The heart of the system devised by Don Coryell is a three-digit number that gives assignments to each of three pass receivers; for instance, the split end, the tight end, and the flanker, in that order; or the leftmost receiver, middle receiver, and right receiver, in that order. Each digit is a code for one of nine passing routes the receiver is to run, based on a "route tree". Some routes include a change of direction with which to throw off the defender covering the receiver. Through the route tree, the quarterback knows where each receiver will be and can quickly scan to see who is most open.


The nine numbered passing routes tell a receiver to run as follows when the ball is snapped:


The Coryell system is primarily concerned with efficiently devising pass plays, an important factor in the Air Coryell offense. It allows quick and unambiguous communication with each receiver on a passing play. However, if there are more than three receivers or more than 9 pass routes, or to assign a route to additional players, the system must be modified, as done in the West Coast system, reducing the efficiency advantage. In such a modified system, the quarterback might call, "896 H-Shallow F-Curl", assigning numbered routes to the three receivers (the split end, the tight end, and the flanker), while "H-Shallow" and "F-Curl" refer to routes run by the halfback and fullback.


A typical Erhardt–Perkins concept assigns each player a task based on his initial location. For example, "Ghost" is a three-receiver concept: the outside receiver runs a vertical or fly route, the middle receiver runs an 8-yard out route, and the inside receiver runs a flat route. "Ghost" works in any personnel package or formation; it can be run with a five wide receiver set in a spread formation, or "base personnel" in the I formation where the fullback motions into the slot position.


The Erhardt–Perkins system is more flexible than the other two systems. The play call is simple and brief. The team can use the remaining time on the play clock not to assign instructions but to study the defense and adapt its plan. The Erhardt–Perkins system works well with the no-huddle offense. The offense can run at a faster pace, getting more offensive plays in per game, conserving the time on the game clock, and keeping the defense on its heels.


However, the Erhardt–Perkins system requires versatile and intelligent players. The same player may line up as a running back, tight end, or wide receiver on any given play, so players need adequate skills to play several positions. Erhardt–Perkins requires that players memorize the entire playbook. Each player must know every route in every concept, and be able to run each route depending on which position in the formation he occupies. Players who are successful under other play calling systems can become lost in the complexities of Erhardt–Perkins. In 2015, 14-year NFL veteran wide receiver Reggie Wayne asked to be released from the New England Patriots after only 2 pre-season games. It was reported that Wayne thought that the playbook was too complicated to learn.


The Erhardt–Perkins system was developed by Ron Erhardt and Ray Perkins, two assistant coaches who worked under Chuck Fairbanks for the Patriots during the 1970s. The system was later implemented by the New York Giants in 1982 when Perkins was hired as their head coach, and Erhardt as his offensive coordinator. A third coach who followed Perkins and Erhardt from the Patriots to the Giants was defensive assistant Bill Parcells, who succeeded Perkins as head coach. Being primarily a defensive coach, Parcells retained Erhardt as his offensive coordinator and let him continue to use the Erhardt–Perkins offense and its play calling system. The system was disseminated through the league by various members of the Parcells coaching tree, and is used effectively by Patriots head coach Bill Belichick.


The New England Patriots generally run a modified Erhardt-Perkins offensive system and a Fairbanks-Bullough 3–4 defensive system, though they have also used a 4–3 defense and increased their use of the nickel defense.


The Patriots run a modified "Ron Erhardt-Ray Perkins" offensive system first installed by Charlie Weis under Bill Belichick. Both Ron Erhardt and Ray Perkins served as offensive assistant coaches under the defensive-minded Chuck Fairbanks while he was head coach of the Patriots in the 1970s. This system is known for its multiple formation and personnel grouping variations on a core number of base plays. Under this system, each formation and each play are separately numbered. Additional word descriptions further modify each play.


The Erhardt-Perkins system traditionally had a reputation of being a smash-mouth offense that maximizes a team's time of possession and does not frequently call upon its running backs to serve as receivers. Erhardt often said, "throw to score, run to win." This may have been especially true during the years Bill Parcells ran this system as the head coach of the New York Giants.


An example of a running play under this system is "Zero, Ride Thirty-six". Zero sets the formation. Thirty indicates who will be the ball carrier running with the ball. Six indicates which hole between the offensive linemen the ball carrier will attempt to run through (see Offensive Nomenclature).


