AMAN laments that the Indigenous Peoples Bill has been stalled in parliament for over 10 years. This law could help end structural discrimination, recognize ancestral rights, and stop the repeated seizure of Indigenous lands. This will demonstrate that state officials are complying with the constitution and address accusations of persistent neglect of Indigenous peoples and their traditional rights, particularly rights to land, customary territories, and natural resources. This author spoke with Eustobio Rero Renggi, AMAN’s deputy secretary-general for Organizational Affairs, who attended COP30 in Brazil. He shared the following insight: At COP30, countries rarely discussed the rights of Indigenous peoples. Most progress for these groups took place outside the main talks. One major step was when 11 countries agreed to recognize global tenure rights, signing an agreement that covers land-use rights for 160 million hectares. Philanthropic groups and some developed countries also pledged $1.8 billion in global funding to support Indigenous peoples. The Indonesian government has promised to restore 1.4 million hectares of customary forests, but this commitment needs more attention since there has been no official progress in recognizing these forests after COP30.


Third World’s Stephen ‘Cat’ Coore, a Jamaican who straddled musical genres, dies at 69

It was with shock that Jamaicans learned of the death of one of their most beloved reggae musicians, Stephen “Cat” Coore, who suddenly passed away on January 18, 2026. He is mourned by his wife, Donna Feltis-Coore, and children Shiah, Kanna, Stephen Jr., and Ashley. Prime Minister Andrew Holness posted on X: His tribute was followed by a series of tweets from Culture Minister Olivia “Babsy” Grange, who called Coore “a unique talent and a true Reggae Ambassador” whose music “helped carry Jamaica’s sound to the world,” adding: Opposition Leader Mark Golding’s homage, meanwhile, came from the perspective of being personally acquainted with the musician: Golding continued , “On a personal level, Cat and I shared interests in music and cricket, and we enjoyed good conversations whenever our paths crossed. I saw him most recently last Friday at the UWI Chapel on leaving a funeral. We warmly embraced, with promises that we would soon talk. The news this morning of his passing is therefore all the more shocking.”


Born in Kingston on April 6, 1956, Stephen “Cat” Coore’s musical career started very early, spanning fifty years. He was born into a comfortable and accomplished middle-class family. His father, the Honourable David Hilton Coore , was a well-known politician, lawyer and statesman, who served as Deputy Prime Minister of Jamaica from 1972-1976 under Prime Minister Michael Manley , and was a member of the committee that drafted the Jamaican Constitution. His mother, Rita Angela Innis Coore, was Trinidadian. She studied music and broadcasting at McGill University in Montreal and later at the Royal College of Music in London. She was a well-known music teacher who introduced her son Stephen to music at an early age — he was drawn to string instruments, and began cello lessons. Something of a child prodigy, he played the classical piece “The Swan” for Princess Anne at King’s House during one of her visits to Jamaica, and won a silver medal in the Jamaica Festival at age ten. At age 12, Cat fell in love with the guitar.


His mother bought one for him, and he took to it so quickly that he played with the Alley Cats and then joined the popular Inner Circle Band as lead guitarist at the tender age of 13. He stayed with the group and toured the region for four years. In 1973, at 17, he got together with friends Colin Leslie and Michael “Ibo” Cooper , who also played with Inner Circle alongside singer William “Bunny” Rugs , and Third World — one of the most successful and longest-running bands ever — was born. Initially, they played locally before signing with Island Records. With his wide musical education, Coore helped create the band’s “reggae fusion” genre, which incorporated elements of soul, funk, and rock music as well as classical, when he played cello with verve and gusto . The formula resonated with music fans, both at home and abroad. Third World’s self-titled album was released in 1976 and included a cover of The Abyssinians’ Satta Massagana , one of their most-loved songs, the title of which means “Give Thanks” in Amharic.


That same year, they played at the iconic “Smile Jamaica” concert in Kingston, headlined by Bob Marley and the Wailers. The title song of their second album, “96° in the Shade” (1977) was also a big hit, as was “Now That We’ve Found Love” — a peace anthem by soul group The O’Jays that the band turned into a hit in 1978. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the band reaped international success, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom. Following Marley’s death in 1981, Third World performed at Reggae Sunsplash with his widow Rita and Stevie Wonder, who wrote one of their major hits, “Try Jah Love.” Third World received numerous awards and accolades — both globally and in Jamaica — including nine Grammy nominations. Coore was also presented with the Order of Distinction of Jamaica in 2005, a distinguished national award. Over the years, he received the keys to several cities worldwide, as well as the Jamaica Reggae Industry Association (JaRia) Instrumentalist of the Year award, and lifetime achievement awards from Jamaica Jazz and Blues , Reggae Sumfest , Island Records , International Reggae And World Music Awards (IRAWMA) and more.


On Substack , Jamaican Ricky Browne did not hold back about Coore’s genius: “The Reggae Ambassador, Cat was perhaps the most talented reggae musician that Jamaica has ever produced. A musical genius, he could play just about any instrument, and could platform Third World’s music not just as real reggae, but as worthy of being considered as classical as Beethoven. Anyone who has seen Cat play the cello as if at a classical music concert at the Royal Albert Hall before smoothly transitioning to one of Third World’s biggest hits will never forget it. And he showed that, though reggae was all about the heartbeat, it was more than that, and could stand its ground against any other type of music out there.” Author and filmmaker Barbara Blake Hannah marvelled at Coore’s cello-playing skills: Jamaica Gleaner columnist Gordon Robinson posted: One reggae fan reflected on Coore’s musical mood: Third World itself posted on Facebook: The Caribbean Community of Retired Persons (CCRP), a Kingston-based non-governmental organisation supporting and advocating for senior citizens, paid tribute to Coore, whom it had recently honoured in its annual awards ceremony: “He was so happy at our event,” commented CCRP Co-founder and Executive Chair Jean Lowrie-Chin in a WhatsApp note.


The CCRP also posted the citation for Coore’s award on its Facebook page, in which it recognised that Coore left “an indelible mark on Jamaica’s cultural and musical heritage worldwide,” and that his “visionary musicianship, cultural leadership, and enduring global impact” made him deserving of the award. The Ocho Rios-based reggae station Irie FM summed up the spirit of Coore and his music in an insightful message on Facebook: As a co-founder of Third World, Cat Coore expanded the language of reggae, weaving roots with jazz, soul, funk, classical discipline and global sounds, while never losing Jamaica’s heartbeat. His guitar didn’t just play rhythms; it spoke stories, unity, love and consciousness. Through decades of timeless music, he helped carry reggae from the streets of Jamaica to the world stage, proving it could be both deeply rooted and endlessly evolving. Thank you, Cat, for the soundtracks, the innovation, and the legacy. Your spirit lives on in every chord, every message, and every soul touched by the music.


The musical fraternity, including veteran British reggae bands Steel Pulse and UB40, shared their sadness at Coore’s passing: The Wailers added: Coore’s life in Kingston revolved around his wife and family, even as he served as the Ambassador for the Alligator Head Foundation in Port Antonio and the Goodwill Ambassador for the Issa Trust Foundation . His son Shiah has followed in his musical footsteps, as a bass player. This short conversation between Coore and Shiah, posted on Facebook in 2020, is particularly emotive on the heels of the musician’s passing. Coore’s life embodied music. His wide-ranging musical inspirations included iconic cellists like Pablo Casals and Jaqueline du Pré , not to mention Bob Marley , and guitarists such as Carlos Santana , Chuck Berry and Fats Domino . Cherished for his humour and warm personality , Coore loved to perform. Quite apart from his virtuoso guitar solos, his energy and enthusiasm infused every performance with joy. Reggae fans from Jamaica and around the world were infected with that joy; the memories of it will remain for years to come.


Wasting renewable energy comes at a high cost for the Dominican Republic

Waste is costly. In the Dominican Republic, according to a document from the Coordinating Body of the National Interconnected Electric System (OC) that was accessed by both Climate Tracker and Global Voices, renewable energy companies lost around USD 5.17 million between January and June 2025 because the country chose to waste part of the solar energy generated. As per the same document, the state-owned electricity distribution companies Edenorte, Edesur, and Edeeste (the EDES) recorded operating cost overruns of USD 6.5 million by purchasing more expensive fossil energy when they could have purchased renewable energy. The root of these costs lies in non-compliance with the Technical Minimum Power (PMT) standard by thermoelectric plants — a rule meant to be supervised by the OC — which seeks to limit fossil energy injection to the minimum necessary, to allow greater entry of cheaper renewable energy.


This non-compliance has led the Dominican Republic to adopt a practice known as “ curtailment ,” which involves limiting and interrupting renewable energy production at a generating plant, even though it may have the technical capacity to produce more at that time. This is done to avoid excess supply on the grid, which can occur due to congestion, lack of storage, or a mismatch between peak production hours (such as solar energy at midday) and peak demand (such as in the afternoon). These combined practices delay the energy transition and also represent higher costs for the country. Renewable losses, expensive energy, and the state footing the bill Since October 2024, the Procedure for the Application of Generation Limitation for Safety Reasons in the National Interconnected Electric System (SENI) has been in force. The resulting costs not only directly affect renewable generators, whose energy injection into the system is limited, but also impact the spot market and electricity distribution companies.


In an official OC report on the curtailment situation between January and June 2025, renewable energy curtailed in May reached 16,171 megawatt-hours (MWh), representing an average of 18 percent of total energy, while in January, an average of 21 percent waste was recorded. Under the argument of safety reasons and operational restrictions, SENI keeps a minimum number of thermal power plants in operation, with its data showing that curtailment has been applied during hours of maximum renewable energy production. According to the State-Owned Electric Companies Performance Report , the average energy purchase price decreased in 2025, affecting the revenues of renewable companies whose Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) contracts are linked to these reference values. Renewable sources, operating under fixed-price agreements or prices adjusted according to official indices, saw their profit margins reduced because of the drop in average prices. In contrast, many thermal plants without PPAs sell their energy on the spot market, where the marginal cost increased from 9.75 to 12.65 US cents/kWh between January and July 2025.


