On any fly ball, a runner can initiate an attempt to advance bases as soon as a fielder touches the ball by tagging up, even before the fielder has full control of the ball.


The most sacrifice flies by a team in one game is five; the record was established by the Seattle Mariners in 1988, tied by the Colorado Rockies in 2006, and tied again by the Mariners in 2008.


Five teams have collected three sacrifice flies in an inning: the Chicago White Sox (fifth inning, July 1, 1962 against the Cleveland Indians); the New York Yankees twice (fourth inning, June 29, 2000 against the Detroit Tigers and third inning, August 19, 2000 against the Anaheim Angels); the New York Mets (second inning, June 24, 2005 against the Yankees); and the Houston Astros (seventh inning, June 26, 2005 against the Texas Rangers). In these cases one or more of the flies did not result in a putout due to an error.


Since the rule was reinstated in its present form in 1954, Gil Hodges of the Dodgers holds the record for most sacrifice flies in one season with 19, in 1954; Eddie Murray holds the record for most sacrifice flies in a career with 128.


As of the end of the 2018 season, players who had hit 115 or more career sacrifice flies:


Only once has the World Series been won on a sac fly. In 1912, Larry Gardner of the Boston Red Sox hit a fly ball off a pitch from the New York Giants' Christy Mathewson. Steve Yerkes tagged up and scored from third base to win game 8 in the tenth inning and take the series for the Red Sox.


The New York Yankees' former closer Mariano Rivera, one of the foremost practitioners of the cutter, made the pitch famous after the mid-1990s, though the pitch itself has been around since at least the 1950s.


When the cut fastball is pitched skillfully at speed, particularly against the opposite hand batter (that is, a right-handed pitcher facing a left-handed hitter), the pitch can crack and split a hitter's bat, hence the pitch's occasional nickname of "the buzzsaw". Batter Ryan Klesko, then of the Atlanta Braves, broke three bats in a single plate appearance during the 1999 World Series while facing Rivera. To deal with this problem a few switch hitters batted right-handed against the right-handed Rivera—that is, on the "wrong" side, as switch hitters generally bat from the same side of the plate as the pitcher's glove hand.


In , Dan Haren led all major league starting pitchers with nearly 48% of his pitches classified by PITCHf/x as cutters. Roy Halladay was close behind at 45%. Other pitchers who rely (or relied) heavily on a cut fastball include Jon Lester, James Shields, Josh Tomlin, Will Harris, Mark Melancon, Jaime Garcia, Wade Miley, David Robertson, Jerry Reuss, and Andy Pettitte. Over the course of Kenley Jansen's career from (2010-present) he has thrown his cutter 85.1% of the time, second only to Rivera at 87.2% among pitchers with at least 30 innings during that time period.


The cutter grew in popularity as certain pitchers, including Dan Haren, looked to compensate for loss of speed in their four-seam fastball. Braves third baseman Chipper Jones attributed the increased dominance of pitchers from 2010–2011 to a more prolific use of the cutter, as did Cleveland Indians pitcher Chris Perez. By 2011, it was commonly being called the "pitch du jour" in the baseball press.


Some pushback has developed against (overuse of) the pitch, due to concerns that a pitcher overusing the cutter could develop arm fatigue. Baltimore Orioles General Manager Dan Duquette instructed prized prospect Dylan Bundy not to throw the pitch in the minor leagues, believing its use could make Bundy's fastball and curve less effective.


The wheel play is a defensive strategy in baseball designed to defend against a sacrifice bunt. The play's name derives from the wheel-like rotation of the infielders.


The wheel play is typically only employed when all of the following conditions exist:


In such a scenario, the batting team may attempt a sacrifice bunt in order to move the runner at second base to third base, accepting that the batter will be put out at first base. If that happens, the offense would then have a runner at third base with one out, and that runner could subsequently score on a sacrifice fly.


To defend against this scenario, the wheel play is used by the defense in an attempt to prevent the offense from advancing the runner at second base to third base via a sacrifice bunt.


The wheel play is a unique bunt defense in that the play is designed to put out the lead runner at third base. Most bunt defense strategies give priority to making sure the defense gets an out at first base.


The wheel play begins with the shortstop running to cover (defend) third base. As the pitch is thrown by the pitcher, the third baseman and first baseman rush toward home plate, to be in position to field the bunted ball as quickly as possible, while the second baseman runs to cover (defend) first base. Additionally, the pitcher moves into a defensive position, backing up one of the inrushing fielders (which one, usually depends on which direction the pitcher's pitching motion carries him towards).


The defense seeks to have defenders in position such that once the ball is bunted, it can be picked up quickly by one of the charging fielders, who will be much closer to the batter than they would be in their normal fielding positions. If that occurs, the fielder who picks up the ball can throw it to the shortstop (who is covering third base) to retire the runner advancing from second base, either via a force play (when applicable) or tag out. Recording an out at third base represents a successfully executed wheel play. Additionally, if the batter is not a fast runner, the shortstop (at third base) may be able to throw to the second baseman (at first base) to successfully complete a double play.


Alternately, if a fielder is slow in picking up the ball, and/or he sees that the runner advancing from second base is unlikely to be retired at third base, the fielder can throw the ball to the second baseman (who is covering first base) to retire the batter. While this is not a successfully executed wheel play, it provides no worse an outcome than would have occurred on a normally executed sacrifice bunt.


The offense can attempt to defeat the wheel play:


One of the earliest recorded instances of the wheel play being used in Major League Baseball (MLB) was when it was executed by the Pittsburgh Pirates against the St. Louis Cardinals on August 14, 1960, resulting, as reported by "The Pittsburgh Press", in "an electrifying double play [...] that had the 36,775 fans screaming." Several Pirate players and coaches said they had never seen the play before, but the Pirate players who executed the play attributed the original idea to former Chicago Cubs manager Charlie Grimm, whom they thought used it in 1950.


The Cardinals successfully used the wheel play against the Texas Rangers in the second inning of Game 6 of the 2011 World Series. With runners on first base and second base and no outs, Texas pitcher Colby Lewis attempted a sacrifice bunt, resulting in a double play when third baseman David Freese fielded the bunt, threw to shortstop Rafael Furcal at third base for the first out, and Furcal threw to second baseman Nick Punto at first base for the second out.


A hit and run is a high risk, high reward offensive strategy used in baseball. It uses a stolen base attempt to try to place the defending infielders out of position for an attempted base hit.


The hit and run was introduced to baseball by Ned Hanlon, who was often referred to as "The Father of Modern Baseball", at the beginning of the 1894 season of the National League, as part of what came to be called "inside baseball". Hanlon was manager of the Baltimore Orioles at the time. His team developed the hit and run along with other tactics during spring training at Macon, Georgia. After its implementation in the season's series opener against the New York Giants, the opposing manager objected to its use; however, it was deemed acceptable.


The hit and run relies on the positioning of the defensive players in the infield. The first and third basemen normally stand near the foul lines, generally near the inside of their bases, set slightly back to allow more time to react to sharply hit balls. However, if the runner is on first, the first baseman stands closer to the base to prevent steals by means of pick-off attempts by the pitcher; consequently, such positioning produces a bigger gap between second and first basemen. The second baseman and shortstop stand on opposite sides of second base, covering the areas between first and second, and second and third, respectively. Second base itself is not directly covered, as the pitcher can field batted balls in this direction.


In normal play, if the ball is hit into the infield, one of the infielders will run toward the ball while another runs toward the base that is no longer covered. For instance, if the ball is hit toward the second baseman, he will run toward the ball while the shortstop runs to cover second base. This allows the fielding player to throw the ball to the player covering the base to attempt a put out.


However, during a stolen base attempt, the normal gameplay and positioning is altered. In the typical case, a baserunner on first base will start running toward second, causing the middle infielders to move toward that base in order to tag the runner when the ball is thrown to them from the pitcher or catcher. This reaction places the infielders out of position for a hit ball, with gaps opening at midway points between first and second and second and third.


The hit and run takes advantage of this difference by having the baserunner attempt to steal as soon as the pitch is thrown; the batter then attempts to hit the ball into one of the resulting gaps in the infield defense.


The name "hit and run" is therefore a potential misnomer in that the chronological order of the offensive play is "run and hit," with the runner beginning the steal attempt before the batter makes contact, although in a logical sense it is accurate in that the batter's swing occurs while the runner's steal attempt is ongoing, such that any contact ("hit") will occur simultaneously with ("and") the steal attempt ("run").


Ideally, the ball will be hit into a gap and travel into the outfield, allowing the runners plenty of time to reach the bases. Even if the ball is hit toward a fielder's initial position before the fielder has had time to move away from it, however, the fielder may have turned to run toward the base in order to cover the baserunner. In normal play the fielders would face the batter, allowing them to react in any direction, but after they have turned toward the base this becomes much more difficult. Their momentum in this direction adds to this problem.


The risk in the hit and run is that, if the batter fails to make contact with the ball, the runner is vulnerable to being thrown out at second base, which the official scorer will record as a caught stealing. The defensive team can improve its odds in this case by using a pitchout, having the pitcher throw the ball far outside the strike zone so the catcher can easily catch it and attempt to pick off the runner.


The batter may choose to take a swing at a bad pitch to make it harder for the catcher to handle the incoming pitch, or so the ball goes foul (in which case the runner is allowed to return to first, so the attempt protects the runner from being caught stealing). Either way, this can cause the batter to fall behind in the count, making it harder for him to get a hit. And if he does hit a bad pitch he really can't handle, it could result in poor contact leading directly to the batter being put out, so he may end up giving his at-bat away with no advantage to the offense.


The hit and run has the best chance to be successful when the batter is someone who does not frequently swing and miss, at a time when the count won't disadvantage a hitter if he takes a bad swing, with a runner fast enough to take second base even if the batter does swing and miss.


