Themes for Black: attacking the e4- and c4-pawns, d6–d5 and f7–f5 breaks, queenside play with ...a7–a5–a4.


The wall is yet another structure that leaves Black with a d-pawn weakness, but prevents White from taking control of the center and gives Black active piece play and an opportunity to play on either side of the board.


Openings: Primary: King's Indian, Pirc, Philidor. Other: Benoni, Ruy Lopez (Spanish), Trompowsky, English, Italian Game, Four Knights Game (Scotch variation)


Character: Closed game with opposite side activity.


Themes for White: Massive queenside space advantage, c2–c4–c5 break (optionally prepared with b2–b4), prophylaxis with ...g2–g4 (after f2–f3), f2–f4 break.


Themes for Black: kingside attack, f7–f5 break, g7–g5–g4 break (after f2–f3), c7–c6 break, prophylaxis with ...c6–c5 or ...c7–c5 transposing to a full Benoni formation.


The chain arises from a variety of openings but most commonly in the heavily analyzed King's Indian Classical variation. The theme is a race for a breakthrough on opposite flanks – Black must try to whip up a kingside attack before White's penetrate with devastating effect on the c-file. The position was thought to strongly favor White until a seminal game (Taimanov–Najdorf 1953) where Black introduced the maneuver ...Rf8–f7, ...Bg7–f8, ...Rf7–g7. When the chain arises in the Ruy Lopez, play is much slower with tempo being of little value and featuring piece maneuvering by both sides, Black focusing on the c7–c6 break and White often trying to play on the kingside with the f2–f4 break.


Openings: Primary: French. Other: Nimzowitsch, Trompowsky, Caro–Kann, Bogo-Indian, London System, Colle System, Sicilian (Rossolimo, Alapin, Closed, O'Kelly), Nimzo–Larsen Attack (colors reversed).


Themes for White: kingside mating attack, f2–f4–f5 break.


Themes for Black: Exchanging the hemmed-in queen's bishop, c7–c5 and f7–f6 breaks.


Due to White's kingside space advantage and development advantage, Black must generate counterplay or be mated. Novices often lose to the sparkling Greek gift sacrifice. Attacking the head of the pawn chain with ...f7–f6 is seen as frequently as attacking its base, because it is harder for White to defend the head of the chain than in the d5 chain. In response to exf6, Black accepts a backward e6-pawn in exchange for freeing their position (the b8–h2 diagonal and the semi-open f-file) and the possibility of a further e6–e5 break. If White exchanges with d4xc5 it is called the Wedge formation. White gets an outpost on d4 and the possibility of exploiting the dark squares while Black gets an overextended e5 pawn to work on.


Openings: Primary: Modern Benoni, Queen's Indian Defence, King's Indian Defence Modern Defence, Ruy Lopez, Italian Game. Other: Trompowsky, Ruy Lopez (colors reversed), Italian Game (colors reversed), Réti Opening (colors reversed), King's Indian Attack (colors reversed), Sicilian Defence (Moscow, Rossolimo).


Themes for White: Central pawn majority, e4–e5 break.


Openings: Primary: Giuoco Piano. Other: French (Steiner, Exchange), Ruy Lopez (Berlin), Petrov, King's English, French (colors reversed), Sicilian Alapin (colors reversed).


Themes for Black: Blockading the isolani, trading pieces for a favorable endgame.


Openings: Primary: Queen's Gambit. Other: French, Sicilian Alapin, Symmetrical English, Caro–Kann, Nimzo-Indian, Slav.


Themes for White: d4–d5 break, sacrifice of the isolani, outpost on e5, kingside attack.


The isolani leads to lively play revolving around the d5-square. If Black can clamp down on the pawn, their positional strengths and threat of exchanges give them the advantage. If not, the threat of the d4–d5 break is ever-present, and the isolani can sometimes be sacrificed to unleash the potential of White's pieces, enabling White to whip up a whirlwind attack. Garry Kasparov is famous for the speculative d4–d5 sacrifice.


Openings: Primary: Queen's Gambit Declined. Other: Queen's Indian Defense, Symmetrical English, Sicilian (Alapin).


Themes for White: Line opening advance in the center, kingside attack.


Themes for Black: Forcing a pawn advance and blockading the pair, conversion to isolani.


Like the isolani, the are a structural weakness but with them usually comes increased piece activity to compensate. The play revolves around Black trying to force one of the pawns to advance. If Black can establish a permanent blockade the game is positionally won. On the other hand, White aims to keep the pawns hanging, trying to generate a kingside attack leveraging off of their superior center control. Other themes for White include tactical possibilities and line opening breaks in the center.


Openings: Primary: Queen's Gambit Declined. Other: Caro–Kann (colors reversed), Colle System (colors reversed), London System (colors reversed).


Themes for White: Minority attack, e3–e4 break.


Themes for Black: e4 outpost, kingside attack.


Openings: Primary: Queen's Gambit Declined, Caro–Kann. Other: Alekhine Defense, QGD Tarrasch Defense (colors reversed), Symmetrical English, Symmetrical English (colors reversed).


Themes for White: Exploiting the dark squares, d6 outpost; queenside majority in the endgame, with an advanced pawn.


Themes for Black: e4 outpost, kingside attack, White's overextended pawn, e6–e5 and b7–b5 breaks.


Openings: Primary: Dutch Defense. Other: Colle System, Bird's Opening (with colors reversed).


Themes: Exchanging the bad bishop, e4/e5 outposts, breaks on the c and g files.


Players must carefully consider how to recapture on the e4/e5-square, since it alters the symmetric pawn formation and creates strategic subtleties.


Openings: Primary: English, Dutch, King's Indian Attack. Other: Sicilian (Closed, Moscow), Vienna Game, Bishop's Opening.


Themes: Exchanging the bad bishop, d4/d5 outposts, breaks on the b- and f-files.


This structure appears in one of Botvinnik's treatments of the English. Players must carefully consider how to recapture on the d4/d5-square, since it alters the symmetric pawn formation and creates strategic subtleties. Adding the typical White fianchetto of the king's bishop to this structure provides significant pressure along the long diagonal, and usually prepares the f2–f4–f5 break.


Openings: Primary: Closed Sicilian, Closed English (colors reversed).


Themes for White: kingside pawn storm, c2–c3 and d3–d4 break.


Themes for Black: queenside pawn storm, a1–h8 diagonal.


In chess, doubled pawns are two pawns of the same color residing on the same file. Pawns can become doubled only when one pawn captures onto a file on which another friendly pawn resides. In the diagram, the white pawns on the b-file and e-file are doubled. The pawns on the are doubled and isolated.


In most cases, doubled pawns are considered a weakness due to their inability to defend each other. This inability, in turn, makes it more difficult to achieve a breakthrough which could create a passed pawn (often a deciding factor in endgames). In the case of isolated doubled pawns, these problems are only further aggravated. Several chess strategies and openings are based on burdening the opponent with doubled pawns, a strategic weakness.


There are, however, cases where accepting doubled pawns can be advantageous because doing so may open up a file for a rook, or because the doubled pawns perform a useful function, such as defending important squares. Also, if the opponent is unable to effectively attack the pawns, their inherent weakness may be of little or no consequence. There are also a number of openings that accept doubled pawns in exchange for some prevailing advantage, such as the Two Knights Variation of Alekhine's Defence.


It is possible to have tripled pawns (or more). The diagram shows a position from Lubomir Kavalek–Bobby Fischer, Sousse Interzonal 1967. The pawns remained tripled at the end of the game on move 28 (a draw).


Quadrupled pawns occurred in the game Alexander Alekhine–Vladimir Nenarokov, 1907, in John van der Wiel–Vlastimil Hort, 1981, and in other games. The longest lasting case of quadrupled pawns was in the game Kovacs–Barth, Balatonbereny 1994, lasting 23 moves. The final position was drawn, demonstrating the weakness of the extra pawns (see diagram).


There are different types of doubled pawns (see diagram). A doubled pawn is weak because of four considerations:


The doubled pawns on the b-file are in the best situation, the f-file pawns are next. The h-file pawns are in the worst situation because two pawns are held back by one opposing pawn, so the second pawn has little value . See Chess piece relative value for more discussion.


In chess, a half-open file (or semi-open file) is a with pawns of only one color. The half-open file can provide a line of attack for a player's rook or queen. A half-open file is generally exploited by the player with no pawns on it.


Many openings, such as the Sicilian Defense, aim to complicate the position. In the main line Sicilian, 1.e4 c5 2.Nf3 d6 (or 2...e6, or 2...Nc6) 3.d4 cxd4 4.Nxd4, White obtains a half-open d-file, but Black can pressure White along the half-open c-file.


In positions where White has no pawns on a file but Black has one pawn or more on that file, the position is considered to be half-opened for white. During instances where Black has zero pawns on a file but White has one or more pawns on that file, the position is considered to be half-opened for black.


In such instances where pawns capture or advance, in a way that it opens or half-opens a file or files, this instance is called a pawn break.


The demolition of the pawn structure is a common theme in positions with half-open files, since doubled pawns or isolated pawns may create half-open files.


The game Loek van Wely–Judit Polgár, Hoogeveen, 1997 demonstrates the power of half-open files in attacks. Despite having one fewer pawn than White, Black's possession of two powerful half-open files (her rook on the f-file and queen on the g-file) gives her a winning advantage (see diagram).


and White resigned, anticipating 31.Rxf2 Qxg3+ 32.Kf1 Qxf2.


The Brazilian Defense, also known as Camara Defense or Gunderam Defense, is a chess defense that starts with the moves:


Followed by moves ...g6, ...Bg7 and ...Nf6, creating the typical King's Indian formation.


It was created by International Master Hélder Câmara, who played it for the first time in 1954, in the IV Centennial of the City of São Paulo Tournament and the XXII Brazilian Chess Championship. It became popular among Brazilian players, being employed in the top national competition every year, so much so that they begun calling it "Brazilian Defense". Hélder Câmara also used it in other important chess events, such as the South American Zonal in 1972 (where he attained his International Master title), the Netanya-A International Chess Tournament (Israel) in 1973, and the XLII e XLIII Brazilian Chess Championships, in 1975 and 1976, respectively.