This increase enabled them to improve their revenues and take advantage of a more favourable pricing environment, thereby reinforcing their competitive advantage over the renewable sector. With non-compliance with the law and thermal plants operating above permitted levels, the EDES ultimately pay more. In the Dominican Republic, the state subsidises the EDES. In 2024 alone, DOP 86,393 million (around USD 1,388 million) were budgeted in subsidies, meaning that the financial losses of these companies are also a loss of public funds. Alfonso Rodríguez, current president of the Association for the Promotion of Renewable Energies (ASOFER), said that “as a consequence, distributors end up acquiring more expensive and more polluting energy, while investors in renewable sources see their profitability reduced.” The state continues to pay for the lack of grid modernisation. Law 80-24, establishing the General State Budget for the 2025 Fiscal Year, allocated USD 75,000,000 to the Program to Support the Improvement of Electricity Distribution Networks, executed by state-owned electricity distribution companies, and USD 225,000,000 to the Program for the Improvement of Medium- and Low-Voltage Networks and Customer Regularisation for distributors.


The lack of modern networks and insufficient storage are crucial factors that cause curtailment. The comparison between losses arising from curtailment and the resources allocated in the budget shows the double negative impact of this practice. Inflexibility limits renewables and benefits the fossil regime Another situation that ends up privileging fossil fuel injection over renewables in the grid is forced dispatch, a practice that allows thermal plants to generate energy and receive compensation even when the system does not require it. However, this mechanism does not apply to renewable energy plants, creating an imbalance in the treatment of different generation sources. José Luis Moreno, engineer and professor at the Energy Institute of the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo (IEUASD), stated that “payment for forced dispatch constitutes economic remuneration for energy delivered that should not be delivered, because the plant does not compete with others on price but — due to its inflexibility — it cannot shut down quickly, so it must remain online and is therefore paid forced dispatch for technical reasons.”


Because some plants, especially large thermoelectric plants, cannot be easily shut down, they are forcibly dispatched even when their costs are high and they are not competitive. As a result, cheaper plants like renewables are limited and cannot reach their maximum generation potential. “Plants are dispatched based on how competitive they are in cost — those with cheaper fuel costs first. Then, costs increase until demand is met; when you stop being competitive, you stop dispatching energy, unless you are inflexible, in which case you are forcibly dispatched,” Moreno explained. This essentially means that you do not compete, but you cannot shut down. “Thus, another plant that should have dispatched because it was more competitive does not dispatch,” he continued. “In this case as well, renewables are curtailed.” According to the OC, compensation for forced dispatch amounted to USD 7.44 million between January and June 2024, and USD 11.33 million between January and June 2025, establishing a margin of USD 3.89 million for the state-managed distribution companies.


This exacerbates the economic deficit of the Electricity Distribution Companies (EDE), which reached an accumulated USD 936.7 million by July 2025, according to the State-Owned Electric Companies Performance Report for July 2025 . In the overall financial result, this amount was largely covered by the state, which contributed a total of USD 737.3 million. The roadmap (REmap) of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), published in November 2017, highlights the DR’s potential to increase the share of renewable energy generation to 44 percent by 2030, based mainly on solar photovoltaic energy, wind energy, and bioenergy. “To harness this potential,” the report states, “the Dominican Republic must overcome institutional, economic, and technical challenges. In the case of the electricity sector, the REmap study suggests solutions to address issues related to generation adequacy and flexibility, ensuring the development of electricity grids, which in turn helps manage the limited predictability of solar and wind energy, as well as the effects of the rapid penetration of these variable renewable energy sources.” From Moreno’s perspective, the solution is both obvious and cost-effective: “Store energy primarily to regulate frequency and enable photovoltaic plants to safely enter the system.”


Tensions high in DRC, the global cobalt capital, between artisanal miners and industrial mining companies

Kolwezi, a mining city in the Lualaba Province of the southeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), holds 70 percent of the world’s cobalt reserves . Known as the “Global Cobalt Capital,” tensions are high in this city due to the conflict between artisanal miners, also called “creuseurs” (diggers), and industrial mining companies. Today, this mining resource is of considerable importance owing to its multiple uses and distinctive features, including energy performance, heat resistance, sustainability, and magnetic properties . Cobalt is in high demand in the electric car manufacturing, aeronautics, and medical industries. In DRC, the sector is key as it currently employs more than three million people and accounts for over 90 percent of the country’s economy. Read more: Tragedy in DRC cobalt and copper mine shows human cost of energy transition On December 19, 2025, Louis Watum , Minister of Mines, signed a decree to safeguard mining companies and regulate the artisanal cobalt and copper mining industry in Kolwezi .


This decision to suspend artisanal miners has sparked widespread discontent, resulting in looting, vandalism , and casualties. Paragraphs one and two of Article 109 of the DR Congolese mining code recognize artisanal miners as an integral part of the entities involved in mining activities. However, according to figures that Louis Watum presented at the Makutano Forum in Kinshasa on November 25, 2025, there are 3 million artisanal miners, but a shortage of officially designated Artisanal Mining Zones. The mining industry is poorly organized, partly because the DR Congo’s authorities have sold almost all of the Grand Katanga’s (South-East of the country) mining quarries to foreign investors. Artisanal miners are often forcibly removed to benefit industrial mining companies. Some mines ultimately operate amid volatile relations. Read more: Water pollution in DRC attributed to Chinese mining company The artisanal miners’ fight for survival The lack of official Artisanal Mining Zones ( Zone d’Exploitation Artisanale or ZEA) forces artisanal miners from the Lualaba Province to trespass on mining sites to support their families.


This trespassing causes extensive damage , often resulting in fatal conflicts . Official industrial mining company workers frequently report the killing and serious injury of mining operators and those transporting mining products to the factories. Machine operator Junior Biane explained the situation, telling Global Voices: Nous sommes toujours attaqués dans les mines par les creuseurs artisanaux de Musonoie. Hier par exemple, nous avons été tabassés par les creuseurs et un collègue est touché à l'œil gauche. Artisanal miners from Musonoie frequently attack us in the mines. For example, yesterday, they beat us up, hitting a workmate in the left eye. The mining companies accuse the DR Congo government of failing to take responsibility for protecting their investments from illegal mining activities. Industrial companies demand government protection Kamoto Copper Company (KCC), owned by Anglo-Swiss multinational Glencore , reports instances of artisanal miners trespassing due to a lack of ZEA. Currently, the T17, KOV, and Mashamba mines in the Lualaba Province, where this giant extracts copper, often experience truck robberies and attacks on their workers.


The Chinese company COMMUS has experienced a similar situation. Read more: Water pollution in DRC attributed to Chinese mining company On December 3, 2025 , KCC workers marched to the Provincial Government of Lualaba to denounce this trespassing and acts of violence. Although the mining industry is the pillar of the DR Congo’s economy, the authorities have not implemented a definitive solution. It is the GDP driver and is the primary source of public revenue, accounting for over 30 percent of the national budget . The government must, therefore, address the mining companies’ concerns. Despite its wealth in mineral resources, poverty affects more than half of the DRC population. According to a World Bank report published in October 2025, 85.3 percent of the DRC population lives in extreme poverty. The unemployment rate is estimated at 84 percent , while the average annual per capita income is USD 1,600, or USD 134 per month. The government’s current policy offers no sustainable solutions, neither for artisanal miners nor for industrial mining companies. Read our special coverage: DRC: Poor despite its wealth


Morocco, AFCON, and the controversies that trailed Africa’s biggest football event

When Senegal clinched the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON) title with a 1-0 victory over hosts Morocco on January 18, 2026, the celebration was overshadowed by discussions about the tournament’s conduct and fairness. The final, played at the Prince Moulay Abdellah Stadium in Rabat , unfolded amid intense tension. A Video Assistant Referee -reviewed penalty awarded to Morocco late in the 98th minute of stoppage time triggered an immediate protest from the Senegalese players, who walked off the pitch. In the moments following the walkout, reports indicated that confrontations broke out between Senegalese supporters and stadium officials. When the match eventually resumed, Morocco’s Brahim Díaz attempted a “ Panenka ” — a softly chipped shot aimed down the centre of the goal, but the effort was unsuccessful, with the ball comfortably finding its way into the hands of Senegal’s goalkeeper Édouard Mendy . The match proceeded into extra time, where Senegal midfielder Pape Gueye scored the decisive goal, securing Senegal’s victory and the AFCON title.


Tensions continued into the final’s post-match press conference. Videos circulating online showed several Moroccan journalists walking out of the room as Senegal’s head coach, Pape Bouna Thiaw , entered the venue holding the hand of his daughter: The walkout drew criticism from other foreign journalists present at the tournament, as well as from the International Sports Press Association (AIPS), which described the incident as inconsistent with professional standards of sports journalism: African football and the politics of hosting African football has rarely existed in isolation from the continent’s political geography. Rivalries are often shaped by history, diplomacy, and unresolved political and regional tensions, and major tournaments regularly reopen discussions about fairness and the responsibilities that come with hosting. In recent years, this scrutiny has increasingly centred on Morocco. The country’s frequent hosting of major African football events, including AFCON qualifiers, the Women’s Africa Cup of Nations (WAFCON) , the African Nations Championship (CHAN) , and several Confederation of African Football (CAF) club competitions, has coincided with heightened attention from players, officials, and the African football community.


