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@@ -3153,3 +3153,6 @@ platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/pkg/tool/linux_amd64/test2json filter=lfs diff=lfs
 platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/pkg/tool/linux_amd64/trace filter=lfs diff=lfs merge=lfs -text
 platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/pkg/tool/linux_amd64/vet filter=lfs diff=lfs merge=lfs -text
 platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/cmd/compile/default.pgo filter=lfs diff=lfs merge=lfs -text
+platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/internal/boring/syso/goboringcrypto_linux_amd64.syso filter=lfs diff=lfs merge=lfs -text
+platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/internal/boring/syso/goboringcrypto_linux_arm64.syso filter=lfs diff=lfs merge=lfs -text
+platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/debug/pe/testdata/gcc-amd64-mingw-exec filter=lfs diff=lfs merge=lfs -text

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/aes/cipher_generic.go

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+//go:build !amd64 && !s390x && !ppc64 && !ppc64le && !arm64
+
+package aes
+
+import (
+	"crypto/cipher"
+)
+
+// newCipher calls the newCipherGeneric function
+// directly. Platforms with hardware accelerated
+// implementations of AES should implement their
+// own version of newCipher (which may then call
+// newCipherGeneric if needed).
+func newCipher(key []byte) (cipher.Block, error) {
+	return newCipherGeneric(key)
+}
+
+// expandKey is used by BenchmarkExpand and should
+// call an assembly implementation if one is available.
+func expandKey(key []byte, enc, dec []uint32) {
+	expandKeyGo(key, enc, dec)
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/aes/cipher_s390x.go

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package aes
+
+import (
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/internal/alias"
+	"internal/cpu"
+)
+
+type code int
+
+// Function codes for the cipher message family of instructions.
+const (
+	aes128 code = 18
+	aes192      = 19
+	aes256      = 20
+)
+
+type aesCipherAsm struct {
+	function code     // code for cipher message instruction
+	key      []byte   // key (128, 192 or 256 bits)
+	storage  [32]byte // array backing key slice
+}
+
+// cryptBlocks invokes the cipher message (KM) instruction with
+// the given function code. This is equivalent to AES in ECB
+// mode. The length must be a multiple of BlockSize (16).
+//
+//go:noescape
+func cryptBlocks(c code, key, dst, src *byte, length int)
+
+func newCipher(key []byte) (cipher.Block, error) {
+	// The aesCipherAsm type implements the cbcEncAble, cbcDecAble,
+	// ctrAble and gcmAble interfaces. We therefore need to check
+	// for all the features required to implement these modes.
+	// Keep in sync with crypto/tls/common.go.
+	if !(cpu.S390X.HasAES && cpu.S390X.HasAESCBC && cpu.S390X.HasAESCTR && (cpu.S390X.HasGHASH || cpu.S390X.HasAESGCM)) {
+		return newCipherGeneric(key)
+	}
+
+	var function code
+	switch len(key) {
+	case 128 / 8:
+		function = aes128
+	case 192 / 8:
+		function = aes192
+	case 256 / 8:
+		function = aes256
+	default:
+		return nil, KeySizeError(len(key))
+	}
+
+	var c aesCipherAsm
+	c.function = function
+	c.key = c.storage[:len(key)]
+	copy(c.key, key)
+	return &c, nil
+}
+
+func (c *aesCipherAsm) BlockSize() int { return BlockSize }
+
+func (c *aesCipherAsm) Encrypt(dst, src []byte) {
+	if len(src) < BlockSize {
+		panic("crypto/aes: input not full block")
+	}
+	if len(dst) < BlockSize {
+		panic("crypto/aes: output not full block")
+	}
+	if alias.InexactOverlap(dst[:BlockSize], src[:BlockSize]) {
+		panic("crypto/aes: invalid buffer overlap")
+	}
+	cryptBlocks(c.function, &c.key[0], &dst[0], &src[0], BlockSize)
+}
+
+func (c *aesCipherAsm) Decrypt(dst, src []byte) {
+	if len(src) < BlockSize {
+		panic("crypto/aes: input not full block")
+	}
+	if len(dst) < BlockSize {
+		panic("crypto/aes: output not full block")
+	}
+	if alias.InexactOverlap(dst[:BlockSize], src[:BlockSize]) {
+		panic("crypto/aes: invalid buffer overlap")
+	}
+	// The decrypt function code is equal to the function code + 128.
+	cryptBlocks(c.function+128, &c.key[0], &dst[0], &src[0], BlockSize)
+}
+
+// expandKey is used by BenchmarkExpand. cipher message (KM) does not need key
+// expansion so there is no assembly equivalent.
+func expandKey(key []byte, enc, dec []uint32) {
+	expandKeyGo(key, enc, dec)
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/aes/const.go

@@ -0,0 +1,365 @@
+// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package aes implements AES encryption (formerly Rijndael), as defined in
+// U.S. Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197.
+//
+// The AES operations in this package are not implemented using constant-time algorithms.
+// An exception is when running on systems with enabled hardware support for AES
+// that makes these operations constant-time. Examples include amd64 systems using AES-NI
+// extensions and s390x systems using Message-Security-Assist extensions.
+// On such systems, when the result of NewCipher is passed to cipher.NewGCM,
+// the GHASH operation used by GCM is also constant-time.
+package aes
+
+// This file contains AES constants - 8720 bytes of initialized data.
+
+// https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
+
+// AES is based on the mathematical behavior of binary polynomials
+// (polynomials over GF(2)) modulo the irreducible polynomial x⁸ + x⁴ + x³ + x + 1.
+// Addition of these binary polynomials corresponds to binary xor.
+// Reducing mod poly corresponds to binary xor with poly every
+// time a 0x100 bit appears.
+const poly = 1<<8 | 1<<4 | 1<<3 | 1<<1 | 1<<0 // x⁸ + x⁴ + x³ + x + 1
+
+// Powers of x mod poly in GF(2).
+var powx = [16]byte{
+	0x01,
+	0x02,
+	0x04,
+	0x08,
+	0x10,
+	0x20,
+	0x40,
+	0x80,
+	0x1b,
+	0x36,
+	0x6c,
+	0xd8,
+	0xab,
+	0x4d,
+	0x9a,
+	0x2f,
+}
+
+// FIPS-197 Figure 7. S-box substitution values in hexadecimal format.
+var sbox0 = [256]byte{
+	0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76,
+	0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0, 0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0,
+	0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc, 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15,
+	0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75,
+	0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0, 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84,
+	0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b, 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf,
+	0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85, 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8,
+	0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5, 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2,
+	0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73,
+	0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb,
+	0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c, 0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79,
+	0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9, 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08,
+	0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a,
+	0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e,
+	0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94, 0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf,
+	0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16,
+}
+
+// FIPS-197 Figure 14.  Inverse S-box substitution values in hexadecimal format.
+var sbox1 = [256]byte{
+	0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38, 0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb,
+	0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87, 0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb,
+	0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d, 0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e,
+	0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2, 0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25,
+	0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16, 0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92,
+	0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda, 0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84,
+	0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a, 0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06,
+	0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02, 0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b,
+	0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73,
+	0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85, 0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e,
+	0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89, 0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b,
+	0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20, 0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4,
+	0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31, 0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f,
+	0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d, 0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef,
+	0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0, 0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61,
+	0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26, 0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d,
+}
+
+// Lookup tables for encryption.
+// These can be recomputed by adapting the tests in aes_test.go.
+
+var te0 = [256]uint32{
+	0xc66363a5, 0xf87c7c84, 0xee777799, 0xf67b7b8d, 0xfff2f20d, 0xd66b6bbd, 0xde6f6fb1, 0x91c5c554,
+	0x60303050, 0x02010103, 0xce6767a9, 0x562b2b7d, 0xe7fefe19, 0xb5d7d762, 0x4dababe6, 0xec76769a,
+	0x8fcaca45, 0x1f82829d, 0x89c9c940, 0xfa7d7d87, 0xeffafa15, 0xb25959eb, 0x8e4747c9, 0xfbf0f00b,
+	0x41adadec, 0xb3d4d467, 0x5fa2a2fd, 0x45afafea, 0x239c9cbf, 0x53a4a4f7, 0xe4727296, 0x9bc0c05b,
+	0x75b7b7c2, 0xe1fdfd1c, 0x3d9393ae, 0x4c26266a, 0x6c36365a, 0x7e3f3f41, 0xf5f7f702, 0x83cccc4f,
+	0x6834345c, 0x51a5a5f4, 0xd1e5e534, 0xf9f1f108, 0xe2717193, 0xabd8d873, 0x62313153, 0x2a15153f,
+	0x0804040c, 0x95c7c752, 0x46232365, 0x9dc3c35e, 0x30181828, 0x379696a1, 0x0a05050f, 0x2f9a9ab5,
+	0x0e070709, 0x24121236, 0x1b80809b, 0xdfe2e23d, 0xcdebeb26, 0x4e272769, 0x7fb2b2cd, 0xea75759f,
+	0x1209091b, 0x1d83839e, 0x582c2c74, 0x341a1a2e, 0x361b1b2d, 0xdc6e6eb2, 0xb45a5aee, 0x5ba0a0fb,
+	0xa45252f6, 0x763b3b4d, 0xb7d6d661, 0x7db3b3ce, 0x5229297b, 0xdde3e33e, 0x5e2f2f71, 0x13848497,
+	0xa65353f5, 0xb9d1d168, 0x00000000, 0xc1eded2c, 0x40202060, 0xe3fcfc1f, 0x79b1b1c8, 0xb65b5bed,
+	0xd46a6abe, 0x8dcbcb46, 0x67bebed9, 0x7239394b, 0x944a4ade, 0x984c4cd4, 0xb05858e8, 0x85cfcf4a,
+	0xbbd0d06b, 0xc5efef2a, 0x4faaaae5, 0xedfbfb16, 0x864343c5, 0x9a4d4dd7, 0x66333355, 0x11858594,
+	0x8a4545cf, 0xe9f9f910, 0x04020206, 0xfe7f7f81, 0xa05050f0, 0x783c3c44, 0x259f9fba, 0x4ba8a8e3,
+	0xa25151f3, 0x5da3a3fe, 0x804040c0, 0x058f8f8a, 0x3f9292ad, 0x219d9dbc, 0x70383848, 0xf1f5f504,
+	0x63bcbcdf, 0x77b6b6c1, 0xafdada75, 0x42212163, 0x20101030, 0xe5ffff1a, 0xfdf3f30e, 0xbfd2d26d,
+	0x81cdcd4c, 0x180c0c14, 0x26131335, 0xc3ecec2f, 0xbe5f5fe1, 0x359797a2, 0x884444cc, 0x2e171739,
+	0x93c4c457, 0x55a7a7f2, 0xfc7e7e82, 0x7a3d3d47, 0xc86464ac, 0xba5d5de7, 0x3219192b, 0xe6737395,
+	0xc06060a0, 0x19818198, 0x9e4f4fd1, 0xa3dcdc7f, 0x44222266, 0x542a2a7e, 0x3b9090ab, 0x0b888883,
+	0x8c4646ca, 0xc7eeee29, 0x6bb8b8d3, 0x2814143c, 0xa7dede79, 0xbc5e5ee2, 0x160b0b1d, 0xaddbdb76,
+	0xdbe0e03b, 0x64323256, 0x743a3a4e, 0x140a0a1e, 0x924949db, 0x0c06060a, 0x4824246c, 0xb85c5ce4,
+	0x9fc2c25d, 0xbdd3d36e, 0x43acacef, 0xc46262a6, 0x399191a8, 0x319595a4, 0xd3e4e437, 0xf279798b,
+	0xd5e7e732, 0x8bc8c843, 0x6e373759, 0xda6d6db7, 0x018d8d8c, 0xb1d5d564, 0x9c4e4ed2, 0x49a9a9e0,
+	0xd86c6cb4, 0xac5656fa, 0xf3f4f407, 0xcfeaea25, 0xca6565af, 0xf47a7a8e, 0x47aeaee9, 0x10080818,
+	0x6fbabad5, 0xf0787888, 0x4a25256f, 0x5c2e2e72, 0x381c1c24, 0x57a6a6f1, 0x73b4b4c7, 0x97c6c651,
+	0xcbe8e823, 0xa1dddd7c, 0xe874749c, 0x3e1f1f21, 0x964b4bdd, 0x61bdbddc, 0x0d8b8b86, 0x0f8a8a85,
+	0xe0707090, 0x7c3e3e42, 0x71b5b5c4, 0xcc6666aa, 0x904848d8, 0x06030305, 0xf7f6f601, 0x1c0e0e12,
+	0xc26161a3, 0x6a35355f, 0xae5757f9, 0x69b9b9d0, 0x17868691, 0x99c1c158, 0x3a1d1d27, 0x279e9eb9,
+	0xd9e1e138, 0xebf8f813, 0x2b9898b3, 0x22111133, 0xd26969bb, 0xa9d9d970, 0x078e8e89, 0x339494a7,
+	0x2d9b9bb6, 0x3c1e1e22, 0x15878792, 0xc9e9e920, 0x87cece49, 0xaa5555ff, 0x50282878, 0xa5dfdf7a,
+	0x038c8c8f, 0x59a1a1f8, 0x09898980, 0x1a0d0d17, 0x65bfbfda, 0xd7e6e631, 0x844242c6, 0xd06868b8,
+	0x824141c3, 0x299999b0, 0x5a2d2d77, 0x1e0f0f11, 0x7bb0b0cb, 0xa85454fc, 0x6dbbbbd6, 0x2c16163a,
+}
+var te1 = [256]uint32{
+	0xa5c66363, 0x84f87c7c, 0x99ee7777, 0x8df67b7b, 0x0dfff2f2, 0xbdd66b6b, 0xb1de6f6f, 0x5491c5c5,
+	0x50603030, 0x03020101, 0xa9ce6767, 0x7d562b2b, 0x19e7fefe, 0x62b5d7d7, 0xe64dabab, 0x9aec7676,
+	0x458fcaca, 0x9d1f8282, 0x4089c9c9, 0x87fa7d7d, 0x15effafa, 0xebb25959, 0xc98e4747, 0x0bfbf0f0,
+	0xec41adad, 0x67b3d4d4, 0xfd5fa2a2, 0xea45afaf, 0xbf239c9c, 0xf753a4a4, 0x96e47272, 0x5b9bc0c0,
+	0xc275b7b7, 0x1ce1fdfd, 0xae3d9393, 0x6a4c2626, 0x5a6c3636, 0x417e3f3f, 0x02f5f7f7, 0x4f83cccc,
+	0x5c683434, 0xf451a5a5, 0x34d1e5e5, 0x08f9f1f1, 0x93e27171, 0x73abd8d8, 0x53623131, 0x3f2a1515,
+	0x0c080404, 0x5295c7c7, 0x65462323, 0x5e9dc3c3, 0x28301818, 0xa1379696, 0x0f0a0505, 0xb52f9a9a,
+	0x090e0707, 0x36241212, 0x9b1b8080, 0x3ddfe2e2, 0x26cdebeb, 0x694e2727, 0xcd7fb2b2, 0x9fea7575,
+	0x1b120909, 0x9e1d8383, 0x74582c2c, 0x2e341a1a, 0x2d361b1b, 0xb2dc6e6e, 0xeeb45a5a, 0xfb5ba0a0,
+	0xf6a45252, 0x4d763b3b, 0x61b7d6d6, 0xce7db3b3, 0x7b522929, 0x3edde3e3, 0x715e2f2f, 0x97138484,
+	0xf5a65353, 0x68b9d1d1, 0x00000000, 0x2cc1eded, 0x60402020, 0x1fe3fcfc, 0xc879b1b1, 0xedb65b5b,
+	0xbed46a6a, 0x468dcbcb, 0xd967bebe, 0x4b723939, 0xde944a4a, 0xd4984c4c, 0xe8b05858, 0x4a85cfcf,
+	0x6bbbd0d0, 0x2ac5efef, 0xe54faaaa, 0x16edfbfb, 0xc5864343, 0xd79a4d4d, 0x55663333, 0x94118585,
+	0xcf8a4545, 0x10e9f9f9, 0x06040202, 0x81fe7f7f, 0xf0a05050, 0x44783c3c, 0xba259f9f, 0xe34ba8a8,
+	0xf3a25151, 0xfe5da3a3, 0xc0804040, 0x8a058f8f, 0xad3f9292, 0xbc219d9d, 0x48703838, 0x04f1f5f5,
+	0xdf63bcbc, 0xc177b6b6, 0x75afdada, 0x63422121, 0x30201010, 0x1ae5ffff, 0x0efdf3f3, 0x6dbfd2d2,
+	0x4c81cdcd, 0x14180c0c, 0x35261313, 0x2fc3ecec, 0xe1be5f5f, 0xa2359797, 0xcc884444, 0x392e1717,
+	0x5793c4c4, 0xf255a7a7, 0x82fc7e7e, 0x477a3d3d, 0xacc86464, 0xe7ba5d5d, 0x2b321919, 0x95e67373,
+	0xa0c06060, 0x98198181, 0xd19e4f4f, 0x7fa3dcdc, 0x66442222, 0x7e542a2a, 0xab3b9090, 0x830b8888,
+	0xca8c4646, 0x29c7eeee, 0xd36bb8b8, 0x3c281414, 0x79a7dede, 0xe2bc5e5e, 0x1d160b0b, 0x76addbdb,
+	0x3bdbe0e0, 0x56643232, 0x4e743a3a, 0x1e140a0a, 0xdb924949, 0x0a0c0606, 0x6c482424, 0xe4b85c5c,
+	0x5d9fc2c2, 0x6ebdd3d3, 0xef43acac, 0xa6c46262, 0xa8399191, 0xa4319595, 0x37d3e4e4, 0x8bf27979,
+	0x32d5e7e7, 0x438bc8c8, 0x596e3737, 0xb7da6d6d, 0x8c018d8d, 0x64b1d5d5, 0xd29c4e4e, 0xe049a9a9,
+	0xb4d86c6c, 0xfaac5656, 0x07f3f4f4, 0x25cfeaea, 0xafca6565, 0x8ef47a7a, 0xe947aeae, 0x18100808,
+	0xd56fbaba, 0x88f07878, 0x6f4a2525, 0x725c2e2e, 0x24381c1c, 0xf157a6a6, 0xc773b4b4, 0x5197c6c6,
+	0x23cbe8e8, 0x7ca1dddd, 0x9ce87474, 0x213e1f1f, 0xdd964b4b, 0xdc61bdbd, 0x860d8b8b, 0x850f8a8a,
+	0x90e07070, 0x427c3e3e, 0xc471b5b5, 0xaacc6666, 0xd8904848, 0x05060303, 0x01f7f6f6, 0x121c0e0e,
+	0xa3c26161, 0x5f6a3535, 0xf9ae5757, 0xd069b9b9, 0x91178686, 0x5899c1c1, 0x273a1d1d, 0xb9279e9e,
+	0x38d9e1e1, 0x13ebf8f8, 0xb32b9898, 0x33221111, 0xbbd26969, 0x70a9d9d9, 0x89078e8e, 0xa7339494,
+	0xb62d9b9b, 0x223c1e1e, 0x92158787, 0x20c9e9e9, 0x4987cece, 0xffaa5555, 0x78502828, 0x7aa5dfdf,
+	0x8f038c8c, 0xf859a1a1, 0x80098989, 0x171a0d0d, 0xda65bfbf, 0x31d7e6e6, 0xc6844242, 0xb8d06868,
+	0xc3824141, 0xb0299999, 0x775a2d2d, 0x111e0f0f, 0xcb7bb0b0, 0xfca85454, 0xd66dbbbb, 0x3a2c1616,
+}
+var te2 = [256]uint32{
+	0x63a5c663, 0x7c84f87c, 0x7799ee77, 0x7b8df67b, 0xf20dfff2, 0x6bbdd66b, 0x6fb1de6f, 0xc55491c5,
+	0x30506030, 0x01030201, 0x67a9ce67, 0x2b7d562b, 0xfe19e7fe, 0xd762b5d7, 0xabe64dab, 0x769aec76,
+	0xca458fca, 0x829d1f82, 0xc94089c9, 0x7d87fa7d, 0xfa15effa, 0x59ebb259, 0x47c98e47, 0xf00bfbf0,
+	0xadec41ad, 0xd467b3d4, 0xa2fd5fa2, 0xafea45af, 0x9cbf239c, 0xa4f753a4, 0x7296e472, 0xc05b9bc0,
+	0xb7c275b7, 0xfd1ce1fd, 0x93ae3d93, 0x266a4c26, 0x365a6c36, 0x3f417e3f, 0xf702f5f7, 0xcc4f83cc,
+	0x345c6834, 0xa5f451a5, 0xe534d1e5, 0xf108f9f1, 0x7193e271, 0xd873abd8, 0x31536231, 0x153f2a15,
+	0x040c0804, 0xc75295c7, 0x23654623, 0xc35e9dc3, 0x18283018, 0x96a13796, 0x050f0a05, 0x9ab52f9a,
+	0x07090e07, 0x12362412, 0x809b1b80, 0xe23ddfe2, 0xeb26cdeb, 0x27694e27, 0xb2cd7fb2, 0x759fea75,
+	0x091b1209, 0x839e1d83, 0x2c74582c, 0x1a2e341a, 0x1b2d361b, 0x6eb2dc6e, 0x5aeeb45a, 0xa0fb5ba0,
+	0x52f6a452, 0x3b4d763b, 0xd661b7d6, 0xb3ce7db3, 0x297b5229, 0xe33edde3, 0x2f715e2f, 0x84971384,
+	0x53f5a653, 0xd168b9d1, 0x00000000, 0xed2cc1ed, 0x20604020, 0xfc1fe3fc, 0xb1c879b1, 0x5bedb65b,
+	0x6abed46a, 0xcb468dcb, 0xbed967be, 0x394b7239, 0x4ade944a, 0x4cd4984c, 0x58e8b058, 0xcf4a85cf,
+	0xd06bbbd0, 0xef2ac5ef, 0xaae54faa, 0xfb16edfb, 0x43c58643, 0x4dd79a4d, 0x33556633, 0x85941185,
+	0x45cf8a45, 0xf910e9f9, 0x02060402, 0x7f81fe7f, 0x50f0a050, 0x3c44783c, 0x9fba259f, 0xa8e34ba8,
+	0x51f3a251, 0xa3fe5da3, 0x40c08040, 0x8f8a058f, 0x92ad3f92, 0x9dbc219d, 0x38487038, 0xf504f1f5,
+	0xbcdf63bc, 0xb6c177b6, 0xda75afda, 0x21634221, 0x10302010, 0xff1ae5ff, 0xf30efdf3, 0xd26dbfd2,
+	0xcd4c81cd, 0x0c14180c, 0x13352613, 0xec2fc3ec, 0x5fe1be5f, 0x97a23597, 0x44cc8844, 0x17392e17,
+	0xc45793c4, 0xa7f255a7, 0x7e82fc7e, 0x3d477a3d, 0x64acc864, 0x5de7ba5d, 0x192b3219, 0x7395e673,
+	0x60a0c060, 0x81981981, 0x4fd19e4f, 0xdc7fa3dc, 0x22664422, 0x2a7e542a, 0x90ab3b90, 0x88830b88,
+	0x46ca8c46, 0xee29c7ee, 0xb8d36bb8, 0x143c2814, 0xde79a7de, 0x5ee2bc5e, 0x0b1d160b, 0xdb76addb,
+	0xe03bdbe0, 0x32566432, 0x3a4e743a, 0x0a1e140a, 0x49db9249, 0x060a0c06, 0x246c4824, 0x5ce4b85c,
+	0xc25d9fc2, 0xd36ebdd3, 0xacef43ac, 0x62a6c462, 0x91a83991, 0x95a43195, 0xe437d3e4, 0x798bf279,
+	0xe732d5e7, 0xc8438bc8, 0x37596e37, 0x6db7da6d, 0x8d8c018d, 0xd564b1d5, 0x4ed29c4e, 0xa9e049a9,
+	0x6cb4d86c, 0x56faac56, 0xf407f3f4, 0xea25cfea, 0x65afca65, 0x7a8ef47a, 0xaee947ae, 0x08181008,
+	0xbad56fba, 0x7888f078, 0x256f4a25, 0x2e725c2e, 0x1c24381c, 0xa6f157a6, 0xb4c773b4, 0xc65197c6,
+	0xe823cbe8, 0xdd7ca1dd, 0x749ce874, 0x1f213e1f, 0x4bdd964b, 0xbddc61bd, 0x8b860d8b, 0x8a850f8a,
+	0x7090e070, 0x3e427c3e, 0xb5c471b5, 0x66aacc66, 0x48d89048, 0x03050603, 0xf601f7f6, 0x0e121c0e,
+	0x61a3c261, 0x355f6a35, 0x57f9ae57, 0xb9d069b9, 0x86911786, 0xc15899c1, 0x1d273a1d, 0x9eb9279e,
+	0xe138d9e1, 0xf813ebf8, 0x98b32b98, 0x11332211, 0x69bbd269, 0xd970a9d9, 0x8e89078e, 0x94a73394,
+	0x9bb62d9b, 0x1e223c1e, 0x87921587, 0xe920c9e9, 0xce4987ce, 0x55ffaa55, 0x28785028, 0xdf7aa5df,
+	0x8c8f038c, 0xa1f859a1, 0x89800989, 0x0d171a0d, 0xbfda65bf, 0xe631d7e6, 0x42c68442, 0x68b8d068,
+	0x41c38241, 0x99b02999, 0x2d775a2d, 0x0f111e0f, 0xb0cb7bb0, 0x54fca854, 0xbbd66dbb, 0x163a2c16,
+}
+var te3 = [256]uint32{
+	0x6363a5c6, 0x7c7c84f8, 0x777799ee, 0x7b7b8df6, 0xf2f20dff, 0x6b6bbdd6, 0x6f6fb1de, 0xc5c55491,
+	0x30305060, 0x01010302, 0x6767a9ce, 0x2b2b7d56, 0xfefe19e7, 0xd7d762b5, 0xababe64d, 0x76769aec,
+	0xcaca458f, 0x82829d1f, 0xc9c94089, 0x7d7d87fa, 0xfafa15ef, 0x5959ebb2, 0x4747c98e, 0xf0f00bfb,
+	0xadadec41, 0xd4d467b3, 0xa2a2fd5f, 0xafafea45, 0x9c9cbf23, 0xa4a4f753, 0x727296e4, 0xc0c05b9b,
+	0xb7b7c275, 0xfdfd1ce1, 0x9393ae3d, 0x26266a4c, 0x36365a6c, 0x3f3f417e, 0xf7f702f5, 0xcccc4f83,
+	0x34345c68, 0xa5a5f451, 0xe5e534d1, 0xf1f108f9, 0x717193e2, 0xd8d873ab, 0x31315362, 0x15153f2a,
+	0x04040c08, 0xc7c75295, 0x23236546, 0xc3c35e9d, 0x18182830, 0x9696a137, 0x05050f0a, 0x9a9ab52f,
+	0x0707090e, 0x12123624, 0x80809b1b, 0xe2e23ddf, 0xebeb26cd, 0x2727694e, 0xb2b2cd7f, 0x75759fea,
+	0x09091b12, 0x83839e1d, 0x2c2c7458, 0x1a1a2e34, 0x1b1b2d36, 0x6e6eb2dc, 0x5a5aeeb4, 0xa0a0fb5b,
+	0x5252f6a4, 0x3b3b4d76, 0xd6d661b7, 0xb3b3ce7d, 0x29297b52, 0xe3e33edd, 0x2f2f715e, 0x84849713,
+	0x5353f5a6, 0xd1d168b9, 0x00000000, 0xeded2cc1, 0x20206040, 0xfcfc1fe3, 0xb1b1c879, 0x5b5bedb6,
+	0x6a6abed4, 0xcbcb468d, 0xbebed967, 0x39394b72, 0x4a4ade94, 0x4c4cd498, 0x5858e8b0, 0xcfcf4a85,
+	0xd0d06bbb, 0xefef2ac5, 0xaaaae54f, 0xfbfb16ed, 0x4343c586, 0x4d4dd79a, 0x33335566, 0x85859411,
+	0x4545cf8a, 0xf9f910e9, 0x02020604, 0x7f7f81fe, 0x5050f0a0, 0x3c3c4478, 0x9f9fba25, 0xa8a8e34b,
+	0x5151f3a2, 0xa3a3fe5d, 0x4040c080, 0x8f8f8a05, 0x9292ad3f, 0x9d9dbc21, 0x38384870, 0xf5f504f1,
+	0xbcbcdf63, 0xb6b6c177, 0xdada75af, 0x21216342, 0x10103020, 0xffff1ae5, 0xf3f30efd, 0xd2d26dbf,
+	0xcdcd4c81, 0x0c0c1418, 0x13133526, 0xecec2fc3, 0x5f5fe1be, 0x9797a235, 0x4444cc88, 0x1717392e,
+	0xc4c45793, 0xa7a7f255, 0x7e7e82fc, 0x3d3d477a, 0x6464acc8, 0x5d5de7ba, 0x19192b32, 0x737395e6,
+	0x6060a0c0, 0x81819819, 0x4f4fd19e, 0xdcdc7fa3, 0x22226644, 0x2a2a7e54, 0x9090ab3b, 0x8888830b,
+	0x4646ca8c, 0xeeee29c7, 0xb8b8d36b, 0x14143c28, 0xdede79a7, 0x5e5ee2bc, 0x0b0b1d16, 0xdbdb76ad,
+	0xe0e03bdb, 0x32325664, 0x3a3a4e74, 0x0a0a1e14, 0x4949db92, 0x06060a0c, 0x24246c48, 0x5c5ce4b8,
+	0xc2c25d9f, 0xd3d36ebd, 0xacacef43, 0x6262a6c4, 0x9191a839, 0x9595a431, 0xe4e437d3, 0x79798bf2,
+	0xe7e732d5, 0xc8c8438b, 0x3737596e, 0x6d6db7da, 0x8d8d8c01, 0xd5d564b1, 0x4e4ed29c, 0xa9a9e049,
+	0x6c6cb4d8, 0x5656faac, 0xf4f407f3, 0xeaea25cf, 0x6565afca, 0x7a7a8ef4, 0xaeaee947, 0x08081810,
+	0xbabad56f, 0x787888f0, 0x25256f4a, 0x2e2e725c, 0x1c1c2438, 0xa6a6f157, 0xb4b4c773, 0xc6c65197,
+	0xe8e823cb, 0xdddd7ca1, 0x74749ce8, 0x1f1f213e, 0x4b4bdd96, 0xbdbddc61, 0x8b8b860d, 0x8a8a850f,
+	0x707090e0, 0x3e3e427c, 0xb5b5c471, 0x6666aacc, 0x4848d890, 0x03030506, 0xf6f601f7, 0x0e0e121c,
+	0x6161a3c2, 0x35355f6a, 0x5757f9ae, 0xb9b9d069, 0x86869117, 0xc1c15899, 0x1d1d273a, 0x9e9eb927,
+	0xe1e138d9, 0xf8f813eb, 0x9898b32b, 0x11113322, 0x6969bbd2, 0xd9d970a9, 0x8e8e8907, 0x9494a733,
+	0x9b9bb62d, 0x1e1e223c, 0x87879215, 0xe9e920c9, 0xcece4987, 0x5555ffaa, 0x28287850, 0xdfdf7aa5,
+	0x8c8c8f03, 0xa1a1f859, 0x89898009, 0x0d0d171a, 0xbfbfda65, 0xe6e631d7, 0x4242c684, 0x6868b8d0,
+	0x4141c382, 0x9999b029, 0x2d2d775a, 0x0f0f111e, 0xb0b0cb7b, 0x5454fca8, 0xbbbbd66d, 0x16163a2c,
+}
+
+// Lookup tables for decryption.
+// These can be recomputed by adapting the tests in aes_test.go.
+
+var td0 = [256]uint32{
+	0x51f4a750, 0x7e416553, 0x1a17a4c3, 0x3a275e96, 0x3bab6bcb, 0x1f9d45f1, 0xacfa58ab, 0x4be30393,
+	0x2030fa55, 0xad766df6, 0x88cc7691, 0xf5024c25, 0x4fe5d7fc, 0xc52acbd7, 0x26354480, 0xb562a38f,
+	0xdeb15a49, 0x25ba1b67, 0x45ea0e98, 0x5dfec0e1, 0xc32f7502, 0x814cf012, 0x8d4697a3, 0x6bd3f9c6,
+	0x038f5fe7, 0x15929c95, 0xbf6d7aeb, 0x955259da, 0xd4be832d, 0x587421d3, 0x49e06929, 0x8ec9c844,
+	0x75c2896a, 0xf48e7978, 0x99583e6b, 0x27b971dd, 0xbee14fb6, 0xf088ad17, 0xc920ac66, 0x7dce3ab4,
+	0x63df4a18, 0xe51a3182, 0x97513360, 0x62537f45, 0xb16477e0, 0xbb6bae84, 0xfe81a01c, 0xf9082b94,
+	0x70486858, 0x8f45fd19, 0x94de6c87, 0x527bf8b7, 0xab73d323, 0x724b02e2, 0xe31f8f57, 0x6655ab2a,
+	0xb2eb2807, 0x2fb5c203, 0x86c57b9a, 0xd33708a5, 0x302887f2, 0x23bfa5b2, 0x02036aba, 0xed16825c,
+	0x8acf1c2b, 0xa779b492, 0xf307f2f0, 0x4e69e2a1, 0x65daf4cd, 0x0605bed5, 0xd134621f, 0xc4a6fe8a,
+	0x342e539d, 0xa2f355a0, 0x058ae132, 0xa4f6eb75, 0x0b83ec39, 0x4060efaa, 0x5e719f06, 0xbd6e1051,
+	0x3e218af9, 0x96dd063d, 0xdd3e05ae, 0x4de6bd46, 0x91548db5, 0x71c45d05, 0x0406d46f, 0x605015ff,
+	0x1998fb24, 0xd6bde997, 0x894043cc, 0x67d99e77, 0xb0e842bd, 0x07898b88, 0xe7195b38, 0x79c8eedb,
+	0xa17c0a47, 0x7c420fe9, 0xf8841ec9, 0x00000000, 0x09808683, 0x322bed48, 0x1e1170ac, 0x6c5a724e,
+	0xfd0efffb, 0x0f853856, 0x3daed51e, 0x362d3927, 0x0a0fd964, 0x685ca621, 0x9b5b54d1, 0x24362e3a,
+	0x0c0a67b1, 0x9357e70f, 0xb4ee96d2, 0x1b9b919e, 0x80c0c54f, 0x61dc20a2, 0x5a774b69, 0x1c121a16,
+	0xe293ba0a, 0xc0a02ae5, 0x3c22e043, 0x121b171d, 0x0e090d0b, 0xf28bc7ad, 0x2db6a8b9, 0x141ea9c8,
+	0x57f11985, 0xaf75074c, 0xee99ddbb, 0xa37f60fd, 0xf701269f, 0x5c72f5bc, 0x44663bc5, 0x5bfb7e34,
+	0x8b432976, 0xcb23c6dc, 0xb6edfc68, 0xb8e4f163, 0xd731dcca, 0x42638510, 0x13972240, 0x84c61120,
+	0x854a247d, 0xd2bb3df8, 0xaef93211, 0xc729a16d, 0x1d9e2f4b, 0xdcb230f3, 0x0d8652ec, 0x77c1e3d0,
+	0x2bb3166c, 0xa970b999, 0x119448fa, 0x47e96422, 0xa8fc8cc4, 0xa0f03f1a, 0x567d2cd8, 0x223390ef,
+	0x87494ec7, 0xd938d1c1, 0x8ccaa2fe, 0x98d40b36, 0xa6f581cf, 0xa57ade28, 0xdab78e26, 0x3fadbfa4,
+	0x2c3a9de4, 0x5078920d, 0x6a5fcc9b, 0x547e4662, 0xf68d13c2, 0x90d8b8e8, 0x2e39f75e, 0x82c3aff5,
+	0x9f5d80be, 0x69d0937c, 0x6fd52da9, 0xcf2512b3, 0xc8ac993b, 0x10187da7, 0xe89c636e, 0xdb3bbb7b,
+	0xcd267809, 0x6e5918f4, 0xec9ab701, 0x834f9aa8, 0xe6956e65, 0xaaffe67e, 0x21bccf08, 0xef15e8e6,
+	0xbae79bd9, 0x4a6f36ce, 0xea9f09d4, 0x29b07cd6, 0x31a4b2af, 0x2a3f2331, 0xc6a59430, 0x35a266c0,
+	0x744ebc37, 0xfc82caa6, 0xe090d0b0, 0x33a7d815, 0xf104984a, 0x41ecdaf7, 0x7fcd500e, 0x1791f62f,
+	0x764dd68d, 0x43efb04d, 0xccaa4d54, 0xe49604df, 0x9ed1b5e3, 0x4c6a881b, 0xc12c1fb8, 0x4665517f,
+	0x9d5eea04, 0x018c355d, 0xfa877473, 0xfb0b412e, 0xb3671d5a, 0x92dbd252, 0xe9105633, 0x6dd64713,
+	0x9ad7618c, 0x37a10c7a, 0x59f8148e, 0xeb133c89, 0xcea927ee, 0xb761c935, 0xe11ce5ed, 0x7a47b13c,
+	0x9cd2df59, 0x55f2733f, 0x1814ce79, 0x73c737bf, 0x53f7cdea, 0x5ffdaa5b, 0xdf3d6f14, 0x7844db86,
+	0xcaaff381, 0xb968c43e, 0x3824342c, 0xc2a3405f, 0x161dc372, 0xbce2250c, 0x283c498b, 0xff0d9541,
+	0x39a80171, 0x080cb3de, 0xd8b4e49c, 0x6456c190, 0x7bcb8461, 0xd532b670, 0x486c5c74, 0xd0b85742,
+}
+var td1 = [256]uint32{
+	0x5051f4a7, 0x537e4165, 0xc31a17a4, 0x963a275e, 0xcb3bab6b, 0xf11f9d45, 0xabacfa58, 0x934be303,
+	0x552030fa, 0xf6ad766d, 0x9188cc76, 0x25f5024c, 0xfc4fe5d7, 0xd7c52acb, 0x80263544, 0x8fb562a3,
+	0x49deb15a, 0x6725ba1b, 0x9845ea0e, 0xe15dfec0, 0x02c32f75, 0x12814cf0, 0xa38d4697, 0xc66bd3f9,
+	0xe7038f5f, 0x9515929c, 0xebbf6d7a, 0xda955259, 0x2dd4be83, 0xd3587421, 0x2949e069, 0x448ec9c8,
+	0x6a75c289, 0x78f48e79, 0x6b99583e, 0xdd27b971, 0xb6bee14f, 0x17f088ad, 0x66c920ac, 0xb47dce3a,
+	0x1863df4a, 0x82e51a31, 0x60975133, 0x4562537f, 0xe0b16477, 0x84bb6bae, 0x1cfe81a0, 0x94f9082b,
+	0x58704868, 0x198f45fd, 0x8794de6c, 0xb7527bf8, 0x23ab73d3, 0xe2724b02, 0x57e31f8f, 0x2a6655ab,
+	0x07b2eb28, 0x032fb5c2, 0x9a86c57b, 0xa5d33708, 0xf2302887, 0xb223bfa5, 0xba02036a, 0x5ced1682,
+	0x2b8acf1c, 0x92a779b4, 0xf0f307f2, 0xa14e69e2, 0xcd65daf4, 0xd50605be, 0x1fd13462, 0x8ac4a6fe,
+	0x9d342e53, 0xa0a2f355, 0x32058ae1, 0x75a4f6eb, 0x390b83ec, 0xaa4060ef, 0x065e719f, 0x51bd6e10,
+	0xf93e218a, 0x3d96dd06, 0xaedd3e05, 0x464de6bd, 0xb591548d, 0x0571c45d, 0x6f0406d4, 0xff605015,
+	0x241998fb, 0x97d6bde9, 0xcc894043, 0x7767d99e, 0xbdb0e842, 0x8807898b, 0x38e7195b, 0xdb79c8ee,
+	0x47a17c0a, 0xe97c420f, 0xc9f8841e, 0x00000000, 0x83098086, 0x48322bed, 0xac1e1170, 0x4e6c5a72,
+	0xfbfd0eff, 0x560f8538, 0x1e3daed5, 0x27362d39, 0x640a0fd9, 0x21685ca6, 0xd19b5b54, 0x3a24362e,
+	0xb10c0a67, 0x0f9357e7, 0xd2b4ee96, 0x9e1b9b91, 0x4f80c0c5, 0xa261dc20, 0x695a774b, 0x161c121a,
+	0x0ae293ba, 0xe5c0a02a, 0x433c22e0, 0x1d121b17, 0x0b0e090d, 0xadf28bc7, 0xb92db6a8, 0xc8141ea9,
+	0x8557f119, 0x4caf7507, 0xbbee99dd, 0xfda37f60, 0x9ff70126, 0xbc5c72f5, 0xc544663b, 0x345bfb7e,
+	0x768b4329, 0xdccb23c6, 0x68b6edfc, 0x63b8e4f1, 0xcad731dc, 0x10426385, 0x40139722, 0x2084c611,
+	0x7d854a24, 0xf8d2bb3d, 0x11aef932, 0x6dc729a1, 0x4b1d9e2f, 0xf3dcb230, 0xec0d8652, 0xd077c1e3,
+	0x6c2bb316, 0x99a970b9, 0xfa119448, 0x2247e964, 0xc4a8fc8c, 0x1aa0f03f, 0xd8567d2c, 0xef223390,
+	0xc787494e, 0xc1d938d1, 0xfe8ccaa2, 0x3698d40b, 0xcfa6f581, 0x28a57ade, 0x26dab78e, 0xa43fadbf,
+	0xe42c3a9d, 0x0d507892, 0x9b6a5fcc, 0x62547e46, 0xc2f68d13, 0xe890d8b8, 0x5e2e39f7, 0xf582c3af,
+	0xbe9f5d80, 0x7c69d093, 0xa96fd52d, 0xb3cf2512, 0x3bc8ac99, 0xa710187d, 0x6ee89c63, 0x7bdb3bbb,
+	0x09cd2678, 0xf46e5918, 0x01ec9ab7, 0xa8834f9a, 0x65e6956e, 0x7eaaffe6, 0x0821bccf, 0xe6ef15e8,
+	0xd9bae79b, 0xce4a6f36, 0xd4ea9f09, 0xd629b07c, 0xaf31a4b2, 0x312a3f23, 0x30c6a594, 0xc035a266,
+	0x37744ebc, 0xa6fc82ca, 0xb0e090d0, 0x1533a7d8, 0x4af10498, 0xf741ecda, 0x0e7fcd50, 0x2f1791f6,
+	0x8d764dd6, 0x4d43efb0, 0x54ccaa4d, 0xdfe49604, 0xe39ed1b5, 0x1b4c6a88, 0xb8c12c1f, 0x7f466551,
+	0x049d5eea, 0x5d018c35, 0x73fa8774, 0x2efb0b41, 0x5ab3671d, 0x5292dbd2, 0x33e91056, 0x136dd647,
+	0x8c9ad761, 0x7a37a10c, 0x8e59f814, 0x89eb133c, 0xeecea927, 0x35b761c9, 0xede11ce5, 0x3c7a47b1,
+	0x599cd2df, 0x3f55f273, 0x791814ce, 0xbf73c737, 0xea53f7cd, 0x5b5ffdaa, 0x14df3d6f, 0x867844db,
+	0x81caaff3, 0x3eb968c4, 0x2c382434, 0x5fc2a340, 0x72161dc3, 0x0cbce225, 0x8b283c49, 0x41ff0d95,
+	0x7139a801, 0xde080cb3, 0x9cd8b4e4, 0x906456c1, 0x617bcb84, 0x70d532b6, 0x74486c5c, 0x42d0b857,
+}
+var td2 = [256]uint32{
+	0xa75051f4, 0x65537e41, 0xa4c31a17, 0x5e963a27, 0x6bcb3bab, 0x45f11f9d, 0x58abacfa, 0x03934be3,
+	0xfa552030, 0x6df6ad76, 0x769188cc, 0x4c25f502, 0xd7fc4fe5, 0xcbd7c52a, 0x44802635, 0xa38fb562,
+	0x5a49deb1, 0x1b6725ba, 0x0e9845ea, 0xc0e15dfe, 0x7502c32f, 0xf012814c, 0x97a38d46, 0xf9c66bd3,
+	0x5fe7038f, 0x9c951592, 0x7aebbf6d, 0x59da9552, 0x832dd4be, 0x21d35874, 0x692949e0, 0xc8448ec9,
+	0x896a75c2, 0x7978f48e, 0x3e6b9958, 0x71dd27b9, 0x4fb6bee1, 0xad17f088, 0xac66c920, 0x3ab47dce,
+	0x4a1863df, 0x3182e51a, 0x33609751, 0x7f456253, 0x77e0b164, 0xae84bb6b, 0xa01cfe81, 0x2b94f908,
+	0x68587048, 0xfd198f45, 0x6c8794de, 0xf8b7527b, 0xd323ab73, 0x02e2724b, 0x8f57e31f, 0xab2a6655,
+	0x2807b2eb, 0xc2032fb5, 0x7b9a86c5, 0x08a5d337, 0x87f23028, 0xa5b223bf, 0x6aba0203, 0x825ced16,
+	0x1c2b8acf, 0xb492a779, 0xf2f0f307, 0xe2a14e69, 0xf4cd65da, 0xbed50605, 0x621fd134, 0xfe8ac4a6,
+	0x539d342e, 0x55a0a2f3, 0xe132058a, 0xeb75a4f6, 0xec390b83, 0xefaa4060, 0x9f065e71, 0x1051bd6e,
+	0x8af93e21, 0x063d96dd, 0x05aedd3e, 0xbd464de6, 0x8db59154, 0x5d0571c4, 0xd46f0406, 0x15ff6050,
+	0xfb241998, 0xe997d6bd, 0x43cc8940, 0x9e7767d9, 0x42bdb0e8, 0x8b880789, 0x5b38e719, 0xeedb79c8,
+	0x0a47a17c, 0x0fe97c42, 0x1ec9f884, 0x00000000, 0x86830980, 0xed48322b, 0x70ac1e11, 0x724e6c5a,
+	0xfffbfd0e, 0x38560f85, 0xd51e3dae, 0x3927362d, 0xd9640a0f, 0xa621685c, 0x54d19b5b, 0x2e3a2436,
+	0x67b10c0a, 0xe70f9357, 0x96d2b4ee, 0x919e1b9b, 0xc54f80c0, 0x20a261dc, 0x4b695a77, 0x1a161c12,
+	0xba0ae293, 0x2ae5c0a0, 0xe0433c22, 0x171d121b, 0x0d0b0e09, 0xc7adf28b, 0xa8b92db6, 0xa9c8141e,
+	0x198557f1, 0x074caf75, 0xddbbee99, 0x60fda37f, 0x269ff701, 0xf5bc5c72, 0x3bc54466, 0x7e345bfb,
+	0x29768b43, 0xc6dccb23, 0xfc68b6ed, 0xf163b8e4, 0xdccad731, 0x85104263, 0x22401397, 0x112084c6,
+	0x247d854a, 0x3df8d2bb, 0x3211aef9, 0xa16dc729, 0x2f4b1d9e, 0x30f3dcb2, 0x52ec0d86, 0xe3d077c1,
+	0x166c2bb3, 0xb999a970, 0x48fa1194, 0x642247e9, 0x8cc4a8fc, 0x3f1aa0f0, 0x2cd8567d, 0x90ef2233,
+	0x4ec78749, 0xd1c1d938, 0xa2fe8cca, 0x0b3698d4, 0x81cfa6f5, 0xde28a57a, 0x8e26dab7, 0xbfa43fad,
+	0x9de42c3a, 0x920d5078, 0xcc9b6a5f, 0x4662547e, 0x13c2f68d, 0xb8e890d8, 0xf75e2e39, 0xaff582c3,
+	0x80be9f5d, 0x937c69d0, 0x2da96fd5, 0x12b3cf25, 0x993bc8ac, 0x7da71018, 0x636ee89c, 0xbb7bdb3b,
+	0x7809cd26, 0x18f46e59, 0xb701ec9a, 0x9aa8834f, 0x6e65e695, 0xe67eaaff, 0xcf0821bc, 0xe8e6ef15,
+	0x9bd9bae7, 0x36ce4a6f, 0x09d4ea9f, 0x7cd629b0, 0xb2af31a4, 0x23312a3f, 0x9430c6a5, 0x66c035a2,
+	0xbc37744e, 0xcaa6fc82, 0xd0b0e090, 0xd81533a7, 0x984af104, 0xdaf741ec, 0x500e7fcd, 0xf62f1791,
+	0xd68d764d, 0xb04d43ef, 0x4d54ccaa, 0x04dfe496, 0xb5e39ed1, 0x881b4c6a, 0x1fb8c12c, 0x517f4665,
+	0xea049d5e, 0x355d018c, 0x7473fa87, 0x412efb0b, 0x1d5ab367, 0xd25292db, 0x5633e910, 0x47136dd6,
+	0x618c9ad7, 0x0c7a37a1, 0x148e59f8, 0x3c89eb13, 0x27eecea9, 0xc935b761, 0xe5ede11c, 0xb13c7a47,
+	0xdf599cd2, 0x733f55f2, 0xce791814, 0x37bf73c7, 0xcdea53f7, 0xaa5b5ffd, 0x6f14df3d, 0xdb867844,
+	0xf381caaf, 0xc43eb968, 0x342c3824, 0x405fc2a3, 0xc372161d, 0x250cbce2, 0x498b283c, 0x9541ff0d,
+	0x017139a8, 0xb3de080c, 0xe49cd8b4, 0xc1906456, 0x84617bcb, 0xb670d532, 0x5c74486c, 0x5742d0b8,
+}
+var td3 = [256]uint32{
+	0xf4a75051, 0x4165537e, 0x17a4c31a, 0x275e963a, 0xab6bcb3b, 0x9d45f11f, 0xfa58abac, 0xe303934b,
+	0x30fa5520, 0x766df6ad, 0xcc769188, 0x024c25f5, 0xe5d7fc4f, 0x2acbd7c5, 0x35448026, 0x62a38fb5,
+	0xb15a49de, 0xba1b6725, 0xea0e9845, 0xfec0e15d, 0x2f7502c3, 0x4cf01281, 0x4697a38d, 0xd3f9c66b,
+	0x8f5fe703, 0x929c9515, 0x6d7aebbf, 0x5259da95, 0xbe832dd4, 0x7421d358, 0xe0692949, 0xc9c8448e,
+	0xc2896a75, 0x8e7978f4, 0x583e6b99, 0xb971dd27, 0xe14fb6be, 0x88ad17f0, 0x20ac66c9, 0xce3ab47d,
+	0xdf4a1863, 0x1a3182e5, 0x51336097, 0x537f4562, 0x6477e0b1, 0x6bae84bb, 0x81a01cfe, 0x082b94f9,
+	0x48685870, 0x45fd198f, 0xde6c8794, 0x7bf8b752, 0x73d323ab, 0x4b02e272, 0x1f8f57e3, 0x55ab2a66,
+	0xeb2807b2, 0xb5c2032f, 0xc57b9a86, 0x3708a5d3, 0x2887f230, 0xbfa5b223, 0x036aba02, 0x16825ced,
+	0xcf1c2b8a, 0x79b492a7, 0x07f2f0f3, 0x69e2a14e, 0xdaf4cd65, 0x05bed506, 0x34621fd1, 0xa6fe8ac4,
+	0x2e539d34, 0xf355a0a2, 0x8ae13205, 0xf6eb75a4, 0x83ec390b, 0x60efaa40, 0x719f065e, 0x6e1051bd,
+	0x218af93e, 0xdd063d96, 0x3e05aedd, 0xe6bd464d, 0x548db591, 0xc45d0571, 0x06d46f04, 0x5015ff60,
+	0x98fb2419, 0xbde997d6, 0x4043cc89, 0xd99e7767, 0xe842bdb0, 0x898b8807, 0x195b38e7, 0xc8eedb79,
+	0x7c0a47a1, 0x420fe97c, 0x841ec9f8, 0x00000000, 0x80868309, 0x2bed4832, 0x1170ac1e, 0x5a724e6c,
+	0x0efffbfd, 0x8538560f, 0xaed51e3d, 0x2d392736, 0x0fd9640a, 0x5ca62168, 0x5b54d19b, 0x362e3a24,
+	0x0a67b10c, 0x57e70f93, 0xee96d2b4, 0x9b919e1b, 0xc0c54f80, 0xdc20a261, 0x774b695a, 0x121a161c,
+	0x93ba0ae2, 0xa02ae5c0, 0x22e0433c, 0x1b171d12, 0x090d0b0e, 0x8bc7adf2, 0xb6a8b92d, 0x1ea9c814,
+	0xf1198557, 0x75074caf, 0x99ddbbee, 0x7f60fda3, 0x01269ff7, 0x72f5bc5c, 0x663bc544, 0xfb7e345b,
+	0x4329768b, 0x23c6dccb, 0xedfc68b6, 0xe4f163b8, 0x31dccad7, 0x63851042, 0x97224013, 0xc6112084,
+	0x4a247d85, 0xbb3df8d2, 0xf93211ae, 0x29a16dc7, 0x9e2f4b1d, 0xb230f3dc, 0x8652ec0d, 0xc1e3d077,
+	0xb3166c2b, 0x70b999a9, 0x9448fa11, 0xe9642247, 0xfc8cc4a8, 0xf03f1aa0, 0x7d2cd856, 0x3390ef22,
+	0x494ec787, 0x38d1c1d9, 0xcaa2fe8c, 0xd40b3698, 0xf581cfa6, 0x7ade28a5, 0xb78e26da, 0xadbfa43f,
+	0x3a9de42c, 0x78920d50, 0x5fcc9b6a, 0x7e466254, 0x8d13c2f6, 0xd8b8e890, 0x39f75e2e, 0xc3aff582,
+	0x5d80be9f, 0xd0937c69, 0xd52da96f, 0x2512b3cf, 0xac993bc8, 0x187da710, 0x9c636ee8, 0x3bbb7bdb,
+	0x267809cd, 0x5918f46e, 0x9ab701ec, 0x4f9aa883, 0x956e65e6, 0xffe67eaa, 0xbccf0821, 0x15e8e6ef,
+	0xe79bd9ba, 0x6f36ce4a, 0x9f09d4ea, 0xb07cd629, 0xa4b2af31, 0x3f23312a, 0xa59430c6, 0xa266c035,
+	0x4ebc3774, 0x82caa6fc, 0x90d0b0e0, 0xa7d81533, 0x04984af1, 0xecdaf741, 0xcd500e7f, 0x91f62f17,
+	0x4dd68d76, 0xefb04d43, 0xaa4d54cc, 0x9604dfe4, 0xd1b5e39e, 0x6a881b4c, 0x2c1fb8c1, 0x65517f46,
+	0x5eea049d, 0x8c355d01, 0x877473fa, 0x0b412efb, 0x671d5ab3, 0xdbd25292, 0x105633e9, 0xd647136d,
+	0xd7618c9a, 0xa10c7a37, 0xf8148e59, 0x133c89eb, 0xa927eece, 0x61c935b7, 0x1ce5ede1, 0x47b13c7a,
+	0xd2df599c, 0xf2733f55, 0x14ce7918, 0xc737bf73, 0xf7cdea53, 0xfdaa5b5f, 0x3d6f14df, 0x44db8678,
+	0xaff381ca, 0x68c43eb9, 0x24342c38, 0xa3405fc2, 0x1dc37216, 0xe2250cbc, 0x3c498b28, 0x0d9541ff,
+	0xa8017139, 0x0cb3de08, 0xb4e49cd8, 0x56c19064, 0xcb84617b, 0x32b670d5, 0x6c5c7448, 0xb85742d0,
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/aes/ctr_s390x.go

