Sports historians have called Gillman the “father of the passing game,” and his focus on studying game films certainly influenced most football coaches by the early 1960s, including Jack Neumeier. While Gillman's innovations with the passing game inspired many followers, neither Gillman nor his protégés had utilized the ace formation or developed any other offense resembling the spread as the 1960s came to a close.


The head coach of the San Diego State Aztecs during the mid-‘60s, Don Coryell, found inspiration in Sid Gillman’s passing game. Coryell had developed a national reputation as one of the most prominent innovators of the I formation during the 1950s. Coryell brought the I formation with him when he joined John McKay’s coaching staff at USC for a short stay in 1961, and it became the signature power running formation at what came to be known as Tailback U under McKay and his successor John Robinson.


Football aficionados can trace Coryell’s focus on spacing and downfield movement and separation between receivers back to Dutch Meyer’s 1952 book, "Spread Formation Football." Coryell's emphasis on precisely timed and executed pass routes now seems like the norm at all levels of football. But Don Coryell had just begun experimenting with all of these elements in 1970.


Nobody dreamed in 1970 that Coach Neumeier's new and innovative one-back spread offense would gradually percolate throughout the football world and eventually become football's dominant offense.


In a 2013 article, sports commentator Matt Offer wrote that Neumeier's “offense could be considered ground zero for all that we have come to think of as modern in the game of Football. Spreading the defense horizontally with formations, and vertically with passing concepts. Isolating defenders in match ups where your guy has the best chance to win. It all seems so simple now, but in 1970 when everyone and their mother was running the Veer it truly was revolutionary.” Nationally respected sportswriter Bart Wright's 2013 book on the history of the modern spread offense, "Football Revolution," gives clear credit to Coach Neumeier and his 1970 Granada Hills Highlanders team for originating what football coaches across the nation have come to know as “basketball on grass.”


In a chapter in Tim Layden's "Blood, Sweat and Chalk" entitled “The One-Back Spread: An L.A. high school coach took a chance and launched an offense – and John Elway and Drew Brees with it,” Layden talks about the “radical change” introduced by Neumeier with his 1970 Highlanders and his “wide-open spread game.” But it took some amazing luck for Coach Neumeier's football ideas to achieve national attention and ultimately dominance.


As they frequently do, following the remarkable success of his 1970 team, other coaches talked about Neumeier's offense and began to incorporate elements of it into their own offensive schemes. Other local high school coaches – mostly competitors – saw it, liked it, copied it and began to utilize it. Today, there are books written about Neumeier's offense. Coaching workshops introduce coaches to the one-back spread and teach them how to implement it. They also teach coaches how to defend against it.


But the story of how the one-back spread offense “went viral,” to use today's internet-driven jargon, isn’t quite that simple. In the 1970s, there were no coaching clinics, YouTube videos or internet blogs to make the case for the one-back spread offense to high school coaches, much less college or NFL coaches. Most coaches in 1970 looked at innovative passing offenses with disdain. New football concepts spread slowly through the instinctively conservative ranks of football coaches. Today, it's not even clear who coined the phrase “one-back spread offense.”


Jack Elway began to utilize the one-back spread in his offense at Northridge during the 1978 season. He took it with him when he became head coach at San Jose State a year later. During his tenure at San Jose State and later at Stanford, Jack Elway became an even more successful proselytizer for the one-back spread offense. Elway worked with Jack Neumeier to teach the offense to a number of prominent members of the coaching profession, most significantly Dennis Erickson. Erickson served as Jack Elway’s offensive coordinator at San Jose State.


Dennis Erickson initially heard about the spread offense while serving as the offensive coordinator at Fresno State in the late 1970s. Moving on to San Jose State in 1979, he combined his ideas about the offense with Jack Elway’s. As a result of the Elway connection, Erickson spent time that year learning about the offense with Jack Neumeier. In fact, in Matt Opper’s 2013 article, by the late-1970s, Granada Hills had become “a must stop destination for college coaches across the nation.”


Tiller went on to become an outstanding college head coach at Purdue. At Purdue, Tiller utilized the one-back spread offense again with tremendous success. His quarterbacks at Purdue playing out of the one-back spread included Kyle Orton and Drew Brees, among others. In 2000, Brees led the Boilermakers to the Rose Bowl with Neumeier’s offense. Tiller’s teams forced the Big Ten to adapt to the challenges posed by the wide-open one-back spread.


Brown confirms this lineage for Urban Meyer's offensive theories and success, also connecting the Ohio State coach to Joe Tiller and Rich Rodriguez, among other coaches who have built successful careers coaching variations on the one-back spread offense. So at least some of Urban Meyer's theories about football offenses, leading to Ohio State's most recent national championship, trace directly back to Jack Neumeier.


Today, virtually every NFL, college, high school and youth league football offense shows clear signs of Coach Neumeier's influence. Fans can watch elements of Neumeier's offense at every level of play, from peewee league scrimmages to NFL Super Bowls. In the 2016 College Football Playoff National Championship bowl game and the 2016 Super Bowl, all of the offenses were direct descendants of the turbocharged “basketball on grass” offense that Jack Neumeier created out of desperation for his undersized 1970 Granada Hills High School football team. His offense continues to live on and thrive years after Jack Neumeier's death in 2004.


Reflecting on the enduring impact of Neumeier's spread offense, sportswriter Mary Crouse wrote that “It amuses Neumeier's first guinea pig, [Dana] Potter, to see a college or pro team throw the ball out of the shotgun on first down or attempt 40 passes a game. The same things stirred critics when Neumeier introduced them to the [Los Angeles] City football scene. ‘I had a lot of coaches tell me Coach Neumeier's offense would never work in college or the pros,' Potter said. `So it's hilarious for me to see how many teams are using it now. It's neat to see how his offense has evolved.’"


While it took decades for Cactus Jack's Aerial attack – the up-tempo one-back spread offense – to percolate throughout the football world, there is no doubt that Coach Neumeier's theories and the success of his 1970 team changed that world forever.


The spread offense is specifically designed to open up seams and holes for the offense, and does not specifically focus on the passing or running game, however, like all types of offenses, there can be sub types which can specifically focus on the passing or running game, or even option, fakes or trick plays.


The basic pre-snap appearance of the spread offense is constant—multiple receivers on the field. Most contemporary versions of the spread utilize a shotgun snap, although many teams also run the spread with the quarterback under center. Jack Neumeier's 1970 iteration of the spread offense utilized both formations. In addition, the actual execution from those formations varies, depending on the preferences of the coaching staff. While most of these are balanced offenses, such as the one utilized by Larry Fedora's North Carolina Tar Heels, several sub-forms also exist.


The spread option is a shotgun-based variant of the classic triple option attack that was prevalent in football well into the 1990s. Notable users of this offense include Ryan Day's Ohio State Buckeyes, Mario Cristobal's Oregon Ducks, Chip Kelly’s UCLA Bruins, Scott Frost’s Nebraska Cornhuskers, Gus Malzahn’s Auburn Tigers, Jim Harbaugh’s Michigan Wolverines and Dan Mullen's Florida Gators.


The spread option is a run-first scheme that requires a quarterback that is comfortable carrying the ball, a mobile offensive line that can effectively pull and trap, and receivers that can hold their blocks. Its essence is misdirection. Because it operates from the shotgun, its triple option usually consists of a slot receiver, a tailback, and a dual-threat quarterback.


One of the primary plays in the spread option is the zone read, invented and made popular by Rich Rodriguez. The quarterback must be able to read the defensive end and determine whether he is collapsing down the line or playing up-field containment in order to determine the proper play to make with the ball.


A key component of the spread option is that the running threat posed by the quarterback forces a defensive lineman or linebacker to "freeze" in order to plug the running lane; this has the effect of blocking the target player without needing to put a body on him.


Recently, use of the spread has led to new defenses, most noticeably the 3-3-5. Traditional defenses use 4 or 5 down linemen sets to stop an offense, but with the growing number of spread offenses, teams are looking to smaller, faster defensive players to cover more of the field. The strategy and philosophy behind this thinking has been widely debated and many coaches have found success using a 30 front, or using a 40 front against the spread.


The 2008 Miami Dolphins also implemented some form of the spread offense in their offensive schemes. Lining up in the "wildcat" formation, the Miami Dolphins, borrowing from Gus Malzahn's college spread offense, “direct snap” the ball to their running back, Ronnie Brown, who was then able to read the defense, and either pass or keep the ball himself.


In recent years, the spread offense has become a very popular term used in context of the high school game with the offense's innovative ways to make the game faster and higher scoring. While it has changed the game, and teams that successfully run it are scoring more points, there is debate whether the offensive system is as effective as it seems.


Some coaches have taken to packaging their offensive system and marketing them to programs around the country, such as Tony Franklin, who served as an assistant coach at the University of Kentucky under Hal Mumme where he developed his offense based on Mumme's "Air Raid" system. Manny Matsakis being another example as he is the inventor of the Triple Shoot Offense, which is a spread set with forms in the Shotgun, Pistol and under center. Matsakis was an assistant coach under both Mike Leach at Texas Tech and Bill Snyder at Kansas State. He is currently the head coach of Enka High School in Asheville, North Carolina.


As a reaction to the success of the spread offense in high-profile colleges, such as The University of Florida, innovative high school coaches began retooling the system to work on high school teams. Now the system has been widely adopted, with numerous schools achieving success. Defenses are left with the challenge of defending more of the field than ever before, and the offense was given the advantage of having numerous running and passing lanes created by the defense being so spread out.


In American and Canadian football, a single-wing formation was a precursor to the modern spread or shotgun formation. The term usually connotes formations in which the snap is tossed rather than handed—formations with one wingback and a handed snap are commonly called "wing T" or "winged T".


