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-------------------------------- MODULE Zab --------------------------------- |
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EXTENDS Integers, FiniteSets, Sequences, Naturals, TLC |
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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\* The set of servers |
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CONSTANT Server |
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\* States of server |
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CONSTANTS LOOKING, FOLLOWING, LEADING |
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\* Zab states of server |
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CONSTANTS ELECTION, DISCOVERY, SYNCHRONIZATION, BROADCAST |
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\* Message types |
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CONSTANTS CEPOCH, NEWEPOCH, ACKEPOCH, NEWLEADER, ACKLD, COMMITLD, PROPOSE, ACK, COMMIT |
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\* [MaxTimeoutFailures, MaxTransactionNum, MaxEpoch, MaxRestarts] |
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CONSTANT Parameters |
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MAXEPOCH == 10 |
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NullPoint == CHOOSE p: p \notin Server |
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Quorums == |
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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\* Variables that all servers use. |
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VARIABLES state, \* State of server, in . |
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zabState, \* Current phase of server, in |
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\* . |
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acceptedEpoch, \* Epoch of the last LEADERINFO packet accepted, |
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\* namely f.p in paper. |
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currentEpoch, \* Epoch of the last NEWLEADER packet accepted, |
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\* namely f.a in paper. |
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history, \* History of servers: sequence of transactions, |
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\* containing: [zxid, value, ackSid, epoch]. |
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lastCommitted \* Maximum index and zxid known to be committed, |
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\* namely 'lastCommitted' in Leader. Starts from 0, |
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\* and increases monotonically before restarting. |
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\* Variables only used for leader. |
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VARIABLES learners, \* Set of servers leader connects. |
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cepochRecv, \* Set of learners leader has received CEPOCH from. |
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\* Set of record [sid, connected, epoch], |
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\* where epoch means f.p from followers. |
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ackeRecv, \* Set of learners leader has received ACKEPOCH from. |
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\* Set of record |
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\* [sid, connected, peerLastEpoch, peerHistory], |
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\* to record f.a and h(f) from followers. |
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ackldRecv, \* Set of learners leader has received ACKLD from. |
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\* Set of record [sid, connected]. |
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sendCounter \* Count of txns leader has broadcast. |
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\* Variables only used for follower. |
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VARIABLES connectInfo \* If follower has connected with leader. |
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\* If follower lost connection, then null. |
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\* Variable representing oracle of leader. |
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VARIABLE leaderOracle \* Current oracle. |
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\* Variables about network channel. |
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VARIABLE msgs \* Simulates network channel. |
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\* msgs[i][j] means the input buffer of server j |
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\* from server i. |
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\* Variables only used in verifying properties. |
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VARIABLES epochLeader, \* Set of leaders in every epoch. |
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proposalMsgsLog, \* Set of all broadcast messages. |
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violatedInvariants \* Check whether there are conditions |
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\* contrary to the facts. |
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\* Variable used for recording critical data, |
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\* to constrain state space or update values. |
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VARIABLE recorder \* Consists: members of Parameters and pc, values. |
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\* Form is record: |
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\* [pc, nTransaction, maxEpoch, nTimeout, nRestart, nClientRequest] |
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serverVars == <<state, zabState, acceptedEpoch, currentEpoch, |
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history, lastCommitted>> |
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leaderVars == <<learners, cepochRecv, ackeRecv, ackldRecv, |
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sendCounter>> |
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followerVars == connectInfo |
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electionVars == leaderOracle |
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msgVars == msgs |
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verifyVars == <<proposalMsgsLog, epochLeader, violatedInvariants>> |
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vars == <<serverVars, leaderVars, followerVars, electionVars, |
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msgVars, verifyVars, recorder>> |
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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\* Return the maximum value from the set S |
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Maximum(S) == IF S = THEN -1 |
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ELSE CHOOSE n \in S: \A m \in S: n >= m |
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\* Return the minimum value from the set S |
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Minimum(S) == IF S = THEN -1 |
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ELSE CHOOSE n \in S: \A m \in S: n <= m |
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\* Check server state |
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IsLeader(s) == state[s] = LEADING |
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IsFollower(s) == state[s] = FOLLOWING |
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IsLooking(s) == state[s] = LOOKING |
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\* Check if s is a quorum |
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IsQuorum(s) == s \in Quorums |
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IsMyLearner(i, j) == j \in learners[i] |
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IsMyLeader(i, j) == connectInfo[i] = j |
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HasNoLeader(i) == connectInfo[i] = NullPoint |
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HasLeader(i) == connectInfo[i] /= NullPoint |
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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\* FALSE: zxid1 <= zxid2; TRUE: zxid1 > zxid2 |
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ZxidCompare(zxid1, zxid2) == \/ zxid1[1] > zxid2[1] |
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\/ /\ zxid1[1] = zxid2[1] |
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/\ zxid1[2] > zxid2[2] |
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ZxidEqual(zxid1, zxid2) == zxid1[1] = zxid2[1] /\ zxid1[2] = zxid2[2] |