In 1969, a work dedicated to its analysis called "Notas Sobre a Defesa Brasileira" ("Annotations on the Brazilian Defense") was published.


According to its creator, this defense was envisioned as an attempt to use the King's Indian Defense against the King's Pawn opening.


The first official use of the Brazilian Defense was in a game between Manoel Madeira de Ley (white) and Hélder Câmara (black) during the fourth round of the IV Centennial of the City of São Paulo Tournament, on October 19, 1954.


In the game of chess, prophylaxis (Greek προφύλαξις, "prophylaxis," "guarding or preventing beforehand") or a "prophylactic move" is a move that stops the opponent from taking action in a certain area for fear of some type of reprisal. Prophylactic moves are aimed at not just improving one's position, but preventing the opponent from improving their own. Perhaps the most common prophylactic idea is the advance of the near a castled king to make luft averting the possibility of a back rank checkmate, or to prevent pins.


In a more strategic sense, prophylaxis leads to a very , often frustrating for players with a strong tactical orientation. Players who play in the prophylactic style prevent the initiation of tactical play by threatening unpleasant consequences. One of the largest advantages of this approach is that it keeps risk to a minimum while causing an overaggressive opponent to lose patience and make a mistake. The disadvantage is that it frequently fails against an opponent who is content with a draw.


Any move that prevents an opponent from threatening something can be called prophylactic, even if this word would not be used to describe the player's style. For example, Mikhail Tal and Garry Kasparov frequently played the move h3 in the Ruy Lopez—a prophylactic move intended to prevent Black from playing ...Bg4 and creating an irritating pin on the knight at f3—yet neither player would ever be described as playing in the prophylactic style. All grandmasters make use of prophylaxis in one way or another.


Advanced prophylactic play cannot usually be employed by novice players. However, many standard and widespread opening moves can be considered prophylactic.


The board above shows a common tactical position. White is looking for Nf7, resulting in a fork on the queen and rook, guaranteeing a material advantage - as the king cannot take the knight as it is defended by the bishop. In response, black plays h6, denying the knight of the g5 square, thus anticipating the attack.


Pawn moves such as h6 or a6 don't require such an immediate threat in order to be played. They can often be played as recreational moves to stop tactics of bishops or knights occupying the g5/b5 squares entirely. Bishops have incentive to be played on these squares as it results in pins on the queen and king respectively - forcing the knight to stay stationary.


The aim of this strategy is to put immediate pressure on the opponent with the intent of ending points quickly. Good returns must be made, or else the server can gain the advantage. This tactic is especially useful on fast courts (e.g. grass courts) and less so on slow courts (e.g. clay courts). For it to be successful, the player must either have a good serve to expose an opponent's poor return or be exceptionally quick and confident in movement around the net to produce an effective returning volley. Ken Rosewall, for instance, had a feeble serve but was a very successful serve-and-volley player for two decades. Goran Ivanišević, on the other hand, had success employing the serve-and-volley strategy with great serves and average volleys.


In the mid-1950s, when Pancho Gonzales was dominating professional tennis with his serve-and-volley game, occasional brief attempts were made to partially negate the power of his serve. This, it was felt, would lead to longer rallies and more spectator interest. At least three times the rules were modified:


Other male tennis players known for their serve-and-volley technique include Pancho Segura, Frank Sedgman, Ken Rosewall, Lew Hoad, Rod Laver, Roy Emerson, John McEnroe, Stefan Edberg, Pat Cash, Boris Becker, Patrick Rafter, Pete Sampras and Tim Henman. Sampras, despite being known for his great serve and volley game, did not always come to the net behind the serve on slower courts, particularly on the second serve. This was especially the case when he was younger.


Although the strategy has become less common in both the men's and women's game, a few players still prefer to approach the net on their serves in the twenty-first century. Examples of players who employ serve-and-volley as the chief style of play include: Feliciano López, Nicolas Mahut, Rajeev Ram, Ivo Karlović, Dustin Brown, Pierre-Hugues Herbert, Sergiy Stakhovsky, Łukasz Kubot, Leander Paes, and Mischa Zverev.


Other players, despite not being pure serve-and-volleyers, do employ serve-and-volley as a surprise tactic. Examples include Roger Federer, Rafael Nadal, and Daniil Medvedev.


On the women's side, serve-and-volley has become almost extinct at the very top level. Hsieh Su-wei is the only active notable (WTA elite) player that prefers to play with this style.


Some of the most interesting matches of all time according to Pat Cash have pitted great baseliners such as Björn Borg, Mats Wilander or Andre Agassi against great serve-and-volleyers such as John McEnroe, Pat Rafter or Pete Sampras. Since Tilden's time, head-to-head results on various surfaces, such as those played out in the famous rivalry between Borg and McEnroe, contradict his theory that great baseline players will tend to defeat great serve-and-volley ones.


Despite the improvements in racquet technology made towards the end of the twentieth century which made serve-and-volley a rarer tool in a tennis player's skill set, players familiar with the strategy still advocate it. Roger Federer advocated up-and-coming players not to ignore the tactic's strategy of coming to the net, especially on faster surfaces and as a surprise tactic. Yet other players, such as Mischa Zverev, acknowledged the difficulty of mastering serve-and-volley, recalling his 36-month effort to adopt the style. He said: "Every point, you have to be ready. You're either going to get passed, you're going to miss an easy volley or you're going to win the point," and likened it to the stochastic nature of flipping a coin.


Players use different tennis strategies to enhance their own strengths and exploit their opponent's weaknesses in order to gain the advantage and win more points.


Players typically specialize or naturally play in a certain way, based on what they can do best. Based on their style, players generally fit into one of three types, "baseliners", "volleyers", "all-court players". Many players have attributes of all three categories but, at times, may also focus on just one style based on the surface, or on the condition, or on the opponent.


A "baseliner" plays from the back of the tennis court, around/behind/within the baseline, preferring to hit groundstrokes, allowing themselves more time to react to their opponent's shots, rather than to come up to the net (except in certain situations).


A "volleyer" plays nearer towards the net, preferring to hit volleys, allowing less time for their opponent to react to their shots, rather than to stay/play from further back on the tennis court (except in certain situations).


"All-court players" fall somewhere in between, employing both "baseliner" strategies and "volleyer" strategies depending on the situations.


A player's weaknesses may also determine strategy. For example, most players have a stronger forehand, therefore they will favor the forehand even to the point of "running around" a backhand to hit a forehand.


While they tend to make relatively few errors because they do not attempt the complicated and ambitious shots of the aggressive baseliner, the effective counterpuncher must be able to periodically execute an aggressive shot, either using the pace given by their opponent or using precision and angle. Speed and agility are key for the counterpuncher, as well as a willingness to patiently chase down every ball to frustrate opponents. Returning every aggressive shot that the opponent provides is often the cause of further errors due to the effort required in trying increasingly harder and better shots. However, it is noted that for some faster players, including Gaël Monfils, Gilles Simon, Lleyton Hewitt and Andy Murray, standing too deep behind the court can hinder their attacking abilities.


At lower levels, the defensive counter-puncher often frustrates their opponent so much that they may try to change their style of play due to ineffective baseline results. At higher levels, the all-court player or aggressive baseliner is usually able to execute winners with higher velocity and better placement, taking the counterpuncher out of the point as early as possible.


Most counter-punchers often excel on slow courts, such as clay. The court gives them extra time to chase down shots and it is harder for opponents to create winners. However, some counter-punchers who have the ability to mix up their game and turn defense into offense, like Lleyton Hewitt, Andy Murray and Agnieszka Radwanska have excelled on faster courts like hard and grass as well as slower courts. Counter-punchers are often particularly strong players at low-level play, where opponents cannot make winners with regularity.


A serve and volleyer has a great net game, is quick around the net, and has fine touch for volleys. "Serve and volleyers" come up to the net at every opportunity when serving. They are almost always attackers and can hit many "winners" with varieties of volleys and drop volleys. When not serving, they often employ the "chip-and-charge", chipping back the serve without attempting to hit a winner and rushing the net. The serve-and-volleyers' strategy is to put pressure on the opponent to try to hit difficult passing shots. This strategy is extremely effective against pushers.


Bill Tilden, the dominant player of the 1920s, preferred to play from the back of the court, and liked nothing better than to face an opponent who rushed the net – one way or another Tilden would find a way to hit the ball past him. In his book Match Play and the Spin of the Ball, Tilden propounds the theory that "by definition" a great baseline player will always beat a great serve-and-volleyer. Some of the best matches of all time have pitted great baseliners such as Björn Borg, Mats Wilander or Andre Agassi against great serve-and-volleyers such as John McEnroe, Boris Becker, Stefan Edberg, or Pete Sampras.


Some players, such as Tommy Haas, Roger Federer and Andy Roddick will only employ this strategy on grass courts or as a surprise tactic on any surface. Roger Federer uses this commonly against Rafael Nadal, to break up long rallies and physically taxing games.


All-court players, or all-rounders, have aspects of every tennis style, whether that be offensive baseliner, defensive counter-puncher or serve-and-volleyer. All-court players use the best bits from each style and mix it together to create a truly formidable tennis style to play against. In game situations they are very versatile; when an all-court player's baseline game is not working, he/she may switch to a net game, and vice versa. All-court players have the ability to adjust to different opponents that play different styles more easily than pure baseliners or serve and volleyers. All-court players typically have the speed, determination and fitness of a defensive counter-puncher, the confidence, skill and flair of offensive baseliners and have the touch, the agility around the net and tactical thinking of the serve-and-volleyer.


However, just because the all-court player has a combination of skills used by all tennis styles does not necessarily mean that they can beat an offensive baseliner or a defensive counter-puncher or even a serve-and-volleyer. It just means it would be more difficult to read the game of an all-court player.


Perfect examples for all-rounders are Boris Becker or Pete Sampras in men's singles and Daniela Hantuchova or Martina Hingis in women's singles.


Holding serve is crucial in tennis. To hold serve, serves must be accurately placed, and a high priority should be placed on first serve percentage. In addition, the velocity of serve is important. A weak serve can be easily attacked by an aggressive returner. The first ball after the serve is also key. Players should serve in order to get a weak return and keep the opponent on the defense with that first shot. For example, following a wide serve, it is ideal to hit the opponent's return to the open court.


