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+I n t e r n a t i o n a l   T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n   U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION  
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR  
+OF ITU
+
+# X.1037
+
+(10/2013)
+
+SERIES X: DATA NETWORKS, OPEN SYSTEM  
+COMMUNICATIONS AND SECURITY
+
+Information and network security – Network security
+
+# --- IPv6 technical security guidelines
+
+Recommendation ITU-T X.1037
+
+## ITU-T X-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **DATA NETWORKS, OPEN SYSTEM COMMUNICATIONS AND SECURITY**
+
+|                                    |                      |
+|------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| PUBLIC DATA NETWORKS               | X.1–X.199            |
+| OPEN SYSTEMS INTERCONNECTION       | X.200–X.299          |
+| INTERWORKING BETWEEN NETWORKS      | X.300–X.399          |
+| MESSAGE HANDLING SYSTEMS           | X.400–X.499          |
+| DIRECTORY                          | X.500–X.599          |
+| OSI NETWORKING AND SYSTEM ASPECTS  | X.600–X.699          |
+| OSI MANAGEMENT                     | X.700–X.799          |
+| SECURITY                           | X.800–X.849          |
+| OSI APPLICATIONS                   | X.850–X.899          |
+| OPEN DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING        | X.900–X.999          |
+| INFORMATION AND NETWORK SECURITY   |                      |
+| General security aspects           | X.1000–X.1029        |
+| <b>Network security</b>            | <b>X.1030–X.1049</b> |
+| Security management                | X.1050–X.1069        |
+| Telebiometrics                     | X.1080–X.1099        |
+| SECURE APPLICATIONS AND SERVICES   |                      |
+| Multicast security                 | X.1100–X.1109        |
+| Home network security              | X.1110–X.1119        |
+| Mobile security                    | X.1120–X.1139        |
+| Web security                       | X.1140–X.1149        |
+| Security protocols                 | X.1150–X.1159        |
+| Peer-to-peer security              | X.1160–X.1169        |
+| Networked ID security              | X.1170–X.1179        |
+| IPTV security                      | X.1180–X.1199        |
+| CYBERSPACE SECURITY                |                      |
+| Cybersecurity                      | X.1200–X.1229        |
+| Countering spam                    | X.1230–X.1249        |
+| Identity management                | X.1250–X.1279        |
+| SECURE APPLICATIONS AND SERVICES   |                      |
+| Emergency communications           | X.1300–X.1309        |
+| Ubiquitous sensor network security | X.1310–X.1339        |
+| CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION EXCHANGE |                      |
+| Overview of cybersecurity          | X.1500–X.1519        |
+| Vulnerability/state exchange       | X.1520–X.1539        |
+| Event/incident/heuristics exchange | X.1540–X.1549        |
+| Exchange of policies               | X.1550–X.1559        |
+| Heuristics and information request | X.1560–X.1569        |
+| Identification and discovery       | X.1570–X.1579        |
+| Assured exchange                   | X.1580–X.1589        |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T X.1037
+
+# IPv6 technical security guidelines
+
+## Summary
+
+The Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) is intended to provide many built-in benefits such as large address space, and self-configuration capabilities. Because it is a new protocol that is likely to be massively adopted in the coming years and operates differently than the Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4), both foreseeable and unforeseeable security issues will arise. Many new functions or requirements of IPv6, i.e., automatic configuration of interfaces, multicast addressing for specific services, the ability to assign multiple IPv6 addresses to a given interface, and for the use of the ICMPv6 protocol as the cornerstone of the IPv6 protocol machinery (dynamic neighbour discovery, ICMPv6 Router Advertisement (RA) messages that convey configuration information so that IPv6 terminal devices can automatically access to the IPv6 network, etc.) can be identified. Although somewhat equivalent capabilities exist in IPv4 and have been exposed to security threats for quite some time, IPv6 implementation and operation differs from IPv4, at the risk of raising specific security issues.
+
+From that perspective, Recommendation ITU-T X.1037 provides a set of technical security guidelines for telecommunication organizations to deploy and operate IPv6 networks and services. The content of this Recommendation focuses on how to securely deploy network facilities for telecommunication organizations and how to ensure security operations for the IPv6 environment.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval   | Study Group | Unique ID*                                                                      |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0     | ITU-T X.1037   | 2013-10-07 | 17          | <a href="http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/11946-en">11.1002/1000/11946-en</a> |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Countermeasure, DHCPv6, DNS, domain name system, dynamic host configuration protocol, end nodes, firewall, IDS, Internet Protocol version 6, intrusion detection system, IPv6, NAT, network address translation, network devices, risk assessment, router, security threats, switch.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL <http://handle.itu.int/> in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID. For example, <http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/11830-en>.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at <http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/ipr/>.
+
+© ITU 2014
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+|                                                         | <b>Page</b> |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope .....                                           | 1           |
+| 2 References.....                                       | 1           |
+| 3 Definitions .....                                     | 2           |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere.....                        | 2           |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation.....           | 2           |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms .....                      | 2           |
+| 5 Conventions .....                                     | 3           |
+| 6 Topology of IPv6 network for enterprise networks..... | 3           |
+| 7 Network devices .....                                 | 5           |
+| 7.1 Router .....                                        | 5           |
+| 7.2 Switch.....                                         | 7           |
+| 7.3 NAT device .....                                    | 8           |
+| 8 End nodes (clients, load balancer) and servers.....   | 8           |
+| 8.1 End nodes .....                                     | 8           |
+| 8.2 DHCP server.....                                    | 11          |
+| 8.3 DNS server .....                                    | 11          |
+| 9 Security devices .....                                | 12          |
+| 9.1 Intrusion detection system.....                     | 12          |
+| 9.2 Firewall.....                                       | 12          |
+| Appendix I – Examples of threats.....                   | 13          |
+| Bibliography.....                                       | 17          |
+
+
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T X.1037
+
+# IPv6 technical security guidelines
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+Recommendation ITU-T X.1037 specifies security threats raised by the introduction of the IPv6. It also provides a risk assessment related to these threats and documents the technical solutions for a secure IPv6 deployment. This Recommendation focuses on three components: network devices (e.g., router, switch), server/client devices (e.g., end nodes, DHCP server) and security devices (e.g., intrusion detection system (IDS), and firewall (FW)) that will be also deployed in an IPv6 network. Recommendation ITU-T X.1037 provides a technical security guideline to developers of network products, security operators and managers of enterprise networks that are planning to deploy IPv6, so that they are able to mitigate security threats on their IPv6 network. This Recommendation provides a security guideline focusing on IPv6 in enterprise networks. The guidelines for other environments such as home network and carrier network are outside the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [IEEE 802.1x] IEEE Standard 802.1x-2010, *IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks – Port Based Network Access Control*.
+- [IETF RFC 1981] IETF RFC 1981 (1996), *Path MTU Discovery for IP version 6*.
+- [IETF RFC 2460] IETF RFC 2460 (1998), *Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification*.
+- [IETF RFC 2993] IETF RFC 2993 (2000), *Architectural Implications of NAT*.
+- [IETF RFC 3315] IETF RFC 3315 (2003), *Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)*.
+- [IETF RFC 3704] IETF RFC 3704 (2004), *Ingress Filtering for Multihomed Networks*.
+- [IETF RFC 3810] IETF RFC 3810 (2004), *Multicast Listener Discovery Version 2 (MLDv2) for IPv6*.
+- [IETF RFC 3971] IETF RFC 3971 (2005), *SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)*.
+- [IETF RFC 4552] IETF RFC 4552 (2006), *Authentication/Confidentiality for OSPFv3*.
+- [IETF RFC 4864] IETF RFC 4864 (2007), *Local Network Protection for IPv6*.
+- [IETF RFC 4890] IETF RFC 4890 (2007), *Recommendations for Filtering ICMPv6 Messages in Firewalls*.
+- [IETF RFC 5095] IETF RFC 5095 (2007), *Deprecation of Type 0 Routing Headers in IPv6*.
+- [IETF RFC 5340] IETF RFC 5340 (2008), *OSPF for IPv6*.
+- [IETF RFC 5722] IETF RFC 5722 (2009), *Handling of Overlapping IPv6 Fragments*.
+- [IETF RFC 5902] IETF RFC 5902 (2010), *IAB Thoughts on IPv6 Network Address Translation*.
+
+- [IETF RFC 6092] IETF RFC 6092 (2011), *Recommended Simple Security Capabilities in Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) for Providing Residential IPv6 Internet Service.*
+- [IETF RFC 6104] IETF RFC 6104 (2011), *Rogue IPv6 Router Advertisement Problem Statement.*
+- [IETF RFC 6105] IETF RFC 6105 (2011), *IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard.*
+- [IETF RFC 6146] IETF RFC 6146 (2011), *Stateful NAT64: Network Address and Protocol Translation from IPv6 Clients to IPv4 Servers.*
+- [IETF RFC 6169] IETF RFC 6169 (2011), *Security Concerns with IP Tunneling.*
+- [IETF RFC 6296] IETF RFC 6296 (2011), *IPv6-to-IPv6 Network Prefix Translation.*
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+None.
+
+## 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 abuse, abused, abusing:** To use wrongly or improperly and to misuse. In the context of this Recommendation, "abusing" the IPv6 protocol or some feature of the protocol means to use it in ways that were unintended by the developers.
+
+**3.2.2 forged packet:** A packet generated by an attacker, typically with illegitimate fields or entries that misuse the protocol format, in an attempt to violate network security by creating a denial-of-service (DoS) condition or attack situation.
+
+# 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+|        |                                               |
+|--------|-----------------------------------------------|
+| AAAA   | IPv6 address record                           |
+| AS     | Autonomous System                             |
+| CPE    | Customer Premises Equipment                   |
+| DAD    | Duplicate Address Detection                   |
+| DDoS   | Distributed Denial-of-Service                 |
+| DHCP   | Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol           |
+| DHCPv6 | Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol version 6 |
+| DMZ    | Demilitarized Zone                            |
+| DNS    | Domain Name System                            |
+| DoS    | Denial-of-Service                             |
+| FIB    | Forwarding Information Base                   |
+| FW     | Firewall                                      |
+| ICMP   | Internet Control Message Protocol             |
+| ICMPv6 | Internet Control Message Protocol version 6   |
+| ID     | Identifier                                    |
+
+|        |                                      |
+|--------|--------------------------------------|
+| IDS    | Intrusion Detection System           |
+| IGMP   | Internet Group Management Protocol   |
+| IPv4   | Internet Protocol version 4          |
+| IPv6   | Internet Protocol version 6          |
+| ISP    | Internet Service Provider            |
+| L2     | Layer 2                              |
+| LSA    | Link State Advertisement             |
+| LSDB   | Link State Database                  |
+| MAC    | Media Access Control                 |
+| MLD    | Multicast Listener Discovery         |
+| MTU    | Maximum Transfer Unit                |
+| NA     | Neighbour Advertisement              |
+| NAT    | Network Address Translation          |
+| NAT64  | Network Address Translation 6 to 4   |
+| NAT66  | Network Address Translation 6 to 6   |
+| NDPMon | Neighbour Discovery Protocol Monitor |
+| NDP    | Neighbour Discovery Protocol         |
+| NPTv6  | Network Prefix Translation version 6 |
+| NS     | Neighbour Solicitation               |
+| OSPF   | Open Shortest Path First             |
+| OSPFv3 | Open Shortest Path First version 3   |
+| PMTUD  | Path MTU Discovery                   |
+| RA     | Router Advertisement                 |
+| SEND   | Secure Neighbor Discovery            |
+| TCP    | Transmission Control Protocol        |
+| TTL    | Time To Live                         |
+| uRPF   | unicast Reverse Path Forwarding      |
+
+# **5 Conventions**
+
+None.
+
+# **6 Topology of IPv6 network for enterprise networks**
+
+This clause describes a topology of the IPv6 enterprise network (including transition environments to IPv6 where there exist three different types of hosts: IPv4 only, IPv6 only and IPv4/IPv6-enabled) that will be used as an enterprise network for illustrating the attack scenarios and security countermeasures. The topology of an IPv6 enterprise network is illustrated in Figure 6-1 as an example. Similar to an IPv4 network, it consists of five segments: an external segment, a demilitarized zone (DMZ), a backbone segment, a server segment and a client segment. The external segment is a connection point between Internet service providers (ISPs) and a customer
+
+premises equipment (CPE) installed in the enterprise network. The DMZ segment provides external services (e.g., web server, load balancer) to users, and it is also generally used to deploy security devices such as IDS and firewall. The backbone segment is a large-capacity, high-speed network, and other network segments are connected to each other through it. In the server segment there exist many different kinds of network service platforms (e.g., DNS server, DHCPv6 server), which are necessary for internal users. Finally, client computers are located in the client segment.
+
+This IPv6 security guideline focuses on describing IPv6 security threats and countermeasures from the viewpoint of network components: network devices (in all segments), client and server end nodes (in client and server segments), and security devices (in DMZ segment). For this purpose, the remainder of this Recommendation is organized as follows:
+
+- IPv6 threats recognized in network device are described in clause 7.
+- IPv6 threats recognized in clients, servers, and other end devices are described in clause 8.
+- IPv6 threats recognized in security devices such as firewalls and IDS devices are described in clause 9.
+
+For the countermeasures against each threat, they can be recommended to be implemented in several network components. For example, countermeasures against denial of service attacks targeting the DHCPv6 server can be implemented on a firewall as well as a DHCPv6 server itself (see Threat and Measure 16 in clause 8.2.1).
+
+![Figure 6-1: Example topology of an IPv6 enterprise network. The diagram shows a multi-segment network architecture. At the top, the 'External segment' connects to 'ISP 1' and 'ISP 2' via a 'CPE (router) E-R1'. Below this is the 'DMZ' segment, which contains a 'Load balancer D-S1', 'Web servers D-S4 and D-S3', a 'Router D-R1', two 'Firewalls D-F1 and D-F2', and an 'IDS D-I1'. The 'Backbone' segment consists of three 'Routers B-R1, B-R2, and B-R3'. The 'Server segment' includes a 'NAS server S-S2', a 'DNS server S-S3', a 'DHCP server S-S1', and an 'L2 switch S-B1'. The 'Client segment' features an 'L2 switch C-B1' connected to three client computers 'C-C1, C-C2, and C-C3'. Red lines indicate security-related connections or threats, such as from ISPs to the DMZ and from the DMZ to the backbone.](daa4a6fa7e2ba1954258f86b4928eb32_img.jpg)
+
+X.1037(13)\_F6-1
+
+Figure 6-1: Example topology of an IPv6 enterprise network. The diagram shows a multi-segment network architecture. At the top, the 'External segment' connects to 'ISP 1' and 'ISP 2' via a 'CPE (router) E-R1'. Below this is the 'DMZ' segment, which contains a 'Load balancer D-S1', 'Web servers D-S4 and D-S3', a 'Router D-R1', two 'Firewalls D-F1 and D-F2', and an 'IDS D-I1'. The 'Backbone' segment consists of three 'Routers B-R1, B-R2, and B-R3'. The 'Server segment' includes a 'NAS server S-S2', a 'DNS server S-S3', a 'DHCP server S-S1', and an 'L2 switch S-B1'. The 'Client segment' features an 'L2 switch C-B1' connected to three client computers 'C-C1, C-C2, and C-C3'. Red lines indicate security-related connections or threats, such as from ISPs to the DMZ and from the DMZ to the backbone.
+
+**Figure 6-1 – Example topology of an IPv6 enterprise network**
+
+# **7 Network devices**
+
+## **7.1 Router**
+
+### **7.1.1 Security threats and countermeasures**
+
+##### **Threat 1:**
+
+Open Shortest Path First version 3 (OSPFv3) is specified in [IETF RFC 5340]. OSPFv3 uses link state advertisement (LSA) to exchange information between routers. There are nine types of LSAs (e.g., network LSA, router LSA, AS-external LSA) and the LSA header includes information about the LSA function code and the flooding scope (e.g., link-local, area) of the LSA embedded in the header. OSPFv3 is able to handle unknown LSAs using the "U" bit in the header. If the value of U bit is set to 1 in an LSA, this means that the LSA is unknown. Thus, if a router receives such LSAs, the router must store all of them into its link state database (LSDB). Therefore, attackers can crash the LSDB of a router by issuing a tremendous amount of unknown LSAs. Furthermore, since OSPFv3 can decide the flooding scope of LSAs with "S1" and "S2" bits, attackers are able to launch more easily DDoS attacks to routers by using the two bits.
+
+##### **Measure 1:**
+
+When using OSPFv3 on a router, it is recommended to implement the authentication function based on [IETF RFC 4552], so that the router is able to discard LSAs from unauthorized nodes. In addition, it is effective for a router to configure the maximum number of LSAs that the router can handle.
+
+#### **Threat 2:**
+
+Neighbour cache is used for maintaining entries that identify IPv6 neighbours to which traffic has been sent recently. Entries are keyed on the neighbour's on-link unicast IP address and contain information like the link-layer address, a flag indicating whether the neighbour is a router or a host, the reachability state, the number of unanswered probes, etc. If there is no existing neighbour cache entry for neighbour solicitation (NS) messages, the router creates a new entry. Therefore, if attackers send a large number of NS messages with different source IPv6 addresses to a host via a victim router and respond with neighbour advertisement (NA) messages for all of the NS messages at the same time, the router must create many neighbour cache entries. As a result, attackers are able to overflow the router's neighbour cache.
+
+##### **Measure 2:**
+
+The most practical solution for the neighbour cache problem is to limit the maximum number of NA messages that a host can return against NS messages within a fixed interval. Another option is to design a router that is able to continue to work even if the router's neighbour cache is overflowed.
+
+#### **Threat 3:**
+
+Similar to the source route option in the IPv4 header, the original IPv6 specification allowed an IPv6 host to explicitly specify intermediate nodes by which packets are transmitted using the routing header extension, Type 0 (RH0) on each packet. Since RH0 can include multiple entries of the same IP address, attackers can construct packets that will oscillate between two arbitrary nodes specified in RH0, causing congestion between the nodes and consuming valuable router processing and forwarding resources, potentially leading to a DoS attack. Due to high potential for abuse, and relatively limited usefulness of RH0 (its primary use was for diagnostics and troubleshooting), the IETF deprecated support for RH0 in [IETF RFC 5095].
+
+##### Measure 3:
+
+Fortunately, [IETF RFC 5095] has already been standardized in 2007 as a countermeasure against the security risk of RH0, which specifies that routers must ignore packets with RH Type 0. Therefore, operators and developers are recommended to verify that their devices are configured correctly according to this specification.
+
+##### Threat 4:
+
+IPv4 manages multicast clients by a specific protocol called Internet group management protocol (IGMP). IPv6 performs the same function but implements it differently, by using one of the functions of the Internet control message protocol version 6 (ICMPv6) called multicast listener discovery (MLD; see [IETF RFC 3810]). An MLD capable router maintains multicast clients and addresses based on Multicast Listener Report and Multicast Listener Done messages sent by the clients. Since the MLD Querier holds all multicast addresses according to the MLD messages sent by all clients, attackers can exhaust a router's memory resource by sending a large number of Multicast Listener Report messages to the Querier. In addition, multicast communications of legitimate multicast clients can be disrupted by sending a source spoofed (forged) Multicast Listener Done message to a router causing the removal of the IP addresses of legitimate multicast clients.
+
+##### Measure 4:
+
+The most fundamental solution for the MLD DoS attack against routers is to authenticate Multicast Listener Report/Done messages between a router and a client so that the router can discard forged MLD messages. In addition, as a practical solution for this security risk, routers are recommended to limit the rate of Multicast Listener Report messages. Another solution, see [IETF RFC 4890], recommends for firewalls to drop MLD messages that contain a link local address as the source address.
+
+##### Threat 5:
+
+Since the smallest subnet size in IPv6 is /64, a /64 subnet is sometimes used for a point-to-point link between a pair of routers. In this case, only two in the huge number of IPv6 addresses are used for interfaces of the routers and the rest remains unused. Although it depends on the router implementation, by specifying one of the remaining IP addresses for source and destination addresses of a packet, the packet may loop between the two routers until its time to live (TTL) reaches zero. Consequently, this vulnerability may lead to DoS attacks against routers.
+
+##### Measure 5:
+
+Point-to-point link addressing within networks MUST use /127s Global Unicast Address prefixes. This is not only for the sake of optimizing the IPv6 addressing space (it's not even the primary motivation), but also for preventing typical Ping-Pong attacks. Indeed, the Ping-Pong attack can be summarized as follows:
+
+- Routers A and B are connected with a P2P link. A is assigned 2001:db8:dead::1/64 address on its P2P I/F and B is assigned 2001:db8:dead::2/64 address on the corresponding P2P I/F that connects it to A.
+- An IPv6 datagram arrives at A with 2001:db8:dead::3/128 as the destination address.
+- The destination is for the subnet associated with the P2P link, but does not correspond to A's I/F address. So A forwards the IPv6 datagram on the P2P link, because there is usually NO Neighbor Discovery operation on a P2P link. That's the *Ping*.
+- B receives the said datagram and checks the destination address mentioned above. This address belongs to the prefix associated with the P2P link and B therefore forwards the datagram back on the P2P link. That's the *Pong*.
+
+- A then receives the packet and the cycle is repeated.
+
+An attacker can therefore flood IPv6 traffic with unused destination addresses on a /64 subnet. The traffic bounces back and forth until the corresponding Hop Limit expires. This results in bandwidth consumption and unauthorized router resource usage. Hence the use of /127 prefixes.<sup>1</sup>
+
+NOTE – This clause currently focuses on enterprise networking environments that only run OSPFv3 as the IPv6 Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) . Additional security considerations related to the activation of other routing protocols, like MP-BGP and RIPng are considered.
+
+## 7.2 Switch
+
+### 7.2.1 Security threats and countermeasures
+
+#### Threat 6:
+
+An IPv6 address consists of a 64-bit prefix and a 64-bit interface identifier (ID); hence, a 64-bit address space can be used for devices in a single local network. In a common Ethernet-based local network, since the 64-bit address space is larger than the media access control (MAC) address space (48 bits), all of the MAC addresses can be bound with at least one IPv6 address, while the IPv4 address space (32 bits) is not sufficient for binding with a MAC address. This means that a malicious node can conduct a DoS attack to exhaust a forwarding information base (FIB) of an L2 switch by sending massive packets with different MAC addresses.
+
+##### Measure 6:
+
+IEEE 802.1x authentication [IEEE 802.1x] which permits only certified addresses is one of the effective solutions against this attack as well as for limiting the number of MAC addresses on a single physical port of the L2 switch. In addition, developers are recommended to maintain the total number of FIB entries by appropriately discarding older entries when the total number exceeds a threshold.
+
+##### Threat 7:
+
+RA Guard ([IETF RFC 6105]) has been proposed to mitigate attack vectors based on forged ICMPv6 Router Advertisement (RA) messages. Basically, an RA-Guard-capable L2 switch observes its ports and determines to forward or not RAs received from connected devices based on L2 and L3 header information and static configurations. However, by sending an RA message with forged fragment packets, an attacker can avoid the inspection of an RA Guard so that the attacker can deliver rogue RA messages to legitimate hosts in a network.
+
+##### Measure 7:
+
+In order to avoid the attack, RA-Guard-capable L2 switches should parse the IPv6 entire header chain in the packet, to identify whether the packet is a Router Advertisement message. Especially if the packet is a first fragment, the switch should check the validity of the fragment offset.
+
+---
+
+<sup>1</sup> A split-horizon mechanism would assume that a packet received on a subnet that corresponds to the subnet used for the P2P link addressing, but does not belong to the receiving interface does not have to be forwarded back out the same interface (if the destination on the subnet exists, this destination already received the packet).
+
+## **7.3 NAT device**
+
+### **7.3.1 Security threats and countermeasures**
+
+##### **Threat 8:**
+
+A NAT device is commonly deployed on a border of a network and translates either source or destination IP addresses of a packet in order to bridge two different types of networks such as private-global networks and IPv4-IPv6 networks. Particularly NAT66, the so-called NAT and prefix translation version 6 (NPTv6), translates IP addresses of packets between two distinct IPv6 networks as well as NAT64, which translates IP addresses of packets between IPv6 and IPv4 so that both IPv6 and IPv4 nodes can communicate with each other. However, if an implementation of a NAT device has a state table (i.e., binding information base (BIB)) to manage the status of each translated address, it might be vulnerable to the NAT state table exhaustion DoS attack. Namely, if a malicious IPv6 node sends a huge number of packets towards hosts behind a NAT device while changing its source IPv6 address for each packet, the node can eventually conduct a DoS attack against the NAT device. This kind of attack exists in an IPv4 environment as well, but as IPv6 has an enormous number of available IP addresses, the effects of the attack can be more dramatic in an IPv6 environment than in an IPv4 environment.