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TxnZxidEqual(txn, z) == txn.zxid[1] = z[1] /\ txn.zxid[2] = z[2] |
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TxnEqual(txn1, txn2) == /\ ZxidEqual(txn1.zxid, txn2.zxid) |
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/\ txn1.value = txn2.value |
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EpochPrecedeInTxn(txn1, txn2) == txn1.zxid[1] < txn2.zxid[1] |
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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\* Actions about recorder |
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GetParameter(p) == IF p \in DOMAIN Parameters THEN Parameters[p] ELSE 0 |
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GetRecorder(p) == IF p \in DOMAIN recorder THEN recorder[p] ELSE 0 |
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RecorderGetHelper(m) == (m :> recorder[m]) |
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RecorderIncHelper(m) == (m :> recorder[m] + 1) |
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RecorderIncTimeout == RecorderIncHelper("nTimeout") |
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RecorderGetTimeout == RecorderGetHelper("nTimeout") |
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RecorderIncRestart == RecorderIncHelper("nRestart") |
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RecorderGetRestart == RecorderGetHelper("nRestart") |
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RecorderSetTransactionNum(pc) == ("nTransaction" :> |
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IF pc[1] = "LeaderProcessRequest" THEN |
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LET s == CHOOSE i \in Server: |
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\A j \in Server: Len(history'[i]) >= Len(history'[j]) |
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IN Len(history'[s]) |
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ELSE recorder["nTransaction"]) |
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RecorderSetMaxEpoch(pc) == ("maxEpoch" :> |
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IF pc[1] = "LeaderProcessCEPOCH" THEN |
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LET s == CHOOSE i \in Server: |
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\A j \in Server: acceptedEpoch'[i] >= acceptedEpoch'[j] |
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IN acceptedEpoch'[s] |
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ELSE recorder["maxEpoch"]) |
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RecorderSetRequests(pc) == ("nClientRequest" :> |
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IF pc[1] = "LeaderProcessRequest" THEN |
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recorder["nClientRequest"] + 1 |
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ELSE recorder["nClientRequest"] ) |
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RecorderSetPc(pc) == ("pc" :> pc) |
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RecorderSetFailure(pc) == CASE pc[1] = "Timeout" -> RecorderIncTimeout @@ RecorderGetRestart |
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[] pc[1] = "LeaderTimeout" -> RecorderIncTimeout @@ RecorderGetRestart |
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[] pc[1] = "FollowerTimeout" -> RecorderIncTimeout @@ RecorderGetRestart |
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[] pc[1] = "Restart" -> RecorderIncTimeout @@ RecorderIncRestart |
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[] OTHER -> RecorderGetTimeout @@ RecorderGetRestart |
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UpdateRecorder(pc) == recorder' = RecorderSetFailure(pc) @@ RecorderSetTransactionNum(pc) |
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@@ RecorderSetMaxEpoch(pc) @@ RecorderSetPc(pc) |
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@@ RecorderSetRequests(pc) @@ recorder |
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UnchangeRecorder == UNCHANGED recorder |
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CheckParameterHelper(n, p, Comp(_,_)) == IF p \in DOMAIN Parameters |
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THEN Comp(n, Parameters[p]) |
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ELSE TRUE |
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CheckParameterLimit(n, p) == CheckParameterHelper(n, p, LAMBDA i, j: i < j) |
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CheckTimeout == CheckParameterLimit(recorder.nTimeout, "MaxTimeoutFailures") |
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CheckTransactionNum == CheckParameterLimit(recorder.nTransaction, "MaxTransactionNum") |
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CheckEpoch == CheckParameterLimit(recorder.maxEpoch, "MaxEpoch") |
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CheckRestart == /\ CheckTimeout |
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/\ CheckParameterLimit(recorder.nRestart, "MaxRestarts") |
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CheckStateConstraints == CheckTimeout /\ CheckTransactionNum /\ CheckEpoch /\ CheckRestart |
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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\* Actions about network |
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PendingCEPOCH(i, j) == /\ msgs[j][i] /= << >> |
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/\ msgs[j][i][1].mtype = CEPOCH |
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PendingNEWEPOCH(i, j) == /\ msgs[j][i] /= << >> |
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/\ msgs[j][i][1].mtype = NEWEPOCH |
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PendingACKEPOCH(i, j) == /\ msgs[j][i] /= << >> |
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/\ msgs[j][i][1].mtype = ACKEPOCH |
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PendingNEWLEADER(i, j) == /\ msgs[j][i] /= << >> |
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/\ msgs[j][i][1].mtype = NEWLEADER |
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PendingACKLD(i, j) == /\ msgs[j][i] /= << >> |
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/\ msgs[j][i][1].mtype = ACKLD |
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PendingCOMMITLD(i, j) == /\ msgs[j][i] /= << >> |
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/\ msgs[j][i][1].mtype = COMMITLD |
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PendingPROPOSE(i, j) == /\ msgs[j][i] /= << >> |
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/\ msgs[j][i][1].mtype = PROPOSE |
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PendingACK(i, j) == /\ msgs[j][i] /= << >> |
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/\ msgs[j][i][1].mtype = ACK |
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PendingCOMMIT(i, j) == /\ msgs[j][i] /= << >> |
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/\ msgs[j][i][1].mtype = COMMIT |
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\* Add a message to msgs - add a message m to msgs. |
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Send(i, j, m) == msgs' = [msgs EXCEPT ![i][j] = Append(msgs[i][j], m)] |
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\* Remove a message from msgs - discard head of msgs. |
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Discard(i, j) == msgs' = IF msgs[i][j] /= << >> THEN [msgs EXCEPT ![i][j] = Tail(msgs[i][j])] |
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ELSE msgs |
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\* Combination of Send and Discard - discard head of msgs[j][i] and add m into msgs. |
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Reply(i, j, m) == msgs' = [msgs EXCEPT ![j][i] = Tail(msgs[j][i]), |
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![i][j] = Append(msgs[i][j], m)] |
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\* Shuffle input buffer. |
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Clean(i, j) == msgs' = [msgs EXCEPT ![j][i] = << >>, ![i][j] = << >>] |
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CleanInputBuffer(S) == msgs' = [s \in Server |-> |
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[v \in Server |-> IF v \in S THEN << >> |
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ELSE msgs[s][v] ] ] |
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\* Leader broadcasts a message PROPOSE to all other servers in Q. |
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\* Note: In paper, Q is fuzzy. We think servers who leader broadcasts NEWLEADER to |
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\* should receive every PROPOSE. So we consider ackeRecv as Q. |
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\* Since we let ackeRecv = Q, there may exist some follower receiving COMMIT before |