There are three different types of serves and each one of them can be used in different situations. One type of serve is the serve with slice. The slice serve works better when the player tosses the ball to the right and immediately hits the outer-right part of the ball. This serve is best used when you hit it wide so you get your opponent off the court.


Another type is the kick serve. To achieve a good execution, the player must toss the ball above the head and immediately spin the bottom-left part of the ball. Since the ball is tossed above the head, it is necessary for the player to arch correctly under the ball. This serve is best used as second serve because the amount of spin that is added to the ball makes it very safe. The kick serve is also effective when a change of rhythm is needed or when the opponent struggles with the high bounce that results from the effect.


A third type of serve is the flat one. To execute this serve, the player must toss the ball right in front and immediately hit the middle-top part of the ball. This is usually a very hard serve and therefore risky. However, if the flat serve is executed with enough power and precision, it can turn into a great weapon to win points faster.


Though strategy is important in singles, it is even more important in doubles. The additional width of the alleys on the doubles court has a great effect on the angles possible in doubles play. Consequently, doubles is known as a game of angles.


The ideal is both-up strategy, often called "Attacking Doubles" because the net is the "high ground", and the both-up strategy puts both players close to it, in a position to score because of their excellent vantage points and angles. A team in the both-up formation, however, is vulnerable to a good lob from either opponent at any time. To be successful with Attacking Doubles, teams must have effective serves and penetrating volleys to prevent good lobs and good overhead shots to put away poor returns.


Teams that play attacking doubles try to get into the both-up formation on every point. When serving, their server follows most first serves to the net and some second serves. As a result, attacking doubles is also called "serve-and-volley doubles". When receiving, their receiver follows most second-service returns to the net.


At the professional level, attacking doubles is the standard, though slowly degrading, strategy of choice.


At lower levels of the game, not all players have penetrating volleys and strong overhead shots. So, many use up-and-back strategy. The weakness in this formation is the large angular gap it creates between partners, a gap that an opposing net player can easily hit a clean winner through if they successfully poach a passing shot.


Nonetheless, up-and-back strategy is versatile, with elements of both offense and defense. In fact, since the server must begin each point at the baseline and the receiver must be far enough back to return the serve, virtually every point in doubles begins with both teams in this formation.


Teams without net games strong enough to play Attacking Doubles can still play both-up when they have their opponents on the defensive. To achieve this, a team would patiently play up-and-back for a chance to hit a forcing shot and bring their baseliner to the net.


Australian Doubles and the I-Formation are variations of up-and-back strategy. In Australian doubles, the server's partner at net lines up on the same side of the court, fronting the opposing net player, who serves as a poaching block and blind. The receiver then must return serve down the line and is liable to have that return poached. In the I-Formation, the server's net partner lines up in the center, between the server and receiver so he or she can poach in either direction. Both Australian Doubles and the I-Formation are poaching formations that can also be used to start the point for serve-and-volley doubles.


Both-back strategy is strictly defensive. It is normally seen only when the opposing team is both-up or when the returner is passing the net player on the return. This might be a good tactic when the opponent has a serve with a lot of pressure and an aggressive player at the net. From here the defenders can return the most forcing shots till they get a chance to hit a good lob or an offensive shot. If their opponents at net become impatient and try to angle the ball away when a baseliner can reach it, the defender can turn the tables and score outright. However this strategy leaves the volley court open to drop shots from the opposition.


In baseball, a first-pitch strike is when the pitcher throws a strike to the batter during the first pitch of the at bat. Statistics indicate that throwing a strike on the first pitch allows the pitcher to gain an advantage in the at bat, limiting the hitter's chance of getting on base.


With the continued interest and development of statistics in the game of baseball, first-pitch strikes have been under the microscope of many fans and sabermetricians (those who study the game based on evidence, mainly stats that measure game activity). Many studies have proven that the first pitch in the at bat is the most important one. And according to Craig Burley's 2004 study in The Hardball Times, throwing a strike on a 0-0 count could potentially save over 12,000 runs scored in a single Major League Baseball season.


In Burley's study, he used stats from the 2003 MLB season. He found that when a pitcher throws a strike on the first pitch of the at bat, hitters collected a .261 batting average. But if the first pitch was a ball, their batting average jumped to .280, a substantial difference.


From Burley, "Let's imagine that we have two pitchers, both of whom are otherwise perfectly average but one of whom always throws a strike on the first pitch, while the other always throws a ball. The first pitcher, the "strike one" pitcher, has an expected ERA (earned run average) of about 3.60. The second one, the otherwise perfectly average one who always throws a ball on pitch one, has an expected ERA of about 5.50. He'll also pitch about 12% fewer innings (without taking into account the higher pitch counts that would result from starting 1-0)."


While there are some players in the game who are notorious for swinging at the first pitch, Burley's study proved that there is little risk in jumping ahead early in the count. Less than 8 percent of first-pitch strikes turn into base hits.


After that it becomes even more difficult for the hitter. Once a pitcher gets to a 0-1 count, hitters hit just .239 against him from there on out.


The Minnesota Twins franchise has taken the idea of command and first-pitch strikes to a new level. Considered a small-market team, the Twins needed to find any advantage they could to keep pace with the larger franchises.


Twins pitchers are taught from the very beginning to get ahead in the count, throwing first-pitch strikes as often as possible. In training camp, pitchers who collect the most first-pitch strikes are given free dinner or other rewards.


The scouts and coaches throughout the organization are trained to look for pitchers with consistent arm slots and deliveries, allowing them to spot young players who will harness the command that the franchise looks for.


As a team, the Twins haven’t ranked outside the top five in fewest walks allowed since 1996, and they’ve been first or second in that category in nine of the past 13 seasons.


Former Minnesota pitcher Brad Radke became the poster boy for first-pitch strikes, and his rate of 1.63 walks per nine innings ranks 32nd in baseball history.


Minnesota has become of the most successful small-market teams in the game, and as the Twins opened their new stadium, Target Field, for the 2010 season, their payroll ($97.5 million) ranked 11th among 30 big league clubs, a sign of how far the franchise has come and a testament to the importance of throwing first-pitch strikes.


"It stems from a manifesto we put together way back in the day: As a small-market club, how are you going to get an edge? We believe that command and control and makeup are true separators in the pitching category."—Twins scouting director Mike Radcliff told ESPN's Jerry Crasnick in May, 2010.


Despite this lip service, however, the Twins have been below-average in the frequency with which they throw first-pitch strikes over the last three seasons.


Following the 2009 season, a contributor to FederalBaseball.com (an unofficial Washington Nationals blog) collected data to compare first-pitch strike percentages to earned run averages. The results indicated that there was a correlation between the two statistics, and pitchers who harnessed a higher first-pitch strike percentage often carried a lower ERA.


Of the starting pitchers with the 20 lowest ERAs in 2009, 16 of them had above-average first-pitch strike percentages. The contributor created a graph to plot the results. To view the graph, click here.


When viewing the graph, keep in mind:


The chart includes two dashed orange lines. The ERA line is at 4.20, which was the 2009 National League average. The first-pitch strike line is at the MLB average 58.13 percent.


In the upper-left corner are pitchers with higher than average first-pitch strike percentages and lower than average ERAs. In the bottom-left corner are pitchers with lower than average first-pitch strike percentages and lower than average ERAs.


According to FanGraphs.com, as of Aug. 11, 2010, the three starting pitchers with the highest first-pitch strike percentages were Cliff Lee (70.8 percent), Carl Pavano (68 percent), and Roy Halladay (67.6 percent). Pavano (3.28) had the highest ERA of the three, with Halladay and Lee both carrying ERAs below 2.50.


Starting pitchers throughout the league have acknowledged that throwing first-pitch strikes gives them a better chance for success.


Daniel Hudson, a 23-year-old starting pitcher for the Arizona Diamondbacks told FoxSports.com on Aug. 6, 2010 that throwing first-pitch strikes has aided in his increased performance.


After a winning start in which he threw first-pitch strikes to 20 of the 29 hitters he faced, he told FoxSports.com, "When you get that first-pitch strike, it automatically puts [the hitters] in a hole and gives me an advantage. It's very important to get that first pitch over in every at-bat."


Seattle Mariners’ pitcher Jason Vargas was enjoying the best season of his career through Aug. 11, 2010, with an ERA close to 3.00. Following a 2009 season in which he won just three games in 14 starts and had an ERA of 4.91, Vargas took a new approach. After throwing just 51 percent strikes on the first pitch in 2009, that number jumped to 63 percent in 2010, above the MLB average. From SeattlePI.com, "It puts him in the drivers' seat to execute pitch sequences to hitters on his own accord, rather than having to give in and offer hitters fastballs in fastball-counts."


Phil Hughes of the New York Yankees has excelled in his first full season as a starting pitcher and was named to the American League All-Star team. Hughes has developed a knack for getting one over on the first pitch, increasing his first-pitch strike percentage in each of his four seasons in the majors. His percentage of 64.3 through Aug. 11, 2010 is the highest of his career, and the eighth best in the American League.


On June 19, 2010, Hughes told NJ.com, "There's a lot of good strike-throwers out there, but that's been my main goal, just get strike one and take it one pitch at a time. Get ahead, and go from there … When you’re falling behind 1-0 as opposed to 0-1, it's a huge difference … That's all I try to do is just throw strikes and be aggressive. And know that if I put myself in those good situations, good counts, more or less good things are going to happen."


Hughes backed up his comments with statistics. Through Aug. 11, 2010, Hughes allowed just a .221 batting average against after throwing a first-pitch strike, as opposed to a .273 batting average against after throwing a ball on the first pitch. His win total on the season is the highest of his career.


In baseball, an ace is the best starting pitcher on a team and nearly always the first pitcher in the team's starting rotation. Barring injury or exceptional circumstances, an ace typically starts on Opening Day. In addition, aces are usually preferred to start crucial playoff games, sometimes on three days' rest.


The term may be a derivation of the nickname of Asa Brainard (real first name: "Asahel"), a 19th-century star pitcher, who was sometimes referred to as "Ace".


