IN-Abs/test-data/summary/2256.txt

In June 1948 the appellant instituted a suit against the first respondent and others for their ejectment from the property in suit, On February 28, 1949 the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act came into force.
The first respondent was not a thika tenant within the definition therefore of given in the Act.
The suit was decreed by the Munsif in March 1949.
In November 1949 the appeal filed by the first respondent was ,dismissed by the first appellate court.
He then filed a second ,,appeal in the High Court which was heard in 1954.
Before that the Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1953 was passed.
Under this Act the first respondent came within the definition of thika tenant.
The High Court remanded the case to the Subordinate Judge for trying the case in the light of the amended Act.
The Subordinate Judge held that the first respondent was a thika tenant and could not be ejected as none of the grounds mentioned in section 3 of the Act had been established by the appellant.
The latter appealed to the High Court and urged that with the omission of section 29 in the 1953 Act Civil Courts became, unable to remit ejectment suits to the Rent Controller with the result that the Act as amended could not apply to pre Act suits.
The High Court however took the view that after the omission of sections 28 and 29 from the Act suits for eviction before civil courts became infructuous and, accordingly, dismissed the appeal.
The appellant with certificate came to this Court.
The questions that fell for consideration were: (i) whether the tenant could take the benefit of section 3 in a pre Act suit, (ii) whether in view of the omission of sections 28 and 29 from the Act the civil courts had jurisdiction to try such a suit.
HELD:Per Wanchoo C.J. & Mitter J. (i) While it is a general principle of law that statutes are not to operate retrospectively so as to defeat vested interests; such operation may be given by express enactment or by necessary implication from the language employed.
The language of section 3 leaves no room for doubt that it is retrospective since it expressly states that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract, a thika tenant will be liable to ejectment on grounds specified therein and not otherwise.
[179 D E; 180 F G].
Knight vs Lee, and Beadling vs Goll, 39 Times Law Reporter 31, referred to.
Section 3 does not purport to lay down that the grounds mentioned therein have got to be stated in the notice of ejectment.
All that the section lays down is that ejectment could not be had unless the ,existence of one of the grounds was proved.
Such proof could have been adduced at the trial even if no mention of the grounds had been made before.
The appellant not having given such proof the case was rightly decided against him.
[183 C D].
171 (ii) However In a pre Act suit no notice under section 4 could be insisted on as that section , clearly prospective.
Section 5 which required proceedings to be filed before the Controller was also clearly prospective.
[180 H; 181 A; B H].
(iii) The High Court was wrong in holding, that suits for the eviction of thika tenants became infructious before civil courts after the omission of sections 28 and 29.
There being no longer any provision for transfer of pending suits and appeals, the court hearing the appeal would have to pass a decree for ejectment even if the defendant was a thika tenant after taking into account section 3.
[183 D F].
Per Bhargava, J. This appeal must be dismissed because the respondent was entitled to the benefit of section 3.
It was not necessary to express any opinion whether compliance With section 4 was also required or whether it being prospective only no such compliance by the appellant was needed.
[184 B].