Created by Glenn "Pop" Warner, the single wing was superior to the T formation in its ability to get an extra eligible receiver down field.


Among coaches, single-wing football denotes a formation using a long snap from center as well as a deceptive scheme that evolved from Glenn "Pop" Warner's offensive style. Traditionally, the single-wing was an offensive formation that featured a core of four backs including a tailback, a fullback, a quarterback (blocking back), and a wingback. Linemen were set "unbalanced", with two on one side of the center and four on the other. This was done by moving the off-side guard or tackle to the strong side. The single-wing was one of the first formations attempting to trick the defense instead of over-powering it.


For much of the history of the single-wing formation, players were expected to play on both sides of the ball. Consequently, offensive players often turned around to play a corresponding location on defense. The offensive backs played defensive backs, just as the offensive linemen played defensive linemen. Unlike teams of today, single-wing teams had few specialists who only played on certain downs.


College football playbooks prior to the 1950s were dominated with permutations of the traditional single-wing envisioned by Warner. Two-time All-American Jack Crain's handwritten playbook clearly denotes how the University of Texas ran their version of the single-wing circa 1939–1940. University of Texas Coach Dana X. Bible ran a balanced line, which means that there were the same numbers of linemen on each side of the center. Also, the ends were slightly split.


The advent of the T formation in the 1940s led to a decline in the use of single-wing formations. For example, the single-wing coach Dana X. Bible, upon his retirement in 1946, saw his replacement, Blair Cherry, quickly install the T formation like many other college coaches of the day. Wallace Wade said he was "not convinced that the single wing is not a more potent formation than the T. The single wing we used caused the defense to spread. It called for more intensive coaching on individual assignments."


However, from 1949 to 1957 Henry "Red" Sanders elevated a seldom distinguished UCLA football program to an elite level with his precision single-wing system, winning a National Championship at UCLA in 1954.


The Sutherland single-wing was a variation of the single-wing used with great success by Coach Jock Sutherland of the 1930s and 1940s. Note that coach Sutherland mastered many forms of the single-wing, but the formation described here is the one he invented and was named for him.


The Sutherland single-wing differs from the traditional single-wing in that the wingback is brought into the backfield as a halfback, flanking the fullback on the other side from the tailback. This allows a more flexible running attack to the weak-side. Both the tailback and halfback are triple threats in this offense. The weakness of this formation is less power than the traditional single-wing and it requires very talented backs to play tailback and halfback effectively.


The double-wing is an offensive formation which should not be confused with the Double Wing offense. The double-wing formation is used in many offenses from the youth level through college. The formation was first introduced by Glenn "Pop" Warner around 1912. Just a few offenses that use the formation are the double wing, flexbone and wing T offenses. It was the primary formation used by Ara Parseghian when he ran the wing T at Notre Dame, winning National Championships in 1966 and 1973.


The formation is not necessarily the same in all offenses and is often a broad term to describe any offense with two wingbacks. In the wing T, the double-wing formation is used to refer to Red, Blue and Loose Red formations.


The double-wing formation in American football usually includes one wide receiver, two wingbacks, one fullback, and one tight end.


The direct snap or toss from the center usually went to the tailback or fullback; however, the quarterback could also take the ball. The tailback was very important to the success of the offense because he had to run, pass, block, and even punt. Unlike today, the quarterback usually blocked at the point of attack. As with his modern day counterpart, a single-wing quarterback might also act as a field general by calling plays. The fullback was chosen for his larger size so that he could "buck" the line. This meant that the fullback would block or carry the ball between the defensive tackles. The wingback could double-team block with an offensive lineman at scrimmage or even run a pass route.


The single-wing formation was designed to place double-team blocks at the point of attack. Gaining this extra blocker was achieved in several ways. First, the unbalanced line placed an extra guard or tackle on one side of the center. Second, a wingback stationed outside end could quickly move to a crucial blocking position. Third, the fullback and especially the quarterback could lead the ball carrier producing interference. Finally, linemen, usually guards, would pull at the snap and block at the specified hole. Line splits were always close except for ends who might move out from the tackle.


The single-wing formation depended on a center who was skilled both at blocking and at tossing the ball from between his legs to the receiving back. The center had to direct the ball to any of several moving backs, with extreme accuracy, as the play started. Single-wing plays would not work efficiently if the back had to wait on the snap because quick defensive penetration would overrun the play. The center was taught to direct the ball to give the tailback or fullback receiver a running start in the direction that the play was designed to go.


The single-wing formation was a deceptive formation with spectators, referees, and defensive players often losing sight of the ball. A backfield player, called a "spinner", might turn 360 degrees while faking the ball to the other backs, or even keeping the ball or passing it. Defensive players were often fooled as to which back was carrying the ball.


Single-wing teams used both a standard punting formation and a quick punt, often kicking on second or third downs. The quick punt, or quick kick, saw the tailback-punter quickly backing up 5 yards as the ball was in the air from the center to distance him from rushers. The strategy was to keep defensive halfbacks, expecting a possession play, from dropping back to return the ball. The standard punt formation was often used for either punting as well as running or passing the ball. Most teams had a litany of plays that they might run from a punt formation.


Prior to 1930 the shape of the football was a prominent oval shape called a prolate spheroid. Due to the shape of the ball, single-wing backs handled the ball more like a basketball, with short tosses and underhand lobs. Gradually, balls were allowed to be elongated enough to produce streamlined passes with a spiral. The spiraled ball could be thrown farther with more accuracy, thus increasing the potential for offenses to use the forward pass more frequently.


The single-wing quarterback played a different role than modern-day quarterbacks. While the quarterback may have called the snap count due to his position close to the center of the formation, he may not have called the actual play in the huddle. For much of the history of football, coaches were not allowed to call plays from the sideline. This responsibility may have gone to the team captain. The quarterback was expected to be an excellent blocker at the point of attack. Some playbooks referred to this player as the blocking back. The quarterback also had to handle the ball by faking, handing off, or optioning to other backs.


Although the single-wing has lost much of its popularity since World War II, its characteristic features are still prevalent in all levels of modern football. They include pulling guards, double teams, play action passes, laterals, wedge blocking, trap blocking, the sweep, the reverse and the quick kick. Many current offenses, such as the spread option, use single-wing tendencies for running plays, while using wide receivers instead of wingbacks.


The current incarnation of the Wildcat offense, which has been adopted by many college, NFL, and high school teams uses many elements of the single-wing formation.


Colton California has been a consistently successful single-wing team by reaching the state playoffs on six consecutive seasons.


In 1998 The Menominee Maroons won the Michigan high school class BB football championship, and in 2006 and 2007 won the Michigan High School Class B football championship, winning 28 consecutive games over the last 2 years, and reaching the state playoffs for the last 11 years.


In 1971 the Corning High School Cardinals of Corning, California had a 9–0 undefeated season utilizing a balanced single-wing offense under coach Tag McFadden. They were the number one rated school Division 4 in the state and Mcfadden was garnered coach of year by Cal-Hi Sports.


In 1974 and 1975, St. Mark's School (MA) compiled a 13–1 record running the Princeton Single Wing.


In 1980 Coach Ted Hern brought the single-wing to Moriarty High School, the "Fighting" Pintos made three state championship appearances winning 2 state titles, one undefeated season and suffering only 3 losses in four seasons. Coach Frank Ortiz was an assistant coach in the later seasons.


Since 1985, Santa Rosa High School has used the single-wing formation under Coach Frank Ortiz. The Lions have made the playoffs every year except three, won their district title 17 times, won the New Mexico AA State Championships in 1993, 1996, 1998, 2007, 2010, 2011, and 2012 and made a total of 13 State Finals appearances.


In 2005 St. Mary's of Lynn in Massachusetts won the D4A Eastern Mass Title following two consecutive division titles with Ed Melanson running the Single Wing. Prior to Coach Melanson installing the Single Wing there in 2002, St. Mary's had not had a winning season since 1977.


In Kansas, Mark Bliss installed the Single Wing offense at Conway Springs High School in 1997, coaching the team to Kansas Class 3A state championships in 1998, 2001, 2002, and 2003. During his seven seasons at Conway Springs, his teams compiled a record of 81–4, including a 62-game winning streak. Conway Springs continues to run the Single Wing offense and added state titles in 2004, 2008, and again in 2011 and are perennial playoffs contenders under Coach Matt Biehler.


In Kansas, Ed Buller created a football dynasty centered around the Single Wing offense. In his 40 years of coaching, which ended in 1984, Buller's only losing season was his first. Buller compiled a record of 335–78–7 and coached the Clyde Bluejays to 10 undefeated seasons along with 39 consecutive winning seasons.


In Nebraska Dave Cisar's Screaming Eagle youth football teams have been running the Single Wing offense for 8 seasons. During that time period those teams have gone 78-5 and averaged over 35 points per contest and won two State Titles. He did this with 6 totally different teams in 4 different leagues in various age groups. His teams even used the famous "fullback full spinner series" along with the other traditional Single Wing plays. Coach Cisar published a book "Winning Youth Football a Step by Step Plan" in 2006 to help youth coaches install this "old school" offense.


In Connecticut Anthony Sagnella runs the single wing with his North Haven High School Team that reached the 2015 Class L state Championship Game and were defeated by New Caanan, 42–35. Tailback Mike Montano was an All-State Selection as a RB with over 1800 Rushing yards and 30 TDs.


On September 21, 2008, the Miami Dolphins used a version of the single-wing offense (specifically the Wildcat offense) against the New England Patriots on six plays, which produced five touchdowns (four rushing and one passing) in a 38–13 upset victory, after its successful adoption on the college and high school level by several teams.