The concentration of tournaments in one host nation has also drawn public comment from prominent figures in the game. Nigerian football star and six-time African Women’s Footballer of the Year, Asisat Oshoala . In a post on X (formerly Twitter), wrote: Across multiple tournaments, visiting teams and fans have raised similar concerns , including allegations of crowd hostility and security concerns when fixtures are held on Moroccan soil. One such example dates back to the CAF Champions League final between Al Ahly and Wydad Casablanca , played in Morocco. In widely circulated footage following Al Ahly’s 2–0 defeat, then head coach Pitso Mosimane spoke to journalists about what he characterized as an intimidating atmosphere and officiating decisions he believed influenced the match. The clip continues to circulate online and is often referenced in broader discussions about hosting conditions at Moroccan venues. Sporting frustrations in the 2025 AFCON event During the recently concluded AFCON tournament, similar issues resurfaced. Morocco was accused by opposing teams and observers of benefiting from contentious officiating decisions.


According to reports, Senegalese officials filed formal complaints earlier in the week regarding crowd safety and their treatment upon arrival in Morocco. Other controversies, including an incident where Moroccan ball boys removed the opposing goalkeepers’ towels, were captured in several videos and shared widely on social media, and created chaos after the match that spilled beyond the field: Refereeing decisions throughout AFCON 2025 also drew criticism from teams and analysts. Several key matches featured contentious decisions and late VAR interventions, intensified frustrations among players and coaches. In one tournament match involving Cameroon, Samuel Eto’o , president of the Cameroon Football Federation, was sanctioned by CAF with a fine and a ban for his alleged conduct toward match officials following what he viewed as unfavourable decisions. This isn’t the first time football tensions have escalated beyond the field. In 2019, the CAF Champions League final between Esperance of Tunisia and Wydad Casablanca descended into chaos , leaving players stranded when the VAR technology, which was mandated for the final, was suddenly unavailable.


CAF’s indecisiveness and reversal of its own decisions ultimately exposed its fragility. In 2014, Global Voices published an analysis of hostile host tactics in African football using the Libya versus Nigeria AFCON qualifying match scandal , which revealed how logistics and even basic hospitality were turned into weapons. Morocco and the question of belonging For decades, Morocco has maintained an uneasy relationship with the rest of Africa. In 1984, it withdrew from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU), after the body recognised the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic . In 1987, Morocco applied to become a Member of the European Union but was rejected on the grounds that it was not a European State. When Morocco rejoined the African Union in 2017, it did so strategically, with football becoming a major part of its re-entry strategy.


It has since hosted the African Nations Championship (CHAN) in 2018 , the 2023 U-23 Africa Cup of Nations , the U-17 Africa Cup of Nations in 2025 , the 2024 Women’s Africa Cup of Nations (WAFCON) , and the 2025 AFCON tournament . While Morocco’s hosting of major tournaments has expanded its continental visibility and influence, often described by analysts as a form of soft-power projection, reactions during the tournament suggested a more fractured reception among sections of the African football public. On social media, some users questioned Morocco’s relationship with the rest of the continent: CAF’s complicity and the cost of silence CAF’s greatest failure is not that these incidents occur, but that they are rarely meaningfully confronted . Host nations are awarded repeated tournaments without rigorous post-event accountability . Crowd behavior is condemned in statements and forgotten in practice. Smaller federations are expected to “move on” for the sake of unity, while patterns repeat themselves with new victims.


According to an X user , @mthulisi24 When racist abuse, intimidation, and mob behaviour are excused, it’s just a mirror of a system stuck in feudal thinking. Power without accountability, intimidation over fairness. This isn’t ‘passion,’ it’s medieval conduct wearing a modern jersey, enabled by CAF . Another user, @ MASKURAID , added: Fantastic facilities should not excuse abominable behaviour. @CAF_Online needs to show that the welfare of participating Nations matters and not allow host countries to seek undue advantage by using underhanded methods to ‘win.’ Football should unite us. This is not how. Senegal’s victory marked a significant achievement in the country’s football history and lifted it in FIFA’s world rankings to 12th, while Morocco also reached its highest ranking despite narrowly missing the title. The highest ranking achieved by an African team was Nigeria's fifth in April 1994. Even though Morocco has been praised for the organisation of the tournament due to its modern stadium facilities and its logistical capacities, the tournament’s legacy will likely be shaped as much by the controversies that trailed it.


Venezuela inflates release figures as political prisoners remain in limbo

During the first days of Venezuela’s interim government under Delcy Rodríguez, officials announced the release of what they called a “significant number of political prisoners,” framing the move as a gesture of de-escalation and reconciliation . A week after the announcement, Jorge Rodríguez, president of the National Assembly and Delcy Rodríguez’s brother, claimed that more than 400 detainees had been freed in a “mass release” following the political transition. Independent verification, however, tells a very different story. Human rights organizations such as Foro Penal have been able to confirm only around 154 releases , a fraction of the official figure of an estimated 800 to 1,000 political prisoners believed to remain detained. Authorities have not published a verified list of those released, nor explained the legal criteria governing the process. Government officials have also continued to challenge the very notion of “political prisoners,” portraying detainees as common criminals — an assertion that contradicts years of documentation by Venezuelan and international human rights bodies. This week, Foro Penal itself became a target of criticism in the National Assembly (the legislative body).


Founded in 2002, the organisation has spent more than two decades documenting politically motivated detentions and working with families, lawyers, and international institutions, including the UN and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. According to Foro Penal, 863 people were detained for political reasons before the release announcement, including 86 cases of enforced disappearance. Since 2014, it has documented more than 18,000 politically motivated detentions, far exceeding historical precedents in the country. Families waiting, without answers Across Venezuela, families have gathered outside detention centers , waiting for names to be called, without any official confirmation that releases will take place. In Caracas, relatives have camped for days outside facilities such as El Helicoide, Rodeo 1, and Zona 7, relying on rumors and informal messages to locate loved ones. Authorities have provided no schedules, lists, nor explanations. Many families have turned to social media to make their cases visible. One such space is the Instagram account @madresendefensadelaverdad2024 , where mothers, sisters, and daughters document detentions and demand accountability. Among those featured is Kennedy Tejeda, a lawyer known for defending political detainees in the state of Carabobo. He was detained while seeking information about people arrested during protests following the 2024 election.


Another case is of Juan Diego Lucena, a mobile phone technician, a volunteer at a nursing home, and a volunteer firefighter. He was detained while working at his phone repair business. According to his family, his health has deteriorated in detention: “Lately, he’s been sick — tachycardia, high blood pressure, panic attacks. He’s not a terrorist. He’s a volunteer who has always wanted to help those around him.” The account also highlights José Manuel Salas, described by his mother as a bohemian, a dreamer, and a loving young man. A student at the time of his detention, Salas was reportedly attacked by unidentified security forces and taken to a detention center while unconscious. These testimonies illustrate the human cost behind the numbers, as families continue to seek answers, justice, and the release of those they say are being held for political reasons. A fragile and uncertain process So far, 154 releases have been independently confirmed by Foro Penal — roughly 14 percent of the organization’s estimated total of 1,100 political prisoners. Those freed include several high-profile figures, including human rights activist Rocío San Miguel , journalist Biaggio Pillieri, and politician Enrique Márquez . Most were released under restrictive conditions that limit public speech, and several left the country immediately out of fear of re-detention.


Concerns deepened when, 62 hours after the release announcement, the family of Edison Torres, a police officer detained for allegedly sharing critical messages, confirmed that he had died in state custody. Authorities offered no explanation or cause of death. Political detention in Venezuela now extends well beyond the context of protest. Following the 2024 presidential election, security forces carried out widespread home raids under Operación Tun Tun (Operation Knock Knock), often without warrants and targeting perceived critics. Some detainees were publicly exposed on state television before being transferred to intelligence facilities. Inside detention centers, former prisoners and monitors report medical neglect, abuse, and torture, with places like El Helicoide becoming symbols of repression and institutional decay. Human rights groups warn against interpreting the recent releases as a structural change. Previous cycles have followed a “revolving door” pattern, with detainees released only to be re-arrested months later. Without judicial reform, transparency, and guarantees of due process, releases remain fragile. For now, the gap between official discourse and lived reality persists. While the government speaks of reconciliation, hundreds of families continue to wait outside prisons — uncertain whether their loved ones are alive, when they might be freed, or whether freedom will truly mean safety.


Harassment and security threats forced the cancellation of a Pride-themed community event in Malaysia

A two-day wellness program intended for LGBTQ+ people in Hulu Langat, Selangor, Malaysia, was cancelled after participants and organizers received threats and harassment instigated by authorities who called for an investigation against those who normalize what they called “deviant sexual behavior.” The “Glamping with Pride” event was supposed to take place on January 17 and 18th organized by JEJAKA , a support group that promotes the health and rights of gay, bisexual, and queer men in Malaysia. Around 50 participants were expected to join the program aimed at improving health literacy and countering the stigma against HIV. But the online promotion of the event triggered protests from conservative segments of the population. At least five police reports were filed for allegedly violating cyber laws, particularly section 504 of the Penal Code for intentional insult with intent to provoke a breach of the peace and section 233 of the Communications and Multimedia Act for improper use of network facilities. Malaysia has a predominantly Muslim population.


In recent years, Muslim hardliners have pressed for stricter enforcement of Islamic teachings in governance. Local and religious authorities doubled down by issuing statements against the event. The Department of Islamic Development Malaysia (Jakim) said “stern action” is needed against activities that “threaten public peace.” Jakim would like to stress that any effort to normalise deviant sexual behaviour clearly contravenes Islamic principles and teachings and also goes against the nation’s moral values and legal framework. The authorities will not compromise with the organising of any event that is found to contravene Islamic teachings, legal provisions, and threatens public peace. Stern action will be taken under the law. Some community leaders have warned that holding the event could be an attempt to turn the glamping site “into a testing ground for deviant ideologies.” JEJAKA insisted that its activity posed no threat to the community. We reiterate that Glamping with Pride was a private, community-based health and well-being programme that included educational activities to improve health literacy and reduce stigma around issues such as HIV. Camping and recreational activities take place across the country every day.


