Both the Giants and Eagles developed similar formations of this design. The Eagles named their version the "Herman Edwards" play after their cornerback who scored the winning touchdown on the above fateful play.


The tackle spread or "Emory and Henry" formation is an unusual American football formation that dates to the early 1950s, when the Wasps of Emory & Henry College under head coach Conley Snidow used it as part of their base offense. Instead of the conventional grouping of all five ineligible offensive linemen in the middle of the formation, the Emory and Henry spreads the tackles out to the edge of the field along with two receivers or slotbacks, creating two groupings of three players near each sideline. Meanwhile, the center and the guards remain in the middle of the field along with the quarterback and a running back.


The formation has also been used as a basis for trick plays such as a backwards pass to a player near the sideline followed by forward pass down the field.


The Emory & Henry formation was revived in the 1990s by Florida and South Carolina coach Steve Spurrier, who coined its commonly used name when he explained that he'd seen Emory and Henry College run it in the 1950s. The New England Patriots used a variation of the formation by placing a (legally declared) eligible-numbered receiver in the ineligible tackle position; the confusion this caused prompted the league to impose a rule change prohibiting that twist beginning in 2015.


A tackle-spread formation was included in the video game "Madden NFL 18" under the name "Gun Monster;" it proved to be a problem for the game's artificial intelligence, which could not discern eligible receivers from ineligible ones.


The Cincinnati Bengals under Marvin Lewis occasionally used a variant of the Emory and Henry formation, which they called the "Star Wars" formation; in their version, both offensive tackles line up on the same side of the quarterback, thus creating a hybrid between the Emory & Henry and the swinging gate.


The A-11 offense combines the Emory and Henry with the wildcat, in that either of the two backs in the backfield can receive the snap and act as quarterback. In its earliest incarnation, it also used a loophole in the high school rulebook that allowed players wearing any uniform number to play at either an ineligible or eligible position, further increasing defensive confusion and allowing for more flexibility among players changing positions between plays. However, this facet of the offense was never legal at the college or professional level, and the high school loophole was closed in 2009.


There are no rules regarding the formation of defensive players or their movement before the snap of the ball as the choice of when to snap the ball is that of the offense which would consequently deprive the defense of an opportunity to take a set position. Therefore, the deployment and tactics of defensive players are bound only by the imagination of the play designer and the line of scrimmage. Below are some of the most popular defensive formations through the history of football.


The original 6-1 was invented by Steve Owen in 1950 as a counter to the powerful passing attack of Paul Brown's Cleveland Browns. It was called the "Umbrella" defense because of the four defensive backs, whose crescent alignment resembled an opened umbrella, and the tactic of allowing the defensive ends to fall back into pass coverage, converting the defense, in Owen's language, from a 6–1–4 into a 4–1–6. If offenses grew wise to the drop back, the ends could pass rush instead. Using this new defense, the Giants defeated the Browns twice in 1950 during the regular season.


It saw use during the 1950s in Owen's hands, but never became a significant base defense. It was functionally replaced by the more versatile 4–3.


In this variation of the 3–4, known also as the "3–4 eagle", the nose guard is removed from play and in his place is an extra linebacker, who lines up on the line where the nose guard would be, sometimes slightly behind where the nose guard would be. It allows defenses more flexibility in man to man coverages and zone blitzes. It was created by Los Angeles Rams defensive coordinator Fritz Shurmur, and evolved from Buddy Ryan's 46 defense. Shurmur created the defense in part to take advantage of the pass rush abilities of Kevin Greene, a defensive end sized linebacker. The "eagle" in the formation's name comes from the late 1940s-early 1950s Philadelphia Eagles coached by Greasy Neale.


The original Eagle defense was a 5–2 arrangement, with five defensive linemen and two linebackers. In Neale's defense, as in Shurmur's variation, the nose tackle could also drop into pass coverage, thus Shurmur's use of the Eagle defense name.


The 4–4 defense consists of four defensive linemen, four linebackers, and three defensive backs (one safety, two corners). It puts "eight men in the box" to stop the run, but it sacrifices deep coverage against the pass, especially if the opponent's receivers are better athletes than the cornerbacks. The formation is popular in high school football as well as smaller collegiate teams. If the opposite team is a good passing team, outside linebackers are usually called on to defend slotbacks.


The 5-3 defense consists of five defensive linemen, three linebackers, and three defensive backs (one safety, two corners). It appeared in the early thirties as a response to the improving passing offenses of the time, particularly the T formation. It grew in importance as the 1940s progressed, as it was more effective versus the T than the other standard defense of the time, the 6–2. By 1950, five man lines were standard in the NFL, either the 5-3 or the 5-2 Eagle. As late as the early 1950s, the Cleveland Browns were using a 5-3 as their base defense.


The 6-2 defense consists of six defensive linemen, two linebackers, and three defensive backs (one safety, two corners). This was the primary defense in football, at all levels, during the single wing era (the 1930s), combining enough passing defense to handle the passing attacks of the day along with the ability to handle the power running games of the times. As the T formation grew popular in the 1940s, this formation was replaced in the NFL with the 5-3 and the 5-2 defenses.


In colleges, this defensive front has remained viable for a much longer period of time, because colleges, historically, have run a lot more than the NFL. Three common six man fronts seen in this more modern era are the tight six (linebackers over offensive ends, four linemen between linebackers), the wide tackle 6 (linebackers over offensive tackles, two linemen between linebackers) and the split 6 (linebackers over guard-center gap, all linemen outside linebackers).


The 5–2 defense consists of five defensive linemen, two linebackers, and four defensive backs (two corners, two safeties). Historically, this was the first major defense with 4 defensive backs, and was used to combat the passing attacks of the time. A later evolution of the original 5-2 is the Oklahoma 5–2, which ultimately became the professional 3-4 when the defensive ends of the original 5-2 were substituted over time for the outside linebackers of the 3–4. The differences between the Oklahoma 5-2 and the 3-4 are largely semantics.


Seven-man line defenses use seven down linemen on the line of scrimmage. The most common seven-man line defenses were the 7-2-2 defense and the 7-1-2-1 defense. They were most common before the forward pass became prevalent, but were still common prior to the inception of the platoon system. They are still sometimes used in goal-line situations.


There are a couple paths to the 4-2-5. One is by removing a linebacker from the standard 4–3 to add the extra defensive back. The second is by converting the ends of a wide tackle six to safeties (the defensive ends of a wide tackle six already have pass defense responsibilities). A variation is the 2–4–5, which is primarily run by teams that run the 3–4 defense. They replace a defensive tackle with a corner.


The 3–3–5 removes a lineman to the nickelback.


The 33 stack uses an extra strong safety, and "stacks" linebackers and safeties directly behind the defensive linemen.


The 3–5–3 refers to a defense that has three down linemen (the "3" level), three linebackers and two corners (the "5" level), one free safety and 2 strong safeties (the "3" level). This is similar to a 33 stack, but with players more spread. Also called the "umbrella" defense or "3-deep". In this set, the third safety would be referred to as a "weak safety" (WS) and allows two position safeties at the mid-level with a third safety deep. It is because of this that the secondary safety in a football defense is called a free safety rather than a weak safety


Any defense consisting of six defensive backs. The sixth defensive back is known as the dimeback and this defense is also used in passing situations (particularly when the offense is using four wide receivers). As the extra defensive back in the nickel formation is called the nickel, two nickels gives you a dime, hence the name of the formation.


Defense consisting of seven (quarter) or eight (half dollar) defensive backs. The seventh defensive back is often an extra safety, and this defense is used in extreme passing situations (such as to defend against a Hail Mary pass). It is occasionally referred to as the prevent defense because of its use in preventing desperation plays. The cornerbacks and safeties in a prevent defense usually make a point of defending the goal line at the expense of receivers in the middle of the field.


The quarter formations are run from a 3–1–7 or a 4–0–7 in most instances; the New England Patriots have used an 0–4–7 in some instances with no down linemen. Half dollar defenses are almost always run from a 3–0–8 formation. The eighth defensive back in this case is usually a wide receiver from the offense. The wide receiver can capitalize on interception opportunities in the expected high-risk offensive play.


Unlike other formations, the extra safety is not referred to as a quarterback or halfback (except in Canadian football), to avoid confusion with the offensive positions of the same names, but rather simply as a defensive back or a safety.


Formations with many defensive backs positioned far from the line of scrimmage are susceptible to running plays and short passes. However, since the defense is typically used only in the last few seconds of a game when the defensive team need only keep the offense from scoring a touchdown, giving up a few yards in the middle of the field is inconsequential.


More extreme defensive formations have been used when a coach feels that his team is at a particular disadvantage due to the opponent's offensive tactics or poor personnel match-ups.


For example, in 2007, New York Jets head coach Eric Mangini employed a scheme against Tom Brady and the New England Patriots that utilized only 1 defensive lineman and 6 linebackers. Prior to the snap, only the lone lineman assumed a three-point stance near the offensive center while the 6 linebackers "roved" up and down the line of scrimmage, attempting to confuse the quarterback as to whether they would rush the passer, drop into coverage, or play the run. This defense (combined with poor weather conditions) did slow the Patriot's passing game, but proved ineffective against the run, and the Patriots won the game.


Punting formations use a five-man offensive line, three "upbacks" (sometimes also referred to as "personal protectors") approximately 3 yards behind the line to act as an additional line of defense, two wide receivers known as "gunners" either to stop the punt returner or to down the ball, and the punter, 15 yards behind the line of scrimmage to receive the long snap. (If the punting team is deep in its own territory, the 15-yard distance would have to be shortened by up to 5 yards to keep the punter in front of the end line.) The number of upbacks and gunners can vary, and either position can be replaced by a tight end in a "max protect" situation.


