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IN CASE 8/55
FEDERATION CHARBONNIERE DE BELGIQUE, REPRESENTED BY LOUIS DEHASSE, LEON CANIVET, PIERRE DELVILLE AND HENRI GOUDAILLIER, ASSISTED BY PAUL TSCHOFFEN, ADVOCATE AT THE COUR D'APPEL, LIEGE, AND HENRI SIMONT, ADVOCATE AT THE COUR DE CASSATION OF BELGIUM, PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITE LIBRE DE BRUSSELS, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERV...
HIGH AUTHORITY OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, REPRESENTED BY ITS LEGAL ADVISER, WALTER MUCH, ACTING AS AGENT, ASSISTED BY G. VAN HECKE, ADVOCATE AT THE COUR D'APPEL, BRUSSELS, PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITY OF LOUVAIN, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT ITS OFFICES, 2, PLACE DE METZ, DEFENDANT,
APPLICATION FOR THE ANNULMENT OF DECISION NO 22/55 OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY OF 28 MAY 1955 AND OF CERTAIN DECISIONS OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY RESULTING FROM ITS LETTER OF 28 MAY 1955 TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM CONCERNING THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE EQUALIZATION SYSTEM (JOURNAL OFFICIEL OF 31 MAY 1955, PP. 753-758),...
IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION, THE EQUALIZATION MACHINERY PROVIDED FOR IN PART THREE OF THE CONVENTION SHALL BE SET UP BEFORE THE COMMON MARKET IS ESTABLISHED.
THUS, FROM THE BEGINNING, THE CONVENTION EXPOSES THE BELGIAN COAL MARKET TO THE EFFECTS OF THE COMMON MARKET ONLY THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF SPECIAL MEASURES, AND IN PARTICULAR THE INTRODUCTION OF THE EQUALIZATION SCHEME.
THE MEASURES IN QUESTION ARE EXPLAINED BY THE EXISTENCE OF A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BELGIUM AND THE OTHER STATES OF THE COMMUNITY RESULTING FROM DISADVANTAGEOUS CONDITIONS OF PRODUCTION.
DURING THE ORAL PROCEDURE THE DEFENDANT EXPLAINED THE CAUSES OF THAT DISADVANTAGE.
THAT EXPLANATION HAS NOT BEEN CONTRADICTED AND IT APPEARS TO THE COURT TO BE CORRECT.
IN FACT, IN BELGIUM:
2. MINING TECHNIQUES ARE NOT SO ADVANCED, SINCE FOR SEVERAL YEARS IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE THE NECESSARY INVESTMENTS; AND
3. THE LEVEL OF WAGES IS HIGHER THAN IN THE OTHER PRODUCING COUNTRIES.
IN ORDER TO BRING THE PRICES OF BELGIAN COAL INTO LINE WITH THE RULING COMMON MARKET PRICES THAT ARTICLE PROVIDES FOR ALL CONSUMERS OF THAT COAL TO BENEFIT FROM A REDUCTION IN PRICES AND INDICATES THE CONDITIONS WHICH UNDERTAKINGS MUST SATISFY IN ORDER TO BENEFIT FROM EQUALIZATION, THE DATE FROM WHICH PRICES MUST BE BR...
IF, AS THE APPLICANT HAS SUGGESTED, THE PRICES WERE BROUGHT INTO LINE BY A RISE IN THE RULING COMMON MARKET PRICES RATHER THAN BY A REDUCTION IN BELGIAN PRICES THE EQUALIZATION PAYMENTS WOULD BE TRANSFORMED INTO A SUBSIDY FOR WHICH THERE IS NO REASON OR PURPOSE.
UNDER THE TERMS OF ARTICLE 26 OF THE CONVENTION THE EXISTENCE OF A SITUATION IN WHICH EQUALIZATION IS JUSTIFIED IMPLIES THE NEED TO LOWER THE LEVEL OF BELGIAN PRICES TO A MORE OR LESS FIXED LIMIT RESULTING FROM A GENERAL ASSESSMENT BASED ON ESTIMATED PRODUCTION COSTS IN BELGIUM AT THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.