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\* COMMITLD, and zxid in COMMIT later than zxid in COMMITLD. To avoid this situation, |
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\* if f \in ackeRecv but \notin ackldRecv, f should not receive COMMIT until |
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\* f \in ackldRecv and receives COMMITLD. |
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Broadcast(i, m) == |
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LET ackeRecv_quorum == |
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sid_ackeRecv == |
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IN msgs' = [msgs EXCEPT ![i] = [v \in Server |-> IF /\ v \in sid_ackeRecv |
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/\ v \in learners[i] |
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/\ v /= i |
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THEN Append(msgs[i][v], m) |
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ELSE msgs[i][v] ] ] |
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\* Since leader decides to broadcasts message COMMIT when processing ACK, so |
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\* we need to discard ACK and broadcast COMMIT. |
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\* Here Q is ackldRecv, because we assume that f should not receive COMMIT until |
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\* f receives COMMITLD. |
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DiscardAndBroadcast(i, j, m) == |
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LET ackldRecv_quorum == {a \in ackldRecv[i]: a.connected = TRUE } |
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sid_ackldRecv == { a.sid: a \in ackldRecv_quorum } |
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IN msgs' = [msgs EXCEPT ![j][i] = Tail(msgs[j][i]), |
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![i] = [v \in Server |-> IF /\ v \in sid_ackldRecv |
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/\ v \in learners[i] |
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/\ v /= i |
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THEN Append(msgs[i][v], m) |
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ELSE msgs[i][v] ] ] |
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\* Leader broadcasts LEADERINFO to all other servers in cepochRecv. |
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DiscardAndBroadcastNEWEPOCH(i, j, m) == |
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LET new_cepochRecv_quorum == |
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new_sid_cepochRecv == |
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IN msgs' = [msgs EXCEPT ![j][i] = Tail(msgs[j][i]), |
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![i] = [v \in Server |-> IF /\ v \in new_sid_cepochRecv |
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/\ v \in learners[i] |
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/\ v /= i |
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THEN Append(msgs[i][v], m) |
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ELSE msgs[i][v] ] ] |
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\* Leader broadcasts NEWLEADER to all other servers in ackeRecv. |
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DiscardAndBroadcastNEWLEADER(i, j, m) == |
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LET new_ackeRecv_quorum == {a \in ackeRecv'[i]: a.connected = TRUE } |
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new_sid_ackeRecv == |
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IN msgs' = [msgs EXCEPT ![j][i] = Tail(msgs[j][i]), |
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![i] = [v \in Server |-> IF /\ v \in new_sid_ackeRecv |
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/\ v \in learners[i] |
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/\ v /= i |
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THEN Append(msgs[i][v], m) |
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ELSE msgs[i][v] ] ] |
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\* Leader broadcasts COMMITLD to all other servers in ackldRecv. |
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DiscardAndBroadcastCOMMITLD(i, j, m) == |
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LET new_ackldRecv_quorum == {a \in ackldRecv'[i]: a.connected = TRUE } |
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new_sid_ackldRecv == |
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IN msgs' = [msgs EXCEPT ![j][i] = Tail(msgs[j][i]), |
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![i] = [v \in Server |-> IF /\ v \in new_sid_ackldRecv |
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/\ v \in learners[i] |
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/\ v /= i |
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THEN Append(msgs[i][v], m) |
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ELSE msgs[i][v] ] ] |
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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\* Define initial values for all variables |
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InitServerVars == /\ state = [s \in Server |-> LOOKING] |
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/\ zabState = [s \in Server |-> ELECTION] |
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/\ acceptedEpoch = [s \in Server |-> 0] |
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/\ currentEpoch = [s \in Server |-> 0] |
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/\ history = [s \in Server |-> << >>] |
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/\ lastCommitted = [s \in Server |-> [ index |-> 0, |
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zxid |-> <<0, 0>> ] ] |
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InitLeaderVars == /\ learners = [s \in Server |-> {}] |
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/\ cepochRecv = [s \in Server |-> {}] |
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/\ ackeRecv = [s \in Server |-> {}] |
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/\ ackldRecv = [s \in Server |-> {}] |
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/\ sendCounter = [s \in Server |-> 0] |
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InitFollowerVars == connectInfo = [s \in Server |-> NullPoint] |
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InitElectionVars == leaderOracle = NullPoint |
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InitMsgVars == msgs = [s \in Server |-> [v \in Server |-> << >>] ] |
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InitVerifyVars == /\ proposalMsgsLog = {} |
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/\ epochLeader = [i \in 1..MAXEPOCH |-> {} ] |
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/\ violatedInvariants = [stateInconsistent |-> FALSE, |
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proposalInconsistent |-> FALSE, |
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commitInconsistent |-> FALSE, |
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ackInconsistent |-> FALSE, |
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messageIllegal |-> FALSE ] |
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InitRecorder == recorder = [nTimeout |-> 0, |
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nTransaction |-> 0, |
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maxEpoch |-> 0, |
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nRestart |-> 0, |
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pc |-> <<"Init">>, |
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nClientRequest |-> 0] |
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Init == /\ InitServerVars |
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/\ InitLeaderVars |
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/\ InitFollowerVars |
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/\ InitElectionVars |
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/\ InitVerifyVars |
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/\ InitMsgVars |
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/\ InitRecorder |
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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\* Utils in state switching |
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FollowerShutdown(i) == |
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/\ state' = [state EXCEPT ![i] = LOOKING] |
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/\ zabState' = [zabState EXCEPT ![i] = ELECTION] |
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/\ connectInfo' = [connectInfo EXCEPT ![i] = NullPoint] |
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LeaderShutdown(i) == |
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/\ LET S == learners[i] |