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package aes
+
+import (
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/internal/alias"
+	"encoding/binary"
+)
+
+// Assert that aesCipherAsm implements the ctrAble interface.
+var _ ctrAble = (*aesCipherAsm)(nil)
+
+// xorBytes xors the contents of a and b and places the resulting values into
+// dst. If a and b are not the same length then the number of bytes processed
+// will be equal to the length of shorter of the two. Returns the number
+// of bytes processed.
+//
+//go:noescape
+func xorBytes(dst, a, b []byte) int
+
+// streamBufferSize is the number of bytes of encrypted counter values to cache.
+const streamBufferSize = 32 * BlockSize
+
+type aesctr struct {
+	block   *aesCipherAsm          // block cipher
+	ctr     [2]uint64              // next value of the counter (big endian)
+	buffer  []byte                 // buffer for the encrypted counter values
+	storage [streamBufferSize]byte // array backing buffer slice
+}
+
+// NewCTR returns a Stream which encrypts/decrypts using the AES block
+// cipher in counter mode. The length of iv must be the same as [BlockSize].
+func (c *aesCipherAsm) NewCTR(iv []byte) cipher.Stream {
+	if len(iv) != BlockSize {
+		panic("cipher.NewCTR: IV length must equal block size")
+	}
+	var ac aesctr
+	ac.block = c
+	ac.ctr[0] = binary.BigEndian.Uint64(iv[0:]) // high bits
+	ac.ctr[1] = binary.BigEndian.Uint64(iv[8:]) // low bits
+	ac.buffer = ac.storage[:0]
+	return &ac
+}
+
+func (c *aesctr) refill() {
+	// Fill up the buffer with an incrementing count.
+	c.buffer = c.storage[:streamBufferSize]
+	c0, c1 := c.ctr[0], c.ctr[1]
+	for i := 0; i < streamBufferSize; i += 16 {
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(c.buffer[i+0:], c0)
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(c.buffer[i+8:], c1)
+
+		// Increment in big endian: c0 is high, c1 is low.
+		c1++
+		if c1 == 0 {
+			// add carry
+			c0++
+		}
+	}
+	c.ctr[0], c.ctr[1] = c0, c1
+	// Encrypt the buffer using AES in ECB mode.
+	cryptBlocks(c.block.function, &c.block.key[0], &c.buffer[0], &c.buffer[0], streamBufferSize)
+}
+
+func (c *aesctr) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) {
+	if len(dst) < len(src) {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: output smaller than input")
+	}
+	if alias.InexactOverlap(dst[:len(src)], src) {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: invalid buffer overlap")
+	}
+	for len(src) > 0 {
+		if len(c.buffer) == 0 {
+			c.refill()
+		}
+		n := xorBytes(dst, src, c.buffer)
+		c.buffer = c.buffer[n:]
+		src = src[n:]
+		dst = dst[n:]
+	}
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/aes/gcm_amd64.s