THE APPLICANT HAS MAINTAINED THAT THE TREATY ESTABLISHES A MARKET SYSTEM IN WHICH PRICES ARE FIXED BY THE UNDERTAKINGS AND THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY CONTRARY PROVISION, IT IS THEREFORE THE UNDERTAKINGS THEMSELVES WHICH FIX PRICES IN THIS INSTANCE WHICH, WHERE THEY RECEIVE EQUALIZATION PAYMENTS, THEY MUST DO AT THE LEV...
ACCORDING TO THAT ARGUMENT, DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD ALL THOSE AIMS ARE SUBJECT TO OR FALL ESSENTIALLY WITHIN THE AREA OF DISCRETION OF THE BELGIAN COLLIERIES THEMSELVES.
SUCH A RESULT CANNOT BE ACCEPTED.
DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD PRICES OF BELGIAN COAL MUST BE FIXED AND MUST REMAIN AT APPROXIMATELY THE LEVEL OF ESTIMATED PRODUCTION COSTS. THAT LIMIT, WHICH IS FIXED BY MEANS OF A GENERAL ASSESSMENT BASED, INTER ALIA, ON ESTIMATED IMPROVEMENTS IN THE OUTPUT OF THE MINES AND THE EFFECTS OF PLANS FOR THE CLOSURE OF MA...
FINALLY, ARTICLE 61 OF THE TREATY IS NOT APPLICABLE HERE. THAT PROVISION PROVIDES FOR INTERVENTION ONLY IN CASES OF NECESSITY TO DEAL WITH TEMPORARY DIFFICULTIES CAUSED BY EXCESSIVE RISES BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE NORMAL OPERATION OF THE MARKET ECONOMY. TO MAKE USE OF THAT ARTICLE TO MAINTAIN PRICES PERMANENTLY AT AN ARTIFI...
FURTHERMORE, THE AWKWARD NATURE OF THE PROCEDURE UNDER ARTICLE 61 DOES NOT FIT IN EASILY WITH THE FIXING OF PRICES WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO REVISION AS A RESULT OF MODIFICATIONS IN THE ASSESSMENTS OF ESTIMATED PRODUCTION COSTS WHICH ARE MADE AS THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD COMES TO AN END AND AS THE PLANS ARE ALREADY BEING PART...
THIS CASE CONCERNS QUITE ANOTHER MATTER, THAT IS, THE ASSESSMENT OF FUTURE PRODUCTION COSTS IN THE LIGHT OF EXPECTED IMPROVEMENTS IN OUTPUT AS A RESULT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANS FOR RE-EQUIPMENT AND MODERNIZATION, WHICH IS A PURELY TECHNICAL MATTER. AS REGARDS THE AMOUNT OF THE REDUCTION, THAT IS NOT OPEN TO DISCU...
AS THAT METHOD IS SUFFICIENTLY EFFECTIVE, THE FIXING OF PRICES BY THE HIGH AUTHORITY ON ITS OWN AUTHORITY NEED NOT BE ACCEPTED AS BEING INDISPENSABLE.
FOR THAT REASON THE HIGH AUTHORITY CAN BE EMPOWERED ONLY TO REDUCE EQUALIZATION PAYMENTS TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE UNDERTAKINGS HAVE NOT REDUCED THEIR PRICES WITHIN THE STATED LIMITS.
IN THAT CASE, UNDERTAKINGS ALWAYS HAVE A CLEAR INTEREST IN RISKING SUCH A REDUCTION IN EQUALIZATION AND IN PREFERRING PROFITS FROM PRICES WHICH ARE TOO HIGH IN RELATIVE TERMS TO HIGHER EQUALIZATION PAYMENTS CORRESPONDING TO ANY REDUCTION IN PRICES WHICH THEY MIGHT HAVE MADE, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR E...
IT RESULTS FROM THE FOREGOING THAT INDIRECT ACTION ON THE PART OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY SUCH AS A REDUCTION IN EQUALIZATION PAYMENTS IS INSUFFICIENT TO ATTAIN THE OBJECTIVE OF ARTICLE 26 (2) (a) OF THE CONVENTION. IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT MUST BE ACCEPTED THAT ONLY DIRECT ACTION BY THE HIGH AUTHORITY CAN GUARANTEE THE I...
THE COURT DOES NOT SHARE THAT OPINION IN SO FAR AS, AS IT HAS JUST OBSERVED, THE POWER INVOLVED IN THIS INSTANCE IS ONE WITHOUT WHICH EQUALIZATION CANNOT OPERATE AS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 26 OF THE CONVENTION, THAT IS, ON THE BASIS OF AN IMMEDIATE AND GUARANTEED REDUCTION IN PRICES.