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IN /\ state' = [s \in Server |-> IF s \in S THEN LOOKING ELSE state[s] ] |
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/\ zabState' = [s \in Server |-> IF s \in S THEN ELECTION ELSE zabState[s] ] |
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/\ connectInfo' = [s \in Server |-> IF s \in S THEN NullPoint ELSE connectInfo[s] ] |
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/\ CleanInputBuffer(S) |
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/\ learners' = [learners EXCEPT ![i] = ] |
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SwitchToFollower(i) == |
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/\ state' = [state EXCEPT ![i] = FOLLOWING] |
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/\ zabState' = [zabState EXCEPT ![i] = DISCOVERY] |
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SwitchToLeader(i) == |
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/\ state' = [state EXCEPT ![i] = LEADING] |
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/\ zabState' = [zabState EXCEPT ![i] = DISCOVERY] |
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/\ learners' = [learners EXCEPT ![i] = {i}] |
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/\ cepochRecv' = [cepochRecv EXCEPT ![i] = |
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] |
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/\ ackeRecv' = [ackeRecv EXCEPT ![i] = { [ sid |-> i, |
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connected |-> TRUE, |
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peerLastEpoch |-> currentEpoch[i], |
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peerHistory |-> history[i] ] }] |
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/\ ackldRecv' = [ackldRecv EXCEPT ![i] = |
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] |
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/\ sendCounter' = [sendCounter EXCEPT ![i] = 0] |
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RemoveCepochRecv(set, sid) == |
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LET sid_cepochRecv == {s.sid: s \in set} |
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IN IF sid \notin sid_cepochRecv THEN set |
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ELSE LET info == CHOOSE s \in set: s.sid = sid |
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new_info == [ sid |-> sid, |
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connected |-> FALSE, |
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epoch |-> info.epoch ] |
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IN (set \ {info}) \union {new_info} |
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RemoveAckeRecv(set, sid) == |
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LET sid_ackeRecv == {s.sid: s \in set} |
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IN IF sid \notin sid_ackeRecv THEN set |
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ELSE LET info == CHOOSE s \in set: s.sid = sid |
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new_info == [ sid |-> sid, |
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connected |-> FALSE, |
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peerLastEpoch |-> info.peerLastEpoch, |
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peerHistory |-> info.peerHistory ] |
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IN (set \ {info}) \union {new_info} |
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RemoveAckldRecv(set, sid) == |
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LET sid_ackldRecv == {s.sid: s \in set} |
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IN IF sid \notin sid_ackldRecv THEN set |
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ELSE LET info == CHOOSE s \in set: s.sid = sid |
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new_info == [ sid |-> sid, |
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connected |-> FALSE ] |
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IN (set \ {info}) \union {new_info} |
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RemoveLearner(i, j) == |
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/\ learners' = [learners EXCEPT ![i] = @ \ ] |
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/\ cepochRecv' = [cepochRecv EXCEPT ![i] = RemoveCepochRecv(@, j) ] |
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/\ ackeRecv' = [ackeRecv EXCEPT ![i] = RemoveAckeRecv(@, j) ] |
|
|
/\ ackldRecv' = [ackldRecv EXCEPT ![i] = RemoveAckldRecv(@, j) ] |
|
|
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
|
\* Actions of election |
|
|
UpdateLeader(i) == |
|
|
/\ IsLooking(i) |
|
|
/\ leaderOracle /= i |
|
|
/\ leaderOracle' = i |
|
|
/\ SwitchToLeader(i) |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<acceptedEpoch, currentEpoch, history, lastCommitted, |
|
|
followerVars, verifyVars, msgVars>> |
|
|
/\ UpdateRecorder(<<"UpdateLeader", i>>) |
|
|
|
|
|
FollowLeader(i) == |
|
|
/\ IsLooking(i) |
|
|
/\ leaderOracle /= NullPoint |
|
|
/\ \/ /\ leaderOracle = i |
|
|
/\ SwitchToLeader(i) |
|
|
\/ /\ leaderOracle /= i |
|
|
/\ SwitchToFollower(i) |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED leaderVars |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<acceptedEpoch, currentEpoch, history, lastCommitted, |
|
|
electionVars, followerVars, verifyVars, msgVars>> |
|
|
/\ UpdateRecorder(<<"FollowLeader", i>>) |
|
|
|
|
|
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
\* Timeout between leader and follower. |
|
|
Timeout(i, j) == |
|
|
/\ CheckTimeout \* test restrictions of timeout |
|
|
/\ IsLeader(i) /\ IsMyLearner(i, j) |
|
|
/\ IsFollower(j) /\ IsMyLeader(j, i) |
|
|
/\ LET newLearners == learners[i] \ |
|
|
IN \/ /\ IsQuorum(newLearners) \* just remove this learner |
|
|
/\ RemoveLearner(i, j) |
|
|
/\ FollowerShutdown(j) |
|
|
/\ Clean(i, j) |
|
|
\/ /\ ~IsQuorum(newLearners) \* leader switches to looking |
|
|
/\ LeaderShutdown(i) |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<cepochRecv, ackeRecv, ackldRecv>> |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<acceptedEpoch, currentEpoch, history, lastCommitted, |
|
|
sendCounter, electionVars, verifyVars>> |
|
|
/\ UpdateRecorder(<<"Timeout", i, j>>) |
|
|
|
|
|
Restart(i) == |
|
|
/\ CheckRestart \* test restrictions of restart |
|
|
/\ \/ /\ IsLooking(i) |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<state, zabState, learners, followerVars, msgVars, |
|
|
cepochRecv, ackeRecv, ackldRecv>> |
|
|
\/ /\ IsFollower(i) |
|
|
/\ LET connectedWithLeader == HasLeader(i) |
|
|
IN \/ /\ connectedWithLeader |
|
|
/\ LET leader == connectInfo[i] |
|
|
newLearners == learners[leader] \ |
|
|
IN |
|
|
\/ /\ IsQuorum(newLearners) \* leader remove learner i |
|
|
/\ RemoveLearner(leader, i) |
|
|
/\ FollowerShutdown(i) |
|
|
/\ Clean(leader, i) |
|
|
\/ /\ ~IsQuorum(newLearners) \* leader switches to looking |
|
|
/\ LeaderShutdown(leader) |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<cepochRecv, ackeRecv, ackldRecv>> |
|
|
\/ /\ ~connectedWithLeader |
|
|
/\ FollowerShutdown(i) |
|
|
/\ CleanInputBuffer() |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<learners, cepochRecv, ackeRecv, ackldRecv>> |
|
|
\/ /\ IsLeader(i) |
|
|
/\ LeaderShutdown(i) |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<cepochRecv, ackeRecv, ackldRecv>> |
|
|
/\ lastCommitted' = [lastCommitted EXCEPT ![i] = [ index |-> 0, |
|
|
zxid |-> <<0, 0>> ] ] |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<acceptedEpoch, currentEpoch, history, |
|
|
sendCounter, leaderOracle, verifyVars>> |
|
|
/\ UpdateRecorder(<<"Restart", i>>) |
|
|
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
|
(* Establish connection between leader and follower. *) |
|
|
ConnectAndFollowerSendCEPOCH(i, j) == |
|
|
/\ IsLeader(i) /\ \lnot IsMyLearner(i, j) |
|
|
/\ IsFollower(j) /\ HasNoLeader(j) /\ leaderOracle = i |
|
|
/\ learners' = [learners EXCEPT ![i] = @ \union ] |
|
|
/\ connectInfo' = [connectInfo EXCEPT ![j] = i] |
|
|
/\ Send(j, i, [ mtype |-> CEPOCH, |
|
|
mepoch |-> acceptedEpoch[j] ]) \* contains f.p |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<serverVars, electionVars, verifyVars, cepochRecv, |
|
|
ackeRecv, ackldRecv, sendCounter>> |
|
|
/\ UpdateRecorder(<<"ConnectAndFollowerSendCEPOCH", i, j>>) |
|
|
|
|
|
CepochRecvQuorumFormed(i) == LET sid_cepochRecv == {c.sid: c \in cepochRecv[i]} |
|
|
IN IsQuorum(sid_cepochRecv) |
|
|
CepochRecvBecomeQuorum(i) == LET sid_cepochRecv == {c.sid: c \in cepochRecv'[i]} |
|
|
IN IsQuorum(sid_cepochRecv) |
|
|
|
|
|
UpdateCepochRecv(oldSet, sid, peerEpoch) == |
|
|
LET sid_set == |
|
|
IN IF sid \in sid_set |
|
|
THEN LET old_info == CHOOSE info \in oldSet: info.sid = sid |
|
|
new_info == [ sid |-> sid, |
|
|
connected |-> TRUE, |
|
|
epoch |-> peerEpoch ] |
|
|
IN ( oldSet \ ) \union |