@@ -0,0 +1,1286 @@
+// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// This is an optimized implementation of AES-GCM using AES-NI and CLMUL-NI
+// The implementation uses some optimization as described in:
+// [1] Gueron, S., Kounavis, M.E.: Intel® Carry-Less Multiplication
+//     Instruction and its Usage for Computing the GCM Mode rev. 2.02
+// [2] Gueron, S., Krasnov, V.: Speeding up Counter Mode in Software and
+//     Hardware
+
+#include "textflag.h"
+
+#define B0 X0
+#define B1 X1
+#define B2 X2
+#define B3 X3
+#define B4 X4
+#define B5 X5
+#define B6 X6
+#define B7 X7
+
+#define ACC0 X8
+#define ACC1 X9
+#define ACCM X10
+
+#define T0 X11
+#define T1 X12
+#define T2 X13
+#define POLY X14
+#define BSWAP X15
+
+DATA bswapMask<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x08090a0b0c0d0e0f
+DATA bswapMask<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0001020304050607
+
+DATA gcmPoly<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000001
+DATA gcmPoly<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0xc200000000000000
+
+DATA andMask<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x00000000000000ff
+DATA andMask<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000
+DATA andMask<>+0x10(SB)/8, $0x000000000000ffff
+DATA andMask<>+0x18(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000
+DATA andMask<>+0x20(SB)/8, $0x0000000000ffffff
+DATA andMask<>+0x28(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000
+DATA andMask<>+0x30(SB)/8, $0x00000000ffffffff
+DATA andMask<>+0x38(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000
+DATA andMask<>+0x40(SB)/8, $0x000000ffffffffff
+DATA andMask<>+0x48(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000
+DATA andMask<>+0x50(SB)/8, $0x0000ffffffffffff
+DATA andMask<>+0x58(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000
+DATA andMask<>+0x60(SB)/8, $0x00ffffffffffffff
+DATA andMask<>+0x68(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000
+DATA andMask<>+0x70(SB)/8, $0xffffffffffffffff
+DATA andMask<>+0x78(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000
+DATA andMask<>+0x80(SB)/8, $0xffffffffffffffff
+DATA andMask<>+0x88(SB)/8, $0x00000000000000ff
+DATA andMask<>+0x90(SB)/8, $0xffffffffffffffff
+DATA andMask<>+0x98(SB)/8, $0x000000000000ffff
+DATA andMask<>+0xa0(SB)/8, $0xffffffffffffffff
+DATA andMask<>+0xa8(SB)/8, $0x0000000000ffffff
+DATA andMask<>+0xb0(SB)/8, $0xffffffffffffffff
+DATA andMask<>+0xb8(SB)/8, $0x00000000ffffffff
+DATA andMask<>+0xc0(SB)/8, $0xffffffffffffffff
+DATA andMask<>+0xc8(SB)/8, $0x000000ffffffffff
+DATA andMask<>+0xd0(SB)/8, $0xffffffffffffffff
+DATA andMask<>+0xd8(SB)/8, $0x0000ffffffffffff
+DATA andMask<>+0xe0(SB)/8, $0xffffffffffffffff
+DATA andMask<>+0xe8(SB)/8, $0x00ffffffffffffff
+
+GLOBL bswapMask<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16
+GLOBL gcmPoly<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16
+GLOBL andMask<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $240
+
+// func gcmAesFinish(productTable *[256]byte, tagMask, T *[16]byte, pLen, dLen uint64)
+TEXT ·gcmAesFinish(SB),NOSPLIT,$0
+#define pTbl DI
+#define tMsk SI
+#define tPtr DX
+#define plen AX
+#define dlen CX
+
+	MOVQ productTable+0(FP), pTbl
+	MOVQ tagMask+8(FP), tMsk
+	MOVQ T+16(FP), tPtr
+	MOVQ pLen+24(FP), plen
+	MOVQ dLen+32(FP), dlen
+
+	MOVOU (tPtr), ACC0
+	MOVOU (tMsk), T2
+
+	MOVOU bswapMask<>(SB), BSWAP
+	MOVOU gcmPoly<>(SB), POLY
+
+	SHLQ $3, plen
+	SHLQ $3, dlen
+
+	MOVQ plen, B0
+	PINSRQ $1, dlen, B0
+
+	PXOR ACC0, B0
+
+	MOVOU (16*14)(pTbl), ACC0
+	MOVOU (16*15)(pTbl), ACCM
+	MOVOU ACC0, ACC1
+
+	PCLMULQDQ $0x00, B0, ACC0
+	PCLMULQDQ $0x11, B0, ACC1
+	PSHUFD $78, B0, T0
+	PXOR B0, T0
+	PCLMULQDQ $0x00, T0, ACCM
+
+	PXOR ACC0, ACCM
+	PXOR ACC1, ACCM
+	MOVOU ACCM, T0
+	PSRLDQ $8, ACCM
+	PSLLDQ $8, T0
+	PXOR ACCM, ACC1
+	PXOR T0, ACC0
+
+	MOVOU POLY, T0
+	PCLMULQDQ $0x01, ACC0, T0
+	PSHUFD $78, ACC0, ACC0
+	PXOR T0, ACC0
+
+	MOVOU POLY, T0
+	PCLMULQDQ $0x01, ACC0, T0
+	PSHUFD $78, ACC0, ACC0
+	PXOR T0, ACC0
+
+	PXOR ACC1, ACC0
+
+	PSHUFB BSWAP, ACC0
+	PXOR T2, ACC0
+	MOVOU ACC0, (tPtr)
+
+	RET
+#undef pTbl
+#undef tMsk
+#undef tPtr
+#undef plen
+#undef dlen
+
+// func gcmAesInit(productTable *[256]byte, ks []uint32)
+TEXT ·gcmAesInit(SB),NOSPLIT,$0
+#define dst DI
+#define KS SI
+#define NR DX
+
+	MOVQ productTable+0(FP), dst
+	MOVQ ks_base+8(FP), KS
+	MOVQ ks_len+16(FP), NR
+
+	SHRQ $2, NR
+	DECQ NR
+
+	MOVOU bswapMask<>(SB), BSWAP
+	MOVOU gcmPoly<>(SB), POLY
+
+	// Encrypt block 0, with the AES key to generate the hash key H
+	MOVOU (16*0)(KS), B0
+	MOVOU (16*1)(KS), T0
+	AESENC T0, B0
+	MOVOU (16*2)(KS), T0
+	AESENC T0, B0
+	MOVOU (16*3)(KS), T0
+	AESENC T0, B0
+	MOVOU (16*4)(KS), T0
+	AESENC T0, B0
+	MOVOU (16*5)(KS), T0
+	AESENC T0, B0
+	MOVOU (16*6)(KS), T0
+	AESENC T0, B0
+	MOVOU (16*7)(KS), T0
+	AESENC T0, B0
+	MOVOU (16*8)(KS), T0
+	AESENC T0, B0
+	MOVOU (16*9)(KS), T0
+	AESENC T0, B0
+	MOVOU (16*10)(KS), T0
+	CMPQ NR, $12
+	JB initEncLast
+	AESENC T0, B0
+	MOVOU (16*11)(KS), T0
+	AESENC T0, B0
+	MOVOU (16*12)(KS), T0
+	JE initEncLast
+	AESENC T0, B0
+	MOVOU (16*13)(KS), T0
+	AESENC T0, B0
+	MOVOU (16*14)(KS), T0
+initEncLast:
+	AESENCLAST T0, B0
+
+	PSHUFB BSWAP, B0
+	// H * 2
+	PSHUFD $0xff, B0, T0
+	MOVOU B0, T1
+	PSRAL $31, T0
+	PAND POLY, T0
+	PSRLL $31, T1
+	PSLLDQ $4, T1
+	PSLLL $1, B0
+	PXOR T0, B0
+	PXOR T1, B0
+	// Karatsuba pre-computations
+	MOVOU B0, (16*14)(dst)
+	PSHUFD $78, B0, B1
+	PXOR B0, B1
+	MOVOU B1, (16*15)(dst)
+
+	MOVOU B0, B2
+	MOVOU B1, B3
+	// Now prepare powers of H and pre-computations for them
+	MOVQ $7, AX
+
+initLoop:
+		MOVOU B2, T0
+		MOVOU B2, T1
+		MOVOU B3, T2
+		PCLMULQDQ $0x00, B0, T0
+		PCLMULQDQ $0x11, B0, T1
+		PCLMULQDQ $0x00, B1, T2
+
+		PXOR T0, T2
+		PXOR T1, T2
+		MOVOU T2, B4
+		PSLLDQ $8, B4
+		PSRLDQ $8, T2
+		PXOR B4, T0
+		PXOR T2, T1
+
+		MOVOU POLY, B2
+		PCLMULQDQ $0x01, T0, B2
+		PSHUFD $78, T0, T0
+		PXOR B2, T0
+		MOVOU POLY, B2
+		PCLMULQDQ $0x01, T0, B2
+		PSHUFD $78, T0, T0
+		PXOR T0, B2
+		PXOR T1, B2
+
+		MOVOU B2, (16*12)(dst)
+		PSHUFD $78, B2, B3
+		PXOR B2, B3
+		MOVOU B3, (16*13)(dst)
+
+		DECQ AX
+		LEAQ (-16*2)(dst), dst
+	JNE initLoop
+
+	RET
+#undef NR
+#undef KS
+#undef dst
+
+// func gcmAesData(productTable *[256]byte, data []byte, T *[16]byte)
+TEXT ·gcmAesData(SB),NOSPLIT,$0
+#define pTbl DI
+#define aut SI
+#define tPtr CX
+#define autLen DX
+
+#define reduceRound(a) 	MOVOU POLY, T0;	PCLMULQDQ $0x01, a, T0; PSHUFD $78, a, a; PXOR T0, a
+#define mulRoundAAD(X ,i) \
+	MOVOU (16*(i*2))(pTbl), T1;\
+	MOVOU T1, T2;\
+	PCLMULQDQ $0x00, X, T1;\
+	PXOR T1, ACC0;\
+	PCLMULQDQ $0x11, X, T2;\
+	PXOR T2, ACC1;\
+	PSHUFD $78, X, T1;\
+	PXOR T1, X;\
+	MOVOU (16*(i*2+1))(pTbl), T1;\
+	PCLMULQDQ $0x00, X, T1;\
+	PXOR T1, ACCM
+
+	MOVQ productTable+0(FP), pTbl
+	MOVQ data_base+8(FP), aut
+	MOVQ data_len+16(FP), autLen
+	MOVQ T+32(FP), tPtr
+
+	PXOR ACC0, ACC0
+	MOVOU bswapMask<>(SB), BSWAP
+	MOVOU gcmPoly<>(SB), POLY
+
+	TESTQ autLen, autLen
+	JEQ dataBail
+
+	CMPQ autLen, $13	// optimize the TLS case
+	JE dataTLS
+	CMPQ autLen, $128
+	JB startSinglesLoop
+	JMP dataOctaLoop
+
+dataTLS:
+	MOVOU (16*14)(pTbl), T1
+	MOVOU (16*15)(pTbl), T2
+	PXOR B0, B0
+	MOVQ (aut), B0
+	PINSRD $2, 8(aut), B0
+	PINSRB $12, 12(aut), B0
+	XORQ autLen, autLen
+	JMP dataMul
+
+dataOctaLoop:
+		CMPQ autLen, $128
+		JB startSinglesLoop
+		SUBQ $128, autLen
+
+		MOVOU (16*0)(aut), X0
+		MOVOU (16*1)(aut), X1
+		MOVOU (16*2)(aut), X2
+		MOVOU (16*3)(aut), X3
+		MOVOU (16*4)(aut), X4
+		MOVOU (16*5)(aut), X5
+		MOVOU (16*6)(aut), X6
+		MOVOU (16*7)(aut), X7
+		LEAQ (16*8)(aut), aut
+		PSHUFB BSWAP, X0
+		PSHUFB BSWAP, X1
+		PSHUFB BSWAP, X2
+		PSHUFB BSWAP, X3
+		PSHUFB BSWAP, X4
+		PSHUFB BSWAP, X5
+		PSHUFB BSWAP, X6
+		PSHUFB BSWAP, X7
+		PXOR ACC0, X0
+
+		MOVOU (16*0)(pTbl), ACC0
+		MOVOU (16*1)(pTbl), ACCM
+		MOVOU ACC0, ACC1
+		PSHUFD $78, X0, T1
+		PXOR X0, T1
+		PCLMULQDQ $0x00, X0, ACC0
+		PCLMULQDQ $0x11, X0, ACC1
+		PCLMULQDQ $0x00, T1, ACCM
+
+		mulRoundAAD(X1, 1)
+		mulRoundAAD(X2, 2)
+		mulRoundAAD(X3, 3)
+		mulRoundAAD(X4, 4)
+		mulRoundAAD(X5, 5)
+		mulRoundAAD(X6, 6)
+		mulRoundAAD(X7, 7)
+
+		PXOR ACC0, ACCM
+		PXOR ACC1, ACCM
+		MOVOU ACCM, T0
+		PSRLDQ $8, ACCM
+		PSLLDQ $8, T0
+		PXOR ACCM, ACC1
+		PXOR T0, ACC0
+		reduceRound(ACC0)
+		reduceRound(ACC0)
+		PXOR ACC1, ACC0
+	JMP dataOctaLoop
+
+startSinglesLoop:
+	MOVOU (16*14)(pTbl), T1
+	MOVOU (16*15)(pTbl), T2
+
+dataSinglesLoop:
+
+		CMPQ autLen, $16
+		JB dataEnd
+		SUBQ $16, autLen
+
+		MOVOU (aut), B0
+dataMul:
+		PSHUFB BSWAP, B0
+		PXOR ACC0, B0
+
+		MOVOU T1, ACC0
+		MOVOU T2, ACCM
+		MOVOU T1, ACC1
+
+		PSHUFD $78, B0, T0
+		PXOR B0, T0
+		PCLMULQDQ $0x00, B0, ACC0
+		PCLMULQDQ $0x11, B0, ACC1
+		PCLMULQDQ $0x00, T0, ACCM
+
+		PXOR ACC0, ACCM
+		PXOR ACC1, ACCM
+		MOVOU ACCM, T0
+		PSRLDQ $8, ACCM
+		PSLLDQ $8, T0
+		PXOR ACCM, ACC1
+		PXOR T0, ACC0
+
+		MOVOU POLY, T0
+		PCLMULQDQ $0x01, ACC0, T0
+		PSHUFD $78, ACC0, ACC0
+		PXOR T0, ACC0
+
+		MOVOU POLY, T0
+		PCLMULQDQ $0x01, ACC0, T0
+		PSHUFD $78, ACC0, ACC0
+		PXOR T0, ACC0
+		PXOR ACC1, ACC0
+
+		LEAQ 16(aut), aut
+
+	JMP dataSinglesLoop
+
+dataEnd:
+
+	TESTQ autLen, autLen
+	JEQ dataBail
+
+	PXOR B0, B0
+	LEAQ -1(aut)(autLen*1), aut
+
+dataLoadLoop:
+
+		PSLLDQ $1, B0
+		PINSRB $0, (aut), B0
+
+		LEAQ -1(aut), aut
+		DECQ autLen
+		JNE dataLoadLoop
+
+	JMP dataMul
+
+dataBail:
+	MOVOU ACC0, (tPtr)
+	RET
+#undef pTbl
+#undef aut
+#undef tPtr
+#undef autLen
+
+// func gcmAesEnc(productTable *[256]byte, dst, src []byte, ctr, T *[16]byte, ks []uint32)
+TEXT ·gcmAesEnc(SB),0,$256-96
+#define pTbl DI
+#define ctx DX
+#define ctrPtr CX
+#define ptx SI
+#define ks AX
+#define tPtr R8
+#define ptxLen R9
+#define aluCTR R10
+#define aluTMP R11
+#define aluK R12
+#define NR R13
+
+#define increment(i) ADDL $1, aluCTR; MOVL aluCTR, aluTMP; XORL aluK, aluTMP; BSWAPL aluTMP; MOVL aluTMP, (3*4 + 8*16 + i*16)(SP)
+#define aesRnd(k) AESENC k, B0; AESENC k, B1; AESENC k, B2; AESENC k, B3; AESENC k, B4; AESENC k, B5; AESENC k, B6; AESENC k, B7
+#define aesRound(i) MOVOU (16*i)(ks), T0;AESENC T0, B0; AESENC T0, B1; AESENC T0, B2; AESENC T0, B3; AESENC T0, B4; AESENC T0, B5; AESENC T0, B6; AESENC T0, B7
+#define aesRndLast(k) AESENCLAST k, B0; AESENCLAST k, B1; AESENCLAST k, B2; AESENCLAST k, B3; AESENCLAST k, B4; AESENCLAST k, B5; AESENCLAST k, B6; AESENCLAST k, B7
+#define combinedRound(i) \
+	MOVOU (16*i)(ks), T0;\
+	AESENC T0, B0;\
+	AESENC T0, B1;\
+	AESENC T0, B2;\
+	AESENC T0, B3;\
+	 MOVOU (16*(i*2))(pTbl), T1;\
+	 MOVOU T1, T2;\
+	AESENC T0, B4;\
+	AESENC T0, B5;\
+	AESENC T0, B6;\
+	AESENC T0, B7;\
+	 MOVOU (16*i)(SP), T0;\
+	 PCLMULQDQ $0x00, T0, T1;\
+	 PXOR T1, ACC0;\
+	 PSHUFD $78, T0, T1;\
+	 PCLMULQDQ $0x11, T0, T2;\
+	 PXOR T1, T0;\
+	 PXOR T2, ACC1;\
+	 MOVOU (16*(i*2+1))(pTbl), T2;\
+	 PCLMULQDQ $0x00, T2, T0;\
+	 PXOR T0, ACCM
+#define mulRound(i) \
+	MOVOU (16*i)(SP), T0;\
+	MOVOU (16*(i*2))(pTbl), T1;\
+	MOVOU T1, T2;\
+	PCLMULQDQ $0x00, T0, T1;\
+	PXOR T1, ACC0;\
+	PCLMULQDQ $0x11, T0, T2;\
+	PXOR T2, ACC1;\
+	PSHUFD $78, T0, T1;\
+	PXOR T1, T0;\
+	MOVOU (16*(i*2+1))(pTbl), T1;\
+	PCLMULQDQ $0x00, T0, T1;\
+	PXOR T1, ACCM
+
+	MOVQ productTable+0(FP), pTbl
+	MOVQ dst+8(FP), ctx
+	MOVQ src_base+32(FP), ptx
+	MOVQ src_len+40(FP), ptxLen
+	MOVQ ctr+56(FP), ctrPtr
+	MOVQ T+64(FP), tPtr
+	MOVQ ks_base+72(FP), ks
+	MOVQ ks_len+80(FP), NR
+
+	SHRQ $2, NR
+	DECQ NR
+
+	MOVOU bswapMask<>(SB), BSWAP
+	MOVOU gcmPoly<>(SB), POLY
+
+	MOVOU (tPtr), ACC0
+	PXOR ACC1, ACC1
+	PXOR ACCM, ACCM
+	MOVOU (ctrPtr), B0
+	MOVL (3*4)(ctrPtr), aluCTR
+	MOVOU (ks), T0
+	MOVL (3*4)(ks), aluK
+	BSWAPL aluCTR
+	BSWAPL aluK
+
+	PXOR B0, T0
+	MOVOU T0, (8*16 + 0*16)(SP)
+	increment(0)
+
+	CMPQ ptxLen, $128
+	JB gcmAesEncSingles
+	SUBQ $128, ptxLen
+
+	// We have at least 8 blocks to encrypt, prepare the rest of the counters
+	MOVOU T0, (8*16 + 1*16)(SP)
+	increment(1)
+	MOVOU T0, (8*16 + 2*16)(SP)
+	increment(2)
+	MOVOU T0, (8*16 + 3*16)(SP)
+	increment(3)
+	MOVOU T0, (8*16 + 4*16)(SP)
+	increment(4)
+	MOVOU T0, (8*16 + 5*16)(SP)
+	increment(5)
+	MOVOU T0, (8*16 + 6*16)(SP)
+	increment(6)
+	MOVOU T0, (8*16 + 7*16)(SP)
+	increment(7)
+
+	MOVOU (8*16 + 0*16)(SP), B0
+	MOVOU (8*16 + 1*16)(SP), B1
+	MOVOU (8*16 + 2*16)(SP), B2
+	MOVOU (8*16 + 3*16)(SP), B3
+	MOVOU (8*16 + 4*16)(SP), B4
+	MOVOU (8*16 + 5*16)(SP), B5
+	MOVOU (8*16 + 6*16)(SP), B6
+	MOVOU (8*16 + 7*16)(SP), B7
+
+	aesRound(1)
+	increment(0)
+	aesRound(2)
+	increment(1)
+	aesRound(3)
+	increment(2)
+	aesRound(4)
+	increment(3)
+	aesRound(5)
+	increment(4)
+	aesRound(6)
+	increment(5)
+	aesRound(7)
+	increment(6)
+	aesRound(8)
+	increment(7)
+	aesRound(9)
+	MOVOU (16*10)(ks), T0
+	CMPQ NR, $12
+	JB encLast1
+	aesRnd(T0)
+	aesRound(11)
+	MOVOU (16*12)(ks), T0
+	JE encLast1
+	aesRnd(T0)
+	aesRound(13)
+	MOVOU (16*14)(ks), T0
+encLast1:
+	aesRndLast(T0)
+
+	MOVOU (16*0)(ptx), T0
+	PXOR T0, B0
+	MOVOU (16*1)(ptx), T0
+	PXOR T0, B1
+	MOVOU (16*2)(ptx), T0
+	PXOR T0, B2
+	MOVOU (16*3)(ptx), T0
+	PXOR T0, B3
+	MOVOU (16*4)(ptx), T0
+	PXOR T0, B4
+	MOVOU (16*5)(ptx), T0
+	PXOR T0, B5
+	MOVOU (16*6)(ptx), T0
+	PXOR T0, B6
+	MOVOU (16*7)(ptx), T0
+	PXOR T0, B7
+
+	MOVOU B0, (16*0)(ctx)
+	PSHUFB BSWAP, B0
+	PXOR ACC0, B0
+	MOVOU B1, (16*1)(ctx)
+	PSHUFB BSWAP, B1
+	MOVOU B2, (16*2)(ctx)
+	PSHUFB BSWAP, B2
+	MOVOU B3, (16*3)(ctx)
+	PSHUFB BSWAP, B3
+	MOVOU B4, (16*4)(ctx)
+	PSHUFB BSWAP, B4
+	MOVOU B5, (16*5)(ctx)
+	PSHUFB BSWAP, B5
+	MOVOU B6, (16*6)(ctx)
+	PSHUFB BSWAP, B6
+	MOVOU B7, (16*7)(ctx)
+	PSHUFB BSWAP, B7
+
+	MOVOU B0, (16*0)(SP)
+	MOVOU B1, (16*1)(SP)
+	MOVOU B2, (16*2)(SP)
+	MOVOU B3, (16*3)(SP)
+	MOVOU B4, (16*4)(SP)
+	MOVOU B5, (16*5)(SP)
+	MOVOU B6, (16*6)(SP)
+	MOVOU B7, (16*7)(SP)
+
+	LEAQ 128(ptx), ptx
+	LEAQ 128(ctx), ctx
+
+gcmAesEncOctetsLoop:
+
+		CMPQ ptxLen, $128
+		JB gcmAesEncOctetsEnd
+		SUBQ $128, ptxLen
+
+		MOVOU (8*16 + 0*16)(SP), B0
+		MOVOU (8*16 + 1*16)(SP), B1
+		MOVOU (8*16 + 2*16)(SP), B2
+		MOVOU (8*16 + 3*16)(SP), B3
+		MOVOU (8*16 + 4*16)(SP), B4
+		MOVOU (8*16 + 5*16)(SP), B5
+		MOVOU (8*16 + 6*16)(SP), B6
+		MOVOU (8*16 + 7*16)(SP), B7
+
+		MOVOU (16*0)(SP), T0
+		PSHUFD $78, T0, T1
+		PXOR T0, T1
+
+		MOVOU (16*0)(pTbl), ACC0
+		MOVOU (16*1)(pTbl), ACCM
+		MOVOU ACC0, ACC1
+
+		PCLMULQDQ $0x00, T1, ACCM
+		PCLMULQDQ $0x00, T0, ACC0
+		PCLMULQDQ $0x11, T0, ACC1
+
+		combinedRound(1)
+		increment(0)
+		combinedRound(2)
+		increment(1)
+		combinedRound(3)
+		increment(2)
+		combinedRound(4)
+		increment(3)
+		combinedRound(5)
+		increment(4)
+		combinedRound(6)
+		increment(5)
+		combinedRound(7)
+		increment(6)
+
+		aesRound(8)
+		increment(7)
+
+		PXOR ACC0, ACCM
+		PXOR ACC1, ACCM
+		MOVOU ACCM, T0
+		PSRLDQ $8, ACCM
+		PSLLDQ $8, T0
+		PXOR ACCM, ACC1
+		PXOR T0, ACC0
+
+		reduceRound(ACC0)
+		aesRound(9)
+
+		reduceRound(ACC0)
+		PXOR ACC1, ACC0
+
+		MOVOU (16*10)(ks), T0
+		CMPQ NR, $12
+		JB encLast2
+		aesRnd(T0)
+		aesRound(11)
+		MOVOU (16*12)(ks), T0
+		JE encLast2
+		aesRnd(T0)
+		aesRound(13)
+		MOVOU (16*14)(ks), T0
+encLast2:
+		aesRndLast(T0)
+
+		MOVOU (16*0)(ptx), T0
+		PXOR T0, B0
+		MOVOU (16*1)(ptx), T0
+		PXOR T0, B1
+		MOVOU (16*2)(ptx), T0
+		PXOR T0, B2
+		MOVOU (16*3)(ptx), T0
+		PXOR T0, B3
+		MOVOU (16*4)(ptx), T0
+		PXOR T0, B4
+		MOVOU (16*5)(ptx), T0
+		PXOR T0, B5
+		MOVOU (16*6)(ptx), T0
+		PXOR T0, B6
+		MOVOU (16*7)(ptx), T0
+		PXOR T0, B7
+
+		MOVOU B0, (16*0)(ctx)
+		PSHUFB BSWAP, B0
+		PXOR ACC0, B0
+		MOVOU B1, (16*1)(ctx)
+		PSHUFB BSWAP, B1
+		MOVOU B2, (16*2)(ctx)
+		PSHUFB BSWAP, B2
+		MOVOU B3, (16*3)(ctx)
+		PSHUFB BSWAP, B3
+		MOVOU B4, (16*4)(ctx)
+		PSHUFB BSWAP, B4
+		MOVOU B5, (16*5)(ctx)
+		PSHUFB BSWAP, B5
+		MOVOU B6, (16*6)(ctx)
+		PSHUFB BSWAP, B6
+		MOVOU B7, (16*7)(ctx)
+		PSHUFB BSWAP, B7
+
+		MOVOU B0, (16*0)(SP)
+		MOVOU B1, (16*1)(SP)
+		MOVOU B2, (16*2)(SP)
+		MOVOU B3, (16*3)(SP)
+		MOVOU B4, (16*4)(SP)
+		MOVOU B5, (16*5)(SP)
+		MOVOU B6, (16*6)(SP)
+		MOVOU B7, (16*7)(SP)
+
+		LEAQ 128(ptx), ptx
+		LEAQ 128(ctx), ctx
+
+		JMP gcmAesEncOctetsLoop
+
+gcmAesEncOctetsEnd:
+
+	MOVOU (16*0)(SP), T0
+	MOVOU (16*0)(pTbl), ACC0
+	MOVOU (16*1)(pTbl), ACCM
+	MOVOU ACC0, ACC1
+	PSHUFD $78, T0, T1
+	PXOR T0, T1
+	PCLMULQDQ $0x00, T0, ACC0
+	PCLMULQDQ $0x11, T0, ACC1
+	PCLMULQDQ $0x00, T1, ACCM
+
+	mulRound(1)
+	mulRound(2)
+	mulRound(3)
+	mulRound(4)
+	mulRound(5)
+	mulRound(6)
+	mulRound(7)
+
+	PXOR ACC0, ACCM
+	PXOR ACC1, ACCM
+	MOVOU ACCM, T0
+	PSRLDQ $8, ACCM
+	PSLLDQ $8, T0
+	PXOR ACCM, ACC1
+	PXOR T0, ACC0
+
+	reduceRound(ACC0)
+	reduceRound(ACC0)
+	PXOR ACC1, ACC0
+
+	TESTQ ptxLen, ptxLen
+	JE gcmAesEncDone
+
+	SUBQ $7, aluCTR
+
+gcmAesEncSingles:
+
+	MOVOU (16*1)(ks), B1
+	MOVOU (16*2)(ks), B2
+	MOVOU (16*3)(ks), B3
+	MOVOU (16*4)(ks), B4
+	MOVOU (16*5)(ks), B5
+	MOVOU (16*6)(ks), B6
+	MOVOU (16*7)(ks), B7
+
+	MOVOU (16*14)(pTbl), T2
+
+gcmAesEncSinglesLoop:
+
+		CMPQ ptxLen, $16
+		JB gcmAesEncTail
+		SUBQ $16, ptxLen
+
+		MOVOU (8*16 + 0*16)(SP), B0
+		increment(0)
+
+		AESENC B1, B0
+		AESENC B2, B0
+		AESENC B3, B0
+		AESENC B4, B0
+		AESENC B5, B0
+		AESENC B6, B0
+		AESENC B7, B0
+		MOVOU (16*8)(ks), T0
+		AESENC T0, B0
+		MOVOU (16*9)(ks), T0
+		AESENC T0, B0
+		MOVOU (16*10)(ks), T0
+		CMPQ NR, $12
+		JB encLast3
+		AESENC T0, B0
+		MOVOU (16*11)(ks), T0
+		AESENC T0, B0
+		MOVOU (16*12)(ks), T0
+		JE encLast3
+		AESENC T0, B0
+		MOVOU (16*13)(ks), T0
+		AESENC T0, B0
+		MOVOU (16*14)(ks), T0
+encLast3:
+		AESENCLAST T0, B0
+
+		MOVOU (ptx), T0
+		PXOR T0, B0
+		MOVOU B0, (ctx)
+
+		PSHUFB BSWAP, B0
+		PXOR ACC0, B0
+
+		MOVOU T2, ACC0
+		MOVOU T2, ACC1
+		MOVOU (16*15)(pTbl), ACCM
+
+		PSHUFD $78, B0, T0
+		PXOR B0, T0
+		PCLMULQDQ $0x00, B0, ACC0
+		PCLMULQDQ $0x11, B0, ACC1
+		PCLMULQDQ $0x00, T0, ACCM
+
+		PXOR ACC0, ACCM
+		PXOR ACC1, ACCM
+		MOVOU ACCM, T0
+		PSRLDQ $8, ACCM
+		PSLLDQ $8, T0
+		PXOR ACCM, ACC1
+		PXOR T0, ACC0
+
+		reduceRound(ACC0)
+		reduceRound(ACC0)
+		PXOR ACC1, ACC0
+
+		LEAQ (16*1)(ptx), ptx
+		LEAQ (16*1)(ctx), ctx
+
+	JMP gcmAesEncSinglesLoop
+
+gcmAesEncTail:
+	TESTQ ptxLen, ptxLen
+	JE gcmAesEncDone
+
+	MOVOU (8*16 + 0*16)(SP), B0
+	AESENC B1, B0
+	AESENC B2, B0
+	AESENC B3, B0
+	AESENC B4, B0
+	AESENC B5, B0
+	AESENC B6, B0
+	AESENC B7, B0
+	MOVOU (16*8)(ks), T0
+	AESENC T0, B0
+	MOVOU (16*9)(ks), T0
+	AESENC T0, B0
+	MOVOU (16*10)(ks), T0
+	CMPQ NR, $12
+	JB encLast4
+	AESENC T0, B0
+	MOVOU (16*11)(ks), T0
+	AESENC T0, B0
+	MOVOU (16*12)(ks), T0
+	JE encLast4
+	AESENC T0, B0
+	MOVOU (16*13)(ks), T0
+	AESENC T0, B0
+	MOVOU (16*14)(ks), T0
+encLast4:
+	AESENCLAST T0, B0
+	MOVOU B0, T0
+
+	LEAQ -1(ptx)(ptxLen*1), ptx
+
+	MOVQ ptxLen, aluTMP
+	SHLQ $4, aluTMP
+
+	LEAQ andMask<>(SB), aluCTR
+	MOVOU -16(aluCTR)(aluTMP*1), T1
+
+	PXOR B0, B0
+ptxLoadLoop:
+		PSLLDQ $1, B0
+		PINSRB $0, (ptx), B0
+		LEAQ -1(ptx), ptx
+		DECQ ptxLen
+	JNE ptxLoadLoop
+
+	PXOR T0, B0
+	PAND T1, B0
+	MOVOU B0, (ctx)	// I assume there is always space, due to TAG in the end of the CT
+
+	PSHUFB BSWAP, B0
+	PXOR ACC0, B0
+
+	MOVOU T2, ACC0
+	MOVOU T2, ACC1
+	MOVOU (16*15)(pTbl), ACCM
+
+	PSHUFD $78, B0, T0
+	PXOR B0, T0
+	PCLMULQDQ $0x00, B0, ACC0
+	PCLMULQDQ $0x11, B0, ACC1
+	PCLMULQDQ $0x00, T0, ACCM
+
+	PXOR ACC0, ACCM
+	PXOR ACC1, ACCM
+	MOVOU ACCM, T0
+	PSRLDQ $8, ACCM
+	PSLLDQ $8, T0
+	PXOR ACCM, ACC1
+	PXOR T0, ACC0
+
+	reduceRound(ACC0)
+	reduceRound(ACC0)
+	PXOR ACC1, ACC0
+
+gcmAesEncDone:
+	MOVOU ACC0, (tPtr)
+	RET
+#undef increment
+
+// func gcmAesDec(productTable *[256]byte, dst, src []byte, ctr, T *[16]byte, ks []uint32)
+TEXT ·gcmAesDec(SB),0,$128-96
+#define increment(i) ADDL $1, aluCTR; MOVL aluCTR, aluTMP; XORL aluK, aluTMP; BSWAPL aluTMP; MOVL aluTMP, (3*4 + i*16)(SP)
+#define combinedDecRound(i) \
+	MOVOU (16*i)(ks), T0;\
+	AESENC T0, B0;\
+	AESENC T0, B1;\
+	AESENC T0, B2;\
+	AESENC T0, B3;\
+	MOVOU (16*(i*2))(pTbl), T1;\
+	MOVOU T1, T2;\
+	AESENC T0, B4;\
+	AESENC T0, B5;\
+	AESENC T0, B6;\
+	AESENC T0, B7;\
+	MOVOU (16*i)(ctx), T0;\
+	PSHUFB BSWAP, T0;\
+	PCLMULQDQ $0x00, T0, T1;\
+	PXOR T1, ACC0;\
+	PSHUFD $78, T0, T1;\
+	PCLMULQDQ $0x11, T0, T2;\
+	PXOR T1, T0;\
+	PXOR T2, ACC1;\
+	MOVOU (16*(i*2+1))(pTbl), T2;\
+	PCLMULQDQ $0x00, T2, T0;\
+	PXOR T0, ACCM
+
+	MOVQ productTable+0(FP), pTbl
+	MOVQ dst+8(FP), ptx
+	MOVQ src_base+32(FP), ctx
+	MOVQ src_len+40(FP), ptxLen
+	MOVQ ctr+56(FP), ctrPtr
+	MOVQ T+64(FP), tPtr
+	MOVQ ks_base+72(FP), ks
+	MOVQ ks_len+80(FP), NR
+
+	SHRQ $2, NR
+	DECQ NR
+
+	MOVOU bswapMask<>(SB), BSWAP
+	MOVOU gcmPoly<>(SB), POLY
+
+	MOVOU (tPtr), ACC0
+	PXOR ACC1, ACC1
+	PXOR ACCM, ACCM
+	MOVOU (ctrPtr), B0
+	MOVL (3*4)(ctrPtr), aluCTR
+	MOVOU (ks), T0
+	MOVL (3*4)(ks), aluK
+	BSWAPL aluCTR
+	BSWAPL aluK
+
+	PXOR B0, T0
+	MOVOU T0, (0*16)(SP)
+	increment(0)
+
+	CMPQ ptxLen, $128
+	JB gcmAesDecSingles
+
+	MOVOU T0, (1*16)(SP)
+	increment(1)
+	MOVOU T0, (2*16)(SP)
+	increment(2)
+	MOVOU T0, (3*16)(SP)
+	increment(3)
+	MOVOU T0, (4*16)(SP)
+	increment(4)
+	MOVOU T0, (5*16)(SP)
+	increment(5)
+	MOVOU T0, (6*16)(SP)
+	increment(6)
+	MOVOU T0, (7*16)(SP)
+	increment(7)
+
+gcmAesDecOctetsLoop:
+
+		CMPQ ptxLen, $128
+		JB gcmAesDecEndOctets
+		SUBQ $128, ptxLen
+
+		MOVOU (0*16)(SP), B0
+		MOVOU (1*16)(SP), B1
+		MOVOU (2*16)(SP), B2
+		MOVOU (3*16)(SP), B3
+		MOVOU (4*16)(SP), B4
+		MOVOU (5*16)(SP), B5
+		MOVOU (6*16)(SP), B6
+		MOVOU (7*16)(SP), B7
+
+		MOVOU (16*0)(ctx), T0
+		PSHUFB BSWAP, T0
+		PXOR ACC0, T0
+		PSHUFD $78, T0, T1
+		PXOR T0, T1
+
+		MOVOU (16*0)(pTbl), ACC0
+		MOVOU (16*1)(pTbl), ACCM
+		MOVOU ACC0, ACC1
+
+		PCLMULQDQ $0x00, T1, ACCM
+		PCLMULQDQ $0x00, T0, ACC0
+		PCLMULQDQ $0x11, T0, ACC1
+
+		combinedDecRound(1)
+		increment(0)
+		combinedDecRound(2)
+		increment(1)
+		combinedDecRound(3)
+		increment(2)
+		combinedDecRound(4)
+		increment(3)
+		combinedDecRound(5)
+		increment(4)
+		combinedDecRound(6)
+		increment(5)
+		combinedDecRound(7)
+		increment(6)
+
+		aesRound(8)
+		increment(7)
+
+		PXOR ACC0, ACCM
+		PXOR ACC1, ACCM
+		MOVOU ACCM, T0
+		PSRLDQ $8, ACCM
+		PSLLDQ $8, T0
+		PXOR ACCM, ACC1
+		PXOR T0, ACC0
+
+		reduceRound(ACC0)
+		aesRound(9)
+
+		reduceRound(ACC0)
+		PXOR ACC1, ACC0
+
+		MOVOU (16*10)(ks), T0
+		CMPQ NR, $12
+		JB decLast1
+		aesRnd(T0)
+		aesRound(11)
+		MOVOU (16*12)(ks), T0
+		JE decLast1
+		aesRnd(T0)
+		aesRound(13)
+		MOVOU (16*14)(ks), T0
+decLast1:
+		aesRndLast(T0)
+
+		MOVOU (16*0)(ctx), T0
+		PXOR T0, B0
+		MOVOU (16*1)(ctx), T0
+		PXOR T0, B1
+		MOVOU (16*2)(ctx), T0
+		PXOR T0, B2
+		MOVOU (16*3)(ctx), T0
+		PXOR T0, B3
+		MOVOU (16*4)(ctx), T0
+		PXOR T0, B4
+		MOVOU (16*5)(ctx), T0
+		PXOR T0, B5
+		MOVOU (16*6)(ctx), T0
+		PXOR T0, B6
+		MOVOU (16*7)(ctx), T0
+		PXOR T0, B7
+
+		MOVOU B0, (16*0)(ptx)
+		MOVOU B1, (16*1)(ptx)
+		MOVOU B2, (16*2)(ptx)
+		MOVOU B3, (16*3)(ptx)
+		MOVOU B4, (16*4)(ptx)
+		MOVOU B5, (16*5)(ptx)
+		MOVOU B6, (16*6)(ptx)
+		MOVOU B7, (16*7)(ptx)
+
+		LEAQ 128(ptx), ptx
+		LEAQ 128(ctx), ctx
+
+		JMP gcmAesDecOctetsLoop
+
+gcmAesDecEndOctets:
+
+	SUBQ $7, aluCTR
+
+gcmAesDecSingles:
+
+	MOVOU (16*1)(ks), B1
+	MOVOU (16*2)(ks), B2
+	MOVOU (16*3)(ks), B3
+	MOVOU (16*4)(ks), B4
+	MOVOU (16*5)(ks), B5
+	MOVOU (16*6)(ks), B6
+	MOVOU (16*7)(ks), B7
+
+	MOVOU (16*14)(pTbl), T2
+
+gcmAesDecSinglesLoop:
+
+		CMPQ ptxLen, $16
+		JB gcmAesDecTail
+		SUBQ $16, ptxLen
+
+		MOVOU (ctx), B0
+		MOVOU B0, T1
+		PSHUFB BSWAP, B0
+		PXOR ACC0, B0
+
+		MOVOU T2, ACC0
+		MOVOU T2, ACC1
+		MOVOU (16*15)(pTbl), ACCM
+
+		PCLMULQDQ $0x00, B0, ACC0
+		PCLMULQDQ $0x11, B0, ACC1
+		PSHUFD $78, B0, T0
+		PXOR B0, T0
+		PCLMULQDQ $0x00, T0, ACCM
+
+		PXOR ACC0, ACCM
+		PXOR ACC1, ACCM
+		MOVOU ACCM, T0
+		PSRLDQ $8, ACCM
+		PSLLDQ $8, T0
+		PXOR ACCM, ACC1
+		PXOR T0, ACC0
+
+		reduceRound(ACC0)
+		reduceRound(ACC0)
+		PXOR ACC1, ACC0
+
+		MOVOU (0*16)(SP), B0
+		increment(0)
+		AESENC B1, B0
+		AESENC B2, B0
+		AESENC B3, B0
+		AESENC B4, B0
+		AESENC B5, B0
+		AESENC B6, B0
+		AESENC B7, B0
+		MOVOU (16*8)(ks), T0
+		AESENC T0, B0
+		MOVOU (16*9)(ks), T0
+		AESENC T0, B0
+		MOVOU (16*10)(ks), T0
+		CMPQ NR, $12
+		JB decLast2
+		AESENC T0, B0
+		MOVOU (16*11)(ks), T0
+		AESENC T0, B0
+		MOVOU (16*12)(ks), T0
+		JE decLast2
+		AESENC T0, B0
+		MOVOU (16*13)(ks), T0
+		AESENC T0, B0
+		MOVOU (16*14)(ks), T0
+decLast2:
+		AESENCLAST T0, B0
+
+		PXOR T1, B0
+		MOVOU B0, (ptx)
+
+		LEAQ (16*1)(ptx), ptx
+		LEAQ (16*1)(ctx), ctx
+
+	JMP gcmAesDecSinglesLoop
+
+gcmAesDecTail:
+
+	TESTQ ptxLen, ptxLen
+	JE gcmAesDecDone
+
+	MOVQ ptxLen, aluTMP
+	SHLQ $4, aluTMP
+	LEAQ andMask<>(SB), aluCTR
+	MOVOU -16(aluCTR)(aluTMP*1), T1
+
+	MOVOU (ctx), B0	// I assume there is TAG attached to the ctx, and there is no read overflow
+	PAND T1, B0
+
+	MOVOU B0, T1
+	PSHUFB BSWAP, B0
+	PXOR ACC0, B0
+
+	MOVOU (16*14)(pTbl), ACC0
+	MOVOU (16*15)(pTbl), ACCM
+	MOVOU ACC0, ACC1
+
+	PCLMULQDQ $0x00, B0, ACC0
+	PCLMULQDQ $0x11, B0, ACC1
+	PSHUFD $78, B0, T0
+	PXOR B0, T0
+	PCLMULQDQ $0x00, T0, ACCM
+
+	PXOR ACC0, ACCM
+	PXOR ACC1, ACCM
+	MOVOU ACCM, T0
+	PSRLDQ $8, ACCM
+	PSLLDQ $8, T0
+	PXOR ACCM, ACC1
+	PXOR T0, ACC0
+
+	reduceRound(ACC0)
+	reduceRound(ACC0)
+	PXOR ACC1, ACC0
+
+	MOVOU (0*16)(SP), B0
+	increment(0)
+	AESENC B1, B0
+	AESENC B2, B0
+	AESENC B3, B0
+	AESENC B4, B0
+	AESENC B5, B0
+	AESENC B6, B0
+	AESENC B7, B0
+	MOVOU (16*8)(ks), T0
+	AESENC T0, B0
+	MOVOU (16*9)(ks), T0
+	AESENC T0, B0
+	MOVOU (16*10)(ks), T0
+	CMPQ NR, $12
+	JB decLast3
+	AESENC T0, B0
+	MOVOU (16*11)(ks), T0
+	AESENC T0, B0
+	MOVOU (16*12)(ks), T0
+	JE decLast3
+	AESENC T0, B0
+	MOVOU (16*13)(ks), T0
+	AESENC T0, B0
+	MOVOU (16*14)(ks), T0
+decLast3:
+	AESENCLAST T0, B0
+	PXOR T1, B0
+
+ptxStoreLoop:
+		PEXTRB $0, B0, (ptx)
+		PSRLDQ $1, B0
+		LEAQ 1(ptx), ptx
+		DECQ ptxLen
+
+	JNE ptxStoreLoop
+
+gcmAesDecDone:
+
+	MOVOU ACC0, (tPtr)
+	RET