Often the precise circumstance to call for a hit and run occurs with a two-balls, one-strike count on a hitter, as this situation may meet all of the above criteria, depending on who is at bat and who is on base, but it can occur at other times. An alert defense understands the probability that the offense will call the play at a specific moment, and thus it may choose to call for a pitchout at that moment to defend it. An alert offense, in turn, understands the probability of a forthcoming pitchout, and use the hit and run opportunity as a decoy, causing the pitchout to become another ball in the count in the hitter's favor, increasing his chances of reaching base by walk or hit.


The hit and run is a very old baseball strategy, dating back to the 19th-century game.


In baseball, a triple play (denoted as TP in baseball statistics) is the rare act of making three outs during the same continuous play.


Triple plays happen infrequently – there have been 723 triple plays in Major League Baseball (MLB) since 1876, an average of approximately five per season – because they depend on a combination of two elements, which are themselves uncommon:


In baseball scorekeeping, the abbreviation GITP can be used if the batter grounded into a triple play.


The most likely scenario for a triple play is no outs with runners on first base and second base, which has been the case for the majority of MLB triple plays. In that context, two examples of triple plays are:


The most recent triple play in MLB was turned by the Cincinnati Reds on April 17, 2021, against the Cleveland Indians in the top of the eighth inning at Great American Ball Park in Cincinnati, Ohio—with runners at first base and third base, Indians batter Josh Naylor hit a line drive caught by Reds first baseman Joey Votto (first out) who tagged baserunner Franmil Reyes (second out); meanwhile, baserunner Eddie Rosario thought the ball hit the ground and ran home without returning to third base, so Votto threw the ball to Max Schrock at third base (third out).


The rarest type of triple play, and one of the rarest events of any kind in baseball, is for a single fielder to complete all three outs. There have only been 15 unassisted triple plays in MLB history, making this feat rarer than a perfect game.


Typically, an unassisted triple play is achieved when a middle infielder catches a line drive near second base (first out), steps on the base before the runner who started there can tag up (second out), and then tags the runner advancing from first before he can return there (third out). Of the 15 unassisted triple plays in MLB history, 12 have been completed in this manner by a middle infielder.


The most recent MLB unassisted triple play is consistent with the above – it occurred on August 23, 2009, by second baseman Eric Bruntlett of the Philadelphia Phillies, in a game against the New York Mets. In the bottom of the ninth inning with men on first and second, the base runners were both running when Jeff Francoeur hit a line drive very close to second base, which Bruntlett was covering. Bruntlett caught the ball (first out), stepped on second before Luis Castillo could tag up (second out), and then tagged Daniel Murphy who was approaching from first (third out). This was only the second game-ending unassisted triple play in MLB history, the first one having occurred in 1927.


Political columnist and baseball enthusiast George Will posed one hypothetical way that a triple play could occur with no fielder touching the ball. With runners on first and second and no outs, the batter hits an infield fly, and is automatically out: one out. The runner from first passes the runner from second and is called out for that infraction: two outs. Just after that, the falling ball hits the runner from second, who is called out for interference: three outs.


Whenever a batter or runner is out without a fielder touching the ball, MLB rule book section 10.09 provides for automatic putouts to be assigned by the official scorer. In this case, the first out would be credited to whoever the official scorer believes would have had the best chance of catching the infield fly. The second and third outs would be credited to the fielder(s) closest to the points the runners were, when their respective outs occurred. Under the scenario described above, the same fielder (the shortstop, for example) could be credited with all three putouts, thus attaining an unassisted triple play without having touched the ball.


Texas League Hall of Famer Keith Bodie tells "Sporting News" that this event occurred in a 1986 spring training game.


The statistics below reflect historical totals through April 17, 2021.


Position of baserunners when the triple play started.


June 11, 1885, by the New York Giants against the Providence Grays, scored as 4*-4*-3*, with a newspaper account the next day naming the fielders, batter, and runners at first and second; however, it is unknown if there was a runner at third base.


Asterisks (*) denote which players recorded outs, per standard baseball positions.Combinations that have occurred at least 10 times are listed.


On June 27, 1967, the New York Mets and Pittsburgh Pirates staged a triple play before their game at Shea Stadium for the film "The Odd Couple". The scene depicts Bill Mazeroski of the Pirates grounding into a game-ending 5-4-3 triple play. Mazeroski, who played 17 major league seasons, was only involved in one actual MLB triple play; he was the runner on second base when the Chicago Cubs turned a 3-3-6 triple play on October 3, 1965.


Other names include change-of-pace, change or off-speed pitch, although that term can also be used simply to mean any pitch that is slower than a fastball. In addition, before at least the second half of the twentieth century, the term "slow ball" was used to denote pitches that were not a fastball or breaking ball, which almost always meant a type of changeup. Therefore, the terms "slow ball" and "changeup" could be used interchangeably.


The changeup is analogous to the slower ball in cricket.


Since the rise of Pedro Martínez, a Dominican pitcher whose changeup was one of the tools that led to his three Cy Young Awards, the changeup has become increasingly popular in the Dominican Republic. Dominican pitchers including Edinson Vólquez, Michael Ynoa, and Ervin Santana are all known to have developed effective changeups in the Dominican Republic after Martínez's success with the pitch.


Probably the most famous changeup thrower of the last 30 years, Atlanta Braves southpaw Tom Glavine utilized a two-seam changeup as his number one pitch on the way to winning two Cy Young Awards, a World Series MVP, and 305 wins in a celebrated Hall of Fame career.


Hall of Famer reliever Trevor Hoffman had one of the best changeups in his prime and used it to record 601 saves.


In recent years, some of the game's best pitchers have relied heavily on the changeup. A 2013 article published by "Sports Illustrated" noted that Justin Verlander, Félix Hernández, Stephen Strasburg, David Price, and Max Scherzer have revolutionized the pitch and used it abundantly in their arsenal.


There are several variations of changeups, which are generated by using different grips on the ball during the pitch.


The circle changeup is one well-known grip. The pitcher forms a circle with the index finger and thumb and lays the middle and ring fingers across the seams of the ball. By pronating the wrist upon release, the pitcher can make the pitch break in the same direction as a screwball. More or less break will result from the pitcher's arm slot. Pedro Martínez used this pitch throughout his career to great effect, and many considered it to be his best pitch.


The most common type is the straight changeup. The ball is held with three fingers (instead of the usual two) and closer to the palm, to kill some of the speed generated by the wrist and fingers. This pitch generally breaks downward slightly, though its motion does not differ greatly from a two-seam fastball.


Other variations include the palmball, vulcan changeup and fosh. The split-finger fastball is used by many pitchers as a type of changeup.


In baseball, a tag out, sometimes just called a tag, is a play in which a baserunner is out because a fielder touches him with the ball or with the hand or glove holding the ball, while the ball is live and the runner is in jeopardy of being put out – usually when he is not touching a base.


A baserunner is in jeopardy when any of the following are true:


A tag is therefore the most common way to retire baserunners who are not in danger of being forced out, though a forced runner may be tagged out in lieu of stepping on the forced base. Additionally, a tag out can be used on an appeal play.


Runners attempting to advance are sometimes thrown out, which means that a fielder throws the ball to someone covering the base, who then tags the runner before the runner touches the base. A runner who leads off a base too far might be picked off; that is, the pitcher throws to a fielder covering the base, who then tags the runner out.


When a runner is tagged out, a farther advanced runner who had been forced to advance no longer has to do so. For example, when a sharply hit ball is caught on one hop by the first baseman, he might immediately tag out the runner at first who is forced to advance to second; but when this is done a runner already at second is no longer forced to advance to third base. The result of such a tag is called "removing the force".


The fastball is the most common type of pitch thrown by pitchers in baseball and softball. "Power pitchers," such as former American major leaguers Nolan Ryan and Roger Clemens, rely on speed to prevent the ball from being hit, and have thrown fastballs at speeds of (officially) and up to (unofficially). Pitchers who throw more slowly can put movement on the ball, or throw it on the outside of home plate where batters can't easily reach it.


Fastballs are usually thrown with backspin, so that the Magnus effect creates an upward force on the ball. This causes it to fall less rapidly than expected, and sometimes causes an optical illusion often called a rising fastball. Although it is impossible for a human to throw a baseball fast enough and with enough backspin for the ball to actually rise, to the batter the pitch seems to rise due to the unexpected lack of natural drop on the pitch.


A straight pitch is achieved by gripping the ball with the fingers across the wide part of the seam (called a "four-seam fastball") so that both the index and middle fingers are touching two seams perpendicularly. A sinking fastball is thrown by gripping it across the narrow part (a "two-seam fastball") so that both the index and middle fingers are along a seam. Lateral motion is achieved by holding a four-seam fastball off-center (a "cut fastball"), and sinking action with a lateral break is thrown by splitting the fingers along the seams (a "split-finger fastball").


Colloquially, a fastball pitcher 'throws heat' or 'puts steam on it', among many other variants.


The four-seam fastball is the most common variant of the fastball. The pitch is used often by the pitcher to get ahead in the count or when he needs to throw a strike. This type of fastball is intended to have minimal lateral movement, relying more on its velocity. It is often perceived as the fastest pitch a pitcher throws, with recorded top speeds above 100 mph. The fastest pitch recognized by MLB was on September 25, 2010, at Petco Park in San Diego by then Cincinnati Reds left-handed relief pitcher Aroldis Chapman. It was clocked at 105.1 miles per hour.


April 19, 2011 Chapman lit up the stadium radar gun at 106 MPH (the TV-reading had his pitch at 105 MPH, and the pitchF/X reading was actually 102.4 MPH).


Two general methods are used to throw a four-seam fastball. The first and most traditional way is to find the horseshoe seam area, or the area where the seams are the farthest apart. Keeping those seams parallel to the body, the pitcher places his index and middle fingers perpendicular to them with the pads on the farthest seam from him. The thumb then rests underneath the ball about in the middle of the two fingers. With this grip, the thumb will generally have no seam on which to rest.