|
|
ELSE LET follower_info == [ sid |-> sid, |
|
|
connected |-> TRUE, |
|
|
epoch |-> peerEpoch ] |
|
|
IN oldSet \union |
|
|
|
|
|
\* Determine new e' in this round from a quorum of CEPOCH. |
|
|
DetermineNewEpoch(i) == |
|
|
LET epoch_cepochRecv == {c.epoch: c \in cepochRecv'[i]} |
|
|
IN Maximum(epoch_cepochRecv) + 1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
LeaderProcessCEPOCH(i, j) == |
|
|
/\ CheckEpoch \* test restrictions of max epoch |
|
|
/\ IsLeader(i) |
|
|
/\ PendingCEPOCH(i, j) |
|
|
/\ LET msg == msgs[j][i][1] |
|
|
infoOk == IsMyLearner(i, j) |
|
|
IN /\ infoOk |
|
|
/\ \/ \* 1. has not broadcast NEWEPOCH |
|
|
/\ ~CepochRecvQuorumFormed(i) |
|
|
/\ \/ /\ zabState[i] = DISCOVERY |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED violatedInvariants |
|
|
\/ /\ zabState[i] /= DISCOVERY |
|
|
/\ PrintT("Exception: CepochRecvQuorumFormed false," \o |
|
|
" while zabState not DISCOVERY.") |
|
|
/\ violatedInvariants' = [violatedInvariants |
|
|
EXCEPT !.stateInconsistent = TRUE] |
|
|
/\ cepochRecv' = [cepochRecv EXCEPT ![i] = UpdateCepochRecv(@, j, msg.mepoch) ] |
|
|
/\ \/ \* 1.1. cepochRecv becomes quorum, |
|
|
\* then determine e' and broadcasts NEWEPOCH in Q. |
|
|
/\ CepochRecvBecomeQuorum(i) |
|
|
/\ acceptedEpoch' = [acceptedEpoch EXCEPT ![i] = DetermineNewEpoch(i)] |
|
|
/\ LET m == [ mtype |-> NEWEPOCH, |
|
|
mepoch |-> acceptedEpoch'[i] ] |
|
|
IN DiscardAndBroadcastNEWEPOCH(i, j, m) |
|
|
\/ \* 1.2. cepochRecv still not quorum. |
|
|
/\ ~CepochRecvBecomeQuorum(i) |
|
|
/\ Discard(j, i) |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED acceptedEpoch |
|
|
\/ \* 2. has broadcast NEWEPOCH |
|
|
/\ CepochRecvQuorumFormed(i) |
|
|
/\ cepochRecv' = [cepochRecv EXCEPT ![i] = UpdateCepochRecv(@, j, msg.mepoch) ] |
|
|
/\ Reply(i, j, [ mtype |-> NEWEPOCH, |
|
|
mepoch |-> acceptedEpoch[i] ]) |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<violatedInvariants, acceptedEpoch>> |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<state, zabState, currentEpoch, history, lastCommitted, learners, |
|
|
ackeRecv, ackldRecv, sendCounter, followerVars, |
|
|
electionVars, proposalMsgsLog, epochLeader>> |
|
|
/\ UpdateRecorder(<<"LeaderProcessCEPOCH", i, j>>) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
FollowerProcessNEWEPOCH(i, j) == |
|
|
/\ IsFollower(i) |
|
|
/\ PendingNEWEPOCH(i, j) |
|
|
/\ LET msg == msgs[j][i][1] |
|
|
infoOk == IsMyLeader(i, j) |
|
|
stateOk == zabState[i] = DISCOVERY |
|
|
epochOk == msg.mepoch >= acceptedEpoch[i] |
|
|
IN /\ infoOk |
|
|
/\ \/ \* 1. Normal case |
|
|
/\ epochOk |
|
|
/\ \/ /\ stateOk |
|
|
/\ acceptedEpoch' = [acceptedEpoch EXCEPT ![i] = msg.mepoch] |
|
|
/\ LET m == [ mtype |-> ACKEPOCH, |
|
|
mepoch |-> currentEpoch[i], |
|
|
mhistory |-> history[i] ] |
|
|
IN Reply(i, j, m) |
|
|
/\ zabState' = [zabState EXCEPT ![i] = SYNCHRONIZATION] |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED violatedInvariants |
|
|
\/ /\ ~stateOk |
|
|
/\ PrintT("Exception: Follower receives NEWEPOCH," \o |
|
|
" whileZabState not DISCOVERY.") |
|
|
/\ violatedInvariants' = [violatedInvariants |
|
|
EXCEPT !.stateInconsistent = TRUE] |
|
|
/\ Discard(j, i) |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<acceptedEpoch, zabState>> |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<followerVars, learners, cepochRecv, ackeRecv, |
|
|
ackldRecv, state>> |
|
|
\/ \* 2. Abnormal case - go back to election |
|
|
/\ ~epochOk |
|
|
/\ FollowerShutdown(i) |
|
|
/\ LET leader == connectInfo[i] |
|
|
IN /\ Clean(i, leader) |
|
|
/\ RemoveLearner(leader, i) |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<acceptedEpoch, violatedInvariants>> |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<currentEpoch, history, lastCommitted, sendCounter, |
|
|
electionVars, proposalMsgsLog, epochLeader>> |
|
|
/\ UpdateRecorder(<<"FollowerProcessNEWEPOCH", i, j>>) |
|
|
|
|
|
AckeRecvQuorumFormed(i) == LET sid_ackeRecv == {a.sid: a \in ackeRecv[i]} |
|
|
IN IsQuorum(sid_ackeRecv) |
|
|
AckeRecvBecomeQuorum(i) == LET sid_ackeRecv == {a.sid: a \in ackeRecv'[i]} |
|
|
IN IsQuorum(sid_ackeRecv) |
|
|
|
|
|
UpdateAckeRecv(oldSet, sid, peerEpoch, peerHistory) == |
|
|
LET sid_set == |
|
|
follower_info == [ sid |-> sid, |
|
|
connected |-> TRUE, |
|
|
peerLastEpoch |-> peerEpoch, |
|
|
peerHistory |-> peerHistory ] |
|
|
IN IF sid \in sid_set |
|
|
THEN LET old_info == CHOOSE info \in oldSet: info.sid = sid |
|
|
IN (oldSet \ ) \union |
|
|
ELSE oldSet \union |
|
|
|
|
|
\* for checking invariants |
|
|
RECURSIVE SetPacketsForChecking(_,_,_,_,_,_) |
|
|
SetPacketsForChecking(set, src, ep, his, cur, end) == |
|
|
IF cur > end THEN set |
|
|
ELSE LET m_proposal == [ source |-> src, |
|
|
epoch |-> ep, |
|
|
zxid |-> his[cur].zxid, |
|
|
data |-> his[cur].value ] |
|
|
IN SetPacketsForChecking((set \union ), src, ep, his, cur + 1, end) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
LastZxidOfHistory(his) == IF Len(his) = 0 THEN <<0, 0>> |
|
|
ELSE his[Len(his)].zxid |
|
|
|
|
|
\* TRUE: f1.a > f2.a or (f1.a = fa.a and f1.zxid >= f2.zxid) |
|
|
MoreResentOrEqual(ss1, ss2) == \/ ss1.currentEpoch > ss2.currentEpoch |
|
|
\/ /\ ss1.currentEpoch = ss2.currentEpoch |
|
|
/\ ~ZxidCompare(ss2.lastZxid, ss1.lastZxid) |
|
|
|
|
|
\* Determine initial history Ie' in this round from a quorum of ACKEPOCH. |
|
|
DetermineInitialHistory(i) == |
|
|
LET set == ackeRecv'[i] |
|
|
ss_set == |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
selected == CHOOSE ss \in ss_set: |
|
|
\A ss1 \in (ss_set \ ): MoreResentOrEqual(ss, ss1) |
|
|
info == CHOOSE f \in set: f.sid = selected.sid |
|
|
IN info.peerHistory |
|
|
|
|
|
RECURSIVE InitAcksidHelper(_,_) |
|
|
InitAcksidHelper(txns, src) == IF Len(txns) = 0 THEN << >> |
|
|
ELSE LET oldTxn == txns[1] |
|
|
newTxn == [ zxid |-> oldTxn.zxid, |
|
|
value |-> oldTxn.value, |
|
|
ackSid |-> , |
|
|
epoch |-> oldTxn.epoch ] |
|
|
IN <<newTxn>> \o InitAcksidHelper( Tail(txns), src) |
|
|
|
|
|
\* Atomically let all txns in initial history contain self's acks. |
|
|
InitAcksid(i, his) == InitAcksidHelper(his, i) |
|
|
|
|
|
(* Leader waits for receiving ACKEPOPCH from a quorum, and determines initialHistory |
|
|
according to history of whom has most recent state summary from them. After this, |
|
|
leader's zabState turns to SYNCHRONIZATION. *) |
|
|
LeaderProcessACKEPOCH(i, j) == |
|
|
/\ IsLeader(i) |
|
|
/\ PendingACKEPOCH(i, j) |
|
|
/\ LET msg == msgs[j][i][1] |
|
|
infoOk == IsMyLearner(i, j) |
|
|
IN /\ infoOk |
|
|
/\ \/ \* 1. has broadcast NEWLEADER |
|
|
/\ AckeRecvQuorumFormed(i) |
|
|
/\ ackeRecv' = [ackeRecv EXCEPT ![i] = UpdateAckeRecv(@, j, |
|
|
msg.mepoch, msg.mhistory) ] |
|
|
/\ LET toSend == history[i] \* contains (Ie', Be') |
|
|
m == [ mtype |-> NEWLEADER, |
|
|
mepoch |-> acceptedEpoch[i], |
|
|
mhistory |-> toSend ] |
|
|
set_forChecking == SetPacketsForChecking({ }, i, |
|
|
acceptedEpoch[i], toSend, 1, Len(toSend)) |
|
|
IN |
|
|
/\ Reply(i, j, m) |
|
|
/\ proposalMsgsLog' = proposalMsgsLog \union set_forChecking |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<violatedInvariants, currentEpoch, history, |
|
|
zabState, epochLeader>> |
|
|
\/ \* 2. has not broadcast NEWLEADER |
|
|
/\ ~AckeRecvQuorumFormed(i) |
|
|
/\ \/ /\ zabState[i] = DISCOVERY |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED violatedInvariants |
|
|
\/ /\ zabState[i] /= DISCOVERY |
|
|
/\ PrintT("Exception: AckeRecvQuorumFormed false," \o |
|
|
" while zabState not DISCOVERY.") |
|
|
/\ violatedInvariants' = [violatedInvariants EXCEPT |
|
|
!.stateInconsistent = TRUE] |
|
|
/\ ackeRecv' = [ackeRecv EXCEPT ![i] = UpdateAckeRecv(@, j, |
|
|
msg.mepoch, msg.mhistory) ] |
|
|
/\ \/ \* 2.1. ackeRecv becomes quorum, determine Ie' |
|
|
\* and broadcasts NEWLEADER in Q. (l.1.2 + l.2.1) |
|
|
/\ AckeRecvBecomeQuorum(i) |
|
|
/\ \* Update f.a |
|
|
LET newLeaderEpoch == acceptedEpoch[i] IN |
|
|
/\ currentEpoch' = [currentEpoch EXCEPT ![i] = newLeaderEpoch] |
|
|
/\ epochLeader' = [epochLeader EXCEPT ![newLeaderEpoch] |
|
|
= @ \union {i} ] \* for checking invariants |
|
|
/\ \* Determine initial history Ie' |
|
|
LET initialHistory == DetermineInitialHistory(i) IN |
|
|
history' = [history EXCEPT ![i] = InitAcksid(i, initialHistory) ] |
|
|
/\ \* Update zabState |
|
|
zabState' = [zabState EXCEPT ![i] = SYNCHRONIZATION] |
|
|
/\ \* Broadcast NEWLEADER with (e', Ie') |
|
|
LET toSend == history'[i] |
|
|
m == [ mtype |-> NEWLEADER, |
|
|
mepoch |-> acceptedEpoch[i], |
|
|
mhistory |-> toSend ] |
|
|
set_forChecking == SetPacketsForChecking({ }, i, |
|
|
acceptedEpoch[i], toSend, 1, Len(toSend)) |
|
|
IN |
|
|
/\ DiscardAndBroadcastNEWLEADER(i, j, m) |
|
|
/\ proposalMsgsLog' = proposalMsgsLog \union set_forChecking |
|
|
\/ \* 2.2. ackeRecv still not quorum. |
|
|
/\ ~AckeRecvBecomeQuorum(i) |
|
|
/\ Discard(j, i) |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<currentEpoch, history, zabState, |