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/aes/gcm_arm64.s

@@ -0,0 +1,1021 @@
+// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+#include "textflag.h"
+
+#define B0 V0
+#define B1 V1
+#define B2 V2
+#define B3 V3
+#define B4 V4
+#define B5 V5
+#define B6 V6
+#define B7 V7
+
+#define ACC0 V8
+#define ACC1 V9
+#define ACCM V10
+
+#define T0 V11
+#define T1 V12
+#define T2 V13
+#define T3 V14
+
+#define POLY V15
+#define ZERO V16
+#define INC V17
+#define CTR V18
+
+#define K0 V19
+#define K1 V20
+#define K2 V21
+#define K3 V22
+#define K4 V23
+#define K5 V24
+#define K6 V25
+#define K7 V26
+#define K8 V27
+#define K9 V28
+#define K10 V29
+#define K11 V30
+#define KLAST V31
+
+#define reduce() \
+	VEOR	ACC0.B16, ACCM.B16, ACCM.B16     \
+	VEOR	ACC1.B16, ACCM.B16, ACCM.B16     \
+	VEXT	$8, ZERO.B16, ACCM.B16, T0.B16   \
+	VEXT	$8, ACCM.B16, ZERO.B16, ACCM.B16 \
+	VEOR	ACCM.B16, ACC0.B16, ACC0.B16     \
+	VEOR	T0.B16, ACC1.B16, ACC1.B16       \
+	VPMULL	POLY.D1, ACC0.D1, T0.Q1          \
+	VEXT	$8, ACC0.B16, ACC0.B16, ACC0.B16 \
+	VEOR	T0.B16, ACC0.B16, ACC0.B16       \
+	VPMULL	POLY.D1, ACC0.D1, T0.Q1          \
+	VEOR	T0.B16, ACC1.B16, ACC1.B16       \
+	VEXT	$8, ACC1.B16, ACC1.B16, ACC1.B16 \
+	VEOR	ACC1.B16, ACC0.B16, ACC0.B16     \
+
+// func gcmAesFinish(productTable *[256]byte, tagMask, T *[16]byte, pLen, dLen uint64)
+TEXT ·gcmAesFinish(SB),NOSPLIT,$0
+#define pTbl R0
+#define tMsk R1
+#define tPtr R2
+#define plen R3
+#define dlen R4
+
+	MOVD	$0xC2, R1
+	LSL	$56, R1
+	MOVD	$1, R0
+	VMOV	R1, POLY.D[0]
+	VMOV	R0, POLY.D[1]
+	VEOR	ZERO.B16, ZERO.B16, ZERO.B16
+
+	MOVD	productTable+0(FP), pTbl
+	MOVD	tagMask+8(FP), tMsk
+	MOVD	T+16(FP), tPtr
+	MOVD	pLen+24(FP), plen
+	MOVD	dLen+32(FP), dlen
+
+	VLD1	(tPtr), [ACC0.B16]
+	VLD1	(tMsk), [B1.B16]
+
+	LSL	$3, plen
+	LSL	$3, dlen
+
+	VMOV	dlen, B0.D[0]
+	VMOV	plen, B0.D[1]
+
+	ADD	$14*16, pTbl
+	VLD1.P	(pTbl), [T1.B16, T2.B16]
+
+	VEOR	ACC0.B16, B0.B16, B0.B16
+
+	VEXT	$8, B0.B16, B0.B16, T0.B16
+	VEOR	B0.B16, T0.B16, T0.B16
+	VPMULL	B0.D1, T1.D1, ACC1.Q1
+	VPMULL2	B0.D2, T1.D2, ACC0.Q1
+	VPMULL	T0.D1, T2.D1, ACCM.Q1
+
+	reduce()
+
+	VREV64	ACC0.B16, ACC0.B16
+	VEOR	B1.B16, ACC0.B16, ACC0.B16
+
+	VST1	[ACC0.B16], (tPtr)
+	RET
+#undef pTbl
+#undef tMsk
+#undef tPtr
+#undef plen
+#undef dlen
+
+// func gcmAesInit(productTable *[256]byte, ks []uint32)
+TEXT ·gcmAesInit(SB),NOSPLIT,$0
+#define pTbl R0
+#define KS R1
+#define NR R2
+#define I R3
+	MOVD	productTable+0(FP), pTbl
+	MOVD	ks_base+8(FP), KS
+	MOVD	ks_len+16(FP), NR
+
+	MOVD	$0xC2, I
+	LSL	$56, I
+	VMOV	I, POLY.D[0]
+	MOVD	$1, I
+	VMOV	I, POLY.D[1]
+	VEOR	ZERO.B16, ZERO.B16, ZERO.B16
+
+	// Encrypt block 0 with the AES key to generate the hash key H
+	VLD1.P	64(KS), [T0.B16, T1.B16, T2.B16, T3.B16]
+	VEOR	B0.B16, B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	T0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	T1.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	T2.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	T3.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	VLD1.P	64(KS), [T0.B16, T1.B16, T2.B16, T3.B16]
+	AESE	T0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	T1.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	T2.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	T3.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	TBZ	$4, NR, initEncFinish
+	VLD1.P	32(KS), [T0.B16, T1.B16]
+	AESE	T0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	T1.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	TBZ	$3, NR, initEncFinish
+	VLD1.P	32(KS), [T0.B16, T1.B16]
+	AESE	T0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	T1.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+initEncFinish:
+	VLD1	(KS), [T0.B16, T1.B16, T2.B16]
+	AESE	T0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	T1.B16, B0.B16
+	VEOR	T2.B16, B0.B16, B0.B16
+
+	VREV64	B0.B16, B0.B16
+
+	// Multiply by 2 modulo P
+	VMOV	B0.D[0], I
+	ASR	$63, I
+	VMOV	I, T1.D[0]
+	VMOV	I, T1.D[1]
+	VAND	POLY.B16, T1.B16, T1.B16
+	VUSHR	$63, B0.D2, T2.D2
+	VEXT	$8, ZERO.B16, T2.B16, T2.B16
+	VSHL	$1, B0.D2, B0.D2
+	VEOR	T1.B16, B0.B16, B0.B16
+	VEOR	T2.B16, B0.B16, B0.B16 // Can avoid this when VSLI is available
+
+	// Karatsuba pre-computation
+	VEXT	$8, B0.B16, B0.B16, B1.B16
+	VEOR	B0.B16, B1.B16, B1.B16
+
+	ADD	$14*16, pTbl
+	VST1	[B0.B16, B1.B16], (pTbl)
+	SUB	$2*16, pTbl
+
+	VMOV	B0.B16, B2.B16
+	VMOV	B1.B16, B3.B16
+
+	MOVD	$7, I
+
+initLoop:
+	// Compute powers of H
+	SUBS	$1, I
+
+	VPMULL	B0.D1, B2.D1, T1.Q1
+	VPMULL2	B0.D2, B2.D2, T0.Q1
+	VPMULL	B1.D1, B3.D1, T2.Q1
+	VEOR	T0.B16, T2.B16, T2.B16
+	VEOR	T1.B16, T2.B16, T2.B16
+	VEXT	$8, ZERO.B16, T2.B16, T3.B16
+	VEXT	$8, T2.B16, ZERO.B16, T2.B16
+	VEOR	T2.B16, T0.B16, T0.B16
+	VEOR	T3.B16, T1.B16, T1.B16
+	VPMULL	POLY.D1, T0.D1, T2.Q1
+	VEXT	$8, T0.B16, T0.B16, T0.B16
+	VEOR	T2.B16, T0.B16, T0.B16
+	VPMULL	POLY.D1, T0.D1, T2.Q1
+	VEXT	$8, T0.B16, T0.B16, T0.B16
+	VEOR	T2.B16, T0.B16, T0.B16
+	VEOR	T1.B16, T0.B16, B2.B16
+	VMOV	B2.B16, B3.B16
+	VEXT	$8, B2.B16, B2.B16, B2.B16
+	VEOR	B2.B16, B3.B16, B3.B16
+
+	VST1	[B2.B16, B3.B16], (pTbl)
+	SUB	$2*16, pTbl
+
+	BNE	initLoop
+	RET
+#undef I
+#undef NR
+#undef KS
+#undef pTbl
+
+// func gcmAesData(productTable *[256]byte, data []byte, T *[16]byte)
+TEXT ·gcmAesData(SB),NOSPLIT,$0
+#define pTbl R0
+#define aut R1
+#define tPtr R2
+#define autLen R3
+#define H0 R4
+#define pTblSave R5
+
+#define mulRound(X) \
+	VLD1.P	32(pTbl), [T1.B16, T2.B16] \
+	VREV64	X.B16, X.B16               \
+	VEXT	$8, X.B16, X.B16, T0.B16   \
+	VEOR	X.B16, T0.B16, T0.B16      \
+	VPMULL	X.D1, T1.D1, T3.Q1         \
+	VEOR	T3.B16, ACC1.B16, ACC1.B16 \
+	VPMULL2	X.D2, T1.D2, T3.Q1         \
+	VEOR	T3.B16, ACC0.B16, ACC0.B16 \
+	VPMULL	T0.D1, T2.D1, T3.Q1        \
+	VEOR	T3.B16, ACCM.B16, ACCM.B16
+
+	MOVD	productTable+0(FP), pTbl
+	MOVD	data_base+8(FP), aut
+	MOVD	data_len+16(FP), autLen
+	MOVD	T+32(FP), tPtr
+
+	VEOR	ACC0.B16, ACC0.B16, ACC0.B16
+	CBZ	autLen, dataBail
+
+	MOVD	$0xC2, H0
+	LSL	$56, H0
+	VMOV	H0, POLY.D[0]
+	MOVD	$1, H0
+	VMOV	H0, POLY.D[1]
+	VEOR	ZERO.B16, ZERO.B16, ZERO.B16
+	MOVD	pTbl, pTblSave
+
+	CMP	$13, autLen
+	BEQ	dataTLS
+	CMP	$128, autLen
+	BLT	startSinglesLoop
+	B	octetsLoop
+
+dataTLS:
+	ADD	$14*16, pTbl
+	VLD1.P	(pTbl), [T1.B16, T2.B16]
+	VEOR	B0.B16, B0.B16, B0.B16
+
+	MOVD	(aut), H0
+	VMOV	H0, B0.D[0]
+	MOVW	8(aut), H0
+	VMOV	H0, B0.S[2]
+	MOVB	12(aut), H0
+	VMOV	H0, B0.B[12]
+
+	MOVD	$0, autLen
+	B	dataMul
+
+octetsLoop:
+		CMP	$128, autLen
+		BLT	startSinglesLoop
+		SUB	$128, autLen
+
+		VLD1.P	32(aut), [B0.B16, B1.B16]
+
+		VLD1.P	32(pTbl), [T1.B16, T2.B16]
+		VREV64	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		VEOR	ACC0.B16, B0.B16, B0.B16
+		VEXT	$8, B0.B16, B0.B16, T0.B16
+		VEOR	B0.B16, T0.B16, T0.B16
+		VPMULL	B0.D1, T1.D1, ACC1.Q1
+		VPMULL2	B0.D2, T1.D2, ACC0.Q1
+		VPMULL	T0.D1, T2.D1, ACCM.Q1
+
+		mulRound(B1)
+		VLD1.P  32(aut), [B2.B16, B3.B16]
+		mulRound(B2)
+		mulRound(B3)
+		VLD1.P  32(aut), [B4.B16, B5.B16]
+		mulRound(B4)
+		mulRound(B5)
+		VLD1.P  32(aut), [B6.B16, B7.B16]
+		mulRound(B6)
+		mulRound(B7)
+
+		MOVD	pTblSave, pTbl
+		reduce()
+	B	octetsLoop
+
+startSinglesLoop:
+
+	ADD	$14*16, pTbl
+	VLD1.P	(pTbl), [T1.B16, T2.B16]
+
+singlesLoop:
+
+		CMP	$16, autLen
+		BLT	dataEnd
+		SUB	$16, autLen
+
+		VLD1.P	16(aut), [B0.B16]
+dataMul:
+		VREV64	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		VEOR	ACC0.B16, B0.B16, B0.B16
+
+		VEXT	$8, B0.B16, B0.B16, T0.B16
+		VEOR	B0.B16, T0.B16, T0.B16
+		VPMULL	B0.D1, T1.D1, ACC1.Q1
+		VPMULL2	B0.D2, T1.D2, ACC0.Q1
+		VPMULL	T0.D1, T2.D1, ACCM.Q1
+
+		reduce()
+
+	B	singlesLoop
+
+dataEnd:
+
+	CBZ	autLen, dataBail
+	VEOR	B0.B16, B0.B16, B0.B16
+	ADD	autLen, aut
+
+dataLoadLoop:
+		MOVB.W	-1(aut), H0
+		VEXT	$15, B0.B16, ZERO.B16, B0.B16
+		VMOV	H0, B0.B[0]
+		SUBS	$1, autLen
+		BNE	dataLoadLoop
+	B	dataMul
+
+dataBail:
+	VST1	[ACC0.B16], (tPtr)
+	RET
+
+#undef pTbl
+#undef aut
+#undef tPtr
+#undef autLen
+#undef H0
+#undef pTblSave
+
+// func gcmAesEnc(productTable *[256]byte, dst, src []byte, ctr, T *[16]byte, ks []uint32)
+TEXT ·gcmAesEnc(SB),NOSPLIT,$0
+#define pTbl R0
+#define dstPtr R1
+#define ctrPtr R2
+#define srcPtr R3
+#define ks R4
+#define tPtr R5
+#define srcPtrLen R6
+#define aluCTR R7
+#define aluTMP R8
+#define aluK R9
+#define NR R10
+#define H0 R11
+#define H1 R12
+#define curK R13
+#define pTblSave R14
+
+#define aesrndx8(K) \
+	AESE	K.B16, B0.B16    \
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16   \
+	AESE	K.B16, B1.B16    \
+	AESMC	B1.B16, B1.B16   \
+	AESE	K.B16, B2.B16    \
+	AESMC	B2.B16, B2.B16   \
+	AESE	K.B16, B3.B16    \
+	AESMC	B3.B16, B3.B16   \
+	AESE	K.B16, B4.B16    \
+	AESMC	B4.B16, B4.B16   \
+	AESE	K.B16, B5.B16    \
+	AESMC	B5.B16, B5.B16   \
+	AESE	K.B16, B6.B16    \
+	AESMC	B6.B16, B6.B16   \
+	AESE	K.B16, B7.B16    \
+	AESMC	B7.B16, B7.B16
+
+#define aesrndlastx8(K) \
+	AESE	K.B16, B0.B16    \
+	AESE	K.B16, B1.B16    \
+	AESE	K.B16, B2.B16    \
+	AESE	K.B16, B3.B16    \
+	AESE	K.B16, B4.B16    \
+	AESE	K.B16, B5.B16    \
+	AESE	K.B16, B6.B16    \
+	AESE	K.B16, B7.B16
+
+	MOVD	productTable+0(FP), pTbl
+	MOVD	dst+8(FP), dstPtr
+	MOVD	src_base+32(FP), srcPtr
+	MOVD	src_len+40(FP), srcPtrLen
+	MOVD	ctr+56(FP), ctrPtr
+	MOVD	T+64(FP), tPtr
+	MOVD	ks_base+72(FP), ks
+	MOVD	ks_len+80(FP), NR
+
+	MOVD	$0xC2, H1
+	LSL	$56, H1
+	MOVD	$1, H0
+	VMOV	H1, POLY.D[0]
+	VMOV	H0, POLY.D[1]
+	VEOR	ZERO.B16, ZERO.B16, ZERO.B16
+	// Compute NR from len(ks)
+	MOVD	pTbl, pTblSave
+	// Current tag, after AAD
+	VLD1	(tPtr), [ACC0.B16]
+	VEOR	ACC1.B16, ACC1.B16, ACC1.B16
+	VEOR	ACCM.B16, ACCM.B16, ACCM.B16
+	// Prepare initial counter, and the increment vector
+	VLD1	(ctrPtr), [CTR.B16]
+	VEOR	INC.B16, INC.B16, INC.B16
+	MOVD	$1, H0
+	VMOV	H0, INC.S[3]
+	VREV32	CTR.B16, CTR.B16
+	VADD	CTR.S4, INC.S4, CTR.S4
+	// Skip to <8 blocks loop
+	CMP	$128, srcPtrLen
+
+	MOVD	ks, H0
+	// For AES-128 round keys are stored in: K0 .. K10, KLAST
+	VLD1.P	64(H0), [K0.B16, K1.B16, K2.B16, K3.B16]
+	VLD1.P	64(H0), [K4.B16, K5.B16, K6.B16, K7.B16]
+	VLD1.P	48(H0), [K8.B16, K9.B16, K10.B16]
+	VMOV	K10.B16, KLAST.B16
+
+	BLT	startSingles
+	// There are at least 8 blocks to encrypt
+	TBZ	$4, NR, octetsLoop
+
+	// For AES-192 round keys occupy: K0 .. K7, K10, K11, K8, K9, KLAST
+	VMOV	K8.B16, K10.B16
+	VMOV	K9.B16, K11.B16
+	VMOV	KLAST.B16, K8.B16
+	VLD1.P	16(H0), [K9.B16]
+	VLD1.P  16(H0), [KLAST.B16]
+	TBZ	$3, NR, octetsLoop
+	// For AES-256 round keys occupy: K0 .. K7, K10, K11, mem, mem, K8, K9, KLAST
+	VMOV	KLAST.B16, K8.B16
+	VLD1.P	16(H0), [K9.B16]
+	VLD1.P  16(H0), [KLAST.B16]
+	ADD	$10*16, ks, H0
+	MOVD	H0, curK
+
+octetsLoop:
+		SUB	$128, srcPtrLen
+
+		VMOV	CTR.B16, B0.B16
+		VADD	B0.S4, INC.S4, B1.S4
+		VREV32	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		VADD	B1.S4, INC.S4, B2.S4
+		VREV32	B1.B16, B1.B16
+		VADD	B2.S4, INC.S4, B3.S4
+		VREV32	B2.B16, B2.B16
+		VADD	B3.S4, INC.S4, B4.S4
+		VREV32	B3.B16, B3.B16
+		VADD	B4.S4, INC.S4, B5.S4
+		VREV32	B4.B16, B4.B16
+		VADD	B5.S4, INC.S4, B6.S4
+		VREV32	B5.B16, B5.B16
+		VADD	B6.S4, INC.S4, B7.S4
+		VREV32	B6.B16, B6.B16
+		VADD	B7.S4, INC.S4, CTR.S4
+		VREV32	B7.B16, B7.B16
+
+		aesrndx8(K0)
+		aesrndx8(K1)
+		aesrndx8(K2)
+		aesrndx8(K3)
+		aesrndx8(K4)
+		aesrndx8(K5)
+		aesrndx8(K6)
+		aesrndx8(K7)
+		TBZ	$4, NR, octetsFinish
+		aesrndx8(K10)
+		aesrndx8(K11)
+		TBZ	$3, NR, octetsFinish
+		VLD1.P	32(curK), [T1.B16, T2.B16]
+		aesrndx8(T1)
+		aesrndx8(T2)
+		MOVD	H0, curK
+octetsFinish:
+		aesrndx8(K8)
+		aesrndlastx8(K9)
+
+		VEOR	KLAST.B16, B0.B16, B0.B16
+		VEOR	KLAST.B16, B1.B16, B1.B16
+		VEOR	KLAST.B16, B2.B16, B2.B16
+		VEOR	KLAST.B16, B3.B16, B3.B16
+		VEOR	KLAST.B16, B4.B16, B4.B16
+		VEOR	KLAST.B16, B5.B16, B5.B16
+		VEOR	KLAST.B16, B6.B16, B6.B16
+		VEOR	KLAST.B16, B7.B16, B7.B16
+
+		VLD1.P	32(srcPtr), [T1.B16, T2.B16]
+		VEOR	B0.B16, T1.B16, B0.B16
+		VEOR	B1.B16, T2.B16, B1.B16
+		VST1.P  [B0.B16, B1.B16], 32(dstPtr)
+		VLD1.P	32(srcPtr), [T1.B16, T2.B16]
+		VEOR	B2.B16, T1.B16, B2.B16
+		VEOR	B3.B16, T2.B16, B3.B16
+		VST1.P  [B2.B16, B3.B16], 32(dstPtr)
+		VLD1.P	32(srcPtr), [T1.B16, T2.B16]
+		VEOR	B4.B16, T1.B16, B4.B16
+		VEOR	B5.B16, T2.B16, B5.B16
+		VST1.P  [B4.B16, B5.B16], 32(dstPtr)
+		VLD1.P	32(srcPtr), [T1.B16, T2.B16]
+		VEOR	B6.B16, T1.B16, B6.B16
+		VEOR	B7.B16, T2.B16, B7.B16
+		VST1.P  [B6.B16, B7.B16], 32(dstPtr)
+
+		VLD1.P	32(pTbl), [T1.B16, T2.B16]
+		VREV64	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		VEOR	ACC0.B16, B0.B16, B0.B16
+		VEXT	$8, B0.B16, B0.B16, T0.B16
+		VEOR	B0.B16, T0.B16, T0.B16
+		VPMULL	B0.D1, T1.D1, ACC1.Q1
+		VPMULL2	B0.D2, T1.D2, ACC0.Q1
+		VPMULL	T0.D1, T2.D1, ACCM.Q1
+
+		mulRound(B1)
+		mulRound(B2)
+		mulRound(B3)
+		mulRound(B4)
+		mulRound(B5)
+		mulRound(B6)
+		mulRound(B7)
+		MOVD	pTblSave, pTbl
+		reduce()
+
+		CMP	$128, srcPtrLen
+		BGE	octetsLoop
+
+startSingles:
+	CBZ	srcPtrLen, done
+	ADD	$14*16, pTbl
+	// Preload H and its Karatsuba precomp
+	VLD1.P	(pTbl), [T1.B16, T2.B16]
+	// Preload AES round keys
+	ADD	$128, ks
+	VLD1.P	48(ks), [K8.B16, K9.B16, K10.B16]
+	VMOV	K10.B16, KLAST.B16
+	TBZ	$4, NR, singlesLoop
+	VLD1.P	32(ks), [B1.B16, B2.B16]
+	VMOV	B2.B16, KLAST.B16
+	TBZ	$3, NR, singlesLoop
+	VLD1.P	32(ks), [B3.B16, B4.B16]
+	VMOV	B4.B16, KLAST.B16
+
+singlesLoop:
+		CMP	$16, srcPtrLen
+		BLT	tail
+		SUB	$16, srcPtrLen
+
+		VLD1.P	16(srcPtr), [T0.B16]
+		VEOR	KLAST.B16, T0.B16, T0.B16
+
+		VREV32	CTR.B16, B0.B16
+		VADD	CTR.S4, INC.S4, CTR.S4
+
+		AESE	K0.B16, B0.B16
+		AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		AESE	K1.B16, B0.B16
+		AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		AESE	K2.B16, B0.B16
+		AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		AESE	K3.B16, B0.B16
+		AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		AESE	K4.B16, B0.B16
+		AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		AESE	K5.B16, B0.B16
+		AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		AESE	K6.B16, B0.B16
+		AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		AESE	K7.B16, B0.B16
+		AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		AESE	K8.B16, B0.B16
+		AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		AESE	K9.B16, B0.B16
+		TBZ	$4, NR, singlesLast
+		AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		AESE	K10.B16, B0.B16
+		AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		AESE	B1.B16, B0.B16
+		TBZ	$3, NR, singlesLast
+		AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		AESE	B2.B16, B0.B16
+		AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		AESE	B3.B16, B0.B16
+singlesLast:
+		VEOR	T0.B16, B0.B16, B0.B16
+encReduce:
+		VST1.P	[B0.B16], 16(dstPtr)
+
+		VREV64	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		VEOR	ACC0.B16, B0.B16, B0.B16
+
+		VEXT	$8, B0.B16, B0.B16, T0.B16
+		VEOR	B0.B16, T0.B16, T0.B16
+		VPMULL	B0.D1, T1.D1, ACC1.Q1
+		VPMULL2	B0.D2, T1.D2, ACC0.Q1
+		VPMULL	T0.D1, T2.D1, ACCM.Q1
+
+		reduce()
+
+	B	singlesLoop
+tail:
+	CBZ	srcPtrLen, done
+
+	VEOR	T0.B16, T0.B16, T0.B16
+	VEOR	T3.B16, T3.B16, T3.B16
+	MOVD	$0, H1
+	SUB	$1, H1
+	ADD	srcPtrLen, srcPtr
+
+	TBZ	$3, srcPtrLen, ld4
+	MOVD.W	-8(srcPtr), H0
+	VMOV	H0, T0.D[0]
+	VMOV	H1, T3.D[0]
+ld4:
+	TBZ	$2, srcPtrLen, ld2
+	MOVW.W	-4(srcPtr), H0
+	VEXT	$12, T0.B16, ZERO.B16, T0.B16
+	VEXT	$12, T3.B16, ZERO.B16, T3.B16
+	VMOV	H0, T0.S[0]
+	VMOV	H1, T3.S[0]
+ld2:
+	TBZ	$1, srcPtrLen, ld1
+	MOVH.W	-2(srcPtr), H0
+	VEXT	$14, T0.B16, ZERO.B16, T0.B16
+	VEXT	$14, T3.B16, ZERO.B16, T3.B16
+	VMOV	H0, T0.H[0]
+	VMOV	H1, T3.H[0]
+ld1:
+	TBZ	$0, srcPtrLen, ld0
+	MOVB.W	-1(srcPtr), H0
+	VEXT	$15, T0.B16, ZERO.B16, T0.B16
+	VEXT	$15, T3.B16, ZERO.B16, T3.B16
+	VMOV	H0, T0.B[0]
+	VMOV	H1, T3.B[0]
+ld0:
+
+	MOVD	ZR, srcPtrLen
+	VEOR	KLAST.B16, T0.B16, T0.B16
+	VREV32	CTR.B16, B0.B16
+
+	AESE	K0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	K1.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	K2.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	K3.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	K4.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	K5.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	K6.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	K7.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	K8.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	K9.B16, B0.B16
+	TBZ	$4, NR, tailLast
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	K10.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	B1.B16, B0.B16
+	TBZ	$3, NR, tailLast
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	B2.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	B3.B16, B0.B16
+
+tailLast:
+	VEOR	T0.B16, B0.B16, B0.B16
+	VAND	T3.B16, B0.B16, B0.B16
+	B	encReduce
+
+done:
+	VST1	[ACC0.B16], (tPtr)
+	RET
+
+// func gcmAesDec(productTable *[256]byte, dst, src []byte, ctr, T *[16]byte, ks []uint32)
+TEXT ·gcmAesDec(SB),NOSPLIT,$0
+	MOVD	productTable+0(FP), pTbl
+	MOVD	dst+8(FP), dstPtr
+	MOVD	src_base+32(FP), srcPtr
+	MOVD	src_len+40(FP), srcPtrLen
+	MOVD	ctr+56(FP), ctrPtr
+	MOVD	T+64(FP), tPtr
+	MOVD	ks_base+72(FP), ks
+	MOVD	ks_len+80(FP), NR
+
+	MOVD	$0xC2, H1
+	LSL	$56, H1
+	MOVD	$1, H0
+	VMOV	H1, POLY.D[0]
+	VMOV	H0, POLY.D[1]
+	VEOR	ZERO.B16, ZERO.B16, ZERO.B16
+	// Compute NR from len(ks)
+	MOVD	pTbl, pTblSave
+	// Current tag, after AAD
+	VLD1	(tPtr), [ACC0.B16]
+	VEOR	ACC1.B16, ACC1.B16, ACC1.B16
+	VEOR	ACCM.B16, ACCM.B16, ACCM.B16
+	// Prepare initial counter, and the increment vector
+	VLD1	(ctrPtr), [CTR.B16]
+	VEOR	INC.B16, INC.B16, INC.B16
+	MOVD	$1, H0
+	VMOV	H0, INC.S[3]
+	VREV32	CTR.B16, CTR.B16
+	VADD	CTR.S4, INC.S4, CTR.S4
+
+	MOVD	ks, H0
+	// For AES-128 round keys are stored in: K0 .. K10, KLAST
+	VLD1.P	64(H0), [K0.B16, K1.B16, K2.B16, K3.B16]
+	VLD1.P	64(H0), [K4.B16, K5.B16, K6.B16, K7.B16]
+	VLD1.P	48(H0), [K8.B16, K9.B16, K10.B16]
+	VMOV	K10.B16, KLAST.B16
+
+	// Skip to <8 blocks loop
+	CMP	$128, srcPtrLen
+	BLT	startSingles
+	// There are at least 8 blocks to encrypt
+	TBZ	$4, NR, octetsLoop
+
+	// For AES-192 round keys occupy: K0 .. K7, K10, K11, K8, K9, KLAST
+	VMOV	K8.B16, K10.B16
+	VMOV	K9.B16, K11.B16
+	VMOV	KLAST.B16, K8.B16
+	VLD1.P	16(H0), [K9.B16]
+	VLD1.P  16(H0), [KLAST.B16]
+	TBZ	$3, NR, octetsLoop
+	// For AES-256 round keys occupy: K0 .. K7, K10, K11, mem, mem, K8, K9, KLAST
+	VMOV	KLAST.B16, K8.B16
+	VLD1.P	16(H0), [K9.B16]
+	VLD1.P  16(H0), [KLAST.B16]
+	ADD	$10*16, ks, H0
+	MOVD	H0, curK
+
+octetsLoop:
+		SUB	$128, srcPtrLen
+
+		VMOV	CTR.B16, B0.B16
+		VADD	B0.S4, INC.S4, B1.S4
+		VREV32	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		VADD	B1.S4, INC.S4, B2.S4
+		VREV32	B1.B16, B1.B16
+		VADD	B2.S4, INC.S4, B3.S4
+		VREV32	B2.B16, B2.B16
+		VADD	B3.S4, INC.S4, B4.S4
+		VREV32	B3.B16, B3.B16
+		VADD	B4.S4, INC.S4, B5.S4
+		VREV32	B4.B16, B4.B16
+		VADD	B5.S4, INC.S4, B6.S4
+		VREV32	B5.B16, B5.B16
+		VADD	B6.S4, INC.S4, B7.S4
+		VREV32	B6.B16, B6.B16
+		VADD	B7.S4, INC.S4, CTR.S4
+		VREV32	B7.B16, B7.B16
+
+		aesrndx8(K0)
+		aesrndx8(K1)
+		aesrndx8(K2)
+		aesrndx8(K3)
+		aesrndx8(K4)
+		aesrndx8(K5)
+		aesrndx8(K6)
+		aesrndx8(K7)
+		TBZ	$4, NR, octetsFinish
+		aesrndx8(K10)
+		aesrndx8(K11)
+		TBZ	$3, NR, octetsFinish
+		VLD1.P	32(curK), [T1.B16, T2.B16]
+		aesrndx8(T1)
+		aesrndx8(T2)
+		MOVD	H0, curK
+octetsFinish:
+		aesrndx8(K8)
+		aesrndlastx8(K9)
+
+		VEOR	KLAST.B16, B0.B16, T1.B16
+		VEOR	KLAST.B16, B1.B16, T2.B16
+		VEOR	KLAST.B16, B2.B16, B2.B16
+		VEOR	KLAST.B16, B3.B16, B3.B16
+		VEOR	KLAST.B16, B4.B16, B4.B16
+		VEOR	KLAST.B16, B5.B16, B5.B16
+		VEOR	KLAST.B16, B6.B16, B6.B16
+		VEOR	KLAST.B16, B7.B16, B7.B16
+
+		VLD1.P	32(srcPtr), [B0.B16, B1.B16]
+		VEOR	B0.B16, T1.B16, T1.B16
+		VEOR	B1.B16, T2.B16, T2.B16
+		VST1.P  [T1.B16, T2.B16], 32(dstPtr)
+
+		VLD1.P	32(pTbl), [T1.B16, T2.B16]
+		VREV64	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		VEOR	ACC0.B16, B0.B16, B0.B16
+		VEXT	$8, B0.B16, B0.B16, T0.B16
+		VEOR	B0.B16, T0.B16, T0.B16
+		VPMULL	B0.D1, T1.D1, ACC1.Q1
+		VPMULL2	B0.D2, T1.D2, ACC0.Q1
+		VPMULL	T0.D1, T2.D1, ACCM.Q1
+		mulRound(B1)
+
+		VLD1.P	32(srcPtr), [B0.B16, B1.B16]
+		VEOR	B2.B16, B0.B16, T1.B16
+		VEOR	B3.B16, B1.B16, T2.B16
+		VST1.P  [T1.B16, T2.B16], 32(dstPtr)
+		mulRound(B0)
+		mulRound(B1)
+
+		VLD1.P	32(srcPtr), [B0.B16, B1.B16]
+		VEOR	B4.B16, B0.B16, T1.B16
+		VEOR	B5.B16, B1.B16, T2.B16
+		VST1.P  [T1.B16, T2.B16], 32(dstPtr)
+		mulRound(B0)
+		mulRound(B1)
+
+		VLD1.P	32(srcPtr), [B0.B16, B1.B16]
+		VEOR	B6.B16, B0.B16, T1.B16
+		VEOR	B7.B16, B1.B16, T2.B16
+		VST1.P  [T1.B16, T2.B16], 32(dstPtr)
+		mulRound(B0)
+		mulRound(B1)
+
+		MOVD	pTblSave, pTbl
+		reduce()
+
+		CMP	$128, srcPtrLen
+		BGE	octetsLoop
+
+startSingles:
+	CBZ	srcPtrLen, done
+	ADD	$14*16, pTbl
+	// Preload H and its Karatsuba precomp
+	VLD1.P	(pTbl), [T1.B16, T2.B16]
+	// Preload AES round keys
+	ADD	$128, ks
+	VLD1.P	48(ks), [K8.B16, K9.B16, K10.B16]
+	VMOV	K10.B16, KLAST.B16
+	TBZ	$4, NR, singlesLoop
+	VLD1.P	32(ks), [B1.B16, B2.B16]
+	VMOV	B2.B16, KLAST.B16
+	TBZ	$3, NR, singlesLoop
+	VLD1.P	32(ks), [B3.B16, B4.B16]
+	VMOV	B4.B16, KLAST.B16
+
+singlesLoop:
+		CMP	$16, srcPtrLen
+		BLT	tail
+		SUB	$16, srcPtrLen
+
+		VLD1.P	16(srcPtr), [T0.B16]
+		VREV64	T0.B16, B5.B16
+		VEOR	KLAST.B16, T0.B16, T0.B16
+
+		VREV32	CTR.B16, B0.B16
+		VADD	CTR.S4, INC.S4, CTR.S4
+
+		AESE	K0.B16, B0.B16
+		AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		AESE	K1.B16, B0.B16
+		AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		AESE	K2.B16, B0.B16
+		AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		AESE	K3.B16, B0.B16
+		AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		AESE	K4.B16, B0.B16
+		AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		AESE	K5.B16, B0.B16
+		AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		AESE	K6.B16, B0.B16
+		AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		AESE	K7.B16, B0.B16
+		AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		AESE	K8.B16, B0.B16
+		AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		AESE	K9.B16, B0.B16
+		TBZ	$4, NR, singlesLast
+		AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		AESE	K10.B16, B0.B16
+		AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		AESE	B1.B16, B0.B16
+		TBZ	$3, NR, singlesLast
+		AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		AESE	B2.B16, B0.B16
+		AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+		AESE	B3.B16, B0.B16
+singlesLast:
+		VEOR	T0.B16, B0.B16, B0.B16
+
+		VST1.P	[B0.B16], 16(dstPtr)
+
+		VEOR	ACC0.B16, B5.B16, B5.B16
+		VEXT	$8, B5.B16, B5.B16, T0.B16
+		VEOR	B5.B16, T0.B16, T0.B16
+		VPMULL	B5.D1, T1.D1, ACC1.Q1
+		VPMULL2	B5.D2, T1.D2, ACC0.Q1
+		VPMULL	T0.D1, T2.D1, ACCM.Q1
+		reduce()
+
+	B	singlesLoop
+tail:
+	CBZ	srcPtrLen, done
+
+	VREV32	CTR.B16, B0.B16
+	VADD	CTR.S4, INC.S4, CTR.S4
+
+	AESE	K0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	K1.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	K2.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	K3.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	K4.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	K5.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	K6.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	K7.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	K8.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	K9.B16, B0.B16
+	TBZ	$4, NR, tailLast
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	K10.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	B1.B16, B0.B16
+	TBZ	$3, NR, tailLast
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	B2.B16, B0.B16
+	AESMC	B0.B16, B0.B16
+	AESE	B3.B16, B0.B16
+tailLast:
+	VEOR	KLAST.B16, B0.B16, B0.B16
+
+	// Assuming it is safe to load past dstPtr due to the presence of the tag
+	VLD1	(srcPtr), [B5.B16]
+
+	VEOR	B5.B16, B0.B16, B0.B16
+
+	VEOR	T3.B16, T3.B16, T3.B16
+	MOVD	$0, H1
+	SUB	$1, H1
+
+	TBZ	$3, srcPtrLen, ld4
+	VMOV	B0.D[0], H0
+	MOVD.P	H0, 8(dstPtr)
+	VMOV	H1, T3.D[0]
+	VEXT	$8, ZERO.B16, B0.B16, B0.B16
+ld4:
+	TBZ	$2, srcPtrLen, ld2
+	VMOV	B0.S[0], H0
+	MOVW.P	H0, 4(dstPtr)
+	VEXT	$12, T3.B16, ZERO.B16, T3.B16
+	VMOV	H1, T3.S[0]
+	VEXT	$4, ZERO.B16, B0.B16, B0.B16
+ld2:
+	TBZ	$1, srcPtrLen, ld1
+	VMOV	B0.H[0], H0
+	MOVH.P	H0, 2(dstPtr)
+	VEXT	$14, T3.B16, ZERO.B16, T3.B16
+	VMOV	H1, T3.H[0]
+	VEXT	$2, ZERO.B16, B0.B16, B0.B16
+ld1:
+	TBZ	$0, srcPtrLen, ld0
+	VMOV	B0.B[0], H0
+	MOVB.P	H0, 1(dstPtr)
+	VEXT	$15, T3.B16, ZERO.B16, T3.B16
+	VMOV	H1, T3.B[0]
+ld0:
+
+	VAND	T3.B16, B5.B16, B5.B16
+	VREV64	B5.B16, B5.B16
+
+	VEOR	ACC0.B16, B5.B16, B5.B16
+	VEXT	$8, B5.B16, B5.B16, T0.B16
+	VEOR	B5.B16, T0.B16, T0.B16
+	VPMULL	B5.D1, T1.D1, ACC1.Q1
+	VPMULL2	B5.D2, T1.D2, ACC0.Q1
+	VPMULL	T0.D1, T2.D1, ACCM.Q1
+	reduce()
+done:
+	VST1	[ACC0.B16], (tPtr)
+
+	RET

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/aes/gcm_ppc64x.go

@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
+// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+//go:build ppc64le || ppc64
+
+package aes
+
+import (
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+	"runtime"
+)
+
+// This file implements GCM using an optimized GHASH function.
+
+//go:noescape
+func gcmInit(productTable *[256]byte, h []byte)
+
+//go:noescape
+func gcmHash(output []byte, productTable *[256]byte, inp []byte, len int)
+
+//go:noescape
+func gcmMul(output []byte, productTable *[256]byte)
+
+const (
+	gcmCounterSize       = 16
+	gcmBlockSize         = 16
+	gcmTagSize           = 16
+	gcmStandardNonceSize = 12
+)
+
+var errOpen = errors.New("cipher: message authentication failed")
+
+// Assert that aesCipherGCM implements the gcmAble interface.
+var _ gcmAble = (*aesCipherAsm)(nil)
+
+type gcmAsm struct {
+	cipher *aesCipherAsm
+	// ks is the key schedule, the length of which depends on the size of
+	// the AES key.
+	ks []uint32
+	// productTable contains pre-computed multiples of the binary-field
+	// element used in GHASH.
+	productTable [256]byte
+	// nonceSize contains the expected size of the nonce, in bytes.
+	nonceSize int
+	// tagSize contains the size of the tag, in bytes.
+	tagSize int
+}
+
+func counterCryptASM(nr int, out, in []byte, counter *[gcmBlockSize]byte, key *uint32)
+
+// NewGCM returns the AES cipher wrapped in Galois Counter Mode. This is only
+// called by [crypto/cipher.NewGCM] via the gcmAble interface.
+func (c *aesCipherAsm) NewGCM(nonceSize, tagSize int) (cipher.AEAD, error) {
+	var h1, h2 uint64
+	g := &gcmAsm{cipher: c, ks: c.enc, nonceSize: nonceSize, tagSize: tagSize}
+
+	hle := make([]byte, gcmBlockSize)
+
+	c.Encrypt(hle, hle)
+
+	// Reverse the bytes in each 8 byte chunk
+	// Load little endian, store big endian
+	if runtime.GOARCH == "ppc64le" {
+		h1 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(hle[:8])
+		h2 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(hle[8:])
+	} else {
+		h1 = binary.BigEndian.Uint64(hle[:8])
+		h2 = binary.BigEndian.Uint64(hle[8:])
+	}
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(hle[:8], h1)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(hle[8:], h2)
+	gcmInit(&g.productTable, hle)
+
+	return g, nil
+}
+
+func (g *gcmAsm) NonceSize() int {
+	return g.nonceSize
+}
+
+func (g *gcmAsm) Overhead() int {
+	return g.tagSize
+}
+
+func sliceForAppend(in []byte, n int) (head, tail []byte) {
+	if total := len(in) + n; cap(in) >= total {
+		head = in[:total]
+	} else {
+		head = make([]byte, total)
+		copy(head, in)
+	}
+	tail = head[len(in):]
+	return
+}
+
+// deriveCounter computes the initial GCM counter state from the given nonce.
+func (g *gcmAsm) deriveCounter(counter *[gcmBlockSize]byte, nonce []byte) {
+	if len(nonce) == gcmStandardNonceSize {
+		copy(counter[:], nonce)
+		counter[gcmBlockSize-1] = 1
+	} else {
+		var hash [16]byte
+		g.paddedGHASH(&hash, nonce)
+		lens := gcmLengths(0, uint64(len(nonce))*8)
+		g.paddedGHASH(&hash, lens[:])
+		copy(counter[:], hash[:])
+	}
+}
+
+// counterCrypt encrypts in using AES in counter mode and places the result
+// into out. counter is the initial count value and will be updated with the next
+// count value. The length of out must be greater than or equal to the length
+// of in.
+// counterCryptASM implements counterCrypt which then allows the loop to
+// be unrolled and optimized.
+func (g *gcmAsm) counterCrypt(out, in []byte, counter *[gcmBlockSize]byte) {
+	counterCryptASM(len(g.cipher.enc)/4-1, out, in, counter, &g.cipher.enc[0])
+}
+
+// increments the rightmost 32-bits of the count value by 1.
+func gcmInc32(counterBlock *[16]byte) {
+	c := counterBlock[len(counterBlock)-4:]
+	x := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(c) + 1
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(c, x)
+}
+
+// paddedGHASH pads data with zeroes until its length is a multiple of
+// 16-bytes. It then calculates a new value for hash using the ghash
+// algorithm.
+func (g *gcmAsm) paddedGHASH(hash *[16]byte, data []byte) {
+	if siz := len(data) - (len(data) % gcmBlockSize); siz > 0 {
+		gcmHash(hash[:], &g.productTable, data[:], siz)
+		data = data[siz:]
+	}
+	if len(data) > 0 {
+		var s [16]byte
+		copy(s[:], data)
+		gcmHash(hash[:], &g.productTable, s[:], len(s))
+	}
+}
+
+// auth calculates GHASH(ciphertext, additionalData), masks the result with
+// tagMask and writes the result to out.
+func (g *gcmAsm) auth(out, ciphertext, aad []byte, tagMask *[gcmTagSize]byte) {
+	var hash [16]byte
+	g.paddedGHASH(&hash, aad)
+	g.paddedGHASH(&hash, ciphertext)
+	lens := gcmLengths(uint64(len(aad))*8, uint64(len(ciphertext))*8)
+	g.paddedGHASH(&hash, lens[:])
+
+	copy(out, hash[:])
+	for i := range out {
+		out[i] ^= tagMask[i]
+	}
+}
+
+// Seal encrypts and authenticates plaintext. See the [cipher.AEAD] interface for
+// details.
+func (g *gcmAsm) Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, data []byte) []byte {
+	if len(nonce) != g.nonceSize {
+		panic("cipher: incorrect nonce length given to GCM")
+	}
+	if uint64(len(plaintext)) > ((1<<32)-2)*BlockSize {
+		panic("cipher: message too large for GCM")
+	}
+
+	ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(plaintext)+g.tagSize)
+
+	var counter, tagMask [gcmBlockSize]byte
+	g.deriveCounter(&counter, nonce)
+
+	g.cipher.Encrypt(tagMask[:], counter[:])
+	gcmInc32(&counter)
+
+	g.counterCrypt(out, plaintext, &counter)
+	g.auth(out[len(plaintext):], out[:len(plaintext)], data, &tagMask)
+
+	return ret
+}
+
+// Open authenticates and decrypts ciphertext. See the [cipher.AEAD] interface
+// for details.
+func (g *gcmAsm) Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, data []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if len(nonce) != g.nonceSize {
+		panic("cipher: incorrect nonce length given to GCM")
+	}
+	if len(ciphertext) < g.tagSize {
+		return nil, errOpen
+	}
+	if uint64(len(ciphertext)) > ((1<<32)-2)*uint64(BlockSize)+uint64(g.tagSize) {
+		return nil, errOpen
+	}
+
+	tag := ciphertext[len(ciphertext)-g.tagSize:]
+	ciphertext = ciphertext[:len(ciphertext)-g.tagSize]
+
+	var counter, tagMask [gcmBlockSize]byte
+	g.deriveCounter(&counter, nonce)
+
+	g.cipher.Encrypt(tagMask[:], counter[:])
+	gcmInc32(&counter)
+
+	var expectedTag [gcmTagSize]byte
+	g.auth(expectedTag[:], ciphertext, data, &tagMask)
+
+	ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(ciphertext))
+
+	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(expectedTag[:g.tagSize], tag) != 1 {
+		for i := range out {
+			out[i] = 0
+		}
+		return nil, errOpen
+	}
+
+	g.counterCrypt(out, ciphertext, &counter)
+	return ret, nil
+}
+
+func gcmLengths(len0, len1 uint64) [16]byte {
+	return [16]byte{
+		byte(len0 >> 56),
+		byte(len0 >> 48),
+		byte(len0 >> 40),
+		byte(len0 >> 32),
+		byte(len0 >> 24),
+		byte(len0 >> 16),
+		byte(len0 >> 8),
+		byte(len0),
+		byte(len1 >> 56),
+		byte(len1 >> 48),
+		byte(len1 >> 40),
+		byte(len1 >> 32),
+		byte(len1 >> 24),
+		byte(len1 >> 16),
+		byte(len1 >> 8),
+		byte(len1),
+	}
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/aes/gcm_ppc64x.s