A pro-style offense in American football is any offensive scheme that resembles those predominantly used at the professional level of play in the National Football League (NFL), in contrast to those typically used at the collegiate or high school level. Pro-style offenses are fairly common at top-quality colleges but much less used at the high school level. The term should not be confused with a pro set, which is a specific formation that is used by some offenses at the professional level.


Generally, pro-style offenses are more complex than typical college or high school offenses. They are balanced, requiring offensive lines that are adept at both pass and run blocking, quarterbacks (QBs) with good decision-making abilities, and running backs (RBs) who are capable of running between the tackles. Offenses that fall under the pro-style category include the West Coast offense, the Air Coryell offense, and the Erhardt-Perkins offensive system.


Often, pro style offenses use certain formations much more commonly than the air raid, run and shoot, flexbone, spread, pistol, or option offenses. Pro-style offenses typically use the fullback (FB) and TEs much more commonly than offenses used at the collegiate or high school levels.


Part of the complexity of the offense is that teams at the professional level often employ multiple formations and are willing to use them at any point during an actual game. One example might be that a team uses a Strong I formation run (FB lined up where the TE is located on the line of scrimmage) on 1st Down followed up by a running play out of the Ace formation on second down before attempting a pass on 3rd down out of a two-WR shotgun formation.


Another aspect of the complexity is that the running game is primarily built on zone blocking or involves a power run scheme. Both of these require an offensive of line that is very athletic, one play they could be trying to zone block a Linebacker, and the following one could be power blocking a defensive line. Most of the blocking schemes involve a series of rules, or a system in which they operate their blocks. The passing game as a result often employs play-action, often with the QB dropping back from under center, as a means of passing the ball while building on the running game.


Coaches who make the transition from the NFL to the NCAA as head coaches often bring with them their pro-style offenses. Such examples include Charlie Weis (former HC at Kansas), Dave Wannstedt (former HC at Pittsburgh), Bill O'Brien (former HC at Penn State). One positive aspect of employing a pro-style offense is that it can help players make transitions from the college level to the professional level quicker as a result of their familiarity with the system's complexity.


The triple option is an American football play used to offer several ways to move the football forward on the field of play. The triple option is based on the option run, but uses three players who might run with the ball instead of the two used in a standard option run.


There are three basic forms of triple option: the wishbone triple option, the veer triple option, and the I formation triple option. These differ in terms of the personnel on the field and their positioning prior to the start of the play.


The wishbone triple option can use several formations including the flexbone or Maryland I. The wishbone triple option is a running play where either the fullback, the quarterback, or one of the halfbacks (also called "running backs" [RB] or "tail backs") runs the ball.


If this is run properly it can be extremely effective as most all defensive players are accounted for by blockers. Once the quarterback or tailback gets beyond the line of scrimmage there should be nobody in front of him because the tackle, guard, tailback, and wide receiver are all downfield picking up the first threat.


The play is called the triple option as the fullback dive is the first option, the quarterback keeping the ball is the second option, and the quarterback pitching to the halfback is the third option.


A slight variation of this formation is the "flexbone", where the running backs move to just outside the tackles, but still behind the line of scrimmage. The running back that the play is using for the third option motions in, and while in motion the ball is snapped. The triple option, in this case, is still run mostly the same as the wishbone.


The veer triple option uses two halfbacks and a tight end (TE). The "inside veer" play is similar to the wishbone triple option, but the dive option is performed by the halfback on the side of the play, and the other halfback becomes the pitch man. The veer is more challenging to run to the weak side (the side without the tight end) because there is no lead blocker for the pitch man. The "outside veer" moves the halfback dive option outside the offensive tackle, forcing the outside linebacker to stop the halfback dive, and forcing the defensive backs to play the pitch option.


The triple option can be run out of the I formation as well. With two running backs, it is sometimes called the "I-veer", as the play is similar to the two running back veer offense. Three running back I formations such as the Maryland I and the stack I are more similar to the wishbone play.


Nebraska in 1980–2003 deployed an I formation triple option. They won 3 national titles with it 1994, 1995, and 1997.


In recent years, as spread and zone read offenses have become popular, many teams have begun to run variations of the triple option with the quarterback in the shotgun. This has been greatly popularized by the success of coaches such as Rich Rodriguez, Mark Helfrich, and Urban Meyer. The more traditional version of the triple option uses a quarterback under center and is advocated by the service academy coaches, including Fisher DeBerry, formerly of Air Force, and Paul Johnson, formerly head coach of Navy and Georgia Tech (who installed this offense at Hawai'i and Georgia Southern, the latter school winning several Division I Football Championship Subdivision titles using it).


Paul Johnson, along with former assistant and current Navy head coach Ken Niumatalolo, have had the most success with the triple option/veer in the last few years. The triple option can be used in the spread offense. Teams like Ohio State, Oregon, and Arizona have used an inside zone triple option from the spread. The quarterback reads the defensive end for "give" or "keep". If the defensive end squeezes down to take the dive, the quarterback will pull the ball and take his reading progression to the outside linebacker or defensive back. If the linebacker/defensive back takes the quarterback, the quarterback will pitch the ball to his running back who is running in formation with the quarterback.


The rule change that resulted in the widespread use of RPOs by college offenses was controversial. By "destroy[ing] the ages-old division between passing plays and running plays" the RPO changes offense, defense and officiating roles. "The Wall Street Journal" highlighted the option in the lead-up to the 2017 playoff between Alabama and Clemson, in which both teams "will [try to] use [it] to win".


The RPO has also been utilized in the NFL despite rules disallowing linemen to block more than one yard downfield on passing plays, though NFL QBs must make quicker reads to avoid a penalty if they decide to throw a forward pass.


University of Nevada head coach Chris Ault popularized the single back alignment (and renamed it the "Pistol") in 2005. While the pistol offense has been experimented with by dozens of college football teams such as LSU, Syracuse, Indiana, and Missouri, Ault's Nevada Wolf Pack is most strongly associated with the formation. Using the Pistol Offense, during the 2009 season, Nevada led the nation in rushing at 345 yards a game and were second in total offense at 506 yards. The Wolf Pack also became the first team in college football history with three 1,000-yard rushers in the same season: quarterback Colin Kaepernick and running backs Luke Lippincott and Vai Taua.


Football Championship Subdivision team James Madison University used "The Pistol" to help beat #13 ranked Virginia Tech on September 11, 2010. The pistol has also made the transition to the NFL, mainly being used by the Carolina Panthers with Cam Newton and Robert Griffin III of the Washington Redskins, as well as the aforementioned Colin Kaepernick with the San Francisco 49ers, who in the NFL Playoffs versus the Green Bay Packers set the all-time single game rushing record for a quarterback with 181 yards. Along with the wildcat, the pistol has added more of a college "playmaker" aspect to the professional game.


On December 5, 2010, the Pittsburgh Steelers used the Pistol offense so quarterback Ben Roethlisberger could play with a bad foot.


In American football, a smashmouth offense is an offensive system that relies on a strong running game, where most of the plays run by the offense are handoffs to the fullback or tailback. It is a more traditional style of offense that often results in a higher time of possession by running the ball heavily. So-called "smash-mouth football" is often run out of the I-formation or wishbone formation, with tight ends and receivers used as blockers. Though the offense is run-oriented, pass opportunities can develop as defenses play close to the line. Play-action can be very effective for a run-oriented team.


"Three Yards and a Cloud of Dust".


This term describes run-heavy offenses such as those used by coach Woody Hayes of Ohio State University in the 1950s and 1960s. A grind-it-out ball control offense, it relies on time of possession utilizing a high percentage of inside running plays off of handoffs by the quarterback to advance the ball down the field. Hayes relied primarily on the fullback off-tackle play. A quarterback under Hayes would often throw fewer than 10 passes a game. Hayes is credited as saying "Three things can happen when you pass the ball, and two of them are bad".


Pro Football Focus (also written as ProFootballFocus, and often referred to by its initials, PFF) is a website that focuses on thorough analysis of the National Football League (NFL) and NCAA Division-I football in the United States. PFF produces 0-100 Player Grades and a range of advanced statistics for teams and players by watching, charting and grading every player on every play in every game both at the NFL and FBS level.


PFF was founded by Neil Hornsby in the United Kingdom. Dissatisfied with some limitations of standard statistics, Hornsby began grading players in 2004. The staff gradually expanded over the next few years, and the site was launched in 2007. The 2006 NFL season is the first season for which PFF has complete data. For the 2011 season, PFF provided customized data to three NFL teams, agents, media and NFL players. In 2014, sports commentator and former NFL player Cris Collinsworth bought a majority interest in the service, which moved its operations to Cincinnati, near where Collinsworth lives in Ft. Thomas, Kentucky. PFF began collecting data for every NCAA Division-I college football game in 2014.


As of 2019, PFF provides customized data to all 32 NFL teams, 74 NCAA FBS teams, 4 CFL teams, national/regional media (i.e. Washington Post, The Athletic, ESPN) and sports agencies/agents.


PFF grades every NFL player on every play on a scale of -2 to +2 using half point increments. The grades are based on context and performance. A four-yard run that gains a first down after two broken tackles will receive a better grade than a four-yard run on 3rd & 5, where the ball carrier does nothing more than expected. A quarterback who makes a good pass that a receiver tips into the arms of a defender will not negatively affect the quarterback's grade on that play, despite the overall negative result for the team.


Furthermore, grades are separated by play type. Beyond just an overall grade, an offensive lineman receives one grade for pass-blocking and one for run-blocking. The average grade is meant to be zero, and raw grades are normalized.


In watching every game, PFF is also able to record information and create data that is typically unavailable. One example is how frequently individual offensive linemen yield pressure.


PFF covers every player on every play of every game at the NFL and major college football level and creates advanced stats based on the information gleaned from this.