The pitch velocity gone up so much mostly by the development of better training and clearer communication within the baseball community that velocity is so valued. People like Tom House, Eric Cressey, Kyle Boddy, and Ron Wolforth have all pushed the edge and dedicated careers to research on what makes the ultimate pitcher. Pitchers are getting bigger, faster and stronger, and pushing their bodies in the weight room as well as with weighted ball throwing. All of this has created a faster, more powerful game for pitchers on the mound today.


Higher pitch velocities have resulted in fewer hits and other imbalances. A more distant pitcher's mound and other changes have been proposed to restore balance.


A two-seam fastball, sometimes called a two-seamer, tailing fastball, running fastball, or sinker is another variant of the straight fastball. It is designed to have more movement than a four-seam fastball, so the batter cannot hit it hard, but it can be more difficult to master and control. Because of the deviation from the straight trajectory, the two-seam fastball is sometimes called a moving fastball.


The pitcher grabs a baseball and finds the area on it where the seams are the closest together, and puts his index and middle fingers on each of those seams. A sinker is a similar pitch that drops 3 to 6 inches more than a typical two-seam fastball; this causes batters to hit ground balls more often, mostly due to the tilted sidespin on the ball.


Each finger should be touching the seam from the pads or tips to almost the ball of each finger. The thumb should rest underneath the ball in the middle of those two fingers, finding the apex of the horseshoe part of the seam. The thumb needs to rest on that seam from the side to the middle of its pad. If the middle finger is used, more whipping action occurs, making the pitch go around 10 mph faster. This ball tends to move for the pitcher a little bit depending on velocity, arm slot angle, and pressure points of the fingers. Retired pitchers Greg Maddux and Pedro Martínez were known for their effective two-seamers.


The rising fastball is an effect perceived by some batters, but is a baseball myth. Some batters are under the impression that they have seen a "rising" fastball, which starts with the trajectory of a normal fastball, but which as it approaches the plate rises several inches and gains a burst of speed. Tom Seaver, Jim Palmer, Sandy Koufax, Dwight Gooden, Nolan Ryan and Chan Ho Park have been described as paramount pitchers with this kind of ball action.


Such a pitch is known to be beyond the physical capabilities of pitchers, due to the very high backspin required to overcome gravity with the Magnus effect. While not physically impossible (conservation of momentum is maintained through imparting the required opposing momentum to air, as an airplane does at takeoff), the amount of spin required is beyond the capabilities of a human arm. It has been explained as an optical illusion.


What is likely happening is that the pitcher first throws a fastball at one speed, and then, using an identical arm motion, throws another fastball at a higher speed. The higher-speed fastball arrives faster and sinks less due to its high speed. The added back-spin from the higher speed further decreases the amount of sink. When the pitch is thrown, the batter expects a fastball at the same speed, yet it arrives more quickly and at a higher level. The batter perceives it as a fastball which has risen and increased in speed. A switch from a two-seam to a fastball can enhance this effect.


It is possible for a rising fastball to be thrown by a submarine pitcher because of the technique with which they throw the ball. Because they throw almost underhanded with their knuckles near the field surface, the batter perceives the sensation of the ball going upward because of its low starting point and flight trajectory. This is not the traditional rising fastball batters believe they see. This type of movement is similar to a rising fastball in fast-pitch softball. Left-hander Sid Fernandez was known for throwing a rising fastball from a slightly "submarine" motion.


A cut fastball, or "cutter", is similar to a slider, but the pitcher tends to use a four-seam grip. The pitcher shifts the grip on a four-seamer (often by slightly rotating the thumb inwards and the two top fingers to the outside) to create more spin. This usually causes the pitch to shift inwards or outwards by a few inches, less than a typical slider, and often late. A cutter is effective for pitchers with a strong four-seamer since the grip and delivery look virtually identical. The unexpected motion will often fool batters into hitting the ball off-center, or missing it altogether.


It helps to have larger hands to throw this pitch. Because the fingers are spread wider than normal on the baseball, this pitch produces more stress from the hand up through the arm. While the mechanics are the same as a normal fastball, the stress it places on the hand and arm is different. Over time it is possible to damage the arm. It is therefore not recommended for younger pitchers to learn this pitch. Older pitchers should feel comfortable deploying this pitch, but to use it in moderation. The splitter is an effective pitch because the hitter generally picks up the movement later and either swings over the ball or produces a weakly hit ground ball.


The split-finger is used currently by pitchers such as Jonathan Papelbon, and Masahiro Tanaka. Former players noted for use of the split-finger fastball include Bruce Sutter, Mike Scott, John Smoltz, Jack Morris, Kazuhiro Sasaki, Bryan Harvey, Roger Clemens, Dan Haren, and Fred Breining.


The incurve was a term used until about 1930 used to describe a simple fastball. As a curveball was often called an "outcurve", one might assume that an incurve is the opposite of a curveball, in other words, the modern screwball. However, this does not appear to be so, as cited by John McGraw.


A side-arm fast ball is thrown from an angle different from the normal one. It is at a lower angle and is thrown from the side, hence the name "side"-arm. It will have a sinking motion to the right if the pitcher is right-handed, or to the left if the pitcher is left-handed. It is usually slower than a normal four-seam fastball.


In baseball and softball, a double play (denoted as DP in baseball statistics) is the act of making two outs during the same continuous play. Double plays can occur any time there is at least one baserunner and fewer than two outs.


In Major League Baseball (MLB), the double play is defined in the Official Rules in the Definitions of Terms, and for the official scorer in Rule 9.11. During the 2016 Major League Baseball season, teams completed an average 145 double plays per 162 games played during the regular season.


The simplest scenario for a double play is a runner on first base with less than two outs. In that context, five example double plays are:


Double plays can occur in many ways in addition to these examples, and can involve many combinations of fielders. A double play can include an out resulting from a rare event, such as interference or an appeal play.


Per standard baseball positions, the examples given above are recorded, respectively, as:


Double plays that are initiated by a batter hitting a ground ball are recorded in baseball statistics as GIDP (grounded into double play). This statistic has been tracked since 1933 in the National League and since 1939 in the American League. This statistic does not include line-outs into double plays, for which there is no official statistic for a batter.


The double play is a coup for the fielding team and debilitating to the batting team. The fielding team can select pitches to induce a double play — such as a sinker, which is more likely to be hit as a ground ball — and can position fielders to make a ground ball more likely to be turned into a double play. The batting team may take action — such as a hit and run play — to reduce the chance of grounding into a force double play.


In baseball slang, making a double play is referred to as "turning two" or a "twin killing" (a play on "twin billing", a moviehouse offering two features on the same ticket). Double plays are also known as "the pitcher's best friend" because they disrupt offense more than any other play, except for the rare triple play. A force double play made on a ground ball hit to the third baseman, who throws to the second baseman, who then throws to the first baseman, is referred to as an "around the horn" double play.


The ability to "make the pivot" on a force double play – receiving a throw from the third base side, then quickly turning and throwing to first base – is a key skill for a second baseman.


The most famous double play trio—although they never set any records—were Joe Tinker, Johnny Evers and Frank Chance, who were the shortstop, second baseman and first baseman, respectively, for the Chicago Cubs between 1902 and 1912. Their double play against the New York Giants in a 1910 game inspired Giants fan Franklin Pierce Adams to write the short poem "Baseball's Sad Lexicon", otherwise known as "Tinker to Evers to Chance", which immortalized the trio. All three players were part of the Cubs team that won the National League pennant in 1906, 1907, 1908, and 1910, and the World Series in 1907 and 1908, turning 491 double plays on the way. They were elected to the National Baseball Hall of Fame in 1946.


Jim Rice: 36 (Boston Red Sox, 1984)


Albert Pujols: 399 (through October 9, 2020)


The team record for a single game is seven GIDPs. It was set by the San Francisco Giants, who grounded into seven double plays on May 4, 1969, in a 3–1 loss to the Houston Astros. The Pittsburgh Pirates suffered seven double plays (only six GIDPs) on August 17, 2018, in a 1–0 loss to the Chicago Cubs. The 1990 Boston Red Sox grounded into 174 double plays to set the single season team record.


In baseball, a pickoff is an act by a pitcher or catcher, throwing a live ball to a fielder so that the fielder can tag out a baserunner who is either leading off or about to begin stealing the next base.


A pickoff attempt occurs when this throw is made in an attempt to make such an out or, more commonly, to "keep the runner close" by making it clear that the pitcher is aware and concerned with the runner's actions. A catcher may also attempt to throw runners out who likewise "stray too far" from their bases after a pitch; this can also be called a pickoff attempt. A runner who is picked off is said to have been "caught napping", especially if he made no attempt to return to his base.


A pickoff move is the motion the pitcher goes through in making this attempt; some pitchers have better pickoff moves than others. Pitchers in professional baseball use the pickoff move often, perhaps several times per game or even per inning if speedy baserunners reach base. Pitchers with more confidence in their ability to eliminate batters directly via strikeouts or flyouts use fewer pickoff attempts. In lower-skilled amateur games, the pickoff move is less common due to the potential for an error if the pitcher throws wild or the fielder fails to make the catch. In youth leagues that don't allow leading off, such as Little League and Cal Ripken League, the need for a pickoff move is eliminated.


A pitcher uses many tactics to attempt to disguise whether he is going to begin a pitch or a pickoff attempt. However, some deceptive actions are illegal and may be called a balk.


There are a few reasons to use this tactic:


A baserunner with a reputation for stealing bases, can also take advantage of the pitcher's desire to hold them to their base, as a means to throw off the pitcher's concentration. By taking a large lead, the runner can hope to force the pitcher to make mistakes, therefore helping the batter, by improving their chances at the plate. Prolific base stealers can accomplish this without a true intention to steal any base at all. Pitchers should be aware of this, and take care not to attempt to pick-off a runner, to the point of fatigue or losing focus on the batter.


On August 24, 1983, Tippy Martinez of the Baltimore Orioles picked off three consecutive Toronto Blue Jays base runners in the first half of the 10th inning. The catcher for the Orioles, utility infielder Lenn Sakata, had replaced the backup catcher at the start of the inning. Sakata hadn't played as a catcher since Little League, and the Blue Jays thought it would be easy to steal off him. In the bottom half of the same inning, Sakata hit a walk-off home run.