@@ -0,0 +1,1103 @@
+// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+//go:build ppc64 || ppc64le
+
+// Portions based on CRYPTOGAMS code with the following comment:
+// # ====================================================================
+// # Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+// # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+// # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+// # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+// # ====================================================================
+
+// The implementations for gcmHash, gcmInit and gcmMul are based on the generated asm
+// from the script https://github.com/dot-asm/cryptogams/blob/master/ppc/ghashp8-ppc.pl
+// from commit d47afb3c.
+
+// Changes were made due to differences in the ABI and some register usage.
+// Some arguments were changed due to the way the Go code passes them.
+
+// Portions that use the stitched AES-GCM approach in counterCryptASM
+// are based on code found in
+// https://github.com/IBM/ipcri/blob/main/aes/p10_aes_gcm.s
+
+#include "textflag.h"
+
+#define XIP    R3
+#define HTBL   R4
+#define INP    R5
+#define LEN    R6
+
+#define XL     V0
+#define XM     V1
+#define XH     V2
+#define IN     V3
+#define ZERO   V4
+#define T0     V5
+#define T1     V6
+#define T2     V7
+#define XC2    V8
+#define H      V9
+#define HH     V10
+#define HL     V11
+#define LEMASK V12
+#define XL1    V13
+#define XM1    V14
+#define XH1    V15
+#define IN1    V16
+#define H2     V17
+#define H2H    V18
+#define H2L    V19
+#define XL3    V20
+#define XM2    V21
+#define IN2    V22
+#define H3L    V23
+#define H3     V24
+#define H3H    V25
+#define XH3    V26
+#define XM3    V27
+#define IN3    V28
+#define H4L    V29
+#define H4     V30
+#define H4H    V31
+
+#define IN0    IN
+#define H21L   HL
+#define H21H   HH
+#define LOPERM H2L
+#define HIPERM H2H
+
+#define VXL    VS32
+#define VIN    VS35
+#define VXC2   VS40
+#define VH     VS41
+#define VHH    VS42
+#define VHL    VS43
+#define VIN1   VS48
+#define VH2    VS49
+#define VH2H   VS50
+#define VH2L   VS51
+
+#define VIN2   VS54
+#define VH3L   VS55
+#define VH3    VS56
+#define VH3H   VS57
+#define VIN3   VS60
+#define VH4L   VS61
+#define VH4    VS62
+#define VH4H   VS63
+
+#define VIN0   VIN
+
+#define ESPERM V10
+#define TMP2 V11
+
+// The following macros provide appropriate
+// implementations for endianness as well as
+// ISA specific for power8 and power9.
+#ifdef GOARCH_ppc64le
+#  ifdef GOPPC64_power9
+#define P8_LXVB16X(RA,RB,VT)   LXVB16X (RA)(RB), VT
+#define P8_STXVB16X(VS,RA,RB)  STXVB16X VS, (RA)(RB)
+#  else
+#define NEEDS_ESPERM
+#define P8_LXVB16X(RA,RB,VT) \
+	LXVD2X  (RA+RB), VT \
+	VPERM	VT, VT, ESPERM, VT
+
+#define P8_STXVB16X(VS,RA,RB) \
+	VPERM	VS, VS, ESPERM, TMP2; \
+	STXVD2X TMP2, (RA+RB)
+
+#  endif
+#else
+#define P8_LXVB16X(RA,RB,VT) \
+	LXVD2X  (RA+RB), VT
+
+#define P8_STXVB16X(VS,RA,RB) \
+	STXVD2X VS, (RA+RB)
+
+#endif
+
+#define MASK_PTR   R8
+
+#define MASKV   V0
+#define INV     V1
+
+// The following macros are used for
+// the stitched implementation within
+// counterCryptASM.
+
+// Load the initial GCM counter value
+// in V30 and set up the counter increment
+// in V31
+#define SETUP_COUNTER \
+	P8_LXVB16X(COUNTER, R0, V30); \
+	VSPLTISB $1, V28; \
+	VXOR V31, V31, V31; \
+	VSLDOI $1, V31, V28, V31
+
+// These macros set up the initial value
+// for a single encryption, or 4 or 8
+// stitched encryptions implemented
+// with interleaving vciphers.
+//
+// The input value for each encryption
+// is generated by XORing the counter
+// from V30 with the first key in VS0
+// and incrementing the counter.
+//
+// Single encryption in V15
+#define GEN_VCIPHER_INPUT \
+	XXLOR VS0, VS0, V29 \
+	VXOR V30, V29, V15; \
+	VADDUWM V30, V31, V30
+
+// 4 encryptions in V15 - V18
+#define GEN_VCIPHER_4_INPUTS \
+	XXLOR VS0, VS0, V29; \
+	VXOR V30, V29, V15; \
+	VADDUWM V30, V31, V30; \
+	VXOR V30, V29, V16; \
+	VADDUWM V30, V31, V30; \
+	VXOR V30, V29, V17; \
+	VADDUWM V30, V31, V30; \
+	VXOR V30, V29, V18; \
+	VADDUWM V30, V31, V30
+
+// 8 encryptions in V15 - V22
+#define GEN_VCIPHER_8_INPUTS \
+	XXLOR VS0, VS0, V29; \
+	VXOR V30, V29, V15; \
+	VADDUWM V30, V31, V30; \
+	VXOR V30, V29, V16; \
+	VADDUWM V30, V31, V30; \
+	VXOR V30, V29, V17; \
+	VADDUWM V30, V31, V30; \
+	VXOR V30, V29, V18; \
+	VADDUWM V30, V31, V30; \
+	VXOR V30, V29, V19; \
+	VADDUWM V30, V31, V30; \
+	VXOR V30, V29, V20; \
+	VADDUWM V30, V31, V30; \
+	VXOR V30, V29, V21; \
+	VADDUWM V30, V31, V30; \
+	VXOR V30, V29, V22; \
+	VADDUWM V30, V31, V30
+
+// Load the keys to be used for
+// encryption based on key_len.
+// Keys are in VS0 - VS14
+// depending on key_len.
+// Valid keys sizes are verified
+// here. CR2 is set and used
+// throughout to check key_len.
+#define LOAD_KEYS(blk_key, key_len) \
+	MOVD	$16, R16; \
+	MOVD	$32, R17; \
+	MOVD	$48, R18; \
+	MOVD	$64, R19; \
+	LXVD2X (blk_key)(R0), VS0; \
+	LXVD2X (blk_key)(R16), VS1; \
+	LXVD2X (blk_key)(R17), VS2; \
+	LXVD2X (blk_key)(R18), VS3; \
+	LXVD2X (blk_key)(R19), VS4; \
+	ADD $64, R16; \
+	ADD $64, R17; \
+	ADD $64, R18; \
+	ADD $64, R19; \
+	LXVD2X (blk_key)(R16), VS5; \
+	LXVD2X (blk_key)(R17), VS6; \
+	LXVD2X (blk_key)(R18), VS7; \
+	LXVD2X (blk_key)(R19), VS8; \
+	ADD $64, R16; \
+	ADD $64, R17; \
+	ADD $64, R18; \
+	ADD $64, R19; \
+	LXVD2X (blk_key)(R16), VS9; \
+	LXVD2X (blk_key)(R17), VS10; \
+	CMP key_len, $12, CR2; \
+	CMP key_len, $10; \
+	BEQ keysLoaded; \
+	LXVD2X (blk_key)(R18), VS11; \
+	LXVD2X (blk_key)(R19), VS12; \
+	BEQ CR2, keysLoaded; \
+	ADD $64, R16; \
+	ADD $64, R17; \
+	LXVD2X (blk_key)(R16), VS13; \
+	LXVD2X (blk_key)(R17), VS14; \
+	CMP key_len, $14; \
+	BEQ keysLoaded; \
+	MOVD R0,0(R0); \
+keysLoaded:
+
+// Encrypt 1 (vin) with first 9
+// keys from VS1 - VS9.
+#define VCIPHER_1X9_KEYS(vin) \
+	XXLOR VS1, VS1, V23; \
+	XXLOR VS2, VS2, V24; \
+	XXLOR VS3, VS3, V25; \
+	XXLOR VS4, VS4, V26; \
+	XXLOR VS5, VS5, V27; \
+	VCIPHER vin, V23, vin; \
+	VCIPHER vin, V24, vin; \
+	VCIPHER vin, V25, vin; \
+	VCIPHER vin, V26, vin; \
+	VCIPHER vin, V27, vin; \
+	XXLOR VS6, VS6, V23; \
+	XXLOR VS7, VS7, V24; \
+	XXLOR VS8, VS8, V25; \
+	XXLOR VS9, VS9, V26; \
+	VCIPHER vin, V23, vin; \
+	VCIPHER vin, V24, vin; \
+	VCIPHER vin, V25, vin; \
+	VCIPHER	vin, V26, vin
+
+// Encrypt 1 value (vin) with
+// 2 specified keys
+#define VCIPHER_1X2_KEYS(vin, key1, key2) \
+	XXLOR key1, key1, V25; \
+	XXLOR key2, key2, V26; \
+	VCIPHER vin, V25, vin; \
+	VCIPHER vin, V26, vin
+
+// Encrypt 4 values in V15 - V18
+// with the specified key from
+// VS1 - VS9.
+#define VCIPHER_4X1_KEY(key) \
+	XXLOR key, key, V23; \
+	VCIPHER V15, V23, V15; \
+	VCIPHER V16, V23, V16; \
+	VCIPHER V17, V23, V17; \
+	VCIPHER V18, V23, V18
+
+// Encrypt 8 values in V15 - V22
+// with the specified key,
+// assuming it is a VSreg
+#define VCIPHER_8X1_KEY(key) \
+	XXLOR key, key, V23; \
+	VCIPHER V15, V23, V15; \
+	VCIPHER V16, V23, V16; \
+	VCIPHER V17, V23, V17; \
+	VCIPHER V18, V23, V18; \
+	VCIPHER V19, V23, V19; \
+	VCIPHER V20, V23, V20; \
+	VCIPHER V21, V23, V21; \
+	VCIPHER V22, V23, V22
+
+// Load input block into V1-V4
+// in big endian order and
+// update blk_inp by 64.
+#define LOAD_INPUT_BLOCK64(blk_inp) \
+	MOVD $16, R16; \
+	MOVD $32, R17; \
+	MOVD $48, R18; \
+	P8_LXVB16X(blk_inp,R0,V1); \
+	P8_LXVB16X(blk_inp,R16,V2); \
+	P8_LXVB16X(blk_inp,R17,V3); \
+	P8_LXVB16X(blk_inp,R18,V4); \
+	ADD $64, blk_inp
+
+// Load input block into V1-V8
+// in big endian order and
+// Update blk_inp by 128
+#define LOAD_INPUT_BLOCK128(blk_inp) \
+	MOVD $16, R16; \
+	MOVD $32, R17; \
+	MOVD $48, R18; \
+	MOVD $64, R19; \
+	MOVD $80, R20; \
+	MOVD $96, R21; \
+	MOVD $112, R22; \
+	P8_LXVB16X(blk_inp,R0,V1); \
+	P8_LXVB16X(blk_inp,R16,V2); \
+	P8_LXVB16X(blk_inp,R17,V3); \
+	P8_LXVB16X(blk_inp,R18,V4); \
+	P8_LXVB16X(blk_inp,R19,V5); \
+	P8_LXVB16X(blk_inp,R20,V6); \
+	P8_LXVB16X(blk_inp,R21,V7); \
+	P8_LXVB16X(blk_inp,R22,V8); \
+	ADD $128, blk_inp
+
+// Finish encryption on 8 streams and
+// XOR with input block
+#define VCIPHERLAST8_XOR_INPUT \
+	VCIPHERLAST     V15, V23, V15; \
+	VCIPHERLAST     V16, V23, V16; \
+	VCIPHERLAST     V17, V23, V17; \
+	VCIPHERLAST     V18, V23, V18; \
+	VCIPHERLAST     V19, V23, V19; \
+	VCIPHERLAST     V20, V23, V20; \
+	VCIPHERLAST     V21, V23, V21; \
+	VCIPHERLAST     V22, V23, V22; \
+	XXLXOR          V1, V15, V1; \
+	XXLXOR          V2, V16, V2; \
+	XXLXOR          V3, V17, V3; \
+	XXLXOR          V4, V18, V4; \
+	XXLXOR          V5, V19, V5; \
+	XXLXOR          V6, V20, V6; \
+	XXLXOR          V7, V21, V7; \
+	XXLXOR          V8, V22, V8
+
+// Finish encryption on 4 streams and
+// XOR with input block
+#define VCIPHERLAST4_XOR_INPUT \
+	VCIPHERLAST     V15, V23, V15; \
+	VCIPHERLAST     V16, V23, V16; \
+	VCIPHERLAST     V17, V23, V17; \
+	VCIPHERLAST     V18, V23, V18; \
+	XXLXOR          V1, V15, V1; \
+	XXLXOR          V2, V16, V2; \
+	XXLXOR          V3, V17, V3; \
+	XXLXOR          V4, V18, V4
+
+// Store output block from V1-V8
+// in big endian order and
+// Update blk_out by 128
+#define STORE_OUTPUT_BLOCK128(blk_out) \
+	P8_STXVB16X(V1,blk_out,R0); \
+	P8_STXVB16X(V2,blk_out,R16); \
+	P8_STXVB16X(V3,blk_out,R17); \
+	P8_STXVB16X(V4,blk_out,R18); \
+	P8_STXVB16X(V5,blk_out,R19); \
+	P8_STXVB16X(V6,blk_out,R20); \
+	P8_STXVB16X(V7,blk_out,R21); \
+	P8_STXVB16X(V8,blk_out,R22); \
+	ADD $128, blk_out
+
+// Store output block from V1-V4
+// in big endian order and
+// Update blk_out by 64
+#define STORE_OUTPUT_BLOCK64(blk_out) \
+	P8_STXVB16X(V1,blk_out,R0); \
+	P8_STXVB16X(V2,blk_out,R16); \
+	P8_STXVB16X(V3,blk_out,R17); \
+	P8_STXVB16X(V4,blk_out,R18); \
+	ADD $64, blk_out
+
+// func gcmInit(productTable *[256]byte, h []byte)
+TEXT ·gcmInit(SB), NOSPLIT, $0-32
+	MOVD productTable+0(FP), XIP
+	MOVD h+8(FP), HTBL
+
+	MOVD   $0x10, R8
+	MOVD   $0x20, R9
+	MOVD   $0x30, R10
+	LXVD2X (HTBL)(R0), VH // Load H
+
+	VSPLTISB $-16, XC2           // 0xf0
+	VSPLTISB $1, T0              // one
+	VADDUBM  XC2, XC2, XC2       // 0xe0
+	VXOR     ZERO, ZERO, ZERO
+	VOR      XC2, T0, XC2        // 0xe1
+	VSLDOI   $15, XC2, ZERO, XC2 // 0xe1...
+	VSLDOI   $1, ZERO, T0, T1    // ...1
+	VADDUBM  XC2, XC2, XC2       // 0xc2...
+	VSPLTISB $7, T2
+	VOR      XC2, T1, XC2        // 0xc2....01
+	VSPLTB   $0, H, T1           // most significant byte
+	VSL      H, T0, H            // H<<=1
+	VSRAB    T1, T2, T1          // broadcast carry bit
+	VAND     T1, XC2, T1
+	VXOR     H, T1, IN           // twisted H
+
+	VSLDOI $8, IN, IN, H      // twist even more ...
+	VSLDOI $8, ZERO, XC2, XC2 // 0xc2.0
+	VSLDOI $8, ZERO, H, HL    // ... and split
+	VSLDOI $8, H, ZERO, HH
+
+	STXVD2X VXC2, (XIP+R0) // save pre-computed table
+	STXVD2X VHL, (XIP+R8)
+	MOVD    $0x40, R8
+	STXVD2X VH, (XIP+R9)
+	MOVD    $0x50, R9
+	STXVD2X VHH, (XIP+R10)
+	MOVD    $0x60, R10
+
+	VPMSUMD IN, HL, XL // H.lo·H.lo
+	VPMSUMD IN, H, XM  // H.hi·H.lo+H.lo·H.hi
+	VPMSUMD IN, HH, XH // H.hi·H.hi
+
+	VPMSUMD XL, XC2, T2 // 1st reduction phase
+
+	VSLDOI $8, XM, ZERO, T0
+	VSLDOI $8, ZERO, XM, T1
+	VXOR   XL, T0, XL
+	VXOR   XH, T1, XH
+
+	VSLDOI $8, XL, XL, XL
+	VXOR   XL, T2, XL
+
+	VSLDOI  $8, XL, XL, T1 // 2nd reduction phase
+	VPMSUMD XL, XC2, XL
+	VXOR    T1, XH, T1
+	VXOR    XL, T1, IN1
+
+	VSLDOI $8, IN1, IN1, H2
+	VSLDOI $8, ZERO, H2, H2L
+	VSLDOI $8, H2, ZERO, H2H
+
+	STXVD2X VH2L, (XIP+R8)  // save H^2
+	MOVD    $0x70, R8
+	STXVD2X VH2, (XIP+R9)
+	MOVD    $0x80, R9
+	STXVD2X VH2H, (XIP+R10)
+	MOVD    $0x90, R10
+
+	VPMSUMD IN, H2L, XL   // H.lo·H^2.lo
+	VPMSUMD IN1, H2L, XL1 // H^2.lo·H^2.lo
+	VPMSUMD IN, H2, XM    // H.hi·H^2.lo+H.lo·H^2.hi
+	VPMSUMD IN1, H2, XM1  // H^2.hi·H^2.lo+H^2.lo·H^2.hi
+	VPMSUMD IN, H2H, XH   // H.hi·H^2.hi
+	VPMSUMD IN1, H2H, XH1 // H^2.hi·H^2.hi
+
+	VPMSUMD XL, XC2, T2  // 1st reduction phase
+	VPMSUMD XL1, XC2, HH // 1st reduction phase
+
+	VSLDOI $8, XM, ZERO, T0
+	VSLDOI $8, ZERO, XM, T1
+	VSLDOI $8, XM1, ZERO, HL
+	VSLDOI $8, ZERO, XM1, H
+	VXOR   XL, T0, XL
+	VXOR   XH, T1, XH
+	VXOR   XL1, HL, XL1
+	VXOR   XH1, H, XH1
+
+	VSLDOI $8, XL, XL, XL
+	VSLDOI $8, XL1, XL1, XL1
+	VXOR   XL, T2, XL
+	VXOR   XL1, HH, XL1
+
+	VSLDOI  $8, XL, XL, T1  // 2nd reduction phase
+	VSLDOI  $8, XL1, XL1, H // 2nd reduction phase
+	VPMSUMD XL, XC2, XL
+	VPMSUMD XL1, XC2, XL1
+	VXOR    T1, XH, T1
+	VXOR    H, XH1, H
+	VXOR    XL, T1, XL
+	VXOR    XL1, H, XL1
+
+	VSLDOI $8, XL, XL, H
+	VSLDOI $8, XL1, XL1, H2
+	VSLDOI $8, ZERO, H, HL
+	VSLDOI $8, H, ZERO, HH
+	VSLDOI $8, ZERO, H2, H2L
+	VSLDOI $8, H2, ZERO, H2H
+
+	STXVD2X VHL, (XIP+R8)   // save H^3
+	MOVD    $0xa0, R8
+	STXVD2X VH, (XIP+R9)
+	MOVD    $0xb0, R9
+	STXVD2X VHH, (XIP+R10)
+	MOVD    $0xc0, R10
+	STXVD2X VH2L, (XIP+R8)  // save H^4
+	STXVD2X VH2, (XIP+R9)
+	STXVD2X VH2H, (XIP+R10)
+
+	RET
+
+// func gcmHash(output []byte, productTable *[256]byte, inp []byte, len int)
+TEXT ·gcmHash(SB), NOSPLIT, $0-64
+	MOVD output+0(FP), XIP
+	MOVD productTable+24(FP), HTBL
+	MOVD inp+32(FP), INP
+	MOVD len+56(FP), LEN
+
+	MOVD   $0x10, R8
+	MOVD   $0x20, R9
+	MOVD   $0x30, R10
+	LXVD2X (XIP)(R0), VXL // load Xi
+
+	LXVD2X   (HTBL)(R8), VHL    // load pre-computed table
+	MOVD     $0x40, R8
+	LXVD2X   (HTBL)(R9), VH
+	MOVD     $0x50, R9
+	LXVD2X   (HTBL)(R10), VHH
+	MOVD     $0x60, R10
+	LXVD2X   (HTBL)(R0), VXC2
+#ifdef GOARCH_ppc64le
+	LVSL     (R0)(R0), LEMASK
+	VSPLTISB $0x07, T0
+	VXOR     LEMASK, T0, LEMASK
+	VPERM    XL, XL, LEMASK, XL
+#endif
+	VXOR     ZERO, ZERO, ZERO
+
+	CMPU LEN, $64
+	BGE  gcm_ghash_p8_4x
+
+	LXVD2X (INP)(R0), VIN
+	ADD    $16, INP, INP
+	SUBCCC $16, LEN, LEN
+#ifdef GOARCH_ppc64le
+	VPERM  IN, IN, LEMASK, IN
+#endif
+	VXOR   IN, XL, IN
+	BEQ    short
+
+	LXVD2X (HTBL)(R8), VH2L  // load H^2
+	MOVD   $16, R8
+	LXVD2X (HTBL)(R9), VH2
+	ADD    LEN, INP, R9      // end of input
+	LXVD2X (HTBL)(R10), VH2H
+
+loop_2x:
+	LXVD2X (INP)(R0), VIN1
+#ifdef GOARCH_ppc64le
+	VPERM  IN1, IN1, LEMASK, IN1
+#endif
+
+	SUBC    $32, LEN, LEN
+	VPMSUMD IN, H2L, XL   // H^2.lo·Xi.lo
+	VPMSUMD IN1, HL, XL1  // H.lo·Xi+1.lo
+	SUBE    R11, R11, R11 // borrow?-1:0
+	VPMSUMD IN, H2, XM    // H^2.hi·Xi.lo+H^2.lo·Xi.hi
+	VPMSUMD IN1, H, XM1   // H.hi·Xi+1.lo+H.lo·Xi+1.hi
+	AND     LEN, R11, R11
+	VPMSUMD IN, H2H, XH   // H^2.hi·Xi.hi
+	VPMSUMD IN1, HH, XH1  // H.hi·Xi+1.hi
+	ADD     R11, INP, INP
+
+	VXOR XL, XL1, XL
+	VXOR XM, XM1, XM
+
+	VPMSUMD XL, XC2, T2 // 1st reduction phase
+
+	VSLDOI $8, XM, ZERO, T0
+	VSLDOI $8, ZERO, XM, T1
+	VXOR   XH, XH1, XH
+	VXOR   XL, T0, XL
+	VXOR   XH, T1, XH
+
+	VSLDOI $8, XL, XL, XL
+	VXOR   XL, T2, XL
+	LXVD2X (INP)(R8), VIN
+	ADD    $32, INP, INP
+
+	VSLDOI  $8, XL, XL, T1     // 2nd reduction phase
+	VPMSUMD XL, XC2, XL
+#ifdef GOARCH_ppc64le
+	VPERM   IN, IN, LEMASK, IN
+#endif
+	VXOR    T1, XH, T1
+	VXOR    IN, T1, IN
+	VXOR    IN, XL, IN
+	CMP     R9, INP
+	BGT     loop_2x            // done yet?
+
+	CMPWU LEN, $0
+	BNE   even
+
+short:
+	VPMSUMD IN, HL, XL // H.lo·Xi.lo
+	VPMSUMD IN, H, XM  // H.hi·Xi.lo+H.lo·Xi.hi
+	VPMSUMD IN, HH, XH // H.hi·Xi.hi
+
+	VPMSUMD XL, XC2, T2 // 1st reduction phase
+
+	VSLDOI $8, XM, ZERO, T0
+	VSLDOI $8, ZERO, XM, T1
+	VXOR   XL, T0, XL
+	VXOR   XH, T1, XH
+
+	VSLDOI $8, XL, XL, XL
+	VXOR   XL, T2, XL
+
+	VSLDOI  $8, XL, XL, T1 // 2nd reduction phase
+	VPMSUMD XL, XC2, XL
+	VXOR    T1, XH, T1
+
+even:
+	VXOR    XL, T1, XL
+#ifdef GOARCH_ppc64le
+	VPERM   XL, XL, LEMASK, XL
+#endif
+	STXVD2X VXL, (XIP+R0)
+
+	OR R12, R12, R12 // write out Xi
+	RET
+
+gcm_ghash_p8_4x:
+	LVSL     (R8)(R0), T0      // 0x0001..0e0f
+	MOVD     $0x70, R8
+	LXVD2X   (HTBL)(R9), VH2
+	MOVD     $0x80, R9
+	VSPLTISB $8, T1            // 0x0808..0808
+	MOVD     $0x90, R10
+	LXVD2X   (HTBL)(R8), VH3L  // load H^3
+	MOVD     $0xa0, R8
+	LXVD2X   (HTBL)(R9), VH3
+	MOVD     $0xb0, R9
+	LXVD2X   (HTBL)(R10), VH3H
+	MOVD     $0xc0, R10
+	LXVD2X   (HTBL)(R8), VH4L  // load H^4
+	MOVD     $0x10, R8
+	LXVD2X   (HTBL)(R9), VH4
+	MOVD     $0x20, R9
+	LXVD2X   (HTBL)(R10), VH4H
+	MOVD     $0x30, R10
+
+	VSLDOI  $8, ZERO, T1, T2   // 0x0000..0808
+	VADDUBM T0, T2, HIPERM     // 0x0001..1617
+	VADDUBM T1, HIPERM, LOPERM // 0x0809..1e1f
+
+	SRD $4, LEN, LEN // this allows to use sign bit as carry
+
+	LXVD2X (INP)(R0), VIN0       // load input
+	LXVD2X (INP)(R8), VIN1
+	SUBCCC $8, LEN, LEN
+	LXVD2X (INP)(R9), VIN2
+	LXVD2X (INP)(R10), VIN3
+	ADD    $0x40, INP, INP
+#ifdef GOARCH_ppc64le
+	VPERM  IN0, IN0, LEMASK, IN0
+	VPERM  IN1, IN1, LEMASK, IN1
+	VPERM  IN2, IN2, LEMASK, IN2
+	VPERM  IN3, IN3, LEMASK, IN3
+#endif
+
+	VXOR IN0, XL, XH
+
+	VPMSUMD IN1, H3L, XL1
+	VPMSUMD IN1, H3, XM1
+	VPMSUMD IN1, H3H, XH1
+
+	VPERM   H2, H, HIPERM, H21L
+	VPERM   IN2, IN3, LOPERM, T0
+	VPERM   H2, H, LOPERM, H21H
+	VPERM   IN2, IN3, HIPERM, T1
+	VPMSUMD IN2, H2, XM2         // H^2.lo·Xi+2.hi+H^2.hi·Xi+2.lo
+	VPMSUMD T0, H21L, XL3        // H^2.lo·Xi+2.lo+H.lo·Xi+3.lo
+	VPMSUMD IN3, H, XM3          // H.hi·Xi+3.lo  +H.lo·Xi+3.hi
+	VPMSUMD T1, H21H, XH3        // H^2.hi·Xi+2.hi+H.hi·Xi+3.hi
+
+	VXOR XM2, XM1, XM2
+	VXOR XL3, XL1, XL3
+	VXOR XM3, XM2, XM3
+	VXOR XH3, XH1, XH3
+
+	BLT tail_4x
+
+loop_4x:
+	LXVD2X (INP)(R0), VIN0
+	LXVD2X (INP)(R8), VIN1
+	SUBCCC $4, LEN, LEN
+	LXVD2X (INP)(R9), VIN2
+	LXVD2X (INP)(R10), VIN3
+	ADD    $0x40, INP, INP
+#ifdef GOARCH_ppc64le
+	VPERM  IN1, IN1, LEMASK, IN1
+	VPERM  IN2, IN2, LEMASK, IN2
+	VPERM  IN3, IN3, LEMASK, IN3
+	VPERM  IN0, IN0, LEMASK, IN0
+#endif
+
+	VPMSUMD XH, H4L, XL   // H^4.lo·Xi.lo
+	VPMSUMD XH, H4, XM    // H^4.hi·Xi.lo+H^4.lo·Xi.hi
+	VPMSUMD XH, H4H, XH   // H^4.hi·Xi.hi
+	VPMSUMD IN1, H3L, XL1
+	VPMSUMD IN1, H3, XM1
+	VPMSUMD IN1, H3H, XH1
+
+	VXOR  XL, XL3, XL
+	VXOR  XM, XM3, XM
+	VXOR  XH, XH3, XH
+	VPERM IN2, IN3, LOPERM, T0
+	VPERM IN2, IN3, HIPERM, T1
+
+	VPMSUMD XL, XC2, T2   // 1st reduction phase
+	VPMSUMD T0, H21L, XL3 // H.lo·Xi+3.lo  +H^2.lo·Xi+2.lo
+	VPMSUMD T1, H21H, XH3 // H.hi·Xi+3.hi  +H^2.hi·Xi+2.hi
+
+	VSLDOI $8, XM, ZERO, T0
+	VSLDOI $8, ZERO, XM, T1
+	VXOR   XL, T0, XL
+	VXOR   XH, T1, XH
+
+	VSLDOI $8, XL, XL, XL
+	VXOR   XL, T2, XL
+
+	VSLDOI  $8, XL, XL, T1 // 2nd reduction phase
+	VPMSUMD IN2, H2, XM2   // H^2.hi·Xi+2.lo+H^2.lo·Xi+2.hi
+	VPMSUMD IN3, H, XM3    // H.hi·Xi+3.lo  +H.lo·Xi+3.hi
+	VPMSUMD XL, XC2, XL
+
+	VXOR XL3, XL1, XL3
+	VXOR XH3, XH1, XH3
+	VXOR XH, IN0, XH
+	VXOR XM2, XM1, XM2
+	VXOR XH, T1, XH
+	VXOR XM3, XM2, XM3
+	VXOR XH, XL, XH
+	BGE  loop_4x
+
+tail_4x:
+	VPMSUMD XH, H4L, XL // H^4.lo·Xi.lo
+	VPMSUMD XH, H4, XM  // H^4.hi·Xi.lo+H^4.lo·Xi.hi
+	VPMSUMD XH, H4H, XH // H^4.hi·Xi.hi
+
+	VXOR XL, XL3, XL
+	VXOR XM, XM3, XM
+
+	VPMSUMD XL, XC2, T2 // 1st reduction phase
+
+	VSLDOI $8, XM, ZERO, T0
+	VSLDOI $8, ZERO, XM, T1
+	VXOR   XH, XH3, XH
+	VXOR   XL, T0, XL
+	VXOR   XH, T1, XH
+
+	VSLDOI $8, XL, XL, XL
+	VXOR   XL, T2, XL
+
+	VSLDOI  $8, XL, XL, T1 // 2nd reduction phase
+	VPMSUMD XL, XC2, XL
+	VXOR    T1, XH, T1
+	VXOR    XL, T1, XL
+
+	ADDCCC $4, LEN, LEN
+	BEQ    done_4x
+
+	LXVD2X (INP)(R0), VIN0
+	CMPU   LEN, $2
+	MOVD   $-4, LEN
+	BLT    one
+	LXVD2X (INP)(R8), VIN1
+	BEQ    two
+
+three:
+	LXVD2X (INP)(R9), VIN2
+#ifdef GOARCH_ppc64le
+	VPERM  IN0, IN0, LEMASK, IN0
+	VPERM  IN1, IN1, LEMASK, IN1
+	VPERM  IN2, IN2, LEMASK, IN2
+#endif
+
+	VXOR IN0, XL, XH
+	VOR  H3L, H3L, H4L
+	VOR  H3, H3, H4
+	VOR  H3H, H3H, H4H
+
+	VPERM   IN1, IN2, LOPERM, T0
+	VPERM   IN1, IN2, HIPERM, T1
+	VPMSUMD IN1, H2, XM2         // H^2.lo·Xi+1.hi+H^2.hi·Xi+1.lo
+	VPMSUMD IN2, H, XM3          // H.hi·Xi+2.lo  +H.lo·Xi+2.hi
+	VPMSUMD T0, H21L, XL3        // H^2.lo·Xi+1.lo+H.lo·Xi+2.lo
+	VPMSUMD T1, H21H, XH3        // H^2.hi·Xi+1.hi+H.hi·Xi+2.hi
+
+	VXOR XM3, XM2, XM3
+	JMP  tail_4x
+
+two:
+#ifdef GOARCH_ppc64le
+	VPERM IN0, IN0, LEMASK, IN0
+	VPERM IN1, IN1, LEMASK, IN1
+#endif
+
+	VXOR  IN, XL, XH
+	VPERM ZERO, IN1, LOPERM, T0
+	VPERM ZERO, IN1, HIPERM, T1
+
+	VSLDOI $8, ZERO, H2, H4L
+	VOR    H2, H2, H4
+	VSLDOI $8, H2, ZERO, H4H
+
+	VPMSUMD T0, H21L, XL3 // H.lo·Xi+1.lo
+	VPMSUMD IN1, H, XM3   // H.hi·Xi+1.lo+H.lo·Xi+2.hi
+	VPMSUMD T1, H21H, XH3 // H.hi·Xi+1.hi
+
+	JMP tail_4x
+
+one:
+#ifdef GOARCH_ppc64le
+	VPERM IN0, IN0, LEMASK, IN0
+#endif
+
+	VSLDOI $8, ZERO, H, H4L
+	VOR    H, H, H4
+	VSLDOI $8, H, ZERO, H4H
+
+	VXOR IN0, XL, XH
+	VXOR XL3, XL3, XL3
+	VXOR XM3, XM3, XM3
+	VXOR XH3, XH3, XH3
+
+	JMP tail_4x
+
+done_4x:
+#ifdef GOARCH_ppc64le
+	VPERM   XL, XL, LEMASK, XL
+#endif
+	STXVD2X VXL, (XIP+R0)      // write out Xi
+	RET
+
+// func gcmMul(output []byte, productTable *[256]byte)
+TEXT ·gcmMul(SB), NOSPLIT, $0-32
+	MOVD output+0(FP), XIP
+	MOVD productTable+24(FP), HTBL
+
+	MOVD   $0x10, R8
+	MOVD   $0x20, R9
+	MOVD   $0x30, R10
+	LXVD2X (XIP)(R0), VIN // load Xi
+
+	LXVD2X   (HTBL)(R8), VHL    // Load pre-computed table
+	LXVD2X   (HTBL)(R9), VH
+	LXVD2X   (HTBL)(R10), VHH
+	LXVD2X   (HTBL)(R0), VXC2
+#ifdef GOARCH_ppc64le
+	VSPLTISB $0x07, T0
+	VXOR     LEMASK, T0, LEMASK
+	VPERM    IN, IN, LEMASK, IN
+#endif
+	VXOR     ZERO, ZERO, ZERO
+
+	VPMSUMD IN, HL, XL // H.lo·Xi.lo
+	VPMSUMD IN, H, XM  // H.hi·Xi.lo+H.lo·Xi.hi
+	VPMSUMD IN, HH, XH // H.hi·Xi.hi
+
+	VPMSUMD XL, XC2, T2 // 1st reduction phase
+
+	VSLDOI $8, XM, ZERO, T0
+	VSLDOI $8, ZERO, XM, T1
+	VXOR   XL, T0, XL
+	VXOR   XH, T1, XH
+
+	VSLDOI $8, XL, XL, XL
+	VXOR   XL, T2, XL
+
+	VSLDOI  $8, XL, XL, T1 // 2nd reduction phase
+	VPMSUMD XL, XC2, XL
+	VXOR    T1, XH, T1
+	VXOR    XL, T1, XL
+
+#ifdef GOARCH_ppc64le
+	VPERM   XL, XL, LEMASK, XL
+#endif
+	STXVD2X VXL, (XIP+R0)      // write out Xi
+	RET
+
+#define BLK_INP    R3
+#define BLK_OUT    R4
+#define BLK_KEY    R5
+#define KEY_LEN    R6
+#define BLK_IDX    R7
+#define IDX        R8
+#define IN_LEN     R9
+#define COUNTER    R10
+#define CONPTR     R14
+#define MASK       V5
+
+// Implementation of the counterCrypt function in assembler.
+// Original loop is unrolled to allow for multiple encryption
+// streams to be done in parallel, which is achieved by interleaving
+// vcipher instructions from each stream. This is also referred to as
+// stitching, and provides significant performance improvements.
+// Some macros are defined which enable execution for big or little
+// endian as well as different ISA targets.
+//func (g *gcmAsm) counterCrypt(out, in []byte, counter *[gcmBlockSize]byte, key[gcmBlockSize]uint32)
+//func counterCryptASM(xr, out, in, counter, key)
+TEXT ·counterCryptASM(SB), NOSPLIT, $16-72
+	MOVD	xr(FP), KEY_LEN
+	MOVD    out+8(FP), BLK_OUT
+	MOVD    out_len+16(FP), R8
+	MOVD    in+32(FP), BLK_INP
+	MOVD    in_len+40(FP), IN_LEN
+	MOVD    counter+56(FP), COUNTER
+	MOVD    key+64(FP), BLK_KEY
+
+// Set up permute string when needed.
+#ifdef NEEDS_ESPERM
+	MOVD    $·rcon(SB), R14
+	LVX     (R14), ESPERM   // Permute value for P8_ macros.
+#endif
+	SETUP_COUNTER		// V30 Counter V31 BE {0, 0, 0, 1}
+	LOAD_KEYS(BLK_KEY, KEY_LEN)	// VS1 - VS10/12/14 based on keysize
+	CMP     IN_LEN, $128
+	BLT	block64
+block128_loop:
+	// Do 8 encryptions in parallel by setting
+	// input values in V15-V22 and executing
+	// vcipher on the updated value and the keys.
+	GEN_VCIPHER_8_INPUTS
+	VCIPHER_8X1_KEY(VS1)
+	VCIPHER_8X1_KEY(VS2)
+	VCIPHER_8X1_KEY(VS3)
+	VCIPHER_8X1_KEY(VS4)
+	VCIPHER_8X1_KEY(VS5)
+	VCIPHER_8X1_KEY(VS6)
+	VCIPHER_8X1_KEY(VS7)
+	VCIPHER_8X1_KEY(VS8)
+	VCIPHER_8X1_KEY(VS9)
+	// Additional encryptions are done based on
+	// the key length, with the last key moved
+	// to V23 for use with VCIPHERLAST.
+	// CR2 = CMP key_len, $12
+	XXLOR VS10, VS10, V23
+	BLT	CR2, block128_last // key_len = 10
+	VCIPHER_8X1_KEY(VS10)
+	VCIPHER_8X1_KEY(VS11)
+	XXLOR VS12,VS12,V23
+	BEQ	CR2, block128_last // ken_len = 12
+	VCIPHER_8X1_KEY(VS12)
+	VCIPHER_8X1_KEY(VS13)
+	XXLOR VS14,VS14,V23	// key_len = 14
+block128_last:
+	// vcipher encryptions are in V15-V22 at this
+	// point with vcipherlast remaining to be done.
+	// Load input block into V1-V8, setting index offsets
+	// in R16-R22 to use with the STORE.
+	LOAD_INPUT_BLOCK128(BLK_INP)
+	// Do VCIPHERLAST on the last key for each encryption
+	// stream and XOR the result with the corresponding
+	// value from the input block.
+	VCIPHERLAST8_XOR_INPUT
+	// Store the results (8*16) and update BLK_OUT by 128.
+	STORE_OUTPUT_BLOCK128(BLK_OUT)
+	ADD	$-128, IN_LEN	// input size
+	CMP     IN_LEN, $128	// check if >= blocksize
+	BGE	block128_loop	// next input block
+	CMP	IN_LEN, $0
+	BEQ	done
+block64:
+	CMP	IN_LEN, $64	// Check if >= 64
+	BLT	block16_loop
+	// Do 4 encryptions in parallel by setting
+	// input values in V15-V18 and executing
+	// vcipher on the updated value and the keys.
+	GEN_VCIPHER_4_INPUTS
+	VCIPHER_4X1_KEY(VS1)
+	VCIPHER_4X1_KEY(VS2)
+	VCIPHER_4X1_KEY(VS3)
+	VCIPHER_4X1_KEY(VS4)
+	VCIPHER_4X1_KEY(VS5)
+	VCIPHER_4X1_KEY(VS6)
+	VCIPHER_4X1_KEY(VS7)
+	VCIPHER_4X1_KEY(VS8)
+	VCIPHER_4X1_KEY(VS9)
+	// Check key length based on CR2
+	// Move last key to V23 for use with later vcipherlast
+	XXLOR	VS10, VS10, V23
+	BLT	CR2, block64_last	// size = 10
+	VCIPHER_4X1_KEY(VS10)		// Encrypt next 2 keys
+	VCIPHER_4X1_KEY(VS11)
+	XXLOR	VS12, VS12, V23
+	BEQ	CR2, block64_last	// size = 12
+	VCIPHER_4X1_KEY(VS12)		// Encrypt last 2 keys
+	VCIPHER_4X1_KEY(VS13)
+	XXLOR	VS14, VS14, V23		// size = 14
+block64_last:
+	LOAD_INPUT_BLOCK64(BLK_INP)	// Load 64 bytes of input
+	// Do VCIPHERLAST on the last for each encryption
+	// stream and XOR the result with the corresponding
+	// value from the input block.
+	VCIPHERLAST4_XOR_INPUT
+	// Store the results (4*16) and update BLK_OUT by 64.
+	STORE_OUTPUT_BLOCK64(BLK_OUT)
+	ADD	$-64, IN_LEN		// decrement input block length
+	CMP	IN_LEN, $0		// check for remaining length
+	BEQ	done
+block16_loop:
+	CMP	IN_LEN, $16		// More input
+	BLT	final_block		// If not, then handle partial block
+	// Single encryption, no stitching
+	GEN_VCIPHER_INPUT		// Generate input value for single encryption
+	VCIPHER_1X9_KEYS(V15)		// Encrypt V15 value with 9 keys
+	XXLOR	VS10, VS10, V23		// Last key -> V23 for later vcipiherlast
+	// Key length based on CR2. (LT=10, EQ=12, GT=14)
+	BLT	CR2, block16_last	// Finish for key size 10
+	VCIPHER_1X2_KEYS(V15, VS10, VS11) // Encrypt V15 with 2 more keys
+	XXLOR	VS12, VS12, V23		// Last key -> V23 for later vcipherlast
+	BEQ	CR2, block16_last	// Finish for key size 12
+	VCIPHER_1X2_KEYS(V15, VS12, VS13) // Encrypt V15 with last 2 keys
+	XXLOR	VS14, VS14, V23		// Last key -> V23 for vcipherlast with key size 14
+block16_last:
+	P8_LXVB16X(BLK_INP, R0, V1)	// Load input
+	VCIPHERLAST V15, V23, V15	// Encrypt last value in V23
+	XXLXOR	V15, V1, V1		// XOR with input
+	P8_STXVB16X(V1,R0,BLK_OUT)	// Store final encryption value to output
+	ADD	$16, BLK_INP		// Increment input pointer
+	ADD	$16, BLK_OUT		// Increment output pointer
+	ADD	$-16, IN_LEN		// Decrement input length
+	BR	block16_loop		// Check for next
+final_block:
+	CMP	IN_LEN, $0
+	BEQ	done
+	GEN_VCIPHER_INPUT		// Generate input value for partial encryption
+	VCIPHER_1X9_KEYS(V15)		// Encrypt V15 with 9 keys
+	XXLOR	VS10, VS10, V23		// Save possible last key
+	BLT	CR2, final_block_last
+	VCIPHER_1X2_KEYS(V15, VS10, VS11)	// Encrypt V15 with next 2 keys
+	XXLOR	VS12, VS12, V23		// Save possible last key
+	BEQ	CR2, final_block_last
+	VCIPHER_1X2_KEYS(V15, VS12, VS13) // Encrypt V15 with last 2 keys
+	XXLOR	VS14, VS14, V23		// Save last key
+final_block_last:
+	VCIPHERLAST V15, V23, V15	// Finish encryption
+#ifdef GOPPC64_power10
+	// set up length
+	SLD	$56, IN_LEN, R17
+	LXVLL	BLK_INP, R17, V25
+	VXOR	V25, V15, V25
+	STXVLL	V25, BLK_OUT, R17
+#else
+	ADD	$32, R1, MASK_PTR
+	MOVD	$0, R16
+	P8_STXVB16X(V15, MASK_PTR, R0)
+	CMP	IN_LEN, $8
+	BLT	next4
+	MOVD	0(MASK_PTR), R14
+	MOVD	0(BLK_INP), R15
+	XOR	R14, R15, R14
+	MOVD	R14, 0(BLK_OUT)
+	ADD	$8, R16
+	ADD	$-8, IN_LEN
+next4:
+	CMP	IN_LEN, $4
+	BLT	next2
+	MOVWZ	(BLK_INP)(R16), R15
+	MOVWZ	(MASK_PTR)(R16), R14
+	XOR	R14, R15, R14
+	MOVW	R14, (R16)(BLK_OUT)
+	ADD	$4, R16
+	ADD	$-4, IN_LEN
+next2:
+	CMP	IN_LEN, $2
+	BLT	next1
+	MOVHZ	(BLK_INP)(R16), R15
+	MOVHZ	(MASK_PTR)(R16), R14
+	XOR	R14, R15, R14
+	MOVH	R14, (R16)(BLK_OUT)
+	ADD	$2, R16
+	ADD	$-2, IN_LEN
+next1:
+	CMP	IN_LEN, $1
+	BLT	done
+	MOVBZ	(MASK_PTR)(R16), R14
+	MOVBZ	(BLK_INP)(R16), R15
+	XOR	R14, R15, R14
+	MOVB	R14, (R16)(BLK_OUT)
+#endif
+done:
+	// Save the updated counter value
+	P8_STXVB16X(V30, COUNTER, R0)
+	// Clear the keys
+	XXLXOR	VS0, VS0, VS0
+	XXLXOR	VS1, VS1, VS1
+	XXLXOR	VS2, VS2, VS2
+	XXLXOR	VS3, VS3, VS3
+	XXLXOR	VS4, VS4, VS4
+	XXLXOR	VS5, VS5, VS5
+	XXLXOR	VS6, VS6, VS6
+	XXLXOR	VS7, VS7, VS7
+	XXLXOR	VS8, VS8, VS8
+	XXLXOR	VS9, VS9, VS9
+	XXLXOR	VS10, VS10, VS10
+	XXLXOR	VS11, VS11, VS11
+	XXLXOR	VS12, VS12, VS12
+	XXLXOR	VS13, VS13, VS13
+	XXLXOR	VS14, VS14, VS14
+	RET
+