Parcells ran the Erhardt-Perkins offensive system during his pro coaching years, which is where Weis originally learned it. Many teams coached by members of the Parcells-Belichick coaching tree currently use this system, such as Notre Dame during Weis' tenure. The Pittsburgh Steelers also continued to run this system during the Bill Cowher years, from when Ron Erhardt was their offensive coordinator. The Carolina Panthers ran this system as well, under Jeff Davidson, a former Belichick assistant.


Comparison to "West Coast" and "Air Coryell" offenses.


In the view of some experts, there are only approximately five or six major offensive systems run in the NFL today.


The nomenclature of the Erhardt-Perkins system is very different from the Bill Walsh West Coast offense. Formations under the West Coast offense are commonly named after colors (i.e., Green Right). The west coast offense commonly utilizes high percentage, short slanting passes and running backs as receivers. It prefers to have mobile quarterbacks (since its running backs may not be available to block) and large receivers who are able to gain additional yards after the catch.


The nomenclature of the Erhardt-Perkins system is also very different from the Ernie Zampese-Don Coryell "Air Coryell" timed system. Route patterns of the receivers are numbered instead of named in the Air Coryell system (thereby making memorization easier). For example, an Air Coryell play such as "924 F stop swing" indicates that the primary wide receiver (X) should run a 9 pattern (a go), the tight end (Y) should run a 2 pattern (a slant), the secondary wide receiver (Z) should run a 4 pattern (a curl) and the F-back should go out for a swing pass (see Offensive nomenclature). Timing and precision are extremely important under the Air Coryell system, as the routes are intended to run like successive clockwork in order to be successful.


Around 2011, Bill Belichick increasingly adopted an up-tempo, no-huddle offense for his team. The idea behind this strategy is for the offense to call plays rapidly without pause and without a huddle. The intention was to tire the defensive side of the ball out more quickly, prevent them from changing their personnel on the field, and limit the complexity of their plays.


The "Fairbanks-Bullough" 3–4 system is known as a two gap system, because each of the defensive linemen are required to cover the gaps to both sides of the offensive lineman that try to block them. Defensive linemen in this system tend to be stouter, as they need to be able to hold their place without being overwhelmed in order to allow the linebackers behind them to make plays. This is the reason that defensive linemen such as Richard Seymour and Vince Wilfork do not always rack up sack and tackle statistics despite their critical importance to the team.


The system is at times more conservative than certain other defenses currently in vogue in the league, despite the constant threat of its potent linebacker blitz. The Patriots defensive system generally places an emphasis on physicality and discipline over mobility and risk taking and is sometimes characterized as a "bend but do not break defense". The Patriots are also known for putting a great deal of emphasis on the front seven (defensive line and linebackers) but less so on the secondary.


The 3–4 defense was originally devised by Bud Wilkinson at the University of Oklahoma in the late 1940s. Former Patriots and Oklahoma coach Chuck Fairbanks is credited with being a major figure in first bringing the 3–4 defense to the NFL in 1974. It is unclear if the Patriots under Fairbanks or the Houston Oilers under Bum Phillips were the first team to bring the 3–4 defense to the NFL.


Patriots defensive coordinator Hank Bullough made significant further innovations to the system. Parcells was linebackers coach under Ron Erhardt as head coach of the Patriots in 1980 (after Fairbanks left for Colorado in 1978 and Bullough lost out on the head coaching position). When Parcells returned to the Giants as defensive coordinator under Ray Perkins in 1981, he brought the 3–4 defense with him.


Bill Belichick was initially exposed to the 3–4 defense while working as an assistant under Red Miller, head coach of the Denver Broncos and a former Patriots offensive coordinator under Fairbanks. Joe Collier was the defensive coordinator under Red Miller at the time, and his Orange Crush Defense was very successful at stifling opposing offenses. The Broncos had decided to adopt the 3–4 in 1977. Bill Belichick subsequently refined his understanding of the 3–4 as a linebackers coach and defensive coordinator under Parcells with the Giants. Belichick returned the 3–4 defense back to New England when he became coach of the team in 2000. Romeo Crennel subsequently became defensive coordinator for the team.