|
|
proposalMsgsLog, epochLeader>> |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<state, acceptedEpoch, lastCommitted, learners, cepochRecv, ackldRecv, |
|
|
sendCounter, followerVars, electionVars>> |
|
|
/\ UpdateRecorder(<<"LeaderProcessACKEPOCH", i, j>>) |
|
|
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
|
|
|
|
FollowerProcessNEWLEADER(i, j) == |
|
|
/\ IsFollower(i) |
|
|
/\ PendingNEWLEADER(i, j) |
|
|
/\ LET msg == msgs[j][i][1] |
|
|
infoOk == IsMyLeader(i, j) |
|
|
epochOk == acceptedEpoch[i] = msg.mepoch |
|
|
stateOk == zabState[i] = SYNCHRONIZATION |
|
|
IN /\ infoOk |
|
|
/\ \/ \* 1. f.p not equals e', starts a new iteration. |
|
|
/\ ~epochOk |
|
|
/\ FollowerShutdown(i) |
|
|
/\ LET leader == connectInfo[i] |
|
|
IN /\ Clean(i, leader) |
|
|
/\ RemoveLearner(leader, i) |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<violatedInvariants, currentEpoch, history>> |
|
|
\/ \* 2. f.p equals e'. |
|
|
/\ epochOk |
|
|
/\ \/ /\ stateOk |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED violatedInvariants |
|
|
\/ /\ ~stateOk |
|
|
/\ PrintT("Exception: Follower receives NEWLEADER," \o |
|
|
" whileZabState not SYNCHRONIZATION.") |
|
|
/\ violatedInvariants' = [violatedInvariants |
|
|
EXCEPT !.stateInconsistent = TRUE] |
|
|
/\ currentEpoch' = [currentEpoch EXCEPT ![i] = acceptedEpoch[i]] |
|
|
/\ history' = [history EXCEPT ![i] = msg.mhistory] \* no need to care ackSid |
|
|
/\ LET m == [ mtype |-> ACKLD, |
|
|
mzxid |-> LastZxidOfHistory(history'[i]) ] |
|
|
IN Reply(i, j, m) |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<followerVars, state, zabState, learners, cepochRecv, |
|
|
ackeRecv, ackldRecv>> |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<acceptedEpoch, lastCommitted, sendCounter, electionVars, |
|
|
proposalMsgsLog, epochLeader>> |
|
|
/\ UpdateRecorder(<<"FollowerProcessNEWLEADER", i, j>>) |
|
|
|
|
|
AckldRecvQuorumFormed(i) == LET sid_ackldRecv == |
|
|
IN IsQuorum(sid_ackldRecv) |
|
|
AckldRecvBecomeQuorum(i) == LET sid_ackldRecv == |
|
|
IN IsQuorum(sid_ackldRecv) |
|
|
|
|
|
UpdateAckldRecv(oldSet, sid) == |
|
|
LET sid_set == |
|
|
follower_info == [ sid |-> sid, |
|
|
connected |-> TRUE ] |
|
|
IN IF sid \in sid_set |
|
|
THEN LET old_info == CHOOSE info \in oldSet: info.sid = sid |
|
|
IN (oldSet \ ) \union |
|
|
ELSE oldSet \union |
|
|
|
|
|
LastZxid(i) == LastZxidOfHistory(history[i]) |
|
|
|
|
|
RECURSIVE UpdateAcksidHelper(_,_,_) |
|
|
UpdateAcksidHelper(txns, target, endZxid) == |
|
|
IF Len(txns) = 0 THEN << >> |
|
|
ELSE LET oldTxn == txns[1] |
|
|
IN IF ZxidCompare(oldTxn.zxid, endZxid) THEN txns |
|
|
ELSE LET newTxn == [ zxid |-> oldTxn.zxid, |
|
|
value |-> oldTxn.value, |
|
|
ackSid |-> IF target \in oldTxn.ackSid |
|
|
THEN oldTxn.ackSid |
|
|
ELSE oldTxn.ackSid \union , |
|
|
epoch |-> oldTxn.epoch ] |
|
|
IN <<newTxn>> \o UpdateAcksidHelper( Tail(txns), target, endZxid) |
|
|
|
|
|
\* Atomically add ackSid of one learner according to zxid in ACKLD. |
|
|
UpdateAcksid(his, target, endZxid) == UpdateAcksidHelper(his, target, endZxid) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
LeaderProcessACKLD(i, j) == |
|
|
/\ IsLeader(i) |
|
|
/\ PendingACKLD(i, j) |
|
|
/\ LET msg == msgs[j][i][1] |
|
|
infoOk == IsMyLearner(i, j) |
|
|
IN /\ infoOk |
|
|
/\ \/ \* 1. has not broadcast COMMITLD |
|
|
/\ ~AckldRecvQuorumFormed(i) |
|
|
/\ \/ /\ zabState[i] = SYNCHRONIZATION |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED violatedInvariants |
|
|
\/ /\ zabState[i] /= SYNCHRONIZATION |
|
|
/\ PrintT("Exception: AckldRecvQuorumFormed false," \o |
|
|
" while zabState not SYNCHRONIZATION.") |
|
|
/\ violatedInvariants' = [violatedInvariants |
|
|
EXCEPT !.stateInconsistent = TRUE] |
|
|
/\ ackldRecv' = [ackldRecv EXCEPT ![i] = UpdateAckldRecv(@, j) ] |
|
|
/\ history' = [history EXCEPT ![i] = UpdateAcksid(@, j, msg.mzxid)] |
|
|
/\ \/ \* 1.1. ackldRecv becomes quorum, |
|
|
\* then broadcasts COMMITLD and turns to BROADCAST. |
|
|
/\ AckldRecvBecomeQuorum(i) |
|
|
/\ lastCommitted' = [lastCommitted EXCEPT |
|
|
![i] = [ index |-> Len(history[i]), |
|
|
zxid |-> LastZxid(i) ] ] |
|
|
/\ zabState' = [zabState EXCEPT ![i] = BROADCAST] |
|
|
/\ LET m == [ mtype |-> COMMITLD, |
|
|
mzxid |-> LastZxid(i) ] |
|
|
IN DiscardAndBroadcastCOMMITLD(i, j, m) |
|
|
\/ \* 1.2. ackldRecv still not quorum. |
|
|
/\ ~AckldRecvBecomeQuorum(i) |
|
|
/\ Discard(j, i) |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<zabState, lastCommitted>> |
|
|
\/ \* 2. has broadcast COMMITLD |
|
|
/\ AckldRecvQuorumFormed(i) |
|
|
/\ \/ /\ zabState[i] = BROADCAST |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED violatedInvariants |
|
|
\/ /\ zabState[i] /= BROADCAST |
|
|
/\ PrintT("Exception: AckldRecvQuorumFormed true," \o |
|
|
" while zabState not BROADCAST.") |
|
|
/\ violatedInvariants' = [violatedInvariants |
|
|
EXCEPT !.stateInconsistent = TRUE] |
|
|
/\ ackldRecv' = [ackldRecv EXCEPT ![i] = UpdateAckldRecv(@, j) ] |
|
|
/\ history' = [history EXCEPT ![i] = UpdateAcksid(@, j, msg.mzxid)] |
|
|
/\ Reply(i, j, [ mtype |-> COMMITLD, |
|
|
mzxid |-> lastCommitted[i].zxid ]) |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<zabState, lastCommitted>> |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<state, acceptedEpoch, currentEpoch, learners, cepochRecv, ackeRecv, |
|
|
sendCounter, followerVars, electionVars, proposalMsgsLog, epochLeader>> |
|
|
/\ UpdateRecorder(<<"LeaderProcessACKLD", i, j>>) |
|
|
|
|
|
RECURSIVE ZxidToIndexHelper(_,_,_,_) |
|
|
ZxidToIndexHelper(his, zxid, cur, appeared) == |
|
|
IF cur > Len(his) THEN cur |
|
|
ELSE IF TxnZxidEqual(his[cur], zxid) |
|
|
THEN CASE appeared = TRUE -> -1 |
|
|
[] OTHER -> Minimum( |
|
|
) |
|
|
ELSE ZxidToIndexHelper(his, zxid, cur + 1, appeared) |
|
|
|
|
|
\* return -1: this zxid appears at least twice. Len(his) + 1: does not exist. |
|
|
\* 1 - Len(his): exists and appears just once. |
|
|
ZxidToIndex(his, zxid) == IF ZxidEqual( zxid, <<0, 0>> ) THEN 0 |
|
|
ELSE IF Len(his) = 0 THEN 1 |
|
|
ELSE LET len == Len(his) IN |
|
|
IF \E idx \in 1..len: TxnZxidEqual(his[idx], zxid) |
|
|
THEN ZxidToIndexHelper(his, zxid, 1, FALSE) |
|
|
ELSE len + 1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
FollowerProcessCOMMITLD(i, j) == |
|
|
/\ IsFollower(i) |
|
|
/\ PendingCOMMITLD(i, j) |
|
|
/\ LET msg == msgs[j][i][1] |
|
|
infoOk == IsMyLeader(i, j) |
|
|
index == IF ZxidEqual(msg.mzxid, <<0, 0>>) THEN 0 |
|
|
ELSE ZxidToIndex(history[i], msg.mzxid) |
|
|
logOk == index >= 0 /\ index <= Len(history[i]) |
|
|
IN /\ infoOk |
|
|
/\ \/ /\ logOk |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED violatedInvariants |
|
|
\/ /\ ~logOk |
|
|
/\ PrintT("Exception: zxid in COMMITLD not exists in history.") |
|
|
/\ violatedInvariants' = [violatedInvariants |
|
|
EXCEPT !.proposalInconsistent = TRUE] |
|
|
/\ lastCommitted' = [lastCommitted EXCEPT ![i] = [ index |-> index, |
|
|
zxid |-> msg.mzxid ] ] |
|
|
/\ zabState' = [zabState EXCEPT ![i] = BROADCAST] |
|
|
/\ Discard(j, i) |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<state, acceptedEpoch, currentEpoch, history, leaderVars, |
|
|
followerVars, electionVars, proposalMsgsLog, epochLeader>> |
|
|
/\ UpdateRecorder(<<"FollowerProcessCOMMITLD", i, j>>) |
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
|
IncZxid(s, zxid) == IF currentEpoch[s] = zxid[1] THEN <<zxid[1], zxid[2] + 1>> |
|
|
ELSE <<currentEpoch[s], 1>> |
|
|
|
|
|
(* Leader receives client request. |
|
|
Note: In production, any server in traffic can receive requests and |
|
|
forward it to leader if necessary. We choose to let leader be |
|
|
the sole one who can receive write requests, to simplify spec |
|
|
and keep correctness at the same time. *) |
|
|
LeaderProcessRequest(i) == |
|
|
/\ CheckTransactionNum \* test restrictions of transaction num |
|
|
/\ IsLeader(i) |
|
|
/\ zabState[i] = BROADCAST |
|
|
/\ LET request_value == GetRecorder("nClientRequest") \* unique value |
|
|
newTxn == [ zxid |-> IncZxid(i, LastZxid(i)), |
|
|
value |-> request_value, |
|
|
ackSid |-> {i}, |
|
|
epoch |-> currentEpoch[i] ] |
|
|
IN history' = [history EXCEPT ![i] = Append(@, newTxn) ] |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<state, zabState, acceptedEpoch, currentEpoch, lastCommitted, |
|
|
leaderVars, followerVars, electionVars, msgVars, verifyVars>> |
|
|
/\ UpdateRecorder(<<"LeaderProcessRequest", i>>) |
|
|
|
|
|
\* Latest counter existing in history. |
|
|
CurrentCounter(i) == IF LastZxid(i)[1] = currentEpoch[i] THEN LastZxid(i)[2] |
|
|
ELSE 0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
LeaderBroadcastPROPOSE(i) == |
|
|
/\ IsLeader(i) |
|
|
/\ zabState[i] = BROADCAST |
|
|
/\ sendCounter[i] < CurrentCounter(i) \* there exists proposal to be sent |
|
|
/\ LET toSendCounter == sendCounter[i] + 1 |
|
|
toSendZxid == <<currentEpoch[i], toSendCounter>> |
|
|
toSendIndex == ZxidToIndex(history[i], toSendZxid) |