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/aes/gcm_s390x.go

@@ -0,0 +1,371 @@
+// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package aes
+
+import (
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/internal/alias"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+	"internal/cpu"
+)
+
+// This file contains two implementations of AES-GCM. The first implementation
+// (gcmAsm) uses the KMCTR instruction to encrypt using AES in counter mode and
+// the KIMD instruction for GHASH. The second implementation (gcmKMA) uses the
+// newer KMA instruction which performs both operations.
+
+// gcmCount represents a 16-byte big-endian count value.
+type gcmCount [16]byte
+
+// inc increments the rightmost 32-bits of the count value by 1.
+func (x *gcmCount) inc() {
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(x[len(x)-4:], binary.BigEndian.Uint32(x[len(x)-4:])+1)
+}
+
+// gcmLengths writes len0 || len1 as big-endian values to a 16-byte array.
+func gcmLengths(len0, len1 uint64) [16]byte {
+	v := [16]byte{}
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(v[0:], len0)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(v[8:], len1)
+	return v
+}
+
+// gcmHashKey represents the 16-byte hash key required by the GHASH algorithm.
+type gcmHashKey [16]byte
+
+type gcmAsm struct {
+	block     *aesCipherAsm
+	hashKey   gcmHashKey
+	nonceSize int
+	tagSize   int
+}
+
+const (
+	gcmBlockSize         = 16
+	gcmTagSize           = 16
+	gcmMinimumTagSize    = 12 // NIST SP 800-38D recommends tags with 12 or more bytes.
+	gcmStandardNonceSize = 12
+)
+
+var errOpen = errors.New("cipher: message authentication failed")
+
+// Assert that aesCipherAsm implements the gcmAble interface.
+var _ gcmAble = (*aesCipherAsm)(nil)
+
+// NewGCM returns the AES cipher wrapped in Galois Counter Mode. This is only
+// called by [crypto/cipher.NewGCM] via the gcmAble interface.
+func (c *aesCipherAsm) NewGCM(nonceSize, tagSize int) (cipher.AEAD, error) {
+	var hk gcmHashKey
+	c.Encrypt(hk[:], hk[:])
+	g := gcmAsm{
+		block:     c,
+		hashKey:   hk,
+		nonceSize: nonceSize,
+		tagSize:   tagSize,
+	}
+	if cpu.S390X.HasAESGCM {
+		g := gcmKMA{g}
+		return &g, nil
+	}
+	return &g, nil
+}
+
+func (g *gcmAsm) NonceSize() int {
+	return g.nonceSize
+}
+
+func (g *gcmAsm) Overhead() int {
+	return g.tagSize
+}
+
+// sliceForAppend takes a slice and a requested number of bytes. It returns a
+// slice with the contents of the given slice followed by that many bytes and a
+// second slice that aliases into it and contains only the extra bytes. If the
+// original slice has sufficient capacity then no allocation is performed.
+func sliceForAppend(in []byte, n int) (head, tail []byte) {
+	if total := len(in) + n; cap(in) >= total {
+		head = in[:total]
+	} else {
+		head = make([]byte, total)
+		copy(head, in)
+	}
+	tail = head[len(in):]
+	return
+}
+
+// ghash uses the GHASH algorithm to hash data with the given key. The initial
+// hash value is given by hash which will be updated with the new hash value.
+// The length of data must be a multiple of 16-bytes.
+//
+//go:noescape
+func ghash(key *gcmHashKey, hash *[16]byte, data []byte)
+
+// paddedGHASH pads data with zeroes until its length is a multiple of
+// 16-bytes. It then calculates a new value for hash using the GHASH algorithm.
+func (g *gcmAsm) paddedGHASH(hash *[16]byte, data []byte) {
+	siz := len(data) &^ 0xf // align size to 16-bytes
+	if siz > 0 {
+		ghash(&g.hashKey, hash, data[:siz])
+		data = data[siz:]
+	}
+	if len(data) > 0 {
+		var s [16]byte
+		copy(s[:], data)
+		ghash(&g.hashKey, hash, s[:])
+	}
+}
+
+// cryptBlocksGCM encrypts src using AES in counter mode using the given
+// function code and key. The rightmost 32-bits of the counter are incremented
+// between each block as required by the GCM spec. The initial counter value
+// is given by cnt, which is updated with the value of the next counter value
+// to use.
+//
+// The lengths of both dst and buf must be greater than or equal to the length
+// of src. buf may be partially or completely overwritten during the execution
+// of the function.
+//
+//go:noescape
+func cryptBlocksGCM(fn code, key, dst, src, buf []byte, cnt *gcmCount)
+
+// counterCrypt encrypts src using AES in counter mode and places the result
+// into dst. cnt is the initial count value and will be updated with the next
+// count value. The length of dst must be greater than or equal to the length
+// of src.
+func (g *gcmAsm) counterCrypt(dst, src []byte, cnt *gcmCount) {
+	// Copying src into a buffer improves performance on some models when
+	// src and dst point to the same underlying array. We also need a
+	// buffer for counter values.
+	var ctrbuf, srcbuf [2048]byte
+	for len(src) >= 16 {
+		siz := len(src)
+		if len(src) > len(ctrbuf) {
+			siz = len(ctrbuf)
+		}
+		siz &^= 0xf // align siz to 16-bytes
+		copy(srcbuf[:], src[:siz])
+		cryptBlocksGCM(g.block.function, g.block.key, dst[:siz], srcbuf[:siz], ctrbuf[:], cnt)
+		src = src[siz:]
+		dst = dst[siz:]
+	}
+	if len(src) > 0 {
+		var x [16]byte
+		g.block.Encrypt(x[:], cnt[:])
+		for i := range src {
+			dst[i] = src[i] ^ x[i]
+		}
+		cnt.inc()
+	}
+}
+
+// deriveCounter computes the initial GCM counter state from the given nonce.
+// See NIST SP 800-38D, section 7.1.
+func (g *gcmAsm) deriveCounter(nonce []byte) gcmCount {
+	// GCM has two modes of operation with respect to the initial counter
+	// state: a "fast path" for 96-bit (12-byte) nonces, and a "slow path"
+	// for nonces of other lengths. For a 96-bit nonce, the nonce, along
+	// with a four-byte big-endian counter starting at one, is used
+	// directly as the starting counter. For other nonce sizes, the counter
+	// is computed by passing it through the GHASH function.
+	var counter gcmCount
+	if len(nonce) == gcmStandardNonceSize {
+		copy(counter[:], nonce)
+		counter[gcmBlockSize-1] = 1
+	} else {
+		var hash [16]byte
+		g.paddedGHASH(&hash, nonce)
+		lens := gcmLengths(0, uint64(len(nonce))*8)
+		g.paddedGHASH(&hash, lens[:])
+		copy(counter[:], hash[:])
+	}
+	return counter
+}
+
+// auth calculates GHASH(ciphertext, additionalData), masks the result with
+// tagMask and writes the result to out.
+func (g *gcmAsm) auth(out, ciphertext, additionalData []byte, tagMask *[gcmTagSize]byte) {
+	var hash [16]byte
+	g.paddedGHASH(&hash, additionalData)
+	g.paddedGHASH(&hash, ciphertext)
+	lens := gcmLengths(uint64(len(additionalData))*8, uint64(len(ciphertext))*8)
+	g.paddedGHASH(&hash, lens[:])
+
+	copy(out, hash[:])
+	for i := range out {
+		out[i] ^= tagMask[i]
+	}
+}
+
+// Seal encrypts and authenticates plaintext. See the [cipher.AEAD] interface for
+// details.
+func (g *gcmAsm) Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, data []byte) []byte {
+	if len(nonce) != g.nonceSize {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: incorrect nonce length given to GCM")
+	}
+	if uint64(len(plaintext)) > ((1<<32)-2)*BlockSize {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: message too large for GCM")
+	}
+
+	ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(plaintext)+g.tagSize)
+	if alias.InexactOverlap(out[:len(plaintext)], plaintext) {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: invalid buffer overlap")
+	}
+
+	counter := g.deriveCounter(nonce)
+
+	var tagMask [gcmBlockSize]byte
+	g.block.Encrypt(tagMask[:], counter[:])
+	counter.inc()
+
+	var tagOut [gcmTagSize]byte
+	g.counterCrypt(out, plaintext, &counter)
+	g.auth(tagOut[:], out[:len(plaintext)], data, &tagMask)
+	copy(out[len(plaintext):], tagOut[:])
+
+	return ret
+}
+
+// Open authenticates and decrypts ciphertext. See the [cipher.AEAD] interface
+// for details.
+func (g *gcmAsm) Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, data []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if len(nonce) != g.nonceSize {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: incorrect nonce length given to GCM")
+	}
+	// Sanity check to prevent the authentication from always succeeding if an implementation
+	// leaves tagSize uninitialized, for example.
+	if g.tagSize < gcmMinimumTagSize {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: incorrect GCM tag size")
+	}
+	if len(ciphertext) < g.tagSize {
+		return nil, errOpen
+	}
+	if uint64(len(ciphertext)) > ((1<<32)-2)*uint64(BlockSize)+uint64(g.tagSize) {
+		return nil, errOpen
+	}
+
+	tag := ciphertext[len(ciphertext)-g.tagSize:]
+	ciphertext = ciphertext[:len(ciphertext)-g.tagSize]
+
+	counter := g.deriveCounter(nonce)
+
+	var tagMask [gcmBlockSize]byte
+	g.block.Encrypt(tagMask[:], counter[:])
+	counter.inc()
+
+	var expectedTag [gcmTagSize]byte
+	g.auth(expectedTag[:], ciphertext, data, &tagMask)
+
+	ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(ciphertext))
+	if alias.InexactOverlap(out, ciphertext) {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: invalid buffer overlap")
+	}
+
+	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(expectedTag[:g.tagSize], tag) != 1 {
+		// The AESNI code decrypts and authenticates concurrently, and
+		// so overwrites dst in the event of a tag mismatch. That
+		// behavior is mimicked here in order to be consistent across
+		// platforms.
+		for i := range out {
+			out[i] = 0
+		}
+		return nil, errOpen
+	}
+
+	g.counterCrypt(out, ciphertext, &counter)
+	return ret, nil
+}
+
+// gcmKMA implements the cipher.AEAD interface using the KMA instruction. It should
+// only be used if hasKMA is true.
+type gcmKMA struct {
+	gcmAsm
+}
+
+// flags for the KMA instruction
+const (
+	kmaHS      = 1 << 10 // hash subkey supplied
+	kmaLAAD    = 1 << 9  // last series of additional authenticated data
+	kmaLPC     = 1 << 8  // last series of plaintext or ciphertext blocks
+	kmaDecrypt = 1 << 7  // decrypt
+)
+
+// kmaGCM executes the encryption or decryption operation given by fn. The tag
+// will be calculated and written to tag. cnt should contain the current
+// counter state and will be overwritten with the updated counter state.
+// TODO(mundaym): could pass in hash subkey
+//
+//go:noescape
+func kmaGCM(fn code, key, dst, src, aad []byte, tag *[16]byte, cnt *gcmCount)
+
+// Seal encrypts and authenticates plaintext. See the [cipher.AEAD] interface for
+// details.
+func (g *gcmKMA) Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, data []byte) []byte {
+	if len(nonce) != g.nonceSize {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: incorrect nonce length given to GCM")
+	}
+	if uint64(len(plaintext)) > ((1<<32)-2)*BlockSize {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: message too large for GCM")
+	}
+
+	ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(plaintext)+g.tagSize)
+	if alias.InexactOverlap(out[:len(plaintext)], plaintext) {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: invalid buffer overlap")
+	}
+
+	counter := g.deriveCounter(nonce)
+	fc := g.block.function | kmaLAAD | kmaLPC
+
+	var tag [gcmTagSize]byte
+	kmaGCM(fc, g.block.key, out[:len(plaintext)], plaintext, data, &tag, &counter)
+	copy(out[len(plaintext):], tag[:])
+
+	return ret
+}
+
+// Open authenticates and decrypts ciphertext. See the [cipher.AEAD] interface
+// for details.
+func (g *gcmKMA) Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, data []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if len(nonce) != g.nonceSize {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: incorrect nonce length given to GCM")
+	}
+	if len(ciphertext) < g.tagSize {
+		return nil, errOpen
+	}
+	if uint64(len(ciphertext)) > ((1<<32)-2)*uint64(BlockSize)+uint64(g.tagSize) {
+		return nil, errOpen
+	}
+
+	tag := ciphertext[len(ciphertext)-g.tagSize:]
+	ciphertext = ciphertext[:len(ciphertext)-g.tagSize]
+	ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(ciphertext))
+	if alias.InexactOverlap(out, ciphertext) {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: invalid buffer overlap")
+	}
+
+	if g.tagSize < gcmMinimumTagSize {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: incorrect GCM tag size")
+	}
+
+	counter := g.deriveCounter(nonce)
+	fc := g.block.function | kmaLAAD | kmaLPC | kmaDecrypt
+
+	var expectedTag [gcmTagSize]byte
+	kmaGCM(fc, g.block.key, out[:len(ciphertext)], ciphertext, data, &expectedTag, &counter)
+
+	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(expectedTag[:g.tagSize], tag) != 1 {
+		// The AESNI code decrypts and authenticates concurrently, and
+		// so overwrites dst in the event of a tag mismatch. That
+		// behavior is mimicked here in order to be consistent across
+		// platforms.
+		for i := range out {
+			out[i] = 0
+		}
+		return nil, errOpen
+	}
+
+	return ret, nil
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/aes/modes.go

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package aes
+
+import (
+	"crypto/cipher"
+)
+
+// gcmAble is implemented by cipher.Blocks that can provide an optimized
+// implementation of GCM through the AEAD interface.
+// See crypto/cipher/gcm.go.
+type gcmAble interface {
+	NewGCM(nonceSize, tagSize int) (cipher.AEAD, error)
+}
+
+// cbcEncAble is implemented by cipher.Blocks that can provide an optimized
+// implementation of CBC encryption through the cipher.BlockMode interface.
+// See crypto/cipher/cbc.go.
+type cbcEncAble interface {
+	NewCBCEncrypter(iv []byte) cipher.BlockMode
+}
+
+// cbcDecAble is implemented by cipher.Blocks that can provide an optimized
+// implementation of CBC decryption through the cipher.BlockMode interface.
+// See crypto/cipher/cbc.go.
+type cbcDecAble interface {
+	NewCBCDecrypter(iv []byte) cipher.BlockMode
+}
+
+// ctrAble is implemented by cipher.Blocks that can provide an optimized
+// implementation of CTR through the cipher.Stream interface.
+// See crypto/cipher/ctr.go.
+type ctrAble interface {
+	NewCTR(iv []byte) cipher.Stream
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/aes/modes_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package aes
+
+import (
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// Check that the optimized implementations of cipher modes will
+// be picked up correctly.
+
+// testInterface can be asserted to check that a type originates
+// from this test group.
+type testInterface interface {
+	InAESPackage() bool
+}
+
+// testBlock implements the cipher.Block interface and any *Able
+// interfaces that need to be tested.
+type testBlock struct{}
+
+func (*testBlock) BlockSize() int      { return 0 }
+func (*testBlock) Encrypt(a, b []byte) {}
+func (*testBlock) Decrypt(a, b []byte) {}
+func (*testBlock) NewGCM(int, int) (cipher.AEAD, error) {
+	return &testAEAD{}, nil
+}
+func (*testBlock) NewCBCEncrypter([]byte) cipher.BlockMode {
+	return &testBlockMode{}
+}
+func (*testBlock) NewCBCDecrypter([]byte) cipher.BlockMode {
+	return &testBlockMode{}
+}
+func (*testBlock) NewCTR([]byte) cipher.Stream {
+	return &testStream{}
+}
+
+// testAEAD implements the cipher.AEAD interface.
+type testAEAD struct{}
+
+func (*testAEAD) NonceSize() int                         { return 0 }
+func (*testAEAD) Overhead() int                          { return 0 }
+func (*testAEAD) Seal(a, b, c, d []byte) []byte          { return []byte{} }
+func (*testAEAD) Open(a, b, c, d []byte) ([]byte, error) { return []byte{}, nil }
+func (*testAEAD) InAESPackage() bool                     { return true }
+
+// Test the gcmAble interface is detected correctly by the cipher package.
+func TestGCMAble(t *testing.T) {
+	b := cipher.Block(&testBlock{})
+	if _, ok := b.(gcmAble); !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("testBlock does not implement the gcmAble interface")
+	}
+	aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(b)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("%v", err)
+	}
+	if _, ok := aead.(testInterface); !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("cipher.NewGCM did not use gcmAble interface")
+	}
+}
+
+// testBlockMode implements the cipher.BlockMode interface.
+type testBlockMode struct{}
+
+func (*testBlockMode) BlockSize() int          { return 0 }
+func (*testBlockMode) CryptBlocks(a, b []byte) {}
+func (*testBlockMode) InAESPackage() bool      { return true }
+
+// Test the cbcEncAble interface is detected correctly by the cipher package.
+func TestCBCEncAble(t *testing.T) {
+	b := cipher.Block(&testBlock{})
+	if _, ok := b.(cbcEncAble); !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("testBlock does not implement the cbcEncAble interface")
+	}
+	bm := cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(b, []byte{})
+	if _, ok := bm.(testInterface); !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("cipher.NewCBCEncrypter did not use cbcEncAble interface")
+	}
+}
+
+// Test the cbcDecAble interface is detected correctly by the cipher package.
+func TestCBCDecAble(t *testing.T) {
+	b := cipher.Block(&testBlock{})
+	if _, ok := b.(cbcDecAble); !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("testBlock does not implement the cbcDecAble interface")
+	}
+	bm := cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(b, []byte{})
+	if _, ok := bm.(testInterface); !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("cipher.NewCBCDecrypter did not use cbcDecAble interface")
+	}
+}
+
+// testStream implements the cipher.Stream interface.
+type testStream struct{}
+
+func (*testStream) XORKeyStream(a, b []byte) {}
+func (*testStream) InAESPackage() bool       { return true }
+
+// Test the ctrAble interface is detected correctly by the cipher package.
+func TestCTRAble(t *testing.T) {
+	b := cipher.Block(&testBlock{})
+	if _, ok := b.(ctrAble); !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("testBlock does not implement the ctrAble interface")
+	}
+	s := cipher.NewCTR(b, []byte{})
+	if _, ok := s.(testInterface); !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("cipher.NewCTR did not use ctrAble interface")
+	}
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/boring/boring.go

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+// Copyright 2020 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+//go:build boringcrypto
+
+// Package boring exposes functions that are only available when building with
+// Go+BoringCrypto. This package is available on all targets as long as the
+// Go+BoringCrypto toolchain is used. Use the Enabled function to determine
+// whether the BoringCrypto core is actually in use.
+//
+// Any time the Go+BoringCrypto toolchain is used, the "boringcrypto" build tag
+// is satisfied, so that applications can tag files that use this package.
+package boring
+
+import "crypto/internal/boring"
+
+// Enabled reports whether BoringCrypto handles supported crypto operations.
+func Enabled() bool {
+	return boring.Enabled
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/boring/boring_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+// Copyright 2020 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+//go:build boringcrypto
+
+package boring_test
+
+import (
+	"crypto/boring"
+	"runtime"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestEnabled(t *testing.T) {
+	supportedPlatform := runtime.GOOS == "linux" && (runtime.GOARCH == "amd64" || runtime.GOARCH == "arm64")
+	if supportedPlatform && !boring.Enabled() {
+		t.Error("Enabled returned false on a supported platform")
+	} else if !supportedPlatform && boring.Enabled() {
+		t.Error("Enabled returned true on an unsupported platform")
+	}
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/boring/notboring_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+// Copyright 2020 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+//go:build (goexperiment.boringcrypto && !boringcrypto) || (!goexperiment.boringcrypto && boringcrypto)
+
+package boring_test
+
+import "testing"
+
+func TestNotBoring(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Error("goexperiment.boringcrypto and boringcrypto should be equivalent build tags")
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/cipher/benchmark_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package cipher_test
+
+import (
+	"crypto/aes"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"strconv"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func benchmarkAESGCMSeal(b *testing.B, buf []byte, keySize int) {
+	b.ReportAllocs()
+	b.SetBytes(int64(len(buf)))
+
+	var key = make([]byte, keySize)
+	var nonce [12]byte
+	var ad [13]byte
+	aes, _ := aes.NewCipher(key[:])
+	aesgcm, _ := cipher.NewGCM(aes)
+	var out []byte
+
+	b.ResetTimer()
+	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+		out = aesgcm.Seal(out[:0], nonce[:], buf, ad[:])
+	}
+}
+
+func benchmarkAESGCMOpen(b *testing.B, buf []byte, keySize int) {
+	b.ReportAllocs()
+	b.SetBytes(int64(len(buf)))
+
+	var key = make([]byte, keySize)
+	var nonce [12]byte
+	var ad [13]byte
+	aes, _ := aes.NewCipher(key[:])
+	aesgcm, _ := cipher.NewGCM(aes)
+	var out []byte
+
+	ct := aesgcm.Seal(nil, nonce[:], buf[:], ad[:])
+
+	b.ResetTimer()
+	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+		out, _ = aesgcm.Open(out[:0], nonce[:], ct, ad[:])
+	}
+}
+
+func BenchmarkAESGCM(b *testing.B) {
+	for _, length := range []int{64, 1350, 8 * 1024} {
+		b.Run("Open-128-"+strconv.Itoa(length), func(b *testing.B) {
+			benchmarkAESGCMOpen(b, make([]byte, length), 128/8)
+		})
+		b.Run("Seal-128-"+strconv.Itoa(length), func(b *testing.B) {
+			benchmarkAESGCMSeal(b, make([]byte, length), 128/8)
+		})
+
+		b.Run("Open-256-"+strconv.Itoa(length), func(b *testing.B) {
+			benchmarkAESGCMOpen(b, make([]byte, length), 256/8)
+		})
+		b.Run("Seal-256-"+strconv.Itoa(length), func(b *testing.B) {
+			benchmarkAESGCMSeal(b, make([]byte, length), 256/8)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func benchmarkAESStream(b *testing.B, mode func(cipher.Block, []byte) cipher.Stream, buf []byte) {
+	b.SetBytes(int64(len(buf)))
+
+	var key [16]byte
+	var iv [16]byte
+	aes, _ := aes.NewCipher(key[:])
+	stream := mode(aes, iv[:])
+
+	b.ResetTimer()
+	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+		stream.XORKeyStream(buf, buf)
+	}
+}
+
+// If we test exactly 1K blocks, we would generate exact multiples of
+// the cipher's block size, and the cipher stream fragments would
+// always be wordsize aligned, whereas non-aligned is a more typical
+// use-case.
+const almost1K = 1024 - 5
+const almost8K = 8*1024 - 5
+
+func BenchmarkAESCFBEncrypt1K(b *testing.B) {
+	benchmarkAESStream(b, cipher.NewCFBEncrypter, make([]byte, almost1K))
+}
+
+func BenchmarkAESCFBDecrypt1K(b *testing.B) {
+	benchmarkAESStream(b, cipher.NewCFBDecrypter, make([]byte, almost1K))
+}
+
+func BenchmarkAESCFBDecrypt8K(b *testing.B) {
+	benchmarkAESStream(b, cipher.NewCFBDecrypter, make([]byte, almost8K))
+}
+
+func BenchmarkAESOFB1K(b *testing.B) {
+	benchmarkAESStream(b, cipher.NewOFB, make([]byte, almost1K))
+}
+
+func BenchmarkAESCTR1K(b *testing.B) {
+	benchmarkAESStream(b, cipher.NewCTR, make([]byte, almost1K))
+}
+
+func BenchmarkAESCTR8K(b *testing.B) {
+	benchmarkAESStream(b, cipher.NewCTR, make([]byte, almost8K))
+}
+
+func BenchmarkAESCBCEncrypt1K(b *testing.B) {
+	buf := make([]byte, 1024)
+	b.SetBytes(int64(len(buf)))
+
+	var key [16]byte
+	var iv [16]byte
+	aes, _ := aes.NewCipher(key[:])
+	cbc := cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(aes, iv[:])
+	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+		cbc.CryptBlocks(buf, buf)
+	}
+}
+
+func BenchmarkAESCBCDecrypt1K(b *testing.B) {
+	buf := make([]byte, 1024)
+	b.SetBytes(int64(len(buf)))
+
+	var key [16]byte
+	var iv [16]byte
+	aes, _ := aes.NewCipher(key[:])
+	cbc := cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(aes, iv[:])
+	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+		cbc.CryptBlocks(buf, buf)
+	}
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/cipher/cbc.go