Bill Parcells ran the Fairbanks-Bullough 3–4 defensive system during his coaching years. He served as an NFL head coach for 19 seasons, coaching the New York Giants (1983–1990), New England Patriots (1993–1996), New York Jets (1997–1999) and Dallas Cowboys (2003–2006). Parcells, who won 2 Super Bowls with the Giants in 1986 and 1990, earned a reputation for turning teams that were in a period of decline into postseason contenders. He is the only coach in NFL history to take 4 different teams to the NFL playoffs and 3 different NFL teams to a conference championship game. Parcells enjoyed more successful seasons when Bill Belichick served as his defensive coordinator. In 2013, Bill Parcells was inducted into the Pro Football Hall of Fame.


Many teams coached by members of the Parcells-Belichick coaching tree currently run similar defensive systems, such as the University of Alabama under Nick Saban and the Cleveland Browns under Eric Mangini from 2009–2010.


The 3–4 zone blitz defense was developed by Dick LeBeau as defensive coordinator of the Cincinnati Bengals. Prior to becoming defensive coordinator of the Bengals, LeBeau was tutored by Bengals defensive coordinator Hank Bullough. LeBeau's system commonly calls upon linemen to be mobile enough to drop back into zone coverage in place of blitzing linebackers. Elements of the 3–4 zone blitz defense have been incorporated over time into the modern Phillips 3–4.


Changes to New England's defensive scheme over time.


Over time, New England has also used a 4–3 defense and increased its usage of nickel defense. Belichick believes that teaching the techniques and fundamentals of his defense is more important than what alignment his defenses use, noting that he used a 4–3 defense when he coached the Cleveland Browns.


The New England Patriots are noted for the following characteristics:


For example, in Super Bowl XXXVI, the Patriots' defense used an aggressive bump and run nickel and dime package instead of their base 3–4 to disrupt the timing of the highly touted Air Coryell system employed by the Rams under Mike Martz (also known as "The Greatest Show on Turf"). This modifiable aspect of the Patriots system is in stark contrast to simpler systems like the Tampa 2 defense, in which the same scheme is often run repeatedly with the emphasis being on execution rather than on flexibility.


In his book "How Football Explains America", Sal Paolantonio noted the many parallels between the Patriots' philosophy and military training taught at West Point. This is likely the result of Bill Parcells' having coached at West Point for four years and Bill Belichick's close ties with the Naval Academy.


In American football the air raid offense refers to an offensive scheme popularized by such coaches as Mike Leach, Hal Mumme, Sonny Dykes, and Tony Franklin during their tenures at Iowa Wesleyan University, Valdosta State, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Texas Tech, Louisiana Tech, and Washington State.


The system is designed out of a shotgun formation with four wide receivers and one running back. The formations are a variation of the run and shoot offense with two outside receivers and two inside slot receivers. The offense also uses trips formations featuring three wide receivers on one side of the field and a lone single receiver on the other side.


The offense owes much to the influence of BYU head coach LaVell Edwards who used the splits and several key passing concepts during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s while coaching players such as Jim McMahon, Steve Young, Robbie Bosco, and Ty Detmer. Mike Leach has made reference that he and Hal Mumme largely incorporated much of the BYU passing attack into what is now known as the air raid offense. Some of the concepts such as the shallow cross route were incorporated into such offenses as the West Coast offense during the early 1990s as well, prominently under Mike Shanahan while he was the head coach of the Denver Broncos.


The scheme is notable for its focus on passing. As many as 65–75% of the calls during a season result in a passing play. The quarterback has the freedom to audible to any play based on what the defense is showing him at the line of scrimmage. In at least one instance, as a result of the quarterback's ability to audible, as many as 90% of the run plays called in a season were chosen by audible at the line of scrimmage.


An important element in this offense is the inclusion of the no huddle. The quarterback and the offense race up to the line of scrimmage, diagnose what the defense is showing, and then snap the ball based on the quarterback's play call. This not only allows a team to come back if they are many points down as seen in the 2006 Insight Bowl, but it also allows them to tire out the defense, allowing for bigger runs and longer pass completions. The fast pace limits the defense's ability to substitute players and adjust their scheme. The hurried pace can cause defensive mental mistakes such as missed assignments, being out of position or too many men on the field.


Another important aspect of the air raid offense is the split of the offensive linemen. In a conventional offense, the linemen are bunched together fairly tightly but in an air raid offense, linemen are often split apart about a half to a full yard from another. While in theory this allows easier blitz lanes, it forces the defensive ends and defensive tackles to run further to reach the quarterback for a sack. The quick, short passes offset any Blitz that may come. Another advantage is that by forcing the defensive line to widen, it opens up wide passing lanes for the quarterback to throw the ball through with less chance of having his pass knocked down or intercepted.