|
|
toSendTxn == history[i][toSendIndex] |
|
|
m_proposal == [ mtype |-> PROPOSE, |
|
|
mzxid |-> toSendTxn.zxid, |
|
|
mdata |-> toSendTxn.value ] |
|
|
m_proposal_forChecking == [ source |-> i, |
|
|
epoch |-> currentEpoch[i], |
|
|
zxid |-> toSendTxn.zxid, |
|
|
data |-> toSendTxn.value ] |
|
|
IN /\ sendCounter' = [sendCounter EXCEPT ![i] = toSendCounter] |
|
|
/\ Broadcast(i, m_proposal) |
|
|
/\ proposalMsgsLog' = proposalMsgsLog \union |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<serverVars, learners, cepochRecv, ackeRecv, ackldRecv, |
|
|
followerVars, electionVars, epochLeader, violatedInvariants>> |
|
|
/\ UpdateRecorder(<<"LeaderBroadcastPROPOSE", i>>) |
|
|
|
|
|
IsNextZxid(curZxid, nextZxid) == |
|
|
\/ \* first PROPOSAL in this epoch |
|
|
/\ nextZxid[2] = 1 |
|
|
/\ curZxid[1] < nextZxid[1] |
|
|
\/ \* not first PROPOSAL in this epoch |
|
|
/\ nextZxid[2] > 1 |
|
|
/\ curZxid[1] = nextZxid[1] |
|
|
/\ curZxid[2] + 1 = nextZxid[2] |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
FollowerProcessPROPOSE(i, j) == |
|
|
/\ IsFollower(i) |
|
|
/\ PendingPROPOSE(i, j) |
|
|
/\ LET msg == msgs[j][i][1] |
|
|
infoOk == IsMyLeader(i, j) |
|
|
isNext == IsNextZxid(LastZxid(i), msg.mzxid) |
|
|
newTxn == [ zxid |-> msg.mzxid, |
|
|
value |-> msg.mdata, |
|
|
ackSid |-> , |
|
|
epoch |-> currentEpoch[i] ] |
|
|
m_ack == [ mtype |-> ACK, |
|
|
mzxid |-> msg.mzxid ] |
|
|
IN /\ infoOk |
|
|
/\ \/ /\ isNext |
|
|
/\ history' = [history EXCEPT ![i] = Append(@, newTxn)] |
|
|
/\ Reply(i, j, m_ack) |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED violatedInvariants |
|
|
\/ /\ ~isNext |
|
|
/\ LET index == ZxidToIndex(history[i], msg.mzxid) |
|
|
exist == index > 0 /\ index <= Len(history[i]) |
|
|
IN \/ /\ exist |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED violatedInvariants |
|
|
\/ /\ ~exist |
|
|
/\ PrintT("Exception: Follower receives PROPOSE, while" \o |
|
|
" txn is neither the next nor exists in history.") |
|
|
/\ violatedInvariants' = [violatedInvariants EXCEPT |
|
|
!.proposalInconsistent = TRUE] |
|
|
/\ Discard(j, i) |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED history |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<state, zabState, acceptedEpoch, currentEpoch, lastCommitted, |
|
|
leaderVars, followerVars, electionVars, proposalMsgsLog, epochLeader>> |
|
|
/\ UpdateRecorder(<<"FollowerProcessPROPOSE", i, j>>) |
|
|
|
|
|
LeaderTryToCommit(s, index, zxid, newTxn, follower) == |
|
|
LET allTxnsBeforeCommitted == lastCommitted[s].index >= index - 1 |
|
|
\* Only when all proposals before zxid has been committed, |
|
|
\* this proposal can be permitted to be committed. |
|
|
hasAllQuorums == IsQuorum(newTxn.ackSid) |
|
|
\* In order to be committed, a proposal must be accepted |
|
|
\* by a quorum. |
|
|
ordered == lastCommitted[s].index + 1 = index |
|
|
\* Commit proposals in order. |
|
|
IN \/ /\ \* Current conditions do not satisfy committing the proposal. |
|
|
\/ ~allTxnsBeforeCommitted |
|
|
\/ ~hasAllQuorums |
|
|
/\ Discard(follower, s) |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<violatedInvariants, lastCommitted>> |
|
|
\/ /\ allTxnsBeforeCommitted |
|
|
/\ hasAllQuorums |
|
|
/\ \/ /\ ~ordered |
|
|
/\ PrintT("Warn: Committing zxid " \o ToString(zxid) \o " not first.") |
|
|
/\ violatedInvariants' = [violatedInvariants EXCEPT |
|
|
!.commitInconsistent = TRUE] |
|
|
\/ /\ ordered |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED violatedInvariants |
|
|
/\ lastCommitted' = [lastCommitted EXCEPT ![s] = [ index |-> index, |
|
|
zxid |-> zxid ] ] |
|
|
/\ LET m_commit == [ mtype |-> COMMIT, |
|
|
mzxid |-> zxid ] |
|
|
IN DiscardAndBroadcast(s, follower, m_commit) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
LastAckIndexFromFollower(i, j) == |
|
|
LET set_index == |
|
|
IN Maximum(set_index) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
LeaderProcessACK(i, j) == |
|
|
/\ IsLeader(i) |
|
|
/\ PendingACK(i, j) |
|
|
/\ LET msg == msgs[j][i][1] |
|
|
infoOk == IsMyLearner(i, j) |
|
|
index == ZxidToIndex(history[i], msg.mzxid) |
|
|
exist == index >= 1 /\ index <= Len(history[i]) \* proposal exists in history |
|
|
outstanding == lastCommitted[i].index < Len(history[i]) \* outstanding not null |
|
|
hasCommitted == ~ZxidCompare(msg.mzxid, lastCommitted[i].zxid) |
|
|
ackIndex == LastAckIndexFromFollower(i, j) |
|
|
monotonicallyInc == \/ ackIndex = -1 |
|
|
\/ ackIndex + 1 = index |
|
|
IN /\ infoOk |
|
|
/\ \/ /\ exist |
|
|
/\ monotonicallyInc |
|
|
/\ LET txn == history[i][index] |
|
|
txnAfterAddAck == [ zxid |-> txn.zxid, |
|
|
value |-> txn.value, |
|
|
ackSid |-> txn.ackSid \union , |
|
|
epoch |-> txn.epoch ] |
|
|
IN |
|
|
/\ history' = [history EXCEPT ![i][index] = txnAfterAddAck ] |
|
|
/\ \/ /\ \* Note: outstanding is 0. |
|
|
\* / proposal has already been committed. |
|
|
\/ ~outstanding |
|
|
\/ hasCommitted |
|
|
/\ Discard(j, i) |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<violatedInvariants, lastCommitted>> |
|
|
\/ /\ outstanding |
|
|
/\ ~hasCommitted |
|
|
/\ LeaderTryToCommit(i, index, msg.mzxid, txnAfterAddAck, j) |
|
|
\/ /\ \/ ~exist |
|
|
\/ ~monotonicallyInc |
|
|
/\ PrintT("Exception: No such zxid. " \o |
|
|
" / ackIndex doesn't inc monotonically.") |
|
|
/\ violatedInvariants' = [violatedInvariants |
|
|
EXCEPT !.ackInconsistent = TRUE] |
|
|
/\ Discard(j, i) |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<history, lastCommitted>> |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<state, zabState, acceptedEpoch, currentEpoch, leaderVars, |
|
|
followerVars, electionVars, proposalMsgsLog, epochLeader>> |
|
|
/\ UpdateRecorder(<<"LeaderProcessACK", i, j>>) |
|
|
|
|
|
(* Follower processes COMMIT. *) |
|
|
FollowerProcessCOMMIT(i, j) == |
|
|
/\ IsFollower(i) |
|
|
/\ PendingCOMMIT(i, j) |
|
|
/\ LET msg == msgs[j][i][1] |
|
|
infoOk == IsMyLeader(i, j) |
|
|
pending == lastCommitted[i].index < Len(history[i]) |
|
|
IN /\ infoOk |
|
|
/\ \/ /\ ~pending |
|
|
/\ PrintT("Warn: Committing zxid without seeing txn.") |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<lastCommitted, violatedInvariants>> |
|
|
\/ /\ pending |
|
|
/\ LET firstElement == history[i][lastCommitted[i].index + 1] |
|
|
match == ZxidEqual(firstElement.zxid, msg.mzxid) |
|
|
IN |
|
|
\/ /\ ~match |
|
|
/\ PrintT("Exception: Committing zxid not equals" \o |
|
|
" next pending txn zxid.") |
|
|
/\ violatedInvariants' = [violatedInvariants EXCEPT |
|
|
!.commitInconsistent = TRUE] |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED lastCommitted |
|
|
\/ /\ match |
|
|
/\ lastCommitted' = [lastCommitted EXCEPT ![i] = |
|
|
[ index |-> lastCommitted[i].index + 1, |
|
|
zxid |-> firstElement.zxid ] ] |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED violatedInvariants |
|
|
/\ Discard(j, i) |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<state, zabState, acceptedEpoch, currentEpoch, history, |
|
|
leaderVars, followerVars, electionVars, proposalMsgsLog, epochLeader>> |
|
|
/\ UpdateRecorder(<<"FollowerProcessCOMMIT", i, j>>) |
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
|
(* Used to discard some messages which should not exist in network channel. |
|
|
This action should not be triggered. *) |
|
|
FilterNonexistentMessage(i) == |
|
|
/\ \E j \in Server \ {i}: /\ msgs[j][i] /= << >> |
|
|
/\ LET msg == msgs[j][i][1] |
|
|
IN |
|
|
\/ /\ IsLeader(i) |
|
|
/\ LET infoOk == IsMyLearner(i, j) |
|
|
IN |
|
|
\/ msg.mtype = NEWEPOCH |
|
|
\/ msg.mtype = NEWLEADER |
|
|
\/ msg.mtype = COMMITLD |
|
|
\/ msg.mtype = PROPOSE |
|
|
\/ msg.mtype = COMMIT |
|
|
\/ /\ ~infoOk |
|
|
/\ \/ msg.mtype = CEPOCH |
|
|
\/ msg.mtype = ACKEPOCH |
|
|
\/ msg.mtype = ACKLD |
|
|
\/ msg.mtype = ACK |
|
|
\/ /\ IsFollower(i) |
|
|
/\ LET infoOk == IsMyLeader(i, j) |
|
|
IN |
|
|
\/ msg.mtype = CEPOCH |
|
|
\/ msg.mtype = ACKEPOCH |
|
|
\/ msg.mtype = ACKLD |
|
|
\/ msg.mtype = ACK |
|
|
\/ /\ ~infoOk |
|
|
/\ \/ msg.mtype = NEWEPOCH |
|
|
\/ msg.mtype = NEWLEADER |
|
|
\/ msg.mtype = COMMITLD |
|
|
\/ msg.mtype = PROPOSE |
|
|
\/ msg.mtype = COMMIT |
|
|
\/ IsLooking(i) |
|
|
/\ Discard(j, i) |
|
|
/\ violatedInvariants' = [violatedInvariants EXCEPT !.messageIllegal = TRUE] |
|
|
/\ UNCHANGED <<serverVars, leaderVars, followerVars, electionVars, |
|
|
proposalMsgsLog, epochLeader>> |
|
|
/\ UnchangeRecorder |
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
|
\* Defines how the variables may transition. |
|
|
Next == |
|
|
|
|
|
\/ \E i \in Server: UpdateLeader(i) |
|
|
\/ \E i \in Server: FollowLeader(i) |
|
|
|
|
|
\/ \E i, j \in Server: Timeout(i, j) |
|
|
\/ \E i \in Server: Restart(i) |
|
|
|
|
|
\/ \E i, j \in Server: ConnectAndFollowerSendCEPOCH(i, j) |
|
|
\/ \E i, j \in Server: LeaderProcessCEPOCH(i, j) |
|
|
\/ \E i, j \in Server: FollowerProcessNEWEPOCH(i, j) |
|
|
\/ \E i, j \in Server: LeaderProcessACKEPOCH(i, j) |
|
|