Most field goals feature nine offensive linemen (seven on the line, both ends in the tight end position, with two extra slightly off the line of scrimmage), a place holder who kneels 7 yards behind the line of scrimmage, and a kicker.


In 2018, the NFL further amended the rules on the kickoff formation. All players other than the kicker may now line up no more than 1 yard behind the restraining line. The rule also states that there must be five players on both sides of the ball. On each side, two players must line up outside the numbers and two players must be lined up between the numbers and the hashmarks. The NFL also made a rule regarding the receiving team's formation in 2018. Eight players on the receiving team must be lined up in the 15-yard "set up zone" measured from the receiving team's restraining line 10 yards from the ball.


Kick return formations vary; in most situations, an association football-like formation is used, with eleven players staggered throughout the field including two (rarely, one) kick returners back to field deep kicks, two more twenty yards ahead of them to field squib kicks, two more at about midfield mainly to assist in blocking, and five players located the minimum ten yards from the kicking line. In obvious onside kick formations, more players are moved to the front of the formation, usually top wide receivers and other players who are good at recovering and catching loose balls; this formation is known as the "hands team". A kick returner will usually remain back in the event of an unexpected deep kick in this situation.


To defend punts, the defensive line usually uses a man-on-man system with seven defensive linemen, two cornerbacks, a linebacker and a kick returner. They may choose to attempt to block the punt, or drop back to block for the receiver.


The wishbone formation, also known simply as the bone, is an offensive formation in American football. The style of attack to which it gives rise is known as the wishbone offense. Like the spread offense in the 2000s, the wishbone was considered to be the most productive and innovative offensive scheme in college football during the 1970s and 1980s.


While the record books commonly refer to Emory Bellard developing the wishbone formation in 1968 as offensive coordinator at Texas, the wishbone's roots can be traced back to the 1950s. According to Barry Switzer, it was Charles “Spud” Cason, football coach at William Monnig Junior High School of Fort Worth, Texas, who first modified the classic T formation in order “to get a slow fullback into the play quicker.” Cason called the formation “Monnig T”. Bellard learned about Cason's tactics while coaching at Breckenridge High School, a small community west of Fort Worth.


Earlier in his career Bellard saw a similar approach implemented by former Detroit Lions guard Ox Emerson, then head coach at Alice High School near Corpus Christi, Texas. Trying to avoid the frequent pounding of his offensive line, Emerson moved one of the starting guards into the backfield, enabling him to get a running start at the opposing defensive line. Bellard served as Emerson's assistant at that time. During his high school coaching career in the late '50s and early '60s, Bellard adopted the basic approaches of both Cason and Emerson, as he won two 3A Texas state championships Breckenridge in 1958 and 1959 and a 4A state title at San Angelo Central High School in 1966, using a wishbone-like option offense.


In 1967 Bellard was hired by Darrell Royal and became offensive coordinator a year later. The Texas Longhorns only scored 18.6 points per game in a 6–4 season in 1967. After watching Texas A&M—running offensive coordinator Bud Moore and Gene Stallings' option offense—beat Bear Bryant's Alabama team in the 1968 Cotton Bowl Classic, Royal instructed Bellard to design a new three-man back-field triple option offense. Bellard tried to merge his old high school tactics with Stallings' triple option out of the Slot-I formation and Homer Rice's variations of the Veer, an offensive formation created by Bill Yeoman.


Bellard later left Texas and – using the wishbone – guided Texas A&M and Mississippi State to bowl game appearances in the late 1970s. At Mississippi State Bellard “broke the bone” and introduced the “wing-bone”, moving one of the halfbacks up to a wing formation and frequently sending him in motion. Another variation of the wishbone formation is called the flexbone.


Ironically, the longest running wishbone offense was run not by Texas but by their arch-rivals, the University of Oklahoma, who ran variations of the wishbone well into the mid-1990s. Oklahoma coach Barry Switzer has been credited by some for having “perfected” the use of the wishbone offense and former OU quarterback Jack Mildren is often referred to as "the Godfather of the wishbone" by University of Oklahoma football fans. In 1971, the Oklahoma Sooners wishbone offense set the all-time NCAA single-season rushing record at 472.4 yards per game, a record which still stands to this day.


Phil Jack Dawson, then head coach of Westbrook High School in Westbrook, Maine, developed an effective defense against the wishbone offense then in use by Texas, called “backbone defense”. Dawson contacted Ara Parseghian, then head coach of the University of Notre Dame, and convinced him to use it against Texas in the 1971 Cotton Bowl Classic. Notre Dame beat Texas 24-11.


In the National Football League, during the strike season of 1987, the San Francisco 49ers used the wishbone successfully against the New York Giants to win 41–21. Coach Bill Walsh used the wishbone because of his replacement quarterback's familiarity with a similar formation in college. The Cleveland Browns also utilized the wishbone at the pro level in a 2018 28–16 win over the Atlanta Falcons.


The Oklahoma playbook describes the quarterback, the architect behind the Wishbone, as, "a running back who can throw." They must also have an aptitude for the option and the decision making that lies within the play design as well as durability (cannot miss a practice).


The fullback is required to be able to handle a physical pounding because he is frequently hit without having the ball; he must also be quick with excellent stamina, and be a good blocker.


This makes the wishbone a "complete" offense. The offense expects to get a one-on-none in the running game and a one-on-one in open space with the passing game. The safety, who must support the run and also defend against the pass, is under tremendous pressure in this attack. The basic wishbone triple option play accounts for every defender on the field. Every defender is threatened before the basic play begins. There is an invitation to overplay or compensate on the basic play and overplaying or making a misstep on the basic play leaves the defense open for counters that leave no one to make up for the mistake.


The wishbone has the quarterback taking the snap from under center, with a fullback close behind him, and two halfbacks (sometimes called "tailbacks") further back, one slightly to the left, and the other slightly to the right. The alignment of the four backs makes an inverted Y, or “wishbone”, shape. There is typically one wide receiver and one tight end, but sometimes two wide receivers, or two tight ends.


The split-T is an offensive formation in American football that was popular in the 1940s and 1950s. Developed by Missouri Tigers head coach Don Faurot as a variation on the T formation, the split-T was first used in the 1941 season and allowed the Tigers to win all but their season-opening match against the Ohio State Buckeyes and the 1942 Sugar Bowl versus Fordham. Jim Tatum and Bud Wilkinson, who coached under Faurot with the Iowa Pre-Flight Seahawks during World War II, brought the split-T to the Oklahoma Sooners in 1946. After Tatum left for Maryland in 1947, Wilkinson became the head coach and went on to win a record-setting 47 straight games and two national titles between 1953 and 1957.


In the basic or tight-T formation, three running backs would line up about five yards behind the quarterback. The offensive linemen would form a fairly tight group in front of the backs. In the split-T, the offensive line was spread out over almost twice as much ground. This prompted the defensive front to widen as well, which created gaps for the offense to exploit.


The original split-T was a full house backfield. Later, Faurot would set up a flanker on one sideline. This was done after experience with nine man lines showed the flanker to create issues for the defense. The use of a split end to aid the passing game was optional, and was not an integral feature of either the split-T or the tight-T.


Faurot used the new formation to create what may have been the first option offense in football, which was a precursor of the wishbone, veer, and some modern run-first spread offenses. With the defense spread out, the offense would, in general, leave one defensive player on the play side unblocked. The blocking schemes were simple, with very little of the pulling or trapping of the more traditional power-running offenses.


The three base plays of the offense were the handoff (a dive play), the keep and the pitch play. The handoff was a fast play, with a halfback driving directly into the line, and the quarterback handing off within one yard of the line of scrimmage. Faurot judged this play to be the most dangerous in his offensive system, as the handoff occurred close to the line of scrimmage, close to potential interference by the defensive team.


If the dive play had not been called, then the quarterback kept the ball. The quarterback would run toward a spot just inside the unblocked defensive player. If that player closed on him, he would pitch the ball back to the outside trailing halfback, aiming for a spot outside that outside defensive player. When executed correctly, this resembled the two-on-one fast break of basketball, from which Faurot originally derived the concept (Faurot also lettered in basketball, as a student, and coached the Northeast Missouri State University basketball team to a conference championship prior to his tenure as the head football coach at Missouri).


Don Faurot, the head coach of the Missouri Tigers, developed the split-T and unleashed it onto the college football world in 1941. He combined this new formation with the athletes he had at running back and quarterback and created an offensive juggernaut. The Tigers finished the season 8-1, with the sole loss in the season opening out of conference game at #10 Ohio State. They were the Big Six Conference champions, ranked #7 in the AP poll, and accepted the invitation to play #6 Fordham in the 1942 Sugar Bowl.


In 1946, Jim Tatum became the Oklahoma head coach. He installed the split-T offense that he had learned as an assistant coach under Don Faurot at the U.S. Navy's Iowa Pre-Flight school football team during World War II. In his first year, he turned around Oklahoma's losing record and delivered a Big Six Conference championship. In 1947, Tatum left Oklahoma for Maryland, where he saw even more success with the split-T, including a consensus national championship in 1953.


Bud Wilkinson, also a Faurot assistant at Iowa Pre-Flight, was the next Sooners head coach. In 1953, after losing to Notre Dame and tying Pittsburgh, Oklahoma beat arch-rivals Texas, 19–14, and went on to win their next 46 games in a row, setting an NCAA record that stands to this day. Notre Dame book-ended the streak when they again beat Oklahoma in Norman, 7–0 on November 16, 1957.


Tatum and Wilkinson would later face off in the 1954 Orange Bowl, when #1/#1 Maryland and #4/#5 Oklahoma met on the field for the first time. Both teams used the split-T as their base offense. Other top football programs used the split-T during this period as well, including Alabama, Houston, Notre Dame, Texas, Michigan, Penn State, and Ohio State.