Fundamental air raid play concepts include Mesh, Stick and Corner, All Curls, 4 Verts, and Fast Screens. These plays are designed to get the ball out of the quarterback's hand quickly, stretch the defense horizontally and vertically, and allow the quarterback to key on one defensive player who will forced to make a decision on which receiver to cover in his assigned area. While air raid plays are commonly designed to beat zone coverages, they also work well against man-to-man schemes since air raid offenses often employ receivers with more than average speed, thus giving them an advantage in man-to-man coverage.


The mesh concept is the bread and butter of the air raid offense and stretches the defense vertically with an outside receiver running a deep route, typically a post route, the running back sliding out into the flat after checking for blocking assignments, and the two remaining receivers running shallow crossing routes that setup a natural pick, or coverage rub.


In gridiron football, clock management is the manipulation of a game clock and play clock to achieve a desired result, typically near the end of a match. It is analogous to "running out the clock" (and associated counter-tactics) seen in many sports, and the act of trying to hasten the game's end is often referred to by this term. Clock management strategies are a significant part of American football, where an elaborate set of rules dictates when the game clock stops between downs, and when it continues to run.


Upon kickoff, the clock is started when a member of the receiving team touches the ball, or, if the member of the receiving team touches the ball in their end zone, carries the ball out of the end zone. The clock is stopped when that player goes out of bounds. (The clock never starts if the receiving team downs the ball in their own end zone for a touchback.) The clock is then restarted when the offense snaps the ball for their first play and continues to run unless one of the following occurs, in which case the clock is stopped at the end of the play and restarts at the next snap unless otherwise provided:


If the clock runs out during a play, the current play is allowed to continue to its conclusion. If the clock runs out between downs, the period ends in American football, but in Canadian football the offense is allowed one last down.


Each team is given three timeouts per half which they can use to stop the clock from running after a play. In the NFL, teams get two timeouts in a preseason or regular season overtime period, or three in a postseason overtime half.


On a fair-catch punt, the clock starts at the snap and stops at the end of the play.


A team on offense that has the higher score seeks to use as much time as possible. A drive may therefore benefit the team, even if it scores no points, by taking time off the clock. The team may:


The team may use counterintuitive game plans, such as declining to score or allowing the opponents to score, to accelerate the end of the game.


A team on offense that has the lower score seeks to conserve time. The team may:


A team that is tied or trailing by one or two points but is within the red zone (and thus in easy field goal range) seeks to burn a specific amount of time off the clock, such that they can stop the clock with five or fewer seconds on the clock, so that their placekicker can kick a field goal with no time remaining and win the game.


One exceptionally rare strategy that a team in possession of the ball near the end of the game can use is the fair catch kick. For the fair catch kick to be a viable option, several conditions must be met: the opposing team must have punted the ball within play and the receiving team used the fair catch to secure the ball, the punt must have been exceptionally short so that the spot of the fair catch is within field goal range and unlikely to be returned, the team using the fair catch kick must be either tied or within three points, and the game must not be played under NCAA rules (the NCAA has no fair catch kick rule).


Various rules ensure that the defense cannot deliberately commit fouls to manipulate the game clock, and in the most extreme such cases, an unfair act can be declared and the game forfeited to the offense. (Likewise, if the offense commits fouls to burn off time and get extra downs, the clock is reset and unsportsmanlike conduct is called on them.)


Several of the strategies discussed above for American football above can be used in the Canadian code, however rule differences mean that running out the clock much more difficult:


These differences make for radically different endgames if the team with the lead has the ball. In the NFL, a team can run 120 seconds (2 minutes)--and slightly more in the NCAA--off the clock without gaining a first down (assuming that the defensive team is out of timeouts). In the Canadian game, just over 40 seconds can be run off.


Advanced Football Analytics (formerly Advanced NFL Stats) was a website dedicated to the analysis of the National Football League (NFL) using mathematical and statistical methods. The site's lead author was noted football researcher and analyst Brian Burke. Burke is a regular contributor to "The New York Times" NFL coverage, "The Washington Post"s Redskins coverage, and supplies research for other notable publications and writers.


Advanced Football Analytics features a variety of analytical techniques and applications. The site predicts game outcomes and rates teams using a logistic regression model based on team efficiency statistics. It also features a live in-game win probability model that estimates the chances either opponent will win a game in progress. Advanced Football Analytics uses its win probability model to analyze strategic coaching decisions such as whether to kick or attempt first down conversions.