FURTHERMORE, UNDER THE TERMS OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE TREATY IT SHALL BE THE DUTY OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY TO ENSURE THAT THE OBJECTIVES SET OUT IN THAT TREATY ARE ATTAINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS THEREOF.
IT MUST BE CONCLUDED FROM THAT PROVISION, WHICH IS THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE FOR THE POWERS OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY DEFINED IN CHAPTER I OF THE TREATY, THAT IT ENJOYS A CERTAIN INDEPENDENCE IN DETERMINING THE IMPLEMENTING MEASURES NECESSARY FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES REFERRED TO IN THE TREATY OR IN THE CONVENTION W...
AS, IN THIS INSTANCE, IT IS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THE AIM OF ARTICLE 26 OF THE CONVENTION, THE HIGH AUTHORITY HAS THE POWER, IF NOT THE DUTY, TO ADOPT - WITHIN THE LIMITS LAID DOWN BY THAT PROVISION - MEASURES TO REDUCE THE PRICES OF BELGIAN COAL.
THE RESULT IS THAT THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ITS TASK IN THIS INSTANCE ASSUMES A POWER TO FIX PRICES ON THE PART OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY.
THE APPLICANT HAS FURTHER DENIED THAT THE HIGH AUTHORITY HAS THE POWER TO FIX PRICES BY MAINTAINING THAT THE SENTENCE IN ARTICLE 26 (2) (a) WHICH STATES THAT "THE PRICE LIST SO FIXED SHALL NOT BE CHANGED WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY" MUST BE INTERPRETED AS PROHIBITING THE HIGH AUTHORITY FROM DRAWING UP A...
THE REDUCTION IN PRICES AS A CONSEQUENCE OF EQUALIZATION IS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE 26 OF THE CONVENTION, WHICH ALSO LAYS DOWN THE EXTENT OF THAT REDUCTION. THERE CAN THEREFORE BE NO QUESTION OF ANY MISUSE OF POWERS SINCE THE ONLY MEASURE WHICH THE HIGH AUTHORITY COULD TAKE IN ORDER TO PURSUE THE OBJECTIVE OF ARTICLE 26 WA...
IT EMERGES FROM THE REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE FOR EXAMINING EQUALIZATION FOR THE BELGIAN COLLIERIES, AS WELL AS FROM THE HIGH AUTHORITY's DETAILED CALCULATIONS CONCERNING THE ASSESSMENT OF THE LEVEL OF ESTIMATED PRODUCTION COSTS THAT ONE OF THE AIMS OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY WAS TO REDUCE THE PRICES OF BELG...
EVEN IF ONE UNJUSTIFIED REASON WERE INCLUDED AMONG THOSE WHICH JUSTIFY THE ACTION OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY, THE DECISION WOULD NOT FOR THAT REASON INVOLVE A MISUSE OF POWERS, IN SO FAR AS IT DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE BASIC AIM OF ARTICLE 26 OF THE CONVENTION.
FOR THE REASONS SET OUT ABOVE THE FIRST AND SECOND COMPLAINTS IN THE APPLICATION MUST BE DISMISSED.
II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELLING PRICES AND ESTIMATED PRODUCTION COSTS
BEFORE EXAMINING THE QUESTION WHETHER THE HIGH AUTHORITY FIXED PRICES AT THE LEVEL PROVIDED FOR IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER WHETHER IT IS TRUE THAT - AS THE APPLICANT ALLEGES - THE HIGH AUTHORITY SUBSTITUTED RUHR PRICES FOR THOSE RULING IN THE COMMON MARKET WITHOUT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE ARTIFICIALLY LOW LEVEL OF RUHR...
ONLY IN THOSE FEW CASES HAS IT BEEN ALLEGED THAT THE HIGH AUTHORITY EXCEEDED THE LEVEL OF COMMON MARKET PRICES. HOWEVER, THE APPLICANT HAS NOT REFERRED TO ANY FACT OR CIRCUMSTANCE WHICH WOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT IN THE AFOREMENTIONED CASES THE LEVEL OF PRICES IN THE COALFIELDS IN QUESTION DETERMINED THE LEVEL IN THE COMMO...