Bible, Dana X., "Championship Football", Prentice-Hall, 1947.


Brown, Paul, and Clary, Jack, "PB: The Paul Brown Story", Atheneum, 1979.


Faurot, Don "Secrets of the "Split-T" Formation", Prentice-Hall, 1950.


Keith, Harold, "Forty-Seven Straight: The Wilkinson Years at Oklahoma", University of Oklahoma Press, 1984.


The shotgun formation is a formation used by the offensive team in gridiron football mainly for passing plays, although some teams use it as their base formation. Instead of the quarterback receiving the snap from center at the line of scrimmage, in the shotgun he stands farther back, often five to seven yards off the line. Sometimes the quarterback will have a back on one or both sides before the snap, while other times he will be the lone player in the backfield with everyone spread out as receivers.


The shotgun formation can offer certain advantages. The offensive linemen have more room to maneuver behind the scrimmage line and form a tighter, more cohesive oval “pocket” in which the quarterback is protected from “blitzing” by the defense. If the quarterback has speed, mobility or both, he can use this formation to scramble before his pass; or, to run to an open field position in the defensive secondary or to the sideline, usually gaining first-down yardage.


Although some running plays can be run effectively from the shotgun, the formation also has weaknesses. The defense knows a pass is more than likely coming, particularly from an empty set lacking any running backs, and there is a higher risk of a botched snap than in a simple center/quarterback exchange. If the defense is planning a pass rush, this formation gives fast defensive players more open and exposed targets in the offensive backfield, with less cluttered “blitzing” routes to the quarterback and any other halfback in the offensive backfield.


Shotgun combines elements of the short punt and spread formations — "spread" in that it has receivers spread widely instead of close to or behind the interior line players. The origins of the term are thought to be that it is like a "shotgun" in spraying receivers around the field. (The alignment of the players also suggests the shape of an actual shotgun.) Formations similar or identical to the shotgun used decades previously would be called names such as "spread double wing". Short punt formations (so called because the distance between the snapper and the ostensible punter is shorter than in long punt formation) do not usually have as much emphasis on wide receivers.


The shotgun evolved from the single wing and the similar double-wing spread; famed triple threat man Sammy Baugh has claimed that the shotgun was effectively the same as the version of the double-wing he ran at Texas Christian University in the 1930s.


In the latter part of the 1940s, the Philadelphia Eagles, under Hall of Fame Coach Earl "Greasy" Neale, implemented the shotgun formation in their offensive attack with quarterback Tommy Thompson.


The formation was named by the man who actually devised it, San Francisco 49ers coach Red Hickey, in 1960. John Brodie was the first National Football League shotgun quarterback, beating out former starter Y. A. Tittle largely because he was mobile enough to effectively run the formation.


Since no other NFL teams used the formation during this time, some believed it had been invented by Tom Landry. Instead, Landry simply dusted off the old innovation to address a pressing problem: keeping Staubach protected while an unusually young and inexperienced squad (12 rookies made the 1975 Cowboys roster) jelled. The Cowboys ended up in the Super Bowl that season, in no small part due to its new use of the old formation. The shotgun became a "signature" formation for the Cowboys, especially during third down situations.


The shotgun was adopted by more teams throughout the pass-happy late 1980s, and was part of almost every team's offense in the 1990s, eventually becoming a base formation for some teams in the late 2000s.


In recent years, the shotgun has become vastly prevalent. Many college quarterbacks—such as Tim Tebow, who almost exclusively used the shotgun at Florida—have difficulty adapting to NFL offenses where about a third of snaps are taken under center. However, with the spread offense increasingly used in the NFL, the shotgun is more popular, since the spread allows for more effective running.


Though the shotgun is a pass-dominated formation, a cleverly designed halfback draw play can put defenses off guard and a fast halfback can get good yardage before the defense recovers from their mistake. A further development of the play is a halfback option pass, with the quarterback being one of the eligible receivers. Roger Staubach's backup and successor, Danny White, twice caught such a pass for a touchdown. It was noted at the time that he was only eligible because of the shotgun formation (an NFL quarterback who takes a snap from underneath the center was and still is an ineligible receiver, a rule not found in any amateur level of American football).


The shotgun is also used in college, but running is used more often than in the NFL. Most offenses in college who run in the shotgun have a fast quarterback. They often use a play where the quarterback has an option of handing the ball off to the running back who runs to the side opposite the side he was lined up on. The quarterback can also run the opposite way depending on how the defense reacts. Urban Meyer and the Florida Gators used this effectively from 2006 to 2009 with Tim Tebow.


The Nevada Wolf Pack currently employs a formation called the "pistol", in which the running back, instead of lining up next to the quarterback, lines up behind the quarterback, who in turn has lined up two to three yards behind the center.


Coach Urban Meyer has added elements of the option offense to the shotgun offense he employed as coach at Bowling Green State University, the University of Utah, and University of Florida. This "spread option" offense is also used by the Missouri Tigers, Ohio State Buckeyes and other college teams with quarterbacks who can run as well as throw effectively.


At times the formation has been more common in Canadian football, which allows only three downs to move ten yards downfield instead of the American game's four. Canadian teams are therefore more likely to find themselves with long yardage to make on the penultimate down, and therefore more likely to line up in the shotgun to increase their opportunities for a large gain. Canadian teams also have the advantage that backs positioned behind the line of scrimmage can run forward and cross the line running as the ball is snapped.


The 46 defense is an American football defensive formation, an eight men in the box defense, with six players along the line of scrimmage. There are two players at linebacker depth playing linebacker technique, and then three defensive backs. The 46 defense was originally developed and popularized with the Chicago Bears by their defensive coordinator Buddy Ryan, who later became head coach of the Philadelphia Eagles and Arizona Cardinals.


Unlike most defensive formations that take their names from the number of defensive linemen and linebackers on the field (i.e. the 4–3 defense has 4 linemen and 3 linebackers), the name "46" originally came from the jersey number of Doug Plank, who was a starting strong safety for the Bears when Ryan developed the defense, a role typically played in the formation as a surrogate linebacker.


The formation was very effective in the 1980s NFL because it often negated a team's running game and forced them to throw the ball. This was difficult for many teams at the time because most offensive passing games centered on the play-action pass, a situation that often favored the defense even further with the quarterback lined up to receive the snap from directly behind the center.


Currently, the 46 is rarely used in professional and college football. This is largely because of multiple receiver and spread formations. The eight man line that the 46 presented was most effective against the two back, two wide receiver sets common in the 1980s.


A weakness of the 46 defense is that with eight defensive players lining up near the line of scrimmage and only three in the secondary, it leaves areas open for receivers to catch passes. Also, timed passes can be thrown before the players blitzing have a chance to reach the quarterback. When the Miami Dolphins gave the Bears their only loss of the 1985 season, Miami exploited these weaknesses with quarterback Dan Marino's quick release of the ball, and their receivers' ability to beat the one-on-one coverage of Chicago's cornerbacks.


Another problem with the 46 defense is that most teams do not have enough impact players to run the 46 as effectively as the Bears and Ryan's other two major successes, the late 1980s Philadelphia Eagles for which he was head coach and the 1993 Houston Oilers for whom he was defensive coordinator, did. Those teams fielded some of the best front-seven defenses ever, and included such players as Jerome Brown, Mike Singletary, Steve McMichael, Richard Dent, Dan Hampton, Clyde Simmons, Reggie White, Otis Wilson, Seth Joyner, William Fuller, and Wilber Marshall.


In today's game, the 46 defense is often simplified to its main component of walking the strong safety up to the line of scrimmage as an eighth man in the box to help contain the run. Defenses today may also run safety blitzes and corner blitzes at crucial moments without committing wholly to the "46" defense. Up front, teams still use the concept of the "T-N-T" alignment, where two defensive ends are covering (lined up directly across from) the guards, and a nose tackle is covering the center. In the case of a zone-blocking scheme, this makes it difficult for the offensive linemen to reach any of the linebackers on the second level.


This is where defensive players would line up against a normal Pro Set offense.


When three or more receivers are used by the offense, the defense makes what is called a jayhawk adjustment. The charlie linebacker will step back to where the middle linebacker was in the normal alignment, the middle linebacker will move to where the strong safety was aligned and the strong safety will move out to cover the third receiver. If the offense uses a fourth receiver, the middle linebacker lines up in front of the center and the charlie linebacker would cover the fourth receiver.


To note, there is nothing particularly innovative about this particular set of assignments. For example, the strong safety could assume either the charley or the jack linebacker role. The linebacker displaced would line up over the weak side offensive tackle, where the strong safety is normally found.


Arguably, the two most difficult positions on offense to develop quickly are wide receivers and quarterbacks. A style of play was needed for teams that could not field strong throwing quarterbacks. In the flexbone formation, intelligent and athletic personnel can adapt to playing a quarterback's position without having to throw the ball very well.


Flexbone teams are often playing against more talented teams so they must use time management and trickery of the flexbone to even the playing field. By running the ball almost exclusively, a flexbone offense also runs the game clock and limits the opposing teams possibly faster and stronger offense from scoring against their own defense.


Another key consideration is that the flexbone formation gives the offense four potential vertical receiving threats at the snap: the two wide receivers and the two slotbacks. This is something that alternative formations such as the I-formation or the traditional wishbone cannot achieve without pre-snap motion that tips the offense's hand. This advantage allows the four-verticals play, a deadly weapon against Cover 3, a common defensive coverage used by the eight-man fronts that a strong running team is likely to face.


Since this offense is primarily used by service academies (Air Force, Army, Navy and The Citadel), it helps alleviate the inherent unbalance related to recruiting and being unable to recruit the type of talent that a larger school like Oklahoma or Alabama might be able to. The Flexbone allows for QBs who may be shorter or smaller than ideal (5'10 - 6'2 and weighing around 185-205 pounds) to be able to start because they often have a speed advantage despite not being able to throw the ball as well.