PFF has been criticized by the analytics community regarding the accuracy and veracity of its ratings. In contrast to the purely quantitative ratings released by sources like Football Outsiders, TeamRankings, and numberFire, PFF uses qualitative and opinion-based grading as the root of its 0-100 Player Grades -- not its advanced statistics. As such, the 0-100 Player Grades are not truly quantitative and could be seen as being prone to bias, poor sample sizing, or other issues.


The hurry-up offense is nearly as old as football itself. John Heisman's 1899 Auburn Tigers ran an early version of the hurry-up. Michigan coach Fielding Yost was known as "Hurry up;" as he had Bennie Owen call signals for the next play - even while still lying beneath the tackle pile from the previous snap.


The first team to employ a version of the no-huddle approach as the normal offensive play strategy was the 1988 Cincinnati Bengals under Sam Wyche with Boomer Esiason as the quarterback. This approach, called the "attack offense," involved a number of strategies including shortened huddles and huddling much closer to the line of scrimmage than usual. The no-huddle approach was used by many teams before but in specific situations for a limited time. This strategy proved to be very effective in limiting substitutions, creating fatigue in the opposing defense, creating play-calling issues for the defense, and various other advantages. The Bengals' regular employment of this offense was extremely effective. The employment of this version of the "no-huddle" propelled the Bengals to their second appearance in the Super Bowl.


In recent times Peyton Manning, formerly with the Indianapolis Colts and later the Denver Broncos, is best known for this technique, frequently changing the play at the line of scrimmage depending on the coverage that he sees from the opposing defense.


In 2013, Chip Kelly became head coach of the Philadelphia Eagles and adapted the hurry-up offense that he used effectively at Oregon to the NFL. During the 2014 season, the Eagles averaged around 22 seconds per play, which is the fastest time of any NFL team since this statistic has been kept.


Differences between the NFL and college approaches.


The two-minute drill is a high-pressure and fast-paced situational strategy where a team will focus on clock management, maximizing the number of plays available for a scoring attempt before a half (or game) expires. The tactics employed during this time involve managing players, substitutions, time-outs, and clock-stopping plays to get as many plays in as possible. In the first half, either team may employ the two-minute drill; however, near the end of the game, only a team tied or losing employs the strategy. Most famously, the two-minute drill references end-of-game drives by a team tied or trailing by one possession.


The two-minute drill is named for the point in the game, frequently after the two minute warning, when it is employed. If significantly more time remains, a team's standard strategies are still viable; if significantly less, a team has little option beyond a Hail Mary pass or the hook and lateral.


Finally, as the offense gets closer to scoring, their clock management stance may shift towards running out the clock in an effort to deny the opponent their own opportunity for a two-minute drill.


In American football, the West Coast offense is an offense that places a greater emphasis on passing than on running.


There are two similar but distinct offensive strategic systems that are commonly referred to as "West Coast offenses". Originally, the term referred to the Air Coryell system popularized by Don Coryell. Following a journalistic error, however, it now more commonly refers to the offensive system devised by Bill Walsh while he was the offensive coordinator of the Cincinnati Bengals. The offense is characterized by short, horizontal passing routes in lieu of running plays to "stretch out" defenses, opening up the potential for long runs or long passes. It was popularized when Walsh was the head coach of the San Francisco 49ers.


Initially, Walsh resisted having the term misapplied to his own distinct system and was especially incensed by the use of the word "finesse" in reference to his sophisticated offensive schemes. Zimmerman notes that an article of his so misapplying the term provoked a phone call from an upset Walsh: "He called me up... (saying) that wasn't his offense". Still, the moniker stuck. Now the term is commonly used to refer to a range of pass-oriented offenses that may not be closely related to either the Air Coryell system or Walsh's pass-strategy.


The origins of the offensive system devised by Walsh go back to Paul Brown, coach of the Cleveland Browns and later the Cincinnati Bengals. Under Brown's tenure, Walsh was tasked with devising an offensive plan suited to Bengal quarterback Virgil Carter, who had an accurate but relatively weak arm. In response, Walsh created a system based on short, high-percentage passes, favoring straight and direct ten- to fifteen-yard strikes over forty- to fifty-yard "bombs". This system compensated for any weakness in the quarterback's arm, as it allowed the ball to be thrown to short and intermediate routes where receivers with running ability could make up for any shortage in yards after the catch.


Bernie Kosar used the term to describe the offense formalized by Sid Gillman with the AFL


Chargers in the 1960s and later by Don Coryell's St. Louis Cardinals and Chargers in the 1970s and 1980s. Al Davis, an assistant under Gillman, also carried his version to the Oakland Raiders, where his successors John Rauch, John Madden, and Tom Flores continued to employ and expand upon its basic principles. This is the "West Coast offense" as Kosar originally used the term. It is now commonly referred to as the "Air Coryell" timed system, however, and instead the term West Coast offense is usually used to describe Walsh's system.


The offense uses a specific naming system, with the routes for wide receivers and tight ends receiving three digit numbers, and routes for backs having unique names. For example, a pass play in 3 digit form might be "Split Right 787 check swing, check V". (see Offensive Nomenclature). This provides an efficient way to communicate many different plays with minimal memorization. Conversely, the Walsh "West Coast offense" could in theory have more freedom, since route combinations are not limited by 0-9 digits, but at the price of much more memorization required by the players.


Walsh formulated what has become popularly known as the West Coast offense during his tenure as assistant coach for the Cincinnati Bengals from 1968 to 1975, while working under the tutelage of mentor Paul Brown. Bengals quarterback Virgil Carter would be the first player to successfully implement Walsh's system, leading the NFL in pass completion percentage in 1971. Ken Anderson later replaced Carter as Cincinnati's starting QB, and was even more successful. In his 16-year career in the NFL, Anderson made four trips to the Pro Bowl, won four passing titles, was named NFL MVP in 1981 (and also appeared in Super Bowl XVI that year), and set what was then the record for completion percentage in a single season in 1982 (70.66%).


Several members of Bill Walsh's coaching tree went on to successfully implement his West Coast Offense system.


George Seifert succeeded Walsh as San Francisco's head coach in 1989, and won two Super Bowls with the 49ers; once with Joe Montana at quarterback in 1989, and later with fellow Hall of Famer Steve Young in 1994.


Paul Hackett was another former assistant coach who once served under Walsh. He served as a 49ers assistant from 1983 to 1985, coaching quarterbacks and wide receivers. During this time, Hackett helped San Francisco win Super Bowl XIX. He next served as offensive coordinator for the Dallas Cowboys under Tom Landry from 1986 to 1988. Hackett would later teach his version of Walsh's offense to several coaches, including former Green Bay Packers head coach Mike McCarthy. McCarthy, who was the Packers head coach from 2006 until December 2018, would go on to win a Super Bowl himself with the use of the West Coast offense in 2010, with the help of superstar quarterback Aaron Rodgers.


One of Holmgren's former assistants, Jon Gruden, has had reasonable success running the West Coast offense in his own right. He started his head coaching career with the Oakland Raiders, leading them from 1998 to 2001, and turned the Raiders into a strong playoff contender. Gruden then went on to become head coach of the Tampa Bay Buccaneers, winning Super Bowl XXXVII after the 2002 season. Gruden coached the Buccaneers from 2002 to 2008. After several years as a color commentator on ESPN Monday Night Football, he signed a deal to return to the Raiders as head coach for the 2018 NFL season.


Shanahan also served as head coach of the Washington Redskins from 2010 to 2013, but his time in Washington was significantly less successful than his tenure with the Broncos. Despite guiding the Redskins to the NFC East division title in 2012, along with a trip to the NFL playoffs, he only compiled a 24–40 record over 4 seasons with an 0-1 playoff mark. Overall, Shanahan accumulated an overall record of 178-144: 170–138 in the regular season, with an 8-6 postseason record that included 2 Super Bowl victories.


Gary Kubiak has had a stellar career as an NFL head coach in his own right. Kubiak served as the head coach of the Houston Texans from 2006 to 2013. After serving as the Baltimore Ravens' offensive coordinator in 2014, he became head coach of the Broncos in the 2015 season, and won Super Bowl 50.


LaVell Edwards and Dewey Warren created an offensive system similar to the West Coast offense at Brigham Young University (BYU) in 1973.


One reason for the success of this version of the offense was in its simplicity. Norm Chow said the offenses had around 12 basic pass plays and 5 basic run plays that were run from a variety of formations, with only some plays tagged for extra versatility, so that the players knew the offense by the second day of practice.


The highpoint of the BYU offense was an NCAA Division I-A national football championship in 1984 and a Heisman Trophy for Ty Detmer in 1990. BYU broke over 100 NCAA records for passing and total offense during Edwards' tenure. Several coaches and players associated with BYU's football program had success with this offense at BYU and elsewhere, including Virgil Carter, Mike Holmgren, Andy Reid, Brian Billick, Ted Tollner, Doug Scovil, Norm Chow, Jim McMahon, Steve Young, Ty Detmer, and Steve Sarkisian.


The University of Washington Huskies were among the first of the Pac-10 teams and in 1970, under coach Jim Owens and quarterback Sonny Sixkiller, used the "Sixkiller" variation of Coryell's West Coast offense with great success. Years later in 2002, under coach Keith Gilbertson and quarterback Cody Pickett, the Huskies ran a variation of Walsh's West Coast offense to a conference championship and a top four passing attack averaging 352.4 yards per game. Today, the West Coast offense no longer only resides on the west coast, but can be found in schools across the nation, including Boise State, and Vanderbilt. Former Pittsburgh and Stanford head coach Walt Harris also used a variation of the West Coast offense during his stint at Pittsburgh.


The popular term "West Coast Offense" is more of a philosophy and an approach to the game than it is a set of plays or formations. Traditional offensive thinking argues that a team must establish its running game first, which will draw the defense in and open up vertical passing lanes downfield; "i.e.", passing lanes that run perpendicular to the line of scrimmage.