\/ \E i, j \in Server: FollowerProcessNEWLEADER(i, j) |
|
|
\/ \E i, j \in Server: LeaderProcessACKLD(i, j) |
|
|
\/ \E i, j \in Server: FollowerProcessCOMMITLD(i, j) |
|
|
|
|
|
\/ \E i \in Server: LeaderProcessRequest(i) |
|
|
\/ \E i \in Server: LeaderBroadcastPROPOSE(i) |
|
|
\/ \E i, j \in Server: FollowerProcessPROPOSE(i, j) |
|
|
\/ \E i, j \in Server: LeaderProcessACK(i, j) |
|
|
\/ \E i, j \in Server: FollowerProcessCOMMIT(i, j) |
|
|
|
|
|
\/ \E i \in Server: FilterNonexistentMessage(i) |
|
|
|
|
|
Spec == Init /\ [][Next]_vars |
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
|
\* Define safety properties of Zab. |
|
|
|
|
|
ShouldNotBeTriggered == \A p \in DOMAIN violatedInvariants: violatedInvariants[p] = FALSE |
|
|
|
|
|
\* There is most one established leader for a certain epoch. |
|
|
Leadership1 == \A i, j \in Server: |
|
|
/\ IsLeader(i) /\ zabState[i] \in |
|
|
/\ IsLeader(j) /\ zabState[j] \in |
|
|
/\ currentEpoch[i] = currentEpoch[j] |
|
|
=> i = j |
|
|
|
|
|
Leadership2 == \A epoch \in 1..MAXEPOCH: Cardinality(epochLeader[epoch]) <= 1 |
|
|
|
|
|
\* PrefixConsistency: The prefix that have been committed |
|
|
\* in history in any process is the same. |
|
|
PrefixConsistency == \A i, j \in Server: |
|
|
LET smaller == Minimum() |
|
|
IN \/ smaller = 0 |
|
|
\/ /\ smaller > 0 |
|
|
/\ \A index \in 1..smaller: |
|
|
TxnEqual(history[i][index], history[j][index]) |
|
|
|
|
|
\* Integrity: If some follower delivers one transaction, then some primary has broadcast it. |
|
|
Integrity == \A i \in Server: |
|
|
/\ IsFollower(i) |
|
|
/\ lastCommitted[i].index > 0 |
|
|
=> \A idx \in 1..lastCommitted[i].index: \E proposal \in proposalMsgsLog: |
|
|
LET txn_proposal == [ zxid |-> proposal.zxid, |
|
|
value |-> proposal.data ] |
|
|
IN TxnEqual(history[i][idx], txn_proposal) |
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\* Agreement: If some follower f delivers transaction a and some follower f' delivers transaction b, |
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\* then f' delivers a or f delivers b. |
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Agreement == \A i, j \in Server: |
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/\ IsFollower(i) /\ lastCommitted[i].index > 0 |
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/\ IsFollower(j) /\ lastCommitted[j].index > 0 |
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=> |
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\A idx1 \in 1..lastCommitted[i].index, idx2 \in 1..lastCommitted[j].index : |
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\/ \E idx_j \in 1..lastCommitted[j].index: |
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TxnEqual(history[j][idx_j], history[i][idx1]) |
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\/ \E idx_i \in 1..lastCommitted[i].index: |
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TxnEqual(history[i][idx_i], history[j][idx2]) |
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\* Total order: If some follower delivers a before b, then any process that delivers b |
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\* must also deliver a and deliver a before b. |
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TotalOrder == \A i, j \in Server: |
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LET committed1 == lastCommitted[i].index |
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committed2 == lastCommitted[j].index |
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IN committed1 >= 2 /\ committed2 >= 2 |
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=> \A idx_i1 \in 1..(committed1 - 1) : \A idx_i2 \in (idx_i1 + 1)..committed1 : |
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LET logOk == \E idx \in 1..committed2 : |
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TxnEqual(history[i][idx_i2], history[j][idx]) |
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IN \/ ~logOk |
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\/ /\ logOk |
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/\ \E idx_j2 \in 1..committed2 : |
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/\ TxnEqual(history[i][idx_i2], history[j][idx_j2]) |
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/\ \E idx_j1 \in 1..(idx_j2 - 1): |
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TxnEqual(history[i][idx_i1], history[j][idx_j1]) |
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\* Local primary order: If a primary broadcasts a before it broadcasts b, then a follower that |
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\* delivers b must also deliver a before b. |
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LocalPrimaryOrder == LET p_set(i, e) == |
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txn_set(i, e) == |
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IN \A i \in Server: \A e \in 1..currentEpoch[i]: |
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\/ Cardinality(txn_set(i, e)) < 2 |
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\/ /\ Cardinality(txn_set(i, e)) >= 2 |
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/\ \E txn1, txn2 \in txn_set(i, e): |
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\/ TxnEqual(txn1, txn2) |
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\/ /\ ~TxnEqual(txn1, txn2) |
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/\ LET TxnPre == IF ZxidCompare(txn1.zxid, txn2.zxid) THEN txn2 ELSE txn1 |
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TxnNext == IF ZxidCompare(txn1.zxid, txn2.zxid) THEN txn1 ELSE txn2 |
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IN \A j \in Server: /\ lastCommitted[j].index >= 2 |
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/\ \E idx \in 1..lastCommitted[j].index: |
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TxnEqual(history[j][idx], TxnNext) |
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=> \E idx2 \in 1..lastCommitted[j].index: |
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/\ TxnEqual(history[j][idx2], TxnNext) |
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/\ idx2 > 1 |
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/\ \E idx1 \in 1..(idx2 - 1): |
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TxnEqual(history[j][idx1], TxnPre) |
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\* Global primary order: A follower f delivers both a with epoch e and b with epoch e', and e < e', |
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\* then f must deliver a before b. |
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GlobalPrimaryOrder == \A i \in Server: lastCommitted[i].index >= 2 |
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=> \A idx1, idx2 \in 1..lastCommitted[i].index: |
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\/ ~EpochPrecedeInTxn(history[i][idx1], history[i][idx2]) |
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\/ /\ EpochPrecedeInTxn(history[i][idx1], history[i][idx2]) |
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/\ idx1 < idx2 |
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\* Primary integrity: If primary p broadcasts a and some follower f delivers b such that b has epoch |
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\* smaller than epoch of p, then p must deliver b before it broadcasts a. |
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PrimaryIntegrity == \A i, j \in Server: /\ IsLeader(i) /\ IsMyLearner(i, j) |
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/\ IsFollower(j) /\ IsMyLeader(j, i) |
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/\ zabState[i] = BROADCAST |
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/\ zabState[j] = BROADCAST |
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/\ lastCommitted[j].index >= 1 |
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=> \A idx_j \in 1..lastCommitted[j].index: |
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\/ history[j][idx_j].zxid[1] >= currentEpoch[i] |
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\/ /\ history[j][idx_j].zxid[1] < currentEpoch[i] |
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/\ \E idx_i \in 1..lastCommitted[i].index: |
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TxnEqual(history[i][idx_i], history[j][idx_j]) |
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============================================================================= |
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\* Modification History |
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\* Last modified Tue Jan 31 20:40:11 CST 2023 by huangbinyu |
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\* Last modified Sat Dec 11 22:31:08 CST 2021 by Dell |
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\* Created Thu Dec 02 20:49:23 CST 2021 by Dell |
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