As a result of the misdirection and the size of the outside WRs (usually 6'2 or taller and over 200 pounds) to help block, the slotbacks can be similarly sized to the QB. This allows for the Flexbone to have 3 players who can run fast (with SBs also helping serve as receivers or lead blockers) while the FB can be a more traditional HB size of 220-235 pounds.


Schools at the FCS (formerly I-AA) level that currently run the Flexbone include Wofford, The Citadel, and more recently the upstart program of the Kennesaw State Owls coached by Brian Bohannon who in 2017 lead the Owls to a 12–2 record and appearance in FCS playoffs in only the 3rd year of the program's existence.


The flexbone offense is also popular at the high school football level.


The short punt formation is an older formation on both offense and defense in American football, popular when scoring was harder and a good punt was itself an offensive weapon. In times when punting on third down was fairly common, teams would line up in the short punt formation and offer the triple threat of punt, run or pass. "Harper's Weekly" in 1915 called it "the most valuable formation known to football."


The formation is similar to the single wing and modern shotgun by including the possibility of a long snap from center. However, it is generally a balanced formation, and there are backs on both sides of the tailback, offering better pass protection. As a result, it was considered a much better passing formation than running, as the premiere running formation was the single wing. That said, it was regarded as a good formation for trap plays.


The formation was invented by Amos Alonzo Stagg in 1896. Andy Smith, coach of California's "Wonder Teams" summed up the short-punt philosophy with his motto of "Kick and wait for the breaks." In the early days of the sport the ball was often moved up the field, not through offensive plays, but rather through punting. Once the opposing team got the ball, the defense was relied upon to make the other team's offense lose yards or fumble. To confuse the opponent and attain longer punts, the punting was often done on first or second downs and it was not uncommon for a team to kick more than 40 times in a game.


The formation was used extensively by Fielding Yost's "point-a-minute", hurry up Michigan Wolverines in their early history, as well as his disciple Dan McGugin's Vanderbilt Commodores. Bill Roper used the short punt at Princeton.


The short punt was the base formation for the Benny Friedman-led New York Giants in 1931. In the 1956 NFL Championship, the Chicago Bears shifted into a short punt formation in the third quarter, after falling way behind.


In American football, the A formation was a variation of the single-wing formation used with great success by the New York Giants of the 1930s and early 1940s. This formation was masterminded by Giants coach Steve Owen and relied heavily upon Hall of Fame center Mel Hein for its success.


The A formation differed from the traditional single-wing in that the quarterback played further back from the line and closer to the center. It also place the backfield opposite the "strong" side of the unbalanced line, providing more flexibility in the running game (though less power). The wingback is on the opposite side compared to the single-wing and the quarterback is the primary passer, rather than the tailback. The name of the formation was arbitrary, not from its slight resemblance to the letter "A", unlike formations named "I", "T", "V", and "Y" for the shapes formed by the backs' positioning; Owen labeled the standard single wing his team's "B" formation.


One major advantage of the A is the center could snap the ball to any of three players; typically to the fullback or blocking back for runs and the quarterback for passes. The fourth back, the wingback, became a crucial part of the system when Owen introduced a half-spin sweep series in 1938 which featured a wide sweep play to the motioning wingback, a dive inside by the deep fullback, and a bootleg threat away from sweep action by the quarterback. This triple-threat, highly deceptive series anticipated the Wing-T Buck Sweep series by well over a decade.


A great center like Hein was a major asset, albeit not essential, in running the A formation — however only the Giants used this set-up with any frequency. This gave the Giants an advantage in that teams had to prepare specifically to defend the A whenever they played New York.


The Veer is an option running play often associated with option offenses in American football, made famous at the collegiate level by Bill Yeoman's Houston Cougars. It is currently run primarily on the high school level, with some usage at the collegiate and the professional level where the Veer's blocking scheme has been modified as part of the zone blocking system. The Veer is an effective ball control offense that can help minimize mismatches in a game for a team. However, it can lead to turnovers with pitches and handoff option reads.


The Veer can be run out of any variety of formations, although it was primarily designed to be run out of the split-backed, aptly named veer formation. It has been used out of the I-formation (and its variants, including the Power-I and Maryland I) and the wishbone formation. Some variants of the triple option have now made the jump to the shotgun formation, which has become a popular option formation since Eric Crouch and the University of Nebraska Cornhuskers used the shotgun option during his 2001 Heisman campaign.


He attempts to maintain proper pitch relation to the quarterback, technically a few yards outside the quarterback and moving laterally so that the quarterback may pitch the ball as he goes down the field. This entire action takes no longer than a few seconds.


The fourth player in the split-veer would be a wide receiver or tight end. His job, depending on the formation, would be to block the force player who is responsible for the flat on the side being attacked. The offense relies on the quarterback making the proper reads, turning up the field (if he decides to keep the ball) and gaining yardage. The dive back must remember to not take the football from the quarterback, rather the quarterback must give it to him. The pitch man must maintain proper spacing from the quarterback to ensure that the quarterback can make an effective pitch that can ensure more yardage.


The College Football Hall of Fame credits Bill Yeoman with the invention of the veer formation. Yeoman ran that offense with the Houston Cougars beginning in the mid-1960s and continuing through his career at Houston, which concluded in 1986.


When an offensive system is devised for a team, the coach must take into account his players, so the veer can be applied to several situations. It can be used for undersized players so that double teams and angles can be used to block defenders. It can be used to isolate defenders and create predictable responses to the offenses actions. If a team is very disciplined it can take advantage of an undisciplined defense that can not execute their responsibilities precisely on each snap of the game.


The veer offense was adopted by Jack Lengyel, the new head coach of the Marshall University Thundering Herd prior to the start of the 1971 season after the 1970 team was killed in a plane crash. Lengyel believed that the veer option offense would be a better offense than the Power I offense he had used at the College of Wooster. Bobby Bowden, then the head coach of West Virginia, offered to tutor Lengyel and his coaches on the intricacies and nuances of the veer option offense. Lengyel installed Reggie Oliver at quarterback. The Young Thundering Herd of Marshall would win two games in 1971: a last-second win against Xavier in their first home game after the crash and the homecoming game against ranked Bowling Green.


In the Florida State-Houston game in the Gator Bowl in 1968, the 'Noles brought the safeties up and they ignored the QB, running right past him at times, and crashed into the trailing back, usually Paul Gipson. This took the pitch option away. The Veer wasn't stopped but it was slowed. Florida State won the game 40–20.


Highly athletic defensive lines can also "bring the house" and penetrate the backfield of a veer option offense, disrupting the option read progression and forcing the quarterback to scramble and throw downfield, something which the offense is ill-equipped to do. Persistent backfield penetration can result in a preponderance of Fullback dive plays, which typically result in low gains, putting the offense in a cycle of low-yardage FB dives and incomplete passes under pressure, effectively neutering the "option" portion of the offense.


Other successful teams known to use the veer are the Kemmerer Rangers (Wyoming), which has won two state titles in the last three years; and the Baker County Wildcats (Florida) who went 10–2 and were 30th in the country.


Mount Carmel High School in Chicago, IL has used the veer option under head coach Frank Lenti since 1984. In that time Mount Carmel has won 9 state championships, and was crowned team of the decade in Illinois after winning 5 state titles in the 90's. Notable players that have gone on to the NFL include Donovan McNabb and Simeon Rice.


Pistol-Flex or Pistol Double-Slot is a hybrid of two well-known American football formations: the pistol and flexbone formations. It was pioneered in 2009 by Paul Markowski, who is currently an offensive consultant for Chestnut Hill College. By combining the strengths of each offensive set, the end result is a formation that is very effective for both passing and running. The triple option can be used from this set very effectively. Markowski has developed a true quadruple option play run out of the Pistol-Flex formation.


The base formation of the Pistol-Flex has the QB in a shotgun set four yards behind the center. The B-back is in a three-point stance with his down hand two yards behind the QB's feet. The two slotbacks are set one yard directly behind the offensive tackles to their side. The offensive line splits are all three feet. There are multiple formations that the Pistol-Flex can be run from (Open, Tight, Bone, Box, Twins).


At any given time, there are at least four eligible receivers within one yard of the line of scrimmage, which bodes well for the passing attack.


The I formation is one of the most common offensive formations in American football. The I formation draws its name from the vertical (as viewed from the opposing endzone) alignment of quarterback, fullback, and running back, particularly when contrasted with the same players' alignments in the "T formation".


The formation begins with the usual 5 offensive linemen (2 offensive tackles, 2 guards, and a center), the quarterback under center, and two backs in-line behind the quarterback. The base variant adds a tight end to one side of the line and two wide receivers, one at each end of the line.


The exact origin of the I formation is unclear. Charles M. Hollister of Northwestern in 1900 is one source, as is Bob Zuppke in 1914.


Tom Osborne, head coach at Nebraska for a quarter century, further popularized the formation in the early 1970s as offensive coordinator (under head coach Bob Devaney) with consecutive national titles in 1970 and 1971. He incorporated the option into his I formation scheme beginning in 1980, forming the base of the Nebraska offense for over twenty years, and won three national championships in the 1990s. NFL teams followed the success of the I at the college level and adopted it as well.


The I formation is typically employed in running situations. In the I formation, the tailback starts six to eight yards behind the scrimmage from an upright position, where he can survey the defense. The formation gives the tailback more opportunities for finding weak points in the defense to run into.


The fullback typically fills a blocking, rather than rushing or receiving, role in the modern game. With the fullback in the backfield as a blocker, runs can be made to either side of the line with his additional blocking support. This is contrasted with the use of tight ends as blockers who, being set up at the end of the line, are able to support runs to one side of the line only. The fullback can also be used as a feint—since the defense can spot him more easily than the running back, they may be drawn in his direction while the running back takes the ball the opposite way.