Research topics include game theory applications, luck and randomness, play calling, home field advantage, run-pass balance, and the relative importance of various facets of performance (offensive passing, offensive rushing, defensive passing, etc.). Also featured is research on weather factors, team payroll, and the NFL Draft.


The site has pioneered other analytical concepts such as Air Yards, which is the distance forward of the line of scrimmage that a pass travels. It removes the contribution of Yards After Catch (YAC) run by a receiver.


Advanced Football Analytics also features a catalog of unique individual player stats. Each player's contribution toward his team's wins, known as Win Probability Added (WPA), is available for each season since 2000. Expected Points Added (EPA), success rate (SR), and many other innovative metrics are available.


During the NFL off-season, Burke has posted original research related to other North American professional sports leagues.


Strategic thinking is defined as a mental or thinking process applied by an individual in the context of achieving a goal or set of goals in a game or other endeavor. As a cognitive activity, it produces thought.


When applied in an organizational strategic management process, strategic thinking involves the generation and application of unique business insights and opportunities intended to create competitive advantage for a firm or organization. It can be done individually, as well as collaboratively among key people who can positively alter an organization's future. Group strategic thinking may create more value by enabling a proactive and creative dialogue, where individuals gain other people's perspectives on critical and complex issues. This is regarded as a benefit in highly competitive and fast-changing business landscapes.


Strategic thinking includes finding and developing a strategic foresight capacity for an organization, by exploring all possible organizational futures, and challenging conventional thinking to foster decision making today. Recent strategic thought points ever more clearly towards the conclusion that the critical strategic question is not the conventional "What?", but "Why?" or "How?". The work of Henry Mintzberg and other authors, further support the conclusion; and also draw a clear distinction between strategic thinking and strategic planning, another important strategic management thought process.


General Andre Beaufre wrote in 1963 that strategic thinking "is a mental process, at once abstract and rational, which must be capable of synthesizing both psychological and material data. The strategist must have a great capacity for both analysis and synthesis; analysis is necessary to assemble the data on which he makes his diagnosis, synthesis in order to produce from these data the diagnosis itself—and the diagnosis in fact amounts to a choice between alternative courses of action."


There are many tools and techniques to promote and discipline strategic thinking. The flowchart to the right provides a process for classifying a phenomenon as a scenario in the intuitive logics tradition, and how it differs from a number of other planning approaches.


In the view of F. Graetz, strategic thinking and planning are “distinct, but interrelated and complementary thought processes” that must sustain and support one another for effective strategic management. Graetz's model holds that the role of strategic thinking is "to seek innovation and imagine new and very different futures that may lead the company to redefine its core strategies and even its industry". Strategic planning's role is "to realise and to support strategies developed through the strategic thinking process and to integrate these back into the business".


According to Jeanne Liedtka, strategic thinking differs from strategic planning along the following dimensions of strategic management:


Liedtka observed five “major attributes of strategic thinking in practice” that resemble competencies:


Negging (derived from the verb "neg", meaning "negative feedback") is an act of emotional manipulation whereby a person makes a deliberate backhanded compliment or otherwise flirtatious remark to another person to undermine their confidence and increase their need of the manipulator's approval. The term was coined and prescribed by pickup artists.


Negging is often viewed as straightforward insult rather than as a pick-up line, in spite of the fact that proponents of the technique traditionally stress it is not an insult. Erik von Markovik, who is usually credited with popularising the term negs, explains the difference thus: "A neg is not an insult but a negative social value judgment that is telegraphed. It's the same as if you pulled out a tissue and blew your nose. There's nothing insulting about blowing your nose. You haven't explicitly rejected her. But at the same time, she will feel that you aren't even trying to impress her. This makes her curious as to why and makes you a challenge."


Neil Strauss, in his book "Rules of the Game", also stresses that the primary point of the technique is not to put women down but for a man to disqualify himself as a potential suitor. On this account he refers to negs as "disqualifiers", although the technique described in the book is recognisably the same as von Markovik's. Strauss is equally clear that negs should not be used as insults: "a disqualifier should never be hostile, critical, judgmental, or condescending. There's a line between flirting and hurting. And disqualification is never intended to be mean and insulting."


The term has been popularized in social media and mainstream media. The opposite is "pozzing", whereby one pays a person a compliment in order to gain their affection.