Game 4 of the 2013 World Series ended with a pickoff, as Koji Uehara of the Boston Red Sox threw to first base, causing St. Louis Cardinals' runner Kolten Wong to be tagged out.


Pickoff records are imprecise, as it is not an official MLB statistic, and historical box scores typically did not distinguish between a pickoff and a caught stealing.


Note that each of the pitchers listed in this section is left-handed.


Slap bunting is an offensive baseball and softball technique wherein the batter attempts "to hit the ball to a place on the infield that's farthest from the place where the out needs to be made".


The technique is quite common in softball because of the difficulty of getting a hit with a pitcher only away. By already being in the front of the batter's box with the batter's body turned halfway toward first base, the batter already has some momentum toward first base and might be in better position to get a base hit.


The technique is often successful in sacrifice circumstances, where the placement of the ball could help advance a runner already on base. It is also often used when batters are having difficulty getting a hit off of a difficult pitcher, or when they have a better opportunity of getting on base because of the slap bunt than a hit, perhaps because of the player's running speed.


Some advanced players might perform a slap hit, which is the same technique except that the player swings to place the ball in an infield hole or over the infielders' heads.


In baseball, the squeeze play (a.k.a. squeeze bunt) is a maneuver consisting of a sacrifice bunt with a runner on third base. The batter bunts the ball, expecting to be thrown out at first base, but providing the runner on third base an opportunity to score. Such a bunt is most common with one out. According to Baseball Almanac, the squeeze play was invented in 1894 by George Case and Dutch Carter during a college game at Yale University.


In a safety squeeze, the runner at third takes a lead, but does not run towards homeplate until the batter makes contact bunting.


In a suicide squeeze, the runner takes off as soon as the pitcher begins the windup to throw the pitch, and before releasing the ball. If properly executed, and the batter bunts the ball nearly anywhere in fair territory on the ground, a play at home plate is extremely unlikely. However, if the batter misses the ball the runner will likely be tagged out, and if the batter pops the ball up a double play is likely.


These plays are often used in the late innings of a close game in order to score a tying, winning, or insurance run. A pitcher's typical defense against a squeeze play, if he sees the batter getting into position to attempt a bunt, is to throw a high pitch that is difficult to bunt on the ground.


Although shagging is not considered to be dangerous, several freak injuries have occurred as a result of engaging in it. In 1943, just one season after collecting his 3,000th hit, Paul Waner accidentally gashed his foot while shagging a fly ball in a game against the Pittsburgh Pirates, his former team. This was probably due to Waner being nearsighted and his refusal to wear glasses; thus, he "played the outfield by ear." Nearly four decades later, Jerry Reuss was handed the honor of pitching on Opening Day in 1981, but suffered an injury to his calf while shagging for his teammates. He was replaced by unheralded rookie Fernando Valenzuela, who went on to win his next 8 consecutive decisions.


Other players who have suffered serious injuries due to shagging include Mark Fidrych and Brendan Donnelly. Fidrych suffered a left knee injury after tearing cartilage in 1977 spring training, starting a downward spiral in his career. Donnelly ended up breaking his nose while shagging, resulting in him losing half of his blood and necessitating three operations.


Mariano Rivera, the all-time leader in saves, suffered arguably the most well-known injury from shagging on May 3, 2012. While helping out in pre-game batting practice, Rivera attempted to catch a fly ball from Jayson Nix when he twisted his knee on the warning track of Kauffman Stadium and fell to the ground. An MRI scan revealed he had torn his anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) and part of his meniscus. This prematurely ended his season and led to fears that this could potentially be a career-ending injury. Rivera was able to come back and pitch for the 2013 season, his final season in the major leagues before retiring.


Despite the seriousness of Rivera's injuries, pitchers from across Major League Baseball (MLB) who engaged in shagging flies during batting practice said they would not drop the activity or modify their training routine. These included James Shields and J. J. Putz, along with 2012 Cy Young Award winners R.A. Dickey and David Price. Furthermore, several MLB managers at the time—namely Dale Sveum, Joe Maddon, Jim Leyland and Terry Collins—confirmed they would not order their pitchers to stop shagging.


A hidden ball trick is a play in which a player deceives the opposing team about the location of the ball. Hidden ball tricks are most commonly observed in Baseball, where the defence deceives the runner about the location of the ball, to tag out the runner. In goal-based sports (e.g., American football and lacrosse), the offence deceives the defence about the location of the ball, in an attempt to get the defence running the wrong way, such as in a fumblerooski.


In the sports of baseball and softball, the hidden ball trick usually involves a fielder using sleight of hand or misdirection to confuse a baserunner as to the location of the ball, allowing the fielder to tag out the runner unawares. Though several variations of the play exist, they usually involve a fielder keeping the ball without the runner's knowledge, waiting for the runner to step off a base, and then quickly tagging the runner out. For the trick to work, the fielder (generally an infielder) must get the ball while the ball is still in the play, and the runner must either not know that the fielder has the ball or think that the play is over.


Fielders usually try to fool the runner by miming a throw to the pitcher or another defender while keeping the baseball out of sight, often in his glove. If the runner is not paying attention and assumes that the closest fielder no longer has the ball, he may stray off the base and be tagged out. A related tactic is to quickly re-tag the runner after an unsuccessful tag in the hope that his hand or foot has lost contact with the base after a slide but before time has been called.


While variations exist, the use of the play in major league baseball is somewhat rare. Some say that the hidden-ball trick has been pulled fewer than 300 times in over 100 years of major league baseball.


A first baseman may attempt the play after a pitcher, in an attempt to pick off a runner, throws to first. The first baseman then fakes the throwback to the pitcher while keeping the ball in his glove, and if and when the runner leaves the base, tags the runner. Dave Bergman is a former first baseman who pulled this off on multiple occasions. A second baseman could attempt a similar play after a successful steal of second base, having received a throw from the catcher.


Former second baseman Marty Barrett also successfully performed the trick more than once. After a runner reached second base on a ball hit to the outfield, and after receiving the throw-in from the outfield, he faked a throw to the pitcher while retaining the ball. To aid the deception, Barrett took the throw with his back to the runner, then placed the ball between the back of his glove and one of his fingers: this way, he exposed his glove to the runner without the ball in the pocket, suggesting that he did not have the ball. Other players have hidden the ball in their armpit.


Former third baseman Matt Williams used a different technique which asked the runner to step off the base so that Williams could sweep the dirt off it, then tagged out the runner when the runner complied. This worked twice.


Former third baseman Mike Lowell also made the trick work twice, each time after a throw-in from the outfield. The key to Lowell's success was acting, placement, and waiting: acting as if nothing was on, standing away from the bag but not too far from it, and waiting, at least 10 seconds, until the runner on third took a few steps.


Mike Lowell did it again on September 3, , catching George Stone in the first inning. In-Game 2 of the 1907 World Series, Coughlin caught Jimmy Slagle with a hidden ball trick, the only one in World Series history. The play went from Germany Schaefer to Coughlin.


Willie Kamm was considered another master of the trick. On April 30, , in a game against the Cleveland Indians, Kamm was involved in a rare triple play involving a hidden-ball trick. The Indians had baserunners on first and second bases when Carl Lind grounded out to the shortstop. Johnny Hodapp, who had been on second base, tried to score but got caught in a rundown between third and home. Charlie Jamieson advanced to third. Kamm retrieved the ball and tagged both runners, whereupon the umpire ruled Hodapp out. Kamm then hid the ball under his arm and waited for Jamieson to step off the base. When he did so, Kamm tagged him out to complete the triple play.


In the minor leagues, on August 31, 1987, catcher Dave Bresnahan of the Williamsport Bills pulled an unusual hidden ball trick against the Reading Phillies in the Eastern League. With a runner on third base, Bresnahan switched catcher's mitts and put on a glove in which he had secreted a peeled potato. When the pitch came in, Bresnahan fired the white potato down the third-base line, enticing the runner to sprint home. Bresnahan then tagged the runner with the baseball which he kept in his mitt. The umpire awarded the runner home plate for Bresnahan's deception. Bresnahan was subsequently released from the Bills for the incident, but the fans of the Bills loved the play and the team eventually retired Bresnahan's number.


In goal-based sports (e.g., American football and lacrosse), the offence deceives the defence about the location of the ball, in an attempt to get the defence running the wrong way.


A hidden ball trick is considered a trick play in American football.


There are various executions of the hidden ball plays in American football, including the Statue of Liberty play and Fumblerooski.


On November 9, 1895 John Heisman executed a hidden ball trick utilizing quarterback Reynolds Tichenor to get Auburn's only touchdown in a 6 to 9 loss to Vanderbilt. During the play, the ball was snapped to a half-back who was able to slip it under the back of the quarterback's jersey and who in turn was able to trot in for the touchdown. This was also the first game in the south decided by a field goal. Heisman later used the trick against Pop Warner's Georgia team. Warner picked up the trick and later used it at Cornell against Penn State in 1897. He then used it in 1903 at Carlisle against Harvard and garnered national attention.


The hidden ball trick was famously parodied in the 1930s by the Marx Brothers in the film "Horse Feathers" and by the Three Stooges in the comedy short "Three Little Pigskins".


Hidden ball tricks can be used in rugby and lacrosse.


In baseball, the field manager (commonly referred to as the manager) is the equivalent of a head coach who is responsible for overseeing and making final decisions on all aspects of on-field team strategy, lineup selection, training and instruction. Managers are typically assisted by a staff of assistant coaches whose responsibilities are specialized. Field managers are typically not involved in off-field personnel decisions or long-term club planning, responsibilities that are instead held by a team's general manager.


