uint _growth = _calculateGrowth(_weekly);
uint _required = _growth + _weekly;
uint _required = _weekly;
// …snippet…
token.approve(address(_voter()), _week... | MEDIUM | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Use named mapping parameters to explicitly note the purpose of keys and values. **Description:** Use named mapping parameters to explicitly note the purpose of keys and values:
* [`BasisTradeTailor`](https://github.com/buttonxyz/button-protocol/blob/9002f2b0d05ba80039bd942c809dbe5bc1a252c9/src/BasisTrad... | // Mappings
/// @notice Maps pocket address to the user who controls it
mapping(address => address) public pocketUser;
/// @notice Tracks pending withdrawal amounts for each pocket
mapping(address => uint256) public withdrawalRequests;
/// @notice Whitelist of addresses allowed to create pockets
mapping(add... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Trader can't reduce open position size when under initial margin requirement but over maintenance margin requirement. **Description:** [`OrderBranch::createMarketOrder`](https://github.com/zaros-labs/zaros-core-audit/blob/de09d030c780942b70f1bebcb2d245214144acd2/src/perpetuals/branches/OrderBranch.sol#L2... | function test_TraderCantReducePositionSizeWhenCollateralUnderIntitialRequired() external {
// give naruto some tokens
uint256 USER_STARTING_BALANCE = 100_000e18;
int128 USER_POS_SIZE_DELTA = 10e18;
deal({ token: address(usdToken), to: users.naruto, give: USER_STARTING_BALANCE });
// naruto creat... | HIGH | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: Obol fees will be applied retroactively to all non-distributed funds in the Splitter. When Obol decides to turn on fees, a call will be made to `ImmutableSplitController::updateSplit()`, which will take the predefined split parameters (the original user specified split with Obol's fees added in) and call ... | function updateSplit() external payable {
if (msg.sender != owner()) revert Unauthorized();
(address[] memory accounts, uint32[] memory percentAllocations) = getNewSplitConfiguration();
ISplitMain(splitMain()).updateSplit(split, accounts, percentAllocations, uint32(distributorFee()));
}
function updateSp... | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: [MAOR-11] Oracle report sanity check positive gains limit could result in DoS. **Severity:** Low
**Path:** src/Oracle.sol:sanityCheckUpdate#L362-484
**Description:**
Once the oracle client has generated a report, it submits this report on-chain to the `Oracle.sol` contract. The Oracle contract will pas... | // 7200 slots per day * 365 days per year = 2628000 slots per year
// assuming 5% yield per year
// 5% / 2628000 = 1.9025e-8
// 1.9025e-8 per slot = 19025 PPT
maxConsensusLayerGainPerBlockPPT = 190250; // 10x approximate rate
uint256 upperBound = baselineGrossCLBalance
+ Math.mulDiv(maxConsensusLayerGainPerBlockPP... | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
MEDIUM severity: Attackers can prevent users creating an offer by frontrunning. **Description:** The protocol allows anyone to create offers with an offer ID provided by the user. While this design gives users the flexibility to choose their offer ID, it also introduces a problem.
The `createOffer` function checks if ... | TunnlTwitterOffers.sol
152: function createOffer(bytes32 offerId, uint256 maxPaymentUsdc, uint32 acceptanceDurationSeconds, uint32 _offerDurationSeconds) external {
153:
154: require(offerId != bytes32(0), "Invalid offerId");
155: require(s_offers[offerId].creationDate == 0, "Offer already exists");... | MEDIUM | holdout_Solodit | ||||
LOW severity: The improper usage of return statement:. **Description**
**Recommendation**:
The return statement can be safely removed. | function getRewardRate() public view virtual override whenNotPaused returns ( ) {
rewardRate = _rewardRate;
return rewardRate;
} | LOW | holdout_Solodit | ||||
HIGH severity: Calculation for `owedAmount` will round down to zero. **Impact:**
High, as this will result in 0 claimable rewards for users when they should have been able to claim some
**Likelihood:**
High, as this will happen any time the user's share is smaller than the pool's cached global share, which is almost a... | owedAmount = (currentShareRaw / pool[_poolNumber].currentGlobalShare) * pool[_poolNumber].value;
- owedAmount = (currentShareRaw / pool[_poolNumber].currentGlobalShare) * pool[_poolNumber].value;
+ owedAmount = currentShareRaw * pool[_poolNumber].value / pool[_poolNumber].currentGlobalShare; | HIGH | holdout_Solodit |
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