| estoppel is a rule of equity which has gained new dimensions in recent years. promissory estoppel is defined in black 's law distionary as an estoppel which arises when there is a promise which promissor should reasonable expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of promisee and which does include such action or forbearance and such promise is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of promise. in central london property trust ltd vs high trees house ltd 1947 1 k b 130 high trees case the principle stated is that where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a promise or assurance which was intended to affect the legal relations between them and to be acted on accordingly then once the other party has taken him at his word and acted on it the party who gave the promise or assurance can not afterwards be allowed to revert to the previous legal relationship as if no such promise or assurance had been made by him but he must accept their legal relations subject to the qualification which he himself has so introduced even though it is not supported in point of law by any consideration but only by his word. but that principle does not create any cause of action which did not exist before so that where a promise is made which is not supported by any consideration the promise can not bring an action on the basis of that promise. no vested right as to tax holding is acquired by a person who is granted concession. if any concession has been given it can be withdrawn at any time and no time limit should be insisted upon before it was withdrawn. the rule of promissory estoppel can be invoked only if on the basis of representation made by the government the industry was established to avail benefit if of exemption. in kasinka trading and anr vs union of india and anr 1995 1 scc 274 1994 indlaw sc 2183 it was held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel represents a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice. a person may have a legitimate expectation of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment. the expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority including an implied representation or from consistent past practice. the doctrine of legitimate expectation has an important place in the developing law of judicial review. it is however not necessary to explore the doctrine in this case it is enough merely to note that a legitimate expectation can provide a sufficient interest to enable one who can not point to the existence of a substantive right to obtain the leave of the court to apply for judicial review. it is generally agreed that legitimate expectation gives the applicant sufficient locus standi for judicial review and that the doctrine of legitimate expectation to be confined mostly to right to a fair hearing before a decision which results in negativing a promise or withdrawing an undertaking is taken. the doctrine does not give scope to claim relief straightway from the administrative authorities as no crystallized right as such involved. the protection of such legitimate expectation does not require the fulfilment of the expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise. the basic requirement of article 14 is fairness in action by the state and non arbitrariness in essence and substance is the heart beat of fair play. actions are amenable in the panorama of judicial review only to the extent that the state must act validity for discernible reasons not whimsically for any ulterior purpose. the meaning and true import and concept of arbitrariness is more easily visualized than precisely defined. a question whether the impugned action is arbitrary or not is to be ultimately answered on the facts and circumstances of a given case. a basic and obvious test to apply in such cases is to see whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the impugned action and if so does if really satisfy the test of reasonableness. every state action must be informed by reason and it follows that an act uninformed by reason is per se arbitrary. something overwhelming must appear before the court will intervene. that is and ought to be a difficult onus for an applicant to discharge. there is ample room within the legal boundaries for radical differences of opinion in which neither side is unreasonable. the reasonableness in administrative law must therefore distinguish between proper course and improper abuse of power. nor is the test court 's own standard of reasonableness as it might conceive it in a given situation. the point to note is that the thing is not unreasonable in the legal sense merely because the court thinks it to be unwise. in punjab communications ltd vs union of india of others air 1999 sc 1801 1999 indlaw sc 1548 the change in policy can defeat a substantive legitimate expectation if it can be justified on wednesbury reasonableness. the decision maker has the choice in the balancing of the pros and cons relevant to the change in policy. it is therefore clear that the choice of police is for the decision maker and not the court. the legitimate substantive expectation merely permits the court to find out if the change of policy which is the cause for defeating the legitimate expectation is irrational or perverse or one which no reasonable person could have made a claim based on merely legitimate expectation without anything more can not ipso facto give a right. its uniqueness lies in the fact that it covers the entire span of time present past and future how significant is the statement that today is tomorrows yesterday. the present is as we experience it the past is a present memory and future is a present expectation. if a denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of right guaranteed or is arbitrary discriminatory unfair or biased gross abuse of power of violation of principles of natural justice the same can be questioned on the well known grounds attracting article 14 but a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more can not ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles. it can be one of the grounds to consider but the court must lift the veil and see whether the decision is violative of these principles warranting interference. if the state acts within the bounds of reasonableness it would be legitimate to take into consideration the national priorities and adopt trade policies. as noted above the ultimate test is whether on the touchstone of reasonableness the policy decision comes out unscathed. reasonableness of restriction is to be determined in an objective manner and from the standpoint of interest of the general public and not from the standpoint of the interests of persons upon whom the restrictions have been imposed or upon abstract consideration. a restriction can not be said to be unreasonable merely because in a given case it operates harshly. in determining whether there is any unfairness involved the nature of the right alleged to have taken infringed the underlying purpose of the restriction imposed the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby the disproportion of the imposition the prevailing condition at the relevant time enter into judicial verdict the reasonableness of the legitimate expectation has to be determined with respect to the circumstances relating to the trade or business in question. the state government if it so chooses shall file its further counter affidavits before the high court within six weeks from today indicating the reasons which warranted the withdrawal of the benefits extended. the plea of the appellants regarding legitimate expectation shall be considered by the high court in the light of materials to be placed by the respondents by affidavits as directed above. the court made it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the factual aspects except indicating the principles underlying legitimate expectation. another point which was specifically raised before the high court but has not been dealt by it is the legality of the action in directing retrospective withdrawal of the benefit by a letter of the government whether the same is permissible in law has to be decided by the high court. |