+
+##### **Measure 8:**
+
+The IETF is discussing stateless NPTv6 (without a state table) function. In a case where developers implement a stateful NPTv6 device, they should appropriately control the number of entries in the state table so as not to exceed the upper limit of entries. Additionally, discussions in IETF about threats and measures of DoS attacks against NAT devices in [IETF RFC 2993] (sections 8 and 9), [IETF RFC 4864], [IETF RFC 5902], [IETF RFC 6146] (section 5), [IETF RFC 6092] and [IETF RFC 6296] (section 7) are useful for network operators.
+
+# **8 End nodes (clients, load balancer) and servers**
+
+## **8.1 End nodes**
+
+### **8.1.1 Security threats and countermeasures**
+
+#### **Threat 9:**
+
+IPv6 hosts can automatically configure their addresses (e.g., global addresses) based upon the prefix information conveyed in Internet control message protocol version 6 (ICMPv6) router advertisement (RA) messages. Since they can also choose a default router according to the information conveyed in RA messages, RA messages can be used for man-in-the-middle attacks. In other words, if a malicious node sends a forged RA message indicating itself as the default router to victim hosts, the victim hosts will forward all traffic to the malicious node that is then able to intercept or disturb the victim's communications.
+
+##### **Measure 9:**
+
+To minimize the security risk raised by forged RA messages, it is recommended to apply the RA Guard (see [IETF RFC 6105]).
+
+##### **Threat 10:**
+
+When IPv6 hosts configure their addresses using RA messages, they have to conduct the duplicate address detection (DAD) procedure to verify the uniqueness of the tentative addresses on a link. During the procedure for detecting duplicate addresses, IPv6 hosts that have tentative addresses send neighbour solicitation (NS) messages on the link and a node already using the tentative address replies with a neighbour advertisement (NA) message. If there is no response, the tentative address can be assigned to the interface of IPv6 hosts. However, a malicious host on the link can
+
+prevent IPv6 hosts from obtaining their addresses by always replying with NA messages against NS messages of other IPv6 hosts, leaving the victim hosts in a state where they are unable to obtain their addresses.
+
+##### **Measure 10:**
+
+If administrators check the number of IP addresses that each node has and set its limitation for every host, the security risk by the malicious DAD can be mitigated. To this end, administrators can use open source tools such as a neighbour discovery protocol (NDPMon). In addition, a switch is able to detect malicious DADs by controlling the pair of the MAC addresses of hosts and the physical port connected to the host. Consideration of a rogue RA in IETF ([IETF RFC 6104]) is also useful information for this issue.
+
+#### **Threat 11:**
+
+IPv6 provides a link layer address resolution mechanism with the neighbour discovery protocol (NDP). Once a node determines its link local IP address, the node exchanges neighbour solicitation (NS) and neighbour advertisement (NA) messages on a multicast address so that the node resolves IP addresses to corresponding MAC addresses. NS/NA messages are used to not only perform address resolution, but also other functions: reachability checks between neighbours, and duplicate address detection. When a node receives a NA message in response to a NS message, the node updates its neighbour cache that stores a set of entries about individual neighbours to which traffic has been sent recently. Therefore, a malicious node can easily impersonate other (victim) hosts on the same link by sending forged NA messages that declare the MAC address of the malicious node as the victim's address. Eventually, the malicious node can intercept or disturb the victim's communications.
+
+##### **Measure 11:**
+
+As a countermeasure against attacks abusing NS and NA, secure neighbour discovery (SEND; see [IETF RFC 3971]), which secures the neighbour discovery protocol (NDP) by applying public key based authentication to it can be used. Although SEND is a fundamental solution against these attacks because it burdens operators by maintaining a number of public/private keys, it is difficult to operate SEND in large networks. Another way to protect legitimate nodes from these attacks should be to implement a mechanism which observes and controls NS/NA messages on L2 switches.
+
+#### **Threat 12:**
+
+An IPv6 router notifies IPv6 nodes via "ICMP redirect messages" of appropriate first-hop nodes towards their destinations. An ICMPv6 message has two address fields: a destination address field and a target address field which is a link-local address to which subsequent packets for the destination address should be sent. Consequently, attackers can deceive other (victim) nodes to redirect their traffic to certain nodes on the same link by sending forged redirect messages to the victim nodes. Eventually, the malicious node can intercept or disturb the victim's communications.
+
+##### **Measure 12:**
+
+It is possible to prevent attacks of rogue ICMPv6 redirect messages by configuring every node not to receive ICMPv6 redirect messages. However, since this approach directly conflicts with the objective of ICMPv6 redirecting, operators (or users) should carefully apply such configuration only to requisite minimum nodes such as end nodes that are never required to change their default routes. Another possible solution should be to implement a mechanism which observes and controls ICMPv6 redirect messages on L2 switches.
+
+#### **Threat 13:**
+
+Unlike ICMP in IPv4, IPv6 multicast listeners can send ICMPv6 error messages to the sender of an illegal (e.g., forged) packet sent to a multicast address. If there are  $N$  multicast listener nodes on a
+
+certain multicast address, a single unauthorized packet induces  $N$  error message packets as a reflection to the sender of the original packet. By intentionally sending a large number of unauthorized packets to a multicast address with spoofed source addresses as another (victim) node, an attacker can conduct a packet amplification attack against the victim node, which disrupts the victim's communications.
+
+##### **Measure 13:**
+
+A simple solution for the packet amplification attack by forged multicast packets is to limit the rate of ICMPv6 error messages by firewalls. In fact, many firewall appliances have rate-limit mechanisms of ICMPv6 messages; hence, operators should configure their firewalls with rate-limit policies set to permit baseline (non-attack) ICMPv6 error message levels. It should be noted that path MTU discovery (PMTUD) is highly critical to the proper operation of IPv6 (for the sake of optimized packet processing) and thus ICMPv6 Packet Too Big messages should not be rate limited. Another solution, uRPF (see [IETF RFC 3704] for discussion of RPF), can prevent the attack by inhibiting attackers from sending packets with a spoofed source address.
+
+##### **Threat 14:**
+
+While fragmentation of an IPv4 packet can be performed by routers between source and destination, fragmentation in IPv6 is only permitted to be performed on a source node. Typically, path MTU discovery (PMTUD), (see [IETF RFC 1981]), is used to automatically discover the path MTU of an arbitrary path before starting communication with a destination node. Since reassembly of fragmented packets is performed by a destination node, a malicious node can exhaust the destination node's computational resources by sending a large number of fragmented packets to the destination. IPv6 faces the same problems of fragmentation/defragmentation inherent to IPv4.
+
+##### **Measure 14:**
+
+A simple countermeasure against the DoS attack abusing fragmentation is to appropriately limit the rate of fragment packets (e.g., 1000 packets per second) at a receiver node.
+
+##### **Threat 15:**
+
+Several types of IPv6 extension headers contain variable length options. When these options do not fill out the required number of bytes to complete the extension header, a proper alignment is achieved by introducing padding options, either Pad1 or PadN options, to fill option fields with variable data length. Normally, the Pad1 option is used to fill one octet padding into an option field and the PadN option is used to fill more than one octet padding. However, an attacker can send forged packets with a large number of Pad1 options included in each packet. If the attacker sends a large number of such forged packets, they can exhaust computational resources of another (victim) node to process all of the Pad1 options one by one.
+
+##### **Measure 15:**
+
+Regarding the security risk raised by the DoS attack abusing the padding option header, [IETF RFC 2460] describes that the PadN option should be used rather than the multiple Pad1 options if more than one-octet padding is required. Therefore, it will effectively work that routers drop packets that have more than one Pad1 option header to disturb the DoS attack. According to this policy, [IETF RFC 2460] recommends security appliance vendors implement a function to check the validity of padding option.
+
+## **8.2 DHCP server**
+
+### **8.2.1 Security threats and countermeasures**
+
+##### **Threat 16:**
+
+IPv6 hosts may configure their addresses by using a stateful dynamic address allocation protocol such as the DHCPv6 if they receive any RA messages with M flag set from routers. During the stateful configuration, IPv6 hosts send DHCPv6 SOLICIT messages to all DHCPv6 servers using a link-scoped multicast address (for DHCPv6 relays) and a site-scoped multicast address (for DHCPv6 clients) so that they are able to obtain addresses as well as other configuration parameters (e.g., DNS servers). In that case, a malicious host is able to prevent other IPv6 hosts from obtaining addresses by exhausting the address pool of DHCPv6 servers. In other words, if a malicious host issues large amounts of DHCPv6 SOLICIT messages to obtain all the addresses that DHCPv6 servers have, other IPv6 hosts are unable to obtain their addresses. Other threats such as man-in-the-middle attack by a malicious server, and DoS attack using replayed DHCPv6 messages are indicated in [IETF RFC 3315] section 23.
+
+##### **Measure 16:**
+
+The countermeasures for attacks against DHCPv6 servers have been discussed in section 21, 22 and 23 of [IETF RFC 3315]. As one of the countermeasures against the threat, the DHCP authentication mechanism is effective to mitigate the threat, which applies the authentication option to DHCPv6 messages.
+
+However, even though DHCP authentication is applied, the attack can still be conducted in a case where a node with a legitimate authentication key is compromised by an attacker. Therefore, as another approach, it is also effective against the attack if the DHCPv6 server limits the rate of DHCPv6 SOLICIT messages. The same approach, the rate-limit of DHCPv6 SOLICIT messages, is also effective on firewalls. Another countermeasure on network devices is to limit the number of MAC addresses connected to a physical port on the L2 switch (i.e., to a certain value).
+
+## **8.3 DNS server**
+
+### **8.3.1 Security threats and countermeasures**
+
+##### **Threat 17:**
+
+If a malicious node, which is serving rogue DHCPv6 and DNS services, sends a rogue RA message with a M flag bit set, the other nodes that received the RA messages are forced to use the DHCPv6 service which is operated by the attacker. After that the malicious node sends DHCPv6 Advertise messages so that the malicious node can disguise itself as a DNS server for victim nodes. While the malicious node is pretending to be a DNS server, when a client (victim) tries to resolve an arbitrary node's name, the malicious node may return an AAAA record with the malicious node's IPv6 address. As a result, the victim is unlikely to form a valid IPv6 address and the IPv6 service is therefore denied.
+
+##### **Measure 17:**
+
+DHCPv6 snooping on the L2 switch is effective to avoid this attack, which disturbs the activities of the illegal DHCP server. The DHCP message authentication mechanism ([IETF RFC 3315], section 21) is also effective for this attack. Additionally, the RA Guard disturbs the attack at the first step of the process by dropping the illegal RA message from the attacker, unless the RA message is not fragmented (see Threat/Measure in clause 7.2.1).
+
+# **9 Security devices**
+
+## **9.1 Intrusion detection system**
+
+### **9.1.1 Security threats and countermeasures**
+
+##### **Threat 18:**
+
+6to4 is a transition mechanism for migrating from IPv4 to IPv6. In the 6to4 framework, 6to4 routers carry out the encapsulation of outgoing IPv6 packets and the decapsulation of incoming IPv6 packets. Therefore, if an IPv6 host attacks another IPv6 host via a 6to4 router, and if the intrusion detection system (IDS) does not support the encapsulation/decapsulation of 6to4 packets, 6to4 packets are unable to be detected as cyberattacks or suspicious packets. In addition, [IETF RFC 6169] describes similar threats caused by other auto-tunnelling mechanisms such as Teredo and ISATAP.
+
+##### **Measure 18:**
+
+IDSs are recommended to support the decapsulation function of the encapsulated IPv6 packets and IPv6-in-IPv4 packets over 6to4 tunnels, if these IDSs are deployed in network boundaries. Or if the IDSs do not have these functions, they should be deployed inside CPE or inside hosts so that they can inspect pre-tunnelled traffic.
+
+NOTE – Other tunnelling techniques like TEREDO and ISATAP should be further considered.
+
+## **9.2 Firewall**
+
+### **9.2.1 Security threats and countermeasures**
+
+##### **Threat 19:**
+
+The IPv6 fragment header is used by the IPv6 source host in order to send a packet larger than the path MTU that has been discovered on an arbitrary path. A source host fragments a large packet into multiple smaller packets with the fragment header so that the destination host can reassemble fragmented packets into the original packet according to the fragment header. Each fragmented packet has offset information that indicates the location of the fragment in the original. However, since some firewalls inspect only the first fragment and pass subsequent fragments if the first one was permitted, a malicious sender can bypass firewalls by sending subsequent fragments whose offset is intentionally overlapped with the first fragment.
+
+##### **Measure 19:**
+
+A simple solution is to avoid fragmentation. If IPv6 packet fragmentation cannot be avoided, one of the countermeasures on firewalls is to apply the virtual defragmentation mechanism on firewalls, which reassembles fragments and inspects the original datagram before transmitting the fragments. As a countermeasure on end nodes, receiver nodes should discard datagrams that include overlapping fragments. In addition, [IETF RFC 5722] recommends disallowing overlapping fragments in order to prevent this attack.
+
+## Appendix I
+
+### Examples of threats
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+The following examples of threats provide practical ideas of how to describe "threats" associated with those in the main body of this Recommendation. Examples do not cover all threats in this Recommendation; however, the following examples can be helpful for readers in order to provide additional explanation on several threats discussed in the Recommendation.
+
+**Example 1:** Figure I.1 shows an example where the web server (S-C1) and the client (C-C1) are communicating with each other. On the backbone segment, routers (B-R1, B-R2 and B-R3) are running OSPFv3. If an attacker somehow compromises a host (C-C2) on the backbone segment and sends a large amount of LSAs to the router (B-R3), the number of received LSAs may exceed the router's capacity. Consequently, the router's OSPFv3 process may become extremely heavy, resulting in abnormal forwarding behaviour. This example is associated with Threat 1.
+
+![Diagram illustrating LSA flooding (Threat 1) in a network topology.](898fb89a50d9ec1dfb4e425c816976a7_img.jpg)
+
+The diagram illustrates a network topology divided into three segments: Backbone, Server segment, and Client segment. In the Backbone segment, three routers (B-R1, B-R2, and B-R3) are connected in a line. B-R1 is at the top, connected to B-R2 below it, which is connected to B-R3 below it. In the Server segment, a Web server (S-C1) is connected to B-R2. In the Client segment, a Client (C-C1) is connected to B-R3. An Attacker (C-C2) is also connected to B-R3. The diagram shows two types of traffic: 1. Normal traffic (blue arrows) flowing from the Client (C-C1) through B-R3 and B-R2 to the Web server (S-C1). 2. LSA flooding (red arrows) originating from the Attacker (C-C2) and flooding B-R3. The diagram is labeled 'X.1037(13)\_F1.1' in the bottom right corner.
+
+Diagram illustrating LSA flooding (Threat 1) in a network topology.
+
+Figure I.1 – LSA flooding (Threat 1)
+
+**Example 2:** Figure I.2 shows an attack scenario of forged RA messages. In this attack scenario, the router (B-R3) sends legitimate RA messages to the client (C-C1) that wants to communicate with the web server (S-C1). In this situation, the attacker (C-C2) also sends the client forged RA messages which specify the attacker as the default gateway. Using this attack, the attacker can intercept or disturb all traffic between the client and the web server. This is an example associated with Threat 8.
+
+![Figure I.2 – Forged RA messages (Threat 8). This diagram illustrates a network topology and an attack scenario. The network is divided into three segments: a Backbone, a Server segment, and a Client segment. The Backbone contains Router B-R1. The Server segment contains Router B-R2 and a Web server S-C1. The Client segment contains Router B-R3, Client C-C1, and Attacker C-C2. The attack steps are: 1. Legitimate RA from B-R3 to C-C1; 2. Rogue RA from C-C2 to C-C1; 3. Change default GW from C-C2 to C-C1. The identifier X.1037(13)_F1.2 is at the bottom right.](b6671cfafda3820aafe9a24fa7a4d8c7_img.jpg)
+
+Figure I.2 – Forged RA messages (Threat 8). This diagram illustrates a network topology and an attack scenario. The network is divided into three segments: a Backbone, a Server segment, and a Client segment. The Backbone contains Router B-R1. The Server segment contains Router B-R2 and a Web server S-C1. The Client segment contains Router B-R3, Client C-C1, and Attacker C-C2. The attack steps are: 1. Legitimate RA from B-R3 to C-C1; 2. Rogue RA from C-C2 to C-C1; 3. Change default GW from C-C2 to C-C1. The identifier X.1037(13)\_F1.2 is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure I.2 – Forged RA messages (Threat 8)**
+
+**Example 3:** Figure I.3 shows an attack scenario of the DAD procedure. In this attack scenario, the router (B-R1) sends legitimate RA messages to the client (C-C1) that wants to obtain its own IP address, and the client sends NS messages to check the uniqueness of the IP address. When the attacker (C-C2) receives the NS messages from the client, it replies with NA messages to all NS messages. Using this attack, the client could not obtain its own IP address during the attack. After the attacker stops sending forged RA messages, the client could get its own IP address. The above is a practical example associated with Threat 9.
+
+![Figure I.3 – Abused DAD procedure (Threat 9). This diagram shows the DAD procedure and an attack. The Backbone contains Router B-R1. The Client segment contains Client C-C1 and Attacker C-C2. The steps are: 1. Send RA from B-R1 to C-C1; 2. Receive RA, and set up its own address at C-C1; 3. Send NS from C-C1 to C-C2; 4. Reply NA against all NS from C-C2 to C-C1. The identifier X.1037(13)_F1.3 is at the bottom right.](81a4cbf0b3c4cbc065efdf8f800dadde_img.jpg)
+
+Figure I.3 – Abused DAD procedure (Threat 9). This diagram shows the DAD procedure and an attack. The Backbone contains Router B-R1. The Client segment contains Client C-C1 and Attacker C-C2. The steps are: 1. Send RA from B-R1 to C-C1; 2. Receive RA, and set up its own address at C-C1; 3. Send NS from C-C1 to C-C2; 4. Reply NA against all NS from C-C2 to C-C1. The identifier X.1037(13)\_F1.3 is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure I.3 – Abused DAD procedure (Threat 9)**
+
+**Example 4:** Figure I.4 shows an attack scenario of DHCPv6 SOLICIT messages. In this attack scenario, the attacker (S-C1) sends DHCPv6 SOLICIT messages to the DHCPv6 server (S-S3) in order to exhaust its address pool. The client (D-C2) then sends HDCPv6 SOLICIT messages to the DHCPv6 server to get DHCPv6 advertise messages. The risk assessment of the IPv6 Technical Verification Consortium in Japan ([b-IPv6TVC]) observed that the DHCPv6 server's service was not stopped, but the client could not get DHCPv6 advertise messages from the DHCPv6 server during the attack. After the attacker stops sending DHCPv6 SOLICIT messages, the client could get DHCPv6 advertise messages from the DHCPv6 server. The above is a practical example associated with Threat 16.
+
+![Figure I.4: DHCPv6 SOLICIT messages (Threat 16). The diagram shows a Server segment with an Attacker (S-C1) and a Client (D-C2) connected to a DHCPv6 server (S-S3). The sequence of events is: 1. Flood DHCP solicit (Attacker to server), 2. DHCP advertise (server to Attacker), 3. Send DHCP solicit (Client to server), and 4. Cannot send DHCP advertise (server to Client).](5b8a756d9a71c35f17db8bcb90b438a3_img.jpg)
+
+X.1037(13)\_F1.4
+
+Figure I.4: DHCPv6 SOLICIT messages (Threat 16). The diagram shows a Server segment with an Attacker (S-C1) and a Client (D-C2) connected to a DHCPv6 server (S-S3). The sequence of events is: 1. Flood DHCP solicit (Attacker to server), 2. DHCP advertise (server to Attacker), 3. Send DHCP solicit (Client to server), and 4. Cannot send DHCP advertise (server to Client).
+
+**Figure I.4 – DHCPv6 SOLICIT messages (Threat 16)**
+
+**Example 5:** Figure I.5 shows an attack scenario of 6to4 encapsulation. In this attack scenario, an attacker (S-C1) sends the client (C-C1) via 6to4 tunnel a remote exploit code that induces a target host's unintended or unanticipated behaviour while the router (B-R1) forwards captured traffic to the IDS (D-I1). In this circumstance, the IDS could not detect the exploit code due to its encapsulation. This is an example associated with Threat 18.
+
+![Figure I.5: 6to4 encapsulation (Threat 18). The diagram shows a Backbone with a Router (B-R1) and an IDS (D-I1). The Server segment contains an Attacker (S-C1) and the Client segment contains a 6to4 relay server (C-C2) and a Client (C-C1). The sequence of events is: 1. Send exploit code via 6to4 tunnel (Attacker to relay server), 2. Mirror traffic including exploit code (Router to IDS), and 3. Cannot detect encapsulated exploit code (IDS).](79e1709a7317ead45379cbb8ff3ba802_img.jpg)
+
+X.1037(13)\_F1.5
+
+Figure I.5: 6to4 encapsulation (Threat 18). The diagram shows a Backbone with a Router (B-R1) and an IDS (D-I1). The Server segment contains an Attacker (S-C1) and the Client segment contains a 6to4 relay server (C-C2) and a Client (C-C1). The sequence of events is: 1. Send exploit code via 6to4 tunnel (Attacker to relay server), 2. Mirror traffic including exploit code (Router to IDS), and 3. Cannot detect encapsulated exploit code (IDS).
+
+**Figure I.5 – 6to4 encapsulation (Threat 18)**
+
+**Example 6:** Figure I.6 shows an attack scenario of overlapped fragments. At the beginning, an attacker (E-S1) sends the first fragment to a certain port number (e.g., 22/transmission control protocol (TCP)) permitted by firewalls (D-F1) and (D-F2). Since the port number is permitted, the first fragment is transmitted to a victim node (C-C1). Then the attacker sends the second fragment whose offset is set to zero (i.e., it overwrites the first fragment) to a target port number (e.g., 445/TCP). If the firewalls are configured not to inspect subsequent fragments, the second fragment successfully reaches to the victim node and overwrites the first fragment. Thus, the original port number (22/TCP) is overwritten by the arbitrary port number (445/TCP); hence, a defragmented datagram is able to attack a service on the port. The above is a practical example associated with Threat 19.
+
+![Network diagram illustrating overlapped fragments (Threat 19) across four segments: External, DMZ, Backbone, and Client.](e69b9188aa2c14ec6b21c83f711fef65_img.jpg)
+
+The diagram illustrates a network architecture with four segments and a threat scenario involving overlapped fragments:
+
+- External segment:** Contains an **Attacker** (E-S1).
+- DMZ:** Contains a **Router** (D-R1) and two **Firewalls** (D-F1 and D-F2).
+- Backbone:** Contains a **Router** (B-R1).
+- Client segment:** Contains a **Victim** (C-C1).
+
+Red arrows represent network traffic. A blue arrow shows a path from the Attacker through the DMZ Router and Backbone Router to the Victim. Red arrows represent fragments:
+
+- 1. The first fragment to a certain PERMITTED port number:** A single red arrow from the Attacker to the Victim.
+- 2. Subsequent fragments with overlapped offset to the TARGET port number:** Multiple red arrows from the Attacker to the Victim, overlapping the first fragment's offset.
+
+X.1037(13)\_F1.6
+
+Network diagram illustrating overlapped fragments (Threat 19) across four segments: External, DMZ, Backbone, and Client.
+
+**Figure I.6 – Overlapped fragments (Threat 19)**
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-IETF RFC 3964] IETF RFC 3964 (2004), *Security Considerations for 6to4*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 4593] IETF RFC 4593 (2006), *Generic Threats to Routing Protocols*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 4795] IETF RFC 4795 (2007), *Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR)*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 4861] IETF RFC 4861 (2007), *Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 4942] IETF RFC 4942 (2007), *IPv6 Transition/Coexistence Security Considerations*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 5942] IETF RFC 5942 (2010), *IPv6 Subnet Model: The Relationship between Links and Subnet Prefixes*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 5969] IETF RFC 5969 (2010), *IPv6 Rapid Deployment on IPv4 Infrastructures (6rd) – Protocol Specification*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 6106] IETF RFC 6106 (2011), *IPv6 Router Advertisement Options for DNS Configuration*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 6333] IETF RFC 6333 (2011), *Dual-Stack Lite Broadband Deployments Following IPv4 Exhaustion*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 6434] IETF RFC 6434 (2011), *IPv6 Node Requirements*.