LGBTQ+ people are no different in their desire to learn, gather and exist safely. It announced the cancellation of the event after being targeted with hurtful comments and online threats. This program was not cancelled because it was unlawful or otherwise, but because an environment was created in which reckless rhetoric, misinformation and fear-mongering made it unsafe for people to gather. When words are used irresponsibly, they carry consequences, and in this case, those consequences placed lives at risk. Zaid Ibrahim, a lawyer and former minister in the Prime Minister's Department for Legal Affairs and Judicial Reform, expressed concern over the actions taken by local authorities. I am concerned with the wide-ranging ban on LGBT-related activities ordered by His Highness the Sultan of Selangor, such as the Glamping Pride Malaysians surely have accepted that some of their top leaders are gay or have a mixture of sexual preferences. There are plenty of reports about their lifestyles, and society seems tolerant of them. Some even idolised them The question then is: are we more tolerant of such activities when indulged in by the elites, and come down hard on everyday people?


This is not the first time that authorities have initiated a probe against LGBTQ+ activities. In recent months, authorities also raided facilities for being allegedly “ gay-friendly .” Several civil society groups signed a statement reminding the public that having a different sexual orientation is normal. We reiterate that the existence of different sexual orientations, gender identities, gender expressions, and sex characteristics is a normal part of human diversity. We call the Federal and state agencies to end all vilification, demonisation, misinformation, and portrayal of LGBTQ people as threat to society, morality, culture and religion. Nalini Elumalai, ARTICLE 19’s senior Malaysia programme officer, urged authorities to end the state-sponsored intimidation targeting members of the LGBTQ+ community. These series of events signal a dangerous and systemic trend of state-sponsored intimidation, as well as the perpetuation of ‘hate speech’ against LGBTQI+ people without accountability. We must be clear that targeting minorities does not make Malaysia safer; it only emboldens prejudice, normalises discrimination, and forces a peaceful community further underground, while exacerbating an already restrictive climate of self-censorship.


Viral app ‘Are You Dead Yet?’ unveils the anxiety and pain of single Chinese youths

A newly developed Chinese App “Are You Dead Yet?” (死了麼?), designed for solitary-living people to check in regularly and auto-notify their emergency contacts, unexpectedly topped China’s Apple App Store in January 2026. Given the bluntness of the Chinese expression and the fact that the majority of downloaders are young people rather than the elderly, current affairs analysts have pointed out that the phenomenon reflects the anxiety of the rapidly growing number of “ empty-nest ” youths (空巢青年, kōng cháo qīng nián), a term for single young people who live alone. They are a key demographic in the development of what experts are calling the “ lonely economy .” The creativity of the App comes from its naming rather than its technology. Reportedly, it only took the three-person tech team less than a month to design and write the program, as the function of the App is simple: the users have to submit at least one emergency contact, set a check-in alarm and check-in regularly; once they miss two consecutive check-ins, the app automatically alerts their emergency contacts, suggesting they reach out to them.


Like other similar products in the market, the app was released for six months with few downloads until its eye-catching name caught social media users’ attention and became a hot topic in early January. It entered the top ten most downloaded Apps on the Chinese Apple App Store on January 10. Death is still considered a taboo in daily conversation among Chinese people, especially among the older generation. However, for the younger generation, instead of asking “Are you ok?” friends can greet each other with “Are you dead?” especially when times are challenging. Within days, the developers said that the massive number of newly registered users had pushed the App’s value to RMB 100 million (approximately USD 14.5 million), while the development cost was about RMB 1,000 (USD 145). Users have to pay RMB 8 (USD 1.2) for the download. Despite its popularity, on January 13, the official name of the App changed to “Demumu” to sound less negative, a move that could help prevent a takedown notice from cyber administration authorities.


Empty-nest youths Aside from the name, unlike other security apps designed to help elderly people living alone connect to emergency medical services, “Are You Dead Yet?” targets the younger generation. Reportedly, in 2021, there were 125 million solitary-living households in China, representing one-fourth of the 494 million total households. It was estimated that the total number of solitary living young singles was up to 92 million, far greater than the population of solitary-living elderly. The growing number of youth living alone has led to the emergence and spread of the online term “Empty-nest youth” (空巢青年) on social media in recent years. As a result of the rural-urban divide in economic and social development, many young people have to relocate to first- or second-tier cities for education or employment, far from their hometowns. Most of them have to live alone in small apartments and endure high-pressure study or workloads, without family companionship or social support. Chinese society expects young people to build their own nest and family; however, many young people’s “nests” remain empty without a spouse and offspring.


The number of registered marriages in 2024 fell 20 percent to a record low of 6.1 million. Although there was an 8.5 percent rebound in 2025 due to a series of pro-family policies, the downward trend is unlikely to reverse. The latest Chinese government statistic shows that the country’s birth rate in 2025 fell to 5.63 per 1,000 people, a record low since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, while its death rate rose to 8.04 per 1,000 people, which surpasses the death rate during the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown. Loneliness economy There are many reasons why young people are refraining from building a traditional family; it is a global phenomenon. When commenting on the App, a Chinese psychiatrist , Shi Yuxin, explained on Weibo that the young generation’s longing for autonomy has reached an unprecedented level, and that marriage implied compromise, responsibility, and the suppression of an individual’s choice and freedom. Solitary living allows individuals to control their lifestyles, how they spend money, time, and energy.


Moreover, particular to China, the culture of single-child families and the post-COVID-19 pessimism triggered by the pandemic lockdown and the economic downturn, deters the young generation from settling down. The Chinese psychiatrist said : 高压生活让人们害怕亲密关系中的冲突、内耗与承诺压力，选择独处成了规避情感风险的“安全策略”。 High-pressure lifestyles make people apprehensive about conflicts, emotional drain, and commitment pressures within intimate relationships, leading many to choose solitude as a ‘safe strategy’ to avoid emotional risks. At the same time, empty-nest youths still need companionship, care, and social support. A 2022 study found that among young women who lived alone, 42.9 percent felt insecure at night because they felt the security in residential areas was inadequate. Meanwhile, 17.8 percent of solitary living youths found themselves lacking support when they had accidents or were sick. A Chinese blogger, Wen Xiujia, also pointed out that “Are You Dead Yet?” appealed to the psychology of the insecure youths, who don’t want to disturb others but wish that someone would pay attention to them when they are in need.


He claims that conventional Chinese families do not cater to such emotional needs: “死了么”的每日签到机制，恰好提供了一种“低打扰式安全保障”：无需频繁联系，不必刻意寒暄，仅用一个简单操作，就为独居生活加上一道数字保险。这种“不麻烦别人，也能被看见”的设计，精准击中了现代青年的社交痛点，也让8元定价成为一种“买个心安”的情感消费。 The daily check-in feature of ‘Are You Dead Yet?’ offers a form of ‘low-interruption safety assurance’: there is no frequent contact or polite, ritualistic greeting, just a simple click to add a layer of digital security to solo living. This design, which allows users to ‘be seen without bothering others,’ precisely addresses the pain spots of contemporary young people in their social life. The RMB 8 price tag serves as an emotional consumption for the ‘peace of mind.’ Such anxieties and needs of the solitary living population have driven the expansion of the “ loneliness economy , ” including pet businesses, escort services, online counselling, serviced apartments, and more. According to local media reports, the loneliness economy sector contributed RMB 7.92 trillion (USD 1.13 trillion) to the country’s GDP in 2025. However, as some critics have pointed out , this kind of “loneliness” is a form of alienation caused by policies that shrink public spaces, long working hours, and a media technology that creates a superficial sense of sociality that connects people to consumption and ideological tribes rather than substantial in-person connections.


China is notorious for its 996 work system : 9 am to 9 pm, 6 days a week, and it is customary for employers to use messaging apps to assign work tasks during non-working hours and holidays. A video blogger on Weibo, Pi Xiu’s Perspective, urged his audience not to take the App as a dark joke, but to see its users as real people: 你以为下载的人都是猎奇？其实他们的心态复杂到离谱👇 有人用荒诞对抗焦虑，加班到深夜打开APP，看到“熬夜可能活不过60”的预警，吓得立刻预约体检🏥 有人在写十年后给家人的留言时，边写边哭，突然反思自己是不是太忙了，忙到忘了好好生活❤ 还有人更扎心，连紧急联系人都不知道填谁，下载只是为了求个“至少有人知晓”的心理慰藉😔 Do you think people download the App out of curiosity? In reality, their mindsets are very complicated: Some combat anxiety with absurdity — working late into the night, they open the APP and see a warning, ‘Staying up late may shorten your life to less than 60.’ Terrified, they immediately book a medical checkup.🏥 Others weep while writing letters to their families ten years from now, as they start reflecting: Have I so busy that I have forgotten about living a good life? ❤ Others face a deeper pain — having difficulties to name an emergency contact, they download the APP merely for the psychological comfort of knowing ‘at least someone will know.’ 😔


How the series ‘The Eternaut’ revived searches for the disappeared in Argentina

Breaking the term “eternauta” down into “eter,” evoking eternity or a transcendence of death, and “nauta,” a traveler or navigator, you get “eternal traveler.” In the 1957 Argentine comic strip “ El Eternauta ,” by writer Héctor Germán Oesterheld , the eponymous traveler is Juan Salvo, a character who, far from being a traditional superhero, experiences an unfathomable tragedy. Nearly 70 years after its publication, the tale has been turned into a Netflix series starring Ricardo Darín — one of Argentina's most celebrated actors — as the protagonist. The adaptation incorporates new themes while also respecting the original’s plot structure. Meanwhile, the masks its characters use for their survival appeared in protests against the government of Javier Milei in 2025. Story aside, Oesterheld’s personal history and that of his family have also been gaining attention. The author, his four daughters and two sons-in-law disappeared at the hands of the civil-military dictatorship in Argentina (1976–1983) , and two of the Oesterheld daughters were pregnant at the time of their abduction.