The manager chooses the batting order and starting pitcher before each game, and makes substitutions throughout the game – among the most significant being those decisions regarding when to bring in a relief pitcher. How much control a manager takes in a game's strategy varies from manager to manager and from game to game. Some managers control pitch selection, defensive positioning, decisions to bunt, steal, pitch out, etc., while others designate an assistant coach or a player (often the catcher) to make some or all of these decisions.


Some managers choose to act as their team's first base or third base coach while their team is batting in order to more closely communicate with baserunners, but most managers delegate this responsibility to an assistant. Managers are typically assisted by two or more coaches.


In many cases, a manager is a former professional, semi-professional or college player. A high proportion of current and former managers played the central position of catcher during their playing days, including Yogi Berra, Bruce Bochy, Wilbert Robinson, Joe Girardi, Mike Scioscia, Joe Torre, Connie Mack, Ralph Houk, and Ned Yost.


The manager's responsibilities normally are limited to in-game decisions, with off-field roster management and personnel decisions falling to the team's general manager. The term "manager" used without qualification almost always refers to the field manager (essentially equivalent to the head coach in other North American professional sports leagues), while the general manager is often called the GM. This usage dates back to the early days of professional baseball when it was common practice for teams to have just one "manager" on their staff, and where GM duties were performed either by the field manager or (more commonly) by the owner of the team. Some owners (most famously, Connie Mack of the Philadelphia Athletics) carried out both GM and field managerial duties themselves.


Major League Baseball managers differ from the head coaches of most other professional sports in that they dress in the same uniform as the players and are assigned a jersey number. The wearing of a matching uniform is frequently practiced at other levels of play, as well. The manager may be called "skipper" or "skip" informally by his players.


Control pitchers, who succeed by avoiding surrendering walks, are different from power pitchers who succeed by striking out batters and keeping the ball out of play.


Three of the most famous examples of control pitchers in the history of baseball are Christy Mathewson, Ferguson Jenkins, and Greg Maddux, though Maddux and Jenkins have also had significant strikeout totals (they are members of the 3,000 strikeout club) because of their ability to change speeds and the deceptive nature of their pitches.


In an interview for "ESPN The Magazine" before the , an NBA general manager who chose to remain anonymous (though speculated to be either Rob Hennigan of the Orlando Magic or Ryan McDonough of the Phoenix Suns) stated that because "the last place you want to be is in the middle", his team would try to tank that season to have the best chance at a top pick in the 2014 NBA draft, which was anticipated to be one of the deepest in recent league history. The GM explained how he got the team's owners and the coach to agree to it while trying to keep it a secret from the players.


One of the first teams to "tank" was the 1983–84 Houston Rockets, who considered the season lost after starting 20–26 and decided to play more bench players in order to fall in the standings and get higher in the draft order for the following season. In the 1983–84 NHL season, the Pittsburgh Penguins and New Jersey Devils admitted they wanted to lose in order to get the number one pick in the draft and select Mario Lemieux. But tanking did not become prevalent until the 2010s, when teams in all four major American leagues (the MLB, NFL, NBA, and NHL) were engaged in various forms of the practice.


The Chicago Cubs and Houston Astros pioneered the practice in the MLB in the 2010s, finishing last in their respective leagues for several years. Both teams used subsequent draft picks to select star players who led them to championships, as the Cubs won the 2016 World Series and the Astros won in . Other teams like the Miami Marlins, Baltimore Orioles, Kansas City Royals, and Detroit Tigers have sought to emulate the strategy by trading away top players with the goal of drafting and developing top players and cutting costs in order to become competitive again several years later.


In 2014, the Australian Football League's Melbourne Football Club were fined $500,000 for their involvement in a 2009 tanking scandal.


When Jon Gruden retook control of the Oakland Raiders prior to the 2018 NFL season he liquidated most of the Raiders' talent, most notably trading five-time Pro Bowler Khalil Mack to the Chicago Bears for two first round draft picks, leading to accusations that he was intentionally tanking the team in hopes of fielding a competitive team when the Raiders moved to Las Vegas in 2020. The Raiders, who had finished 12–4 and qualified for the playoffs two seasons prior, finished their 2018 season with only four wins, but saw significant improvement the next season thanks to strong play from the team's rookies.


Philadelphia Eagles head coach Doug Pederson faced allegations of deliberately losing the final game of the 2020 season after he replaced starting quarterback Jalen Hurts for backup Nate Sudfeld. The Eagles were losing by only three points against the Washington Football Team early into the fourth quarter, but an ineffective Sudfeld committed two turnovers on consecutive drives that allowed Washington to win 20-14. As a result, the 4-11-1 Eagles moved up from ninth overall to sixth overall in the 2021 NFL Draft, while Washington clinched the NFC East, which would have been clinched by the New York Giants if Philadelphia won. Pederson denied the allegations, stating he intended to give Sudfeld the opportunity to play, although he would be fired a week after the game.


Fans of the Philadelphia 76ers adopted the mantra "Trust the Process" when the team was tanking from 2013 to 2016.


While tanking can be a successful strategy in eventually building a winning team, it alienates fans in the midst of the rebuilding process as fans are frustrated by losing teams. During the Astros' rebuilding years of 2011–2013 when they lost an average of 108 games per season, attendance was cut in half and one game had a television rating of 0.0. The Sabres have also seen dips in attendance since their alleged rebuilding years in the 2010s and have also been described as a "toxic environment".


Tanking can lead to strife with players' unions as tanking teams choose rookies on inexpensive contracts over free agents wanting multimillion dollar deals.


Leagues also see tanking as a threat to their existing revenue streams. The NBA, for example, sees this as a potentially major issue. One of professional leagues largest drivers of revenue generation is gate receipts from attendance. Tanking has been shown to drastically reduce attendance and thus hurt the NBA's bottom line.


The NBA and NHL have responded to the phenomenon in recent years by changing their draft from reverse-order to a lottery formula which is only loosely tied to the previous season's standings. Some observers have called for leagues to adopt a European-style relegation system where the worst teams are demoted to a minor league to make tanking less attractive. The NBA has even fined executives and owners for referencing the merits of losing.


The NBA changed the way teams are given draft picks. In 2018, they decided to level the odds more at the top of the draft so that the worst team does not have the highest chance of getting the number one overall pick.  This change serves to dissuade teams from intentionally losing.


Sabermetrics or SABRmetrics is the empirical analysis of baseball, especially baseball statistics that measure in-game activity.


Sabermetricians collect and summarize the relevant data from this in-game activity to answer specific questions. The term is derived from the acronym SABR, which stands for the Society for American Baseball Research, founded in 1971. The term "sabermetrics" was coined by Bill James, who is one of its pioneers and is often considered its most prominent advocate and public face.


Henry Chadwick, a sportswriter in New York, developed the box score in 1858. This was the first way statisticians were able to describe the sport of baseball by numerically tracking various aspects of game play. The creation of the box score has given baseball statisticians a summary of the individual and team performances for a given game.


Sabermetrics research began in the middle of the 20th century with the writings of Earnshaw Cook, one of the earliest sabermetricians. Cook's 1964 book "Percentage Baseball" was one of the first of its kind. At first, most organized baseball teams and professionals dismissed Cook's work as meaningless. The idea of a science of baseball statistics began to achieve legitimacy in 1977 when Bill James began releasing "Baseball Abstracts", his annual compendium of baseball data. However, James's ideas were slow to find widespread acceptance.


David Smith founded Retrosheet in 1989, with the objective of computerizing the box score of every major league baseball game ever played, in order to more accurately collect and compare the statistics of the game.


Sabermetrics was created in an attempt for baseball fans to learn about the sport through objective evidence. This is performed by evaluating players in every aspect of the game, specifically batting, pitching, and fielding. These evaluation measures are usually phrased in terms of either runs or team wins as older statistics were deemed ineffective.


The traditional measure of batting performance is considered to be hits divided by the total number of at-bats. Bill James, along with other fathers of sabermetrics, found this measure to be flawed, as it ignores any other way a batter can reach base besides a hit. This led to the creation of the On-base percentage, which takes walks and hit-by-pitches into consideration. To calculate the On-Base percentage, the total number of hits + bases on balls + hit by pitch are divided by at bats + bases on balls + hit by pitch + sacrifice flies.


Another issue with the traditional measure of the batting average is that it does not distinguish between hits (i.e., singles, doubles, triples, and home runs) and gives each hit equal value. Thus, a measure that differentiates among these four hit outcomes, the slugging percentage, was created. To calculate the slugging percentage, the total number of bases of all hits is divided by the total number of times at bat. Stephen Jay Gould proposed that the disappearance of .400 batting average is actually a sign of general improvement in batting. This is because, in the modern era, players are becoming more focused on hitting for power than for average. Therefore, it has become more valuable to compare players using the slugging percentage and on-base percentage over the batting average.


These two improved sabermetric measures are important skills to measure in a batter and have been combined to create the modern statistic OPS. On-base plus slugging is the sum of the on-base percentage and the slugging percentage. This modern statistic has become useful in comparing players and is a powerful method of predicting runs scored from a certain player.


Some of the other statistics that sabermetricians use to evaluate batting performance are weighted on-base average, secondary average, runs created, and equivalent average.


The traditional measure of pitching performance is earned run average. It is calculated as earned runs allowed per 9 innings. Earned run average does not separate the ability of the pitcher from the abilities of the fielders that he plays with. Another classic measure for pitching is a pitcher's winning percentage. Winning percentage is calculated by dividing wins by the number of decisions (wins and losses). Winning percentage is also heavily dependent on the pitcher's team, particularly on the number of runs it scores.


"Baseball Prospectus" created another statistics called the peripheral ERA. This measure of a pitcher's performance takes hits, walks, home runs allowed, and strikeouts while adjusting for ballpark factors. Each ballpark has different dimensions when it comes to the outfield wall so a pitcher should not be measured the same for each of these parks.


Batting average on balls in play (BABIP) is another useful measurement for determining pitcher's performance. When a pitcher has a high BABIP, they will often show improvements in the following season, while a pitcher with low BABIP will often show a decline in the following season. This is based on the statistical concept of regression to the mean. Others have created various means of attempting to quantify individual pitches based on characteristics of the pitch, as opposed to runs earned or balls hit.