+- [b-IPv6TVC] *IPv6 Technical Verification Consortium*.  
+<<http://ipv6tvc.jp/english/default.html>>
+- [b-NIST SP 800-119] NIST SP 800-119 (2010), *Guidelines for the Secure Deployment of IPv6*.  
+<<http://www.csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-119/sp800-119.pdf>>
+- [b-v6PC] *IPv6 Promotion Council in Japan (2009), IPv6 Home Router Guideline*.  
+<[http://www.v6pc.jp/pdf/v6hgw\\_Guideline\\_1\\_0-English.pdf](http://www.v6pc.jp/pdf/v6hgw_Guideline_1_0-English.pdf)>
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+|                 |                                                                                             |
+|-----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A        | Organization of the work of ITU-T                                                           |
+| Series D        | General tariff principles                                                                   |
+| Series E        | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors           |
+| Series F        | Non-telephone telecommunication services                                                    |
+| Series G        | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks                                |
+| Series H        | Audiovisual and multimedia systems                                                          |
+| Series I        | Integrated services digital network                                                         |
+| Series J        | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K        | Protection against interference                                                             |
+| Series L        | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant     |
+| Series M        | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance                         |
+| Series N        | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits             |
+| Series O        | Specifications of measuring equipment                                                       |
+| Series P        | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods                                   |
+| Series Q        | Switching and signalling                                                                    |
+| Series R        | Telegraph transmission                                                                      |
+| Series S        | Telegraph services terminal equipment                                                       |
+| Series T        | Terminals for telematic services                                                            |
+| Series U        | Telegraph switching                                                                         |
+| Series V        | Data communication over the telephone network                                               |
+| <b>Series X</b> | <b>Data networks, open system communications and security</b>                               |
+| Series Y        | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks   |
+| Series Z        | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems                        |

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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l   T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n   U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION  
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR  
+OF ITU
+
+# X.1044
+
+(10/2019)
+
+SERIES X: DATA NETWORKS, OPEN SYSTEM  
+COMMUNICATIONS AND SECURITY
+
+Information and network security – Network security
+
+# --- **Security requirements of network virtualization**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T X.1044
+
+![ITU logo: A blue globe with red lightning bolts and the text 'ITU International Telecommunication Union'.](84a1d09fb489061482111515543b60dc_img.jpg)
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with two red lightning bolts striking it. To the right of the globe, the text 'ITU' is written in a large, bold, blue font, and below it, the words 'International Telecommunication Union' are written in a smaller, blue font.
+
+ITU logo: A blue globe with red lightning bolts and the text 'ITU International Telecommunication Union'.
+
+## ITU-T X-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS DATA NETWORKS, OPEN SYSTEM COMMUNICATIONS AND SECURITY
+
+|                                                        |                      |
+|--------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| PUBLIC DATA NETWORKS                                   | X.1–X.199            |
+| OPEN SYSTEMS INTERCONNECTION                           | X.200–X.299          |
+| INTERWORKING BETWEEN NETWORKS                          | X.300–X.399          |
+| MESSAGE HANDLING SYSTEMS                               | X.400–X.499          |
+| DIRECTORY                                              | X.500–X.599          |
+| OSI NETWORKING AND SYSTEM ASPECTS                      | X.600–X.699          |
+| OSI MANAGEMENT                                         | X.700–X.799          |
+| SECURITY                                               | X.800–X.849          |
+| OSI APPLICATIONS                                       | X.850–X.899          |
+| OPEN DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING                            | X.900–X.999          |
+| INFORMATION AND NETWORK SECURITY                       |                      |
+| General security aspects                               | X.1000–X.1029        |
+| <b>Network security</b>                                | <b>X.1030–X.1049</b> |
+| Security management                                    | X.1050–X.1069        |
+| Telebiometrics                                         | X.1080–X.1099        |
+| SECURE APPLICATIONS AND SERVICES (1)                   |                      |
+| Multicast security                                     | X.1100–X.1109        |
+| Home network security                                  | X.1110–X.1119        |
+| Mobile security                                        | X.1120–X.1139        |
+| Web security                                           | X.1140–X.1149        |
+| Security protocols (1)                                 | X.1150–X.1159        |
+| Peer-to-peer security                                  | X.1160–X.1169        |
+| Networked ID security                                  | X.1170–X.1179        |
+| IPTV security                                          | X.1180–X.1199        |
+| CYBERSPACE SECURITY                                    |                      |
+| Cybersecurity                                          | X.1200–X.1229        |
+| Countering spam                                        | X.1230–X.1249        |
+| Identity management                                    | X.1250–X.1279        |
+| SECURE APPLICATIONS AND SERVICES (2)                   |                      |
+| Emergency communications                               | X.1300–X.1309        |
+| Ubiquitous sensor network security                     | X.1310–X.1319        |
+| Smart grid security                                    | X.1330–X.1339        |
+| Certified mail                                         | X.1340–X.1349        |
+| Internet of things (IoT) security                      | X.1360–X.1369        |
+| Intelligent transportation system (ITS) security       | X.1370–X.1389        |
+| Distributed ledger technology security                 | X.1400–X.1429        |
+| Distributed ledger technology security                 | X.1430–X.1449        |
+| Security protocols (2)                                 | X.1450–X.1459        |
+| CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION EXCHANGE                     |                      |
+| Overview of cybersecurity                              | X.1500–X.1519        |
+| Vulnerability/state exchange                           | X.1520–X.1539        |
+| Event/incident/heuristics exchange                     | X.1540–X.1549        |
+| Exchange of policies                                   | X.1550–X.1559        |
+| Heuristics and information request                     | X.1560–X.1569        |
+| Identification and discovery                           | X.1570–X.1579        |
+| Assured exchange                                       | X.1580–X.1589        |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING SECURITY                               |                      |
+| Overview of cloud computing security                   | X.1600–X.1601        |
+| Cloud computing security design                        | X.1602–X.1639        |
+| Cloud computing security best practices and guidelines | X.1640–X.1659        |
+| Cloud computing security implementation                | X.1660–X.1679        |
+| Other cloud computing security                         | X.1680–X.1699        |
+| QUANTUM COMMUNICATION                                  | X.1700–X.1729        |
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T X.1044
+
+# Security requirements of network virtualization
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T X.1044 analyses security challenges and threats to network virtualization (NV) and specifies security requirements for the physical resources layer, the virtual resources layer and the logically isolated network partition (LINP) layer in network virtualization.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval   | Study Group | Unique ID*                                                                |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0     | ITU-T X.1044   | 2019-10-29 | 17          | <a href="http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/14042">11.1002/1000/14042</a> |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Network virtualization, NV.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL <http://handle.itu.int/> in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID. For example, <http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/11830-en>.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at <http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/ipr/>.
+
+© ITU 2020
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+|                                                                                                             | <b>Page</b> |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope .....                                                                                               | 1           |
+| 2 References.....                                                                                           | 1           |
+| 3 Definitions .....                                                                                         | 1           |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere.....                                                                            | 1           |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation.....                                                               | 1           |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms .....                                                                          | 2           |
+| 5 Conventions .....                                                                                         | 2           |
+| 6 Overview .....                                                                                            | 2           |
+| 7 Security challenges and threats of network virtualization.....                                            | 4           |
+| 7.1 Security challenges and threats to the physical resources layer .....                                   | 4           |
+| 7.2 Security challenges and threats to the virtual resources layer.....                                     | 4           |
+| 7.3 Security challenges and threats to the logically isolated network partition<br>layer .....              | 4           |
+| 8 Security requirements for physical resources layer in network virtualization .....                        | 5           |
+| 8.1 Physical and environmental security .....                                                               | 5           |
+| 8.2 Technical measures .....                                                                                | 5           |
+| 9 Security requirements for a virtual resources layer in network virtualization.....                        | 6           |
+| 10 Security requirements for a logically isolated network partition layer in network<br>virtualization..... | 7           |
+| Bibliography.....                                                                                           | 9           |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation UIT-T X.1044
+
+## Security requirements of network virtualization
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation analyses security challenges and threats to network virtualization (NV), and specifies security requirements for the physical resources layer, the virtual resources layer and the logically isolated network partition (LINP) layer in NV.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T X.1601] Recommendation ITU-T X.1601 (2015), *Security framework for cloud computing*.
+- [ITU-T X.1631] Recommendation ITU-T X.1631 (2015) | ISO/IEC 27017:2015, *Information technology – Security techniques – Code of practice for information security controls based on ISO/IEC 27002 for cloud services*.
+- [ITU-T X.1642] Recommendation ITU-T X.1642 (2016), *Guidelines for the operational security of cloud computing*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3011] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3011 (2012), *Framework of network virtualization for future networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3012 (2014), *Requirements of network virtualization for future networks*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 logically isolated network partition (LINP)** [ITU-T Y.3011]: A network that is composed of multiple virtual resources which is isolated from other LINPs.
+
+NOTE – "logically isolated", which is the counter concept of "physically isolated", means mutual exclusiveness of the subjects (i.e., network partition, in this case), while the original subjects may be physically united/shared within the common physical constraints.
+
+**3.1.2 network virtualization** [ITU-T Y.3011]: A technology that enables the creation of logically isolated network partitions over shared physical networks so that heterogeneous collections of multiple virtual networks can simultaneously coexist over the shared networks. This includes the aggregation of multiple resources in a provider and appearing as a single resource.
+
+## 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+None.
+
+# 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+|      |                                              |
+|------|----------------------------------------------|
+| AAA  | Authentication, Authorization and Accounting |
+| DDoS | Distributed Denial of Service                |
+| DoS  | Denial of Service                            |
+| FN   | Future Network                               |
+| ID   | Identifier                                   |
+| LINP | Logically Isolated Network Partition         |
+| NV   | Network Virtualization                       |
+| NW   | Network                                      |
+| SNMP | Simple Network Management Protocol           |
+| VRM  | Virtual Resources Manager                    |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "**is required to**" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "**is recommended**" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "**is prohibited from**" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "**can optionally**" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option, and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with the specification.
+
+# 6 Overview
+
+According to [ITU-T Y.3011] and [ITU-T Y.3012], network virtualization (NV) is a technology that realizes isolated and flexible networks in order to support a broad range of network architectures, services and users that do not interfere with others. It also enables the easy establishment of experimental networks and accelerates research and development on future network (FN) technologies. Therefore, NV is considered to be a key technology for realizing FNs.
+
+As specified in [ITU-T Y.3011], NV has three layers: physical resources layer, virtual resources layer and LINP layer.
+
+- **Physical resources layer:** Physical resource management enables effective and consistent use of physical resources that may include heterogeneous types of equipment, e.g., routers and servers developed by different vendors.
+- **Virtual resources layer:** Virtual resource management enables LINPs to bind physical resources and virtual resources.
+- **LINP layer:** LINP management enables LINP operators to apply management policies to an LINP.
+
+Figure 1 illustrates the high-level concept of NV.
+
+![Figure 1: Conceptual architecture of network virtualization. The diagram shows a multi-layered architecture. At the top, 'Various services' (blue, green, and red ovals) are connected via dashed lines to three 'Virtual networks' (LINP 1, LINP 2, LINP 3) in the middle. These virtual networks are managed by 'LINP 1 manager', 'LINP 2 manager', and 'LINP 3 manager' respectively. Below the virtual networks is the 'Virtual resources' layer, which contains a complex network of routers and switches. This layer is managed by a 'Virtual resources manager'. At the bottom is the 'Physical resources' layer, which includes 'Physical NW 1', 'Physical NW 2', 'Physical NW 3', and 'Physical NW 4'. These are managed by 'Physical NW 1 manager', 'Physical NW 2 manager', 'Physical NW 3 manager', and 'Physical NW 4 manager' respectively. The diagram illustrates how virtual networks and resources are mapped to and managed by physical resources.](ebff22fb5dd6f50a90e44dca0f82f285_img.jpg)
+
+X.1044(19)\_F01
+
+Figure 1: Conceptual architecture of network virtualization. The diagram shows a multi-layered architecture. At the top, 'Various services' (blue, green, and red ovals) are connected via dashed lines to three 'Virtual networks' (LINP 1, LINP 2, LINP 3) in the middle. These virtual networks are managed by 'LINP 1 manager', 'LINP 2 manager', and 'LINP 3 manager' respectively. Below the virtual networks is the 'Virtual resources' layer, which contains a complex network of routers and switches. This layer is managed by a 'Virtual resources manager'. At the bottom is the 'Physical resources' layer, which includes 'Physical NW 1', 'Physical NW 2', 'Physical NW 3', and 'Physical NW 4'. These are managed by 'Physical NW 1 manager', 'Physical NW 2 manager', 'Physical NW 3 manager', and 'Physical NW 4 manager' respectively. The diagram illustrates how virtual networks and resources are mapped to and managed by physical resources.
+
+**Figure 1 – Conceptual architecture of network virtualization**
+
+NV could realize diverse services and heterogeneous network architectures on a common physical network, and is considered to be a key technology for realizing FNs.
+
+On the other hand, NV also face the following security threats and challenges.
+
+- **To the physical resources layer:** Physical resource management enables effective and consistent use of physical resources that may include heterogeneous types of equipment, e.g., routers and servers developed by different vendors. Physical resources in NV face distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack, vulnerabilities due to shared use of physical network devices, etc.
+- **To the virtual resources layer:** Virtual resource management enables LINPs to bind physical resources and virtual resources. The virtual resources layer is potentially subject to eavesdropping, man in the middle attack, etc.
+- **To the LINP layer:** LINP management enables LINP operators to apply management policies to an LINP. The LINP layer is potentially subject to denial of service (DoS) attacks on LINP management platform, security vulnerabilities of operating system, broken access control, etc.
+
+# **7 Security challenges and threats of network virtualization**
+
+## **7.1 Security challenges and threats to the physical resources layer**
+
+The physical resources layer in NV faces similar challenges and threats to the physical layer in cloud computing due to: a) physical and environmental threats, which include unsecure areas and equipment, such as earthquake, flood, fire; and b) technical attacks, which include DoS or DDoS attacks, malwares and system vulnerabilities.
+
+## **7.2 Security challenges and threats to the virtual resources layer**
+
+The virtual resources layer faces the following challenges and threats:
+
+- a) Unavailability of physical resources: if the physical resources are attacked or broken, the virtual resources, which are the abstraction of those physical resources, will all lose their availability and data.
+- b) Unauthorized administration access: unauthorized administration access to the virtual resource management system can result in data loss. For example, attackers may use a system vulnerability to gain unauthorized administration access to the virtual resource management system and modify configuration information, such as the abstraction information from physical resources to virtual resources.
+- c) System vulnerability: virtual resources data or configuration information can be lost or maliciously modified due to system vulnerabilities.
+- d) Man in the middle attack: attackers can use man-in-the-middle attack if there is a malicious resource in the virtual resource layer that is not discovered.
+- e) Interface vulnerability: attackers may use an interface vulnerability to access the network resource, including interfaces between physical resources layer and virtual resources layer, and interfaces between virtual resources layer and LINP layer.
+- f) Blurred or non-existent network boundaries: NV is not traditionally considered secure because network boundaries are blurred or non-existent in NV.
+- g) Service unavailability: a virtual resources manager (VRM) that is used to administer all virtual resources and coordinate the allocation of LINPs can be subject to a DoS or DDoS attack, for example, which can result in service unavailability.
+- h) Insecure service access: insecure access to a VRM or a virtual resource make it possible for a malicious user to monitor or control the virtual resources, even if these resources are not allocated to the malicious user.
+- i) Account abuse: virtual resources are managed by multiple VRMs and users to provide both internal and external services. Users sharing administrator passwords or otherwise leaving credentials unsecure (e.g., written on notes stuck to a screen), careless or inadequately trained users or malicious actions by disgruntled employees will always pose a significant threat to any business.
+
+## **7.3 Security challenges and threats to the logically isolated network partition layer**
+
+The LINP layer faces the following challenges and threats:
+
+- a) LINP performance degradation: since some LINPs are in a shared physical resource, performance degradation issue of LINPs may be very obvious when those LINPs are quite busy.
+- b) Service unavailability: many issues may cause service unavailability, e.g., the LINP management system is subject to DoS or DDoS, or unavailability of the physical resource, which is a key part of an LINP.
+
+- c) System vulnerability: attackers may use a system vulnerability to access an LINP management system, they may then monitor or control virtual resources, or steal important data, causing whole LINPs to crash.
+- d) Data loss and leakage: loss or leakage of data is a serious threat to the LINP layer when user services run on LINPs, especially for LINPs whose virtual resources are administered by an outside party that provides those LINPs to users.
+- e) Interface vulnerability: attackers may use interface vulnerabilities to access the network resource, including interfaces between LINPs and the LINP management system, as well as between the virtual resources layer and LINP layer.
+- f) Insecure service access: it is possible for a malicious user to monitor or control virtual resources, even if these resources are not allocated to the malicious user through insecure service access.
+- g) Internal threats: there is always a risk of individuals acting in a malicious or careless manner that puts the security of the service at risk, because some employees of these companies who own LINPs have administrator passwords or they have more opportunities to access LINP management system or something else.
+- h) Scalability issues: scalability issues for the number of possible LINPs in a shared physical network should be considered, because LINP performance degradation or service unavailability will occur if the number of LINPs in a shared physical network is too large.
+- i) Loss of trust: sometimes, it is difficult for a user whose virtual resources are administered by an outside party that provides those LINPs to the users to recognize their provider's trust level due to the black-box feature of the LINPs service. Such a lack of sharing at the security level with regard to LINP providers can become a serious security threat for some users in their use of LINP services.
+
+# **8 Security requirements for physical resources layer in network virtualization**
+
+There are two security requirements for a physical resources layer in NV: a) physical and environmental security; and b) technical measures.
+
+## **8.1 Physical and environmental security**
+
+Security requirements for physical and environmental security include secure areas and equipment described in Table 8-1. The objective, the associated implementation guidance and other information specified in clause 11 of [ITU-T X.1631] apply.
+
+## **8.2 Technical measures**
+
+Security requirements against DoS or DDoS attacks, malware and system vulnerabilities to devices are described in Table 8-1. The objective, the associated implementation guidance and other information specified in clause 7.2.2.4 of [ITU-T X.1642] apply.
+
+Table 8-1 summarizes the mapping of security threats and challenges to security requirements in a physical resources layer. The objective, the associated implementation guidance and other information specified in clause 11 of [ITU-T X.1631] and clause 7.2.2.4 of [ITU-T X.1642] apply.
+
+**Table 8-1 – Physical resources layer: Security threat mapping to security requirements**
+
+| Security threats       | Security requirements                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | Reference                        |
+|------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
+| Secure areas threats   | Physical security perimeter<br>Physical entry controls<br>Securing offices, rooms and facilities<br>Protecting against external and environmental threats<br>Working in secure areas<br>Delivery and loading areas                                                                     | Clause 11 of [ITU-T X.1631]      |
+| Equipment threats      | Equipment siting and protection<br>Supporting utilities<br>Cabling security<br>Equipment maintenance<br>Removal of assets<br>Security of equipment and assets off-premises<br>Secure disposal or reuse of equipment<br>Unattended user equipment<br>Clear desk and clear screen policy |                                  |
+| DoS or DDoS attacks    | Measures to secure network traffic                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Clause 7.2.2.4 of [ITU-T X.1642] |
+| Malwares               | Measures against malware                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |                                  |
+| System vulnerabilities | Patch upgrade                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |                                  |
+
+# 9 Security requirements for a virtual resources layer in network virtualization
+
+The security requirements for a virtual resources layer include:
+
+- a) it is required that LINP identification means, such as an LINP identifier (ID), to differentiate LINPs, be provided;
+- b) it is required that security threats and challenges be considered throughout the design, development, deployment and runtime lifecycle of NV;
+- c) it is required that the VRM support logging and auditing;
+- d) it is required that the integrity and accuracy of virtual resource data be maintained;
+- e) it is recommended that standard data transmission techniques, e.g., the simple network management protocol (SNMP), be used;
+- f) it is recommended that access control methods to the interfaces, including interfaces between physical resources layer and virtual resources layer, as well as interfaces between virtual resources layer and LINP layer, e.g., white list and black list, be provided;
+- g) it is required that unified identity management for internal VRMs and external tenants, which contributes to the confidentiality, integrity, as well as availability of services and virtual resources, be provided. See the relevant content in the clause 9.2 of [ITU-T X.1601].
+
+Table 9-1 summarizes the mapping of security threats and challenges to security requirements in a virtual resources layer.
+
+**Table 9-1 – Virtual resources layer: Security threat mapping to security requirements**
+
+| Security threats                   | Security requirements  |
+|------------------------------------|------------------------|
+| shared use of physical resources   | b), d), e)             |
+| unauthorized administration access | a), b), c), d), f)     |
+| system vulnerability               | b), c), d), f)         |
+| man in the middle attack           | b), c), d), e), f)     |
+| interface vulnerability            | b), c), d), f)         |
+| elastic network boundaries         | b), c), d)             |
+| service unavailability             | a), b), c), d), f)     |
+| insecure service access            | a), b), c), d), e), f) |
+| account abuse                      | b), c), d), f), g)     |
+
+# 10 Security requirements for a logically isolated network partition layer in network virtualization
+
+The security requirements for LINP layer include:
+
+- a) it is required that the LINP management system support logging and auditing;
+- b) it is required that the LINP providers ensure secure transmission during various virtual resources of a LINP;
+- c) it is required that interface security, through unilateral or mutual authentication, integrity checksum, end-to-end encryption, digital signature, etc., be ensured;
+- d) it is recommended that access control methods for the LINP management system, e.g., quarantine mechanisms, malicious access identification and authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA) functions, to be provided;
+- e) it is recommended that the number of possible LINPs in a shared physical network be carefully considered;
+- f) it is recommended that the LINP providers supply appropriate encryption methods for user data running on those LINPs.
+- g) it is recommended that key resources of an LINP be backed up, in case some disaster happens;
+- h) it is recommended that monitoring of the security and privacy of data and applications that are implemented and deployed in LINPs be maintained.
+
+Table 10-1 summarizes the mapping of security threats and challenges to security requirements in an LINP layer.
+
+**Table 10-1 – Logically isolated network partition layer: Security threat mapping to security requirements**
+
+| <b>Security threats</b>      | <b>Security requirements</b>   |
+|------------------------------|--------------------------------|
+| LINP performance degradation | b), e)                         |
+| service unavailability       | b), c), e), f)                 |
+| system vulnerability         | a), c), d), f),g)              |
+| data loss and leakage        | a), b), c), d), e), f), h)     |
+| interface vulnerability      | b), c), f)                     |
+| insecure service access      | a), b), c), d), f), h)         |
+| insider threats              | a), b), c), d), e), f), g), h) |
+| scalability issues           | b), e)                         |
+| Loss of trust                | a), b), c), d), f), g), h)     |
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T X.1603] Recommendation ITU-T X.1603 (2018), *Data security requirements for the monitoring service of cloud computing*.
+- [b-ISO/IEC 27033] ISO/IEC 27033 (2010), *Information technology – Security techniques – Network security – Part 3: Reference networking scenarios – Threats, design techniques and control issues*.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+|                 |                                                                                                                                                           |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A        | Organization of the work of ITU-T                                                                                                                         |
+| Series D        | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues                                                       |
+| Series E        | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors                                                                         |
+| Series F        | Non-telephone telecommunication services                                                                                                                  |
+| Series G        | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks                                                                                              |
+| Series H        | Audiovisual and multimedia systems                                                                                                                        |
+| Series I        | Integrated services digital network                                                                                                                       |
+| Series J        | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals                                                               |
+| Series K        | Protection against interference                                                                                                                           |
+| Series L        | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M        | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance                                                                                       |
+| Series N        | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits                                                                           |
+| Series O        | Specifications of measuring equipment                                                                                                                     |
+| Series P        | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks                                                                              |
+| Series Q        | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests                                                                                           |
+| Series R        | Telegraph transmission                                                                                                                                    |
+| Series S        | Telegraph services terminal equipment                                                                                                                     |
+| Series T        | Terminals for telematic services                                                                                                                          |
+| Series U        | Telegraph switching                                                                                                                                       |
+| Series V        | Data communication over the telephone network                                                                                                             |
+| <b>Series X</b> | <b>Data networks, open system communications and security</b>                                                                                             |
+| Series Y        | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities                               |
+| Series Z        | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems                                                                                      |

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+I n t e r n a t i o n a l   T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n   U n i o n
+
+**ITU-T**
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION  
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR  
+OF ITU
+
+**X.1057**
+
+(05/2011)
+
+SERIES X: DATA NETWORKS, OPEN SYSTEM  
+COMMUNICATIONS AND SECURITY
+
+Information and network security – Security management
+
+# --- **Asset management guidelines in telecommunication organizations**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T X.1057
+
+![ITU logo](84a1d09fb489061482111515543b60dc_img.jpg)
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with a red lightning bolt striking it, and the text "ITU" in blue, with "International Telecommunication Union" in smaller blue text below it.