In the early days of baseball, the term "ace" was used to refer to a run.


Modern baseball analysts and fans have started using the term "ace" to refer to the elite pitchers in the game, not necessarily to the best starting pitcher on each team. For example, the April 27, 1981, "Sports Illustrated" cover was captioned "The Amazing A's and Their Five Aces" to describe the starting rotation of the 1981 Oakland Athletics.


In baseball, the double switch is a type of player substitution, usually performed by a team while playing defense. The double switch is typically used to make a pitching substitution, while simultaneously placing the incoming pitcher in a more favorable spot in the batting order than was occupied by the outgoing pitcher. (On the assumption that the pitcher will be a poor hitter, the incoming pitcher will generally take the spot in the batting order of a position player who has recently batted, so as to avoid the pitcher making a plate appearance in the next couple of innings.) To perform a double switch (or any other substitution), the ball must be dead.


Since the batting order can be changed only as a result of a player substitution, while the defensive arrangement may be changed freely (among players currently in the game), the double switch typically takes the following form:


In the short term, the lineup is strengthened because a poor-hitting pitcher will not make a plate appearance soon. The disadvantage is that a position player must be removed from play and replaced by another, often inferior, position player. The advantage of the double switch over pinch hitting is that it uses up fewer players. If a relief pitcher is brought in before the at-bat, then the manager can substitute a pinch-hitter for him. However, this would require a new pitcher for the next half-inning. By using a double switch, an incoming pitcher can be left in the game for a substantial period before his turn in the batting lineup arrives, no matter what the previous batting order was.


When the team is up to bat, a manager can get the same effect as a double switch by leaving in the player who has pinch-hit for the pitcher and replacing another player in the lineup who has made the last out of the inning with a new pitcher. This will take the following form:


A double switch has infrequently resulted in a team batting out of turn because the lineup card was not updated to reflect the change, either because the umpires were not informed of the change, or because the change was not recorded. In addition, because double-switches are typically communicated verbally, it creates opportunities for confusion and miscommunication that can be costly to the switching team.


Power pitcher is a term in baseball for a pitcher who relies on pitch velocity at the expense of accuracy. Power pitchers usually record a high number of strikeouts, and statistics such as strikeouts per 9 innings pitched are common measures of power. An average pitcher strikes out about 5 batters per nine innings while a power pitcher will often strike out one or more every inning. The prototypical power pitcher is National Baseball Hall of Fame member, Nolan Ryan, who struck out a Major League Baseball record 5,714 batters in 5,386 innings. Ryan recorded seven no-hitters, appeared in eight Major League Baseball All-Star Games but also holds the record for most walks issued (2,795).


A famous fictional example of a power pitcher is Ricky "Wild Thing" Vaughn from the film "Major League", a character sports journalist Scott Lauber once called "the power pitcher everyone on my high school baseball team wished they were". Actor Charlie Sheen performed that role; he had actually played baseball earlier in his life, prior to acting, as a pitcher. Additional, non-fictional prominent power pitchers include Hall of Famers Walter Johnson, Bob Gibson, Sandy Koufax, Randy Johnson and Bob Feller. Feller himself famously led his league in strikeouts and walks several times.


The traditional school of thought on power pitching was known as "throw till you blow". However, multimillion-dollar contracts have changed mentalities. The number of pitches thrown is now counted by a team's staff, with particular attention paid to young power arms. The care which some of the older power pitchers took with their arms has allowed for long careers and further opportunity after they have stopped playing. For example, player Roger Clemens has remained in the public eye for years.


The infield shift in baseball is a defensive realignment from the standard positions to blanket one side of the field or another. Used primarily against left-handed batters, it is designed to protect against base hits pulled hard into the gaps between the fielders on one side. Originally called the Williams shift, it has periodically been referred to as the Boudreau shift or Ortiz shift since then.


The infield shift strategy is often associated with Ted Williams, but it was actually first employed against Cy Williams during the 1920s. Cy Williams, a left-handed outfielder with the Chicago Cubs (1912–1917) and Philadelphia Phillies (1918–1930), was second only to Babe Ruth in major league career home runs from 1923 to 1928. Opposing defenses would shift "practically to the entire right side" when he batted.


The shift was later used against Ted Williams of the Boston Red Sox during the 1946 World Series, as a defensive gimmick by St. Louis Cardinals manager Eddie Dyer to psych out and hopefully contain the Boston slugger. It was devised by Cleveland Indians manager Lou Boudreau between games of a doubleheader in July 1946 to halt Williams' hot hitting. In his book "Player-Manager", Boudreau wrote, "I have always regarded the Boudreau Shift as a psychological, rather than a tactical, victory."


The shift has subsequently been employed to thwart extreme pull hitters (mostly lefties), such as Barry Bonds, Ryan Howard, Jason Giambi, David Ortiz, Jim Thome, Adam Dunn, and Mark Teixeira.


The Ortiz shift consists of a baseball infield defense, however the shortstop and second baseman move to the outfield between first and second base while the left and center fielder are moved towards the right side of the field with the third baseman going to the left side of the outfield.


Baseball historian Bill James—who worked for the Red Sox at the time—criticized the Ortiz shift as only working for ground balls and not for home runs, which he described as Ortiz's true danger. Though the shift was mostly used against Ortiz, it has been used elsewhere in baseball.


As the infield shift leaves some areas less covered than others, the batter who hits toward those areas may obtain better results than against an un-shifted infield. A stark example occurred in a 1970 game between the Philadelphia Phillies and the San Francisco Giants: Giant Willie McCovey bunted hard down the third base line when the shift was on. With no one covering third, Willie Mays, on first at the time, came all the way around to score, while McCovey reached second for a double.


Infield shifts can also provide base running opportunities to the batting team. A notable example occurred in Game 4 of the 2009 World Series: with switch hitter Mark Teixeira of the New York Yankees batting left-handed, and the Philadelphia Phillies implementing an infield shift, baserunner Johnny Damon stole second base and then continued on to third base in one continuous play, as there was no fielder on the left side of the infield. Damon would later score what proved to be the winning run of the game.


The shift can be countered by the batter bunting towards third base, as the third baseman is positioned in the outfield. For example, Ortiz started to hit more balls towards the left side of the field, taking advantage of the lack of position players in left field. It was stated that a 2015 Major League Baseball proposal to ban defensive shifts would have benefited Ortiz.


As early as 2015, the Commissioner of Baseball considered banning the shift, with some MLB managers expressing agreement, although there is no consensus on such an idea. In 2019, the independent Atlantic League of Professional Baseball, as part of an agreement with MLB to test experimental rules, has banned (or significantly restricted) the shift by requiring two infielders to be positioned on either side of second base.


In baseball, a ground ball pitcher (also ground-ball pitcher or groundball pitcher) is a type of pitcher that has a tendency to induce ground balls from opposing batters. The average ground ball pitcher has a ground ball rate of at least 50% with extreme ground ball pitchers maintaining a ground ball rate of around 55%. Pitchers with a ground ball rate lower than 50% may be classified as flyball pitchers or as pitchers who exhibit the tendencies of both ground ball and fly ball pitchers. Ground ball pitchers rely on pitches that are low in the strike zone with substantial downward movement, such as splitters and sinker balls.


Baseball analysts and sabermetricians Tom Tango, Mitchel Lichtman, and Andrew Dolphin agree that ground ball pitchers are generally better pitchers than those with fly ball tendencies. Meanwhile, baseball writer and analyst Bill James argues the opposite because of injury patterns among ground ball pitchers.


Against a ground ball pitcher, batters tend to ground out rather than fly out. A ground ball pitcher’s ability to keep balls in the infield in turn keeps balls from resulting in home runs which, according to Hardball Times writer David Gassko, is the strongest benefit of a ground ball pitcher. When a ground ball pitcher does allow a pitch to be bat into the air, it is likely to result in a line drive.


Compared to fly ball pitchers, ground ball pitchers generally allow fewer extra base hits yet more total hits. Likewise, ground ball pitchers tend to give up fewer home runs than fly ball pitchers.


Ground ball pitchers tend to perform better against ground ball hitters than they perform against fly ball hitters.


Compared to fly ball pitchers, ground ball pitchers are more likely to allow unearned runs. David Gassko notes that 2.23% of ground balls result in an error, and these errors account for 85% of all errors. Accordingly, as Gassko argues, the susceptibility of ground balls to errors results in more unearned runs.


With runners on base, ground ball pitchers often force double plays because the weak contact batters make with a ground ball pitcher’s pitches prevents the ball from passing the infield defense.


Ground ball rate, or ground ball percentage, is the percentage of batted balls that are hit as ground balls against a pitcher. A typical ground ball pitcher has a ground ball rate over 50% while an extreme ground ball pitcher maintains a ground ball rate of 55% or higher. Pitchers with high ground ball rates sustain lower BABIP, or Batting Average against Balls in Play (Hardball), on ground balls than those with low ground ball rates.


Ground ball pitchers rely on pitches that are likely to induce weak contact from the batter, thus resulting in a ground ball. Pitches that are low in the strike zone with high negative horizontal or vertical movement and high velocity, such as splitters, sinkers, curveballs, and two-seam fastballs, result in the highest percentage of ground balls. According to data from the 2012 major league season, splitters and sinker balls result in the highest percentages of ground balls compared to other pitches, with 50.3% and 49.8%, respectively.


The sinker ball has an ability to “dive” at the plate, often resulting in ground balls. Several ground ball pitchers such as Tim Hudson, Greg Maddux, Derek Lowe, Chien-Ming Wang, Brandon Webb, and Jake Westbrook rely heavily on their sinker pitches and may often be considered sinkerballers. Self-proclaimed ground ball pitcher Zach Day has indicated that his primary pitch is a sinker ball as well.


Tim Hudson notes that he transformed from a strikeout pitcher to a ground ball pitcher because of the capabilities of his sinker ball. He also notes that he feels double plays are easy to force with a ground ball.


As of 1998, 72% of balls put in play against Greg Maddux resulted in ground balls, who often relies on a sinker ball.


In June 2002, Lowe allowed eleven fly balls to 129 batters, relying on his sinker to induce ground balls.