@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Cipher block chaining (CBC) mode.
+
+// CBC provides confidentiality by xoring (chaining) each plaintext block
+// with the previous ciphertext block before applying the block cipher.
+
+// See NIST SP 800-38A, pp 10-11
+
+package cipher
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/internal/alias"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+)
+
+type cbc struct {
+	b         Block
+	blockSize int
+	iv        []byte
+	tmp       []byte
+}
+
+func newCBC(b Block, iv []byte) *cbc {
+	return &cbc{
+		b:         b,
+		blockSize: b.BlockSize(),
+		iv:        bytes.Clone(iv),
+		tmp:       make([]byte, b.BlockSize()),
+	}
+}
+
+type cbcEncrypter cbc
+
+// cbcEncAble is an interface implemented by ciphers that have a specific
+// optimized implementation of CBC encryption, like crypto/aes.
+// NewCBCEncrypter will check for this interface and return the specific
+// BlockMode if found.
+type cbcEncAble interface {
+	NewCBCEncrypter(iv []byte) BlockMode
+}
+
+// NewCBCEncrypter returns a BlockMode which encrypts in cipher block chaining
+// mode, using the given Block. The length of iv must be the same as the
+// Block's block size.
+func NewCBCEncrypter(b Block, iv []byte) BlockMode {
+	if len(iv) != b.BlockSize() {
+		panic("cipher.NewCBCEncrypter: IV length must equal block size")
+	}
+	if cbc, ok := b.(cbcEncAble); ok {
+		return cbc.NewCBCEncrypter(iv)
+	}
+	return (*cbcEncrypter)(newCBC(b, iv))
+}
+
+// newCBCGenericEncrypter returns a BlockMode which encrypts in cipher block chaining
+// mode, using the given Block. The length of iv must be the same as the
+// Block's block size. This always returns the generic non-asm encrypter for use
+// in fuzz testing.
+func newCBCGenericEncrypter(b Block, iv []byte) BlockMode {
+	if len(iv) != b.BlockSize() {
+		panic("cipher.NewCBCEncrypter: IV length must equal block size")
+	}
+	return (*cbcEncrypter)(newCBC(b, iv))
+}
+
+func (x *cbcEncrypter) BlockSize() int { return x.blockSize }
+
+func (x *cbcEncrypter) CryptBlocks(dst, src []byte) {
+	if len(src)%x.blockSize != 0 {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: input not full blocks")
+	}
+	if len(dst) < len(src) {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: output smaller than input")
+	}
+	if alias.InexactOverlap(dst[:len(src)], src) {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: invalid buffer overlap")
+	}
+
+	iv := x.iv
+
+	for len(src) > 0 {
+		// Write the xor to dst, then encrypt in place.
+		subtle.XORBytes(dst[:x.blockSize], src[:x.blockSize], iv)
+		x.b.Encrypt(dst[:x.blockSize], dst[:x.blockSize])
+
+		// Move to the next block with this block as the next iv.
+		iv = dst[:x.blockSize]
+		src = src[x.blockSize:]
+		dst = dst[x.blockSize:]
+	}
+
+	// Save the iv for the next CryptBlocks call.
+	copy(x.iv, iv)
+}
+
+func (x *cbcEncrypter) SetIV(iv []byte) {
+	if len(iv) != len(x.iv) {
+		panic("cipher: incorrect length IV")
+	}
+	copy(x.iv, iv)
+}
+
+type cbcDecrypter cbc
+
+// cbcDecAble is an interface implemented by ciphers that have a specific
+// optimized implementation of CBC decryption, like crypto/aes.
+// NewCBCDecrypter will check for this interface and return the specific
+// BlockMode if found.
+type cbcDecAble interface {
+	NewCBCDecrypter(iv []byte) BlockMode
+}
+
+// NewCBCDecrypter returns a BlockMode which decrypts in cipher block chaining
+// mode, using the given Block. The length of iv must be the same as the
+// Block's block size and must match the iv used to encrypt the data.
+func NewCBCDecrypter(b Block, iv []byte) BlockMode {
+	if len(iv) != b.BlockSize() {
+		panic("cipher.NewCBCDecrypter: IV length must equal block size")
+	}
+	if cbc, ok := b.(cbcDecAble); ok {
+		return cbc.NewCBCDecrypter(iv)
+	}
+	return (*cbcDecrypter)(newCBC(b, iv))
+}
+
+// newCBCGenericDecrypter returns a BlockMode which encrypts in cipher block chaining
+// mode, using the given Block. The length of iv must be the same as the
+// Block's block size. This always returns the generic non-asm decrypter for use in
+// fuzz testing.
+func newCBCGenericDecrypter(b Block, iv []byte) BlockMode {
+	if len(iv) != b.BlockSize() {
+		panic("cipher.NewCBCDecrypter: IV length must equal block size")
+	}
+	return (*cbcDecrypter)(newCBC(b, iv))
+}
+
+func (x *cbcDecrypter) BlockSize() int { return x.blockSize }
+
+func (x *cbcDecrypter) CryptBlocks(dst, src []byte) {
+	if len(src)%x.blockSize != 0 {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: input not full blocks")
+	}
+	if len(dst) < len(src) {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: output smaller than input")
+	}
+	if alias.InexactOverlap(dst[:len(src)], src) {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: invalid buffer overlap")
+	}
+	if len(src) == 0 {
+		return
+	}
+
+	// For each block, we need to xor the decrypted data with the previous block's ciphertext (the iv).
+	// To avoid making a copy each time, we loop over the blocks BACKWARDS.
+	end := len(src)
+	start := end - x.blockSize
+	prev := start - x.blockSize
+
+	// Copy the last block of ciphertext in preparation as the new iv.
+	copy(x.tmp, src[start:end])
+
+	// Loop over all but the first block.
+	for start > 0 {
+		x.b.Decrypt(dst[start:end], src[start:end])
+		subtle.XORBytes(dst[start:end], dst[start:end], src[prev:start])
+
+		end = start
+		start = prev
+		prev -= x.blockSize
+	}
+
+	// The first block is special because it uses the saved iv.
+	x.b.Decrypt(dst[start:end], src[start:end])
+	subtle.XORBytes(dst[start:end], dst[start:end], x.iv)
+
+	// Set the new iv to the first block we copied earlier.
+	x.iv, x.tmp = x.tmp, x.iv
+}
+
+func (x *cbcDecrypter) SetIV(iv []byte) {
+	if len(iv) != len(x.iv) {
+		panic("cipher: incorrect length IV")
+	}
+	copy(x.iv, iv)
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/cipher/cbc_aes_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// CBC AES test vectors.
+
+// See U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
+// Special Publication 800-38A, ``Recommendation for Block Cipher
+// Modes of Operation,'' 2001 Edition, pp. 24-29.
+
+package cipher_test
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/aes"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+var cbcAESTests = []struct {
+	name string
+	key  []byte
+	iv   []byte
+	in   []byte
+	out  []byte
+}{
+	// NIST SP 800-38A pp 27-29
+	{
+		"CBC-AES128",
+		commonKey128,
+		commonIV,
+		commonInput,
+		[]byte{
+			0x76, 0x49, 0xab, 0xac, 0x81, 0x19, 0xb2, 0x46, 0xce, 0xe9, 0x8e, 0x9b, 0x12, 0xe9, 0x19, 0x7d,
+			0x50, 0x86, 0xcb, 0x9b, 0x50, 0x72, 0x19, 0xee, 0x95, 0xdb, 0x11, 0x3a, 0x91, 0x76, 0x78, 0xb2,
+			0x73, 0xbe, 0xd6, 0xb8, 0xe3, 0xc1, 0x74, 0x3b, 0x71, 0x16, 0xe6, 0x9e, 0x22, 0x22, 0x95, 0x16,
+			0x3f, 0xf1, 0xca, 0xa1, 0x68, 0x1f, 0xac, 0x09, 0x12, 0x0e, 0xca, 0x30, 0x75, 0x86, 0xe1, 0xa7,
+		},
+	},
+	{
+		"CBC-AES192",
+		commonKey192,
+		commonIV,
+		commonInput,
+		[]byte{
+			0x4f, 0x02, 0x1d, 0xb2, 0x43, 0xbc, 0x63, 0x3d, 0x71, 0x78, 0x18, 0x3a, 0x9f, 0xa0, 0x71, 0xe8,
+			0xb4, 0xd9, 0xad, 0xa9, 0xad, 0x7d, 0xed, 0xf4, 0xe5, 0xe7, 0x38, 0x76, 0x3f, 0x69, 0x14, 0x5a,
+			0x57, 0x1b, 0x24, 0x20, 0x12, 0xfb, 0x7a, 0xe0, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0xba, 0xac, 0x3d, 0xf1, 0x02, 0xe0,
+			0x08, 0xb0, 0xe2, 0x79, 0x88, 0x59, 0x88, 0x81, 0xd9, 0x20, 0xa9, 0xe6, 0x4f, 0x56, 0x15, 0xcd,
+		},
+	},
+	{
+		"CBC-AES256",
+		commonKey256,
+		commonIV,
+		commonInput,
+		[]byte{
+			0xf5, 0x8c, 0x4c, 0x04, 0xd6, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0xba, 0x77, 0x9e, 0xab, 0xfb, 0x5f, 0x7b, 0xfb, 0xd6,
+			0x9c, 0xfc, 0x4e, 0x96, 0x7e, 0xdb, 0x80, 0x8d, 0x67, 0x9f, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xc6, 0x70, 0x2c, 0x7d,
+			0x39, 0xf2, 0x33, 0x69, 0xa9, 0xd9, 0xba, 0xcf, 0xa5, 0x30, 0xe2, 0x63, 0x04, 0x23, 0x14, 0x61,
+			0xb2, 0xeb, 0x05, 0xe2, 0xc3, 0x9b, 0xe9, 0xfc, 0xda, 0x6c, 0x19, 0x07, 0x8c, 0x6a, 0x9d, 0x1b,
+		},
+	},
+}
+
+func TestCBCEncrypterAES(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, test := range cbcAESTests {
+		c, err := aes.NewCipher(test.key)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("%s: NewCipher(%d bytes) = %s", test.name, len(test.key), err)
+			continue
+		}
+
+		encrypter := cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(c, test.iv)
+
+		data := make([]byte, len(test.in))
+		copy(data, test.in)
+
+		encrypter.CryptBlocks(data, data)
+		if !bytes.Equal(test.out, data) {
+			t.Errorf("%s: CBCEncrypter\nhave %x\nwant %x", test.name, data, test.out)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCBCDecrypterAES(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, test := range cbcAESTests {
+		c, err := aes.NewCipher(test.key)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("%s: NewCipher(%d bytes) = %s", test.name, len(test.key), err)
+			continue
+		}
+
+		decrypter := cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(c, test.iv)
+
+		data := make([]byte, len(test.out))
+		copy(data, test.out)
+
+		decrypter.CryptBlocks(data, data)
+		if !bytes.Equal(test.in, data) {
+			t.Errorf("%s: CBCDecrypter\nhave %x\nwant %x", test.name, data, test.in)
+		}
+	}
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/cipher/cfb.go

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// CFB (Cipher Feedback) Mode.
+
+package cipher
+
+import (
+	"crypto/internal/alias"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+)
+
+type cfb struct {
+	b       Block
+	next    []byte
+	out     []byte
+	outUsed int
+
+	decrypt bool
+}
+
+func (x *cfb) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) {
+	if len(dst) < len(src) {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: output smaller than input")
+	}
+	if alias.InexactOverlap(dst[:len(src)], src) {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: invalid buffer overlap")
+	}
+	for len(src) > 0 {
+		if x.outUsed == len(x.out) {
+			x.b.Encrypt(x.out, x.next)
+			x.outUsed = 0
+		}
+
+		if x.decrypt {
+			// We can precompute a larger segment of the
+			// keystream on decryption. This will allow
+			// larger batches for xor, and we should be
+			// able to match CTR/OFB performance.
+			copy(x.next[x.outUsed:], src)
+		}
+		n := subtle.XORBytes(dst, src, x.out[x.outUsed:])
+		if !x.decrypt {
+			copy(x.next[x.outUsed:], dst)
+		}
+		dst = dst[n:]
+		src = src[n:]
+		x.outUsed += n
+	}
+}
+
+// NewCFBEncrypter returns a [Stream] which encrypts with cipher feedback mode,
+// using the given [Block]. The iv must be the same length as the [Block]'s block
+// size.
+func NewCFBEncrypter(block Block, iv []byte) Stream {
+	return newCFB(block, iv, false)
+}
+
+// NewCFBDecrypter returns a [Stream] which decrypts with cipher feedback mode,
+// using the given [Block]. The iv must be the same length as the [Block]'s block
+// size.
+func NewCFBDecrypter(block Block, iv []byte) Stream {
+	return newCFB(block, iv, true)
+}
+
+func newCFB(block Block, iv []byte, decrypt bool) Stream {
+	blockSize := block.BlockSize()
+	if len(iv) != blockSize {
+		// stack trace will indicate whether it was de or encryption
+		panic("cipher.newCFB: IV length must equal block size")
+	}
+	x := &cfb{
+		b:       block,
+		out:     make([]byte, blockSize),
+		next:    make([]byte, blockSize),
+		outUsed: blockSize,
+		decrypt: decrypt,
+	}
+	copy(x.next, iv)
+
+	return x
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/cipher/cfb_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package cipher_test
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/aes"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// cfbTests contains the test vectors from
+// https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf, section
+// F.3.13.
+var cfbTests = []struct {
+	key, iv, plaintext, ciphertext string
+}{
+	{
+		"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c",
+		"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f",
+		"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a",
+		"3b3fd92eb72dad20333449f8e83cfb4a",
+	},
+	{
+		"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c",
+		"3B3FD92EB72DAD20333449F8E83CFB4A",
+		"ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51",
+		"c8a64537a0b3a93fcde3cdad9f1ce58b",
+	},
+	{
+		"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c",
+		"C8A64537A0B3A93FCDE3CDAD9F1CE58B",
+		"30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef",
+		"26751f67a3cbb140b1808cf187a4f4df",
+	},
+	{
+		"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c",
+		"26751F67A3CBB140B1808CF187A4F4DF",
+		"f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710",
+		"c04b05357c5d1c0eeac4c66f9ff7f2e6",
+	},
+}
+
+func TestCFBVectors(t *testing.T) {
+	for i, test := range cfbTests {
+		key, err := hex.DecodeString(test.key)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		iv, err := hex.DecodeString(test.iv)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		plaintext, err := hex.DecodeString(test.plaintext)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		expected, err := hex.DecodeString(test.ciphertext)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+
+		block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+
+		ciphertext := make([]byte, len(plaintext))
+		cfb := cipher.NewCFBEncrypter(block, iv)
+		cfb.XORKeyStream(ciphertext, plaintext)
+
+		if !bytes.Equal(ciphertext, expected) {
+			t.Errorf("#%d: wrong output: got %x, expected %x", i, ciphertext, expected)
+		}
+
+		cfbdec := cipher.NewCFBDecrypter(block, iv)
+		plaintextCopy := make([]byte, len(ciphertext))
+		cfbdec.XORKeyStream(plaintextCopy, ciphertext)
+
+		if !bytes.Equal(plaintextCopy, plaintext) {
+			t.Errorf("#%d: wrong plaintext: got %x, expected %x", i, plaintextCopy, plaintext)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCFBInverse(t *testing.T) {
+	block, err := aes.NewCipher(commonKey128)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Error(err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	plaintext := []byte("this is the plaintext. this is the plaintext.")
+	iv := make([]byte, block.BlockSize())
+	rand.Reader.Read(iv)
+	cfb := cipher.NewCFBEncrypter(block, iv)
+	ciphertext := make([]byte, len(plaintext))
+	copy(ciphertext, plaintext)
+	cfb.XORKeyStream(ciphertext, ciphertext)
+
+	cfbdec := cipher.NewCFBDecrypter(block, iv)
+	plaintextCopy := make([]byte, len(plaintext))
+	copy(plaintextCopy, ciphertext)
+	cfbdec.XORKeyStream(plaintextCopy, plaintextCopy)
+
+	if !bytes.Equal(plaintextCopy, plaintext) {
+		t.Errorf("got: %x, want: %x", plaintextCopy, plaintext)
+	}
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/cipher/cipher.go

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package cipher implements standard block cipher modes that can be wrapped
+// around low-level block cipher implementations.
+// See https://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/current_modes.html
+// and NIST Special Publication 800-38A.
+package cipher
+
+// A Block represents an implementation of block cipher
+// using a given key. It provides the capability to encrypt
+// or decrypt individual blocks. The mode implementations
+// extend that capability to streams of blocks.
+type Block interface {
+	// BlockSize returns the cipher's block size.
+	BlockSize() int
+
+	// Encrypt encrypts the first block in src into dst.
+	// Dst and src must overlap entirely or not at all.
+	Encrypt(dst, src []byte)
+
+	// Decrypt decrypts the first block in src into dst.
+	// Dst and src must overlap entirely or not at all.
+	Decrypt(dst, src []byte)
+}
+
+// A Stream represents a stream cipher.
+type Stream interface {
+	// XORKeyStream XORs each byte in the given slice with a byte from the
+	// cipher's key stream. Dst and src must overlap entirely or not at all.
+	//
+	// If len(dst) < len(src), XORKeyStream should panic. It is acceptable
+	// to pass a dst bigger than src, and in that case, XORKeyStream will
+	// only update dst[:len(src)] and will not touch the rest of dst.
+	//
+	// Multiple calls to XORKeyStream behave as if the concatenation of
+	// the src buffers was passed in a single run. That is, Stream
+	// maintains state and does not reset at each XORKeyStream call.
+	XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte)
+}
+
+// A BlockMode represents a block cipher running in a block-based mode (CBC,
+// ECB etc).
+type BlockMode interface {
+	// BlockSize returns the mode's block size.
+	BlockSize() int
+
+	// CryptBlocks encrypts or decrypts a number of blocks. The length of
+	// src must be a multiple of the block size. Dst and src must overlap
+	// entirely or not at all.
+	//
+	// If len(dst) < len(src), CryptBlocks should panic. It is acceptable
+	// to pass a dst bigger than src, and in that case, CryptBlocks will
+	// only update dst[:len(src)] and will not touch the rest of dst.
+	//
+	// Multiple calls to CryptBlocks behave as if the concatenation of
+	// the src buffers was passed in a single run. That is, BlockMode
+	// maintains state and does not reset at each CryptBlocks call.
+	CryptBlocks(dst, src []byte)
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/cipher/cipher_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package cipher_test
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/aes"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/des"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestCryptBlocks(t *testing.T) {
+	buf := make([]byte, 16)
+	block, _ := aes.NewCipher(buf)
+
+	mode := cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, buf)
+	mustPanic(t, "crypto/cipher: input not full blocks", func() { mode.CryptBlocks(buf, buf[:3]) })
+	mustPanic(t, "crypto/cipher: output smaller than input", func() { mode.CryptBlocks(buf[:3], buf) })
+
+	mode = cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, buf)
+	mustPanic(t, "crypto/cipher: input not full blocks", func() { mode.CryptBlocks(buf, buf[:3]) })
+	mustPanic(t, "crypto/cipher: output smaller than input", func() { mode.CryptBlocks(buf[:3], buf) })
+}
+
+func mustPanic(t *testing.T, msg string, f func()) {
+	defer func() {
+		err := recover()
+		if err == nil {
+			t.Errorf("function did not panic, wanted %q", msg)
+		} else if err != msg {
+			t.Errorf("got panic %v, wanted %q", err, msg)
+		}
+	}()
+	f()
+}
+
+func TestEmptyPlaintext(t *testing.T) {
+	var key [16]byte
+	a, err := aes.NewCipher(key[:16])
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	d, err := des.NewCipher(key[:8])
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	s := 16
+	pt := make([]byte, s)
+	ct := make([]byte, s)
+	for i := 0; i < 16; i++ {
+		pt[i], ct[i] = byte(i), byte(i)
+	}
+
+	assertEqual := func(name string, got, want []byte) {
+		if !bytes.Equal(got, want) {
+			t.Fatalf("%s: got %v, want %v", name, got, want)
+		}
+	}
+
+	for _, b := range []cipher.Block{a, d} {
+		iv := make([]byte, b.BlockSize())
+		cbce := cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(b, iv)
+		cbce.CryptBlocks(ct, pt[:0])
+		assertEqual("CBC encrypt", ct, pt)
+
+		cbcd := cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(b, iv)
+		cbcd.CryptBlocks(ct, pt[:0])
+		assertEqual("CBC decrypt", ct, pt)
+
+		cfbe := cipher.NewCFBEncrypter(b, iv)
+		cfbe.XORKeyStream(ct, pt[:0])
+		assertEqual("CFB encrypt", ct, pt)
+
+		cfbd := cipher.NewCFBDecrypter(b, iv)
+		cfbd.XORKeyStream(ct, pt[:0])
+		assertEqual("CFB decrypt", ct, pt)
+
+		ctr := cipher.NewCTR(b, iv)
+		ctr.XORKeyStream(ct, pt[:0])
+		assertEqual("CTR", ct, pt)
+
+		ofb := cipher.NewOFB(b, iv)
+		ofb.XORKeyStream(ct, pt[:0])
+		assertEqual("OFB", ct, pt)
+	}
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/cipher/common_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package cipher_test
+
+// Common values for tests.
+
+var commonInput = []byte{
+	0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x96, 0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a,
+	0xae, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0x1e, 0x03, 0xac, 0x9c, 0x9e, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0xac, 0x45, 0xaf, 0x8e, 0x51,
+	0x30, 0xc8, 0x1c, 0x46, 0xa3, 0x5c, 0xe4, 0x11, 0xe5, 0xfb, 0xc1, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x0a, 0x52, 0xef,
+	0xf6, 0x9f, 0x24, 0x45, 0xdf, 0x4f, 0x9b, 0x17, 0xad, 0x2b, 0x41, 0x7b, 0xe6, 0x6c, 0x37, 0x10,
+}
+
+var commonKey128 = []byte{0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6, 0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c}
+
+var commonKey192 = []byte{
+	0x8e, 0x73, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xda, 0x0e, 0x64, 0x52, 0xc8, 0x10, 0xf3, 0x2b, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xe5,
+	0x62, 0xf8, 0xea, 0xd2, 0x52, 0x2c, 0x6b, 0x7b,
+}
+
+var commonKey256 = []byte{
+	0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe, 0x2b, 0x73, 0xae, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81,
+	0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x08, 0xd7, 0x2d, 0x98, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xf4,
+}
+
+var commonIV = []byte{0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/cipher/ctr.go

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Counter (CTR) mode.
+
+// CTR converts a block cipher into a stream cipher by
+// repeatedly encrypting an incrementing counter and
+// xoring the resulting stream of data with the input.
+
+// See NIST SP 800-38A, pp 13-15
+
+package cipher
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/internal/alias"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+)
+
+type ctr struct {
+	b       Block
+	ctr     []byte
+	out     []byte
+	outUsed int
+}
+
+const streamBufferSize = 512
+
+// ctrAble is an interface implemented by ciphers that have a specific optimized
+// implementation of CTR, like crypto/aes. NewCTR will check for this interface
+// and return the specific Stream if found.
+type ctrAble interface {
+	NewCTR(iv []byte) Stream
+}
+
+// NewCTR returns a [Stream] which encrypts/decrypts using the given [Block] in
+// counter mode. The length of iv must be the same as the [Block]'s block size.
+func NewCTR(block Block, iv []byte) Stream {
+	if ctr, ok := block.(ctrAble); ok {
+		return ctr.NewCTR(iv)
+	}
+	if len(iv) != block.BlockSize() {
+		panic("cipher.NewCTR: IV length must equal block size")
+	}
+	bufSize := streamBufferSize
+	if bufSize < block.BlockSize() {
+		bufSize = block.BlockSize()
+	}
+	return &ctr{
+		b:       block,
+		ctr:     bytes.Clone(iv),
+		out:     make([]byte, 0, bufSize),
+		outUsed: 0,
+	}
+}
+
+func (x *ctr) refill() {
+	remain := len(x.out) - x.outUsed
+	copy(x.out, x.out[x.outUsed:])
+	x.out = x.out[:cap(x.out)]
+	bs := x.b.BlockSize()
+	for remain <= len(x.out)-bs {
+		x.b.Encrypt(x.out[remain:], x.ctr)
+		remain += bs
+
+		// Increment counter
+		for i := len(x.ctr) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
+			x.ctr[i]++
+			if x.ctr[i] != 0 {
+				break
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	x.out = x.out[:remain]
+	x.outUsed = 0
+}
+
+func (x *ctr) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) {
+	if len(dst) < len(src) {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: output smaller than input")
+	}
+	if alias.InexactOverlap(dst[:len(src)], src) {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: invalid buffer overlap")
+	}
+	for len(src) > 0 {
+		if x.outUsed >= len(x.out)-x.b.BlockSize() {
+			x.refill()
+		}
+		n := subtle.XORBytes(dst, src, x.out[x.outUsed:])
+		dst = dst[n:]
+		src = src[n:]
+		x.outUsed += n
+	}
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/cipher/ctr_aes_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// CTR AES test vectors.
+
+// See U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
+// Special Publication 800-38A, ``Recommendation for Block Cipher
+// Modes of Operation,'' 2001 Edition, pp. 55-58.
+
+package cipher_test
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/aes"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+var commonCounter = []byte{0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7, 0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff}
+
+var ctrAESTests = []struct {
+	name string
+	key  []byte
+	iv   []byte
+	in   []byte
+	out  []byte
+}{
+	// NIST SP 800-38A pp 55-58
+	{
+		"CTR-AES128",
+		commonKey128,
+		commonCounter,
+		commonInput,
+		[]byte{
+			0x87, 0x4d, 0x61, 0x91, 0xb6, 0x20, 0xe3, 0x26, 0x1b, 0xef, 0x68, 0x64, 0x99, 0x0d, 0xb6, 0xce,
+			0x98, 0x06, 0xf6, 0x6b, 0x79, 0x70, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x86, 0x17, 0x18, 0x7b, 0xb9, 0xff, 0xfd, 0xff,
+			0x5a, 0xe4, 0xdf, 0x3e, 0xdb, 0xd5, 0xd3, 0x5e, 0x5b, 0x4f, 0x09, 0x02, 0x0d, 0xb0, 0x3e, 0xab,
+			0x1e, 0x03, 0x1d, 0xda, 0x2f, 0xbe, 0x03, 0xd1, 0x79, 0x21, 0x70, 0xa0, 0xf3, 0x00, 0x9c, 0xee,
+		},
+	},
+	{
+		"CTR-AES192",
+		commonKey192,
+		commonCounter,
+		commonInput,
+		[]byte{
+			0x1a, 0xbc, 0x93, 0x24, 0x17, 0x52, 0x1c, 0xa2, 0x4f, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x59, 0xfe, 0x7e, 0x6e, 0x0b,
+			0x09, 0x03, 0x39, 0xec, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0xfa, 0xef, 0xd5, 0xcc, 0xc2, 0xc6, 0xf4, 0xce, 0x8e, 0x94,
+			0x1e, 0x36, 0xb2, 0x6b, 0xd1, 0xeb, 0xc6, 0x70, 0xd1, 0xbd, 0x1d, 0x66, 0x56, 0x20, 0xab, 0xf7,
+			0x4f, 0x78, 0xa7, 0xf6, 0xd2, 0x98, 0x09, 0x58, 0x5a, 0x97, 0xda, 0xec, 0x58, 0xc6, 0xb0, 0x50,
+		},
+	},
+	{
+		"CTR-AES256",
+		commonKey256,
+		commonCounter,
+		commonInput,
+		[]byte{
+			0x60, 0x1e, 0xc3, 0x13, 0x77, 0x57, 0x89, 0xa5, 0xb7, 0xa7, 0xf5, 0x04, 0xbb, 0xf3, 0xd2, 0x28,
+			0xf4, 0x43, 0xe3, 0xca, 0x4d, 0x62, 0xb5, 0x9a, 0xca, 0x84, 0xe9, 0x90, 0xca, 0xca, 0xf5, 0xc5,
+			0x2b, 0x09, 0x30, 0xda, 0xa2, 0x3d, 0xe9, 0x4c, 0xe8, 0x70, 0x17, 0xba, 0x2d, 0x84, 0x98, 0x8d,
+			0xdf, 0xc9, 0xc5, 0x8d, 0xb6, 0x7a, 0xad, 0xa6, 0x13, 0xc2, 0xdd, 0x08, 0x45, 0x79, 0x41, 0xa6,
+		},
+	},
+}
+
+func TestCTR_AES(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tt := range ctrAESTests {
+		test := tt.name
+
+		c, err := aes.NewCipher(tt.key)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("%s: NewCipher(%d bytes) = %s", test, len(tt.key), err)
+			continue
+		}
+
+		for j := 0; j <= 5; j += 5 {
+			in := tt.in[0 : len(tt.in)-j]
+			ctr := cipher.NewCTR(c, tt.iv)
+			encrypted := make([]byte, len(in))
+			ctr.XORKeyStream(encrypted, in)
+			if out := tt.out[0:len(in)]; !bytes.Equal(out, encrypted) {
+				t.Errorf("%s/%d: CTR\ninpt %x\nhave %x\nwant %x", test, len(in), in, encrypted, out)
+			}
+		}
+
+		for j := 0; j <= 7; j += 7 {
+			in := tt.out[0 : len(tt.out)-j]
+			ctr := cipher.NewCTR(c, tt.iv)
+			plain := make([]byte, len(in))
+			ctr.XORKeyStream(plain, in)
+			if out := tt.in[0:len(in)]; !bytes.Equal(out, plain) {
+				t.Errorf("%s/%d: CTRReader\nhave %x\nwant %x", test, len(out), plain, out)
+			}
+		}
+
+		if t.Failed() {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/cipher/ctr_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package cipher_test
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+type noopBlock int
+
+func (b noopBlock) BlockSize() int        { return int(b) }
+func (noopBlock) Encrypt(dst, src []byte) { copy(dst, src) }
+func (noopBlock) Decrypt(dst, src []byte) { copy(dst, src) }
+
+func inc(b []byte) {
+	for i := len(b) - 1; i >= 0; i++ {
+		b[i]++
+		if b[i] != 0 {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func xor(a, b []byte) {
+	for i := range a {
+		a[i] ^= b[i]
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCTR(t *testing.T) {
+	for size := 64; size <= 1024; size *= 2 {
+		iv := make([]byte, size)
+		ctr := cipher.NewCTR(noopBlock(size), iv)
+		src := make([]byte, 1024)
+		for i := range src {
+			src[i] = 0xff
+		}
+		want := make([]byte, 1024)
+		copy(want, src)
+		counter := make([]byte, size)
+		for i := 1; i < len(want)/size; i++ {
+			inc(counter)
+			xor(want[i*size:(i+1)*size], counter)
+		}
+		dst := make([]byte, 1024)
+		ctr.XORKeyStream(dst, src)
+		if !bytes.Equal(dst, want) {
+			t.Errorf("for size %d\nhave %x\nwant %x", size, dst, want)
+		}
+	}
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/cipher/example_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
+// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package cipher_test
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/aes"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+)
+
+func ExampleNewGCM_encrypt() {
+	// Load your secret key from a safe place and reuse it across multiple
+	// Seal/Open calls. (Obviously don't use this example key for anything
+	// real.) If you want to convert a passphrase to a key, use a suitable
+	// package like bcrypt or scrypt.
+	// When decoded the key should be 16 bytes (AES-128) or 32 (AES-256).
+	key, _ := hex.DecodeString("6368616e676520746869732070617373776f726420746f206120736563726574")
+	plaintext := []byte("exampleplaintext")
+
+	block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err.Error())
+	}
+
+	// Never use more than 2^32 random nonces with a given key because of the risk of a repeat.
+	nonce := make([]byte, 12)
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, nonce); err != nil {
+		panic(err.Error())
+	}
+
+	aesgcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err.Error())
+	}
+
+	ciphertext := aesgcm.Seal(nil, nonce, plaintext, nil)
+	fmt.Printf("%x\n", ciphertext)
+}
+
+func ExampleNewGCM_decrypt() {
+	// Load your secret key from a safe place and reuse it across multiple
+	// Seal/Open calls. (Obviously don't use this example key for anything
+	// real.) If you want to convert a passphrase to a key, use a suitable
+	// package like bcrypt or scrypt.
+	// When decoded the key should be 16 bytes (AES-128) or 32 (AES-256).
+	key, _ := hex.DecodeString("6368616e676520746869732070617373776f726420746f206120736563726574")
+	ciphertext, _ := hex.DecodeString("c3aaa29f002ca75870806e44086700f62ce4d43e902b3888e23ceff797a7a471")
+	nonce, _ := hex.DecodeString("64a9433eae7ccceee2fc0eda")
+
+	block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err.Error())
+	}
+
+	aesgcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err.Error())
+	}
+
+	plaintext, err := aesgcm.Open(nil, nonce, ciphertext, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err.Error())
+	}
+
+	fmt.Printf("%s\n", plaintext)
+	// Output: exampleplaintext
+}
+
+func ExampleNewCBCDecrypter() {
+	// Load your secret key from a safe place and reuse it across multiple
+	// NewCipher calls. (Obviously don't use this example key for anything
+	// real.) If you want to convert a passphrase to a key, use a suitable
+	// package like bcrypt or scrypt.
+	key, _ := hex.DecodeString("6368616e676520746869732070617373")
+	ciphertext, _ := hex.DecodeString("73c86d43a9d700a253a96c85b0f6b03ac9792e0e757f869cca306bd3cba1c62b")
+
+	block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+
+	// The IV needs to be unique, but not secure. Therefore it's common to
+	// include it at the beginning of the ciphertext.
+	if len(ciphertext) < aes.BlockSize {
+		panic("ciphertext too short")
+	}
+	iv := ciphertext[:aes.BlockSize]
+	ciphertext = ciphertext[aes.BlockSize:]
+
+	// CBC mode always works in whole blocks.
+	if len(ciphertext)%aes.BlockSize != 0 {
+		panic("ciphertext is not a multiple of the block size")
+	}
+
+	mode := cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv)
+
+	// CryptBlocks can work in-place if the two arguments are the same.
+	mode.CryptBlocks(ciphertext, ciphertext)
+
+	// If the original plaintext lengths are not a multiple of the block
+	// size, padding would have to be added when encrypting, which would be
+	// removed at this point. For an example, see
+	// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-6.2.3.2. However, it's
+	// critical to note that ciphertexts must be authenticated (i.e. by
+	// using crypto/hmac) before being decrypted in order to avoid creating
+	// a padding oracle.
+
+	fmt.Printf("%s\n", ciphertext)
+	// Output: exampleplaintext
+}
+
+func ExampleNewCBCEncrypter() {
+	// Load your secret key from a safe place and reuse it across multiple
+	// NewCipher calls. (Obviously don't use this example key for anything
+	// real.) If you want to convert a passphrase to a key, use a suitable
+	// package like bcrypt or scrypt.
+	key, _ := hex.DecodeString("6368616e676520746869732070617373")
+	plaintext := []byte("exampleplaintext")
+
+	// CBC mode works on blocks so plaintexts may need to be padded to the
+	// next whole block. For an example of such padding, see
+	// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-6.2.3.2. Here we'll
+	// assume that the plaintext is already of the correct length.
+	if len(plaintext)%aes.BlockSize != 0 {
+		panic("plaintext is not a multiple of the block size")
+	}
+
+	block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+
+	// The IV needs to be unique, but not secure. Therefore it's common to
+	// include it at the beginning of the ciphertext.
+	ciphertext := make([]byte, aes.BlockSize+len(plaintext))
+	iv := ciphertext[:aes.BlockSize]
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, iv); err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+
+	mode := cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv)
+	mode.CryptBlocks(ciphertext[aes.BlockSize:], plaintext)
+
+	// It's important to remember that ciphertexts must be authenticated
+	// (i.e. by using crypto/hmac) as well as being encrypted in order to
+	// be secure.
+
+	fmt.Printf("%x\n", ciphertext)
+}
+
+func ExampleNewCFBDecrypter() {
+	// Load your secret key from a safe place and reuse it across multiple
+	// NewCipher calls. (Obviously don't use this example key for anything
+	// real.) If you want to convert a passphrase to a key, use a suitable
+	// package like bcrypt or scrypt.
+	key, _ := hex.DecodeString("6368616e676520746869732070617373")
+	ciphertext, _ := hex.DecodeString("7dd015f06bec7f1b8f6559dad89f4131da62261786845100056b353194ad")
+
+	block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+
+	// The IV needs to be unique, but not secure. Therefore it's common to
+	// include it at the beginning of the ciphertext.
+	if len(ciphertext) < aes.BlockSize {
+		panic("ciphertext too short")
+	}
+	iv := ciphertext[:aes.BlockSize]
+	ciphertext = ciphertext[aes.BlockSize:]
+
+	stream := cipher.NewCFBDecrypter(block, iv)
+
+	// XORKeyStream can work in-place if the two arguments are the same.
+	stream.XORKeyStream(ciphertext, ciphertext)
+	fmt.Printf("%s", ciphertext)
+	// Output: some plaintext
+}
+
+func ExampleNewCFBEncrypter() {
+	// Load your secret key from a safe place and reuse it across multiple
+	// NewCipher calls. (Obviously don't use this example key for anything
+	// real.) If you want to convert a passphrase to a key, use a suitable
+	// package like bcrypt or scrypt.
+	key, _ := hex.DecodeString("6368616e676520746869732070617373")
+	plaintext := []byte("some plaintext")
+
+	block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+
+	// The IV needs to be unique, but not secure. Therefore it's common to
+	// include it at the beginning of the ciphertext.
+	ciphertext := make([]byte, aes.BlockSize+len(plaintext))
+	iv := ciphertext[:aes.BlockSize]
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, iv); err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+
+	stream := cipher.NewCFBEncrypter(block, iv)
+	stream.XORKeyStream(ciphertext[aes.BlockSize:], plaintext)
+
+	// It's important to remember that ciphertexts must be authenticated
+	// (i.e. by using crypto/hmac) as well as being encrypted in order to
+	// be secure.
+	fmt.Printf("%x\n", ciphertext)
+}
+
+func ExampleNewCTR() {
+	// Load your secret key from a safe place and reuse it across multiple
+	// NewCipher calls. (Obviously don't use this example key for anything
+	// real.) If you want to convert a passphrase to a key, use a suitable
+	// package like bcrypt or scrypt.
+	key, _ := hex.DecodeString("6368616e676520746869732070617373")
+	plaintext := []byte("some plaintext")
+
+	block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+
+	// The IV needs to be unique, but not secure. Therefore it's common to
+	// include it at the beginning of the ciphertext.
+	ciphertext := make([]byte, aes.BlockSize+len(plaintext))
+	iv := ciphertext[:aes.BlockSize]
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, iv); err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+
+	stream := cipher.NewCTR(block, iv)
+	stream.XORKeyStream(ciphertext[aes.BlockSize:], plaintext)
+
+	// It's important to remember that ciphertexts must be authenticated
+	// (i.e. by using crypto/hmac) as well as being encrypted in order to
+	// be secure.
+
+	// CTR mode is the same for both encryption and decryption, so we can
+	// also decrypt that ciphertext with NewCTR.
+
+	plaintext2 := make([]byte, len(plaintext))
+	stream = cipher.NewCTR(block, iv)
+	stream.XORKeyStream(plaintext2, ciphertext[aes.BlockSize:])
+
+	fmt.Printf("%s\n", plaintext2)
+	// Output: some plaintext
+}
+
+func ExampleNewOFB() {
+	// Load your secret key from a safe place and reuse it across multiple
+	// NewCipher calls. (Obviously don't use this example key for anything
+	// real.) If you want to convert a passphrase to a key, use a suitable
+	// package like bcrypt or scrypt.
+	key, _ := hex.DecodeString("6368616e676520746869732070617373")
+	plaintext := []byte("some plaintext")
+
+	block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+
+	// The IV needs to be unique, but not secure. Therefore it's common to
+	// include it at the beginning of the ciphertext.
+	ciphertext := make([]byte, aes.BlockSize+len(plaintext))
+	iv := ciphertext[:aes.BlockSize]
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, iv); err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+
+	stream := cipher.NewOFB(block, iv)
+	stream.XORKeyStream(ciphertext[aes.BlockSize:], plaintext)
+
+	// It's important to remember that ciphertexts must be authenticated
+	// (i.e. by using crypto/hmac) as well as being encrypted in order to
+	// be secure.
+
+	// OFB mode is the same for both encryption and decryption, so we can
+	// also decrypt that ciphertext with NewOFB.
+
+	plaintext2 := make([]byte, len(plaintext))
+	stream = cipher.NewOFB(block, iv)
+	stream.XORKeyStream(plaintext2, ciphertext[aes.BlockSize:])
+
+	fmt.Printf("%s\n", plaintext2)
+	// Output: some plaintext
+}
+
+func ExampleStreamReader() {
+	// Load your secret key from a safe place and reuse it across multiple
+	// NewCipher calls. (Obviously don't use this example key for anything
+	// real.) If you want to convert a passphrase to a key, use a suitable
+	// package like bcrypt or scrypt.
+	key, _ := hex.DecodeString("6368616e676520746869732070617373")
+
+	encrypted, _ := hex.DecodeString("cf0495cc6f75dafc23948538e79904a9")
+	bReader := bytes.NewReader(encrypted)
+
+	block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+
+	// If the key is unique for each ciphertext, then it's ok to use a zero
+	// IV.
+	var iv [aes.BlockSize]byte
+	stream := cipher.NewOFB(block, iv[:])
+
+	reader := &cipher.StreamReader{S: stream, R: bReader}
+	// Copy the input to the output stream, decrypting as we go.
+	if _, err := io.Copy(os.Stdout, reader); err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+
+	// Note that this example is simplistic in that it omits any
+	// authentication of the encrypted data. If you were actually to use
+	// StreamReader in this manner, an attacker could flip arbitrary bits in
+	// the output.
+
+	// Output: some secret text
+}
+
+func ExampleStreamWriter() {
+	// Load your secret key from a safe place and reuse it across multiple
+	// NewCipher calls. (Obviously don't use this example key for anything
+	// real.) If you want to convert a passphrase to a key, use a suitable
+	// package like bcrypt or scrypt.
+	key, _ := hex.DecodeString("6368616e676520746869732070617373")
+
+	bReader := bytes.NewReader([]byte("some secret text"))
+
+	block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+
+	// If the key is unique for each ciphertext, then it's ok to use a zero
+	// IV.
+	var iv [aes.BlockSize]byte
+	stream := cipher.NewOFB(block, iv[:])
+
+	var out bytes.Buffer
+
+	writer := &cipher.StreamWriter{S: stream, W: &out}
+	// Copy the input to the output buffer, encrypting as we go.
+	if _, err := io.Copy(writer, bReader); err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+
+	// Note that this example is simplistic in that it omits any
+	// authentication of the encrypted data. If you were actually to use
+	// StreamReader in this manner, an attacker could flip arbitrary bits in
+	// the decrypted result.
+
+	fmt.Printf("%x\n", out.Bytes())
+	// Output: cf0495cc6f75dafc23948538e79904a9
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/cipher/export_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package cipher
+
+// Export internal functions for testing.
+var NewCBCGenericEncrypter = newCBCGenericEncrypter
+var NewCBCGenericDecrypter = newCBCGenericDecrypter