+
+ITU logo
+
+## ITU-T X-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS DATA NETWORKS, OPEN SYSTEM COMMUNICATIONS AND SECURITY
+
+|                                    |                      |
+|------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| PUBLIC DATA NETWORKS               | X.1–X.199            |
+| OPEN SYSTEMS INTERCONNECTION       | X.200–X.299          |
+| INTERWORKING BETWEEN NETWORKS      | X.300–X.399          |
+| MESSAGE HANDLING SYSTEMS           | X.400–X.499          |
+| DIRECTORY                          | X.500–X.599          |
+| OSI NETWORKING AND SYSTEM ASPECTS  | X.600–X.699          |
+| OSI MANAGEMENT                     | X.700–X.799          |
+| SECURITY                           | X.800–X.849          |
+| OSI APPLICATIONS                   | X.850–X.899          |
+| OPEN DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING        | X.900–X.999          |
+| INFORMATION AND NETWORK SECURITY   |                      |
+| General security aspects           | X.1000–X.1029        |
+| Network security                   | X.1030–X.1049        |
+| <b>Security management</b>         | <b>X.1050–X.1069</b> |
+| Telebiometrics                     | X.1080–X.1099        |
+| SECURE APPLICATIONS AND SERVICES   |                      |
+| Multicast security                 | X.1100–X.1109        |
+| Home network security              | X.1110–X.1119        |
+| Mobile security                    | X.1120–X.1139        |
+| Web security                       | X.1140–X.1149        |
+| Security protocols                 | X.1150–X.1159        |
+| Peer-to-peer security              | X.1160–X.1169        |
+| Networked ID security              | X.1170–X.1179        |
+| IPTV security                      | X.1180–X.1199        |
+| CYBERSPACE SECURITY                |                      |
+| Cybersecurity                      | X.1200–X.1229        |
+| Countering spam                    | X.1230–X.1249        |
+| Identity management                | X.1250–X.1279        |
+| SECURE APPLICATIONS AND SERVICES   |                      |
+| Emergency communications           | X.1300–X.1309        |
+| Ubiquitous sensor network security | X.1310–X.1339        |
+| CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION EXCHANGE |                      |
+| Overview of cybersecurity          | X.1500–X.1519        |
+| Vulnerability/state exchange       | X.1520–X.1539        |
+| Event/incident/heuristics exchange | X.1540–X.1549        |
+| Exchange of policies               | X.1550–X.1559        |
+| Heuristics and information request | X.1560–X.1569        |
+| Identification and discovery       | X.1570–X.1579        |
+| Assured exchange                   | X.1580–X.1589        |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **Recommendation ITU-T X.1057**
+
+# **Asset management guidelines in telecommunication organizations**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T X.1057 provides guidelines for securely managing various assets, including electronic information, paper, and IT systems in telecommunication organizations. This Recommendation also describes the main activities and methods for implementing asset management on the basis of the PDCA (Plan – Do – Check – Act) process model.
+
+## **History**
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval   | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0     | ITU-T X.1057   | 2011-05-29 | 17          |
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at <http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/ipr/>.
+
+© ITU 2012
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+|                                                                  | <b>Page</b> |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope .....                                                    | 1           |
+| 2 References.....                                                | 1           |
+| 3 Definitions .....                                              | 1           |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere .....                                | 1           |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation.....                    | 2           |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms .....                               | 2           |
+| 5 Conventions .....                                              | 3           |
+| 6 Overview of asset management .....                             | 3           |
+| 6.1 Concept of asset management process .....                    | 3           |
+| 6.2 Main activities in the asset management process .....        | 4           |
+| 7 Asset management process .....                                 | 5           |
+| 7.1 Establishment of asset management policy .....               | 5           |
+| 7.2 Survey and identification.....                               | 5           |
+| 7.3 Classification and registration .....                        | 6           |
+| 7.4 Evaluation of asset value .....                              | 6           |
+| 7.5 Performance of change management.....                        | 7           |
+| 8 Telecommunication asset classification .....                   | 7           |
+| 8.1 General and telecommunication specific assets .....          | 7           |
+| Appendix I – Example of evaluation of an asset value level ..... | 9           |
+| Appendix II – Example of asset maintenance information.....      | 11          |
+| Appendix III – Example asset register .....                      | 12          |
+| Bibliography.....                                                | 13          |
+
+
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T X.1057
+
+# Asset management guidelines in telecommunication organizations
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+Telecommunication organizations should have very high goals for operating and managing their various assets, for providing customer services and for directly or indirectly supporting their business. It is necessary to protect those assets critical to telecommunication organizations in order to ensure that the operations and services of the telecommunication business are not compromised.
+
+This Recommendation provides an overview of processes and methods that need to be addressed in place to identify, classify, evaluate and maintain the assets that telecommunication organizations own. This Recommendation also suggests some templates as a method for managing assets.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+[ITU-T X.1051] Recommendation ITU-T X.1051 (2008) | ISO/IEC 27011:2008, *Information technology – Security techniques – Information security management guidelines for telecommunications organizations based on ISO/IEC 27002*.
+
+[ISO/IEC 27000] ISO/IEC 27000:2009, *Information technology – Security techniques – Information security management systems – Overview and vocabulary*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 asset** [ISO/IEC 27000]: Anything that has value to the organization.
+
+NOTE – There are many types of assets, including:
+
+- a) information (2.18);
+- b) software, such as a computer program;
+- c) physical, such as computer;
+- d) services;
+- e) people, and their qualifications, skills, and experience; and
+- f) intangibles, such as reputation and image.
+
+**3.1.2 policy** [ISO/IEC 27000]: Overall intention and direction as formally expressed by management.
+
+**3.1.3 telecommunications equipment room** [ITU-T X.1051]: A part of general building such as a room where equipment for providing telecommunications business are sited.
+
+**3.1.4 telecommunications facilities** [ITU-T X.1051]: Machines, equipment, wire and cables, physical buildings or other electrical facilities for the operation of telecommunications.
+
+**3.1.5 user** [ITU-T X.1051]: Person or organization who utilizes information processing facilities or systems, e.g., employee, contractor or third party user.
+
+### **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 asset manager:** A person or an organization who is designated by an asset owner for secure management and protection of the asset.
+
+**3.2.2 asset owner:** A person or an organization who has the ownership and a final obligation of asset management such as asset acquisition, permit of asset use, disposal or discard of asset, etc.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+|      |                                        |
+|------|----------------------------------------|
+| AMP  | Asset Management Process               |
+| AP   | Access Point                           |
+| AVL  | Asset Value Level                      |
+| CCTV | Closed Circuit Television              |
+| CMTS | Cable Modem Termination System         |
+| DBMS | Database Management System             |
+| DHCP | Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol    |
+| DNS  | Domain Name System                     |
+| ESM  | Enterprise Security Management         |
+| IDS  | Intrusion Detection System             |
+| IPS  | Intrusion Prevention System            |
+| ISMS | Information Security Management System |
+| IT   | Information Technology                 |
+| NAS  | Network Access Server                  |
+| NMS  | Network Management System              |
+| NTP  | Network Time Protocol                  |
+| OS   | Operating System                       |
+| PC   | Personal Computer                      |
+| PDCA | Plan – Do – Check – Act                |
+| RAS  | Remote Access Server                   |
+| R&R  | Role and Responsibility                |
+| SLA  | Service Level Agreement                |
+| UPS  | Uninterruptible Power Supply           |
+| VPN  | Virtual Private Network                |
+| WAS  | Web Application Server                 |
+
+# **5 Conventions**
+
+None.
+
+# **6 Overview of asset management**
+
+An asset is a component or part to which an organization directly assigns a value. An organization includes its assets having their own unique values from the various viewpoints of business, financial affairs, reliability and so on. It can be said that the main information and communication facilities within the scope of the ISMS (information security management system) have higher values than other assets. When accidents happen, such assets have great influences on not only users but organization business. Therefore, these assets have high protection priorities. Most organizations strive to find the best methods to identify the main assets that have high protection priorities. The goal of asset management is to identify and protect the most critical components of the organization so that they offer services to their business without any problem. Regarding the importance of assets, a function based on main services and the value of the business should be considered, covering:
+
+- impact on service – Service scope which each asset affects;
+- loss of profit – Degree of financial loss;
+- loss of customer – Possibility of customer loss;
+- image – Damage of an organization's image.
+
+## **6.1 Concept of asset management process**
+
+In general, an asset has value if it is actively used for business and services in an organization. Asset management refers, from the viewpoint of information security, to the appropriate handling and protection measures considering the asset value in the scope defined by telecommunication organizations. In order to systematically and securely manage the various and large number of assets included in an organization, the assets should be managed according to an asset life cycle, which corresponds to a process of acquisition or generation, change, disposal or destruction of the asset. In an organization, while a series of management processes is applied on assets, it is required that certain standards and rules be determined. The asset management process and its alignment to the PDCA model is described in Figure 1.
+
+![Figure 1 – Concept of AMP. A circular diagram showing the five steps of the Asset Management Process (AMP) in a clockwise cycle. The central circle is labeled 'Asset management process (AMP)'. The five steps are: 1. Establishment of asset management policy (Plan), 2. Survey and identification, 3. Classification and registration (Do), 4. Evaluation of asset value, and 5. Performance of change management (Check/Act). Arrows connect the steps in a cycle, with labels 'Plan', 'Do', and 'Check/Act' indicating the phases.](a5ee5c23b6dc52ec1d724b76d5a5f58f_img.jpg)
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+    AMP((Asset management process (AMP)))
+    1((1. Establishment of asset management policy))
+    2((2. Survey and identification))
+    3((3. Classification and registration))
+    4((4. Evaluation of asset value))
+    5((5. Performance of change management))
+    
+    1 -- Plan --> 2
+    2 --> 3
+    3 -- Do --> 4
+    4 --> 5
+    5 -- Check/Act --> 1
+  
+```
+
+Figure 1 – Concept of AMP. A circular diagram showing the five steps of the Asset Management Process (AMP) in a clockwise cycle. The central circle is labeled 'Asset management process (AMP)'. The five steps are: 1. Establishment of asset management policy (Plan), 2. Survey and identification, 3. Classification and registration (Do), 4. Evaluation of asset value, and 5. Performance of change management (Check/Act). Arrows connect the steps in a cycle, with labels 'Plan', 'Do', and 'Check/Act' indicating the phases.
+
+**Figure 1 – Concept of AMP**
+
+### 6.2 Main activities in the asset management process
+
+There are five steps in the asset management process. Some important activities in each step are required for performing asset management. The key activities in each step are:
+
+- a) Establish the policy for asset management:
+  - i) define procedures and methods for handling the assets;
+  - ii) appoint the asset manager responsible for the management of assets;
+  - iii) define the classification criteria in consideration of asset type;
+  - iv) define the criteria for evaluating the asset value level;
+  - v) define the role and responsibility of the asset manager;
+  - vi) define the range or scope of the asset to be managed.
+- b) Survey and identify the assets:
+  - i) survey all assets comprehensively in the established scope of asset management;
+  - ii) recognize and select the assets to be managed;
+  - iii) cooperate with related teams or departments when surveying assets;
+  - iv) give a name to the identified asset and create an asset register or inventory.
+- c) Classify and register the assets:
+  - i) draw up an asset list based on the predefined criteria for asset classification;
+  - ii) register the basic and additional maintenance information of each asset (see Appendix II);
+  - iii) consider the grouping strategy and label for identified assets by using physical or logical means, for effective handling.
+- d) Evaluate the importance level for the asset:
+  - i) assess the importance of the asset with respect to the security requirements;
+  - ii) grant the value level to each asset in order to apply the appropriate security measures;
+
+- iii) always reassess the value of the the asset, if its status has changed.
+- e) Perform change management:
+  - i) periodically check the status of assets;
+  - ii) update the results to an asset register, if the status of any asset has changed;
+  - iii) find and report new issues for improving the asset management policy and process.
+
+# **7 Asset management process**
+
+### **7.1 Establishment of asset management policy**
+
+For the purpose of systematically and efficiently managing the assets, protection objectives should be defined and a management policy should be established for handling assets and selecting control measures. These activities may be helpful as a baseline to determine practicality and cost efficiency of protective controls.
+
+- a) A procedure should be established for managing the assets according to their lifecycle, including creation and registration, change, and disposal of the assets.
+- b) An asset manager having the role of asset owner for security purposes should be assigned.
+- c) Assets should be classified and managed by their types so as to systematically manage the assets. In this case, consistent criteria in consideration of the asset types managed by each telecommunication organization should be prepared, for the purpose of effective asset classification.
+- d) The criteria for evaluating the importance of the identified asset should be established and the criteria for assigning a security level to the assets should be established, for the purpose of managing the assets in accordance with the security level of the assets.
+- e) The asset owner is comprehensively responsible for the corresponding assets. The asset owner may appoint and entrust the asset manager to manage them. The appointed asset manager should be able to acquire the responsibility of asset protection and to continuously maintain the asset security.
+- f) The asset manager should define the range or scope of the asset to be managed, in relation to the application of asset management policies. When defining the scope of asset management, it is necessary to consider all aspects of the organization's business and the security of the assets.
+
+### **7.2 Survey and identification**
+
+There are very many assets, such as IT systems, in telecommunication organizations. In order to effectively protect the assets, it is first necessary to survey and identify overall assets within the security boundary established for risk analysis, including an evaluation of the value of the assets. Fundamentally, it is one of the substantial activities for the valuation of each asset.
+
+- a) One of the roles of an asset manager is to identify the total assets included in an organization and to recognize the assets to be protected. The asset manager surveys and identifies all valuable assets, including intangible assets such as sensitive personal data, system configuration files, etc., as well as tangible assets such as IT systems.
+- b) In this survey process, the asset manager should also check the status of the assets such as in-use, unused, disposal, etc., for managing newly acquired assets as well as the existing ones.
+- c) When surveying the assets, a team or department having the authority of asset management should keep in close cooperation with teams or departments related to installation and operation.
+
+- d) The asset manager should create an asset register or inventory for continuous maintenance of asset information collected in this survey process. The asset manager also gives a name to each of the identified assets to be managed.
+
+### **7.3 Classification and registration**
+
+Assets identified within the established asset boundary are classified by their types as defined in the asset classification criteria. There are classifications by asset items and business process. Classification and registration activities for assets mean that those assets should be managed in the asset register. One of the important considerations is to determine the number of classification categories and the benefits to be gained from their use.
+
+- a) The asset manager should classify the identified assets by their types in accordance with the criteria for asset classification established by the organization. The asset manager should define the basic and additional maintenance information based on the asset attributes, according to the type of asset.
+- b) The asset manager should check whether an asset operator appropriately identifies and classifies the assets. Then the asset manager manages collectively the assets by registering the assets in the asset register.
+- c) Registering the assets includes additional records as well as the basic information to be managed by the corresponding asset type. The additional records depend on the maintenance information based on the attributes of each asset.
+- d) It is possible to treat the assets as one group having the same asset type, the same security characteristic and the same importance level in order to improve the management of a vast number of assets.
+- e) Identified and classified assets are required for labelling. Labelling uses a physical label. The asset label includes basic maintenance information related to asset types such as asset code, asset name, asset value level. For assets that cannot be physically labelled, such as documents in electronic form, it is possible to use electronic means for labelling. Where labelling is not feasible, other means for designating the classification of information can be applied, e.g., via procedures or metadata.
+
+### **7.4 Evaluation of asset value**
+
+To determine measures required to adequately secure an asset, the asset should be evaluated and classified according to its evaluation results. For granting each asset's value, it can be evaluated based on three primary security requirements; confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Assessing the value of the assets is the first task in performing all risk analyses.
+
+- a) The ultimate purpose of evaluation of an asset is to allocate a value to the asset that indicates the importance of the asset. This value then helps organizations to decide how much protection is required to safeguard the asset. The greater the value of the asset, the greater the protection required. When the asset is destroyed or its security is compromised, there is an impact on the organization. This impact can be very severe to the operations of the organization. For example, if a piece of malware spreads through a network management system, it could destroy many electronic information assets that are critical to the effective management and operation of the network and the provision of customer services. Therefore, it is important that asset valuation be carried out on all the critical assets.
+
+- b) The AVL can be computed according to the results of the evaluation by the asset owner. For example, an electronic information asset may have three different values representing the importance of the confidentiality of, of the integrity of, and of the availability of the asset. Based on these three values, a combined asset value can be calculated which indicates the maximum level of security required of the asset. Three integer numbers (e.g., from 3 to 1) can be estimated to reflect the importance of an asset in terms of confidentiality, integrity and availability. After calculation, an AVL can be finally obtained according to the following formula.  
+
+$$\text{AVL (Asset Value Level)} = \text{C (Confidentiality)} + \text{I (Integrity)} + \text{A (Availability)}$$
+- c) The criteria for asset evaluation can be changed according to the telecommunication organizations' security policies, system environment, etc. It is more reasonable to make the evaluation criteria objective and measurable.
+- d) After evaluation, the asset value level is determined and the result is added to an asset register.
+
+### 7.5 Performance of change management
+
+An asset manager should periodically check and update the status of the asset register. A key purpose for follow-up and update is to check whether or not each asset is well managed according to its security level.
+
+- a) The asset manager should periodically check and update the status of assets based on the asset management plan. If there is any change to the assets, the asset manager should again assess the value of the corresponding asset and update the changes to the asset register.
+- b) When an asset is newly acquired or generated, the asset is recorded and managed through some activities that include the identification of the asset, classification, evaluation of importance, and determination of security level.
+- c) If unused assets are found in the process of the periodical check, the asset manager should decide the treatment of those assets with the asset-related departments or teams.
+- d) The asset manager should remove the records of the asset from the asset register when the assets are disposed of.
+- e) The asset manager may continue to find new issues in the process of asset management. It is necessary to document the information that would be helpful for improving asset management and reflect any new issues in the asset policies of the organization.
+
+# 8 Telecommunication asset classification
+
+The asset management process defined in clauses 6 and 7 is applicable to telecommunication organizations as well to all other organizations. The main difference in relation to asset types in telecommunication organizations with respect to other organizations is that focus is placed on telecommunication-specific assets. For example, most organizations will have general IT assets such as PCs, servers, network devices, and commonly used office application software; whereas telecommunication organizations would be dealing with those assets specific to running, operating, and managing mobile, satellite and fixed networks.
+
+## 8.1 General and telecommunication specific assets
+
+Table 1 shows how to classify the various assets by asset type. This table also provides examples of general and telecommunication-specific assets that organizations need in order to apply the asset management process defined in clause 6.
+
+**Table 1 – Examples of general and telecommunication-specific asset**
+
+| Asset type                              | Description                                                                                                              | Examples                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
+|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+|                                         |                                                                                                                          | Telecommunication specific                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | General                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
+| Electronic information                  | Information stored in electronic form                                                                                    | Telecommunication service customer information (database), network session and access log, network configuration files, service use and access policies, etc.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | Database (office DB, etc.), data files (office policy and guidelines, CCTV log, etc.), system files (configuration files, log files, etc.), etc.                                                                     |
+| Paper                                   | Paper information, which means documents or records to be produced and used in tasks                                     | Contracts and agreements including SLAs, network architecture diagrams, IP address lists, cabling diagrams, server system diagrams, network operating system manuals, etc.                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Contracts and agreements, system documents (network configuration diagrams, user manuals, etc.), etc.                                                                                                                |
+| Software                                | Software developed for commercial use or for internal use                                                                | Network operating system, network scanner, early warning detection tool and utilities, audit trail software, etc.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | Application software (office applications, etc.) , system software (OS, DBMS, vulnerability scanner, etc.), development tools and utilities, etc.                                                                    |
+| Hardware                                | Server and network devices used for internal and external services or businesses                                         | Server (DNS server, DHCP server, log server, authentication server, NTP server, NMS server, monitoring server, etc.), network and communications equipment (backbone router, switch, CMTS, NAS/RAS, AP, modem, etc.), security equipment (ESM, firewall, IPS, IDS, VPN, virus wall, vaccine, etc.), mobile systems, satellite systems (stations), microwave systems, transmission system, etc. | Server (web server, DB server, WAS, log server, backup server, storage, etc.), mainframes, network and communications equipment (switch, etc.), security equipment, desktops, workstations, laptops, handhelds, etc. |
+| Facility                                | Place in which systems are installed and operated, which include physical spaces and various supporting equipment rooms  | Cabling facilities, network management and monitoring facilities, telecommunication equipment room, Internet data centre, etc.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Office building, server room, paper room, electrical equipment room, etc.                                                                                                                                            |
+| Supporting utility system and equipment | Equipment used for supporting information system operation, which include power supply, air-conditioning equipment, etc. | Mobile, satellite and fixed network supporting utilities (generator, UPS, etc.), etc.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | Electrical equipment, air-conditioning equipment, fire extinguishing equipment, CCTV, etc.                                                                                                                           |
+
+## Appendix I
+
+### Example of evaluation of an asset value level
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+The following example shows how to determine the asset value level (security level) by evaluating each asset's importance.
+
+- a) Assessing the value of an asset is accomplished based on the criteria predefined in the organization. For example, the scale of any asset's importance can be given from 3 to 1 for each evaluation item, such as confidentiality, integrity and availability. After computation, the final evaluation result of each asset lies between 3 and 9.
+
+| Security requirement   | Description                                                                                                                                                                                                       | Level (Scale) |
+|------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| C<br>(Confidentiality) | The unauthorized disclosure of information could be expected to have a severe or catastrophic adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.                                 | High<br>(3)   |
+|                        | The unauthorized disclosure of information could be expected to have a serious adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.                                                | Medium<br>(2) |
+|                        | The unauthorized disclosure of information could be expected to have a limited adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.                                                | Low<br>(1)    |
+| I<br>(Integrity)       | The unauthorized modification or destruction of information could be expected to have a severe or catastrophic adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.                | High<br>(3)   |
+|                        | The unauthorized modification or destruction of information could be expected to have a serious adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.                               | Medium<br>(2) |
+|                        | The unauthorized modification or destruction of information could be expected to have a limited adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.                               | Low<br>(1)    |
+| A<br>(Availability)    | The disruption of access to or use of information or an information system could be expected to have a severe or catastrophic adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals. | High<br>(3)   |
+|                        | The disruption of access to or use of information or an information system could be expected to have a serious adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.                | Medium<br>(2) |
+|                        | The disruption of access to or use of information or an information system could be expected to have a limited adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.                | Low<br>(1)    |
+
+- b) The AVL of an asset depends on the evaluation result of the asset's importance. The AVL is divided into five levels according to the total evaluation result of each asset.
+
+| <b>AVL <sup>a)</sup><br/>(Security level)</b>                                                  | <b>Evaluation results of security requirements<br/>(Sum)</b> |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Very High                                                                                      | 9                                                            |
+| High                                                                                           | 7-8                                                          |
+| Medium                                                                                         | 6                                                            |
+| Low                                                                                            | 4-5                                                          |
+| Very Low                                                                                       | 3                                                            |
+| <sup>a)</sup> AVL (Asset Value Level) = C (Confidentiality) + I (Integrity) + A (Availability) |                                                              |
+
+## Appendix II
+
+### Example of asset maintenance information
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+The following example shows basic and additional items to be maintained according to the asset type.