EQUALIZATION IS THUS LINKED TO THE TREND IN ESTIMATED PRODUCTION COSTS IN ORDER TO ENSURE A CORRESPONDING TREND IN PRICES.
IT IS POSSIBLE THAT AT THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD A GREATER REDUCTION IN PRODUCTION COSTS WILL BE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT THE FINAL INTEGRATION OF BELGIAN COAL INTO THE COMMON MARKET; THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THAT NEW OBJECTIVE WILL DEPEND ON THE MEANS AVAILABLE AT THAT TIME, BUT THAT QUESTION DOES NOT CONC...
IF, AS THE APPLICANT ALLEGES, THE HIGH AUTHORITY FIXED THE PRICES SOLELY IN ORDER TO BRING THEM INTO LINE WITH THOSE IN THE COMMON MARKET AND HAD NEGLECTED THE LEVEL OF ESTIMATED PRODUCTION COSTS AT THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, ITS DECISION WOULD INVOLVE A MISUSE OF POWERS AND WOULD HAVE TO BE ANNULLED.
HOWEVER, THAT IS NOT THE CASE HERE.
THE DIFFERENT VIEWS HELD BY THE PARTIES DURING THE HEARINGS AS TO THE ASSESSMENT OF THE COSTS OF PRODUCTION FOR BELGIAN COAL AT THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD RELATE SOLELY TO FACTORS OF A STATISTICAL NATURE, THE EVALUATION OF WHICH FOR ACCOUNTING PURPOSES ALONE CANNOT PREJUDICE THE LAWFUL NATURE OF THE CONTESTED M...
EVEN IF THE DEFENDANT HAS COMMITTED CERTAIN ERRORS IN SELECTING THE BASIS FOR ITS CALCULATIONS, AS IS THE CASE WITH REGARD TO SELECTION OF THE REFERENCE YEAR AND PERHAPS ALSO WITH REGARD TO AMORTIZATION AND THE GROUPING OF CATEGORIES OF COAL, IT IS NOT TO BE HELD THAT ITS ERRORS CONSTITUTE IPSO FACTO PROOF OF MISUSE OF...
THE SAME APPLIES TO THE FACT THAT THE DEFENDANT TOOK ACCOUNT OF ESTIMATES MADE IN 1955 CONCERNING THE REORGANIZATION OF THE MARGINAL MINES (SEE THE REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE FOR MINES) AND OF CERTAIN SUBSIDIES AND CERTAIN EXPENSES FOR THE RENEWAL OF PLANT BY WAY OF AMORTIZATION WITHOUT, HOWEVER, ACCEPTING THE RATES...
WHETHER THOSE FACTS ARE CONSIDERED TOGETHER OR INDIVIDUALLY THEY ARE CHARACTERISTIC OF THE JUSTIFIED DESIRE AND WILL OF THE DEFENDANT TO MAKE AN EVER MORE ACCURATE ASSESSMENT OF THE ESTIMATED PRODUCTION COSTS AT THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.
BEFORE THE JUDGMENT OF 16 JULY 1956 WAS GIVEN AND DESPITE CERTAIN RESERVATIONS ON EACH SIDE THE PARTIES PUT FORWARD BY COMMON AGREEMENT A FIGURE REPRESENTING THE AVERAGE WHICH RESULTS FROM GROUPING ALL CATEGORIES TOGETHER; IN THE LIGHT OF THOSE RESERVATIONS THEY HAVE NOW PUT FORWARD AND PLEADED FIGURES BASED ON NEW GRO...
HOWEVER, WITHOUT GOING INTO THE RESPECTIVE INTRINSIC MERITS OF THE DIFFERENT METHODS OF GROUPING, IT MUST BE FOUND THAT A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THEM DOES NOT SHOW THAT THE METHOD CHOSEN BY THE DEFENDANT LED IT TO DISREGARD THE LIMIT FORMED BY THE APPROXIMATE FIGURE FOR THE ESTIMATED PRODUCTION COSTS FOR 1958 AND TO A...
FOR THE REASONS SET OUT ABOVE THE SUBMISSION OF MISUSE OF POWERS IS NOT WELL FOUNDED AS REGARDS THE LEVEL OF SELLING PRICES AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THAT LEVEL AND THE LEVEL OF ESTIMATED PRODUCTION COSTS AT THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.