According to a scouting report by Lewis Shaw, Brandon Webb’s sinker possesses heavy downward movement and high velocity, and one of his notable tendencies is to induce ground balls from right-handed hitters.


In a World Series game on October 21, 1996, against the New York Yankees, then-Atlanta Braves pitcher Greg Maddux pitched one fly ball and eighteen ground balls, earning nineteen of twenty-four outs on ground balls with Wade Boggs grounding into a double play. Yankees’ catcher Joe Girardi said of Maddux’s performance, “[H]e has a great sinker and he gets a lot of ground balls.” Braves center fielder Marquis Grissom noted, “He [Maddux] works fast. His games are not boring, by no means. That’s his style of pitching. He’s a ground ball pitcher.”


Baseball writer Murray Chass noted the similarities between this World Series game and a World Series game Maddux pitched against the Cleveland Indians a year prior, which resulted in a loss by the Indians, who scored two unearned runs. In this game, Maddux earned nineteen ground outs and pitched two fly balls.


In game three of the American League Championship Series between the Cleveland Indians and Boston Red Sox in 2007, Indians pitcher Jake Westbrook used his sinker ball to induce fifteen ground ball outs and also forced two 6-4-3 double plays.


However, the 2014/2015 Kansas City Royals (who play in the American League) are the most recent example of a team with a small ball orientation.


A team may incorporate a small-ball strategy for a variety of reasons, including:


Most commonly, managers will switch to small-ball tactics while a game is in progress, doing so upon the convergence of a variety of factors including having appropriate hitters coming up next in the batting order and, often, having fast runners already on base. A team could also start the game with the intention of playing small ball but then change from this strategy at some point during a game, depending on circumstances, such as when the opposing pitcher is struggling or has left the game or when the team is ahead or behind by several runs.


Small ball is a contrast to a style sometimes called the "big inning", where batters focus more on drawing walks or getting extra-base hits and home runs. This may produce many innings with little but strikeouts and flyouts, but occasionally innings with several runs. By playing small ball, the team trades the longer odds of a big inning for the increased chances of scoring a single run. Specifically, small ball often requires the trading of an out to advance a runner and therefore usually reduces the number of batting opportunities that a team will have in a given inning.


Small ball was once the standard by which the game was played during the "dead-ball era" at the beginning of the 20th century, when both batting averages and home-run totals dropped to historic lows. Teams relied on bunting and stolen bases to score runs. The advent of new, cork-centered baseballs in 1910, as well as the outlawing of specialty pitches such as the spitball, saw a jump in batting averages and home runs.


Small ball has become less common because of the general trend toward smaller parks and more home runs, especially in the American League where the designated hitter rule further increases offensive power. However, all big league managers are still skilled at managing from a small ball perspective, as it is sometimes necessary, especially in critical games. White Sox manager Ozzie Guillén was widely credited for saying his 2005 World Series champion team played not small ball or big inning ball, but "smart ball", which has come to mean a more adaptable strategy.


The general idea of playing small ball is much more widely accepted and used in Japan; good hitters will frequently be asked to lay down a sacrifice bunt in an attempt to advance the runner if the lead off batter reached first or second base.


The San Francisco Giants were widely credited with winning the second game of the 2012 World Series against the Detroit Tigers on small ball. In a 2-0 victory, the Giants scored their first run on a ball that was grounded into a double play and later earned a run on a sacrifice fly.


Sometimes, the term may be used (also correctly, since it is an informal term) to refer to any of the parts of the broader strategy defined above. This may include a bunt single, the hit and run play, a sacrifice fly, the contact play, etc.


When aggregated, such individual efforts can amount to small-ball tactics even when not deliberately deployed by a team's manager. For example, if the lead-off batter reaches base, a series of individual moves can lead to run totals resembling those of the big-inning strategy but scored one at a time.


In baseball, a left-handed specialist (also known as lefty specialist) is a relief pitcher who throws left-handed and specializes in pitching to left-handed batters, weak right-handed batters, and switch-hitters who bat poorly right-handed. Because baseball practices permanent substitution, these pitchers frequently pitch to a very small number of batters in any given game (often only one), and rarely pitch to strictly right-handed batters. Most Major League Baseball (MLB) teams have several left-handed pitchers on their rosters, at least one of whom is a left-handed specialist. A left-handed specialist is sometimes called a "LOOGY" (or Lefty One-Out GuY), coined by John Sickels, and may be used pejoratively.


In the 1991 MLB season, there were 28 left-handed relievers who were not their team's closer and pitched 45 or more games. Only four averaged fewer than an inning per appearance. From 2001 to 2004, over 75 percent of left handed relievers meeting those criteria averaged less than one inning. Left-handed reliever John Candelaria was one of the early specialists in 1991, pitching 59 games and averaged .571 innings. In 1992, he allowed no earned runs—excluding inherited runners—in 43 of the 50 games. Jesse Orosco became a left-handed specialist later in his 24-season career and retired at the age of 46. From 1991 to 2003, he never averaged more than an inning pitched per appearance.


During the 2013 MLB season, there were seven relief pitchers who averaged less than two outs recorded per appearance, all of whom were left-handed. Joe Thatcher, a left-handed specialist, appeared in 72 games with 39.2 innings pitched, and had the fewest outs recorded per appearance with 1.6.


Starting with the 2020 season, all pitchers, whether starters or relievers, will be required to face at least three batters, or pitch to the end of the half-inning in which they enter the game. Exceptions will be allowed only for incapacitating injury or illness while pitching. According to "MLB.com" journalist Anthony Castrovince, "This will effectively end the so-called "LOOGY" (left-handed one-out guy) and other specialist roles in which pitchers are brought in for one very specific matchup."


The right-handed specialist (sometimes called a "ROOGY", for Righty One-Out GuY) is less common than the left-handed specialist, but are occasionally featured.


A bunt is a batting technique in baseball or fastpitch softball. Official Baseball Rules, define a bunt as follows: "A BUNT is a batted ball not swung at, but intentionally met with the bat and tapped slowly within the infield." To bunt, the batter loosely holds the bat in front of home plate and intentionally taps the ball into play. A properly executed bunt will create weak contact with the ball and/or strategically direct it, forcing the infielders to make a difficult defensive play to record an out.


The strategy in bunting is to ground the ball into fair territory, as far from the fielders as possible but within the infield. This requires not only physical dexterity and concentration, but also an awareness of the fielders' positions in relation to the baserunner or baserunners, their likely reactions to the bunt, and knowledge of the pitcher's most likely pitches.


The bunt is typically executed by the batter turning his body toward the pitcher and sliding one hand up the barrel of the bat to help steady it. This is called squaring up. Depending on the situation, the batter might square up either before the pitcher winds up, or as the pitched ball approaches the plate. Sometimes, a batter may square up, then quickly retract the bat and take a full swing as the pitch is delivered.


In a sacrifice bunt, the batter will put the ball into play with the intention of advancing a baserunner, in exchange for the batter being thrown out. The sacrifice bunt is most often used to advance a runner from first to second base, though the runner may also be advanced from second to third base, or from third to home. The sacrifice bunt is most often used in close, low-scoring games, and it is usually performed by weaker hitters, especially against pitchers in games played in National League parks. A sacrifice bunt is not counted as an at-bat. In general, when sacrifice bunting, a batter will square to bunt well before the pitcher releases the ball.


The squeeze play occurs when the batter sacrifices with the purpose of scoring a runner from third base. In the suicide squeeze, in which the runner on third base starts running for home plate as soon as the pitcher starts to pitch the ball, it is integral that the batter bunt the ball successfully, or the runner will likely be tagged out easily. Due to the high-risk nature of this play, it is not often executed, but can often be an exciting moment within the game. Alternatively, in the lower-risk safety squeeze, the runner on third waits for the ball to be bunted before breaking for home. If a runner scores in a squeeze play, the batter may be credited with an RBI.


Often when attempting to bunt for a base hit, the batter will begin running as he is bunting the ball. This is called a drag bunt. Left-handed batters perform this more often than right-handed hitters, because their stance in the batter's box is closer to first base, and they do not need to run across home plate, where the ball will be pitched, as they bunt.


The action of squaring to bunt is compromised during a drag bunt, as the feet are not set. Players sometimes get one hand up the barrel, and other times bunt with both hands at the base of the bat. There have been instances of one-handed drag bunts as well; Rafael Furcal has been known to try such a bunt.


A swinging bunt occurs when a poorly hit ball rolls a short distance into play, much like a bunt. A swinging bunt is often the result of a checked swing, and only has the appearance of a bunt. It is not a true bunt, and if the scorer judges that the batter intended to hit the ball, it cannot be counted as a sacrifice. There is also a "slug" bunt that is intended to surprise the opposing defense, as the desired effect is a hard-hit ball into the infield defense that is expecting a standard bunt.


A foul bunt that is not caught in flight is always counted as a strike, even if it is a third strike and thus results in a strikeout of the batter. This is distinct from all other foul balls which, if not caught in flight, are only counted as a strike if "not" a third strike. This special exception applies only to true bunts, not on any bunt-like contacts that might occur during a full swing or check-swing. If a batter bunts the ball and his bat hits the ball again after initial contact, it is a dead ball even if by accident.


Additionally, the infield fly rule is not applied to bunts popped-up in the air. Instead, the intentional drop rule (Rule 6.05l) that also applies to line drives can be invoked.


In baseball, a closing pitcher, more frequently referred to as a closer (abbreviated CL), is a relief pitcher who specializes in getting the final outs in a close game when his team is leading. The role is often assigned to a team's best reliever. Before the 1990s, pitchers in similar roles were referred to as a fireman, short reliever, and stopper. A small number of closers have won the Cy Young Award. Eight closers have been inducted into the Baseball Hall of Fame: Dennis Eckersley, Rollie Fingers, Goose Gossage, Trevor Hoffman, Mariano Rivera, Lee Smith, Bruce Sutter and Hoyt Wilhelm.


A closer is generally a team's best reliever and designated to pitch the last few outs of games when his team is leading by a margin of three runs or fewer. Rarely does a closer enter with his team losing or in a tie game. A closer's effectiveness has traditionally been measured by the save, an official Major League Baseball (MLB) statistic since 1969. Over time, closers have become one-inning specialists typically brought in at the beginning of the ninth inning in save situations. The pressure of the last three outs of the game is often cited for the importance attributed to the ninth inning.