The chain-linked model or Kline model of innovation was introduced by mechanical engineer Stephen J. Kline in 1985, and further described by Kline and economist Nathan Rosenberg in 1986. The chain-linked model is an attempt to describe complexities in the innovation process. The model is regarded as Kline's most significant contribution.


In the chain-linked model, new knowledge is not necessarily the driver for innovation. Instead, the process begins with the identification of an unfilled market need. This drives research and design, then redesign and production, and finally marketing, with complex feedback loops between all the stages. There are also important feedback loops with the organization's and the world's stored base of knowledge, with new basic research conducted or commissioned as necessary, to fill in gaps.


It is often contrasted with the so-called linear model of innovation, in which basic research leads to applied development, then engineering, then manufacturing, and finally marketing and distribution.


The Kline model was conceived primarily with commercial industrial settings in mind, but has found broad applicability in other settings, for example in military technology development. Variations and extensions of the model have been described by a number of investigators.


In backgammon, there are a number of strategies that are distinct to match play as opposed to money play. These differences are most apparent when a player is within a few points of winning the match.


Backgammon matches are played to a set number of points, ranging from 3 for informal matches to 25 or more for high level tournaments. Traditionally matches are played to an odd number of points, however there is no theoretical reason why a match should not be played to an even number of points.


As with money play, the doubling cube is used. At the start of each game, the doubling cube is placed on the bar with the number 64 showing; the cube is then said to be "centered, on 1". When the cube is centered, the player about to roll may propose that the game be played for twice the current stakes. Their opponent must either accept ("take") the doubled stakes or resign ("drop" or "pass") the game immediately.


When both players are several points away from the target score, doubling strategy is broadly similar to that of money play. The theoretical point for accepting a double is when a player's winning chances are 25% or higher. Suppose a player were offered the same double in the same position 4 times. If the player dropped 4 doubles, they would have a net loss of 4 points. If they accepted the double at 2, lost 3 games and won 1, the net loss would still be 4 points, i.e. 2 * (3 - 1)


In fact, a player can accept a double at slightly worse odds than 25%, due to the value of owning the cube, giving them the exclusive right to redouble. The corollary of this is that a player should be wary of "giving the cube away" too readily; generally an advantage corresponding to 70% winning chances or more is needed before a double becomes correct. The "doubling window" between which both the double and the take are correct is approximately 70% - 78%.


Players generally attempt to double at the "top of the market", i.e. as close as possible to the opponent's theoretical take point. If a player offers a double and the opponent correctly drops, the player is said to have "lost his market" or "doubled someone out". If both the double and the take are correct, the player has "kept his market" or "doubled someone in". While it is preferable to double someone in, due to the volatile nature of the game this is not always possible. For example if a player throws a "joker" which radically changes the assessment of the position (for example a 6-6 in a racing situation), a position which was not a correct double on the previous roll may now be a "drop".


A complicating factor is the possibility of gammons (or more rarely backgammons). When a player has a reasonable chance of winning a gammon, a position may be "too good" to double, i.e. it may be correct to attempt to score 2 points by winning an undoubled gammon rather than "cash" a certain 1 point by doubling the opponent out. Additionally, the threat of a gammon can sometimes make it correct to double even with less than 65% winning chances, or to drop a double with more than 25% winning chances.


Complicating things still further, the specific match score can have a significant effect on correct doubling and checker play strategy.


To facilitate discussion of match play strategy, scores are "normalised", i.e. referred to in terms of the number of points each player is away from victory. For example, if a player is leading 3-2 in a 5 point match, this is referred to as "2-away, 3-away" or "-2, -3"; likewise if a player leads 13-12 in a 15 point match.


"Double match point" (or DMP) refers to any situation where the match depends on the result of a single game, gammons, backgammons and cube actions being irrelevant. Common situations where double match point strategy comes into effect include a score of 1-away, 1-away, a post-Crawford game at 1-away, 2-away in which the leader accepts the inevitable early double, and a doubled game at 2-away, 2-away.


In double match point games, a "blitz", in which a player aggressively pursues a gammon by continually hitting in his own board at the risk of overextending his position, becomes a poor strategy. On the other hand, since gammons don't matter, back games, in which a player maintains two or more anchors in the opponent's home board with a view to hitting later in the game, become a more attractive option. However, double match point games are most commonly decided by a simple racing strategy when one player has an opportunity to break contact with the opponent while ahead in the race.