Despite the emphasis on the running game, the I formation remains an effective base for a passing attack. The formation supports up to three wide receivers and many running backs serve as an additional receiving threat. While the fullback is rarely a pass receiver, he serves as a capable additional pass blocker protecting the quarterback before the pass. The running threat posed by the formation also lends itself to the play-action pass. The flexible nature of the formation also helps prevent defenses from focusing their attention on either the run or pass.


Many subtypes of the I formation exist, generally emphasizing the running or passing strengths of the base version.


The I formation, in any variant, can also be modified as Strong or Weak. This formation is commonly called an Offset I. In either case, the fullback lines up roughly a yard laterally to his usual position. "Strong" refers to a move towards the TE side of the formation (Primary TE, or flanker's side when in a "big" 2TE set), "weak" in the opposite direction. These modifications have little effect on expected play call. However, the Offset I allows a fullback to more easily avoid blockers and get out of the backfield to become a receiver.


In the NFL, the I formation is less frequently used than in college, as the use of the fullback as a blocker has given way to formations with additional tight ends and wide receivers, who may be called on to block during running plays. The increasingly common ace formation replaces the fullback with an additional receiver, who lines up along the line of scrimmage. The I will typically be used in short-yardage and goal line situations. College football now has a spread football system. Which in turn gets rid of the fullback. What spread formation can do is in a way "spread" the defense to cover the entire field.


A formation in football refers to the position players line up in before the start of a down. There are both offensive and defensive formations and there are many formations in both categories. Sometimes, formations are referred to as packages.


At the highest level of play in the NFL and NCAA, the one constant in all formations is the offensive line, consisting of the left and right tackle, left and right guard, and a center. These five positions are often referred to collectively as the "line", and have the primary role of blocking. By rule there must be two additional players on the line of scrimmage called ends. These players are eligible receivers and may play near the linemen (tight ends) or farther away (split end or wide receiver). Most teams play additional players near (but still off) the line of scrimmage to act as extra pass receivers.


Up to four players can be behind the offensive line, but one is always designated the quarterback (defined as the player who receives the ball from the center). Upon the snap of the ball, the quarterback becomes the "ball carrier". The ball carrier has five options:


The three other backs can be halfbacks (who primarily carry the ball), fullbacks (who primarily block), or they can play near (but not on) the line of scrimmage to act as extra tight ends or wide receivers. A tight end that fills the role as the 4th back is often called an "H-Back", and a wide receiver that fills that role is sometimes known as a "flanker" or a "slot" receiver (depending on where he lines up). Most formations have a "strong" side (the side with the tight end, or the side with more players) and a "weak side" (the side opposite the tight end, or the side with fewer players).


The ends, which may be either wide receivers or tight ends, may catch a passed ball or receive a handoff.


Descriptions and diagrams to display offensive formations typically use the following symbols:


The offense is required to set up a formation before a play, subject to several rules:


Two terms often heard in referring to


defensive formations are "box" and "secondary". The "box" is defined as an area on the defensive side of the ball, within 5 yards of the line of scrimmage and framed by the offensive tackles. This area is most commonly occupied by defensive linemen and linebackers. The "secondary" can refer to the defensive backs as a group, or to the area behind the linebackers usually occupied by defensive backs. The two standard NFL defenses, the 4-3 and the 3-4, have 7 players in the box. The phrase "8 in the box" is used to indicate that 1 of the 2 safeties has moved into the box to defend against the run.


This formation assumes the offense is lined up strong side right (from the offense's point of view). This diagram could be matched up to an offensive formation diagram to make a complete 22 player football field.


A trips formation is an offensive football formation, initially used by Joe Gibbs and the Washington Redskins, in which three receivers line up on the same side of the field. The side is usually specified by the quarterback calling "Trips right" or "Trips left" when he calls the play in the huddle.


There are multiple variables of the trips formation, and it may be combined with other types of formations. For example, the call "Shotgun, trips right, slot left" formation would indicate that the tight end and two wide receivers would line up on the right side of the field, while two receivers would line up on the left side of the field (one "wide", the other slightly off the line of scrimmage in the "slot"). The quarterback would line up at least five yards behind the center.


The objective of a trips formation is to flood the defense on one side of the field in order to create and exploit holes in zone pass coverage.


The Notre Dame Box is a variation of the single-wing formation used in American football, with great success by Notre Dame in college football and the Green Bay Packers of the 1920s and 1930s in the NFL. Green Bay's coach, Curly Lambeau, learned the Notre Dame Box while playing for Knute Rockne in the late 1910s. Rockne learned it from Jesse Harper, who learned it from coach Amos Alonzo Stagg. It contained two ends, and four backs. The formation often featured an "unbalanced line" where the center (that is, the player who snapped the ball) was not strictly in the "center" of the line, but close to the weakside.


Although modern use of this offensive formation is largely defunct and exterminated among college and professional teams, several high school football teams across the United States have revived the Notre Dame Box offense and have been highly efficient and successful. Three notable high schools that successfully implemented the Notre Dame Box offense extensively are Western Harnett High School in Lillington, North Carolina, Nauset Regional High School in Eastham, Massachusetts, and Isabella High School in Maplesville, Alabama.


The Chicago Bears's and Clark Shaughnessy's Stanford Indians success with a modernized version of the T-formation in the 1940s eventually led to the demise of the Notre Dame Box, as well as all single-wing variants. The Packers finally switched to the T-formation, after Don Hutson had retired, in 1947. No major NCAA or NFL team has used this formation since and much of the knowledge (i.e. playbooks and, if it ever existed, film) associated with this formation is no longer available.


Modern use of the Notre Dame Box.


Use of the Notre Dame Box in modern times has been limited in part due to changes in football rulebooks regarding motion. The frequent shifts in the backfield that are employed by the system are still legal, but teams must now set themselves in a formation for at least one second before snapping the ball or sending a player into "motion". This motion player must be moving backward or laterally. Canadian football never adopted these changes, and (even though it is not used in that variant of the sport) the original version of the system is still legal.


In the late 1990s, Western Harnett High School of Lillington, North Carolina was featured on ESPN after their program experienced a major turnaround credited to their employment of the Notre Dame Box. The head coach of that team, Travis Conner, later moved on to Jacksonville High School in nearby Jacksonville, North Carolina and installed the Notre Dame Box there, as well. He then moved onto Bunker Hill High School and completely transformed their football program, with the new system Bunker Hill produced 3 top 10 rushers with the leader being Reggie Davis who rushed for a single season near 2,000 yards.


The formation is very prevalent in the north of England, and is used by many teams in BUAFL due to the lack of talented passers as well at the unpredictable weather conditions.


In American football, a T formation (frequently called the full house formation in modern usage, sometimes the Robust T) is a formation used by the offensive team in which three running backs line up in a row about five yards behind the quarterback, forming the shape of a "T".


Numerous variations of the T formation have been developed, including the Power-T, where two tight ends are used, the Pro T, which uses one tight end and one wide receiver, or the Wing T, where one of the running backs (or wingback) lines up one step behind and to the side of the tight end.


Any of these can be run using the original spacing, which produced a front of about seven yards, or the Split-T spacing, where the linemen were farther apart and the total length of the line was from 10 to 16 yards.


The T formation is often said to be the oldest offensive formation in American football and is claimed to have been invented by Walter Camp in 1882. However, as the forward pass was legalized, the original T became obsolete in favor of formations such as the single wing. Innovations, such as a smaller, more throwing-friendly ball, along with the invention of the hand-to-hand snap in the 1930s, led to the T's revival.


The T-formation was viewed as a complicated "gadget" offense by early football coaches. But NFL owner-coach George Halas and Ralph Jones of the Chicago Bears along with University of Chicago coach Clark Shaughnessy, University of Texas coach Dana X. Bible, and Notre Dame coach Frank Leahy were advocates. Shaughnessy was an advisor to Halas in the 1930s while the head coach at the University of Chicago.


The T is referenced in the Chicago Bears fight song, "Bear Down, Chicago Bears", written after the 1940 championship over Washington. "We'll never forget the way you thrilled the nation, with your T formation..."


The T formation is still used in a few instances at the high school level. In Utah, the Duchesne High School team set the state record of 48 consecutive wins using the Wing T. Some smaller colleges and high schools, particularly in the Midwest, still use the T. It is also still used on some levels as a goal line formation (often called a "full house" backfield today). Its simplicity, and emphasis on running, makes it particularly popular as a youth football formation.


In American football, a nickel defense (also known as a 4–2–5 or 3–3–5) is any defensive alignment that uses five defensive backs, of whom the fifth is known as a nickelback. The original and most common form of the nickel defense features four down linemen and two linebackers. Because the traditional 4–2 form preserves the defense's ability to stop an opponent's running game, it has remained more popular than its variants, to the extent that even when another formation technically falls within the "nickel" definition, coaches and analysts will refer to it by a more specific designation (e.g., "3–3–5" for a lineup of three down linemen and three linebackers) that conveys more information with equal or greater conciseness.


In college football, TCU is known to use a nickel defense as its base set, typically playing three safeties and two linebackers. Current Horned Frogs coach Gary Patterson installed the nickel partly out of necessity upon finding that larger and more prominent programs, most notably those of the large public universities in Texas, were able to "recruit away" most of the large athletes who would otherwise be available to the TCU program. As it turned out, the nickel proved to be a very good set against the spread offenses proliferating throughout college football in the early 21st century.