III. INTERVENTION BY THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT
THE APPLICANT HAS NOT GIVEN PROOF THAT WHEN IT ADOPTED DECISION NO 22/55 THE HIGH AUTHORITY SACRIFICED THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF BELGIAN PRODUCERS TO THE BENEFIT OF THE POLICY OF THEIR GOVERNMENT.
IT IS, FURTHERMORE, QUITE NORMAL THAT DISCUSSIONS AND CONSULTATIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN SUCH A MATTER. THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE HIGH AUTHORITY FIXED SELLING PRICES AT A LEVEL HIGHER THAN THAT PROPOSED BY THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT INDICATES RATHER THAT THE HIGH AUTHORITY RETAINED ITS UNFETTERED POWER OF DECISION. THE ...
IV. FIXING OF SELLING PRICES IN CERTAIN CASES WITHOUT PROVISION FOR EQUALIZATION THE DEFENDANT ALLEGES THE EXCLUSION FROM THE BENEFIT OF EQUALIZATION OF UNCLASSIFIED BITUMINOUS COALS FROM THE CAMPINE IN NO WAY IMPLIES THAT THOSE TYPES ARE ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY INTEGRATED INTO THE COMMON MARKET TO BE PLACED OUTSIDE THE S...
IN FACT, THE LETTER OF 28 MAY 1955 LEAVES UNCHANGED THE TYPE OF COAL IN QUESTION WITHIN THE EQUALIZATION SYSTEM IN SPITE OF THE MODIFICATIONS WHICH IT MAKES TO THE RULES WHICH DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF THE EQUALIZATION PAYMENTS TO CERTAIN UNDERTAKINGS.
THE QUESTION WHETHER THAT SYSTEM ENABLES EQUALIZATION TO BE REDUCED OR EVEN WITHDRAWN ON THE BASIS OF THE CONDITIONS OF PRODUCTION OF CERTAIN INDIVIDUAL UNDERTAKINGS FORMS THE SUBJECT OF THE COMPLAINT RELATING TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SELECTIVITY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 26. THE QUESTION WHETHER S...
IT FOLLOWS THAT IN THE FOREGOING CASE THE REDUCTION OR EVEN WITHDRAWAL OF EQUALIZATION IN RESPECT OF CERTAIN TYPES AND IN CERTAIN INDIVIDUAL CASES DOES NOT RESULT IN THOSE TYPES BEING PLACED OUTSIDE THE PRICE LIST, SINCE THERE CAN BE ONLY ONE PRICE LIST RESULTING FROM THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 26 (2) FOR ALL CONSUMERS...
THE SUBMISSION OF MISUSE OF POWERS IS THEREFORE UNFOUNDED.
B - AS REGARDS THE LETTER OF 28 MAY 1955 I. REDUCTION OR WITHDRAWAL OF EQUALIZATION AS REGARDS CERTAIN UNDERTAKINGS THE APPLICANT MAINTAINS, FIRST, THAT THE INTRODUCTION INTO THE EQUALIZATION SCHEME OF A SELECTIVE CRITERION, THAT IS, THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE EQUALIZATION PAYMENTS TO THE INDIVIDUAL SITUATION OF THE UNDERTA...
THAT ARGUMENT MUST BE REJECTED.
AS A RESULT OF THE DECISION CONTAINED IN THE LETTER OF 28 MAY 1955 THE DISADVANTAGES RESULTING FROM LESS FAVOURABLE GEOLOGICAL CONDITIONS, WHICH ARE INDEED ONE OF THE PREMISES OF THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS APPLYING TO THE BELGIAN COAL INDUSTRY, NO LONGER EXISTS. IT FOLLOWS THEREFROM THAT THE PAYMENT OF DIFFERING RATES OF E...
IN SUPPORT OF ITS ARGUMENT THE DEFENDANT AGAIN REFERS TO THE EXISTENCE OF A GUARANTEE TO MAINTAIN PREVIOUS LEVELS OF RECEIPTS. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE CONVENTION DOES NOT REFER TO THE EXISTENCE, WHERE APPROPRIATE, OF A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EQUALIZATION AND RECEIPTS, THE LATTER BEING MENTIONED ONLY IN ARTICLE 25 IN RE...
IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 24 OF THE CONVENTION THE SPECIAL SYSTEM ESTABLISHED FOR THAT PURPOSE MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF SITUATIONS EXISTING WHEN THE COMMON MARKET IS ESTABLISHED. HOWEVER, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO INTERPRET THAT PROVISION WIDELY, AS GUARANTEEING THE MAINTENANCE OF THE ORIGINAL LEVEL OF RECEIPTS.
THE INTRODUCTION OF A SPECIAL SYSTEM, SUCH AS THE EQUALIZATION SCHEME, IS TO BE EXPLAINED BY THE EXISTENCE IN BELGIUM OF CERTAIN CONDITIONS OF PRODUCTION WHICH ARE INHERENTLY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE IN OTHER COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE COMMON MARKET.
EQUALIZATION MUST, THEREFORE, NOT EXCEED THE LIMITS OF WHAT IS STRICTLY NECESSARY IN ORDER TO NEUTRALIZE TO A CERTAIN EXTENT THE EFFECTS OF THE DISADVANTAGE RESULTING FROM THOSE DIFFERENCES, WHICH DOES NOT IMPLY A GUARANTEE THAT THE ORIGINAL LEVEL OF RECEIPTS WILL BE MAINTAINED.
THE QUESTION OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE TOTAL OF SELLING PRICES AND EQUALIZATION PAYMENTS - WHICH DETERMINES THE RECEIPTS OF THE UNDERTAKINGS - MUST VARY DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IS A QUESTION WHICH THE HIGH AUTHORITY MUST EXAMINE IN THE LIGHT OF THE PROGRESS OF THE PROGRAMMES FOR THE RE-EQUIPMENT AND REORGANIZAT...
FURTHERMORE, IF THE PURPOSE OF EQUALIZATION WAS TO GUARANTEE THE MAINTENANCE OF ORIGINAL LEVELS OF RECEIPTS, IT WOULD BE IN CONTRADICTION WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF THE DECREASE OF THE EQUALIZATION LEVY LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 25 OF THE CONVENTION.
IN ADDITION, ARTICLE 1 OF THE CONVENTION REFERS TO PRODUCTION BEING PROGRESSIVELY ADAPTED TO THE NEW CONDITIONS RESULTING FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMON MARKET AND NOT TO THE NEW CONDITIONS BEING ADAPTED TO THE MAINTENANCE OF SITUATIONS EXISTING AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.
MOREOVER, IF, AS THE APPLICANT MAINTAINS, EQUALIZATION WAS INTENDED TO ENSURE THAT THE COLLIERIES HAVE THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE WHICH ARE REGARDED AS INDISPENSABLE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THEIR RE-EQUIPMENT PROGRAMMES, THE AIM OF THE EQUALIZATION SCHEME WOULD GREATLY EXCEED THE REASONS FOR ITS ESTABLISHMENT A...
II. THREAT TO WITHDRAW EQUALIZATION
FURTHERMORE, IF IT WERE TO APPEAR THAT CERTAIN UNDERTAKINGS WERE NOT CARRYING OUT THE WORK OF REORGANIZATION AND RE-EQUIPMENT, SUCH THAT THEY INCURRED LIABILITY, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY BASIS OR JUSTIFICATION FOR EQUALIZATION.
THOSE UNDERTAKINGS WOULD THUS HAVE DEPRIVED THEMSELVES BY THEIR OWN FAULT OF THE RIGHT TO BENEFIT FROM EQUALIZATION.
THE HIGH AUTHORITY MUST TAKE SUCH A POSSIBILITY INTO ACCOUNT.
IT DID SO CONDITIONALLY AT POINT 2 (d) OF ITS LETTER OF 28 MAY 1955, WHEN IT AUTHORIZED THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT TO WITHDRAW EQUALIZATION WHERE APPROPRIATE, SUBJECT TO THE PRIOR AGREEMENT OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY.
THE COURT HEREBY: 1. DISMISSES THE APPLICATION FOR THE ANNULMENT OF DECISION NO 22/55 OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY OF 28 MAY 1955 AND OF CERTAIN DECISIONS OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY RESULTING FROM ITS LETTER OF 28 MAY 1955 TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM CONCERNING THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE EQUALIZATION SYSTEM;
2. ORDERS THE APPLICANT TO BEAR THE COSTS OF THE ACTION.
U predmetu C-8/55,
Fédération Charbonnière de Belgique, s izabranom adresom za dostavu u Luxembourgu, 6, Rue Henri Heine, koju zastupaju Louis Dehasse i Léon Canivet, uz asistenciju Paula Tschoffena, odvjetnika na Cour d’ Appel u Liegeu (Žalbeni sud, Belgija) i Henrija Simonta, odvjetnika na Cour de Cassation de Belgique (Kasacijski sud,...