Bill Walsh's West Coast Offense differs from traditional offense by emphasizing a short, horizontal passing attack to help stretch out the defense, thus opening up options for longer running plays and longer passes that can achieve greater gains. The West Coast Offense as implemented under Walsh features precisely run pass patterns by the receivers that make up about 65% to 80% of the offensive scheme. With the defense stretched out, the offense is then free to focus the remaining plays on longer throws of more than 14 yards and mid to long yard rushes.


Walsh's West Coast Offense attempts to open up running and passing lanes for the backs and receivers to exploit, by causing the defense to concentrate on short passes.


Since most down and distance situations can be attacked with a pass or a run, the intent is to make offensive play calling unpredictable and thus keep the defense's play "honest", forcing defenders to be prepared for a multitude of possible offensive plays rather than focusing aggressively on one likely play from the offense.


Another key part of the Walsh implementation was "pass first, run later", It was Walsh's intention to gain an early lead by passing the ball, then run the ball on a tired defense late in the game, wearing them down further and running down the clock. The San Francisco 49ers, under both Bill Walsh and George Seifert, often executed this strategy very effectively.


The majority of West Coast routes occur within 15 yards of the line of scrimmage. 3-step and 5-step drops by the quarterback take the place of the run and force the opposing defense to commit their focus solely on those intermediate routes. Contrary to popular belief, the offense also uses the 7-step drop for shallow crosses, deep ins and comebacks. For instance, past Michigan Wolverines offenses utilized the 5- and 7-step drops about 85% of the time with West Coast pass schemes implemented by then-quarterbacks coach Scot Loeffler. Because of the speed of modern defenses, only utilizing the 3- and 5-step pass game would be ineffective since the defense could squat and break hard on short-to-intermediate throws with no fear of a down field pass.


The original West Coast Offense of Sid Gillman uses some of the same principles (pass to establish the run, quarterback throws to timed spots), but offensive formations are generally less complicated with more wideouts and motion. The timed spots are often farther down field than in the Walsh-style offense, and the system requires a greater reliance on traditional pocket passing.


Another aspect that makes the West Coast one of the most difficult to master is that it requires a deeper connection between quarterback and receiver, and an ability to communicate mid-play. On any given route, a receiver has as many as three options; a hitch, a slant and a fly, depending on what the defense is showing. The quarterback is responsible for recognizing the defense and the reaction of the receiver to it and adjusting the route if needed. This explains the communication mistakes that commonly occur on West Coast offensive plays where the quarterback throws to a spot that the receiver is running away from.


The West Coast offense requires a quarterback who throws extremely accurately, and often blindly, very close to opposing players. In addition, it requires the quarterback to be able to quickly pick the best one of five receivers to throw to, certainly much more quickly than in previously used systems. Often, the quarterback has no time to think about the play and must act robotically, executing the play exactly as instructed by the offensive coordinator, who calls the plays for him.


Another aspect of the West Coast offense is the use of fast running quarterbacks. In blitz or short-yardage situations, many of the West Coast offense's strengths are negated by defenses blocking running and passing lanes. A running quarterback can compensate by acting as a runner himself, paralyzing an overly aggressive defense. Quarterbacks such as Randall Cunningham and Michael Vick have been successful runners in this offense, as well as other notable scrambling quarterbacks such as Jake Plummer, Donovan McNabb, Aaron Rodgers, Russell Wilson and Tyrod Taylor. The west coast offense also utilizes play-action passes to fool the defense in order to get receivers open, which is usually successful with running quarterbacks.


Although not related to the West Coast offense, the similar "dink-and-dunk" offense has also helped quarterbacks that are more adept to older systems. Kurt Warner (a disciple of a variation of Air Coryell) and Ben Roethlisberger (a traditional gunslinger) are notable examples of non-West Coast quarterbacks that found success in the "dink-and-dunk" system.


In American football a play is a close to the ground "plan of action" or "strategy" used to move the ball down the field. A play begins at either the snap from the center or at kickoff. Most commonly plays occur at the snap during a down. These plays range from basic to very intricate. Football players keep a record of these plays in their playbook.


A play begins in one of two ways:


Once the play begins, it will continue until one of the following events happens:


When the play ends, the ball is set for the next play. For the first three instances above, the ball is set at the point of its "maximum forward progress". That means that if a runner is driven back in the process of a tackle OR is ruled down by lack of forward progress, the ball is placed as close to his opponent's goal line as he had gotten before being driven back. If he runs backwards of his own volition, the ball is marked where he goes down. In the case of an incomplete pass, the ball is placed at the previous line of scrimmage.


The offensive team must have seven players on the line of scrimmage at the start of a play. Those players may be positioned at any place along the line of scrimmage (which extends all of the way across the playing field).


The defensive team may position as many as 11 players on the line of scrimmage. Usually, there are from 3 to 8 defensive players on the line of scrimmage.


In a running play, the ball is advanced beyond the line of scrimmage by a player who receives it from behind the line of scrimmage. The player advancing the ball can be:


Also called "dive", "plunge", "buck", "guts", "slam" or numerous other names. The most basic run play is a run up the middle. In this case, the ball is handed off from the quarterback to a running back. The back then aims for a predetermined hole between his offensive linemen. This hole can be either between center and guard or between guard and tackle. The offensive line will run block, pushing defenders away from the chosen hole. Often, the fullback will lead block through the hole first to clear a path for the half back or running back.


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The 'bread-and-butter' of a run-oriented offense, this is typically the most common run play. Rather than aiming for a hole in the line, the running back aims for the spot just "outside" the tackle. This type of play allows for more improvisation by the running back once he is past the line, since there is often more open field in this area than in any run up the middle.


In a toss play, the RB "curves out" toward the sideline on either side and the QB pitches ("tosses") the ball to the RB.


In a sweep play, the fullback begins by running towards the sideline before heading forward. This motion allows for some of the offensive linemen, often one or both guards, to "pull" from their normal positions and establish a "lane" for the running back to run through. A lead blocking fullback often leads him through the lane. This play, known as the Packers sweep, was the central play in Vince Lombardi's "run-to-daylight" offense that was so successful for the Green Bay Packers of the 1960s.


In a trap, a guard on the "back" side of the play (away from the direction the fullback or running


back is heading) will pull and lead block for the running back (most of the time, the guard will blindside an unblocked down linemen, and kick him out of the play). Often, the fullback will take the place of the guard, and block the opening allowed by this.


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Also called a "misdirection". In this play, the runner begins by taking a step or two "away" from his intended path, then doubling back and heading in the opposite direction. Often defenders are clueing on the first move of the running back. The defenders committed to the first step, but the play moves in the opposite direction.


Counter plays are often (but not always) coupled with "influence" blocking, where the offensive line blocks the defense towards (rather than away from) the intended direction of the play. This gambit often causes the defenders to think the play is going in the opposite direction, and they react as such.


Also called a "delay". In a draw play, the offensive line drops into pass blocking positions, and the quarterback takes a drop as though he were going to pass. He then hands the ball off to his running back (or keeps it himself) and runs forward past the rushing defenders. The idea is that the defenders will be tricked in advancing on the quarterback as though it were a pass play, and this will vacate the area just beyond the line of scrimmage for the runner to take advantage of.


The quarterback fakes a handoff to the running back and continues running with the ball opposite from the direction the running back was headed. The bootleg can have blockers similar to a "sweep" (and in such cases is it often called a "quarterback sweep") or it can be run "naked", that is without any blockers at all. A naked bootleg relies on the defense buying the fake handoff and moving to tackle the running back rather than the quarterback.


The quarterback takes the snap and immediately dives to one side of the center or the other. This is often a short yardage play designed when only a yard or so is needed for a first down or a touchdown. Often the only players on either side of the ball that know the play is coming are the quarterback and the center (hence the "sneak" aspect of it), as the play is often decided by the quarterback upon seeing the defense. The play is often called by a silent signal between quarterback and center (a pinch or a tap in the direction the sneak is headed).


The wide receiver takes a handoff directly from the quarterback. The receiver then may proceed to do one of two things: he either runs the ball towards the line of scrimmage in order to gain yardage, or more rarely, he attempts to pass to another eligible pass receiver.


This play resembles a sweep, but before the running back crosses the line of scrimmage, he hands the ball off to a wide receiver going in them reverse (opposite) direction of where the running back was going. If the defense was drawn to the side of the field the running back was going towards, the receiver can outrun the defense to the other side of the field and make a big gain.


An option play is a play in which the quarterback holds the ball and runs to either side of the offensive line, waiting for an opportunity to run upfield and advance the ball. At the same time, the running back follows, allowing the quarterback the 'option' of pitching the ball just before he is tackled. This tactic forces defensive players to commit to either preventing the pitch or tackling the quarterback, allowing the offensive team to choose the best result.


The option play requires a very fast and mobile quarterback to execute it, and employs a considerable deal of risk, because if the pitch is mishandled it is a live ball that can be recovered by the defense, plus the quarterback can be hurt.


The option is rarely seen outside of college football, as high school teams lack the skill to execute it properly, and defensive players on professional teams are quick enough to disrupt the play to the point that it doesn't merit the risk involved, until the increased usages of read-option and RPO offenses in NFL since the 2010s with increasing number of dual-threat quarterbacks.


College football teams West Virginia, Air Force, Florida in 2000s often employ this play style.


A common form of the option executed on the high school, collegiate, and occasionally professional levels is the veer.


A route is a path or pattern that a receiver in American football and Canadian football runs to get open for a forward pass.