+
+| Asset type                              | Asset maintenance information                                                                                                                                                           |                                                                                                                                                            |
+|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+|                                         | Basic                                                                                                                                                                                   | Additional                                                                                                                                                 |
+| Electronic Information                  | Asset code, asset name (electronic information name), electronic information type, security level, asset purpose, owner, manager                                                        | Related applications, creation date, etc.                                                                                                                  |
+| Paper                                   | Asset code, asset name (paper name), paper type, security level, asset purpose, owner, manager, location                                                                                | Custody period (date), creation date, etc.                                                                                                                 |
+| Software                                | Asset code, asset name, software type, security level, asset purpose, user, owner, manager, related server                                                                              | Model name, product name, software version, manufacturer, product name, acquisition date, maintenance period, etc.                                         |
+| Hardware                                | Asset code, asset name, hardware type, server type, security level, asset purpose, user, owner, manager, location                                                                       | Model name, OS, OS version, main data, installed applications (version), host name, manufacturer, product name, acquisition date, maintenance period, etc. |
+| PC                                      | Asset code, asset name, asset purpose, security level, user, owner, assigned task,                                                                                                      | Model name, OS, OS version, manufacturer, product name, acquisition date, maintenance period, etc.                                                         |
+| Facility                                | Asset code, asset name, asset purpose, model name, ownership type (direct ownership/lease), maintenance type (direct maintenance/lease), security level, user, owner, manager, location | Manufacturer, provider, etc.                                                                                                                               |
+| Supporting utility system and equipment | Asset code, asset name, asset purpose, model name, ownership type (direct ownership/lease), maintenance type (direct maintenance/lease), security level, user, owner, manager, location | Manufacturer, product name, acquisition date , etc.                                                                                                        |
+| People                                  | Department (team), R&R (role and responsibility), task, qualifications, contact points (phone, address, e-mail, etc.)                                                                   | Skills, know-how, knowledge, experience, etc.                                                                                                              |
+
+## Appendix III
+
+### Example asset register
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+The following example shows a register form available for managing the assets in organizations.
+
+| Asset maintenance information |            |            |               |             |               |            | Asset value evaluation |               |                  |             |                                    |
+|-------------------------------|------------|------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|------------|------------------------|---------------|------------------|-------------|------------------------------------|
+| Asset code                    | Asset type | Asset name | Asset purpose | Asset owner | Asset manager | Asset user | Confidentiality (C)    | Integrity (I) | Availability (A) | Sum (total) | Asset value level (security level) |
+|                               |            |            |               |             |               |            |                        |               |                  |             |                                    |
+|                               |            |            |               |             |               |            |                        |               |                  |             |                                    |
+|                               |            |            |               |             |               |            |                        |               |                  |             |                                    |
+|                               |            |            |               |             |               |            |                        |               |                  |             |                                    |
+|                               |            |            |               |             |               |            |                        |               |                  |             |                                    |
+|                               |            |            |               |             |               |            |                        |               |                  |             |                                    |
+|                               |            |            |               |             |               |            |                        |               |                  |             |                                    |
+|                               |            |            |               |             |               |            |                        |               |                  |             |                                    |
+
+## **Bibliography**
+
+- [b-ISO/IEC 27002] ISO/IEC 27002:2005, *Information technology – Security techniques – Code of practice for information security management*.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+|                 |                                                                                             |
+|-----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A        | Organization of the work of ITU-T                                                           |
+| Series D        | General tariff principles                                                                   |
+| Series E        | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors           |
+| Series F        | Non-telephone telecommunication services                                                    |
+| Series G        | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks                                |
+| Series H        | Audiovisual and multimedia systems                                                          |
+| Series I        | Integrated services digital network                                                         |
+| Series J        | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K        | Protection against interference                                                             |
+| Series L        | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant     |
+| Series M        | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance                         |
+| Series N        | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits             |
+| Series O        | Specifications of measuring equipment                                                       |
+| Series P        | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods                                   |
+| Series Q        | Switching and signalling                                                                    |
+| Series R        | Telegraph transmission                                                                      |
+| Series S        | Telegraph services terminal equipment                                                       |
+| Series T        | Terminals for telematic services                                                            |
+| Series U        | Telegraph switching                                                                         |
+| Series V        | Data communication over the telephone network                                               |
+| <b>Series X</b> | <b>Data networks, open system communications and security</b>                               |
+| Series Y        | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks   |
+| Series Z        | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems                        |

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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l   T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n   U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION  
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR  
+OF ITU
+
+# X.1059
+
+(10/2019)
+
+SERIES X: DATA NETWORKS, OPEN SYSTEM  
+COMMUNICATIONS AND SECURITY
+
+Information and network security – Security management
+
+---
+
+**Implementation guidance for telecommunication  
+organizations on risk management of their  
+assets globally accessible in IP-based networks**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T X.1059
+
+# ITU-T X-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS DATA NETWORKS, OPEN SYSTEM COMMUNICATIONS AND SECURITY
+
+|                                                        |                      |
+|--------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| PUBLIC DATA NETWORKS                                   | X.1–X.199            |
+| OPEN SYSTEMS INTERCONNECTION                           | X.200–X.299          |
+| INTERWORKING BETWEEN NETWORKS                          | X.300–X.399          |
+| MESSAGE HANDLING SYSTEMS                               | X.400–X.499          |
+| DIRECTORY                                              | X.500–X.599          |
+| OSI NETWORKING AND SYSTEM ASPECTS                      | X.600–X.699          |
+| OSI MANAGEMENT                                         | X.700–X.799          |
+| SECURITY                                               | X.800–X.849          |
+| OSI APPLICATIONS                                       | X.850–X.899          |
+| OPEN DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING                            | X.900–X.999          |
+| INFORMATION AND NETWORK SECURITY                       |                      |
+| General security aspects                               | X.1000–X.1029        |
+| Network security                                       | X.1030–X.1049        |
+| <b>Security management</b>                             | <b>X.1050–X.1069</b> |
+| Telebiometrics                                         | X.1080–X.1099        |
+| SECURE APPLICATIONS AND SERVICES (1)                   |                      |
+| Multicast security                                     | X.1100–X.1109        |
+| Home network security                                  | X.1110–X.1119        |
+| Mobile security                                        | X.1120–X.1139        |
+| Web security                                           | X.1140–X.1149        |
+| Security protocols (1)                                 | X.1150–X.1159        |
+| Peer-to-peer security                                  | X.1160–X.1169        |
+| Networked ID security                                  | X.1170–X.1179        |
+| IPTV security                                          | X.1180–X.1199        |
+| CYBERSPACE SECURITY                                    |                      |
+| Cybersecurity                                          | X.1200–X.1229        |
+| Countering spam                                        | X.1230–X.1249        |
+| Identity management                                    | X.1250–X.1279        |
+| SECURE APPLICATIONS AND SERVICES (2)                   |                      |
+| Emergency communications                               | X.1300–X.1309        |
+| Ubiquitous sensor network security                     | X.1310–X.1319        |
+| Smart grid security                                    | X.1330–X.1339        |
+| Certified mail                                         | X.1340–X.1349        |
+| Internet of things (IoT) security                      | X.1360–X.1369        |
+| Intelligent transportation system (ITS) security       | X.1370–X.1389        |
+| Distributed ledger technology security                 | X.1400–X.1429        |
+| Distributed ledger technology security                 | X.1430–X.1449        |
+| Security protocols (2)                                 | X.1450–X.1459        |
+| CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION EXCHANGE                     |                      |
+| Overview of cybersecurity                              | X.1500–X.1519        |
+| Vulnerability/state exchange                           | X.1520–X.1539        |
+| Event/incident/heuristics exchange                     | X.1540–X.1549        |
+| Exchange of policies                                   | X.1550–X.1559        |
+| Heuristics and information request                     | X.1560–X.1569        |
+| Identification and discovery                           | X.1570–X.1579        |
+| Assured exchange                                       | X.1580–X.1589        |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING SECURITY                               |                      |
+| Overview of cloud computing security                   | X.1600–X.1601        |
+| Cloud computing security design                        | X.1602–X.1639        |
+| Cloud computing security best practices and guidelines | X.1640–X.1659        |
+| Cloud computing security implementation                | X.1660–X.1679        |
+| Other cloud computing security                         | X.1680–X.1699        |
+| QUANTUM COMMUNICATION                                  | X.1700–X.1729        |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T X.1059
+
+# Implementation guidance for telecommunication organizations on risk management of their assets globally accessible in IP-based networks
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T X.1059 provides guidance for telecommunication organizations on the risk management of their assets globally accessible in IP-based networks, the assets which are exposed directly to hackers and attackers. These assets may also be connected to the traditional (and even old) assets of legacy telecommunication networks, which might have some design level vulnerabilities that could be difficult to fix. Therefore, it would be practical to consider all the assets globally accessible in IP-based networks (AGIT) of a telecommunication organization as a whole, and to introduce some specific security controls to continuously reduce the overall risks and to strengthen the overall security of telecommunication services and networks.
+
+It is suggested that the proposed controls be applied with high priority to assets globally accessible in IP-based networks. The controls might also be applicable to other assets.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval   | Study Group | Unique ID*                                                                |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0     | ITU-T X.1059   | 2019-10-29 | 17          | <a href="http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/14045">11.1002/1000/14045</a> |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Assets survey, risk identification, risk management.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL <http://handle.itu.int/> in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID. For example, <http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/11830-en>.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at <http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/ipr/>.
+
+© ITU 2020
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+|    |                                                                            | <b>Page</b> |
+|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1  | Scope.....                                                                 | 1           |
+| 2  | References.....                                                            | 1           |
+| 3  | Definitions .....                                                          | 1           |
+|    | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere.....                                           | 1           |
+|    | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation.....                              | 1           |
+| 4  | Abbreviations and acronyms .....                                           | 2           |
+| 5  | Conventions .....                                                          | 2           |
+| 6  | Overview of risk management for AGIT.....                                  | 2           |
+|    | 6.1 Processes.....                                                         | 2           |
+|    | 6.2 Phases and steps .....                                                 | 3           |
+|    | 6.3 Structure of the description of the AGIT risk management process ..... | 4           |
+| 7  | Risk assessment .....                                                      | 5           |
+|    | 7.1 Risk identification .....                                              | 5           |
+|    | 7.2 Risk analysis .....                                                    | 9           |
+| 8  | Risk evaluation .....                                                      | 10          |
+|    | 8.1 Description .....                                                      | 10          |
+| 9  | Risk treatment.....                                                        | 11          |
+|    | 9.1 Overview .....                                                         | 11          |
+|    | 9.2 Emergent treatment .....                                               | 11          |
+|    | 9.3 Regular treatment .....                                                | 12          |
+| 10 | Monitoring and review .....                                                | 12          |
+|    | 10.1 Description .....                                                     | 12          |
+|    | 10.2 Implementation guidance .....                                         | 12          |
+| 11 | Communication and consultation .....                                       | 13          |
+|    | 11.1 Description .....                                                     | 13          |
+|    | 11.2 Implementation guidance .....                                         | 13          |
+| 12 | Recording and reporting .....                                              | 13          |
+|    | 12.1 Description .....                                                     | 13          |
+|    | 12.2 Implementation guidance .....                                         | 13          |
+|    | Bibliography.....                                                          | 15          |
+
+# **Introduction**
+
+Telecommunication organizations have become more progressive to leverage the benefits of both legacy and Internet services. Some of these organizations have transferred their legacy services to the Internet, such as using Internet protocol (IP) technology to provide voice services instead of using circuit-switched technology and even integrating voice services such as voice over long-term evolution (VoLTE) with ordinary voice over IP (VoIP). Some organizations have merged Internet flexibility into legacy services, for example, by enabling customers to use web portals to send messages out to the mobile terminals or to check messages and missed calls. Some organizations also utilize the Internet to provide customer self-service experiences, for example, by allowing customers to update their contracts and to make transactions online.
+
+During this transformation process, a large number of assets are deployed by telecommunication organizations to bridge the physical network boundary between IP-based networks and telecommunication networks capabilities. Securing these assets, globally accessible in IP-based networks, has become one of the most obvious challenges for security management teams and the risk management of these assets could be a priority or primary concern for telecommunication organizations.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T X.1059
+
+## Implementation guidance for telecommunication organizations on risk management of their assets globally accessible in IP-based networks
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation identifies threats and challenges that could arise when telecommunication network assets are globally accessible in IP-based networks. It also provides best practices and guidance for the implementation of security controls for the risk management of these assets.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+None.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 control** [b-ISO/IEC 27000]: Measure that is modifying risk.
+
+NOTE 1 – Controls include any process, policy, device, practice, or other actions which modify risk.
+
+NOTE 2 – Controls may not always exert the intended or assumed modifying effect.
+
+**3.1.2 impact** [b-ITU-T X.1055]: Adverse change to the level of business objectives achieved.
+
+**3.1.3 risk profile** [b-ITU-T X.1055]: A set of information describing one of the risks identified by a telecommunication organization.
+
+**3.1.4 risk of exposure** [b-ITU-T X.1055]: Likelihood of a threat being able to expose one or more system vulnerabilities.
+
+## 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 assets globally accessible in IP-based network:** Hardware and software assets that can be reached or connected by an Internet protocol (IP) or a uniform resource locator (URL) address or a certain client, etc., through the infrastructure of public IP networks.
+
+**3.2.2 AGIT profile:** A set of information describing an asset globally accessible in IP-based networks for telecommunication organizations (AGIT) identified as belonging to a telecommunication organization.
+
+**3.2.3 residual risk:** An old risk that cannot disappear or a new risk that appears after risk treatment.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+|       |                                                                                    |
+|-------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| AGIT  | Assets Globally accessible in IP-based network for Telecommunication organizations |
+| DDoS  | Distributed Denial of Service                                                      |
+| IP    | Internet Protocol                                                                  |
+| IT    | Information Technology                                                             |
+| OS    | Operating System                                                                   |
+| PII   | Personally Identifiable Information                                                |
+| RoE   | Risk of Exposure                                                                   |
+| SMS   | Short Message Service                                                              |
+| TCP   | Transmission Control Protocol                                                      |
+| UDP   | User Datagram Protocol                                                             |
+| URL   | Uniform Resource Locator                                                           |
+| VoIP  | Voice over IP                                                                      |
+| VoLTE | Voice over Long-Term Evolution                                                     |
+| VPN   | Virtual Private Network                                                            |
+| WWW   | World Wide Web                                                                     |
+
+# **5 Conventions**
+
+None.
+
+# **6 Overview of risk management for AGIT**
+
+This Recommendation provides implementation guidance of risk management for a specified category of assets which are globally accessible in IP-based network (AGIT) as defined in clause 3.2.1.
+
+## **6.1 Processes**
+
+In general, assets globally accessible in IP-based network for telecommunication organizations (AGIT) include the following six risk management processes (see Figure 6-1):
+
+- 1) Risk assessment
+- 2) Risk evaluation
+- 3) Risk treatment
+- 4) Monitoring and review
+- 5) Communication and consultation
+- 6) Recording and reporting
+
+As part of the risk management lifecycle, AGIT risk management processes from 1 to 3 should be executed in a pre-defined order. The processes of 5, 6 and 7 should provide a feedback mechanism and should work in parallel throughout the whole cycle as shown in Figure 6-1.
+
+![Figure 6-1 – AGIT risk management process model. The diagram shows a flowchart with five main components: 'Recording and reporting' (vertical box on the left), 'Risk assessment', 'Risk evaluation', and 'Risk treatment' (horizontal boxes in the center), and 'Monitoring and reviewing' (vertical box on the right). 'Communication and consultation' is a vertical box on the far right. Arrows indicate the flow: 'Recording and reporting' has bidirectional arrows to 'Risk assessment', 'Risk evaluation', and 'Risk treatment'. 'Risk assessment', 'Risk evaluation', and 'Risk treatment' are connected by downward arrows. 'Risk assessment' and 'Risk evaluation' have bidirectional arrows to 'Monitoring and reviewing'. 'Risk treatment' has a bidirectional arrow to 'Monitoring and reviewing'. 'Monitoring and reviewing' has a bidirectional arrow to 'Communication and consultation'. There are also feedback loops: one from 'Monitoring and reviewing' back to 'Risk assessment', and another from 'Monitoring and reviewing' back to 'Recording and reporting'.](ebff22fb5dd6f50a90e44dca0f82f285_img.jpg)
+
+X.1059(19)\_F6-1
+
+Figure 6-1 – AGIT risk management process model. The diagram shows a flowchart with five main components: 'Recording and reporting' (vertical box on the left), 'Risk assessment', 'Risk evaluation', and 'Risk treatment' (horizontal boxes in the center), and 'Monitoring and reviewing' (vertical box on the right). 'Communication and consultation' is a vertical box on the far right. Arrows indicate the flow: 'Recording and reporting' has bidirectional arrows to 'Risk assessment', 'Risk evaluation', and 'Risk treatment'. 'Risk assessment', 'Risk evaluation', and 'Risk treatment' are connected by downward arrows. 'Risk assessment' and 'Risk evaluation' have bidirectional arrows to 'Monitoring and reviewing'. 'Risk treatment' has a bidirectional arrow to 'Monitoring and reviewing'. 'Monitoring and reviewing' has a bidirectional arrow to 'Communication and consultation'. There are also feedback loops: one from 'Monitoring and reviewing' back to 'Risk assessment', and another from 'Monitoring and reviewing' back to 'Recording and reporting'.
+
+**Figure 6-1 – AGIT risk management process model**
+
+### 6.2 Phases and steps
+
+Each process in the AGIT risk management process model has one or more phases and/or steps. Figure 6-2 illustrates the phases and steps of process 1 to 3 (defined in clause 6.1).
+
+The risk assessment process has two phases, which are risk identification and risk analysis. In the risk identification phase, there are five steps as listed below:
+
+- 1) Identification of AGIT
+- 2) Identification of threats
+- 3) Identification of in-use controls
+- 4) Identification of vulnerabilities
+- 5) Identification of impacts
+
+The two steps involved in the risk analysis phase are the preliminary analysis and the detailed analysis. The risk evaluation process has only one step, that is, risk evaluation. The risk treatment process has two steps, which are emergent treatment and regular treatment. The phases and the steps should be executed in a pre-defined order as shown in Figure 6-2.
+
+Similar to the risk evaluation process, the other three processes – the monitoring and review process, the communication and consultation process, the recording and reporting process – all have only one step respectively.
+
+![Flowchart of the AGIT risk management process model showing phases: Risk assessment (comprising Risk identification, Risk analysis, and Risk evaluation) and Risk treatment.](a5ee5c23b6dc52ec1d724b76d5a5f58f_img.jpg)
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+    subgraph Risk_assessment [Risk assessment]
+        subgraph Risk_identification [Risk identification]
+            A[Identification of AGIT] --> B[Identification of threats]
+            B --> C[Identification of in-use controls]
+            C --> D[Identification of vulnerabilities]
+            D --> E[Identification of impacts]
+        end
+        subgraph Risk_analysis [Risk analysis]
+            E --> F[Preliminary analysis]
+            F --> G[Detailed analysis]
+        end
+        subgraph Risk_evaluation [Risk evaluation]
+            G --> H[Risk evaluation]
+        end
+    end
+    subgraph Risk_treatment [Risk treatment]
+        I[Emergent treatment]
+        J[Regular treatment]
+    end
+    F --> I
+    H --> J
+    I --> G
+
+```
+
+X.1059(19)\_F6-2
+
+Flowchart of the AGIT risk management process model showing phases: Risk assessment (comprising Risk identification, Risk analysis, and Risk evaluation) and Risk treatment.
+
+**Figure 6-2 – Phases and steps in AGIT risk management process model**
+
+### **6.3 Structure of the description of the AGIT risk management process**
+
+The description and the recommended implementation guidance for the steps in the AGIT risk management process model are provided in clauses 7 to 12. The description introduces the generic understanding, practices and briefs for the measures of improvement. The implementation guidance provides detailed information on how to improve the implementation with best practices specific to AGIT with the recommended inputs and outputs.
+
+# **7 Risk assessment**
+
+## **7.1 Risk identification**
+
+### **7.1.1 Identification of AGIT**
+
+##### **7.1.1.1 Description**
+
+AGIT include hardware and software assets that can be reached over or are connected by an IP address or uniform resource locator (URL) address or certain clients, etc., through the infrastructure of public IP networks.
+
+Generally, the value of hardware and software assets depends on the business activity (or process) that they carry, the information that they store, cache or transfer, and their position in the network and service topologies.
+
+AGIT open the capabilities of telecommunication networks by carrying key business activities to globally accessible IP-based networks and transferring communication content and exchanged information which could contain personally identifiable information (PII) and confidential data. AGIT, deployed naturally at the boundary of intranets, could have many connections to entities of legacy networks which provide telecommunication services. Accordingly, AGIT are valuable assets for telecommunication organizations. In practice, it is useful and effective to categorize and identify these assets as one 'whole' entity with similar security and risk management tasks.
+
+This step is to identify and confirm all existing AGIT and their profiles. In general practices, identification of hardware and software assets relies on the inventory of purchases, network blueprints and system design, and the verification of physical or logically deployed entities. Based on these, more efforts to identify AGIT in a more accurately and timely manner would be recommended, which could help resolve the following challenges:
+
+- The number of AGIT could be enormous, for example, hundreds in a large telecommunication organization. These AGIT could be distributed sparsely in dozens of intranets and in several telecommunication networks;
+- Rapid developments in the business environment could compel operations departments to update the deployment of AGIT and diversify open-service capabilities dynamically and continuously. It is unrealistic to require operations' staff to understand the security effects of every business process and keep the security team informed as well;
+- The common inputs may not be adequate to determine the necessary features and attributes of AGIT which could lead to inadequacy in the identification of risks and vulnerabilities so that AGIT could not be secured to an acceptable level.
+
+##### **7.1.1.2 Implementation guidance**
+
+AGIT profiles, business activities open to globally accessible IP-based networks, assigned public IP segments, etc., could be useful inputs to this step.
+
+Continuous education and training should be necessary for operations departments to achieve and agree that any adjustments and updates related to AGIT could risk the established security environment and increase the risk level of many systems in the intranets (or private networks). The applicable standards should be established and operations departments should be required to check security issues ahead of conducting any change related to AGIT.
+
+Approval or maintenance systems could be adopted to allow operations departments to manage changes and keep security teams informed. The use of administrator's privilege could permit security teams to follow changes and compare them to the system conditions of (suspicious) AGIT precisely and thoroughly, and then to update the AGIT profiles.
+
+Cyclic scans from globally accessible IP-based networks could be used to identify unknown public IP addresses and transmission control protocol/user datagram protocol (TCP/UDP) ports in use. Tracing and questioning these new identifications could lead to the discovery of unknown AGIT. Identifying the disappearance of in-use public IP addresses or TCP/UDP ports could lead to the removal of known AGIT.
+
+Cyclic analysis of mirrored network traffic or service logs in the intranets could assist in identifying unknown communication pairs among public IP addresses and private IP addresses to locate unknown AGIT or update the profiles of known AGIT.
+
+Results obtained by scans or analysis could lead to the identification of reasonable or acceptable operations related to AGIT. However, they could also lead to the identification of effects caused by (suspicious) incidents. The security team would therefore need to confirm the information from multiple sources to cross-check these clues prudently.
+
+Changes or adjustments to business activities could be the most common cause of newly discovered AGIT. It should be necessary to consult operations departments to correctly understand the relevance of these AGIT.
+
+The implementation of this control would identify a list of AGIT profiles which should be shared among stakeholders, such as security teams and network managers.
+
+#### **7.1.2 Identification of threats**
+
+##### **7.1.2.1 Description**
+
+This step is to identify all direct and indirect threats against AGIT with several aspects such as threat type, affected AGIT, potential damage, etc. In general practices, threats against assets should be identified based on threat motivation and the asset's value. Historical incidents, expertise and regulation concerns should play key roles in clarifying the threat and the asset's value. The identification process could be conducted for each asset.
+
+Some specific practices in this control should be recommended for better efficiency based on security trends and common features of AGIT.
+
+The input of identification of threats should be AGIT profiles, threats information from external and internal sources (e.g., historical incidents, expertise) which can help analyse the threat level of each AGIT.
+
+##### **7.1.2.2 Implementation guidance**
+
+A list of AGIT profiles and threat information from external and internal sources (e.g., historical incidents and expertise) could be useful inputs to this step.
+
+The exchange of threats intelligence could become a routine practice for more and more telecommunication organizations. A piece of well-built threats intelligence could depict a threat with its motivation and source by standardized language and could even verify itself. Though threats intelligence could hardly affect the classification of generic threats, it could help to identify ignored or new individual threats, which could help to evaluate the risk of exposure (RoE) and the impact to subsequent controls. The exchange of threats intelligence could be considered as a kind of import of external expertise.
+
+With the existence of confirmed vulnerabilities belonging to the services or entities of legacy telecommunication networks, there could be no acceptable treatment to the risks if only legacy telecommunication networks are considered. Therefore, it is recommended to skip the process of risk treatment and consider these kinds of risks on the AGIT supporting business activities of legacy telecommunication networks. This practice integrates risk transfer with greater efficiency. These kinds of risks could be considered as indirect risks against AGIT.