Closers are often the highest paid relievers on their teams, making money on par with starting pitchers. In the rare cases where a team does not have one primary pitcher dedicated to this role, the team is said to have a "closer by committee".


Eight pitchers who were primarily relievers have been inducted into the Baseball Hall of Fame. Hoyt Wilhelm was the first to be elected in 1985, followed by Rollie Fingers, Dennis Eckersley, Bruce Sutter, Goose Gossage, Trevor Hoffman, Lee Smith, and Mariano Rivera. Eckersley was the first closer in the one-inning save era to be inducted. He believed that he was inducted because he was both a starter and a reliever. "If I came up today as a closer and played 20 years, would I have made it [into the Hall of Fame]? These pitchers did the job they were supposed to do for 20 years. What else are they supposed to do?" said Eckersley.


In baseball, middle relief pitchers (or "middle relievers") are relief pitchers who commonly pitch in the fifth, sixth, or seventh innings. In the National League, a middle reliever often comes in after the starting pitcher has been pulled for a pinch hitter. A middle reliever is usually replaced in the eighth or ninth innings by a left-handed specialist, setup pitcher or closers; middle relief pitchers may work these innings as well, especially if the game is not close.


A platoon system in basketball, baseball, or football is a method for substituting players in groups (platoons), to keep complementary players together during playing time.


In baseball, a platoon is a method of sharing playing time, where two players are selected to play a single defensive position. Usually, one platoon player is right-handed and the other is left-handed. Typically the right-handed half of the platoon is played on days when the opposing starting pitcher is left-handed and the left-handed player is played otherwise. The theory behind this is that generally players hit better against their opposite-handed counterparts, and that in some cases the difference is extreme enough to warrant complementing the player with one of opposite handedness.


Platooning can be viewed negatively. Players prefer to play every day, and managers, including Walter Alston, feared that sharing playing time could decrease confidence. Mookie Wilson of the New York Mets requested a trade in 1988 after serving in a platoon for three seasons with Lenny Dykstra.


Terms for this strategy included "double-batting shift, "switch-around players", and "reversible outfield". Tris Speaker referred to his strategy as the "triple shift", because he employed it at three positions. The term "platoon" was coined in the late 1940s. Stengel, now managing the New York Yankees, became a well known proponent of the platoon system, and won five consecutive World Series championships from 1949 through 1953 using the strategy. Stengel platooned Bobby Brown, Billy Johnson, and Gil McDougald at third base, Joe Collins and Moose Skowron at first base, and Hank Bauer and Gene Woodling in left field. Harold Rosenthal, writing for the "New York Herald", referred to Stengel's strategy as a "platoon", after the American football concept, and it came to be known as "two-platooning".


Following Stengel's success, other teams began implementing their own platoons. In the late 1970s through early 1980s, Baltimore Orioles manager Earl Weaver successfully employed a platoon in left field, using John Lowenstein, Benny Ayala, and Gary Roenicke, using whichever player was performing the best at the time. Weaver also considered other factors, including the opposing pitcher's velocity, and his batters' ability in hitting a fastball. The Orioles continued to platoon at catcher and all three outfield positions in 1983 under Joe Altobelli, as the Orioles won the 1983 World Series, leading other teams to pursue the strategy.


Platooning decreased in frequency from the late 1980s through the 1990s, as teams expanded their bullpens to nullify platoon advantages for hitters. However, the use of platoons has increased in recent years. As teams increase their analysis of data, they attempt to put batters and pitchers in situations where they are more likely to succeed. Generally, small market teams, which cannot afford to sign the league's best players to market-value contracts, are most likely to employ platoons. Under manager Bob Melvin, the Athletics have employed many platoons, with Josh Reddick calling Melvin the "king of platoons". Joe Maddon began to employ platoons as manager of the Tampa Bay Rays.


The 2013 World Series champion Boston Red Sox platooned Jonny Gomes and Daniel Nava in left field. After the 2013 season, left-handed relief pitchers Boone Logan and Javier López, both considered left-handed specialists because of their ability to limit the effectiveness of left-handed batters, signed multimillion-dollar contracts as free agents.


When a football team uses two (or more) quarterbacks to run their offense, rather than the traditional one in football, it is known as "platooning quarterbacks". This tactic becomes less common the higher the level of football (high school teams are more likely to do it than National Football League teams for example). Quarterbacks may be switched in and out of the game every play, every drive, every quarter, or depending on certain situations. If quarterbacks are switched game to game that is not platooning, that is a "quarterback controversy" or a simple benching.


Using two different quarterbacks allows an offense to use players with different skill sets. One common reason teams platoon quarterbacks is because one player is a good passer and the other a good runner (see for example Stanley Jackson and Joe Germaine of the 1997 Ohio State Buckeyes). Thus defenses have to prepare for two types of quarterback, not just one. It also allows offenses to run a greater variety of plays.


In baseball, a setup man (or set-up man, also sometimes referred to as a setup pitcher or setup reliever) is a relief pitcher who regularly pitches before the closer. They commonly pitch the eighth inning, with the closer pitching the ninth.


As closers were reduced to one-inning specialists, setup men became more prominent. Setup pitchers often come into the game with the team losing or the game tied. They are usually the second best relief pitcher on a team, behind the closer. After closers became one-inning pitchers, primarily in the ninth inning, setup pitchers became more highly valued. A pitcher who succeeds in this role is often promoted to a closer. Setup men are paid less than closers and mostly make less than the average Major League salary.


The most common statistic used to evaluate relievers is the save. Due to the definition of the statistic, setup men are rarely in position to record a save even if they pitch well, but they can be charged with a blown save if they pitch poorly. The hold statistic was developed to help acknowledge a setup man's effectiveness, but it is not an official Major League Baseball (MLB) statistic.


Historically, setup men were rarely selected to MLB All-Star Games, with the nod usually going to closers with large save totals. From 1971 through 2000, only six relievers with fewer than five saves at midseason were selected as All-Stars. There were 10 such players from 2001 through 2009. In 2015, the majority of the American League's All-Star relievers were not closers, outnumbered 4–3. Setup men who have been named All-Stars multiple times include Justin Duchscherer, Tyler Clippard, Dellin Betances, and Andrew Miller.


Francisco Rodriguez, who was a setup pitcher for the Anaheim Angels in 2002, tied starting pitcher Randy Johnson's Major League Baseball record for wins in a single postseason after recording his fifth victory in the 2002 World Series.


Tim McCarver wrote that the New York Yankees in 1996 "revolutionized baseball" with Mariano Rivera, "a middle reliever who should have been on the All-Star team and who was a legitimate MVP candidate." He finished third in the voting for the American League (AL) Cy Young Award, the highest a setup man has finished. That season, Rivera primarily served as a setup pitcher for closer John Wetteland, typically pitching in the seventh and eighth inning of games before Wetteland pitched in the ninth. Their effectiveness gave the Yankees a 70–3 win–loss record that season when leading after six innings. McCarver said the Yankees played "six-inning games" that year, with Rivera dominating for two innings and Wetteland closing out the victory.


Illustrating the general trend, both Rivera and Rodriguez were moved to closer soon after excelling as setup men. On January 22, 2019, Rivera became the first unanimously elected baseball hall-of-famer having been inducted his first eligible year on the ballot.


In baseball, an opening pitcher, more frequently referred to as an opener, is a pitcher who specializes in getting the first outs in a game, before being replaced by a long reliever or a pitcher who would typically be a starting pitcher. Pitchers employed in the role of opener have usually been relief pitchers by trade. The strategy was frequently employed in Major League Baseball (MLB) by the Tampa Bay Rays during the 2018 season, when it was adopted by other teams as well.


By the 1980s, MLB teams had adopted starting rotations consisting of five starting pitchers, with all other pitchers on the active roster serving as relief pitchers. Traditionally, a starter was expected to throw the most innings of any pitcher in a game. Starters typically pitched until they got into trouble or reached a pitch count threshold.


When Farhan Zaidi became general manager of the San Francisco Giants after the 2018 season, he spoke about using an opener to protect Dereck Rodriguez and Andrew Suarez from being overworked.


The Tampa Bay Rays continued to use an opener in many of their games, with Ryne Stanek often filling the role. The New York Yankees coped with having three of their starting pitchers on the injured list by using reliever Chad Green as an opener. Green would pitch the first inning or two and then hand over the game to a long reliever. During the 2019 regular season, Green opened 15 games for the Yankees; the Yankees won 11 of the games that he started. The Los Angeles Angels pitched a no-hitter using an opener, with Taylor Cole working the first two innings and Félix Peña the last seven in their 13–0 no-hitter against the Seattle Mariners on July 12.


One advantage of the strategy is that the opener, who is often a hard-throwing specialist, can be called in to face the most dangerous hitters, who are usually near the top of the batting order, the first time they come to bat. If the opener is successful, the job of the next pitcher is easier since they will start with less-dangerous hitters. The strategy also throws off the timing of the top-of-the-order hitters, who are not used to seeing different pitchers each time they come to bat, and allows the usual starting pitcher to face the top of the lineup two times rather than three.


From a financial perspective, the strategy allows teams to make more use of relief pitchers who are still under low-paying contracts, potentially reducing the salaries paid to starting pitchers because the latter are used less.


In baseball, a catch occurs when a fielder gains secure possession of a batted ball in flight, and maintains possession until he voluntarily or intentionally releases the ball. When a catch occurs, the batter is out, and runners, once they properly tag up (retouch their time-of-pitch base), may attempt to advance at risk of being tagged out.


Unlike in American football and other sports, neither secure possession for a time nor for a number of steps is enough to demonstrate that a catch has occurred. A fielder may, for example, appear to catch and hold a batted ball securely, take a few more steps, collide with a wall or another player, and drop the ball. This is not a catch.


Umpires signal a catch with the out signal: a fist raised into the air, often with a hammering motion; if there is doubt about it, the umpire will likely shout "That's a catch!" On a close no-catch, the umpire will signal with the safe signal, which is both arms swept to the side and extended, accompanied by the call ""No" catch, "no" catch!" with an emphasis on the word "no".