A "go" or "fly route" is a deep route used typically when the receiver has a speed advantage over the defensive back. In the route, the receiver will run as fast as possible in straight line parallel to the sideline, in an attempt to outrun the defender who is covering them.


A post is a deep play where wide receivers run straight down the field a short distance (10-15 yards), and then angle in toward the center of the field (toward the goal 'posts') where the ball is caught at high speed. When this play was originally designed, the goal posts were on the "zero" yard line, in the front of the endzone - thus, a cornerback in man coverage would be led into the post.


In a skinny post, the route is shorter and quicker than a deep post, which may cover 30 or 40 yards. This may also be referred to as a "glance in" or a "bang eight."


A "flag" or "corner route" is a deep play where wide receivers run straight down the field a long distance (40–50 yards), and then angle out towards the end zone and sideline. It takes its name from the flags that marked the ends of the goal and end lines before the introduction of flexible pylons.


An out route will usually feature the receiver running 7 to 10 yards downfield and then making a 90 degree turn towards the sideline.-.


The In or Drag route is the opposite of the Out route. As its name suggests, the route will usually feature the receiver running 7 to 10 yards downfield and then making a 90 degree turn towards the center of the field.


A receiver takes two steps or more downfield then cuts diagonally across the field behind the linebackers and in front of the safeties.


An eligible receiver runs a predetermined number of steps or yards upfield before stopping and turning back in slightly to face the quarterback, in the hopes that the defender cannot react and disrupt the pass before positive yardage is made.


Particularly in the highest levels of competition (professional and major college), a play may call for the receiver to 'read' the defensive coverage against him, and run a second route if the first option would be ineffectual. As an example, the receiver may be instructed to begin with a slant route, but if the defender has that covered, switch to an out route. For this to work correctly, the passer must make the same read as the receiver.


A screen pass is a pass that is normally thrown to a receiver or running back behind the line of scrimmage. It is thrown behind the line of scrimmage so that the pulling linemen can get their blocks established. There is another screen called a bubble screen where there are 3 receivers bunched together to one side, and after the snap the ball is almost instantly thrown to the one farthest behind the line of scrimmage.


The quarterback takes the snap and drops back to fake a handoff to the running back. The quarterback then rapidly pulls the ball back from the faked handoff, trying to hide it from the defense. The running back continues to move upfield as if he has the ball in his hands. The offensive line starts to run block, but then quickly goes into pass protection.


The receivers appear to block at first, then go into their routes.


On a play-action pass, which is essentially the opposite of the draw play, the quarterback hopes to fake the defenders into thinking the offense is going to run the ball. The effects of this play is to slow down the pass rush of the defense and it forces the defensive backs to make a decision between covering a receiver or coming up to help stop the run.


Stunts are a special means of rushing the quarterback done to confuse the opposing team's offensive line. Properly executing a stunt requires two or more defensive lineman working together. One defensive lineman will take an angled path towards an offensive lineman that he is not lined up across from. This will usually cause the offensive lineman he is lined up across from to follow him while also occupying the offensive lineman he angled towards. In turn, the defensive lineman who would have been blocked by the offensive lineman that is being angled to will loop behind his teammate and rush through the gap that was created by the offensive lineman who followed the defensive lineman taking the angle.


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A blitz occurs when the defense sends non defensive-line personnel (either linebackers or defensive backs) to rush the quarterback. A blitz is an expansion upon the effective concept of the aforementioned pass rush.


In attempting to halt the advancing of the football by the offensive team, the defensive team has many options. There are various formations that are commonly employed to defend against a passing attack.


Man-to-man coverage is when every receiver is covered by a defensive back or linebacker. It is a coverage often used while blitzing because there are not enough players available to effectively execute zone coverage. Man-to-man coverage may be used while not blitzing by teams who have superior defensive backs or against teams with inferior receivers.


Zone defense is when defensive players (typically defensive backs and linebackers) are responsible for a specific area on the field during pass coverage. Zones are usually more effective against long passes. When playing in a zone defense, a defensive player is able to observe what the quarterback is attempting to do, anticipate where a pass may be thrown, and perhaps intercept the pass. Zone defenses tend to produce interceptions of passes or outstanding collisions with receivers after they have made pass receptions.


Strategy forms a major part of American football. Both teams plan many aspects of their plays (offense) and response to plays (defense), such as what formations they take, who they put on the field, and the roles and instructions each player are given. Throughout a game, each team adapts to the other's apparent strengths and weaknesses, trying various approaches to outmaneuver or overpower their opponent in order to win the game.


The goal of the offense is, most generally, to score points. In order to accomplish this goal, coaches and players plan and execute plays – based on a variety of factors: The players involved, the opponent's defensive strategy, the amount of time remaining before halftime or the end of the game, and the number of points needed to win the game. Strategically, the offense can prolong their possession of the ball to prevent the opponent from scoring. Offensive scoring chances, or drives, end when they cannot move the ball 10 yards or the ball is turned over via fumble or interception.


On offense, there are three types of players: linemen, backs, and receivers. These players' positions and duties on the field vary from one offensive scheme to another.


The position names (as well as the abbreviations recognized by coaches, players, and fans) vary from one team's playbook to another, but what follow are among the most commonly used:


Backs are so named because they line up behind (in back of) the line of scrimmage at the start of the play.


Before the ball is snapped the offensive team lines up in a formation. The type of formation used is determined by the game situation. Teams often have "special formations" that they only use in obvious passing situations, short yardage, goal line situations, or formations they have developed for that particular game just to confuse the defense.


There are a nearly unlimited number of possible formations – a few of the more common ones are:


When the team is in formation and the quarterback gives a signal, either by calling out instructions or giving a non-verbal cue (a so-called "silent count"), the center snaps the ball to the quarterback and a play begins.


A running play occurs when the quarterback hands the ball to another player, who then attempts to carry the ball past the line of scrimmage and gain yards, or the quarterback keeps the ball himself and runs beyond the line of scrimmage. In both cases, the offensive line's main job is to run block, preventing the defensive players from tackling the ball carrier.


The choice of running play depends on the strengths of an offensive team, the weaknesses of the defense they are opposing, and the distance needed to score a touchdown or gain a first down. There are many kinds of running plays, including:


When a passing play occurs, the backs and receivers run specific patterns, or routes, and the quarterback throws the ball to one of the players. On these plays, the offensive line's main job is to prevent defensive players from tackling the quarterback before he throws the ball (a "sack") or disrupting the quarterback in any other way during the play.


When successful, passing plays tend to cover more ground than running plays, so they are often used when the offensive team needs to gain a large number of yards. Even if they do not need to gain a large number of yards, it would be foolish to keep doing run plays because the defense could predict it. However, run plays are used to tire the defensive linemen in between passing plays in order to protect the QB from sacks.


One general rule teams must take into account when creating their passing strategy is that only certain players are allowed to catch forward passes. If a player who is not an eligible receiver receives a thrown pass, the team could be penalized. However, if prior to a play the team reports to the referee that a normally ineligible receiver will act as an eligible receiver for one play, that player is allowed to catch passes. Teams will use this strategy from time to time to confuse the defense or force them to devote more attention to possible pass catchers.


Using a combination of passing plays and running plays, the offense tries to gain the yards needed for a first down, touchdown, or field goal. Over the years several football coaches and offensive coordinators have developed some well-known and widely used offensive strategies:


Distinct from the offensive strategies or philosophies, which govern how a team moves the ball down the field, whether a team relies on downfield passes, short passes, inside runs, etc. are the ways in which plays are called. These play calling systems often developed alongside certain offensive strategies, though the systems themselves can work with any strategy. The differences between the systems focus on the specific language used to communicate plays to players. In the NFL, three basic systems predominate:


The goal of defensive strategy is to prevent the opposing offense from gaining yards and scoring points, either by preventing the offense from advancing the ball beyond the line of scrimmage or by the defense taking the ball away from the offense (referred to as a turnover) and scoring points themselves.


On defense, there are three types of players: linemen, linebackers, and defensive backs (also called secondary players). These players' specific positions on the field and duties during the game vary depending on the type of defense being used as well as the kind of offense the defense is facing.


The defensive line lines up in front of the offensive line. The defensive lineman's responsibility is to prevent the offensive line from opening up running lanes for the running back or to sack the quarterback, depending on whether the play is a passing or running play. Most of the time, defensive linemen attack the offensive line but in some plays they drop back in pass coverage to confuse the opposite team.


Linebackers stand behind the defensive linemen or set themselves up on the line of scrimmage. Depending on the type of defensive strategy being used, a linebacker's responsibilities can include helping to stop the run, rushing the quarterback, or dropping back in pass protection.


Defensive backs stand behind the linebackers. Their primary responsibility is pass coverage, although they can also be involved in stopping the run or rushing the quarterback.


By far the most common alignments are four down linemen and three linebackers (a "4–3" defense), or three down linemen and four linebackers ("3–4"), but other formations such as five linemen and two linebackers ("5–2"), or three linemen, three linebackers, and five defensive backs ("3–3–5") are also used by a number of teams.


As with offensive formations, there are many combinations that can be used to set up a defense. Unusual defensive alignments are constantly used in an effort to neutralize a given offense's strengths. In winning Super Bowl XXV, the New York Giants played with two down linemen, four linebackers and five defensive backs, a strategy that prevented their opponents, the Buffalo Bills, a team with a strong passing game, from completing long passes. In a 2004 game, the New England Patriots used no down linemen and seven linebackers for two plays against the Miami Dolphins.


Some of the more familiar defensive formations include:


The defense must wait until the ball is snapped by the opposing center before they can move across the line of scrimmage or otherwise engage any of the offensive players. Once an opposing offense has broken their huddle and lined up in their formation, defensive players often call out instructions to each other to make last-second adjustments to the defense.