Value over replacement player (VORP) is considered a popular sabermetric statistic. This statistic demonstrates how much a player contributes to his team in comparison to a hypothetical player that performs at the minimum level needed to hold a roster position on a major league team. This measurement was invented by Keith Woolner, a former writer for the sabermetric group/website "Baseball Prospectus".


Wins above replacement (WAR) is another popular sabermetric statistic for evaluating a player's contributions to his team. Similar to VORP, WAR compares a given player to a replacement-level player in order to determine the number of additional wins the player has provided to his team. WAR values vary with hitting positions and are largely determined by a player's successful performance and amount of playing time.


Many traditional and modern statistics, such as ERA and Wins Shared, don't give a full understanding of what is taking place on the field. Simple ratios are not sufficient to understand the statistical data of baseball. Structured quantitative analysis is capable of explaining many aspects of the game, for example, to examine how often a team should attempt to steal.


Sabermetrics can be used for multiple purposes, but the most common are evaluating past performance and predicting future performance to determine a player's contributions to his team. These may be useful when determining who should win end-of-the-season awards such as MVP and when determining the value of making a certain trade.


Most baseball players tend to play a few years in the minor leagues before they are called up to the major league. The competitive differences coupled with ballpark effects make the exact comparison of a player's statistics a problem. Sabermetricians have been able to clear this problem by adjusting the player's minor league statistics, also known as the Minor-League Equivalency. Through these adjustments, teams are able to look at a player's performance in both AA and AAA to determine if he is fit to be called up to the majors.


Sabermetrics methods are generally used for three purposes:


A machine learning model can be built using data sets available at sources such as baseball-reference. This model will give probability estimates for the outcome of specific games or the performance of particular players. These estimates are increasingly accurate when applied to a large number of events over a long term. The game outcome (win/lose) is treated as having a binomial distribution.


Predictions can be made using a logistic regression model with explanatory variables including: opponents' runs scored, runs scored, shutouts time at bat, winning rate, and pitcher whip.


Many sabermetricians are still working hard to contribute to the field through creating new measures and asking new questions. Bill James' two "Historical Baseball Abstract" editions and "Win Shares" book have continued to advance the field of sabermetrics, 25 years after he helped start the movement. His former assistant Rob Neyer, who is now a senior writer at ESPN.com and national baseball editor of SBNation, also worked on popularizing sabermetrics since the mid-1980s.


Nate Silver, a former writer and managing partner of "Baseball Prospectus", invented PECOTA. This acronym stands for "Player Empirical Comparison and Optimization Test Algorithm", and is a sabermetric system for forecasting Major League Baseball player performance. Simply put, it assumes that the careers of similar players will follow a similar trajectory. This system has been owned by "Baseball Prospectus" since 2003 and helps the website's authors invent or improve widely relied-upon sabermetric measures and techniques.


Beginning in the 2007 baseball season, the MLB started looking at technology to record detailed information regarding each pitch that is thrown in a game. This became known as the PITCHf/x system which is able to record the speed of the pitch, at its release point and as it crossed the plate, as well as the location and angle of the break of certain pitches through video cameras. FanGraphs is a website that favors this system as well as the analysis of play-by-play data. The website also specializes in publishing advanced baseball statistics as well as graphics that evaluate and track the performance of players and teams.


In baseball, the left right switch is a maneuver by which a player that struggles against left- or right-handed players is replaced by a player who excels in the situation, usually only for the duration of the situation in question. For instance, a right-handed pitcher who is weak against left-handed hitting and is facing a left-handed hitter would be replaced with a pitcher, usually left-handed, who does a superior job of getting a left-handed hitter out. Similarly, a batter who has difficulty hitting against a left-handed pitcher will sometimes be pinch hit for by a batter who does well, even if the original player is superior in other respects.


Conventional baseball wisdom suggests that, when a pitcher and a hitter pitch or bat with the same hand, the pitcher typically has the advantage. This especially holds true for left-handed pitchers, as lefties are less common in a major-league lineup than righties. As a result, the most common use of the lefty-righty switch is when a right-handed pitcher is facing a left-handed batter. The manager of the defensive team will sometimes go to the bullpen, especially in close games where a reliever has already entered the game, and pull out a left-handed specialist to face the left-handed batter. The new pitcher will then attempt to get the batter out. Whether he succeeds or fails, the pitcher will often be replaced after the at-bat.


The lefty-righty switch can also be used against switch hitters who are noticeably poorer from one side of the plate than the other, or in the somewhat rarer instance of a batter who does poorly against "opposite"-handed pitchers. The basic principle in these cases remains the same.


It is less common, although still frequent, for a batter to be replaced to gain a handedness advantage over a pitcher. For instance, with a left-handed pitcher in and a left-handed batter due up, a right-handed bat may be called in from the bench. The righty may not be as strong an all-round player as the player he replaced (thus, his absence from the everyday lineup), but he is a superior tactical choice for the purpose of getting on base in one at bat with a favorable matchup. Such a batter can be pinch run for if he gets on, replaced with a better defensive player for the next half-inning, or simply left in for the duration of the game.


Similarly, position players must accept facing both left-handed and right-handed pitching as part of their job. Managers will usually juggle batters who are exceptionally weak against one sort of pitcher so that they only face starting pitchers who offer favorable matchups, but it is impossible to shield a batter from every instance in which he will face a pitcher who has him at a disadvantage. As a result, a position player must be prepared at all times to face a lefty-righty switch in a situation where his team cannot afford to pinch hit for him.


Inside baseball is a strategy in baseball developed by the 19th-century Baltimore Orioles team and promoted by John McGraw. In his book, "My Thirty Years of Baseball", McGraw credits the development of the "inside baseball" to manager Ned Hanlon. In the 1890s, this kind of play was referred to as "Oriole baseball" or "Baltimore baseball".


Inside baseball is an offensive strategy that focuses on teamwork and good execution. It usually centers on tactics that keep the ball in the infield: walks, base hits, bunts, and stolen bases. One such play, where the batter deliberately strikes the pitched ball downward onto the infield surface with sufficient force such that the ball rebounds skyward, allowing the batter to reach first base safely before the opposing team can field the ball, remains known as a Baltimore Chop.


Another term in use in the 1890s for this style was "scientific baseball", referring to calculated one-run game strategies based on intelligent, cooperative actions of the players. An article in "The New York Times" published in 1911 described "scientific baseball":Scientific baseball of to-day – "inside ball" they call it – consists in making the opposing team think you are going to make a play one way, then shift suddenly and do it in another.


McGraw in his book writes: "So-called inside baseball is mostly bunk. It is merely working out of definite plans that the public does not observe".


This strategy did not rely on big hits and home runs and became the primary offensive strategy during the dead-ball era.


The equivalent modern term is "small ball".


Critics also note that the reputation of the Orioles for the "inside baseball" grew only in retrospect. At the time, the Orioles were more famous for deliberately playing dirty.


Win probability is a statistical tool which suggests a sports team's chances of winning at any given point in a game, based on the performance of historical teams in the same situation. The art of estimating win probability involves choosing which pieces of context matter. Baseball win probability estimates often include whether a team is home or away, inning, number of outs, which bases are occupied, and the score difference. Because baseball proceeds batter by batter, each new batter introduces a discrete state. There are a limited number of possible states, and so baseball win probability tools usually have enough data to make an informed estimate.


American football win probability estimates often include whether a team is home or away, the down and distance, score difference, time remaining, and field position. American football has many more possible states than baseball with far fewer games, so football estimates have a greater margin of error. The first win probability analysis was done in 1971 by Robert E. Machol and former NFL quarterback Virgil Carter.


As a brief example, guessing that each team playing at home will win is based on home advantage. This guess uses a single contextual factor and involves a very large number of games. But with only one factor, the accuracy of this guess is limited to home advantage itself (about 55–70% across sports) and does not change within the game based on in-game factors.


Win probability added is the change in win probability, often how a play or team member affected the probable outcome of the game.


Current research work involves measuring the accuracy of win probability estimates, as well as quantifying the uncertainty in individual estimates. That is, if a tool estimates a 24% win probability because 24% of previous teams in that situation won their games, do future teams win at the same 24% rate? Estimating from hidden data uses testing tools like cross-validation.


While many models involve frequency analysis of past events, other models use Bayesian processes.


Some models include a measure of teams' strength coming into the game, while others assume every team is average. Including strength estimates increases the number of possible states, and therefore decreases an estimate's power while possibly increasing its accuracy.


Whiteyball is a style of playing baseball that was developed by former Major League Baseball manager Whitey Herzog. The term was coined by the press during the 1982 World Series to describe the style of Herzog's St. Louis Cardinals. The team won the Series without a typical power hitter, instead using speed on the base paths, solid pitching, excellent defense, and line drive base hits. Whiteyball was well-suited to the fast, hard AstroTurf surface that Busch Memorial Stadium had at the time, which created large, unpredictable bounces when the ball hit it at sharp angles. In his book "White Rat", Herzog says the approach was a response to the spacious, artificial surface stadiums of the time. He said of the media's dismay at his teams' success:


Herzog used this strategy for his team during the 1980s until he left the Cardinals in 1990.


A 2012 sports article described Whiteyball as follows:


Herzog used many switch-hitters such as Ozzie Smith, Willie McGee, Tom Herr, Terry Pendleton, Vince Coleman, José Oquendo, Garry Templeton, Ted Simmons, Luis Alicea, Mike Ramsey, Tony Scott, and Félix José in St. Louis, along with Willie Wilson and U L Washington when he managed in Kansas City. Kansas City Royals manager Ned Yost used his own version of Whiteyball to get to the 2014 World Series, and win the 2015 series.


According to "The Dickson Baseball Dictionary", a team has "batted around" when each of the nine batters in the team's lineup has made a plate appearance, and the first batter is coming up again during a single inning. Dictionary.com, however, defines "bat around" as "to have every player in the lineup take a turn at bat during a single inning." It is not an official statistic. Opinions differ as to whether nine batters must get an at-bat, or if the opening batter must bat again for "batting around" to have occurred.