The series sent shockwaves that reignited searches for identity. With hundreds of babies and children having been kidnapped from their families, and fates of all kinds awaiting the victims — some were adopted by military personnel, some by civilians — they grew up not knowing their true origins. Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo (Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo), a nonprofit organization founded in 1977, searches for those babies and children taken by the dictatorship. The organization takes identity inquiries and reports of possible abductions, but people also contact them if they are having doubts about their own background. During the period between the release of the series and May 2025, the number of people seeking to learn about their identity increased sixfold , and those contributing information about possible grandchildren being sought tripled . In the wake of the series’s success, relatives have organized and taken action by posting flyers on top of publicity posters for the production featuring photographs of Oesterheld and his four daughters, who are still missing.


H.I.J.O.S. , an organization made up of children of the victims, shared the following post on social media: Are you watching The Eternaut? If so, and you were born in November 1976, or between November 1977 and January 1978, and you have doubts about your identity or that of someone born at those times, contact @abuelasdifusion Photo by Kaloian Santos — H.I.J.O.S. Capital (@hijos_capital) May 3, 2025 Where is Oesterheld? “ Where is Oesterheld ?” This question went viral and transformed into a slogan after the series debuted. The whereabouts of Oesterheld , his daughters, his sons-in-law and the grandchildren his daughters were pregnant with are still unknown nearly 42 years after the end of the dictatorship in Argentina, the same fate faced by thousands of people in the country. Estimates of the number of disappeared people range up to 30,000 , according to human rights organizations. And the Parque de la Memoria victims registry has only collected information on 8,948 victims so far.


As in other countries in the Southern Cone that had dictatorships between 1960 and 1980, government-led repression during the last military dictatorship in Argentina was characterized by forced disappearance as a systematic means to exterminate political activists, union members, and students, only a fraction of whom were members of armed organizations . In the course of state-sanctioned terrorism, multiple methods were used to carry out the forced disappearances, one of them being death flights , in which people were thrown from airplanes into the River Plate. Although the country carried out its Trial of the Juntas — the 1985 judicial process that sentenced some of the dictatorship’s repressors — most disappeared people have not been found, as is the case with the Oesterhelds . The Oesterhelds Héctor Germán Oesterheld was born in Buenos Aires in 1919 and was abducted in 1977, one year after the start of Argentina’s military dictatorship. He was a screenwriter, author and journalist who became a pioneer and leading figure in modern comics . He was also a political activist, joining the Montoneros guerrilla group.


Described by his wife , Elsa Sánchez, as a “freethinker of the left with an overwhelming intelligence,” his keen social and political observations of Argentine reality and all its facets in his life are conveyed in the original comic. Oesterheld grew more committed to the political struggle in the 1970s . At that time, he created a new version of “El Eternauta,” which he finished writing while in hiding. That activism cost him his life. In their testimonies, survivors stated that, despite the tragedy and his physical deterioration, he always preserved his dignity and brilliance in his work. Like him, his four daughters, also members of the Montoneros, were abducted. Two of them, Diana and Marina, were pregnant at the time. Diana was due to give birth in November 1976, and Marina between December 1977 and January 1978. Fernando Araldi Oesterheld, Diana’s first child, was one year old when his parents were abducted.


In 2010, the body of his father, Raúl, was identified by the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team in Cementerio del Norte , a cemetery in the city of San Miguel de Tucumán. Neither his mother nor the baby she was carrying at the time of her abduction has been found. When his family was abducted, Fernando was left in an orphanage until his paternal grandparents recovered him. No one saves themselves alone: Mothers, Grandmothers, H.I.J.O.S. Elsa Sánchez de Oesterheld , the writer’s widow, searched for her daughters and grandchildren until her death in 2015; she was a member of the Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo . She joined the group after other grandmothers approached her and joined her search. She has a quote published on the Abuelas website : “I am fighting for my grandchildren to know the truth. That is why I do not speak of restitution, but of the right to identity.” The Abuelas were not the only organization founded as a result of Argentina’s tragedy and the fight of the relatives of state terrorism victims.


Also in 1977, mothers searching for their children met in the same Plaza de Mayo located in front of the Casa Rosada, the presidential palace. They exchanged information and eventually founded the organization Madres de Plaza de Mayo (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo), taking as their symbol a white cloth diaper worn as a headscarf. Years later, in 1995, an organization made up of the third generation of relatives emerged: H.I.J.O.S. The acronym translates to Sons and Daughters for Identity and Justice Against Forgetting and Silence. So far, the Abuelas have found 140 grandchildren since their search began. The most recent recovery of a grandchild was announced on July 7, 2025, the first resolved case since the series “The Eternaut” was released. @abuelasdifusion would like to announce #Nieto140, the first since the debut of the series The Eternaut The search continues for all the siblings yet to be found If you were born between 1975 and 1983 and you have doubts about your identity, come to us.


Contribute information if you have it Photo by @kalofotograma — H.I.J.O.S. Capital (@hijos_capital) July 8, 2025 The organization continues its work, looking for people born between 1975 and 1983 who may be questioning their identity and origin. The two Oesterheld children are among nearly 300 who have not been recovered. At the same time, the work of Argentina’s National Genetic Data Bank, essential for its provision of testing to reestablish identities, is threatened by cuts to scientific research funding under the current government. The Abuelas and other organizations are calling for public policy to be maintained in order to preserve memory as a countermeasure against state terrorism. Fifteen days after “The Eternaut” series debuted, Manuel Gonçalves Granada , an Abuelas board member and a missing grandson recovered in 1995 (case number 57 ), told Infobae that “it gives them hope and joy to see the mechanisms the Abuelas built reviving because of the series.” “The increase in inquiries creates enormous hope for finding the next grandchild, which is what we work for and what the Abuelas fight for every day,” he said.


Pakistan’s Aafia Siddiqui and the elusive truth in a landscape of politicized narratives

The story of Dr. Aafia Siddiqui , a Pakistani neuroscientist educated in the United States, has remained an open wound for Pakistan for over two decades. Aaafia gained international attention after her 2010 conviction in the United States and is now serving an 86-year prison sentence in Texas for attempted murder and other felonies. The mystery surrounding her treatment persists because its core facts have never faced transparent, international scrutiny. Instead, the United States and Pakistan offer conflicting narratives regarding her disappearance in 2003 and her reappearance in US custody in 2008. In the gap between these two versions, public trust has drained away. The 2008 Incident and the US Verdict The official United States version of events rests on a single afternoon in July 2008. According to court records , Afghan police detained Siddiqui in Ghazni, Afghanistan, allegedly finding documents related to explosives. During questioning by US personnel, officials claim she grabbed an unsecured M4 rifle and opened fire. No one was hit, but Siddiqui was s hot in the torso by US forces during the scuffle.


She was subsequently extradited to New York, where a federal jury convicted her in 2010 on charges tied only to that encounter. Notably, she was not convicted of terrorism or membership in Al-Qaeda , but specifically for the attempted murder of US personnel during that encounter. She was sentenced to 86 years in prison. The disputed timeline: 2003–2008 What the legal record fails to address is the question that defines the case: Where was Siddiqui for five years ? Siddiqui testified that she was abducted in Karachi in 2003 by Pakistani security forces and vanished into secret “black site” custody. Her three young children disappeared with her ; while one later resurfaced, the fate of the others remains a point of deep contention. Journalists and rights advocates, including those at The Guardian, have argued she was held in unacknowledged detention, possibly at the Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan. Former detainees spoke of a “Grey Lady of Bagram” whose screams haunted the facility, though this connection has never been proven in court or examined by an independent inquiry .


Read More: Pakistan: Dr. Aafia Siddiqui Case – A Veiled Mystery The evidence surrounding that 2008 shooting has long drawn skepticism from independent observers. Forensic reports noted a lack of gunshot residue on Siddiqui’s hands, no fingerprints on the weapon, and no bullet holes or injuries to the alleged targets despite the “close range” nature of the struggle. Amnesty International, which monitored the trial, flagged serious concerns regarding its fairness and the court’s refusal to investigate the “missing years.” While these doubts do not legally overturn the verdict, they highlight the disparity between the thinness of the tested evidence and the extraordinary weight of her nearly century-long sentence. Pakistan’s complicity and silence The role of Pakistan sits at the center of this unresolved history. Rights groups, including the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, have stated there is sufficient evidence to believe Siddiqui and her children were apprehended by Pakistani intelligence agencies in 2003. Claims frequently surface that she was handed over to the US for “bounty money” — a practice documented by lawyers like Clive Stafford Smith , who noted that elements within Pakistan’s security apparatus profited from “extraordinary renditions” during the height of US financial aid to the region.


To date, Pakistan has neither proven these claims nor denied them with evidence. The state exists in a contradiction : it expresses public sympathy for “the daughter of the nation,” while maintaining a tactical silence regarding the specific mechanics of her 2003 disappearance. Current status and allegations of abuse The human cost of this unresolved history is visible today. Siddiqui remains held at Federal Medical Center (FMC) Carswell in Texas. Supporters report that she is frequently denied medical care, not allowed to freely practice her religion, and has faced abuse . Her current lawyer, Clive Stafford Smith, has leveled harrowing allegations , stating in late 2023 that she has been subjected to physical and sexual abuse by guards and inmates. While the US insists the legal matter is settled, the Pakistani judiciary has begun to lose patience with its own government’s inaction. Between July 2025 and early 2026, the Islamabad High Court repeatedly rebuked Pakistani officials for using the case as a symbolic political tool rather than pursuing a sustained legal strategy.