A common defensive front adjustment for 3–4 teams to accommodate the nickel backfield involves putting the two outside linebackers into a three-point stance shading the offensive tackles (i.e., a 5 technique). To complete the adjustment, the 3–4 defensive ends are moved to face or shade the offensive guards. The nose tackle is removed for a defensive back. The purpose of this is to leave the four best pass rushers on the field in a long yardage situation. This is not the only adjustment that can be made. Bill Arnsparger would often remove linebackers from a 3–4 to create nickel and dime sets, replacing them with defensive backs.


Zone coverage (also referred to as a zone defense) is a defense scheme in gridiron football used to protect against the pass.


Zone coverage schemes require the linebackers and defensive backs to work together to cover certain areas of the field, making it difficult for the opposing quarterback to complete passes. Zone defenses will generally require linebackers to cover the short and midrange area in the middle of the field, in front of the safeties. In the case where one or two linebackers blitz, the remaining linebacker(s) expands his zone to cover the zone responsibilities of the vacating linebacker(s). Often, blitzing will leave larger holes in the pass defense, but it is a gamble the defensive coordinator wants to make to pressure the quarterback into a poor decision and hopefully an interception or at least an incompletion.


In the following, "cover" refers to the "shell" that the defense rolls into after the snap of the ball, more specifically the number of defenders guarding the deep portion of the field.


In passing situations, the defense will assign players to guard portions of the field, forming a defensive "shell" that the defense hopes will either prevent the offense from completing a pass or ensure a defensive player is able to tackle the receiver after a completed pass. The general terminology used to describe this alignment is "Cover #," with "#" being the number of defensive players forming the coverage shell.


Cover One is a man-to-man coverage for all the defensive backs except for one player (usually a safety) who is not assigned a man to cover but rather plays deep and reacts to the development of the play. Often the safety will remain in a pass coverage position and play a zone defense by guarding the middle of the secondary, reacting to runs or completed passes and double-teaming a receiver if needed.


In a traditional Cover 1, the free safety plays deep and all of the other defenders lock in man coverage to an assigned player for the duration of the play. Essentially, during the pre-snap read, each defender identifies the coverage responsibilities and does not change the assignment. Some teams play a variant of the Cover 1 called Cover 7. In Cover 7, the free safety still plays deep, but the underneath coverage is much more flexible and the defenders switch assignments as the play develops in an attempt to improve defensive positions to make a play on the ball. Examples of these switches include double covering a certain receiver and using defensive help to undercut a route to block a throwing lane.


Cover 1 schemes are usually very aggressive, preferring to proactively disrupt the offense by giving the quarterback little time to make a decision while collapsing the pocket quickly. This is the main advantage of Cover 1 schemes—the ability to blitz from various pre-snap formations while engaging in complex man-to-man coverage schemes post-snap. For example, a safety may blitz while a cornerback is locked in man coverage with a receiver. Or the cornerback may blitz with the safety rotating into man coverage on the receiver post-snap.


The main weakness of the Cover 1 scheme is that there is only one deep defender that must cover a large amount of field and provide help on any deep threats. Offenses can attack Cover 1 schemes by sending two receivers on deep routes, provided that the quarterback has enough time for his receivers to get open. The deep defender must decide which receiver to help out on, leaving the other in man coverage which may be a mismatch.


A secondary weakness is inherent in its design: the use of man coverage opens up yards after catch lanes. Man coverage is attacked by offenses in various ways that try to isolate their best athletes on defenders by passing them the ball quickly before the defender can react or designing plays that clear defenders from certain areas thus opening yards after catch lanes.


Teams that play Cover 2 shells usually subscribe to the "bend-but-don't-break" philosophy, preferring to keep offensive players in front of them for short gains while limiting long passes. This is in stark contrast to a more aggressive Cover 1 type scheme which leaves the offensive team's wide receivers in single man-to-man coverage with only one deep helper. By splitting the deep field between two defenders, the defense can drastically reduce the number of long gains.


In Cover 2 the cornerbacks are considered to be "hard" corners, meaning that they have increased run stopping responsibilities and generally defend against shorter passes, although if two receivers run a deep route on a certain side of the field, that side's corner has deep coverage responsibility as well. The "hard" corners also generally bear the responsibility of "pressing" or "jamming" the offensive receivers- disrupting the receivers intended path downfield. It also relies heavily on the "Mike" (Middle) linebacker's ability to quickly drop deep downfield into pass coverage when he reads a pass.


A variant of cover two is the Inverted Cover 2, in which either right before or after the snap the corners "bail" out while the safeties come up—in effect switching responsibilities. This strategy may be employed to trick a quarterback who has not correctly interpreted the shift. The main drawback here is that the middle of the field is left open.


The advantage of cover 2 is that it provides great versatility to the defense as the corners can play run, short pass, and deep pass with the confidence that they have support from two deep safeties.


Another disadvantage of Cover 2 is that it leaves only seven men in the "box" (the area near the ball at the snap) to defend against the run. In contrast Cover 1 and Cover 3 usually have eight men in the box.


A potential problem with the Cover 2 is that defensive pressure on the Quarterback must be provided nearly exclusively by the front linemen as all other defenders are involved in pass coverage. If the defensive linemen do not provide adequate pressure on the Quarterback, the offense is afforded plenty of time to create and exploit passing opportunities. Blitzing in the Cover 2 often creates greater areas of weakness in the defense than other coverages. Thus, unsuccessful blitzes can prove to be more productive for the offense than in other schemes.


In Cover 3, the two corners and free safety each have responsibility for a deep third of the field, while the strong safety plays like a linebacker. This coverage is generally considered to be a run stopping defense as it focuses on preventing big pass plays and stopping the run while giving up short passes.


On the snap, the CBs work for depth, backpedaling into their assigned zone. One safety moves toward the center of the field. The other safety is free to rotate into the flat area (about 2–4 yards beyond the line of scrimmage), provide pass coverage help, or blitz.


One of the biggest benefits of the Cover 3 coverage scheme is the ability to walk the strong safety up into the box with minimal to no changes in the coverage due to the pre-snap center field position of the free safety. This enables the defense to play strong against the run, but still prevent explosion plays such as a long pass or break away run. This advantage is most pronounced versus two tight end sets which naturally creates 8 holes for running backs, whereas in cover 2 schemes there are only 7 defenders in the box leaving 1 hole uncovered, or requiring a defender to cover 2 holes.


Cover 3 schemes are susceptible to short, timed passes to the outside due to the hard drop of both cornerbacks. This puts pressure on the outside linebackers to react to pass plays and get into their drop quickly if they need to cover a receiver.


Another disadvantage of Cover 3 schemes is they are relatively easy to diagnose by opposing quarterbacks. Because of this, teams will often employ slight wrinkles in their coverage to confuse offenses. An example of this includes employing man coverage on one side and zone on another or swapping coverage zones between defenders. Also leaves the seams open and makes the safety choose on four verticals which leaves one open.


Cover 4 refers to 4 deep defenders each guarding one-fourth of the deep zone. Cover 4 schemes are almost always used to defend against deep passes. (see also Prevent defense).


The most basic Cover 4 scheme involves 3 CBs and 2 safeties. Upon snap, the CBs work for depth, backpedaling into their assigned zone. Both safeties backpedal towards their assigned zone.


As with other coverage shells, Cover 4 is paired with underneath man or zone coverage in its most basic form.


The main advantage of a Cover 4 defense is that it is extremely difficult for even the best quarterbacks to complete long passes against it. Therefore, this coverage is generally used as a prevent defense to be used near the end of a game or half, meaning that the defense sacrifices the run and short pass to avoid giving up the big play with the confidence that the clock will soon expire.


Cover 4 also has the advantage of using safeties in run support as opposed to cornerbacks as would be the case in a Cover 2 scheme. This gives the defense nine in the box and the ability to stop the run with an extra defender on either side. The play-side safety would come up in support on a running play while the back-side safety would be responsible for the middle third of the field and the cornerbacks would have the deep outside thirds.


The main weakness of Cover 4 shells is the large amount of space left open by the retreating defensive backs. Since the defensive backs are working for depth, short pass routes underneath can enable the quarterback to make short- and medium- length passes, as well as isolate a defensive back on a wide receiver near the sideline with little help.


Cover 6 call defensive strength to the Field instead of to the offensive formation or front, and organize personnel by Field-side player and Boundary-side player. The position of the ball on the field therefore dictates strength of the offense. In Cover 6 the field safety and field corner cover fourths of the field, and depend on a field outside linebacker to support underneath them. The free safety covers the boundary-side deep half and the boundary corner plays the flat. Thus the field side of the coverage is quarters, and the boundary side is cover 2.


The Cover 6 gets its name from the fact that it combines elements of the Cover 2 (the strong safety covering half the field) and the Cover 4 on the opposite side. The Pittsburgh Steelers are a Cover 6 team. The quarters play of the strong side safety, like the Steelers' Troy Polamalu, allows him to support on runs quickly. The Tennessee Titans have also been known to use it.


On the strong side, the corner and safety play "Cover 4 rules", which as above the corner and safety each have a quarter of the field working for depth in their zones. The "Sam" linebacker will be dropping outside to cover the flats. If in 3-4 the Middle Backer will cover that sides hook to curl if not blitzing.


On the weak side, the corner and safety play "Cover 2 rules", which as above the corner stays home in the flats, and the safety covers the deep half. The "Will" backer will play hook to curl or blitz depending on the call. If in 3-4 usually the "Will" or the Middle Backer will blitz from that side.


The Cover 6 is also good for calling a corner blitz from the weak side, and having the backer cover flats instead.


Cover 6 has the disadvantages of both Cover 2 and Cover 4. The field side is generally soft on flat coverage. The field side corner can be left in single coverage deep as well. On runs, the field side may be spread by a tight end and 2 receiver formation, offering an advantage on the edge. The Boundary side is hard behind the corner to the sideline, as well as in the seam between corner and linebacker.