+
+As the value of AGIT relies mainly on the business activities and information supported by the AGIT, it should be efficient to group AGIT supporting similar business activities and information together and to identify the threats as a group.
+
+Under the classification of generic threats, some individual threats against AGIT are identified as follows:
+
+- Failure of business capabilities:
+  - basic telecommunication network service failure;
+  - voice and short message service (SMS) hijack (deciphering users' chats, eavesdropping, spam messages, pseudo base station);
+  - distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.
+- Decline of customer satisfaction:
+  - poor service quality;
+  - network paralysis on a massive scale;
+  - service unable to respond.
+- Business information systems security:
+  - PII leakage (account, location, authentication, bill and other information);
+  - identity impersonation;
+  - unauthorized behaviour;
+  - computer virus.
+
+The implementation of this control should identify a list of threats, their sizes and their sources.
+
+#### **7.1.3 Identification of in-use controls**
+
+##### **7.1.3.1 Description**
+
+This step identifies the function, scale and scenario of every effective control and identifies improper controls for later vulnerabilities identification. This control helps to avoid wasting resources on risk treatment and discovers shortages of in-use controls. In generic practices, the identification of in-use controls could be a combination of document reviews, staff interviews and in-field tests.
+
+Some specific practices of this control are recommended to better support other controls, such as the identification of vulnerabilities.
+
+##### **7.1.3.2 Implementation guidance**
+
+A list of AGIT profiles, in-use controls documentation, personnel responsible for controls and other in-use controls could be useful inputs to this step.
+
+It should be necessary to qualify personnel responsible for a control to operate the control correctly and within a reasonable period of time.
+
+There should be pre-defined scenarios or contexts in which a control works well. It is important to use the AGIT profiles to verify if the current information technology (IT) environment, regulations and human resources could match a pre-defined scenario. If a mismatch occurs, the control could be labelled as an improper one for further analysis in subsequent step.
+
+Whether or not the scale of a control could cover all necessary AGIT should also be checked. If a control covers an AGIT which has no corresponded risks, the control could be labelled as an improper or redundant one. If controls were designed to treat the same risks and cover the same AGIT, these controls could be labelled as improper or duplicated ones for further analysis in the process of risk treatment to check the possibility of cost savings.
+
+To determine if common and necessary controls are in use, the following should be verified:
+
+- physical security: The condition of hardware in a working environment, hardware anti-theft measures, visit authentication of physical space, etc.;
+- network security: Management of network topology and network devices, network access controls (e.g., firewalls, intrusion detection systems, virtual private networks (VPNs)), system access authentications, etc.;
+- data security: Read/write access control, backup policies, security storage of confidential data and files, etc.;
+- system security: Access policies for world wide web (WWW) services, security policies for databases, mail systems and web application servers, etc.
+
+When identifying vulnerabilities, improper controls could also be discovered. Therefore, it could be useful to adopt one or more small iterations between the identification of in-use controls and that of vulnerabilities.
+
+Finally, the implementation of this control should identify all the effective and improper controls with explicit reasons.
+
+#### **7.1.4 Identification of vulnerabilities**
+
+##### **7.1.4.1 Description**
+
+This practice is to identify the vulnerabilities with timely verification and rigorous confirmation with the intention of examining the assets and exposing the weakness in case of an attack. While, in generic practice, expertise should be good for human-related vulnerabilities and (automatic) test tools should be efficient and necessary to verify the vulnerabilities of IT listed in the database of known vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the research by experts could be the only way to discover unknown-till-now vulnerabilities.
+
+Some specific practices in the control should be recommended to enhance the timeliness and the practicability.
+
+##### **7.1.4.2 Implementation guidance**
+
+The list of AGIT profiles, in-use controls and improper controls could be useful inputs for this control.
+
+An intact and accurate database of vulnerabilities should be helpful to develop a tools set to verify the existing of vulnerabilities in an efficient way.
+
+Similar to the practice in the identification of threats, for better handling of risk treatment, the confirmed vulnerabilities of legacy telecommunication networks could be protected by AGIT supporting the business activities through the legacy telecommunication networks.
+
+A continuous exchange of threat intelligence with good quality should be important to enable security teams to respond against the new vulnerability in a timely manner. A piece of well-built threats intelligence could contain the proof-of-concept code and the required conditions (such as, operating system (OS) type and OS version) of a new vulnerability to assist in verifying it. An expert could use the code with minor adjustments to make a tool to test the effectiveness.
+
+Once the vulnerability of an AGIT is confirmed, it could be deduced directly that the other AGIT, having the same system conditions, could also have the same vulnerability. While, it could be more rigorous in practice with the consideration of the importance of AGIT, that is, if the same vulnerability cannot be confirmed in another AGIT but having similar configuration and context, then perhaps the vulnerability could be considered as an "upcoming" one. For example, as a service-level vulnerability is confirmed in Linux OS with core 3.05, then the same vulnerability could be considered as an upcoming vulnerability in Linux OS with core 4.01 as well.
+
+The implementation of this control should finally identify an up-to-date list of (close to be) confirmed vulnerabilities belonging to AGIT.
+
+#### **7.1.5 Identification of impact**
+
+##### **7.1.5.1 Description**
+
+In generic practices, impacts should be identified under different incident scenarios. Therefore, establishing typical scenarios should be fundamental to process the identification, and the security team should take full consideration of the cost of overall aspects (such as time, economy and reputation, etc.) to clarify the impact of every scenario.
+
+There would be no specific practices recommended in the control.
+
+After the identification of impact, the whole process of the risk identification should be completed. All the outputs of the previous four steps of risk identification (clauses 7.1.1 to 7.1.4) should be organized hierarchically as risk profiles, where each is a set of information describing one of the risks identified by a telecommunication organization.
+
+### **7.2 Risk analysis**
+
+The methodology of risk analysis includes qualitative and quantitative method which are widely accepted.
+
+In risk analysis for AGIT, risks are classified into emergent risks and regular risks, which should be treated differently. A risk should be regarded as an emergent risk if the risk can cause great damage in a short period of time. Otherwise, the risk should be regarded as a regular risk. The telecommunication organizations could set up their own criteria to determine which risks should be treated as emergent risks. The others are regarded as regular risks.
+
+A preliminary analysis is used to sort out the emergent risks before a detailed analysis is undertaken. If a risk conforms to the criteria of emergent risks, it should be an emergent risk that needs to be treated in time with little cost consideration. Emergent risks should be taken directly to the risk treatment process, and the risk evaluation process could be neglected for time saving.
+
+After the preliminary analysis, a detailed analysis is carried out to go through all the regular risks and the residual risks left by the emergent treatment (in clause 8.1). Limited by human resources, budget and technologies, it could be inevitable to prioritize the treatment order of every risk. Therefore, the detailed analysis should calculate/estimate a risk level for every risk as the output. The risk level is an indicator determined by the impact and the RoE of every risk.
+
+#### **7.2.1 Preliminary analysis**
+
+##### **7.2.1.1 Description**
+
+A preliminary risk analysis is a quick response to the emergent risks as some severe incidents could happen soon or may have happened. Usually the origin of an emergent risk should be more malicious and the scale of the impact on AGIT should be larger when compared with the regular risks. In this case, the preliminary risk analysis could assist the security team to make a decision to initiate a series of quick and efficient controls to deter or delay the escalation of the impact.
+
+#### **7.2.1.2 Implementation guidance**
+
+The qualitative method should be fit for this control. Before executing a preliminary risk analysis, some inspection criteria should be established beforehand to clarify whether a risk is an emergent risk or a regular one. A questionnaire tool could help to build the criteria. The questions in the questionnaire could help the security team to understand the seriousness and the urgency of a risk quickly and reasonably. The following questionnaire could be considered as a common base for further customization:
+
+- Can the risk cause massive network or render services unavailable or interrupted for a long period of time?
+- Can the risk cause massive PII or confidential information leakage?
+
+- Can the risk cause high frequency of identity impersonation or service abuse?
+- Can the risk cause the hijack of a large scale of assets?
+
+The questions above should be answered by the security team according to the up-to-date information, historical statistics and their expertise. The inspection criteria could be settled, for example, based on the answers of the questionnaire.
+
+If a risk conforms to the criteria, it should be an emergent risk and the emergent treatment in clause 9.2 should be its next process. Otherwise, it should be a regular risk and should naturally go through the process of a detailed analysis.
+
+#### **7.2.2 Detailed analysis**
+
+##### **7.2.2.1 Description**
+
+A detailed analysis provides a comprehensive breakdown of the risks and concludes the risk level based on the calculation or the estimation of the RoE and the impact of the risks under different scenarios. The regular risks and the residual risks after the emergent treatment should be the objects of the analysis. The corresponding risk profiles should be necessary inputs.
+
+##### **7.2.2.2 Implementation guidance**
+
+The threats frequency and the ease of vulnerabilities should be taken into account to determine the RoE under every scenario.
+
+The risk levels should be aggregated under the unit of a group of AGIT that share a highly similar scenario, which means the same threat, the same (up-coming) vulnerabilities and a similar context. The aggregated risk levels could reflect better the effects of the scale of threats.
+
+Regardless of whether or not the quantitative method or the qualitative method is adopted by the detailed analysis, some kind of automated tools set should be useful to enhance the quality and the efficiency of the analysis.
+
+# **8 Risk evaluation**
+
+### **8.1 Description**
+
+Risk evaluation is a process to decide which of the risks should be treated based on the outputs of the risk analysis. To make the decision, the risk levels should be compared with the organization risk acceptance criteria. The risk acceptance criteria should involve the basic business requirements that the AGIT should fulfil. If a risk level or an aggregated risk level shows that an AGIT or a group of AGIT cannot comply with the risk acceptance criteria, the risk should be treated.
+
+Risk acceptance criteria should be established based on several factors, such as:
+
+- maximum tolerance of downtime;
+- maximum tolerance of intangible assets loss (such as business reputation, trade secrets);
+- maximum tolerance of monetary loss.
+
+The output of the risk evaluation could be a list of risk over the acceptance level and a corresponded priority.
+
+There would be no specific practices recommended in the control.
+
+# **9 Risk treatment**
+
+### **9.1 Overview**
+
+Risk treatment for AGIT is a process to implement extra or new controls to reduce all the risk levels to no more than an acceptance level. In the risk treatment, the security team should determine what kind of methods should be adopted and how to conduct it properly. There are four kinds of generic risk treatment methods that could be considered, that is, risk modification, risk retention, risk avoidance, and risk sharing. The risk treatment could apply one or more methods flexibly to treat all the risks over the acceptance level according to the priority.
+
+The steps of the process should be divided into the emergent treatment and the regular treatment. Besides, the residual risks after the risk treatment should be considered in the monitoring and review process.
+
+## **9.2 Emergent treatment**
+
+#### **9.2.1 Description**
+
+Emergent treatment is to address the emergent risks. The primary goal of the emergent treatment is to deter or delay the escalation of the impact in time. The emergent treatment should be proactive and usually adopt the methods of the risk modification and the risk avoidance. After rapidly implementing some effective controls to temporarily secure the AGIT, the residual risks should again be taken through the detailed analysis process for further risk management.
+
+#### **9.2.2 Implementation guidance**
+
+With the consideration of the special positions of the AGIT, the technical controls inside of AGIT could always be the most ideal choice to treat the risks. The usual technical controls could be the software/firmware patches, the system configuration adjustment, the access control upgrade, and network topology optimization, etc. However, an ideal control might not be available in time, because it could require time to be designed, developed and tested in the field. Therefore, some preliminary controls could be adopted to degrade the risk level away from the emergent level. In practice, the following measures could be frequently used:
+
+- to block the malicious sources;
+- to filter the specified traffic in a dedicated way with performance loss;
+- to partially disable some of the capabilities of the AGIT or the business activities through the AGIT.
+
+In some cases, there could be no internal controls (such as patches and configuration optimization) in the near future to fix the vulnerability. In this regard the security team could consider the treatment method according to the following aspects:
+
+- potential consequence if the AGIT is shutdown or replaced;
+- potential consequence if the business activities through the AGIT is offline;
+- capabilities and performance loss to deploy external measures temporarily to shield the AGIT in order to degrade the RoE.
+
+In some serious cases, there could be no reasonable or acceptable controls to apply. Thus, the risk retention method should be adopted and close monitoring should be extremely important in the process of the risk monitor and review.
+
+After the emergent treatment, there could be a high possibility of residual risk. Therefore, the residual risks with the corresponding controls could be the output, which should be subjected to further detailed analysis.
+
+### **9.3 Regular treatment**
+
+#### **9.3.1 Description**
+
+Regular treatment is a process to treat risk over the acceptance level. To evaluate the outcome of treatment, risk tolerance level is introduced which describes the maximum residual risk that organizations can endure after the risk treatment. Unless organizations choose to accept the risk, all the risks should be treated effectively to a tolerance level. If more than one controls exist that can successfully treat the risk, these controls should be evaluated based on the cost-effectiveness.
+
+The old risk that cannot disappear or a new risk that appears after risk treatment is defined as the residual risk. As the residual risks might change over time, they should be monitored and reviewed, as recommended in clause 9.
+
+#### **9.3.2 Implementation guidance**
+
+If a risk belongs to many AGIT, a comprehensive and iterative in-field test should be necessary for the controls that could treat the risk. Controls should be applied to every AGIT that has the risk in accordance with carefully assigned priorities. Based on the priority, a small group of representative AGIT should be selected first to conduct the in-field test.
+
+In some cases, there could be no controls to modify the risk level of a risk so that other risk treatment method has to be selected. A honeypot net which is dedicated to the risk could be adopted as a combination of risk retention and risk avoidance.
+
+Some kind of automated tools could be helpful to conduct the necessary deployment of some technical controls and monitor the progress of the risk treatment especially as the treatment faces a large scale of AGIT.
+
+The output of the regular treatment could be a list of controls and their corresponding residual risks.
+
+# **10 Monitoring and review**
+
+### **10.1 Description**
+
+Monitoring is a process incorporating two fundamental aspects, that is, the effects of controls on the risks and the compliance of the management processes and the regulation rules. Reviewing is a process to obtain an overview the effectiveness of the risk management objectives and identify the obvious changes continuously.
+
+The output of the control should have a direct effect on whether or not to re-initiate the whole processes of the risk management or just a part of it.
+
+## **10.2 Implementation guidance**
+
+The process should focus on the imperative changes compared with the boundary and the estimation of the risk management. The possible changes could include:
+
+- the impact actually caused by the security incidents far exceeds the risk acceptance level;
+- any important changes in the regulation environment;
+- new threat intelligence identifies a new vulnerability that could expose a large scale of AGIT to a new threat and an old threat;
+- the evolution of the business activities changes the context of a large quantity of AGIT.
+
+The practice should ensure that the risk management policies and controls are fully understood by business staffs and are executed correctly and efficiently. The practice should also ensure that the risk management process and the related criteria are still appropriate for the organizations' business environment and current security situation worldwide.
+
+# **11 Communication and consultation**
+
+## **11.1 Description**
+
+Communication is a process to bring relevant stakeholders to acquire sufficient information and expertise and to understand the status of risks in general. Consultation is a process whereby agreement is sought with the relevant stakeholders with respect to the application and cost of a particular control.
+
+To assist the step of emergent treatment and risk treatment, specific practice regarding the communication and consultation process should be recommended.
+
+## **11.2 Implementation guidance**
+
+As the security team realizes that an emergent treatment should be necessary, an active and close communication and consultation should be initialized at the same time that a technical solution is under planning. Such kind of activity might not be led by the security team but by some high-level manager or supervisor.
+
+Furthermore, communication and consultation could utilize different areas of expertise to define an objective and quickly raise awareness of an emergent risk and evaluate its consequences from the perspective of business, reputation, regulation, etc. Support from related departments and top management could help assign resources for the security team to execute an emergent treatment and even decrease the criticism after the treatment.
+
+The security team should keep all the relevant stakeholders informed of the progress of an emergent treatment and the final achievements.
+
+# **12 Recording and reporting**
+
+## **12.1 Description**
+
+Recording is a process to document all the necessary information of the entire risk management process. Reporting is a process to provide the materials to support the communication or making a decision for the improvement of risk management.
+
+Specific recording and reporting practices should be recommended to assist in the evaluation of risk management, and to promote the understanding of the security-related practices.
+
+## **12.2 Implementation guidance**
+
+Recording and reporting should be key to evaluate the quality of the whole risk management process. Recording all the meaningful activities with related data should be helpful to calculate indicators, make conclusions and generate reports. It could be useful for AGIT to collect and link the necessary data to support the calculation of the following indicators:
+
+- the survival time before a vulnerability disappears in all AGIT;
+- the loss caused by a threat and vulnerability pair after the risk retention was adopted at least in part of AGIT;
+- the interval of a same vulnerability discovered again in the next AGIT after the first one was confirmed;
+- the frequency of a disappeared-once vulnerability discovered again;
+- the reliability and the effectiveness of a control adopted in the related AGIT.
+
+There are various concrete methods to collect data and calculate the indicators above depending on the management objectives and the technical situation.
+
+Some practices, such as large-scale vulnerability scanning, in the procedure of risk identification could be aggressive or even invasive. This may also be the case for the procedure of risk treatment.
+
+Sometimes, they could have some negative effects and trigger security alerts. Therefore, recording and reporting should be a mandatory tool for the security team to clarify the true intention inside or outside of the team if any confusion or dispute happens. For example, recording and reporting could help clarify whether a suspicious invasion was an authorized test or a true act of hacking.
+
+A well-designed mechanism and information system should be helpful to disseminate and analyse the information gathered by recording and reporting in long term with the full consideration of the confidentiality and the privacy.
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T X.1051] Recommendation ITU-T X.1051 (2016), *Information technology – Security techniques – Code of practice for Information security controls based on ISO/IEC 27002 for telecommunications organizations.*
+- [b-ITU-T X.1055] Recommendation ITU-T X.1055 (2018), *Risk management and risk profile guidelines for telecommunication organizations.*
+- [b-ITU-T X.1057] Recommendation ITU-T X.1057 (2011), *Asset management guidelines in telecommunication organizations.*
+- [b-ISO/IEC 27000] ISO/IEC 27000:2018, *Information technology – Security techniques – Information security management systems – Overview and vocabulary.*
+- [b-ISO/IEC 27002] ISO/IEC 27002:2013, *Information technology – Security techniques – Code of practice for information security controls.*
+- [b-ISO/IEC 27005] ISO/IEC 27005:2011, *Information technology – Security techniques – Information security risk management.*
+- [b-ISO 31000] ISO 31000:2018, *Risk management – Guidelines.*
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+|                 |                                                                                                                                                           |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A        | Organization of the work of ITU-T                                                                                                                         |
+| Series D        | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues                                                       |
+| Series E        | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors                                                                         |
+| Series F        | Non-telephone telecommunication services                                                                                                                  |
+| Series G        | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks                                                                                              |
+| Series H        | Audiovisual and multimedia systems                                                                                                                        |
+| Series I        | Integrated services digital network                                                                                                                       |
+| Series J        | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals                                                               |
+| Series K        | Protection against interference                                                                                                                           |
+| Series L        | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M        | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance                                                                                       |
+| Series N        | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits                                                                           |
+| Series O        | Specifications of measuring equipment                                                                                                                     |
+| Series P        | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks                                                                              |
+| Series Q        | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests                                                                                           |
+| Series R        | Telegraph transmission                                                                                                                                    |
+| Series S        | Telegraph services terminal equipment                                                                                                                     |
+| Series T        | Terminals for telematic services                                                                                                                          |
+| Series U        | Telegraph switching                                                                                                                                       |
+| Series V        | Data communication over the telephone network                                                                                                             |
+| <b>Series X</b> | <b>Data networks, open system communications and security</b>                                                                                             |
+| Series Y        | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities                               |
+| Series Z        | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems                                                                                      |

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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l   T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n   U n i o n
+
+**ITU-T**
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION  
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR  
+OF ITU
+
+**X.1060**
+
+(06/2021)
+
+SERIES X: DATA NETWORKS, OPEN SYSTEM  
+COMMUNICATIONS AND SECURITY
+
+Information and network security – Security management
+
+# --- **Framework for the creation and operation of a cyber defence centre**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T X.1060
+
+## ITU-T X-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS DATA NETWORKS, OPEN SYSTEM COMMUNICATIONS AND SECURITY
+
+|                                                        |                      |
+|--------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| PUBLIC DATA NETWORKS                                   | X.1–X.199            |
+| OPEN SYSTEMS INTERCONNECTION                           | X.200–X.299          |
+| INTERWORKING BETWEEN NETWORKS                          | X.300–X.399          |
+| MESSAGE HANDLING SYSTEMS                               | X.400–X.499          |
+| DIRECTORY                                              | X.500–X.599          |
+| OSI NETWORKING AND SYSTEM ASPECTS                      | X.600–X.699          |
+| OSI MANAGEMENT                                         | X.700–X.799          |
+| SECURITY                                               | X.800–X.849          |
+| OSI APPLICATIONS                                       | X.850–X.899          |
+| OPEN DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING                            | X.900–X.999          |
+| INFORMATION AND NETWORK SECURITY                       |                      |
+| General security aspects                               | X.1000–X.1029        |
+| Network security                                       | X.1030–X.1049        |
+| <b>Security management</b>                             | <b>X.1050–X.1069</b> |
+| Telebiometrics                                         | X.1080–X.1099        |
+| SECURE APPLICATIONS AND SERVICES (1)                   |                      |
+| Multicast security                                     | X.1100–X.1109        |
+| Home network security                                  | X.1110–X.1119        |
+| Mobile security                                        | X.1120–X.1139        |
+| Web security                                           | X.1140–X.1149        |
+| Security protocols (1)                                 | X.1150–X.1159        |
+| Peer-to-peer security                                  | X.1160–X.1169        |
+| Networked ID security                                  | X.1170–X.1179        |
+| IPTV security                                          | X.1180–X.1199        |
+| CYBERSPACE SECURITY                                    |                      |
+| Cybersecurity                                          | X.1200–X.1229        |
+| Countering spam                                        | X.1230–X.1249        |
+| Identity management                                    | X.1250–X.1279        |
+| SECURE APPLICATIONS AND SERVICES (2)                   |                      |
+| Emergency communications                               | X.1300–X.1309        |
+| Ubiquitous sensor network security                     | X.1310–X.1319        |
+| Smart grid security                                    | X.1330–X.1339        |
+| Certified mail                                         | X.1340–X.1349        |
+| Internet of things (IoT) security                      | X.1360–X.1369        |
+| Intelligent transportation system (ITS) security       | X.1370–X.1389        |
+| Distributed ledger technology security                 | X.1400–X.1429        |
+| Distributed ledger technology security                 | X.1430–X.1449        |
+| Security protocols (2)                                 | X.1450–X.1459        |
+| CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION EXCHANGE                     |                      |
+| Overview of cybersecurity                              | X.1500–X.1519        |
+| Vulnerability/state exchange                           | X.1520–X.1539        |
+| Event/incident/heuristics exchange                     | X.1540–X.1549        |
+| Exchange of policies                                   | X.1550–X.1559        |
+| Heuristics and information request                     | X.1560–X.1569        |
+| Identification and discovery                           | X.1570–X.1579        |
+| Assured exchange                                       | X.1580–X.1589        |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING SECURITY                               |                      |
+| Overview of cloud computing security                   | X.1600–X.1601        |
+| Cloud computing security design                        | X.1602–X.1639        |
+| Cloud computing security best practices and guidelines | X.1640–X.1659        |
+| Cloud computing security implementation                | X.1660–X.1679        |
+| Other cloud computing security                         | X.1680–X.1699        |
+| QUANTUM COMMUNICATION                                  |                      |
+| Terminologies                                          | X.1700–X.1701        |
+| Quantum random number generator                        | X.1702–X.1709        |
+| Framework of QKDN security                             | X.1710–X.1711        |
+| Security design for QKDN                               | X.1712–X.1719        |
+| Security techniques for QKDN                           | X.1720–X.1729        |
+| DATA SECURITY                                          |                      |
+| Big Data Security                                      | X.1750–X.1759        |
+| IMT-T SECURITY                                         | X.1800–X.1819        |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T X.1060
+
+# Framework for the creation and operation of a cyber defence centre
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T X.1060 defines cyber defence centre (CDC) as an entity that plays a central role in an organization to address cybersecurity risks. The three processes of build, management and evaluation that a CDC should practically implement are described as a framework. The services that the organization should have in order to implement more specific cybersecurity measures are also provided.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval   | Study Group | Unique ID*                                                                |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0     | ITU-T X.1060   | 2021-06-29 | 17          | <a href="http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/14721">11.1002/1000/14721</a> |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Cyber defence centre, CIRT, security operation centre (SOC).