The judges questioned why no international forum has been engaged if the state truly believes she was victimized. These questions point inward. Pakistan demands justice abroad while avoiding inquiry at home. Power versus accountability The case endures because it exposes how power shields itself. The United States treats the 2010 verdict as the final word, effectively “fencing off” the uncomfortable questions of secret detention. Pakistan treats the case as a political campaign , useful for populist speeches, but too dangerous for actual subpoenas. Neither state has allowed a full accounting of the five missing years. Neither has accepted the risk that the truth might embarrass institutions. Ultimately, the public is left with fragments : a conviction based on a disputed moment, a vanished decade , and a woman who became a global symbol only because the truth was deemed too embarrassing for the institutions involved to admit. As legal experts like the late Ramsey Clark once noted , the case remains one of the most troubling examples of how the law can be used to obscure, rather than reveal, the truth. Silence protects power. Inquiry serves the law.


Women and young girls bear the brunt of Mali’s worsening security crisis

Since 2012, Mali has been in security turmoil with the emergence and expansion of several radical non-State armed groups: Jamāʿat Nuṣrat al-Islām wal-Muslimīn (JNIM), Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI), Katiba Macina , Al Mourabitoun , and the Islamic State Sahel Province (EIGS). These groups demand the independence and empowerment of territories in the northern region of the country, using targeted violent action to weaken and overthrow the powers that be. The current state of affairs has led to ongoing security disruptions across Mali and other Central Sahel countries . Today, the security situation in Mali, a member of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) that withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on January 28, 2024, has been marked by clashes between the Malian armed forces and their allies and non-State armed groups. This situation continues to disproportionately affect the civilian population, especially women and girls who are often victims of sexual violence.


According to the United Nations Population Fund’s (UNFPA) May 2025 Mali Situation Report , the armed groups’ attacks also result in forced marriages and considerably limit access to essential sexual and reproductive health and protection services. In the March 2025 report , UNFPA explains: In March 2025, armed groups intensified their activities, resulting in violent clashes, which led to significant population displacement. Women and girls continue to bear the brunt of this violence, with their rights and safety increasingly at risk. What’s more, the impact of the U.S. budget cuts makes these women and girls more vulnerable. The report continues: However, the sudden termination of U.S. funding has caused the cessation of key humanitarian programmes, leaving thousands stranded without critical life-saving assistance, further exacerbating the vulnerabilities of populations already affected by ongoing conflicts. The impact has been particularly severe on GBV (gender-based violence) services, with over 191,000 people losing access to essential protection, and SRH services, including maternal care and family planning, which has left over 200,000 people at risk. In addition to the violence, Mali has also suffered profound socioeconomic upheaval due in part to the massive population displacement.


Although these challenges affect women and children, they are often understated in official reports. Widely overlooked sexual violence In Mali, in June 2025, more than 402,000 people were displaced, 58 percent of whom were women and girls. The 2024 United Nations Secretary General’s Report on Conflict-related Sexual Violence documents cases of rape, forced marriage, abduction, and sexual slavery that armed groups committed in the Gao, Ménaka (east-central), Kayes (southwest), Mopti, Ségou (south-central), and Tombouctou (north) regions, illustrating the scale and severity of these violations. In rural areas and internally displaced persons camps, testimonies of sexual exploitation, harassment, and forced marriages are building up. Non-State armed groups exploit vulnerable communities, instilling a climate of fear and submission. International institutions have noted that this humanitarian crisis profoundly affects women and girls. In 2025, Amadou, a Malian civil society member, was the victim of an armed robbery and a witness to the rape of women committed by armed men. He told Global Voices: C'état un vendredi soir, vers 19h, des bandits armés ont pris d’assaut notre bus, sans qu’aucun secours n’arrive. Nous avons tout de suite compris qu’il s’agissait d’un braquage.


Nous avons été tous dépouillés, et une dizaine de femmes ont été violées. La terreur et le désespoir de cette nuit resteront à jamais gravés dans ma mémoire. Je n’oublierai jamais leurs cris, leurs larmes, et ce sentiment d’impuissance totale. Cette nuit m’a montré combien il est urgent de protéger les femmes et de briser le silence face à la violence. It was around 7 pm on a Friday evening when armed men stormed our bus, and no help came. We immediately realized this was an armed robbery. They robbed us of everything and raped ten or so women. The terror and despair on that night will be forever etched in my mind. I will never forget their screams, their tears, or that feeling of complete helplessness. That night showed me how urgent it is to protect women and break the silence on this violence. As it is rooted in tradition, forced marriage is commonplace, especially in areas where poverty and insecurity limit opportunities. In this country, one in two girls is married before the age of 18.


This phenomenon has severe consequences: interruption to education, early pregnancies, increased domestic violence, and damage to young girls’ physical and mental health. Read: Mali’s rural communities mobilize against child marriage in defense of girls’ futures Women’s resilience in dark times Despite these difficult circumstances, several Malian women come together locally to break the silence. Various women’s community associations have created safe spaces, run awareness-raising campaigns, and support survivors. These initiatives are forms of resistance and resilience in the face of systemic violence. However, these local organizations are severely under-resourced, and fragilities remain in their actions, given the immense needs. Alimata Traore, President of the Convergence of Rural Women for Food Sovereignty (COFERSA) in Mali, explained: Les femmes restent le premier groupe social discriminé. Elles ont moins accès à la représentation politique, aux postes de pouvoir économique, à l’éducation et elles sont surtout les premières victimes de la pauvreté. Women remain the most discriminated against social group. They have less access to education, political representation, positions of economic power, and are the primary victims of poverty.


The elimination of violence, access to reproductive health services, justice for sexual violence victims, and education for girls remain crucial. Women and girls from Mali are at the crux of these crises. Although they are victims of a conflict through no fault of their own, they are also beacons of hope and change. Amadou added: Certes, nous avons été dépouillés, mais ce sont les femmes qui ont survécu à l’horreur et dont la sécurité et la dignité restent profondément mises en péril. Il est urgent que les initiatives locales soient soutenues, et que les autorités écoutent les voix des femmes et leur donne les moyens d’agir pour se protéger. Of course, the bandits robbed us, but the women are the ones who survived these horrors and whose security and dignity remain deeply threatened. It is imperative that local initiatives be supported and that the authorities listen to women and empower them to protect themselves. The protection of women and girls shouldn’t be optional, but an absolute priority for sustainable peace in Mali. Read our special coverage: Mali: National reconstruction under military leadership


The upcoming election will determine the future of Bangladesh’s democracy and reform agenda

Eighteen months after students and youth took to the streets to topple former President Sheikh Hasina’s increasingly autocratic regime, Bangladesh now faces what Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus describes as a “ century-defining moment .” When Chief Election Commissioner AMM Nasir Uddin announced the schedule for Bangladesh’s 13th national parliamentary election on December 12, 2025, he framed it as a “historic role in advancing the country’s democratic journey.” The interim government of Bangladesh described this election as “ a test the country cannot afford to fail ,” noting that “this opportunity for a democratic transition has come at the cost of enormous sacrifices made by the youth.” Bangladesh, on February 12, will conduct what the European Union calls the “ biggest democratic process of 2026 ”; however, a referendum mechanism, a digital transformation, and systematic gender marginalization expose the potentially shallow foundations of the country’s democratic renewal. The referendum paradox On February 12, voters will not simply elect representatives in Bangladesh’s 13th national parliamentary election ; they will also vote on constitutional reforms that Yunus claims will shape the country for the next hundred years.


Yet this dual mandate creates what might be called democracy’s Trojan horse — a referendum structure that appears democratic in form while potentially undermining democratic legitimacy in practice. According to the July Charter Implementation Order , voters will receive a pink ballot containing approximately 185 words of dense constitutional language covering four complex proposals. They must answer a single yes-or-no question: “Do you agree with the ‘July National Charter (Constitutional Reform) Implementation Order, 2025’ and the following reform proposals contained in the July Charter?” No detailed explanation appears on the ballot itself. No opportunity exists to approve some reforms while rejecting others. Citizens simply vote yes or no on the entire package. This approach transforms what should be deliberative democracy into what political scientists term “ plebiscitary democracy ”—a form in which citizens rubber-stamp elite decisions rather than engaging meaningfully with constitutional engineering. Furthermore, as revealed in National Consensus Commission data , only twelve of the thirty proposed reform areas achieved genuine consensus among political parties, yet Yunus claimed “overall agreement” on all thirty issues.


If voters approve the referendum but the elected Constitutional Reform Council fails to finalize amendments within 270 working days, then a Constitution Amendment Bill prepared by the unelected interim government automatically becomes law . Consequently, Bangladesh could see constitutional amendments drafted by an interim government — which has no electoral mandate — become binding on a democratically elected parliament simply because that parliament failed to complete its assigned task within an arbitrary timeline. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) described this mechanism as “wholly irrational, politically motivated, and absurd,” arguing that no bill can become law without passing through parliamentary procedures and receiving presidential confirmation. Meanwhile, Election Commissioner Abul Fazal Md. Sanaullah noted that mock exercises showed that each voter required seven to eight minutes to complete both ballots, yet the Election Commission’s current arrangements allow only 54 seconds per male voter and 65 seconds per female voter. Standing in queues for hours will discourage participation, especially among women, elderly citizens, and those with health issues. Some voters may simply leave without casting ballots, reducing turnout and weakening electoral legitimacy.


Additionally, concerns about state neutrality have emerged. Analysts have questioned whether the government can remain neutral when field-level officials — many with administrative or electoral responsibilities — have been mobilized to promote a “yes” vote through grassroots outreach. When the state itself appears partisan, even in the absence of explicit coercion, the perception of administrative pressure becomes difficult to avoid. Such perceptions could trigger legal challenges and post-referendum disputes that further destabilize Bangladesh’s fragile democratic transition. If the referendum succeeds, it binds an elected parliament to reforms it had a minimal role in crafting. If the referendum fails, government advisers warn that “fascism will return to Bangladesh.” Either outcome suggests that Bangladesh’s democratic transition rests on shakier foundations than revolutionary rhetoric would suggest. Digital democracy’s double edge When Bangladesh’s Election Commission banned physical campaign posters for the first time in electoral history, it effectively forced the 13th National Parliamentary Election into the digital realm. Most major campaigns have moved their center of gravity online, reshaping how candidates reach voters and how voters encounter politics.