Cover 0 refers to pure man coverage with no deep defender. Similar to Cover 1, Cover 0 has the same strengths and weaknesses but employs an extra rusher at the expense of deep coverage help leaving each pass defender man-to-man. Cover 0 is an aggressive scheme that allows for numerous blitz packages, as it's easier for players to drop off their coverage and rush the quarterback. However, there is no "help over the top"—if a wide receiver "beats" (achieves separation from) his defender, there is no one left in the secondary who can make up the coverage on the receiver, which could result in an easy pass completion and possible touchdown.


In American football, an eight-in-the-box defense is a defensive alignment in which 8 of the 11 defensive players are close to the line of scrimmage.


The area occupied by defensive linemen and linebackers is often referred to as "the box". The box is usually about 3-5 yards in depth and spans the offensive line in width. Normally five to seven defensive players occupy this area but frequently another player is brought into the box for run support against smashmouth-oriented offensive teams or short yardage situations.


Obvious advantages come off the eight in the box strategy including more defenders to stop the run game of the opponent which is the main reason for this strategy. The eight in the box scheme is also often used by teams throughout the NFL as a disguise to which players will be coming after the quarterback. This creates a level of difficulty for the offensive linemen because they will not know pre-snap who they will need to block. Quick decisions will need to be made after the snap of the ball.


Buck-lateral is an American football play or a series of plays used in the Single-wing formation. Since the Single-Wing formation lost prominence by 1950, the football play referred to as the Buck-lateral is almost gone from football's vocabulary. However, prior to this time, the buck-lateral play gave fullbacks the option to run, lateral, or hand-off the ball to another player. Running the buck-lateral required an offensive scheme that needed the fullback to possess many specialized skills, as opposed to today's fullback who mainly blocks and carries the ball infrequently.


Before the invention of the Single-Wing offense by Pop Warner, offenses used simple plays designed for runners to attack the defensive front behind massed line blocking. This battering ram approach usually involved the biggest runner, the fullback, as his main role was to "buck" or smash the middle of the defensive front.


The term lateral describes a short toss from one back to another that does not advance the ball. (see lateral pass) A ball that goes forward to another player is called a forward pass. The pass and the lateral are both allowed to advance the ball when the offense is operating behind their line of scrimmage. Once beyond the line of scrimmage the lateral is the only means of transferring the ball to another player.


The Buck-lateral was a play designed for single wing fullbacks to receive the toss from the center, and start toward the central part of the line to make the play look like a typical smash or buck. However, at some point the fullback might pause to do one of several deceptive options, usually handing-off to passing backs or even keeping the ball and plowing ahead. If the fullback delivers the ball to another back, the new carrier might have several additional options including handing or lateralling the ball to still another back.


Warner's Carlisle formation, or Single-Wing, added additional misdirection and trickery to allow for runners to gain yards by deceiving the defense. The Single-wing also allowed the offense to put more blockers at the point of attack than the defense could muster.


The buck-lateral play was actually a series of plays that started out the same way with the fullback taking the direct snap from center, then directing his forward movement toward the middle of the line of scrimmage. The play had several scripted or "read" options to confuse the defense. The player who was given permission to read the play could determine for himself whether to keep the ball or deliver it to another player. The fullback could basically either keep the ball to pound the middle of the line, or he could give the ball to one of the three other single-wing backs, usually the quarterback. Once in possession, the quarterback then continued the possibilities for initiating other permutations to the play.


To understand the mechanics of the play, one has to understand basic terminology of the single-wing formation.


The tailback was stationed four and one-half yards behind the short-side guard. In a typical formation, the fullback would line up three and one-half yards behind the long-side guard. One and one-half yards behind the tackle or guard, would be the quarterback or blocking back. Finally, the wingback aligns himself to the outside of the opposing defensive tackle. He is only one yard off the line.


In most offenses the tailback was the main ball handler and generator of offense; however, the fullback could also take the direct snap due to his proximity to the tailback. In fact whenever the ball was snapped, one of the two backs would take the snap while the other feigned taking the snap to confuse the defense.


A popular scenario for the buck-lateral saw the fullback with the option to hand-off to the quarterback. The quarterback, on taking the ball, could try to sweep the end or toss the ball to the tailback, who had been paralleling the play more deeply in the backfield. If the tailback takes the lateral from the quarterback, he is in position to sweep the end, or even throw the ball to a receiver down field.


Coaches created different versions of the buck-lateral depending on the versatility of the backfield. In one version the fullback might fake a hand-off to the quarterback, who is standing with his back to the defense to hide the lack of exchange. In another version, the fullback could give the ball to the quarterback, who then might initiate a reverse by giving the ball to the wingback coming back against the flow of the play. In another twist, the quarterback could take the fullback hand-off and complete a jump-pass.


The buck-lateral was especially deceptive and effective, but hard to execute. The single-wing fullback had to have the skills of a modern-day quarterback in handling the ball. Plus, he had to be able to take the punishment associated with bucking the middle of the defense where the bigger, stronger defensive players were stationed.


When the fullback took the snap, defensive players expected the play to hit the center of the line because the traditional role of the fullback was to grind out yardage between the tackles. Defensive players who rushed to stop the fullback at the guard-center gap might be totally surprised if the fullback slipped the ball to the nearby quarterback who was heading in another direction.


Consequently, single-wing teams that could master the buck-lateral series of plays could be successful by always making the defense guess to where the ball was going. Of course, if the defense loses sight of the ball during the fakes or laterals, then the defense is at an extreme disadvantage.


Today's coaches would call the buck-lateral a gadget play, because it was designed to thoroughly confuse the defense by making its members lose sight of the ball with fakes, counter action, and laterals. Trick plays are harder to execute and demand considerably more practice time than less complicated plays.


The Kansas City Chiefs used the fullback inside run variant of the Buck Lateral series on a fourth-and-short situation to set up their first touchdown.


The A-11 offense is an offensive scheme that has been used in some levels of amateur American football. In this offense, a loophole in the rules governing kicking formations is used to disguise which offensive players would be eligible to receive a pass for any given play. It was designed by Kurt Bryan and Steve Humphries of Piedmont High School in California.


The scheme was used at the high school level for two seasons before the national governing body of high school football, the National Federation of State High School Associations, closed the scrimmage kick loophole in February 2009, effectively banning important facets of the offense. Due to rules regarding player numbering and eligible receivers, the scheme as originally designed is not usable at most levels of football, including the National Football League and college football.


The A-11 offense was to be the basis of the A-11 Football League (A11FL), a professional football league which was scheduled to play its first season in 2015. However, after announcing franchises names and scheduling "showcase games" in early 2014, the A11FL folded before taking the field.


The A-11 offense was developed in 2007 by head coach Kurt Bryan and offensive coordinator Steve Humphries at Piedmont High School in Piedmont, California. Coming off a 5–6 record in 2006, the coaches were looking for an edge to compete against other teams that fielded more top athletes. Bryan and Humphries found a loophole in the rules concerning allowable punt formations which they used it to design an every-down offense in which all 11 (hence the name "A-11") players were potentially eligible to receive a forward pass. Using the A-11, Piedmont's record improved to 7–4 in 2007 and 8–3 in 2008, with the offense often confusing defenses and scoring more points.


While some high school coaches noticed Piedmont's success with the A-11 and began incorporating aspects of the offense into their own playbooks, others called the system "an unsporting act" and "outside of the spirit of the rule code". Bryan and Humphries began heavily promoting coaching clinics, instructional DVDs, and other materials soon after completing their first season running the offense, which also drew criticism from other coaches.


High school athletic associations in North Carolina, West Virginia, Louisiana, and the District of Columbia banned the use of the A-11 for the 2008 season. In February 2009, the National Federation of State High School Associations rules committee voted 46–2 to close the loophole allowing the linemen-free formations featured in the A-11. The system's creators petitioned the California Interscholastic Federation to allow use of the offense over the next three seasons on an experimental basis, but the appeal was denied.


The scheme's creators modified the system to comply with the rule changes in 2009. Though the offensive personnel is spread out more than in conventional formations, this version of the A-11 abides by the numbering requirements, making it easier for the defense to determine which players could legally go out for a pass. As such, it is similar to spread schemes from the early days of football such as the Emory & Henry formation. As such, unlike the original A-11, the modified version is legal in most levels of football.


The most striking characteristic of the A-11 is its use of a formation in which most offensive players except the center are spread out across the line of scrimmage standing upright. In conventional football formations, five or more offensive players are offensive linemen, who set up before each play in a three-point stance and who serve exclusively as blockers. Offensive linemen almost never carry the football and are almost always ineligible to catch a forward pass or even advance beyond the line of scrimmage before a pass is thrown. At most levels of football, (including the National Football League (NFL), college football, and American high school football), offensive linemen must wear jersey numbers from 50 to 79, marking them as ineligible receivers in all but very limited situations.


To use the scrimmage kick formation exemption, the player who receives the snap (presumably the kicker or placeholder) must stand at least seven yards behind the line of scrimmage. The A-11 places the quarterback in that position, which becomes a deep shotgun formation. This has the effect of reducing the need for offensive line protection since defensive players have more ground to cover before reaching the passer. The offense also places an additional passing back (similar to the wildcat offense) in the backfield next to the quarterback, creating the potential for either back to receive the snap, pitch to the other back, run or pass the ball, block, or go out for a pass.


As mentioned, a loophole in the rules regarding punt formations allowed the A-11 to be used at the high school level until 2009, when the National Federation of State High School Associations rules committee closed the loophole. A modified version that complies with uniform numbering regulations can still be used.


The scrimmage kick formation is allowed on fourth downs under NCAA rules and on conversion attempts, and a few situations which define a scrimmage kick formation with an additional requirement that "it is obvious that a kick may be attempted." It is otherwise not allowed for most normal plays, making the original A-11 impossible to use on an every-down basis.