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL <http://handle.itu.int/> in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID. For example, <http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/11830-en>.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents/software copyrights, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the appropriate ITU-T databases available via the ITU-T website at <http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/ipr/>.
+
+© ITU 2021
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+|    |                                                                               | Page |
+|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
+| 1  | Scope .....                                                                   | 1    |
+| 2  | References.....                                                               | 1    |
+| 3  | Definitions .....                                                             | 1    |
+|    | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere.....                                              | 1    |
+|    | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation.....                                 | 1    |
+| 4  | Abbreviations and acronyms .....                                              | 1    |
+| 5  | Conventions .....                                                             | 2    |
+| 6  | Structure of this Recommendation .....                                        | 2    |
+| 7  | Overview of a cyber defence centre .....                                      | 2    |
+| 8  | Framework for the creation and operation of a CDC .....                       | 2    |
+| 9  | Build process .....                                                           | 3    |
+|    | 9.1 Overview .....                                                            | 3    |
+|    | 9.2 CDC service recommendation level.....                                     | 4    |
+|    | 9.3 CDC service assignment.....                                               | 5    |
+|    | 9.4 CDC service assessment.....                                               | 6    |
+| 10 | Management process .....                                                      | 7    |
+| 11 | Evaluation process .....                                                      | 8    |
+|    | 11.1 Overview .....                                                           | 8    |
+|    | 11.2 CDC service catalogue evaluation.....                                    | 8    |
+|    | 11.3 CDC service profile evaluation .....                                     | 8    |
+|    | 11.4 CDC service portfolio evaluation.....                                    | 8    |
+| 12 | CDC service categories and service list.....                                  | 9    |
+|    | Annex A – CDC service list with descriptions .....                            | 13   |
+|    | A.1 Category A: Strategic management of CDC .....                             | 13   |
+|    | A.2 Category B: Real-time analysis .....                                      | 14   |
+|    | A.3 Category C: Deep analysis .....                                           | 14   |
+|    | A.4 Category D: Incident response .....                                       | 15   |
+|    | A.5 Category E: Checking and evaluation .....                                 | 15   |
+|    | A.6 Category F: Collection, analysis and evaluation threat intelligence ..... | 16   |
+|    | A.7 Category G: Development and maintenance of CDC platforms .....            | 17   |
+|    | A.8 Category H: Support of internal fraud response.....                       | 18   |
+|    | A.9 Category I: Active relationship with external parties.....                | 18   |
+|    | Bibliography.....                                                             | 20   |
+
+## **Introduction**
+
+Cybersecurity risks in an organization have significant impacts on its overall activities. The risks that organizations face are environmental changes, from both the social and business perspectives, and external pressures by regulations and increased threats. Top management, as the C-suite (CxO), is therefore responsible for managing controls for the entire organization to respond to these risks and changes. As one important aspect of implementing controls in cybersecurity, leadership in development and control security policies in alignment with business objectives is expected and is often provided by the chief security officer (CSO) or chief information security officer (CISO). In order practically to implement security measures, an entity that supports the activities of the CSO or CISO with strategic management at the organizational level is essentially required. This entity is described as a cyber defence centre (CDC) in this Recommendation.
+
+This Recommendation provides a framework for the build and management of a CDC, and evaluation of its effectiveness. The framework indicates how a CDC should determine and implement security services to enable the security of an organization. This framework helps an organization to address its cybersecurity risks.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T 1060
+
+# Framework for the creation and operation of a cyber defence centre
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation establishes a framework for organizations to build and manage a cyber defence centre (CDC), and to evaluate its effectiveness. The framework indicates how a CDC should determine and implement security services to enable the security of an organization.
+
+This Recommendation is intended for those responsible for security at the top management level of an organization, such as the chief security officer (CSO) or chief information security officer (CISO) and security supervisors who assist them.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+None.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following term defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 outsourcing** [b-ITU-T X.1053]: When an enterprise contracts out one or more of its internal processes and/or functions to an outside company. Outsourcing moves enterprise resources to an outside enterprise and keeps a retained capability to manage the relationship with the outsourced processes.
+
+## 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following term:
+
+**3.2.1 cyber defence centre (CDC)**: An entity within an organization that offers security services to manage the cybersecurity risks of its business activities.
+
+# 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+|       |                                          |
+|-------|------------------------------------------|
+| APT   | Advanced Persistent Threat               |
+| CDC   | Cyber Defence Centre                     |
+| CISO  | Chief Information Security Officer       |
+| CSIRT | Computer Security Incident Response Team |
+| CSO   | Chief Security Officer                   |
+| CxO   | C-suite                                  |
+
+|      |                                           |
+|------|-------------------------------------------|
+| IDS  | Intrusion Detection System                |
+| IPS  | Intrusion Prevention System               |
+| IT   | Information Technology                    |
+| SIEM | Security Information and Event Management |
+| SLA  | Service Level Agreement                   |
+| WAF  | Web Application Firewall                  |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+None.
+
+# 6 Structure of this Recommendation
+
+In this Recommendation, a concept of a CDC is explained in clause 7. Clause 8 provides an overview of the framework for creating and operating a CDC. The framework is described in detail in subsequent clauses: CDC build process (clause 9); CDC management process (clause 10); and CDC evaluation process (clause 11). In clause 12, an overall description of security services provided by a CDC is presented as best practice, and each service is described in further detail in Annex A.
+
+# 7 Overview of a cyber defence centre
+
+Organizations act to make their businesses successful. In order to manage risks to business activities, the CISO formulates security policies, especially from a cybersecurity perspective. A CDC is an entity that implements security policies specifically as CDC services, which consist of security activities that are performed by teams responsible for security. CDC services may specify security functions as capabilities of a system to perform security-related processing. Figure 1 shows stakeholders and their roles for CDC operation.
+
+![Figure 1: Stakeholders and their roles for CDC operation. The diagram shows a flow from CxOs and CISO to CDC, and then to Teams for security, which leads to Security functions. Business objectives and Security policies are also shown as inputs to CDC services.](07b17a620c75522d53916a11e12d1bff_img.jpg)
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+    subgraph TopRow [Stakeholders]
+        CxOs((CxOs))
+        CISO((CISO))
+        CDC((CDC))
+        Teams[Teams for security]
+    end
+    subgraph BottomRow [Outputs/Processes]
+        BO[Business objectives]
+        SP[Security policies]
+        CDCS[CDC services]
+        SF[Security functions]
+    end
+    CxOs -.->|Commit| BO
+    CISO -.->|Define and control| SP
+    CDC -.->|Define and implement| CDCS
+    Teams -.->|Install and maintain| SF
+    CDCS -.->|Specify| SF
+    CDCS -.->|Enable| SP
+    CISO -- Empower --> CDC
+    CDC -- Support --> CISO
+    CDC -- Assign --> Teams
+    Teams -- Support --> CDC
+  
+```
+
+X.1060(21)
+
+Figure 1: Stakeholders and their roles for CDC operation. The diagram shows a flow from CxOs and CISO to CDC, and then to Teams for security, which leads to Security functions. Business objectives and Security policies are also shown as inputs to CDC services.
+
+**Figure 1 – Stakeholders and their roles for CDC operation**
+
+Depending on the size and type of the organization, a CDC may be an independent unit, a committee or a small team. Regardless of its format, it should exist as an entity in the organization, and have the authority and resources to implement security services to enable the organization to be secured. Such security services should be aligned with security policies and ensure the qualities of security activities; the level of each service should be explicitly agreed by a documented arrangement, such as a service level agreement (SLA). The overall quality of a CDC security service is assessed by measures specified in clause 9.4.
+
+# 8 Framework for the creation and operation of a CDC
+
+Figure 2 shows a framework for creating and operating a CDC. The framework includes three processes: build, management, and evaluation. To ensure the organization is secured, a CDC should
+
+be established and appropriately managed. It should be also assessed in a timely and regular manner and continuously improve. This framework enables the organization to maintain security activities.
+
+In the build process, security activities in the organization should be considered. Best practice for CDC security services are listed in Annex A. An organization can establish its own service catalogue by selecting services from the list and adding services specific to the organization. Each service in the catalogue should also establish a profile that includes: owner(s), roles and responsibilities, and type of service assignments (insource, outsource or combinations). Once the service profile is established, the current and target score of each CDC service should be determined for the evaluation process.
+
+The management process has three phases and two cycles. The strategic management phase manages the overall activities of a CDC, the operation phase manages routine work for monitoring and analysis, and the response phase manages emergency responses. Those phases are managed in both short and long cycles; operation and response require timely resolutions in short cycles. Meanwhile, strategic management should consider long-term improvement together with output from short cycles in a long cycle. The long-term improvement typically requires decisions for new business investment and drastic modifications of system architectures.
+
+The evaluation process assesses the catalogue, profile and portfolio of a CDC service (see Figure 4), which should be objectively assessed at each appropriate time.
+
+The evaluation results should be reviewed and reflected in all three CDC processes. A recurring cycle of the build, management and evaluation processes to improve security activities should be established and maintained in the organization.
+
+![](367926125450c2bc3f4bdca9d59a62ba_img.jpg)
+
+|                           |                   |                           |                   |
+|---------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------|-------------------|
+| Service list              | Service catalogue | Service profile           | Service portfolio |
+| <b>Build process</b>      |                   |                           |                   |
+| <b>Evaluation process</b> |                   | <b>Management process</b> |                   |
+| <b>Gap analysis</b>       |                   | <b>Phases</b>             | <b>Cycles</b>     |
+| Assessment                |                   | Strategic management      | Long cycle        |
+| Assignment                |                   | Operation                 | Short cycle       |
+| Recommendation level      |                   | Response                  |                   |
+
+X.1060(21)
+
+**Figure 2 – Framework for the creation and operation of a CDC**
+
+# 9 Build process
+
+## 9.1 Overview
+
+The CDC has a build process to determine which security services should be implemented in the organization. The candidate services for implementation are selected from the CDC service list, which is based on best practice in the organization. For the CDC service list, see clause 12.
+
+Figure 3 shows the three phases to build services for a CDC.
+
+![Figure 3: Phases to build services for CDC. The diagram shows a sequential process starting from 'CDC service list' and moving through three phases to 'Organization specific CDC service portfolio'. Phase 1 leads to 'Organization specific CDC service catalogue', Phase 2 leads to 'Organization specific CDC service profile', and Phase 3 leads to 'Organization specific CDC service portfolio'. Below the phases are labels: 'Recommendation level' under Phase 1, 'Service assignment' under Phase 2, and 'Service assessment' under Phase 3. The reference 'X.1060(21)' is at the bottom right.](a5ee5c23b6dc52ec1d724b76d5a5f58f_img.jpg)
+
+```
+
+graph LR
+    A[CDC service list] -- Phase 1 --> B[Organization specific CDC service catalogue]
+    B -- Phase 2 --> C[Organization specific CDC service profile]
+    C -- Phase 3 --> D[Organization specific CDC service portfolio]
+    E([Recommendation level]) --> Phase 1
+    F([Service assignment]) --> Phase 2
+    G([Service assessment]) --> Phase 3
+  
+```
+
+Figure 3: Phases to build services for CDC. The diagram shows a sequential process starting from 'CDC service list' and moving through three phases to 'Organization specific CDC service portfolio'. Phase 1 leads to 'Organization specific CDC service catalogue', Phase 2 leads to 'Organization specific CDC service profile', and Phase 3 leads to 'Organization specific CDC service portfolio'. Below the phases are labels: 'Recommendation level' under Phase 1, 'Service assignment' under Phase 2, and 'Service assessment' under Phase 3. The reference 'X.1060(21)' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 3 – Phases to build services for CDC**
+
+#### 1) Phase 1: Creation of a CDC service catalogue
+
+The organization should firstly create a CDC service catalogue.
+
+In this phase, the candidate services for implementation are extracted from the general service list. Details of the general list are described in clause 12. If there are missing services, such services should be newly defined and added to the CDC service catalogue.
+
+#### 2) Phase 2: Creation of a CDC service profile
+
+For the services listed in the CDC service catalogue, the organization should determine the roles and responsibilities of teams who provide the services. In this phase, the CDC service assignment described in clause 9.3 should be considered.
+
+The organization should thus produce the CDC service profile.
+
+#### 3) Phase 3: Creation of a CDC service portfolio
+
+After deciding the CDC service profile, the organization should measure the current service score (As-is) of each service and set a medium- or long-term target service score (To-be).
+
+Once the levels of As-is and To-be are set, the organization should produce the CDC service portfolio.
+
+Figure 4 shows an example matrix of CDC services. This matrix will be filled after phases 1 to 3.
+
+![Figure 4: Services matrix for a CDC. Below the table, four horizontal arrows indicate the scope of each phase: 'Service list' (shortest), 'Service catalogue' (medium), 'Service profile' (longer), and 'Service portfolio' (longest, covering the entire matrix). The reference 'X.1060(21)' is at the bottom right.](fc69ceb1dee1da7e33bd6c38fc4ceab9_img.jpg)
+
+| Service      | Recommendation level | Service assignment    | Service score |       |
+|--------------|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------|-------|
+|              |                      |                       | As-is         | To-be |
+| Service ex.1 | Basic                | Insourcing (AB Dept.) | 3             | 5     |
+| Service ex.2 | Standard             | Outsourcing (Z-MSSP)  | 2             | 4     |
+| Service ex.3 | Advanced             | Unassignable          | 1             | 2     |
+
+Figure 4: Services matrix for a CDC. Below the table, four horizontal arrows indicate the scope of each phase: 'Service list' (shortest), 'Service catalogue' (medium), 'Service profile' (longer), and 'Service portfolio' (longest, covering the entire matrix). The reference 'X.1060(21)' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 4 – Services matrix for a CDC**
+
+## 9.2 CDC service recommendation level
+
+To implement the most appropriate CDC services for an organization, the necessity of each service can be considered at the five levels listed in Table 1. The priority of service implementation can be clarified by measuring the levels.
+
+**Table 1 – CDC service recommendation level**
+
+| <b>Weight</b> | <b>Description</b>                                                  |
+|---------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Unnecessary   | Services deemed unnecessary                                         |
+| Basic         | Minimum services to be implemented                                  |
+| Standard      | Services that are generally recommended for implementation          |
+| Advanced      | Services required to achieve a higher-level CDC cycle               |
+| Optional      | Services arbitrarily selected according to the expected form of CDC |
+
+## 9.3 CDC service assignment
+
+The organization should clarify specifically which team should implement the CDC service. Depending on the capabilities to implement the services in the organization, the organization should determine CDC service assignment, which might include outsourcing. See Table 2.
+
+**Table 2 – CDC service assignment**
+
+| <b>Type</b> | <b>Description</b>                                                                                                                      |
+|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Insourcing  | Services are provided by a team within the organization. The organization should specify the team in charge.                            |
+| Outsourcing | Services are provided by a team outside of the organization. The organization should specify the outsourcer.                            |
+| Combination | The organization uses insourcing and outsourcing together. A responsible team and a contractor should be specified by the organization. |
+| Unassigned  | Although the organization recognises a service, but there is no assignee in the organization.                                           |
+
+When using outsourcing, the points A) and B) should be clarified.
+
+#### A) Nature of information handled
+
+The organization should classify the nature of the information handled, including definitions or distinctions of “internal” and “external” to the organization. For example, in the case of incidents, information including the damage or impact by an attack should be considered internal, while information on the attack itself is considered to be external.
+
+#### B) Need for specialized security skills
+
+The organization should consider whether specialized skills in the security field are required to provide the service.
+
+CDC services can be classified into quadrants I) to IV) based on these two indicator points. See Figure 5.
+
+![Figure 5 – Sourcing quadrants. A 2x2 matrix with 'Necessity of security skills' on the vertical axis (Low at top, High at bottom) and information type on the horizontal axis (External (Attack) information on left, Internal (Defence) information on right). The quadrants are: Top-Left: Insourcing >= Outsourcing; Top-Right: Insourcing >> Outsourcing; Bottom-Left: Insourcing << Outsourcing; Bottom-Right: Insourcing <= Outsourcing.](d4af765160d04ecef538e5066006dc77_img.jpg)
+
+Figure 5 – Sourcing quadrants. A 2x2 matrix with 'Necessity of security skills' on the vertical axis (Low at top, High at bottom) and information type on the horizontal axis (External (Attack) information on left, Internal (Defence) information on right). The quadrants are: Top-Left: Insourcing >= Outsourcing; Top-Right: Insourcing >> Outsourcing; Bottom-Left: Insourcing << Outsourcing; Bottom-Right: Insourcing <= Outsourcing.
+
+**Figure 5 – Sourcing quadrants**
+
+#### **I) Insourcing >> Outsourcing**
+
+When security expertise is not required to handle confidential information within the organization, insourcing is optimal, and outsourcing is not preferred.
+
+#### **II) Insourcing >= Outsourcing**
+
+If the required expertise is not so high, although it is information external to the organization, activity and management should be performed mainly by the organization and with support provided by outsourcing.
+
+#### **III) Insourcing << Outsourcing**
+
+In order to deal with information, mainly on attacks, that is external to the organization, the service should be implemented by an organization with specialized skills (e.g., outsourcing). Unless experts with specialized skills are available internally, it is hard for an organization to implement the service by itself.
+
+#### **IV) Insourcing <= Outsourcing**
+
+When specialized skills are required to handle internal information within an organization, activity should be performed mainly by a specialized organization (e.g., outsourcing), which the organization should manage and support.
+
+## 9.4 CDC service assessment
+
+When the CDC service portfolio is created, the implementation status in As-is and To-be of each service should be assessed using the service scores listed in Table 3. It should be noted that different service types, e.g., insource and outsource, should be assessed by the criteria assigned for service scores.
+
+**Table 3 – CDC service scores**
+
+| For insource                                                                                                     |           |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
+| Documented operation is authorized by CISO or other organizational director who has appropriate responsibilities | +5 points |
+| Operation is documented and others can play the role of existing operator                                        | +4 points |
+| Operation is not documented, and others can play the partial role of existing operator temporarily               | +3 points |
+| Operation is not documented, and the existing operator can play role                                             | +2 points |
+| Operation is not working                                                                                         | +1 point  |
+| Decided not to implement by insourcing                                                                           | N/A       |
+
+| For outsource                                                                               |           |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
+| Content of service and expected output are understood and their outputs are as expected     | +5 points |
+| Content of service and expected output are understood but their outputs are not as expected | +4 points |
+| Either content of service or expected output is not understood                              | +3 points |
+| Both content of service and expected output are not understood                              | +2 points |
+| Nether output nor report is not reviewed                                                    | +1 point  |
+| Decided not to implement by outsourcing                                                     | N/A       |
+
+# 10 Management process
+
+CDC enables security activities throughout the organization by implementing the CDC management process including three phases and two cycles shown in Figure 6.
+
+![Figure 6 – CDC management process diagram showing three phases: Strategic management, Operation, and Response. A solid line labeled 'Long cycle' connects Strategic management to Operation and back. A dashed line labeled 'Short cycle' connects Operation to Response and back.](ff0952ef692c9d960ce5f6708bcc9711_img.jpg)
+
+```
+
+graph LR
+    SM((Strategic management))
+    OP((Operation))
+    RS((Response))
+    SM -- "Long cycle" --> OP
+    OP -- "Long cycle" --> SM
+    OP -. "Short cycle" .-> RS
+    RS -. "Short cycle" .-> OP
+  
+```
+
+X.1060(21)
+
+Figure 6 – CDC management process diagram showing three phases: Strategic management, Operation, and Response. A solid line labeled 'Long cycle' connects Strategic management to Operation and back. A dashed line labeled 'Short cycle' connects Operation to Response and back.
+
+**Figure 6 – CDC management process**
+
+### (1) Strategic management phase
+
+Strategic management has responsibility and accountability for all strategic services relevant to definitions, design, planning, management, certification, etc. that ensure the long-term development of CDC.
+
+### (2) Operation phase
+
+The maintenance of the introduced framework should be performed in the operation phase. This is the work at the ordinary or usual time and it typically includes routine activities, e.g., analysis of incident detection, and monitoring and maintenance of security response systems. The team that performs such operations is often called a security operations centre (SOC).
+
+### (3) Response phase
+
+An incident response should be executed when an event is detected by the analysis in the operation phase. This phase is always an emergency. Those responding to the incident are often called the computer security incident response team (CSIRT).
+
+The input to the response phase is not limited to that from the operation phase, but the team should also cover responses to reports or notifications from third parties.
+
+#### A) Short cycle
+
+Operation and response are performed daily. In those processes, problems in the business process and issues in the security response system always appear. Therefore, continuous improvement to resolve those issues, e.g., simple automation of simple tasks, improvement of tools to analyse accuracy and review of report items, are necessary within the resources (people, budget, system) allocated in a short cycle.
+
+#### B) Long cycle
+
+A review that requires the allocation of new resources should be applied to a long cycle.
+
+If any issues that cannot be solved by the current system are found when reviewing the short cycle, the response should be a long-term perspective and plan, e.g., the introduction of a new security product, a drastic review of security policies and a large-scale configuration change in the security systems.
+
+# 11 Evaluation process
+
+## 11.1 Overview
+
+The catalogue, profile and portfolio of the CDC service that are formulated in the build process should be evaluated in a timely and regular manner. Figure 7 depicts a process for evaluating CDC services.
+
+![Figure 7 – CDC evaluation process flowchart](f6e8acf9f931452d01688d311b5c0364_img.jpg)
+
+```
+graph LR; A[CDC service list] -- Phase 1 --> B[Organization specific CDC service catalogue]; B -- Phase 2 --> C[Organization specific CDC service profile]; C -- Phase 3 --> D[Organization specific CDC service portfolio]; B --> E((Gap analysis on Recommendation level)); C --> F((Gap analysis on service assignment)); D --> G((Gap analysis on service assessment));
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the CDC evaluation process. It begins with a 'CDC service list' box, which leads to an 'Organization specific CDC service catalogue' box via 'Phase 1'. This catalogue box is linked to a 'Gap analysis on Recommendation level' oval. The catalogue then leads to an 'Organization specific CDC service profile' box via 'Phase 2', which is linked to a 'Gap analysis on service assignment' oval. The profile leads to an 'Organization specific CDC service portfolio' box via 'Phase 3', which is linked to a 'Gap analysis on service assessment' oval. The identifier 'X.1060(21)' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+Figure 7 – CDC evaluation process flowchart
+
+**Figure 7 – CDC evaluation process**
+
+## 11.2 CDC service catalogue evaluation
+
+A gap analysis on the CDC service recommendation level should be performed. A review is required due to changes in the environment and threats, particularly, "unnecessary" services should be re-examined and reviewed to ensure no omissions. The CDC service catalogue should be evaluated when the business introduces changes, such as starting new business activities, and response to new risks and threats.
+
+## 11.3 CDC service profile evaluation
+
+A gap analysis on CDC service assignments should be performed. By deciding service assignments, "unassignable" can be eliminated, and the organization can expect to improve maturity level by reviewing them. The CDC service profile should be evaluated when organizational changes, such as internal organization changes for insource type and outsourcer changes for outsource type, occur.
+
+## 11.4 CDC service portfolio evaluation
+
+A gap analysis on the CDC service score of individual services should be performed. The difference between the target score in To-be and the score in As-is should be clarified so that the organization can focus on what needs to be improved, confirm the CDC service score again and extract issues. The CDC service portfolio should be evaluated on a regular basis.
+
+# 12 CDC service categories and service list
+
+The CDC service categories and list are required in the build and management processes (see clauses 9 and 10).
+
+CDC service has nine service categories:
+
+- A) strategic management of CDC;
+- B) real-time analysis;
+- C) deep analysis;
+- D) incident response;
+- E) checking and evaluation;
+- F) collection, analysis and evaluation of threat intelligence;
+- G) development and maintenance of CDC platforms;
+- H) support of internal fraud response;
+- I) active relationship with external parties.
+
+### A. Strategic management of CDC
+
+This category includes policies and resource planning for all security activities mentioned in categories A) to I) in the organization including a CDC in order to ensure its stable operation.
+
+### B. Real-time analysis
+
+This category constantly monitors and analyses logs and data from various systems, such as network devices, servers and security products. The goal is to discover threats in real time, which can lead to a rapid and appropriate incident response.
+
+### C. Deep analysis
+
+This is a category related to the incident, such as investigating the affected systems, reviewing the compromised data, and analysing the tools and methods used in the attack.