Roughly 40 percent of voters are under the age of 37 , many with little memory of politics conducted exclusively through rallies, posters, and printed manifestos. For this generation, politics appears first on screens, compressed into short videos, graphic explainers, livestreamed speeches, and algorithm-driven feeds. The youth-based National Citizen Party emerged after the 2024 student protests and has since made TikTok and Instagram key tools for engagement, reshaping protest momentum into brief, emotionally resonant visuals designed to appeal to first-time voters. Similarly, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party has leaned heavily into interactive online platforms, inviting voters to respond directly to policy proposals, while Jamaat-e-Islami , a right-leaning Islamist party, has experimented with crowdsourcing manifesto ideas through dedicated websites. Despite impressive headline figures, large segments of Bangladesh’s population remain outside the digital ecosystem. Women, older voters, rural residents, and low-income groups are disproportionately represented among those left offline or semi-connected. Can this shift online represent a genuine structural transformation toward youth agency and merit-based politics, while excluding millions who cannot participate in online political discourse?


Digital platforms enable smaller parties to mobilize constituencies at minimal cost; however, research reveals that sophisticated bot networks and coordinated propaganda campaigns are already working to shape Bangladesh’s electoral outcomes. The gender exclusion test Despite comprising over 50 percent of the population and consistently demonstrating higher voter turnout in competitive elections, women account for only 4.22 percent of candidates in the 2026 election, compared to 6.6 percent of total candidates in the 2024 elections . Of 2,580 nomination papers submitted by candidates from 51 political parties and independents, only 109 came from women — 72 from political parties and 37 from independents. Based on currently available figures, approximately 2,000 candidates will run in 298 constituencies, with the final number of women candidates still unconfirmed, but remaining below 5 percent, representing the lowest women’s candidacy rate since 1991 . Bangladesh Nationalist Party nominated only 10 women among 287 candidates — a mere 3.5 percent that falls short of even the modest 5 percent target the party itself proposed during National Consensus Commission talks. Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami’s record proves even worse.


After entering electoral alliances, the party is fielding candidates in more than 200 constituencies, yet not a single nominee is a woman. This comes despite claiming 43 percent of their members are women and announcing plans to establish “the world’s largest women’s university” by merging Bangladesh’s Eden College and Begum Badrunnesa College. Recent comments from the leadership of the party on the position of women created multiple controversies . Even the youth-led National Citizen Party, teeming with revolutionary youth leaders with a strong female participation, nominated only three women among 47 constituencies — around 7 percent. If political parties cannot honor basic inclusion commitments in candidate selection, critics ask why anyone should believe they will implement complex constitutional amendments once elected and insulated from immediate accountability. As Bangladesh approaches these three tests — the referendum paradox, the double-edged nature of digital democracy, and gender exclusion — they converge to reveal a sobering reality. Together, these will determine whether Bangladesh’s July 2024 uprising translates into genuine democratic consolidation or merely produces what political scientists call “electoral authoritarianism” with a revolutionary facade.


The social media battlefield: Political campaigns in Bangladesh’s national elections

As Bangladesh heads toward its 13th National Parliamentary Election on February 12, 2026, campaigning is moving beyond street processions and public rallies into the digital sphere. Social media, especially Facebook, TikTok, X (formerly Twitter), and YouTube, has emerged as a key arena where political messages are crafted, debated, and pushed to wider audiences. What was once considered an informal extension of political communication has now evolved into a core campaign tool, reflecting broader changes in voter engagement and media consumption across the country, mostly via accessible mobile phones. According to the “state of digital” in Bangladesh in 2026 report, Bangladesh had 186 million active mobile connections, about 105 percent of the population. The same report mentions that 82.8 million people, or 47 percent of people, use the internet, and 64 million use social media, mostly Facebook, TikTok, and YouTube. Read more: The upcoming election will determine the future of Bangladesh’s democracy and reform agenda Social media takes center stage as campaign strategy Political parties and candidates in Bangladesh are now heavily investing in online outreach.


According to a report by the Daily Sun , social media campaigning has become a key component of election strategy, complementing traditional grassroots mobilization. The report mentions that on Facebook, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) Chairman Tarique Rahman has 5.6 million followers. Bangladesh Jamat-e-Islami Party’s Ameer Shafiqur Rahman has 2.3 million followers, and National Citizen Party (NCP) Convener Nahid Islam has 1.2 million followers on Facebook. Candidates routinely use videos, live streams, and short posts to communicate directly with voters across constituencies. Political parties and candidates are also using innovative online campaign sites, campaign songs , games, and other interactive content to engage the voters of different constituencies. With millions of Bangladeshis active online, especially the 39 percent of the population aged 13–34, platforms such as Facebook and TikTok play an increasingly important role in shaping political awareness. Digital campaigning is no longer peripheral; it has become central to how political messages are delivered and received.


Rules for online campaigning In response to the expanding influence of social media, the Bangladesh Election Commission (EC) has introduced regulations aimed at limiting digital misuse during election periods. Candidates are required to submit details of their official social media accounts in advance, and content that violates the electoral code of conduct is prohibited. A Daily Sun summary of the election guidelines notes that spreading unverified or harmful information online, including disinformation and personal attacks, may result in penalties. The rules also explicitly ban the use of artificial intelligence (AI) to distort facts, manipulate images or videos, or mislead voters. The regulations are intended to prevent online campaigning from undermining electoral fairness and transparency. Misinformation and AI-generated content Despite these safeguards, misinformation and digitally manipulated content spiked amid concerns about digital campaigns. In an in-depth fact-check, The Daily Star identified nearly 97 pieces of AI-generated content circulating on Facebook ahead of the election. Many of these posts, including deepfakes and other manipulated videos, spread widely and were used to tilt political narratives in favor of competing party camps.


A recent AFP fact-checking report also confirms the use of AI-generated content to support various political parties. Meanwhile, data released by fact-checking group Rumor Scanner — reported by Bangla Daily Prothom Alo — found 268 instances of misinformation spreading across online platforms in a single month, with a large share related to political topics. Facebook hosted most of these misleading posts. These patterns illustrate how social media, while democratizing access to information, can also become a vector for deceptive political messaging. Local political voices on social media abuse Political actors themselves have begun to publicly address the misuse of social media. In a recent Prothom Alo coverage , Mahdi Amin, spokesperson for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), accused rival groups of spreading widespread misinformation and character-assassination campaigns online ahead of the election. Reports also show how bot-driven waves of fake “haha” post reactions are used to target Facebook posts by activists and politicians across Jamaat, BNP, Awami League, and NCP circles, illustrating how bought engagement distorts public perception and exploits Facebook’s algorithm to suppress the reach of specific posts.


Such incidents capture broader concerns among local political communities about the effects of online campaigns on voter perception and political stability. At the same time, social media platforms are taking steps to address the situation. TikTok Bangladesh has launched an “Election Information Center” in partnership with the Election Commission, aiming to provide users with official election updates. The move reflects how platforms are trying to offset misinformation by promoting verified information. Why this matters to global audiences Bangladesh’s experience mirrors a broader global pattern: social media has evolved from a simple communication tool into a political battleground where narratives are quickly built and amplified to a targeted audience. As Bangladeshi political parties fight for Gen‑Z attention, experimenting with viral content on social media, and confronting misinformation in parallel with street politics, legacy media are used less and less . For international audiences, examining how digital platforms shape elections in Bangladesh offers a window into the changing nature of political participation and the pressures democracies face when technological change moves faster than oversight.


Iran’s internet blackout as media event: Networks, algorithms, and the politics of visibility

What began on December 27, 2025, as coordinated strikes in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar rapidly expanded into nationwide demonstrations across more than 30 provinces. As the unrest grew, Iranian authorities imposed a total internet shutdown on January 8 2026, which NetBlocks confirmed, as a near-complete collapse of connectivity , affecting mobile networks, fixed-line services, and international gateways, continued for several days until limited access began returning on January 23. As limited access returns , videos and testimonies are beginning to reveal a pattern of state violence that the UN Human Rights Council has already described as “ unprecedented in its scope and brutality .” According to a TIME Magazine report citing anonymous state officials, the state’s crackdown could have resulted in over 30,000 deaths. Meanwhile, US-based Iranian human rights NGO, HRANA reports at least 41,800, and possibly up to 50,000, arrests across more than 400 cities, with detainees held in overcrowded facilities where they face heightened risks of torture, forced confessions, and summary execution.


A vacuum filled by regime-aligned voices abroad As in earlier shutdowns in November 2019 and during the Woman, Life, Freedom movement , the blackout also reshaped who could speak for Iranians abroad. With people inside the country cut off, a familiar constellation of regime defenders and state-aligned commentators stepped into the vacuum, influencing how the uprising was interpreted internationally. Reporting has documented protests against figures such as Trita Parsi , founder of NIAC and co-founder of the Quincy Institute , whose public appearances have drawn accusations from demonstrators that they advance narratives sympathetic to Tehran. Similar concerns have surfaced in Canada, where the Iranian Canadian Congress (ICC) has been criticized by diaspora activists for positions they argue align too closely with those of the Islamic Republic. Revealing evidence of this dynamic surfaced in a recent episode of the Iranian state‑aligned program Dialogue , where two regime‑affiliated intellectuals, Foad Izadi and Bijan Abdolkarimi, discussed building an “Iran lobby” in the United States. Izadi, a frequent state media surrogate who has advocated targeting U.S. troops , and Abdolkarimi, a philosophy professor who has called the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ( IRGC) Iran’s “only hope ,” debated the structure of such a lobby and explicitly named Trita Parsi and NIAC.