Between competent players, this will almost always be the final game of the match; one of the players will double early, the other will take, and play will take on a double match point character. The explanation for this is as follows:


Since the cube will not come into play, there are two possible ways for the trailing player to win the match; he can win a gammon in the next game, or he can win the next game and then win the decider at DMP. The combined odds for the trailing player to win the match can be calculated at approximately 30%, assuming that 20% of the wins are gammons:


0.10 (odds of winning gammon in the next game) + 0.40 (odds of winning a single game) * 0.50 (odds of winning the following game) = 0.30.


Since gammon wins are very favorable to the trailer and gammon losses are very costly to the leader, this score is referred to as "gammon go" (GG) for the trailer and "gammon save" (GS) for the leader. The trailer should play more aggressively in pursuit of a gammon i.e. try to steer the game into a blitz, a back game (for either side) or a prime vs prime battle. The leader will try to avoid losing a gammon by attempting to establish an advanced anchor in the opponent's board or else try for a simple running game.


1-away, 2-away (Post-Crawford game) - the "free drop".


The trailer should double at the first opportunity, thereby converting the game into a double match point situation. However, the leader has the option of the "free drop". If the leader is at a disadvantage, however slight, he should drop the double and start a new game at 1-away, 1-away. Whether the leader takes or drops, the next game will be the decider at DMP, so it is preferable to start a new game at 50 - 50 than continue the present game at 49.5 - 50.5.


The free drop is only a minor advantage to the leader, so to all intents and purposes a score of 1-away, 2-away post-Crawford is equivalent to 1-away, 1-away. The free drop also comes into consideration in any post-Crawford game in which the trailer is an even number of points away from victory. For example 1-away, 6-away post-Crawford is equivalent to 1-away, 5-away save for the leader's free drop. In this case the leader may elect to "save" his free drop if he is at only a minimal disadvantage (e.g. having a sound position but losing the opening roll).


1-away, 3-away (Post-Crawford game) - "the trick".


While it is technically correct for the trailer to cube at the first opportunity, the leader's takepoint is less than 10% at this score so it can sometimes be beneficial for the trailer to wait until there's a larger advantage. Since the 1-away 2-away and 1-away 1-away are almost equivalent, the leader gives away almost nothing by accepting the cube.


By waiting, the trailer gives the leader the chance to mistakenly drop, allowing the trailer to "steal" a point. However, while the leader's takepoint is very low based on single-point losses, gammons are very costly with the cube on 2 so the leader should not take positions with significant gammon chances.


A concept-driven strategy is a process for formulating strategy that draws on the explanation of how humans inquire provided by linguistic pragmatic philosophy. This argues that thinking starts by selecting (explicitly or implicitly) a set of concepts (frames, patterns, lens, principles, etc.) gained from our past experiences. These are used to reflect on whatever happens, or is done, in the future.


Concept-driven strategy therefore starts from agreeing and enacting a set of strategic concepts (organizing principles) that "works best" for an organisation. For example, a hospital might set its strategy as intending to be Caring, World Class, Local, Evidence Based, and Team Based. A University might set its strategy as intending to be Ranked, Problem Solving, Online, Equis, and Offering Pathways. A commercial corporation might set its strategy as intending to be Innovative, Global, Have Visible Supply Chains, Agile and Market Share Dominant. These strategic concepts make up its "Statement of Intent" (or Purpose).


The Statement of Purpose, Statement of Intent or concept-driven approach to strategy formulation therefore focuses on setting and enacting a set strategic concepts. If a participatory approach is being used these concepts will be acquired through a process of collaboration with stakeholders. Once agreed the strategic concepts can be used to coordinate activities and act as a set of decision making criteria. The set of concepts that make up the Statement of Intent is then used to make sense of an unpredictable future across an organisation in a co-ordinated manner.


Linguistic pragmatism argues that our prior conceptions interpret our perception (sensory inputs). These conceptions are represented by concepts like running, smiling, justice, reasoning and agility. They are patterns of activity, experienced in our past and remembered. They can be named by those with language and so shared.


Bagginni explains pragmatic concepts using the classic example of whether the earth is flat or round.


Another example would be that we can think of the war in Iraqi differently by reflecting off the concepts of oil security, Imperialism, aggressive capitalism, liberation or democracy.


The concept-driven approach to strategy formulation involves setting and using a set of linguistic pragmatic concepts.