In modern American baseball, some batting positions have nicknames: "leadoff" for first, "cleanup" for fourth, and "last" for ninth. Others are known by the ordinal numbers or the term #-hole (3rd place hitter would be 3-hole). In similar fashion, the third, fourth, and fifth batters are often collectively referred to as the "heart" or "meat" of the batting order, while the seventh, eighth, and ninth batters are called the "bottom of the lineup," a designation generally referring both to their hitting position and to their typical lack of offensive prowess.


For example, Rule 36 ("The Batsman's Position--Order of Batting") in "The Playing Rules of Professional Base Ball Clubs" of 1896 stated the following: "The Batsmen must take their positions within the batsmen's lines ... in the order in which they are named in the batting order, which batting order must be submitted by the Captains of the opposing teams to the Umpire before the game, and this batting order must be followed except in the case of a substitute player, in which case the substitute must take the place of the original player in the batting order. After the first inning the first striker in each inning shall be the batsman whose name follows that of the last man who completed his turn ... in the preceding inning."


In cricket, the batting order is generally fixed so that players are sure of their role within the team, but there is no obligation to submit a definitive batting order and stick to it. A "batsman" can be "promoted" to a higher spot (or conversely, demoted to a lower one) in the batting order according to the team's wishes.


The idea of a "revolving" batting order is unique to baseball, in which the on-deck batter at the time the final out is made in one inning becomes the lead-off batter (unless the current batter had not been struck-out or put a ball in play, in which case he returns as the lead-off batter with a 0-0 reset pitch count) in the next inning (unless his spot is taken by a pinch-hitter).


In the shorter form of cricket, there is only one innings per side, while in the longer form each side bats a maximum of two times. In a typical innings of this latter form, all eleven players on the team will have a chance to bat, and the innings finishes when 10 players are out. In the team's second innings, the batting order is usually maintained, but the team can make any changes it desires.


As in baseball, many batting order configurations are possible, but a standard order might be:


The concept of a batting order in baseball is "profoundly democratic; no matter how good a hitter you are, you have to wait your turn." In that respect, although baseball, like cricket, "may have begun as a gentlemen's game," Americans gravitated toward baseball as a better embodiment of the country's egalitarian ideal, and as a symbol of cultural as well as political independence from the British colonial legacy.


However, it should also be remembered that in cricket a single innings lasts hours or even days, and there are periods in which batting can be markedly easier or more difficult. A related factor is that a single ball is used in an innings for around 80 overs (approximately 5 hours of play). At the beginning of an innings, therefore, when bowlers are fresh and the ball is hard, it would be appreciably more challenging for the non-specialist batsmen to make an impact. Conversely, if such a player bats when the ball is old and the bowlers are tired, he can thrive, and this can often be a great source of pleasure to spectators, as insult is added to injury for the other side.


Finally, in cricket, there is no such thing as a designated hitter, so even if a bowler has no batting ability, he will still be required to bat, usually as the last man in the order.


The first player in the batting order is known as the leadoff hitter. The leadoff batter is traditionally an individual with a high on-base percentage, plate discipline, bat control, good speed, and the ability to steal bases. His goal is to ensure the team has baserunners when the later, more powerful hitters come to bat. Once on base, his main goal is to get into scoring position (that is, 2nd or 3rd base) as quickly as possible, either through steals, hit and run plays or intelligent baserunning decisions, and then on to score.


His need for a high on-base percentage (OBP) exceeds that of the other lineup spots. Because leadoff hitters are selected primarily for their speed and ability to reach base, they are typically not power hitters, but contact hitters. Leadoff hitters typically hit mostly singles and doubles and draw walks to get on base. However, speed is not essential, as was shown by Wade Boggs, but it is highly desired among leadoff hitters.


However, today's model for a leadoff hitter developed only gradually. An early "job description" for a leadoff hitter by baseball pioneer Henry Chadwick in 1867 advised only, "Let your first striker always be the coolest hand of the nine." By 1898, though, a "Sporting Life"


article noted, "It is customary to have a small, active fellow who can hit, run and steal bases, and also worry a pitcher into a preliminary base on balls, as a leader in the list."


Examples of classic leadoff hitters are Phil Rizzuto, Richie Ashburn, Maury Wills, Lou Brock, Pete Rose, Rod Carew, Tim Raines, and Ichiro Suzuki, with some having somewhat more power (Dick McAuliffe, Lou Whitaker, Rickey Henderson, Paul Molitor, Derek Jeter, Carlos Gómez, Gerardo Parra, Johnny Damon).


The term “leadoff hitter” can be used interchangeably to describe not only the first batter on the lineup card, but also the first batter up in any particular inning. For example, if, in the second inning, the fifth batter in the lineup card is the first batter up, it will be said that he is leading off or that he is the leadoff batter for that particular inning.


The third batter, in the "three-hole", is generally the best all-around hitter on the team, often hitting for a high batting average but not necessarily very fast. Part of his job is to reach base for the cleanup hitter, and part of it is to help drive in baserunners himself. Third-place hitters are best known for "keeping the inning alive". However, in recent years, some managers have tended to put their best slugger in this position.


Typically the greatest hitters for a combination of power and OBP on their teams bat third, as is shown by the use of such hitters as Rogers Hornsby, Babe Ruth, Stan Musial, Mel Ott, Ted Williams, Tony Gwynn, Willie Mays, Chipper Jones, Barry Bonds, Mickey Mantle, Carl Yastrzemski, Albert Pujols, Joey Votto, Andrew McCutchen, Miguel Cabrera, Ken Griffey Jr., Ryan Braun, Josh Hamilton, Evan Longoria, José Bautista, Edwin Encarnación, Mike Trout, and Hank Aaron in this position in the lineup. Even without the combination of extreme power (Yogi Berra, Al Kaline, George Brett) or high batting average (Ernie Banks, Harmon Killebrew, Johnny Bench, Mike Schmidt, Reggie Jackson) this batting position contains an inordinate number of hitters who eventually become members of the Baseball Hall of Fame.


The theory behind the cleanup hitter is that, at the beginning of the game, if at least one of the first three batters reaches base with a single-base hit or walk, a home run will result in two or more runs rather than just one (a "solo" home run). If all three players reach base, thereby loading the bases, the cleanup hitter has the chance to hit a grand slam, scoring four runs. But even without the grand slam, this batter can extend an inning with a high batting average and frequent walks.


However, since home runs were a rarity before 1920, the concept of slotting a home run hitter fourth was slow to develop. However, the need for a good run producer in that position was recognized from the early days in baseball history, as demonstrated by player-manager Cap Anson generally penciling his name there. As power came to play a larger role in the game, the tendency to bat home run hitters fourth developed accordingly. In 1904, sportswriter Tim Murnane stated unequivocally that "The heavy hitter of the team is located at the fourth place."


The #3 and #4 hitters can often be switched in roles. For example, the 2011 Detroit Tigers had Miguel Cabrera as their #4 hitter but moved him to the #3 hitter after acquiring Prince Fielder as a free agent before the 2012 season.


In the presence of the designated hitter, the ninth batter is often like the second leadoff. Ninth-hitters tend to be fast, and have a decent on-base percentage like the leadoff hitter.


On August 18, 1956, major league manager Bobby Bragan placed his best hitter in the leadoff position and the remainder of his lineup in descending batting average order. Earnshaw Cook in his 1966 book, "Percentage Baseball", claimed that, using a computer, Bragan's lineup would result in 1 to 2 more wins per season. A recent computer simulation demonstrates the superiority of Bragan's lineup.


Power hitter is a term used in baseball for a skilled player that has a higher than average ability in terms of his batting, featuring a combination of dexterity and personal strength that likely leads to a high number of home-runs as well as doubles and triples.


In terms of detailed analysis, looking at a player's ability as a power hitter often involves using statistics such as someone's 'slugging percentage' (a function that's calculated by evaluating someone's number of moments at bat in relation to the nature of their hits and strikes). 'Isolated Power' (ISO), a measure showing the number of extra bases earned per time at bat that's calculated by subtracting someone's batting average from his slugging percentage, is another statistic used.


The concept generally is analogous to that of a power pitcher, a player who relies on the velocity of his pitches (perhaps at the expense of accuracy) and a high record of strikeout associated with them (statistics such as strikeouts per nine innings pitched are common measures).


Barry Bonds, who set the record for the most home runs in a season in Major League Baseball history, is often cited as a power hitter. His career was later bogged down by issues regarding performance enhancing drugs. However, he managed a total of 762 home runs while also earning a comparatively high ISO compared to his rivals, with the publication "Business Insider" labeling him #3 in a list of the greatest power hitters of all time.


Other baseball figures so cited include the famous hitters Babe Ruth, Lou Gehrig, and Ted Williams. Popular newspaper writer Victor O. Jones wrote about Williams in particular, "Ted is lucky to come along in a baseball age that worships on the shrine of power, pure, unadulterated power."


However, in an instance where if the runner at 3rd base scoring ends the game immediately, a team may elect to have a fifth infielder, as to decrease the chances of a groundball getting through. The drawback is that it decreases the chance of an outfielder getting to a potential fly ball that may result in a play at the plate, however, any fair fly ball hit deep enough is good enough to end the game.


For scorekeeping purposes, whatever position a player is listed as in the box score is the number they get assigned. For example, if a left fielder moves in to play the third base position, and a ball is hit to him, and he throws to the catcher to get the out, the play is recorded as 7–2.


In , in an Opening Day game between the Toronto Blue Jays and Cleveland Indians at Progressive Field in Cleveland, Ohio, in the bottom of the 12th, with the score tied 4–4, the Indians loaded the bases with one out. Manager John Farrell of the Blue Jays decided to take out left fielder Eric Thames and bring in veteran infielder Omar Vizquel (who won 11 Gold Gloves in his career) to play at second base, being the pivot of a potential double play. Sure enough, pitcher Luis Pérez got Asdrúbal Cabrera to ground into the inning ending double play, 6–4–3, although Vizquel was not involved in the double play. The Jays ended up winning 7–4 in 16 innings, which was the longest Opening Day game in MLB history.