+
+The aim is to elucidate the full scope of the incident and identify the impact.
+
+### D. Incident response
+
+This category takes specific actions based on the results of real-time analysis and threat information to deter and eliminate threats.
+
+It aims to minimize the impact on the system and the business, including coordination and reporting with stakeholders.
+
+### E. Checking and evaluation
+
+This category is for vulnerability assessment of systems to be protected, and incident response training and its evaluation. The purpose of this category is to improve the level of security.
+
+### F. Collection, analysis and evaluation of threat intelligence
+
+This category collects threat information on vulnerabilities and attacks (external intelligence) that is available on the Internet and handles information on real-time analysis and incident response (internal intelligence).
+
+The objective is to improve the accuracy of real-time analysis and incident response, and to improve security assets.
+
+### G. Development and maintenance of CDC platforms
+
+This category manages, improves or develops new systems (e.g., security products, log collection databases and operational systems) that are necessary for security response.
+
+The aim is to achieve a smooth and sustainable security activities in other categories.
+
+### H. Support of internal fraud response
+
+This category collects audit data to support responses to internal fraud.
+
+The purpose of this category is to support response and resolution of internal fraud by providing logs and analysis.
+
+### I. Active relationship with external parties
+
+This category includes coordination and collaboration with internal stakeholders and external organizations.
+
+The objective is to improve the security level of the organization, increase the value of the security to the organization, thus further developing and strengthening the organization.
+
+Figure 8 shows service categories mapping with the management processes, and Table 4 lists the services.
+
+Detailed descriptions of each service in a CDC service list are provided in Annex A.
+
+![A hierarchical diagram of CDC service categories. It shows a cycle between Strategic management, Operation, and Response, with a long cycle and a short cycle. The diagram is divided into several main sections: A. Strategic management of CDC, B. Real-time analysis, C. Deep analysis, D. Incident response, E. Checking and evaluation, F. Collection, analysis and evaluation threat intelligence, G. Development and maintenance of CDC platforms, and H. Support of internal fraud response. Each section contains specific sub-categories and tasks.](8fbdfc3d17fb1dae7b2d8f5a287fa9fc_img.jpg)
+
+**I. Active relationship with external parties**
+
+- I-1 Awareness
+- I-2 Education and training
+- I-3 Security consulting
+- I-4 Security vendor collaboration
+- I-5 Collaboration service with external security communities
+- I-6 Technical reporting
+- I-7 Executive security reporting
+
+**Long cycle**
+
+**Short cycle**
+
+**A. Strategic management of CDC**
+
+|                              |                                  |
+|------------------------------|----------------------------------|
+| A-1 Risk management          | A-8 Security architecture design |
+| A-2 Risk assessment          | A-9 Triage criteria management   |
+| A-3 Policy planning          | A-10 Counter measures selection  |
+| A-4 Policy management        | A-11 Quality management          |
+| A-5 Business continuity      | A-12 Security audit              |
+| A-6 Business impact analysis | A-13 Certification               |
+| A-7 Resource management      |                                  |
+
+**B. Real-time analysis**
+
+|                                |                                |
+|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
+| B-1 Real time asset monitoring | B-3 Altering and warning       |
+| B-2 Event data retention       | B-4 Handling enquiry on report |
+
+**C. Deep analysis**
+
+|                             |                                  |
+|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|
+| C-1 Forensic analysis       | C-3 Tracking and tracing         |
+| C-2 Malware sample analysis | C-4 Forensic evidence collection |
+
+**D. Incident response**
+
+|                                       |                              |
+|---------------------------------------|------------------------------|
+| D-1 Incident report acceptance        | D-5 Incident recovery        |
+| D-2 Incident handling                 | D-6 Incident notification    |
+| D-3 Incident classification           | D-7 Incident response report |
+| D-4 Incident response and containment |                              |
+
+**H. Support of internal fraud response**
+
+|                                                  |                                                                |
+|--------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|
+| H-1 Internal fraud response and analysis support | H-2 Internal fraud detection and recurrence prevention support |
+|--------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|
+
+**F. Collection, analysis and evaluation threat intelligence**
+
+|                          |                                |                                                          |                                                        |                                     |
+|--------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
+| F-1 Post mortem analysis | F-4 Threat intelligence report | F-2 Internal threat intelligence collection and analysis | F-3 External threat intelligence collection evaluation | F-5 Threat intelligence utilization |
+|--------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
+
+**E. Checking and evaluation**
+
+|                                    |                              |                                                      |                       |                                                    |
+|------------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------|
+| E-1 Network information collection | E-3 Vulnerability assessment | E-4 Patch management                                 | E-8 Policy compliance | E-7 Handling capability on cyber attack evaluation |
+| E-2 Asset inventory                |                              | E-5 Penetration test                                 | E-9 Hardening         |                                                    |
+|                                    |                              | E-6 Defence capability against APT attack evaluation |                       |                                                    |
+
+**G. Development and maintenance of CDC platforms**
+
+|                                          |                                                 |                                                    |
+|------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|
+| G-1 Security architecture implementation | G-2 Basic operation for network security asset  | G-3 Advanced operation for network security asset  |
+|                                          | G-4 Basic operation for endpoint security asset | G-5 Advanced operation for endpoint security asset |
+| G-12 Existing security tools evaluation  | G-6 Basic operation for cloud security products | G-7 Advanced operation for cloud security products |
+| G-13 New security tools evaluation       | G-9 Basic operation for analysis platform       | G-10 Advanced operation for analysis platform      |
+|                                          | G-8 Deep analysis tool operation                |                                                    |
+|                                          | G-11 Operates CDC systems                       |                                                    |
+
+A hierarchical diagram of CDC service categories. It shows a cycle between Strategic management, Operation, and Response, with a long cycle and a short cycle. The diagram is divided into several main sections: A. Strategic management of CDC, B. Real-time analysis, C. Deep analysis, D. Incident response, E. Checking and evaluation, F. Collection, analysis and evaluation threat intelligence, G. Development and maintenance of CDC platforms, and H. Support of internal fraud response. Each section contains specific sub-categories and tasks.
+
+X.1060(21)
+
+**Figure 8 – CDC service categories**
+
+**Table 4 – CDC service list**
+
+| <b>A</b> | <b>Strategic management of CDC</b>               | <b>F</b> | <b>Collection, analysis and evaluation threat intelligence</b> |
+|----------|--------------------------------------------------|----------|----------------------------------------------------------------|
+| A-1      | Risk management                                  | F-1      | Post-mortem analysis                                           |
+| A-2      | Risk assessment                                  | F-2      | Internal threat intelligence collection and analysis           |
+| A-3      | Policy planning                                  | F-3      | External threat intelligence collection and evaluation         |
+| A-4      | Policy management                                | F-4      | Threat intelligence report                                     |
+| A-5      | Business continuity                              | F-5      | Threat intelligence utilization                                |
+| A-6      | Business impact analysis                         | <b>G</b> | <b>Development and maintenance of CDC platforms</b>            |
+| A-7      | Resource management                              | G-1      | Security architecture implementation                           |
+| A-8      | Security architecture design                     | G-2      | Basic operation for network security asset                     |
+| A-9      | Triage criteria management                       | G-3      | Advanced operation for network security asset                  |
+| A-10     | Counter measures selection                       | G-4      | Basic operation for endpoint security asset                    |
+| A-11     | Quality management                               | G-5      | Advanced operation for endpoint security asset                 |
+| A-12     | Security audit                                   | G-6      | Basic operation for cloud security products                    |
+| A-13     | Certification                                    | G-7      | Advanced operation for cloud security products                 |
+| <b>B</b> | <b>Real-time analysis</b>                        | G-8      | Deep analysis tool operation                                   |
+| B-1      | Real-time asset monitoring                       | G-9      | Basic operation for analysis platform                          |
+| B-2      | Event data retention                             | G-10     | Advanced operation for analysis platform                       |
+| B-3      | Alerting and warning                             | G-11     | Operates CDC systems                                           |
+| B-4      | Handling enquiry on report                       | G-12     | Existing security tools evaluation                             |
+| <b>C</b> | <b>Deep analysis</b>                             | G-13     | New security tools evaluation                                  |
+| C-1      | Forensic analysis                                | <b>H</b> | <b>Support of internal fraud response</b>                      |
+| C-2      | Malware sample analysis                          | H-1      | Internal fraud response and analysis support                   |
+| C-3      | Tracking and tracing                             | H-2      | Internal fraud detection and reoccurrence prevention support   |
+| C-4      | Forensic evidence collection                     | <b>I</b> | <b>Active relationship with external parties</b>               |
+| <b>D</b> | <b>Incident response</b>                         | I-1      | Awareness                                                      |
+| D-1      | Incident report acceptance                       | I-2      | Education and training                                         |
+| D-2      | Incident handling                                | I-3      | Security consulting                                            |
+| D-3      | Incident classification                          | I-4      | Security vendor collaboration                                  |
+| D-4      | Incident response and containment                | I-5      | Collaboration service with external security communities       |
+| D-5      | Incident recovery                                | I-6      | Technical reporting                                            |
+| D-6      | Incident notification                            | I-7      | Executive security reporting                                   |
+| D-7      | Incident response report                         |          |                                                                |
+| <b>E</b> | <b>Checking and evaluation</b>                   |          |                                                                |
+| E-1      | Network information collection                   |          |                                                                |
+| E-2      | Asset inventory                                  |          |                                                                |
+| E-3      | Vulnerability assessment                         |          |                                                                |
+| E-4      | Patch management                                 |          |                                                                |
+| E-5      | Penetration test                                 |          |                                                                |
+| E-6      | Defence capability against APT attack evaluation |          |                                                                |
+| E-7      | Handling capability on cyberattack evaluation    |          |                                                                |
+| E-8      | Policy compliance                                |          |                                                                |
+| E-9      | Hardening                                        |          |                                                                |
+
+# **Annex A**
+
+## **CDC service list with descriptions**
+
+(This annex forms an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+### **A.1 Category A: Strategic management of CDC**
+
+#### **A.1.1 A-1. Risk management**
+
+The risk management service is to achieve coordinated activities including A-2 to A-13 to direct and control an organization with regard to risk.
+
+#### **A.1.2 A-2. Risk assessment**
+
+The risk assessment service provides a snapshot of the risk level of an organization in terms of assets, threats and security measures.
+
+#### **A.1.3 A-3. Policy planning**
+
+The policy planning service is supporting all the activities of defining specific security policies, compiling the guidelines.
+
+#### **A.1.4 A-4. Policy management**
+
+The policy management service is to achieve periodic reviews for evaluation of policy and organization rules, to comply with new or external requirements (e.g., regulations and guidelines).
+
+#### **A.1.5 A-5. Business continuity**
+
+The business continuity service supports the operational functions necessary to ensure correct implementation and execution of the business continuity plan of an organization.
+
+#### **A.1.6 A-6. Business impact analysis**
+
+The business impact analysis service is to achieve a systematic assessment of the possible impacts resulting from various events or scenarios. This service helps organizations understand the scale of loss that could occur. It may cover not only direct financial loss, but also other impacts, such as loss of stakeholder confidence and reputational damage.
+
+#### **A.1.7 A-7. Resource management**
+
+The resource management service plans resources (personnel, budget, systems, etc.) to support security activities and allocates them appropriately to each service.
+
+#### **A.1.8 A-8. Security architecture design**
+
+The security architecture design service is to establish an architecture to secure the business. Development and maintenance of CDC platforms (category G) can be achieved by compiling various security measurements that consider system design and constraints of business processes (e.g., supply chain).
+
+#### **A.1.9 A-9. Triage criteria management**
+
+The triage criteria management service is to set specific triage (response priority) criteria for events (e.g., incidents, vulnerabilities found, threat information discovered) under the agreed scope in the overall policy.
+
+#### **A.1.10 A-10. Counter measures selection**
+
+The counter measures selection service is to support all activities of countermeasure selection for triage criteria (A-9) and of the best technologies with respect to all dispositions of security.
+
+#### **A.1.11 A-11. Quality management**
+
+The quality management service is to check problems in the quality of security activities, whether or not they have a negative impact for business (e.g., usability, productivity) over a period of time (e.g., one week or one month).
+
+#### **A.1.12 A-12. Security audit**
+
+The security audit service systematically and measurably audits how an organization implements security policies and controls at a specific site or time. CDC staff are indirectly involved in audit activities in order to provide necessary information and evidence of implemented state of controls.
+
+#### **A.1.13 A-13. Certification**
+
+The certification service supports activities necessary for an organization to conform to various standards and certification schemes.
+
+### **A.2 Category B: Real-time analysis**
+
+#### **A.2.1 B-1. Real time asset monitoring**
+
+The real-time asset monitoring service is to supervise and analyse systems status or suspicious activities from logs and network flows, and supporting triage as incident or event for gathering information needed.
+
+#### **A.2.2 B-2. Event data retention**
+
+The event data retention service collects and centrally stores events gathered in the process of security monitoring and analysis.
+
+#### **A.2.3 B-3. Alerting and warning**
+
+The alerting and warning service notifies the internal function involved of events that highlight potential risks to information assets (e.g., security devices alert, security bulletins, vulnerabilities and spreading threats).
+
+#### **A.2.4 B-4. Handling enquiry on report**
+
+The handling enquiry on report service is to respond to enquiries about data and reports regarding analysis.
+
+### **A.3 Category C: Deep analysis**
+
+#### **A.3.1 C-1. Forensic analysis**
+
+The forensic analysis service analyses digital evidence that is gathered from security assets and relates to an event to assist in determining what happened.
+
+#### **A.3.2 C-2. Malware sample analysis**
+
+The malware sample analysis service is to analyse malware, programs or scripts deployed by attackers that are found during each forensic process.
+
+#### **A.3.3 C-3. Tracking and tracing**
+
+The service is the capability of an organization to track and trace the source of any attacks on its infrastructures, which is a critical success factor to reduce further occurrences and prevent security incidents. An acknowledged ability to track and trace both internal and external attackers (e.g., cyber attribution) can pre-empt future attacks.
+
+#### **A.3.4 C-4. Forensic evidence collection**
+
+The forensic evidence collection service collects and conserves digital electronic evidence related to an assessed incident, and develops and maintains validity of evidence ("evidence chain of custody").
+
+### **A.4 Category D: Incident response**
+
+#### **A.4.1 D-1. Incident report acceptance**
+
+The incident report acceptance service is to receive analytical reports of operations. However, it may receive reports from another organization within the company or from an outside organization.
+
+#### **A.4.2 D-2. Incident handling**
+
+The incident handling service is to deal with accepted incidents and coordinates activities including D-3 to D-7.
+
+#### **A.4.3 D-3. Incident classification**
+
+The incident classification service is to classify an incident to contribute to a common understanding of the types of incident that occur and what causes them.
+
+#### **A.4.4 D-4. Incident response and containment**
+
+The incident response and containment service is to contain an incident before it spreads through all resources and increases the damage to or impact on them.
+
+#### **A.4.5 D-5. Incident recovery**
+
+The incident recovery service is to support the restoration of the functionality of a target to its normal system operability.
+
+#### **A.4.6 D-6. Incident notification**
+
+The incident notification service is to communicate the occurrence of an incident to incident response teams and other concerned groups.
+
+#### **A.4.7 D-7. Incident response report**
+
+The incident response report service is to achieve the completion and distribution of the report of a closed incident response (if countermeasure efforts are protracted, it will be handed over to the strategic management of CDC (category A)). If CDC staff need a report of current status during handling of an incident, this service distributes an interim report.
+
+### **A.5 Category E: Checking and evaluation**
+
+#### **A.5.1 E-1. Network information collection**
+
+The network information collection service is to receive an overview of the network configuration that is to be protected.
+
+#### **A.5.2 E-2. Asset inventory**
+
+The asset inventory service is to achieve information management relevant to the census of systems, assets and applications that constitute the overall business infrastructure within the scope of CDC support.
+
+#### **A.5.3 E-3. Vulnerability assessment**
+
+The vulnerability assessment service is to examine networks, systems and applications to identify vulnerabilities, determines how they can be exploited and recommends how the risks can be mitigated.
+
+#### **A.5.4 E-4. Patch management**
+
+The patch management service is to support the installation of any security patches required, while the availability of information technology (IT) service is maintained.
+
+#### **A.5.5 E-5. Penetration test**
+
+The penetration test service is to reveal security vulnerabilities that could be exploited by attackers and highlights possible methods of compromise (e.g., threat-led penetration test).
+
+#### **A.5.6 E-6. Defence capability against ATP attack evaluation**
+
+The defence capability against advanced persistent threat (ATP) attack evaluation service is to measure the resistance of an organization to targeted attacks while conducting targeted email training and social engineering tests.
+
+#### **A.5.7 E-7. Handling capability on cyberattack evaluation**
+
+The handling capability on cyber-attack evaluation service is to confirm whether actual security response activities based on a scenario that assumes an attack has occurred can be activated and whether the incident can be brought to an end without delay (called a cyber-attack response exercise).
+
+#### **A.5.8 E-8. Policy compliance**
+
+The policy compliance service is to support the verification of conformity to and compliance with predefined security policies.
+
+#### **A.5.9 E-9. Hardening**
+
+The hardening service is to optimize IT component configuration to identify, evaluate and apply systems security configurations, and to mitigate or eliminate the risk of attacks.
+
+### **A.6 Category F: Collection, analysis and evaluation threat intelligence**
+
+#### **A.6.1 F-1. Post-mortem analysis**
+
+The post-mortem analysis service describes resolution of an incident to ensure review and improvement of the processes and tools for CDC staff.
+
+#### **A.6.2 F-2. Internal threat intelligence collection and analysis**
+
+The internal threat intelligence collection and analysis service is to gather information (internal intelligence) on real-time analysis and incident response.
+
+#### **A.6.3 F-3. External threat intelligence collection and evaluation**
+
+The external threat intelligence collection and evaluation service is to gather information (external intelligence), such as new vulnerabilities, attack trends, malware behaviour and malignant Internet protocol addresses or domain information.
+
+#### **A.6.4 F-4. Threat intelligence report**
+
+The threat intelligence report service is to compile internal and external threat information and document it, including all details.
+
+#### **A.6.5 F-5. Threat intelligence utilization**
+
+The threat intelligence utilization service is to achieve compilation and dissemination of threat information for all categories of security response.
+
+### **A.7 Category G: Development and maintenance of CDC platforms**
+
+#### **A.7.1 G-1. Security architecture implementation**
+
+The security architecture implementation service is to implement the security architecture designed by strategic management of CDC (category A) by using assets.
+
+#### **A.7.2 G-2. Basic operation for network security asset**
+
+The basic operation for network security asset service is to operate network devices, such as firewalls, intrusion detection system/intrusion prevention system (IDS/IPS), web application firewall (WAF) and proxies.
+
+#### **A.7.3 G-3. Advanced operation for network security asset**
+
+The advanced operation for network security asset service is to create custom signatures of an organization for products with attack detection capabilities, such as IDS/IPS and WAF, and applies them if the signature provided by the vendor is insufficient.
+
+#### **A.7.4 G-4. Basic operation for endpoint security asset**
+
+The basic operation for endpoint security asset service is to operate countermeasure products, such as anti-virus software, at endpoints.
+
+#### **A.7.5 G-5. Advanced operation for endpoint security asset**
+
+The advanced operation for endpoint security asset service is to detect suspicious program activity within the endpoint using its protection product, and collects and analyses registry status, process execution, etc. If needed, the service establishes customised indicators of compromise to enable endpoint detection.
+
+#### **A.7.6 G-6. Basic operation for cloud security products**
+
+The basic operation for cloud security products service is to operate security services in a cloud.
+
+#### **A.7.7 G-7. Advanced operation for cloud security products**
+
+The advanced operation for cloud security products service is to create custom signatures of an organization for security services in a cloud with attack detection capabilities. If the signature provided by a vendor is insufficient, the service applies custom signatures.
+
+#### **A.7.8 G-8. Deep analysis tool operation**
+
+The deep analysis tool operation service is to operate tools used in deep analysis, such as digital forensics and malware analysis.
+
+#### **A.7.9 G-9. Basic operation for analysis platform**
+
+The basic operation for analysis platform service is to operate analytical infrastructure that stores the log data required and enables the analysis to be performed routinely, mainly in real-time analysis, such as security information and event management (SIEM).
+
+#### **A.7.10 G-10. Advanced operation for analysis platform**
+
+The advanced operation for analysis platform service is to achieve more detailed and accurate analysis using the organization's own systems to retain system logs and packet capture data that commercial SIEMs cannot capture, and develops customized analysis algorithms and logic for these data, as well as the system.
+
+#### **A.7.11 G-11. Operates CDC systems**
+
+The operates CDC systems service is to operate systems that perform the tasks required for security response operations, such as the various security response tools previously described, the production of various reports, the response to enquiries, and the vulnerability management system.
+
+#### **A.7.12 G-12. Existing security tools evaluation**
+
+The existing security tools evaluation service is to verify the impact on other systems and operations, mainly in terms of availability, when upgrading or changing the settings of existing security-enabled tools.
+
+#### **A.7.13 G-13. New security tools evaluation**
+
+The new security tools evaluation service is to design and install new security assets, if new measures are needed in security activities.
+
+### **A.8 Category H: Support of internal fraud response**
+
+#### **A.8.1 H-1. Internal fraud response and analysis support**
+
+The internal fraud response and analysis support service is to support the organization responding to internal fraud when it is discovered, by organizing its activities from the logs collected by the security activities.
+
+#### **A.8.2 H-2. Internal fraud detection and reoccurrence prevention support**
+
+The internal fraud detection and reoccurrence prevention support service is to analyse the details of internal fraudulent activities that have been discovered, and considers whether it is possible to detect them from the logs, and if so, implements the detection logic.
+
+### **A.9 Category I: Active relationship with external parties**
+
+#### **A.9.1 I-1. Awareness**
+
+The awareness service is to precisely create awareness for the relevant staff across and in relation to the CDC, promotes the utilization of the correct tools, best practice, policies and resources to ensure protection of the business assets.
+
+#### **A.9.2 I-2. Education and training**
+
+The education and training service is to support specialized training activities in the areas of security for staff in the organizations that the CDC supports.
+
+#### **A.9.3 I-3. Security consulting**
+
+The security consulting service provides consultancy services to the various business functions with regards to security.
+
+#### **A.9.4 I-4. Security vendor collaboration**
+
+The security vendor collaboration service is to build a direct line of communication with the provider of a security product or service purchased, requests a response to any deficiencies found in the security response and exchanges positive feedback on areas for improvement.
+
+#### **A.9.5 I-5. Collaboration service with external security communities**
+
+The collaboration service with external security communities is to exchange information proactively by participating in external communities. Such information can reflect on the security activities.
+
+#### **A.9.6 I-6. Technical reporting**
+
+The technical reporting service is to provide reports of the results of monitoring and management activities. These activities help to show the security level of systems and IT infrastructure.
+
+#### **A.9.7 I-7. Executive security reporting**
+
+The executive security reporting service is to produce periodic reports and statistical analysis to top management to highlight the security level and indicators of operational performance of an organization.
+
+# **Bibliography**
+
+- [b-ITU-T X.1053] Recommendation ITU-T X.1053 (2017), *Code of practice for information security controls based on ITU-T X.1051 for small and medium-sized telecommunication organizations.*
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+|                 |                                                                                                                                                           |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A        | Organization of the work of ITU-T                                                                                                                         |
+| Series D        | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues                                                       |
+| Series E        | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors                                                                         |
+| Series F        | Non-telephone telecommunication services                                                                                                                  |
+| Series G        | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks                                                                                              |
+| Series H        | Audiovisual and multimedia systems                                                                                                                        |
+| Series I        | Integrated services digital network                                                                                                                       |
+| Series J        | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals                                                               |
+| Series K        | Protection against interference                                                                                                                           |
+| Series L        | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M        | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance                                                                                       |
+| Series N        | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits                                                                           |
+| Series O        | Specifications of measuring equipment                                                                                                                     |
+| Series P        | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks                                                                              |
+| Series Q        | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests                                                                                           |
+| Series R        | Telegraph transmission                                                                                                                                    |
+| Series S        | Telegraph services terminal equipment                                                                                                                     |
+| Series T        | Terminals for telematic services                                                                                                                          |
+| Series U        | Telegraph switching                                                                                                                                       |
+| Series V        | Data communication over the telephone network                                                                                                             |
+| <b>Series X</b> | <b>Data networks, open system communications and security</b>                                                                                             |
+| Series Y        | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities                               |
+| Series Z        | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems                                                                                      |