To prevent the opposing offense from gaining yards on the ground, a defense might put more emphasis on their run defense. This generally involves placing more players close to the line of scrimmage to get to the ball carrier more quickly. This strategy is often used when the opposing offense only needs to gain a few yards to make a first down or score a touchdown.


When the defense believes the opposing offense will pass the ball, they go into pass defense. There are two general schemes for defending against the pass:


There are times when a defense believes that the best way to stop the offense is to rush the quarterback, which involves sending several players charging at the line of scrimmage in an attempt to tackle the quarterback before he can throw the ball or hand it to another player. Any player on the defense is allowed to rush the quarterback, and many schemes have been developed over 50 years that involve complicated or unusual blitz "packages".


Defensive strategies differ somewhat from offensive strategies in that, unlike offenses that have very specific, detailed plans and assignments for each player, defenses are more reactive, with each player's general goal being to "stop the offense" by tackling the ball carrier, breaking up passing plays, taking the ball away from the offense, or sacking the quarterback. Whereas precision and timing are among the most important parts of offensive strategy, defensive strategies often emphasize aggressiveness and the ability to react to plays as they develop.


Nevertheless, there are many defensive strategies that have been developed over the years that coaches use as a framework for their general defense, making specific adjustments depending on the capabilities of their players and the opponent they are facing.


Some of the most commonly known and used defensive strategies include:


A special team is the group of players who take the field during kickoffs, free kicks, punts, and field goal attempts. Most football teams' special teams include one or more kickers, a long snapper (who specializes in accurate snaps over long distances), kick returners who catch and carry the ball after it is kicked by the opposing team, and blockers who defend during kicks and returns.


Most special teams are made up of players who act as backups or substitutes on the team's offensive and defensive units. Because of the risk of injury, it is uncommon for a starting offensive or defensive player to also play on a special teams unit.


A variety of strategic plays can be attempted during kickoffs, punts, and field goals—to surprise the opposition and score points, gain yardage or first downs, or recover possession of the kicked ball.


A kickoff occurs at the beginning of each half, overtime period (not in college), and following each touchdown, successful field goal, or safety. Strategically, the coach of the other team may choose to have his players kick the ball in one of several ways:


The "no punting" strategy is one that forsakes the practice of punting and instead attempts to make fourth down conversions on as many plays as possible. It has been implemented at Pulaski Academy, a top-ranked prep school, and has been advocated by Gregg Easterbrook in his "Tuesday Morning Quarterback" column and by author Jon Wertheim. Fourth down decisions to punt have been analyzed mathematically by David Romer.


Field goals are worth one point after a scored touchdown, or three points in the event that a team does not score a touchdown but feels it is positioned close enough for the kicker to make the attempt.


Thus it is strategically important for kicking teams to get as close to the ball as possible after a punt, so that they may quickly tackle a returner, down the ball as close to the opposing team's end zone as possible, and (if possible) recover the ball after a fumble and regain possession of the ball.


The Hidden Game of Football is an influential book on American football statistics published in 1988 and written by Bob Carroll, John Thorn, and Pete Palmer. It was the first systematic statistical approach to analyzing American football in a book and is still considered the seminal work on the topic.


Football Outsiders (FO) is a website started in July 2003 which focuses on advanced statistical analysis of the NFL. The site is run by a staff of regular writers, who produce a series of weekly columns using both the site's in-house statistics and their personal analyses of NFL games.


In 2005 and 2006, the site partnered with FOXSports.com to cross-publish many of the Outsiders' regular features, including power rankings based on a "weighted" version of the DVOA (Defense-adjusted Value Over Average) statistic. In 2007, Football Outsiders content appeared on FOXSports.com (in a reduced capacity) along with AOL Sports and ESPN.com. Since 2008, the site has partnered exclusively with ESPN and provides mostly ESPN Insider content. In 2009, Football Outsiders began analyzing college football using similar statistical principles.


Football Outsiders was launched in August 2003 by Aaron Schatz, with two regular columns, one of which used an early version of the proprietary DVOA statistic. The original purpose of the site was to disprove a statement by "Boston Globe" reporter Ron Borges that the 2002 New England Patriots failed to make the postseason because they could not establish the run. Over the course of time, the site added more writers, and hosted Gregg Easterbrook for part of 2003.


Between 2004 and 2005, the site introduced new statistics such as Defense-adjusted Points Above Replacement (DPAR, later Defense-adjusted "Yards" Above Replacement, DYAR) and Adjusted Line Yards (ALY). In 2005, the site began to cross-publish many of its columns on FOXsports.com. In 2005, Football Outsiders also took over publication of "Pro Football Prospectus", a book giving a preview of the upcoming NFL season. In 2009, the annual was renamed "Football Outsiders Almanac".


Currently, the site has incorporated the 1983-2020 NFL seasons into their statistics.


Football Outsiders has devised a series of proprietary formulas to calculate different advanced metrics.


DVOA (Defense-adjusted Value Over Average) calculates a team's success based on the down-and-distance of each play during the season, then calculates how much more or less successful each team is compared to the league average. According to Football Outsiders, DVOA "breaks down every single play of the NFL season to see how much success offensive players achieved in each specific situation compared to the league average in that situation, adjusted for the strength of the opponent. ... Football has one objective -- to get to the end zone -- and two ways to achieve that, by gaining yards and getting first downs. These two goals need to be balanced to determine a player's value or a team's performance."


There is a separate DVOA measurement for special teams, which "compare[s] each kick or punt to the league average for based on the point value of field position at the position of each kick, catch, and return."


DYAR (Defense-adjusted Yards Above Replacement) calculates each player's cumulative value above or below a "replacement-level" alternative. DYAR differs from DVOA in calculating a player's total value through the course of a year, and not on a play-for-play rate. States Football Outsiders, "DVOA, by virtue of being a percentage or rate statistic, doesn’t take into account the cumulative value of having a player producing at a league-median level over the course of an above-average number of plays. By definition, a median level of performance is better than that provided by half of the league and the ability to maintain that level of performance while carrying a heavy work load is very valuable indeed."


Adjusted Line Yards (ALY) "differentiate[s] between the contribution of the running back and the contribution of the offensive line." ALY attempts to "separate the effect that the running back has on a particular play from the effect of the offensive line (and other offensive blockers) and the effect of the defense. ... Yardage ends up falling into roughly the following combinations: Losses, 0-4 yards, 5-10 yards, and 11+ yards. In general, the offensive line is 20% more responsible for lost yardage than it is for yardage gained up to four yards, but 50% less responsible for yardage gained from 5-10 yards, and not responsible for yardage past that. Thus, the creation of Adjusted Line Yards."


Drive Stats calculate a team's average success rate on a possession-by-possession basis: "[E]ach team's total number of drives as well as average yards per drive, points per drive, touchdowns per drive, punts per drive, and turnovers per drive, interceptions per drive, and fumbles lost per drive. LOS/Drive represents average starting field position (line of scrimmage) per drive from the offensive point of view. Drive stats are given for offense and defense, with NET representing simply offense minus defense."


Another metric Football Outsiders uses is Pythagorean projection, which estimates wins in a season by a formula originally conceived by baseball analyst Bill James, that takes the square of team points, and divides it by the sum of the squares of team points scored and allowed.


The 2011 edition of "Football Outsiders Almanac" states, "From 1988 through 2004, 11 of 16 Super Bowls were won by the team that led the NFL in Pythagorean wins, while only seven were won by the team with the most actual victories. Super Bowl champions that led the league in Pythagorean wins but not actual wins include the 2004 Patriots, 2000 Ravens, 1999 Rams and 1997 Broncos."


Although Football Outsiders Almanac acknowledges that the formula had been less-successful in picking Super Bowl participants from 2005-2008, it reasserted itself in 2009 and 2010.


Furthermore, "[t]he Pythagorean projection is also still a valuable predictor of year-to-year improvement. Teams that win a minimum of one full game more than their Pythagorean projection tend to regress the following year; teams that win a minimum of one full game less than their Pythagoerean projection tend to improve the following year, particularly if they were at or above .500 despite their underachieving. For example, the 2008 New Orleans Saints went 8-8 despite 9.5 Pythagorean wins, hinting at the improvement that came with the next year's championship season."


Each year, Football Outsiders calculates the best and worst teams, per play, with the DVOA metric (see above). Below is a list of the highest- and lowest-rated teams in the league in each year from 1985-2019.


Pro Football Prospectus and Football Outsiders Almanac.


From 2005 through 2008, Football Outsiders published the "Pro Football Prospectus" book each year before the football season began. It included an essay for each team analyzing the previous season, evaluating off-season moves, and projecting future performance.


In 2009, Football Outsiders did not publish a "Pro Football Prospectus" volume, but instead produced the self-published "Football Outsiders Almanac 2009". The reason for this is explained in the book:


So why the name change, and why aren’t we in bookstores?


For those who don’t know, our first four books were published through an agreement with Prospectus Entertainment Ventures, the company that owns Baseball Prospectus (as well as the expansion projects Basketball Prospectus and Puck Prospectus). It was PEV that had the publishing contract (first with Workman, then Plume). This year, for various reasons, Plume decided they no longer wanted to publish books related to other sports besides baseball. Other publishers were interested in doing our book, but by the time Plume made their decision, it was too late to get on the publication schedule for 2009.


Bump and run coverage is a strategy formerly widely used by defensive backs in American professional football in which a defender lined up directly in front of a wide receiver and tried to impede him with arms, hands, or entire body and disrupt his intended route. This originated in the American Football League in the 1960s, one of whose earliest experts was Willie Brown of the Oakland Raiders. Mel Blount of the Pittsburgh Steelers specialized in this coverage to such a point as to cause numerous rule changes (see below) strictly limiting when and where a defender may make contact with a potential receiver in order to make it easier for receivers to run their routes and increase scoring.