Later in 2012, on September 13, 2012 in a game vs. the Tampa Bay Rays and Baltimore Orioles at Camden Yards in Baltimore, Maryland, with the game tied 2–2 in the bottom of the 13th, the Orioles loaded the bases with no one out. Rays manager Joe Maddon took out left fielder Sam Fuld to bring in infielder Reid Brignac to play in the middle of the infielder. Rays pitcher Chris Archer ended up getting Robert Andino to ground into a force at home plate before striking out Matt Wieters and Nate McLouth to get out of the jam. The Orioles ended up winning 3–2 in 14 innings.


A fly ball pitcher is a type of baseball pitcher who produces an above-average number of fly balls, typically by keeping his fastball high up in the strike zone and relying on late movement to cause the batter to be unable to make solid contact. This designation is constructed around the ground ball fly ball ratio, which measures how frequently a pitcher gets batters out on fly balls versus ground balls.


The downside of a fly ball pitcher is that, in a ballpark where the design tends to favor hitters over pitchers (an example being Yankee Stadium), a fly ball pitcher will tend to give up more home runs, resulting in a higher earned run average.


Examples include pitchers Sid Fernandez, Ted Lilly, Chris Young and Marco Estrada.


Sistema Peralta ("Peralta system") is a baseball strategy where the pitching rotation in a 9-inning game is approximately divided amongst three pitchers throwing three innings each (3-3-3). Simply put, "one pitcher every three innings". This system contrasts with the more traditional strategy of having a starting pitcher, who handles the bulk of the pitching workload (typically over 5 innings), and reliever(s) who finish up the game (i.e. 5-2-2, 5-2-1-1, among various other combinations). It bears the name of entrepreneur and Tigres del Mexico founder Alejo Peralta who established and implemented its use with Tigres starting in the 1970s.


The strategy is an adaptation from early research theories proposed by mechanical engineering professor at Princeton University and baseball statistician Earnshaw Cook. For games not enforcing the designated hitter rule, Cook realized that he could start the game with a series of relievers and use a designated batter when the pitcher would normally bat. After doing so, in the following half inning where his team had to pitch, he would place the next reliever. This is done until the end of 4 whole innings where he would put in the starting pitcher and proceed as normal until the end of the game.


2010 National League Championship Series (Game 6).


Mexican baseball analyst Tomas Morales pointed out that San Francisco Giants manager Bruce Bochy had used, albeit unaware, a similar version of the system in game 6 of the 2010 National League Championship Series.


In baseball, a pull hitter is a batter who usually hits the ball to the side of the field from which he bats. For example, a right-handed pull hitter, who bats from the left side of the plate, will usually hit the ball to the left side of the field, termed "left field", from the batter's perspective. The opposite of pull hitting is known as "hitting to the opposite field." Hitters who rarely hit to the opposite field or "up the middle" are often described as dead pull hitters.


A long reliever is a relief pitcher in baseball who enters the game if the starting pitcher leaves the game early.


Long relievers often enter in the first three innings of a game when the starting pitcher cannot continue, whether due to ineffective pitching, lack of endurance, rain delays, injury, or ejection. The hope is that the long reliever will be able to get the game under control, and hopefully his team's offense will be able to help get the team back into the game. The hope is also that the long reliever will pitch long enough to save other relievers in the bullpen from having to pitch.


Long relievers are usually players who used to be starters either in the major leagues or in the minors (and still can be a temporary starter if one of the normal starters is injured or otherwise unavailable), but whose teams believe they have better starters available. Sometimes a team's long reliever is a former starter who has lost his effectiveness, either through a decline in skills or a series of injuries. Occasionally, long relievers are inexperienced pitchers who may have the potential to become starters or setup pitchers after gaining major league experience.


The quality of long relievers can vary, but when the long reliever is known to be an ineffective former starter, he is often called the "mop up man" or "mop."


A secondary use of a long reliever is in the late extra innings of a tied game, once the team's other, generally more effective, relievers have already been used. While a long reliever is often a team's least effective pitcher, he is still often a far better choice in an extended game than resorting to one of the team's starting pitchers (which can spread chaos throughout a pitching rotation, as everyone's future schedule gets adjusted), or even worse, resorting to a position player on the mound. A long man generally enters the game somewhere between the 11th and 16th innings in this role, and can be expected to pitch 5 or more innings, before a team will be forced to resort to other options.


Occasionally during the season, a team may find itself with enough rest days to allow it to use a four-man rotation rather than the now standard five. In these situations, a team may choose to keep their "fifth" starter on the roster in the long reliever role. This happens particularly in the post-season, when the fifth starter is a better pitcher than the "regular" long-reliever, allowing the team to carry either an additional short reliever, or position player, in lieu of the regular long man.


In recent years, teams began experimenting with an "opener", a relief pitcher who starts a game but only pitches for at least the first inning. In this strategy, the opener usually pitches against the opponent's best batters at the start of a game in hopes of throwing them off guard, before giving way to a long reliever who would normally be a starter in this situation.


Generally, most long kickers or extended kickers would accelerate in the penultimate lap or shortly after the bell indicating the last lap has begun. A speed kicker would behave more like an anchor runner in a 4x400 relay, positioning themselves on the shoulder of their opponent and using their burst of speed as late as the final straightaway.


Mo Farah developed a reputation as a strategic runner. His finishing kick was not so much a burst of speed, but his extended ability to repeatedly accelerate just enough to discourage anybody from passing him during an intense final lap or so of his races. His Nike Oregon Project teammate Matthew Centrowitz Jr. employed a similar form of holding the lead to win his 2016 gold medal in the 1500.


Because of the advantage of having the tool of a kick in a competitor's arsenal, the techniques to train to kick are a common discussion among runners and coaches.


In tennis, a grip is a way of holding the racquet in order to hit shots during a match. The three most commonly used conventional grips are: the Continental (or "Chopper"), the Eastern and the Semi-Western. Most players change grips during a match depending on what shot they are hitting.


In order to understand the grips, it is important to know that the handle of a racquet always consists of 8 sides or, in other words, has an octagonal shape. A square shape would hurt the hand, while a round shape would not give enough friction to gain a firm grip. The eight sides of the handle are called bevels. They can be numbered from 1 to 8 as follows: if the blade of the racquet is perpendicular to the ground, the bevel facing up is bevel #1. Rotating the racquet clockwise, the next bevel facing up is bevel #2 for the right-handed, and counter-clockwise for the left-handed, and so on to identify all 8 bevels.


Popularized by Fred Perry back in the thirties, the Continental Grip requires no change of grip position, and was therefore considered to make for a faster playing game.


The Eastern forehand grip is primarily used for flatter groundstrokes. In order to execute a proper Eastern forehand grip, players need both index knuckle and heel pad to rest on bevel #3. An easy way to implement this is to place the palm flat against the strings and slide down to the handle and grab, in order to achieve an Eastern forehand. Advantages are this is one of the easiest grips for learning the forehand, easier (faster) to change to a Continental to do some volleying, topspin or slice. Notable players with this grip include Juan Martin Del Potro, Roger Federer and Steffi Graf.


The Semi-Western grip is an "advanced" form that most players either change to on purpose or naturally find through practice. This grip closes the racket face more upon contact, allowing for more topspin but is still able to generate pace. This grip is the most popular on tour and is used by several greats, such as Rafael Nadal and Andy Murray.


The Western grip is one of the more extreme forehand grips used to generate topspin. This grip closes the racket face more than semi-western and was originally used by Rafael Nadal growing up. This grip is great for maximizing margin and hitting deep, loopy balls. Notable players using this grip are Karen Khachanov and Kei Nishikori. Another variation, popularized by Novak Djokovic, is the 3/4 Western grip. For this grip, the knuckle is slightly on the Semi-Western bevel (4) and the heel pad more on the Western side.


The Hawaiian grip is the most extreme forehand grip used to generate heavy topspin. Because of the extreme wrist position, it is not recommended to use because it may cause wrist pain and other joint problems. The nature of the grip is to generate topspin because of the closed racket face. This means that it is harder to drive through the ball, however, is still possible. The most popular player to use this grip is Alberto Berasategui.


The Two-Handed Forehand Grip (F: Bevel #2 + B: Bevel #6).


The basic Two-Handed Forehand grip, is obtained by holding the racquet in a regular Continental grip, then placing the left hand above holding it in a left-handed Semi-Western Forehand grip. This places the reference bevels of the two hands exactly opposite each other. Holding the racquet using two hands for the forehand is highly unusual, but some well-known top WTA players (e.g. Monica Seles, Hsieh Su-wei) have used it successfully. While it shortens the forehand reach and reduces maximum power, it offers unrivalled accuracy, which may more than compensate the former drawbacks. Also, combined with a two-handed backhand, it is almost impossible for the opponent to see which side (backhand or forehand) is hitting the ball. The sides often are equally accurate, and no grip change is required.


The Eastern Backhand grip is obtained when placing the hand such that the base knuckle of the index finger and heel of the hand are right on bevel #1. This grip allows for significant spin and control. The opposite face of the racket is used compared to the Eastern forehand. For someone who uses a Western forehand grip, on the other hand, the same face of the racket as in the forehand is used to strike the ball; no need to change grips if the forehand is played with a Western grip.


The Semi-Western backhand grip, is used by placing the hand such that the base knuckle of the index finger is right on bevel #8. Compared to the Continental grip, the blade has rotated 90 degrees clockwise. This forces the wrist in an uncomfortable twist but allows for the greatest possible spin.


This is basically equivalent to the Semi-Western forehand grip. The same face of the racquet as in the forehand is used to strike the ball. No need to change grips if the forehand is played with a Semi-Western grip.