Izadi stressed that it must be an Iran lobby, not an Iranian lobby, a distinction that expands the imagined network beyond nationality and helps explain how seemingly independent journalists or analysts can be treated as potential conduits for state narratives. Citing remarks attributed to former president Hassan Rouhani (“We want an Iranian lobby”), they compared this model to Israeli and Arab lobbying networks. The significance lies in how the Islamic Republic’s own intellectual class conceptualizes diaspora influence and situates NIAC and Parsi within that architecture, revealing how state ‑ aligned voices abroad help manage narratives when voices inside Iran are silenced. A systematic playbook of narrative manipulation The narratives promoted by these actors followed a consistent playbook. At the center of this playbook is the deliberate manufacturing of doubt . Rather than defending the regime’s actions outright, these actors work to destabilize the very possibility of verification: questioning videos, dismissing eyewitnesses, demanding impossible standards of proof, and amplifying minor ambiguities as if they invalidate overwhelming evidence. This strategy mirrors well‑documented disinformation techniques used in other contexts, where the goal is not to persuade audiences of a single narrative but to erode confidence in any account that contradicts the state.


As the examples below illustrate, this engineered uncertainty becomes the foundation on which all other narrative tactics operate. They referred to the protesters as “rioters” and attempted to recast a nationwide political revolt as a narrow economic grievance , but extensive reporting and UN findings show the uprising was driven by decades of repression, not sanctions. They claimed protesters were foreign-manipulated , yet every credible investigation confirms the movement’s domestic roots . They warned that international support would trigger war or “ another Syria ,” a fear-based argument contradicted by evidence that the only large-scale violence came from the state itself . They demanded impossible levels of proof for every report of killings while accepting official denials without scrutiny , even though independent forensic analysis, geolocated videos, and hospital records have verified mass casualties. They, including both Iranian defenders of the regime and non‑Iranians who present themselves as defenders of “Iran,” minimized the crackdown by recasting it as necessary “security operations,” and insisting on police casualty figures that bear no comparison to the thousands of documented deaths and injuries .


They tried to muddy the record by claiming videos were “fake,” “old,” or AI-generated and insisting victims’ identities were unverifiable, tactics designed to manufacture doubt even though independent verification and families’ own documentation consistently confirmed both the footage and the names as authenti c . When the extent of the massacre became undeniable, the narrative shifted: the killings were suddenly attributed to foreign agents and shadowy armed groups . But countless videos filmed by ordinary Iranians show uniformed state forces attacking unarmed civilians. By characterizing reporting on state violence as “ psychological warfare ” or foreign manipulation, they introduced doubt around verified accounts, despite the convergence of independent reporting, citizen footage, and human rights investigations. They argued the regime remained stable and legitimate , even as mass participation in recurrent uprisings, boycotts, polls and elite fractures revealed a profound legitimacy crisis . They blamed sanctions for Iran’s economic collapse, ignoring extensive research showing corruption, IRGC monopolies, and mismanagement as central drivers. They portray those executed or targeted by the regime as violent actors or foreign assets , ISIS militants, MEK members, Kurdish separatists, even alleged Israeli agents , despite UN and NGO documentation of sham trials, forced confessions, and political executions .


They claimed information wasn’t being suppressed and argued the internet was shut down only to sever “rioters” from Western instigators , even as journalists were jailed and connectivity was deliberately cut to block reporting. They argued the opposition was weak because Iranians did not want change , overlooking decades of repression, infiltration, and civil-society destruction . They justified the crackdown by claiming protesters were killing security forces , but independent investigations show many of the so-called “killed Basij members ” were actually civilians whose families were coerced into labeling them Basij. Human Rights Watch documented cases where authorities conditioned the release of victims’ bodies on such forced declarations, concealing both victim identities and state violence. Pro-Pahlavi distortions and the Zionist frame Meanwhile, foreign-funded and diaspora outlets introduced distortions of their own. During the blackout, some recast the protests through a monarchist, pro-Pahlavi lens, an interpretive shift that mirrors patterns documented by Haaretz , which reported on coordinated influence efforts aimed at elevating Reza Pahlavi as the preferred opposition figure.


In this framing, “real Iranians” were often portrayed as Zionist-aligned or openly supportive of Israel’s intervention , a narrative that erased the country’s political diversity and ignored the long history of anti-imperial, anti-authoritarian struggle inside Iran. By presenting the opposition as uniformly pro-Israel, these networks inadvertently reinforced one of the Islamic Republic’s most effective propaganda lines: that the only alternative to the current system is a Western-backed, Zionist project. A media landscape primed to believe the regime This dynamic made it easy for the regime to gain credibility among global left-leaning audiences and human-rights activists unfamiliar with Iran’s internal landscape. In the post-Gaza media environment, where distrust of mainstream outlets was high and solidarity with Palestine had become a defining moral axis, the Islamic Republic’s long-standing posture as a defender of Palestine resonated strongly. When pro-Pahlavi voices cast dissenters as Zionist proxies, regime-aligned commentators positioned themselves as the only authentic anti-imperialist actors, even as the state carried out mass killings. For audiences without deep knowledge of Iran, this “regime vs. Zionists” binary appeared coherent, allowing the state’s narrative to circulate largely unchallenged during the blackout, through independent media, that independent activists tended to trust. The blackout sealed this imbalance.


With people inside Iran cut off from the internet, the only voices audible on global platforms were those with uninterrupted access: state broadcasters, official spokespeople, and well-resourced pro-Pahlavi networks. Their narratives dominated not because they reflected reality, but because no in-country uploads or testimonies could surface to counter them. Meanwhile, most Iranians in the diaspora, many of them immigrants without institutional media access or large platforms, were similarly sidelined. Their perspectives were drowned out by a small number of highly amplified actors whose visibility reflected resources and platform infrastructures rather than representativeness. The January blackout revealed that political power now operates through control of visibility as much as through force. By severing connectivity, the state decided whose suffering could be seen and whose testimony vanished before reaching the world. In the silence that followed, external actors, regime-aligned or foreign-funded, filled the void, allowing their narratives to harden into “truth” long before survivors could speak. In a landscape shaped by platforms and algorithms, the central question is no longer just what happened in Iran, but who had the power to make their version of events visible.


Nepali poet Mani Lohani on life, literature, and the world of poetry

Mani Lohani is a Nepali writer and television journalist who has been active for more than three decades in poetry and fiction. Originally from Nuwakot town in the Bagmati Province of central Nepal, he is widely recognized for exploring themes of love, life, human relationships, and the profound mysteries surrounding death in his writing. His notable works include the poetry collection Malami Saajh and the story collections Parast Prem and Nirbastra Man. His book Mrityuko Aghiltir earned a major national award for outstanding literary creation. Lohani has received several prestigious honors, including the Bhanumati Award, the Sarbottam Katha Award, the Banitashree Byathit Poetry Award, and the Sasiddhi Rastriy KalaShree Youth Award. His poems and stories have been translated into multiple languages and are included in school-level curricula in Nepal. Sangita Swechcha of Global Voices interviewed Mani Lohani via email to learn more about his decades-long journey as a writer and television journalist, his contributions to Nepali poetry and fiction, and his exploration of themes such as love, human relationships, and the mysteries of death.


Sangita Swechcha (SS): Over your decades-long career, how have your views on love, mysteries of death, and human relationships evolved in your writing? Mani Lohani (ML): The relationship between human beings and its ups and downs is a subject of my interest. If people around the world are under stress, it is because of relationships. Love is the main reason that makes human life energetic and happy. But love does not fall to everyone’s share. Because of people who are dissatisfied in love and relationships, various anarchic activities have increased in society. If society is to be made beautiful, everyone must live with love. Everyone deserves a pleasant relationship. I am writing with this focus. Love is both a human search and a satisfaction. In recent times, people are afflicted by fear of death. Death is not fear — it is a natural aspect of human life. A person who accepts death naturally can remain joyful. For the sake of building a joyful society, I am also writing about death and its mysteries. To find answers, I read books on death found in Eastern philosophy, which helped me understand death not as fear but as a natural process.


After being born, a human must die. If death is inevitable, why fear it? From birth itself, death is with us. But this certainty does not mean hopelessness. One can live joyfully and lovingly, be helpful to others, and proud of oneself. In my writings, I am advocating exactly this. Sangita Swechcha (SS): Your works range from poetry to fiction. How do you approach these genres differently, and what unique possibilities does each offer? Mani Lohani (ML): Poetry and story are different. In poetry, deep experiences of life are expressed in few words, whereas story is connected to society. Simply put, poetry concerns an individual’s mind, while story concerns the psychology of society. Poetry is like a mantra and can connect a person to meditation, whereas story is a practice of transforming society. However, readers do not have to understand poetry and story as I do. They are free to interpret stories and poems according to their own understanding and the pleasure they feel while reading. I write both stories and poems, aiming to communicate easily with the human mind.


While writing, I keep in mind readers who are more filled with knowledge and experience but cannot express it. I like to write their feelings in a way they themselves can understand. Sangita Swechcha (SS): How do you see contemporary Nepali poetry interacting with global literary trends, and what international influences resonate with your work? Mani Lohani (ML): In recent times, society has become a global village. A poem written in one corner of the world can easily be available elsewhere. For this reason, not only poetry but all human activity is becoming global. We poets in Nepal have given importance to translation to take our works to the global market. We are serious about ensuring good poems reach the world audience and have made various efforts. Through translation and literary activities, exchanges with world literature are taking place. Regarding international influence on my poetry, because I am connected to communication, I stay updated with national and international news and am influenced by events linked to human sensitivity. While reading great writers of world literature, I have found opportunities to learn from their writing and refine myself.