The A-11 was also not legal under Canadian football rules. There is no scrimmage kick exemption in the Canadian Football League (CFL). Persons who wish to change position from an eligible to an ineligible receiver (or vice versa) must physically change their uniform to a number that reflects their eligibility, and must seek permission from the official to do so.


Furthermore, until the end of the 2008 season the CFL rule book dictated that a designated quarterback must take all snaps, which made the two-quarterback system used by the A-11 (as well as offenses such as the Wildcat) illegal in the CFL. This rule was removed in CFL, mainly so that the Wildcat formation could be used. However, the A-11 is still unusable.


Single set back (also known as the "Lone Setback" or "Singleback" or "Ace" formation or "Oneback" or "Solo") is an offensive base formation in American Football which requires only one running back (usually a halfback) lined up about five yards behind the quarterback. There are many variations on single back formations including two tight ends and two wide receivers, one tight end/three wide receivers, etc. The running back can line up directly behind the quarterback or offset either the weak side (away from the tight end) or the strong side (towards the tight end).


This formation has gained popularity in the NFL as teams have started trading out a fullback, or blocking back, in favor of another wide receiver or tight end who is usually faster and better able to receive the ball, while still helping the run game with down-field blocks. The effectiveness of the formation is further increased if the team has athletic tight ends with good pass catching abilities, thereby increasing the versatility of the formation. It is, moreover, good for bootlegs and reverses.


The prevent defense is a defensive alignment in American football that seeks to prevent the offense from completing a long pass or scoring a touchdown in a single play and seeks to run out the clock. It is used by a defense that is winning by more than a touchdown, late in the fourth quarter, or in specific situations, such as third-and-very-long if it seems clear that the offense must pass the football to gain long yardage.


The alignment uses five or more defensive backs (or players in that role), preferring fast players over large players. They back up so far that they concede short-yardage plays but try to ensure that no receiver is uncovered downfield or can get behind them.


The prevent defense concedes short gains, such as four to eight yards per play, as long as the clock keeps running, but aims to prevent plays resulting in longer gains.


Safeties and cornerbacks pull back to a "safe zone" five to ten yards off the line of scrimmage, and the free safety often plays as far as twenty yards back. The defense does not jam receivers on the line. The prevent defense employs zone defense, in which each defensive back is responsible for an area of the field rather than a specific player. The backs watch the quarterback's eyes to determine where he intends to pass the ball.


When used late in the fourth quarter to run out the clock, the sidelines become an important area to defend, as a player who receives a pass near the sideline can run out of bounds and stop the clock. The defender's priority is less to prevent a reception than to keep the receiver in bounds following one. This keeps the clock running and reduces the amount of time the offense has to score.


The prevent defense uses five or more defensive backs.


The nickel defense has five backs, so named because the nickel is the five-cent coin.


The quarter defense has three down linemen, one linebacker, and seven defensive backs.


The half-dollar defense has eight defensive backs, no linebackers and three defensive linemen. The rare package is used when the offense needs to score a touchdown on the very next play, such as with a desperation Hail Mary pass. In theory, "dollar defense" (nine backs) and "twoonie defenses" (ten backs) are also possible but, for practical reasons, are almost never used; similar scenarios may involve linebackers replacing defensive linemen.


Professional teams may not have enough defensive backs on the roster to play the quarter or half-dollar defenses, so wide receivers sometimes fill the extra positions, particularly in late-game situations when the receivers' offensive skills can be put to defensive use.


When the defense concedes short plays, an offense that can practice clock management effectively can score without executing the long pass the defense seeks to prevent. Some coaches avoid using the prevent defense and choose instead to continue playing the same defensive schemes that seemed to be working well to that point. John Madden once said, "All a prevent defense does is prevent you from winning."


By conceding to the offense many easy gains for short yardage but no big play, the prevent defense can make the end of the game uninteresting for fans.


The attempt to prevent a long-yardage play can be a victim of individual effort, as happened to the Denver Broncos in the 2012 AFC Divisional Round playoff game. With less than 40 seconds to play, the Baltimore Ravens needed a touchdown to tie the game and faced a third down from their own 30-yard line. Broncos safety Rahim Moore allowed Baltimore receiver Jacoby Jones to get behind him and catch a 70-yard touchdown pass from Joe Flacco. The Ravens went on to win the game in double overtime.


The spread offense is an offensive scheme in gridiron football that typically places the quarterback in the shotgun formation, and "spreads" the defense horizontally using three-, four-, and even five-receiver sets. Used at every level of the game including professional (NFL, CFL), college (NCAA, NAIA, CIS), and high school programs across the US and Canada, spread offenses often employ a no-huddle approach. Some implementations of the spread also feature wide splits between the offensive linemen.


Spread offenses can emphasize the pass or the run, with the common attribute that they force the defense to cover the entire field from sideline to sideline. Many spread teams use the read option running play to put pressure on both sides of the defense. Similar to the run and shoot offense, passing-oriented spread offenses often leverage vertical (down field) passing routes to spread the defense vertically, which opens up multiple vertical seams for both the running and passing game.


The grandfather of the spread offense is Rusty Russell, a graduate of Howard Payne University, in Brownwood, Texas, and coach of Fort Worth's Masonic Home and School for orphaned boys. Russell began coaching Masonic Home in 1927, and due to the fact that his teams were often over-matched physically by other schools, they were called the "Mighty Mites". While there, he deployed the earliest form of a spread offense to great success. Russell's team is the subject of a book by author Jim Dent entitled, "Twelve Mighty Orphans: The Inspiring True Story of the Mighty Mites Who Ruled Texas Football".


But, as Bart Wright notes in his 2013 book "Football Revolution: The Rise of the Spread Offense and How It Transformed College Football", Meyer's spread the defensive rush to the ball….” While some later football historians and coaches have confused the Meyer Spread, which relied on great quarterbacks like Baugh and O’Brien to pass around 17 times a game on average, with more contemporary spread offenses, Wright concludes that it is “preposterous that Meyer’s offense was any sort of antecedent” to the modern spread offense invented by Jack Neumeier around 1970 (see below).


The spread's first evolution came about in 1956 when former NIU Huskies head coach Howard Fletcher adapted Meyer's spread with the shotgun formation to create what he termed the "Shotgun Spread" a more pass-oriented version. Under Fletcher's newly created offense, quarterback George Bork led the nation in total offense and passing in 1962 and 1963. Bork became the first man in college football history to pass for 3,000 yards in a season in 1963 while guiding the Huskies to a victory in the Mineral Water Bowl and the NCAA College Division National Championship.


The modern spread: Jack Neumeier and "basketball on grass".


While there is no evidence to suggest Neumeier had heard of Rusty Russell or Howard Fletcher in 1970, Jack Neumeier evidently built his offensive theories upon a foundation established by other coaches, including Glenn “Tiger” Ellison, a high school coach from Ohio and a college teammate and friend of legendary Ohio State coach Woody Hayes. published a book, "Run and Shoot Football: Offense of the Future", in 1965 that found its way into Neumeier's library. In his book, Ellison describes his desperate experiments with the "departure into insanity" "Lonesome Polecat" sandlot-style formation in a successful attempt to avoid a losing season in 1958.


Neumeier then took Ellison’s ideas and synthesized something even more innovative than the “Run and Shoot.” Combining motion, four wide receivers, an occasional no-huddle series and a power running game, along with blocking innovations designed for an undersized line added to the mix by his offensive line coach Jack Mathias, Neumeier's great experiment in 1970 and his tinkering during subsequent seasons took football offenses in a new direction.


Another piece of the puzzle Neumeier assembled preparing for the 1970 season came from Red Hickey during Hickey's stint coaching the San Francisco 49ers. Hickey first utilized the shotgun formation in a 1960 NFL game against the Baltimore Colts. The shotgun, based on an old short punt formation that dated back to the World War I era, which Pop Warner then updated as a double wing formation in the 1930s at Stanford, featured the quarterback setting up for a long snap seven yards behind the center. Hickey thought it might help to slow the Colt pass rush and give the 49ers quarterback another second or two to spot his receivers.


A brief sensation for the 49ers, Hickey's shotgun formation only lasted for the final few games of the 1960 season and a few games into 1961. Opponents soon neutralized the formation when they realized that their defenses could take advantage of the need for the center to focus on the long snap before making his block. Linebackers blitzing up the middle collapsed the pocket protecting 49er quarterbacks. By the end of the 1961 NFL season, football coaches universally agreed that the shotgun formation was dead and buried, until Jack Neumeier resurrected it as part of the new spread passing offense he synthesized.


Sid Gillman, after a long career, coached the San Diego Chargers throughout the 1960s. Before his lengthy stint with the Chargers, he coached the Los Angeles Rams. An innovator with the use of motion and passing in football offenses, Gillman also revolutionized the use of game films to study opposing teams. As a trademark of his offenses, Gillman utilized the forward passing of his talented quarterback John Hadl to Hall of Fame split end Lance Alworth and flanker Gary Garrison to open up defenses for the Chargers’ rushing game and to move the ball down the field.


Gillman continued coaching off and on into the 1980s. During a stint working with the Los Angeles Express of the short-lived United States Football League during the early ‘80s, Gillman became a leading advocate for what some sportswriters referred to as the “ace” formation, a variation of the one-back spread offense that evolved after Jack Neumeier's retirement from coaching.


In an article written by Bob Oates of the Los Angeles Times in 1984, Gillman talked about evolving trends and the future of football. “’The thing that makes the ace formation so effective’ Gillman said, ‘is that it enables you to do so many more things. Its offensive potential – with four guys up there in receiving positions – is mathematically almost limitless. It causes the defense more trouble than any two-back formation.’”