In contrast, under NCAA rules, contact is allowed anywhere on the field as long as contact is in front of the defender and a pass is not in the air.


This play works well against routes that require the receiver to be in a certain spot at a certain time. The disadvantage, however, is that the receiver can shed contact and get behind the cornerback for a big play. This varies from the more traditional defensive formation in which a defensive player will give the receiver a "cushion" of about 5 yards to prevent the receiver from getting behind him. In the NFL, a defensive back is allowed any sort of contact within the 5 yard bump zone except for holding the receiver, otherwise the defensive back can be called for an illegal contact penalty, costing 5 yards and an automatic first down, enforced since 1978, and known colloquially as the Mel Blount Rule.


In the sports of American football or Canadian football, the act of icing the kicker or freezing the kicker is the act of calling a timeout immediately prior to the snap in order to disrupt the process of kicking a field goal. The intent is to throw the kicker off of their routine and force them to feel pressure for a longer amount of time. The tactic is used at the collegiate and professional levels, although its effectiveness has not been proven.


In order to ice a kicker, either a player or a coach on the defending team will call a timeout just as the kicker is about to attempt a game-tying or game-winning field goal. This is intended to either stop the kick immediately as the kicker is mentally prepared, or allow for the kicker to kick immediately after the timeout so that the initial kick does not count, in an attempt to mentally disrupt the kicker for the actual kick. If the tactic is successful, the kicker will miss the kick due to choking. Should the kicker make the subsequent kick, then the attempt to ice the kicker is considered unsuccessful.


One variant of this tactic, attributed to former Denver Broncos coach Mike Shanahan, is to call time out from the sidelines just before the ball is snapped. This prevents the kicking team from realizing the kick will not count until after the play is over. However, this has the potential to backfire: the invalid first kick could miss or be blocked, only to be followed by a successful second kick.


A similar tactic is also common in basketball, known as icing the shooter. A team may call a time out just before the opposing team's free-throw shooter is given the ball on the final free throw, in an attempt to disrupt the shooter, typically if a missed free throw allows for the calling team to either have a chance to win the game with a successful field goal, or allows the calling team to preserve a lead.


In American football, Air Coryell is the offensive scheme and philosophy developed by former San Diego Chargers coach Don Coryell. The offensive philosophy has been also called the "Coryell offense" or the "vertical offense".


With Dan Fouts as quarterback, the San Diego Chargers' offense was among the greatest passing offenses in National Football League history. The Chargers led the league in passing yards an NFL record six consecutive years from 1978 to 1983 and again in 1985. They also led the league in total yards in offense 1978–83 and 1985. Dan Fouts, Charlie Joiner, and Kellen Winslow would all be inducted into the Pro Football Hall of Fame from those Charger teams.


The pro set was the default NFL scheme prior to Don Coryell. It was generally a running offense that used play action fakes to set up deep passing attempts when defenses stacked up vs the running game. On pass plays, it provided one or even two backs to help protect the quarterback.


The pro set features a tight end, two wide receivers, a halfback and a fullback, often split behind the quarterback. While QBs can take snaps from under center or from the shotgun position, QBs generally take snaps from under center in the pro set to allow for more effective use of the play action pass. Offenses tended to be ball-control, grind-it-out style offenses. In 1978, the contact from defenders on receivers was minimized with the passing of the Mel Blount Rule.


Coryell opens up passing in the NFL.


Today most NFL offenses' passing games are at least partially based on Coryell conventions.


Former coach of the St. Louis Rams, Mike Martz, says "Don is the father of the modern passing game. People talk about the West Coast offense, but Don started the 'West Coast' decades ago and kept updating it. You look around the NFL now, and so many teams are running a version of the Coryell offense. Coaches have added their own touches, but it's still Coryell's offense. He has disciples all over the league. He changed the game.".


The offense did not have any set formations, as receivers could line up anywhere on any given pass play. Passes were thrown to a spot before the receiver even got there, allowing defenders no hint where the pass was being targeted. Each receiver had two or three different route options they could adjust depending on the coverage during the play. Throwing a deep pass was the first option on each play. Coryell's offense had more progressions than Gillman's, with backup options for screen passes and underneath routes.


The Coryell offense is a combination of deep and mid range passing and power running. The offense relies on getting all five receivers out into patterns that combined stretched the field, setting up defensive backs with route technique, and the quarterback throwing to a spot on time where the receiver can catch and turn upfield. Pass protection is critical to success because at least two of the five receivers will run a deep in, skinny post, comeback, speed out, or shallow cross.


Overall, the goal of the Coryell offense is to have at least two downfield, fast wide receivers who adjust to the deep pass very well, combined with a sturdy pocket quarterback with a strong arm. The Coryell offense uses three key weapons. The first is a strong inside running game, the second is its ability to strike deep with two or more receivers on any play, and the third is to not only use those two attacks in cooperation with each other, but to include a great deal of mid-range passing to a TE, WR, or back.


After the Chargers in 1980 acquired running back Chuck Muncie, the offense started using a single set back featuring Muncie as the lone running back and adding a second tight end into the game. When defenses countered with extra defensive backs, the offense would run the ball. Joe Gibbs, the Chargers offensive coordinator at the time, said that marked "the evolution of the one-back offense."


Originally it was known as the West Coast offense until an article about San Francisco 49ers Head Coach Bill Walsh in "Sports Illustrated" in the early 80s incorrectly called Walsh's offense "the West Coast offense," and this mis-labelling stuck. Subsequently, Coryell's offense scheme was referred to as "Air Coryell"—the name announcers had assigned to his high powered Charger offenses in San Diego, featuring 3 Hall of Famers in QB Dan Fouts, WR Charlie Joiner, & TE Kellen Winslow, as well as Pro Bowl WR Wes Chandler & HB Chuck Muncie. Today it is also known as the "Coryell offense", although the "vertical offense" is another accepted name.


In NFL coaching circles, the most famous and successful advocates of the Air Coryell system are Norv Turner, Mike Martz and Al Saunders.


The Mike Martz variant is a much more robust offense with a more complex playbook. It is a much more aggressive passing offense, frequently deploying pre-snap motion and shifts, with the running game often forgotten. There is much less of a focus on play action. The Martz variant favors an elusive feature back, such as Hall of Famer Marshall Faulk, who can catch the ball, over the power runners the Turner scheme favors. Martz credits both his influences on his variation of the offensive system and his overall coaching philosophy to Don Coryell. Martz learned the so-called 3 digit system the offense is famous for with how the plays are called from Turner when they were both in Washington.


This may have been especially true when the Rams surprisingly lost Super Bowl XXXVI to the New England Patriots. In that contest, the Patriots' defense successfully contained Marshall Faulk, holding him to only 76 yards rushing and 54 yards receiving. The Rams offense gained more yards than the Patriots offense, 427-267. But the New England defense forced 3 St. Louis turnovers. The Patriots scored 17 points off those turnovers. It should also be noted that Kurt Warner's rhythm was disrupted by Patriots head coach Bill Belichick's defensive game plan. Warner went 28-44 on his passing attempts, throwing for 365 yards and scoring 2 touchdowns (1 running, 1 passing). However, Warner also threw two costly interceptions which proved to eventually help the Patriots win the Super Bowl.


The Coryell offense attacked vertically through seams, while the West Coast offense moved laterally as much as vertically through angles on curl and slant routes. The Coryell offense had lower completion percentages than the West Coast offense, but the returns were greater on a successful play. "The Coryell offense required more talented players, a passer who could get the ball there, and men who can really run—a lot of them," said Walsh. He said the West Coast offense was developed out of necessity to operate with less talented players. He noted, "[Coryell] already had the talent and used it brilliantly."


In American football, a two-level defense is a defensive formation with only two layers of defense instead of the customary three layers.


The two-level was invented to combat the run and shoot offense in the 1980s, but has stayed in use due to its adaptability in combating all types of offenses. The defense of spread formations remains a strong suit of this model.


A play calling system in American football is the specific language and methods used to call offensive plays.


It is distinct from the play calling philosophy, which is concerned with overall strategy: whether a team favors passing or running, whether a team seeks to speed up or slow down play, what part of the field passes should target, and so on. The play calling system comprises tactics for making calls for individual plays and communicating those decisions to the players.


In any football play, each of the team's eleven players on offense has a specific, scripted task. Success requires that players' tasks mesh into an effective play. A team maximizes the difficulty for the opposition by having a wide variety of plays, which means that players' tasks vary on different plays. A play calling system informs each player of his task in the current play.


There are constraints in designing a play calling system. The 40-second play clock means a team has 30 seconds or less from the end of one play to prepare for the next play. A complicated play calling system that lets a team tailor a play more precisely is harder for players to memorize and communicate. Noise from the fans in the stadium can interfere with communication, sometimes deliberately. To the extent the opposition can intercept and understand the call, it can prepare for it better.


The design of a play calling system answers the following questions:


Three general approaches to play calling dominate the National Football League:


In the West Coast system, all plays have code names. They indicate the specific formation and tell players where to line up. This code name is followed by modifiers that communicate variations on the play. For running plays, the modifier specifies the blocking scheme and the path that the primary ball carrier takes during the run, usually indicating which of nine numbered gaps, or holes, between offensive-line players he aims for in his run. For passing plays, the modifier indicates what pass route each player is supposed to take.


Here are some plays from one specific West Coast playbook, and what the names mean:


The West Coast system has its roots in the system devised by Paul Brown as the head coach of the Cleveland Browns and Cincinnati Bengals. It became known as the West Coast system when Brown's protege Bill Walsh used a similar scheme as head coach of the San Francisco 49ers during their success of the 1980s and 1990s. The West Coast system was designed alongside the West Coast offense, though it is not confined to that offense.