The fielder must catch the ball with his hand or glove. If the fielder uses his cap, protector, pocket or any other part of his uniform in getting possession, it is not a catch. Therefore, a foul ball which directly becomes lodged in the equipment of the catcher (other than his or her glove) is not considered a catch and hence not a foul tip.


It is not a catch if the batted ball hits a fielder, then hits a member of the offensive team or an umpire, and then is caught by another defensive player.


A catch is legal if the ball is finally held by any fielder before it touches the ground. Runners may leave their bases the instant the first fielder touches the ball. A fielder may reach over a fence, a railing, a rope, or a line of demarcation to make a catch. He may jump on top of a railing or a canvas that may be in foul ground. Interference should not be called in cases where a spectator comes into contact with a fielder and a catch is not made if the fielder reaches over a fence, a railing, a rope. The fielder does so at his or her own risk.


If a fielder, attempting a catch at the edge of the dugout, is "held up" and kept from an apparent fall by a player or players of either team and the catch is made, it shall be allowed.


To avoid ambiguity with the common term "catch" meaning any action that gains possession of a ball, some may say that a fielder gloved a thrown ball or a batted, bouncing ball.


In Major League history, the term knuckle curve or knuckle curveball has been used to describe three entirely different pitches.


The third type of knuckle curve was thrown by Dave Stenhouse in the 1960s. Stenhouse's knuckle curve was thrown like a fastball but with a knuckleball grip. Stenhouse discovered that this pitch had excellent movement, and when he came to the majors, he utilized it as a breaking pitch. This pitch may have been the same as the knuckleball thrown by Jesse Haines and Freddie Fitzsimmons. The pitch would be perfected by Chicago White Sox legend Hoyt Wilhelm during the later stages of his career, after flirting with it for most of his time in the majors.


In baseball, a force is a situation when a baserunner is compelled (or "forced") to vacate his time-of-pitch base—and thus try to advance to the next base—because the batter became a runner. A runner at first base is always forced to attempt to advance to second base when the batter becomes a runner. Runners at second or third base are forced only when all bases preceding their time-of-pitch base are occupied by other baserunners and the batter becomes a runner.


A forced runner's force base is the next base beyond his time-of-pitch base. Any attempt by fielders to put a forced runner out is called a force play.


A force on a runner is "removed" when the batter or a following runner is put out. This most often happens on fly outs—on such, the batter-runner is out, and the other runner(s) must return to their time-of-pitch base, known as tagging up. It also occasionally happens when a sharply hit ground ball is fielded by the first baseman, who then quickly steps on first base to force out the batter-runner. This removes the requirement that the runner already on first must advance to second base; he cannot be forced out by a defensive player holding the ball while touching second base, and the runner can try to escape from a rundown by returning to first base.


For force outs resulting from neighborhood plays, see the highlighted link.


An appeal play may also be a force play; for example, with runners on first and third bases and two out, the batter gets a hit but the runner from first misses second base on the way to third. After a proper appeal, this runner will be called out. This is a force out because the runner was out for failing to touch a base to which he was forced; this force out is the third out and thus the run does not score. However, most appeals are not force plays, because appeals usually do not involve a forced runner.


It is not a force out when a runner is put out while trying to tag up after a caught fly ball. Because this out is similar to a true force out, in that the runner can be put out by a fielder possessing the ball at the base that the runner needs to reach, there is a widespread misconception that this out is a force out. But it is not, which means the run would count if it scored before the third out is made on a runner trying to tag up


A rundown, informally known as a pickle or the hotbox, is a situation in the game of baseball that occurs when the baserunner is stranded between two bases, also known as no-man's land, and is in jeopardy of being tagged out. When the base runner attempts to advance to the next base, he is cut off by the defensive player who has a live ball and attempts to return to his previous base before being tagged out. As he is doing this, the defenseman throws the ball past the base runner to the previous base, forcing him to reverse directions again. This is repeated until the runner is put out or reaches a base safely.


A rundown can be escaped if a fielder makes an error, the runner gets around the fielder with the ball without running out of the baseline, a fielder throws the ball elsewhere (e.g., toward home plate if another runner is trying to score), or the runner manages to get by the fielder without the ball while there is no other fielder to cover the runner's destination base.


In baseball, an appeal play occurs when a member of the defensive team calls the attention of an umpire to an infraction which he would otherwise ignore.


A runner shall be called out, after a successful live ball appeal, if he:


Fielders have the right to appeal any runner at any base he has reached or passed, at any time while the ball is alive, subject to the following restrictions:


An appeal is "legal" if the fielder


Umpires will only rule on legal appeals. A potential appeal is "viable" if the appeal is legal and the umpire knows that the runner has indeed committed an infraction and will be called out if the appeal is executed by a fielder.


Suppose that runners are on first and third base, and the batter hits a fly ball. The runner on third tags up, leaving third base immediately after the outfielder touches the ball. The runner seems to score, beating the throw home, but failing to touch home plate. He proceeds into his dugout without again attempting to touch home base. The runner on first base stays at first base, and action becomes relaxed while the ball is in the infield.


The fielders now suspect that the runner left third base too early and also missed the plate. Suppose that a fielder, with the live ball, touches third base and tells the nearest umpire, "I think he left too early." This is a proper legal appeal, and the umpire should rule with a safe signal, perhaps saying, "No, he was fine." Now no legal appeal may again occur on that runner at third base. Suppose then that a fielder, with the live ball, touches home base and says to the nearest umpire, "I think he never touched home." This is a legal and viable appeal, and so the umpire should call the runner out and direct that his run shall not count.


Since the ball was live (and indeed must be for appeals to be legal), the runner from first could have attempted to advance at any time during the appeals. If the defense attempts to play on that runner, their opportunity to appeal the runner from third base is lost, and the run would count regardless of any subsequent attempt to appeal.


A member of the defensive team may appeal to the umpire when a batter bats out of turn. The umpire then enforces the penalty for batting out of turn, if any. The ball must be live for this as for any appeal. After the appeal is made, the umpire will usually signal "Time" and figure out whether the appeal is successful.


In U.S. high school games or other games governed by NFHS rules, the defense may execute any of the live ball appeals above during a dead ball by simply communicating the infraction to the umpire, so it is never necessary to attempt a live ball appeal; it is always safer for the defense to ask for time to make the ball dead, and then make any requests to the umpire.


Tie goes to the runner is a popular interpretation of baseball rules. The claim is that a batter-runner who arrives on base the same time as the ball is safe. However, umpires generally reject the concept that baseball provides for a tie in this way, and instead rule on the basis that either the player or the ball has reached the base first.


The wording of rule 5.09(a)(10), formerly 6.05(j), of the "Official Baseball Rules" is that a batter is out when "After a third strike or after he hits a fair ball, he or first base is tagged before he touches first base". Therefore, if the runner or first base is not tagged before he touches first base, he is safe.


In response to a question from a Little League umpire, Major League Baseball umpire Tim McClelland has written that the concept of a tie at a base does not exist, and that a runner either beats the ball or does not. In 2009, umpire Mark Dewdeny, a contributor for Bleacher Report, citing McClelland, also rejected the idea of a tie, and further commented that even if a "physicist couldn't make an argument one way or the other" from watching an instant replay, the runner would still be out.


One of the most notorious MLB players with a reputation for wall climbing is Minnesota Twins outfielder Torii Hunter. He has won nine Gold Gloves in his sixteen-year major league career. He once robbed Barry Bonds of a home run in right-center field in the first inning of the 2002 MLB All-Star Game.


In baseball, an unassisted triple play occurs when a defensive player makes all three outs by himself in one continuous play, without his teammates making any assists. Neal Ball was the first to achieve this in Major League Baseball (MLB) under modern rules, doing so on July 19, 1909. For this rare play to be possible there must be no outs in the inning and at least two runners on base, normally with the runners going on the pitch (e.g., double steal or hit-and-run). An unassisted triple play usually consists of a hard line drive hit directly at an infielder for the first out, with that same fielder then able to double off one of the base runners and tag a second for the second and third outs.


Most unassisted triple plays in MLB have taken this form: an infielder catches a line drive (one out), steps on a base to double off a runner (two outs), and then tags another runner on the runner's way to the next base (three outs). In general, the "next base" is usually the same base that the infielder stepped on to record the second out, and the last runner is tagged before he can return to the previous base. Infrequently, the order of the last two putouts is reversed.


It is nearly impossible for an unassisted triple play to occur unless the fielder is positioned between the two runners. For this reason, all but two of these plays have been accomplished by middle infielders (second basemen and shortstops). The other two were completed by first basemen, who were able to reach second base before the returning baserunner. For example, after collecting the first two outs, Tigers' first baseman Johnny Neun ignored his shortstop's shouts to throw the ball, and instead ran to second base to get the final out himself. The only unassisted triple play that did not take one of these forms occurred in the 19th century, under rules that are no longer in effect (see below).


It is plausible that a third baseman could complete an unassisted triple play with runners at second and third or with bases loaded, but this has never happened in MLB. Players in other positions (pitcher, catcher, outfielders) completing an unassisted triple play would require unusual confusion or mistakes by the baserunners, or an atypical defensive alignment (for example, repositioning an outfielder as a fifth infielder).


The unassisted triple play, the perfect game, hitting four home runs in one game and five extra-base hits in a game are thus comparable in terms of rarity, but the perfect game and the home run and extra-base hit records require an extraordinary effort along with a fair amount of luck. By contrast, the unassisted triple play is essentially always a matter of luck: a combination of the right circumstances with the relatively simple effort of catching the ball and running in the right direction with it. Troy Tulowitzki said of his feat, "It fell right in my lap", and as WGN-TV sports anchor Dan Roan commented, "That's the way these plays always happen."


In baseball and softball, the curveball is a type of pitch thrown with a characteristic grip and hand movement that imparts forward spin to the ball, causing it to dive as it approaches the plate. Varieties of curveball include the 12–6 curveball, power curveball, and the knuckle curve. Its close relatives are the slider and the slurve. The "curve" of the ball varies from pitcher to pitcher.


The expression "to throw a curveball" essentially translates to introducing a significant deviation to a preceding concept.