Visoke vlasti Europske zajednice za ugljen i čelik, s izabranom adresom za dostavu u njezinim uredima na adresi 2, Place de Metz, Luxembourg, koju zastupa njezin pravni savjetnik, Walter Much, u svojstvu agenta, uz asistenciju G. van Heckea, odvjetnika na Cour d’ Appel u Bruxellesu (Žalbeni sud, Belgija), profesora na ...
povodom tužbe za poništenje podnesene protiv odluke Visoke vlasti br. 22/55 od 28. svibnja 1955. i protiv određenih odluka Visoke vlasti kako proizlaze iz dopisa koji je 28. svibnja 1955. ona uputila vladi Kraljevine Belgije o uređenju sustava izjednačavanja (Službeni list Zajednice od 31. svibnja 1955., stranice 753. ...
SUD,
u sastavu: M. Pilotti, predsjednik, J. Rueff i O. Riese, predsjednici vijeća, P. J. S. Serrarens, L. Delvaux, Ch. L. Hammes i A. van Kleffens, suci,
nezavisni odvjetnik: M. Lagrange,
tajnik: A. van Houtte,
donosi sljedeću
Presudu
A - Dopuštenost tužbe
Tužbom se traži poništenje:
1. Odluke Visoke vlasti br. 22/55 od 28. svibnja 1955. i priloženog cjenika, objavljenih u Službenom listu Zajednice od 31. svibnja 1955., utoliko što utvrđuju niže cijene za određene vrste ugljena.
2. odlukâ iz dopisa koji je Visoka vlast 28. svibnja 1955. uputila belgijskoj vladi i iz tablice stopa subvencija za izjednačavanje priložene tom dopisu:
(a) utoliko što povlačenjem ili smanjenjem izjednačavanja u slučaju određenih ugljenokopa nastaje diskriminacija među proizvođačima istih vrsta ugljena.
(b) utoliko što će sukladno tom dopisu uplate određenim poduzetnicima za izjednačavanje biti ili će moći biti povučene zbog toga što oni ne ulažu u obnovu kapaciteta koliko je moguće ili nužno ili odbijaju ustupiti ili razmijeniti ležišta ugljenokopa iako se ustupanje ili razmjena smatraju neophodnim za bolji razvoj ru...
Što se tiče odluke br. 22/55 tužitelj tvrdi da je to pojedinačna odluka.
Tuženica međutim smatra da je riječ o općoj odluci.
Po mišljenju tužitelja pojedinačna narav odluke proizlazi iz činjenice da su zbog neraskidive veze između izjednačavanja i utvrđivanja cijena učinci cjenika za tri ugljenokopa u Campini i za druge belgijske rudnike različiti utoliko što subvencija za izjednačavanje odobrena trima rudnicima nije ista kao ona koje primaj...
Bez poricanja činjenice da će se učinci cjenika razlikovati u mjeri u kojoj se razlikuje sâma subvencija za izjednačavanje, Sud odbija argument tužitelja prema kojem te razlike učinaka cjenika određuju narav odluke br. 22/55.
Naime, ta je odluka donesena u okviru posebnog sustava koji stavak 26. Konvencije predviđa za Belgiju tijekom prijelaznog razdoblja, a primjenjuje se u skladu s konkretnim modalitetima, koliko god da su detaljni i različiti, na sve poduzetnike i sve transakcije koji su obuhvaćeni tim sustavom.
U okviru tog sustava odluka se odnosi na poduzetnike samo zbog toga što su oni proizvođači ugljena bez navođenja ikakvih drugih pojedinosti.
Ako bi se u Belgiji otkrilo novo ležište, poduzetnik koji obavlja eksploataciju na tom ležištu morao bi prodavati po cijenama utvrđenim u odluci.
Štoviše, teritorijalno ograničenje ne podrazumijeva nikakvo individualno određenje i opravdava se činjenicom da je belgijskoj industriji izjednačavanje potrebno.
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