The delivery of a curveball is entirely different from that of most other pitches. The pitcher at the top of the throwing arc will snap the arm and wrist in a downward motion. The ball first leaves contact with the thumb and tumbles over the index finger thus imparting the forward or "top-spin" characteristic of a curveball. The result is the exact opposite pitch of the four-seam fastball's backspin, but with all four seams rotating in the direction of the flight path with forward-spin, with the axis of rotation perpendicular to the intended flight path, much like a reel mower or a bowling ball.


From a hitter's perspective, the curveball will start in one location (usually high or at the top of the strike zone) and then dive rapidly as it approaches the plate. The most effective curveballs will start breaking at the apex of the arc of the ball flight, and continue to break more and more rapidly as they approach and cross through the strike zone. A curveball that a pitcher fails to put enough spin on will not break much and is colloquially called a "hanging curve". Hanging curves are usually disastrous for a pitcher because the low velocity, non-breaking pitch arrives high in the zone where hitters can wait on it and drive it for power.


The curveball is a popular and effective pitch in professional baseball, but it is not particularly widespread in leagues with players younger than college level. This is with regard for the safety of the pitcher – not because of its difficulty – though the pitch is widely considered difficult to learn as it requires some degree of mastery and the ability to pinpoint the thrown ball's location. There is generally a greater chance of throwing wild pitches when throwing the curveball.


When thrown correctly, it could have a break from seven to as much as 20 inches in comparison to the same pitcher's fastball.


Due to the unnatural motion required to throw it, the curveball is considered a more advanced pitch and poses inherent risk of injury to a pitcher's elbow and shoulder. There has been a controversy, as reported in "The New York Times", March 12, 2012, about whether curveballs alone are responsible for injuries in young pitchers or whether it is the number of pitches thrown that are the predisposing factor. In theory, allowing time for the cartilage and tendons of the arm to fully develop would protect against injuries. While acquisition of proper form might be protective, Dr. James Andrews is quoted in the article as stating that in many children, insufficient neuromuscular control, lack of proper mechanics, and fatigue make maintenance of proper form unlikely.


The parts of the arm most commonly injured by the curveball are the ligaments in the elbow, the biceps, and the forearm muscles. Major elbow injury requires repair through elbow ligament reconstruction, or Tommy John surgery.


The "12–6 curveball" vs. the "Roundhouse Curveball" vs. the "Slurve".


Curveballs have a variety of trajectories and breaks among pitchers. This chiefly has to do with the arm slot and release point of a given pitcher, which is in turn governed by how comfortable the pitcher is throwing the overhand curveball.


Pitchers who can throw a curveball completely overhanded with the arm slot more or less vertical will have a curveball that will break straight downwards. This is called a 12–6 curveball as the break of the pitch is on a straight path downwards like the hands of a clock at 12 and 6. The axis of rotation of a 12–6 curve is parallel with the level ground and perpendicular to its flight path.


Generally the Magnus effect describes the laws of physics that make a curveball curve. A fastball travels through the air with backspin, which creates a higher pressure zone in the air ahead of and under the baseball. The baseball's raised seams augment the ball's ability to develop a boundary layer and therefore a greater differential of pressure between the upper and lower zones. The effect of gravity is partially counteracted as the ball rides on and into increased pressure. Thus the fastball falls less than a ball thrown without spin (neglecting knuckleball effects) during the 60 feet 6 inches it travels to home plate.


On the other hand, a curveball, thrown with topspin, creates a higher pressure zone on top of the ball, which deflects the ball downward in flight. Instead of counteracting gravity, the curveball adds additional downward force, thereby giving the ball an exaggerated drop in flight.


There was once a debate on whether a curveball actually curves or is an optical illusion. In 1949, Ralph B. Lightfoot, an aeronautical engineer at Sikorsky Aircraft, used wind tunnel tests to prove that a curveball curves. On whether a curveball is caused by an illusion, Baseball Hall of Fame pitcher Dizzy Dean has been quoted in a number of variations on this basic premise: "Stand behind a tree 60 feet away, and I will whomp you with an optical illusion!"


However, optical illusion caused by the ball's spinning may play an important part in what makes curveballs difficult to hit. The curveball's trajectory is smooth, however the batter perceives a sudden, dramatic change in the ball's direction. When an object that is spinning and moving through space is viewed directly, the overall motion is interpreted correctly by the brain. However, as it enters the peripheral vision, the internal spinning motion distorts how the overall motion is perceived. A curveball's trajectory begins in the center of the batter's vision, but overlaps with peripheral vision as it approaches the plate, which may explain the suddenness of the break perceived by the batter. A peer-reviewed article on this hypothesis was published in 2010.


Popular nicknames for the curveball include "the bender" and "the hook" (both describing the trajectory of the pitch), as well as "the yakker" and "Uncle Charlie". New York Mets pitcher Dwight Gooden threw a curve so deadly that it was nicknamed "Lord Charles" and the great hitter Bill Madlock called it "the yellow hammer” - apparently because it came down like a hammer and was too yellow to get hit by a bat. Because catchers frequently use two fingers to signal for a curve, the pitch is also referred to as "the deuce" or "number two".


Records of the Princeton University (then the College of New Jersey) game from September 26, 1863 in the "New York Clipper" of the Nassaus facing the Athletics refer to F. P. Henry, Princeton Class of 1866, "slow pitching with a great twist to the ball achieved a victory over fast pitching." By 1866, many Princeton players were pitching and hitting "curved balls".


In the past, major league pitchers Tommy Bridges, Bob Feller, Virgil Trucks, Herb Score, Camilo Pascual and Sandy Koufax were regarded as having outstanding curveballs.


In baseball, a sacrifice bunt (also called a sacrifice hit) is a batter's act of deliberately bunting the ball, before there are two outs, in a manner that allows a baserunner to advance to another base. The batter is almost always putout, and hence sacrificed (to a certain degree that is the intent of the batter), but sometimes reaches base due to an error or fielder's choice. In that situation, if runners still advance bases, it is still scored a sacrifice bunt instead of the error or the fielder's choice. Sometimes the batter may safely reach base by simply outrunning the throw to first; this is not scored as a sacrifice bunt but rather a single.


A successful sacrifice bunt does not count as an at bat, does not impact a player's batting average, and counts as a plate appearance. Unlike a sacrifice fly, a sacrifice bunt is not included in the calculation of the player's on-base percentage. If the official scorer believes that the batter was attempting to bunt for a base hit and not solely to advance the runners, the batter is charged an at bat and is not credited with a sacrifice bunt.


In leagues without a designated hitter, sacrifice bunts are most commonly attempted by pitchers, who are typically not productive hitters. Managers consider that if a pitcher's at bat will probably result in an out, they might as well go out in a way most likely to advance the runners. The play also obviates the need for the pitcher to run the base paths, and hence avoids the risk of injury. Some leadoff hitters also bunt frequently in similar situations and may be credited with a sacrifice, but as they are often highly skilled bunters and faster runners, they are often trying to get on base as well as advance runners.


A sacrifice bunt attempted while a runner is on third is called a squeeze play. A sacrifice bunt attempted while a runner on third is attempting to steal home is called a suicide squeeze.


Although a sacrifice bunt is not the same as a sacrifice fly, both fell under the same statistical category until 1954.


In scoring, a sacrifice bunt may be denoted by SH, S, or occasionally, SAC.


Notable players with 300 or more sacrifice bunts.


The following players have accumulated 300 or more sacrifice bunts in their playing careers:


Since the beginning of the live-ball era (1920), the career leader in sacrifice bunts is Joe Sewell with 275. He was first called up by the Cleveland Indians late in the 1920 season shortly after the death of Indians star shortstop Ray Chapman after being hit in the head by a pitch, the event which is generally regarded as the start of the live-ball era.


Though touted as good strategy by traditionalists, the sacrifice bunt has received significant criticism by modern sabermetrics. Simply, sabermetricians argue that the value of moving a runner to another base is offset by the team's sacrificing one of its limited and valuable 27 outs. An out conceded is an out wasted, in other words.


The following stats illustrate the argument. From 1993-2010, if a team had a runner on first base with no outs, on average it would score .941 runs from that point until the end of the inning. If a team had a runner on second base with one out, however, the average was .721 runs from that point forward. Thus, if a batter walks to lead off an inning and his team bats, that team will, on average, score almost one run in the inning. On the other hand, that team decreases its run expectancy by 23 percent if it successfully bunts and moves the runner to second with one out.


Complicating affairs are the many difficulties and risks associated with bunting. The runner or runners on base must have speed, or the defense may get an easy force out. A manager could feasibly pinch run, but then his bench becomes smaller (that is, there are fewer substitute players available). The player at the plate must also lay down a quality bunt. That is, the player must lay down a bunt that does not pop up, go foul, or go straight to a fielder. Even if all goes well, if the sacrifice bunt is successful, the team must still get a hit to score the runner, and they now have 2 outs remaining instead of three.


In baseball, a sacrifice fly (sometimes abbreviated to sac fly) is defined by Rule 9.08(d):


"Score a sacrifice fly when, before two are out, the batter hits a ball in flight handled by an outfielder or an infielder running in the outfield in fair or foul territory that


It is called a "sacrifice" fly because the batter allows a teammate to score a run, while sacrificing his own ability to do so. Sacrifice flies are traditionally recorded in box scores with the designation "SF".


As addressed within Rule 9.02(a)(1) of the Official Baseball Rules a sacrifice fly is not counted as a time at bat for the batter, though the batter is credited with a run batted in.


The purpose of not counting a sacrifice fly as an at-bat is to avoid penalizing hitters for a successful action. The sacrifice fly is one of two instances in baseball where a batter is not charged with a time at bat after putting a ball in play; the other is the sacrifice hit (also known as a sacrifice bunt). But, while a sacrifice fly does not affect a player's batting average, it counts as a plate appearance and lowers his on-base percentage. A player on a hitting streak will have the hit streak end if he has no official at-bats but has a sacrifice fly.


The sacrifice fly is credited even if another runner is put out so long as the run scores. The sacrifice fly is credited on a dropped ball even if another runner is forced out by reason of the batter becoming a runner.