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/cipher/fuzz_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+// Copyright 2021 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+//go:build ppc64le
+
+package cipher_test
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/aes"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+var cbcAESFuzzTests = []struct {
+	name string
+	key  []byte
+}{
+	{
+		"CBC-AES128",
+		commonKey128,
+	},
+	{
+		"CBC-AES192",
+		commonKey192,
+	},
+	{
+		"CBC-AES256",
+		commonKey256,
+	},
+}
+
+var timeout *time.Timer
+
+const datalen = 1024
+
+func TestFuzz(t *testing.T) {
+
+	for _, ft := range cbcAESFuzzTests {
+		c, _ := aes.NewCipher(ft.key)
+
+		cbcAsm := cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(c, commonIV)
+		cbcGeneric := cipher.NewCBCGenericEncrypter(c, commonIV)
+
+		if testing.Short() {
+			timeout = time.NewTimer(10 * time.Millisecond)
+		} else {
+			timeout = time.NewTimer(2 * time.Second)
+		}
+
+		indata := make([]byte, datalen)
+		outgeneric := make([]byte, datalen)
+		outdata := make([]byte, datalen)
+
+	fuzzencrypt:
+		for {
+			select {
+			case <-timeout.C:
+				break fuzzencrypt
+			default:
+			}
+
+			rand.Read(indata[:])
+
+			cbcGeneric.CryptBlocks(indata, outgeneric)
+			cbcAsm.CryptBlocks(indata, outdata)
+
+			if !bytes.Equal(outdata, outgeneric) {
+				t.Fatalf("AES-CBC encryption does not match reference result: %x and %x, please report this error to security@golang.org", outdata, outgeneric)
+			}
+		}
+
+		cbcAsm = cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(c, commonIV)
+		cbcGeneric = cipher.NewCBCGenericDecrypter(c, commonIV)
+
+		if testing.Short() {
+			timeout = time.NewTimer(10 * time.Millisecond)
+		} else {
+			timeout = time.NewTimer(2 * time.Second)
+		}
+
+	fuzzdecrypt:
+		for {
+			select {
+			case <-timeout.C:
+				break fuzzdecrypt
+			default:
+			}
+
+			rand.Read(indata[:])
+
+			cbcGeneric.CryptBlocks(indata, outgeneric)
+			cbcAsm.CryptBlocks(indata, outdata)
+
+			if !bytes.Equal(outdata, outgeneric) {
+				t.Fatalf("AES-CBC decryption does not match reference result: %x and %x, please report this error to security@golang.org", outdata, outgeneric)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/cipher/gcm.go

@@ -0,0 +1,427 @@
+// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package cipher
+
+import (
+	"crypto/internal/alias"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+)
+
+// AEAD is a cipher mode providing authenticated encryption with associated
+// data. For a description of the methodology, see
+// https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_encryption.
+type AEAD interface {
+	// NonceSize returns the size of the nonce that must be passed to Seal
+	// and Open.
+	NonceSize() int
+
+	// Overhead returns the maximum difference between the lengths of a
+	// plaintext and its ciphertext.
+	Overhead() int
+
+	// Seal encrypts and authenticates plaintext, authenticates the
+	// additional data and appends the result to dst, returning the updated
+	// slice. The nonce must be NonceSize() bytes long and unique for all
+	// time, for a given key.
+	//
+	// To reuse plaintext's storage for the encrypted output, use plaintext[:0]
+	// as dst. Otherwise, the remaining capacity of dst must not overlap plaintext.
+	Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte
+
+	// Open decrypts and authenticates ciphertext, authenticates the
+	// additional data and, if successful, appends the resulting plaintext
+	// to dst, returning the updated slice. The nonce must be NonceSize()
+	// bytes long and both it and the additional data must match the
+	// value passed to Seal.
+	//
+	// To reuse ciphertext's storage for the decrypted output, use ciphertext[:0]
+	// as dst. Otherwise, the remaining capacity of dst must not overlap plaintext.
+	//
+	// Even if the function fails, the contents of dst, up to its capacity,
+	// may be overwritten.
+	Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error)
+}
+
+// gcmAble is an interface implemented by ciphers that have a specific optimized
+// implementation of GCM, like crypto/aes. NewGCM will check for this interface
+// and return the specific AEAD if found.
+type gcmAble interface {
+	NewGCM(nonceSize, tagSize int) (AEAD, error)
+}
+
+// gcmFieldElement represents a value in GF(2¹²⁸). In order to reflect the GCM
+// standard and make binary.BigEndian suitable for marshaling these values, the
+// bits are stored in big endian order. For example:
+//
+//	the coefficient of x⁰ can be obtained by v.low >> 63.
+//	the coefficient of x⁶³ can be obtained by v.low & 1.
+//	the coefficient of x⁶⁴ can be obtained by v.high >> 63.
+//	the coefficient of x¹²⁷ can be obtained by v.high & 1.
+type gcmFieldElement struct {
+	low, high uint64
+}
+
+// gcm represents a Galois Counter Mode with a specific key. See
+// https://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/proposedmodes/gcm/gcm-revised-spec.pdf
+type gcm struct {
+	cipher    Block
+	nonceSize int
+	tagSize   int
+	// productTable contains the first sixteen powers of the key, H.
+	// However, they are in bit reversed order. See NewGCMWithNonceSize.
+	productTable [16]gcmFieldElement
+}
+
+// NewGCM returns the given 128-bit, block cipher wrapped in Galois Counter Mode
+// with the standard nonce length.
+//
+// In general, the GHASH operation performed by this implementation of GCM is not constant-time.
+// An exception is when the underlying [Block] was created by aes.NewCipher
+// on systems with hardware support for AES. See the [crypto/aes] package documentation for details.
+func NewGCM(cipher Block) (AEAD, error) {
+	return newGCMWithNonceAndTagSize(cipher, gcmStandardNonceSize, gcmTagSize)
+}
+
+// NewGCMWithNonceSize returns the given 128-bit, block cipher wrapped in Galois
+// Counter Mode, which accepts nonces of the given length. The length must not
+// be zero.
+//
+// Only use this function if you require compatibility with an existing
+// cryptosystem that uses non-standard nonce lengths. All other users should use
+// [NewGCM], which is faster and more resistant to misuse.
+func NewGCMWithNonceSize(cipher Block, size int) (AEAD, error) {
+	return newGCMWithNonceAndTagSize(cipher, size, gcmTagSize)
+}
+
+// NewGCMWithTagSize returns the given 128-bit, block cipher wrapped in Galois
+// Counter Mode, which generates tags with the given length.
+//
+// Tag sizes between 12 and 16 bytes are allowed.
+//
+// Only use this function if you require compatibility with an existing
+// cryptosystem that uses non-standard tag lengths. All other users should use
+// [NewGCM], which is more resistant to misuse.
+func NewGCMWithTagSize(cipher Block, tagSize int) (AEAD, error) {
+	return newGCMWithNonceAndTagSize(cipher, gcmStandardNonceSize, tagSize)
+}
+
+func newGCMWithNonceAndTagSize(cipher Block, nonceSize, tagSize int) (AEAD, error) {
+	if tagSize < gcmMinimumTagSize || tagSize > gcmBlockSize {
+		return nil, errors.New("cipher: incorrect tag size given to GCM")
+	}
+
+	if nonceSize <= 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("cipher: the nonce can't have zero length, or the security of the key will be immediately compromised")
+	}
+
+	if cipher, ok := cipher.(gcmAble); ok {
+		return cipher.NewGCM(nonceSize, tagSize)
+	}
+
+	if cipher.BlockSize() != gcmBlockSize {
+		return nil, errors.New("cipher: NewGCM requires 128-bit block cipher")
+	}
+
+	var key [gcmBlockSize]byte
+	cipher.Encrypt(key[:], key[:])
+
+	g := &gcm{cipher: cipher, nonceSize: nonceSize, tagSize: tagSize}
+
+	// We precompute 16 multiples of |key|. However, when we do lookups
+	// into this table we'll be using bits from a field element and
+	// therefore the bits will be in the reverse order. So normally one
+	// would expect, say, 4*key to be in index 4 of the table but due to
+	// this bit ordering it will actually be in index 0010 (base 2) = 2.
+	x := gcmFieldElement{
+		binary.BigEndian.Uint64(key[:8]),
+		binary.BigEndian.Uint64(key[8:]),
+	}
+	g.productTable[reverseBits(1)] = x
+
+	for i := 2; i < 16; i += 2 {
+		g.productTable[reverseBits(i)] = gcmDouble(&g.productTable[reverseBits(i/2)])
+		g.productTable[reverseBits(i+1)] = gcmAdd(&g.productTable[reverseBits(i)], &x)
+	}
+
+	return g, nil
+}
+
+const (
+	gcmBlockSize         = 16
+	gcmTagSize           = 16
+	gcmMinimumTagSize    = 12 // NIST SP 800-38D recommends tags with 12 or more bytes.
+	gcmStandardNonceSize = 12
+)
+
+func (g *gcm) NonceSize() int {
+	return g.nonceSize
+}
+
+func (g *gcm) Overhead() int {
+	return g.tagSize
+}
+
+func (g *gcm) Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, data []byte) []byte {
+	if len(nonce) != g.nonceSize {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: incorrect nonce length given to GCM")
+	}
+	if uint64(len(plaintext)) > ((1<<32)-2)*uint64(g.cipher.BlockSize()) {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: message too large for GCM")
+	}
+
+	ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(plaintext)+g.tagSize)
+	if alias.InexactOverlap(out, plaintext) {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: invalid buffer overlap")
+	}
+
+	var counter, tagMask [gcmBlockSize]byte
+	g.deriveCounter(&counter, nonce)
+
+	g.cipher.Encrypt(tagMask[:], counter[:])
+	gcmInc32(&counter)
+
+	g.counterCrypt(out, plaintext, &counter)
+
+	var tag [gcmTagSize]byte
+	g.auth(tag[:], out[:len(plaintext)], data, &tagMask)
+	copy(out[len(plaintext):], tag[:])
+
+	return ret
+}
+
+var errOpen = errors.New("cipher: message authentication failed")
+
+func (g *gcm) Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, data []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if len(nonce) != g.nonceSize {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: incorrect nonce length given to GCM")
+	}
+	// Sanity check to prevent the authentication from always succeeding if an implementation
+	// leaves tagSize uninitialized, for example.
+	if g.tagSize < gcmMinimumTagSize {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: incorrect GCM tag size")
+	}
+
+	if len(ciphertext) < g.tagSize {
+		return nil, errOpen
+	}
+	if uint64(len(ciphertext)) > ((1<<32)-2)*uint64(g.cipher.BlockSize())+uint64(g.tagSize) {
+		return nil, errOpen
+	}
+
+	tag := ciphertext[len(ciphertext)-g.tagSize:]
+	ciphertext = ciphertext[:len(ciphertext)-g.tagSize]
+
+	var counter, tagMask [gcmBlockSize]byte
+	g.deriveCounter(&counter, nonce)
+
+	g.cipher.Encrypt(tagMask[:], counter[:])
+	gcmInc32(&counter)
+
+	var expectedTag [gcmTagSize]byte
+	g.auth(expectedTag[:], ciphertext, data, &tagMask)
+
+	ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(ciphertext))
+	if alias.InexactOverlap(out, ciphertext) {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: invalid buffer overlap")
+	}
+
+	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(expectedTag[:g.tagSize], tag) != 1 {
+		// The AESNI code decrypts and authenticates concurrently, and
+		// so overwrites dst in the event of a tag mismatch. That
+		// behavior is mimicked here in order to be consistent across
+		// platforms.
+		for i := range out {
+			out[i] = 0
+		}
+		return nil, errOpen
+	}
+
+	g.counterCrypt(out, ciphertext, &counter)
+
+	return ret, nil
+}
+
+// reverseBits reverses the order of the bits of 4-bit number in i.
+func reverseBits(i int) int {
+	i = ((i << 2) & 0xc) | ((i >> 2) & 0x3)
+	i = ((i << 1) & 0xa) | ((i >> 1) & 0x5)
+	return i
+}
+
+// gcmAdd adds two elements of GF(2¹²⁸) and returns the sum.
+func gcmAdd(x, y *gcmFieldElement) gcmFieldElement {
+	// Addition in a characteristic 2 field is just XOR.
+	return gcmFieldElement{x.low ^ y.low, x.high ^ y.high}
+}
+
+// gcmDouble returns the result of doubling an element of GF(2¹²⁸).
+func gcmDouble(x *gcmFieldElement) (double gcmFieldElement) {
+	msbSet := x.high&1 == 1
+
+	// Because of the bit-ordering, doubling is actually a right shift.
+	double.high = x.high >> 1
+	double.high |= x.low << 63
+	double.low = x.low >> 1
+
+	// If the most-significant bit was set before shifting then it,
+	// conceptually, becomes a term of x^128. This is greater than the
+	// irreducible polynomial so the result has to be reduced. The
+	// irreducible polynomial is 1+x+x^2+x^7+x^128. We can subtract that to
+	// eliminate the term at x^128 which also means subtracting the other
+	// four terms. In characteristic 2 fields, subtraction == addition ==
+	// XOR.
+	if msbSet {
+		double.low ^= 0xe100000000000000
+	}
+
+	return
+}
+
+var gcmReductionTable = []uint16{
+	0x0000, 0x1c20, 0x3840, 0x2460, 0x7080, 0x6ca0, 0x48c0, 0x54e0,
+	0xe100, 0xfd20, 0xd940, 0xc560, 0x9180, 0x8da0, 0xa9c0, 0xb5e0,
+}
+
+// mul sets y to y*H, where H is the GCM key, fixed during NewGCMWithNonceSize.
+func (g *gcm) mul(y *gcmFieldElement) {
+	var z gcmFieldElement
+
+	for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
+		word := y.high
+		if i == 1 {
+			word = y.low
+		}
+
+		// Multiplication works by multiplying z by 16 and adding in
+		// one of the precomputed multiples of H.
+		for j := 0; j < 64; j += 4 {
+			msw := z.high & 0xf
+			z.high >>= 4
+			z.high |= z.low << 60
+			z.low >>= 4
+			z.low ^= uint64(gcmReductionTable[msw]) << 48
+
+			// the values in |table| are ordered for
+			// little-endian bit positions. See the comment
+			// in NewGCMWithNonceSize.
+			t := &g.productTable[word&0xf]
+
+			z.low ^= t.low
+			z.high ^= t.high
+			word >>= 4
+		}
+	}
+
+	*y = z
+}
+
+// updateBlocks extends y with more polynomial terms from blocks, based on
+// Horner's rule. There must be a multiple of gcmBlockSize bytes in blocks.
+func (g *gcm) updateBlocks(y *gcmFieldElement, blocks []byte) {
+	for len(blocks) > 0 {
+		y.low ^= binary.BigEndian.Uint64(blocks)
+		y.high ^= binary.BigEndian.Uint64(blocks[8:])
+		g.mul(y)
+		blocks = blocks[gcmBlockSize:]
+	}
+}
+
+// update extends y with more polynomial terms from data. If data is not a
+// multiple of gcmBlockSize bytes long then the remainder is zero padded.
+func (g *gcm) update(y *gcmFieldElement, data []byte) {
+	fullBlocks := (len(data) >> 4) << 4
+	g.updateBlocks(y, data[:fullBlocks])
+
+	if len(data) != fullBlocks {
+		var partialBlock [gcmBlockSize]byte
+		copy(partialBlock[:], data[fullBlocks:])
+		g.updateBlocks(y, partialBlock[:])
+	}
+}
+
+// gcmInc32 treats the final four bytes of counterBlock as a big-endian value
+// and increments it.
+func gcmInc32(counterBlock *[16]byte) {
+	ctr := counterBlock[len(counterBlock)-4:]
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(ctr, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(ctr)+1)
+}
+
+// sliceForAppend takes a slice and a requested number of bytes. It returns a
+// slice with the contents of the given slice followed by that many bytes and a
+// second slice that aliases into it and contains only the extra bytes. If the
+// original slice has sufficient capacity then no allocation is performed.
+func sliceForAppend(in []byte, n int) (head, tail []byte) {
+	if total := len(in) + n; cap(in) >= total {
+		head = in[:total]
+	} else {
+		head = make([]byte, total)
+		copy(head, in)
+	}
+	tail = head[len(in):]
+	return
+}
+
+// counterCrypt crypts in to out using g.cipher in counter mode.
+func (g *gcm) counterCrypt(out, in []byte, counter *[gcmBlockSize]byte) {
+	var mask [gcmBlockSize]byte
+
+	for len(in) >= gcmBlockSize {
+		g.cipher.Encrypt(mask[:], counter[:])
+		gcmInc32(counter)
+
+		subtle.XORBytes(out, in, mask[:])
+		out = out[gcmBlockSize:]
+		in = in[gcmBlockSize:]
+	}
+
+	if len(in) > 0 {
+		g.cipher.Encrypt(mask[:], counter[:])
+		gcmInc32(counter)
+		subtle.XORBytes(out, in, mask[:])
+	}
+}
+
+// deriveCounter computes the initial GCM counter state from the given nonce.
+// See NIST SP 800-38D, section 7.1. This assumes that counter is filled with
+// zeros on entry.
+func (g *gcm) deriveCounter(counter *[gcmBlockSize]byte, nonce []byte) {
+	// GCM has two modes of operation with respect to the initial counter
+	// state: a "fast path" for 96-bit (12-byte) nonces, and a "slow path"
+	// for nonces of other lengths. For a 96-bit nonce, the nonce, along
+	// with a four-byte big-endian counter starting at one, is used
+	// directly as the starting counter. For other nonce sizes, the counter
+	// is computed by passing it through the GHASH function.
+	if len(nonce) == gcmStandardNonceSize {
+		copy(counter[:], nonce)
+		counter[gcmBlockSize-1] = 1
+	} else {
+		var y gcmFieldElement
+		g.update(&y, nonce)
+		y.high ^= uint64(len(nonce)) * 8
+		g.mul(&y)
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(counter[:8], y.low)
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(counter[8:], y.high)
+	}
+}
+
+// auth calculates GHASH(ciphertext, additionalData), masks the result with
+// tagMask and writes the result to out.
+func (g *gcm) auth(out, ciphertext, additionalData []byte, tagMask *[gcmTagSize]byte) {
+	var y gcmFieldElement
+	g.update(&y, additionalData)
+	g.update(&y, ciphertext)
+
+	y.low ^= uint64(len(additionalData)) * 8
+	y.high ^= uint64(len(ciphertext)) * 8
+
+	g.mul(&y)
+
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(out, y.low)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(out[8:], y.high)
+
+	subtle.XORBytes(out, out, tagMask[:])
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/cipher/gcm_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,656 @@
+// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package cipher_test
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/aes"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"reflect"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+var aesGCMTests = []struct {
+	key, nonce, plaintext, ad, result string
+}{
+	{ // key=16, plaintext=null
+		"11754cd72aec309bf52f7687212e8957",
+		"3c819d9a9bed087615030b65",
+		"",
+		"",
+		"250327c674aaf477aef2675748cf6971",
+	},
+	{ // key=24, plaintext=null
+		"e2e001a36c60d2bf40d69ff5b2b1161ea218db263be16a4e",
+		"3c819d9a9bed087615030b65",
+		"",
+		"",
+		"c7b8da1fe2e3dccc4071ba92a0a57ba8",
+	},
+	{ // key=32, plaintext=null
+		"5394e890d37ba55ec9d5f327f15680f6a63ef5279c79331643ad0af6d2623525",
+		"3c819d9a9bed087615030b65",
+		"",
+		"",
+		"d9b260d4bc4630733ffb642f5ce45726",
+	},
+	{
+		"ca47248ac0b6f8372a97ac43508308ed",
+		"ffd2b598feabc9019262d2be",
+		"",
+		"",
+		"60d20404af527d248d893ae495707d1a",
+	},
+	{
+		"fbe3467cc254f81be8e78d765a2e6333",
+		"c6697351ff4aec29cdbaabf2",
+		"",
+		"67",
+		"3659cdc25288bf499ac736c03bfc1159",
+	},
+	{
+		"8a7f9d80d08ad0bd5a20fb689c88f9fc",
+		"88b7b27d800937fda4f47301",
+		"",
+		"50edd0503e0d7b8c91608eb5a1",
+		"ed6f65322a4740011f91d2aae22dd44e",
+	},
+	{
+		"051758e95ed4abb2cdc69bb454110e82",
+		"c99a66320db73158a35a255d",
+		"",
+		"67c6697351ff4aec29cdbaabf2fbe3467cc254f81be8e78d765a2e63339f",
+		"6ce77f1a5616c505b6aec09420234036",
+	},
+	{
+		"77be63708971c4e240d1cb79e8d77feb",
+		"e0e00f19fed7ba0136a797f3",
+		"",
+		"7a43ec1d9c0a5a78a0b16533a6213cab",
+		"209fcc8d3675ed938e9c7166709dd946",
+	},
+	{
+		"7680c5d3ca6154758e510f4d25b98820",
+		"f8f105f9c3df4965780321f8",
+		"",
+		"c94c410194c765e3dcc7964379758ed3",
+		"94dca8edfcf90bb74b153c8d48a17930",
+	},
+
+	{ // key=16, plaintext=16
+		"7fddb57453c241d03efbed3ac44e371c",
+		"ee283a3fc75575e33efd4887",
+		"d5de42b461646c255c87bd2962d3b9a2",
+		"",
+		"2ccda4a5415cb91e135c2a0f78c9b2fdb36d1df9b9d5e596f83e8b7f52971cb3",
+	},
+	{
+		"ab72c77b97cb5fe9a382d9fe81ffdbed",
+		"54cc7dc2c37ec006bcc6d1da",
+		"007c5e5b3e59df24a7c355584fc1518d",
+		"",
+		"0e1bde206a07a9c2c1b65300f8c649972b4401346697138c7a4891ee59867d0c",
+	},
+	{ // key=24, plaintext=16
+		"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c",
+		"54cc7dc2c37ec006bcc6d1da",
+		"007c5e5b3e59df24a7c355584fc1518d",
+		"",
+		"7bd53594c28b6c6596feb240199cad4c9badb907fd65bde541b8df3bd444d3a8",
+	},
+	{ // key=32, plaintext=16
+		"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308",
+		"54cc7dc2c37ec006bcc6d1da",
+		"007c5e5b3e59df24a7c355584fc1518d",
+		"",
+		"d50b9e252b70945d4240d351677eb10f937cdaef6f2822b6a3191654ba41b197",
+	},
+	{ // key=16, plaintext=23
+		"ab72c77b97cb5fe9a382d9fe81ffdbed",
+		"54cc7dc2c37ec006bcc6d1da",
+		"007c5e5b3e59df24a7c355584fc1518dabcdefab",
+		"",
+		"0e1bde206a07a9c2c1b65300f8c64997b73381a6ff6bc24c5146fbd73361f4fe",
+	},
+	{ // key=24, plaintext=23
+		"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c",
+		"54cc7dc2c37ec006bcc6d1da",
+		"007c5e5b3e59df24a7c355584fc1518dabcdefab",
+		"",
+		"7bd53594c28b6c6596feb240199cad4c23b86a96d423cffa929e68541dc16b28",
+	},
+	{ // key=32, plaintext=23
+		"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308",
+		"54cc7dc2c37ec006bcc6d1da",
+		"007c5e5b3e59df24a7c355584fc1518dabcdefab",
+		"",
+		"d50b9e252b70945d4240d351677eb10f27fd385388ad3b72b96a2d5dea1240ae",
+	},
+
+	{ // key=16, plaintext=51
+		"fe47fcce5fc32665d2ae399e4eec72ba",
+		"5adb9609dbaeb58cbd6e7275",
+		"7c0e88c88899a779228465074797cd4c2e1498d259b54390b85e3eef1c02df60e743f1b840382c4bccaf3bafb4ca8429bea063",
+		"88319d6e1d3ffa5f987199166c8a9b56c2aeba5a",
+		"98f4826f05a265e6dd2be82db241c0fbbbf9ffb1c173aa83964b7cf5393043736365253ddbc5db8778371495da76d269e5db3e291ef1982e4defedaa2249f898556b47",
+	},
+	{
+		"ec0c2ba17aa95cd6afffe949da9cc3a8",
+		"296bce5b50b7d66096d627ef",
+		"b85b3753535b825cbe5f632c0b843c741351f18aa484281aebec2f45bb9eea2d79d987b764b9611f6c0f8641843d5d58f3a242",
+		"f8d00f05d22bf68599bcdeb131292ad6e2df5d14",
+		"a7443d31c26bdf2a1c945e29ee4bd344a99cfaf3aa71f8b3f191f83c2adfc7a07162995506fde6309ffc19e716eddf1a828c5a890147971946b627c40016da1ecf3e77",
+	},
+	{
+		"2c1f21cf0f6fb3661943155c3e3d8492",
+		"23cb5ff362e22426984d1907",
+		"42f758836986954db44bf37c6ef5e4ac0adaf38f27252a1b82d02ea949c8a1a2dbc0d68b5615ba7c1220ff6510e259f06655d8",
+		"5d3624879d35e46849953e45a32a624d6a6c536ed9857c613b572b0333e701557a713e3f010ecdf9a6bd6c9e3e44b065208645aff4aabee611b391528514170084ccf587177f4488f33cfb5e979e42b6e1cfc0a60238982a7aec",
+		"81824f0e0d523db30d3da369fdc0d60894c7a0a20646dd015073ad2732bd989b14a222b6ad57af43e1895df9dca2a5344a62cc57a3ee28136e94c74838997ae9823f3a",
+	},
+	{
+		"d9f7d2411091f947b4d6f1e2d1f0fb2e",
+		"e1934f5db57cc983e6b180e7",
+		"73ed042327f70fe9c572a61545eda8b2a0c6e1d6c291ef19248e973aee6c312012f490c2c6f6166f4a59431e182663fcaea05a",
+		"0a8a18a7150e940c3d87b38e73baee9a5c049ee21795663e264b694a949822b639092d0e67015e86363583fcf0ca645af9f43375f05fdb4ce84f411dcbca73c2220dea03a20115d2e51398344b16bee1ed7c499b353d6c597af8",
+		"aaadbd5c92e9151ce3db7210b8714126b73e43436d242677afa50384f2149b831f1d573c7891c2a91fbc48db29967ec9542b2321b51ca862cb637cdd03b99a0f93b134",
+	},
+	{ //key=24 plaintext=51
+		"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c",
+		"e1934f5db57cc983e6b180e7",
+		"73ed042327f70fe9c572a61545eda8b2a0c6e1d6c291ef19248e973aee6c312012f490c2c6f6166f4a59431e182663fcaea05a",
+		"0a8a18a7150e940c3d87b38e73baee9a5c049ee21795663e264b694a949822b639092d0e67015e86363583fcf0ca645af9f43375f05fdb4ce84f411dcbca73c2220dea03a20115d2e51398344b16bee1ed7c499b353d6c597af8",
+		"0736378955001d50773305975b3a534a4cd3614dd7300916301ae508cb7b45aa16e79435ca16b5557bcad5991bc52b971806863b15dc0b055748919b8ee91bc8477f68",
+	},
+	{ //key-32 plaintext=51
+		"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308",
+		"e1934f5db57cc983e6b180e7",
+		"73ed042327f70fe9c572a61545eda8b2a0c6e1d6c291ef19248e973aee6c312012f490c2c6f6166f4a59431e182663fcaea05a",
+		"0a8a18a7150e940c3d87b38e73baee9a5c049ee21795663e264b694a949822b639092d0e67015e86363583fcf0ca645af9f43375f05fdb4ce84f411dcbca73c2220dea03a20115d2e51398344b16bee1ed7c499b353d6c597af8",
+		"fc1ae2b5dcd2c4176c3f538b4c3cc21197f79e608cc3730167936382e4b1e5a7b75ae1678bcebd876705477eb0e0fdbbcda92fb9a0dc58c8d8f84fb590e0422e6077ef",
+	},
+	{ //key=16 plaintext=138
+		"d9f7d2411091f947b4d6f1e2d1f0fb2e",
+		"e1934f5db57cc983e6b180e7",
+		"67c6697351ff4aec29cdbaabf2fbe3467cc254f81be8e78d765a2e63339fc99a66320db73158a35a255d051758e95ed4abb2cdc69bb454110e827441213ddc8770e93ea141e1fc673e017e97eadc6b968f385c2aecb03bfb32af3c54ec18db5c021afe43fbfaaa3afb29d1e6053c7c9475d8be6189f95cbba8990f95b1ebf1b3aabbccddee",
+		"0a8a18a7150e940c3d87b38e73baee9a5c049ee21795663e264b694a949822b639092d0e67015e86363583fcf0ca645af9f43375f05fdb4ce84f411dcbca73c2220dea03a20115d2e51398344b16bee1ed7c499b353d6c597af8",
+		"be86d00ce4e150190f646eae0f670ad26b3af66db45d2ee3fd71badd2fe763396bdbca498f3f779c70b80ed2695943e15139b406e5147b3855a1441dfb7bd64954b581e3db0ddf26b1c759e2276a4c18a8e4ad4b890f473e61c78e60074bd0633961e87e66d0a1be77c51ab6b9bb3318ccdd43794ffc18a03a83c1d368eeea590a13407c7ef48efc66e26047f3ab9deed0412ce89e",
+	},
+	{ //key=24 plaintext=138
+		"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c",
+		"e1934f5db57cc983e6b180e7",
+		"67c6697351ff4aec29cdbaabf2fbe3467cc254f81be8e78d765a2e63339fc99a66320db73158a35a255d051758e95ed4abb2cdc69bb454110e827441213ddc8770e93ea141e1fc673e017e97eadc6b968f385c2aecb03bfb32af3c54ec18db5c021afe43fbfaaa3afb29d1e6053c7c9475d8be6189f95cbba8990f95b1ebf1b3aabbccddee",
+		"0a8a18a7150e940c3d87b38e73baee9a5c049ee21795663e264b694a949822b639092d0e67015e86363583fcf0ca645af9f43375f05fdb4ce84f411dcbca73c2220dea03a20115d2e51398344b16bee1ed7c499b353d6c597af8",
+		"131d5ad9230858559b8c1929ec2c18be90d7d4630e49018262ce5c511688bd10622109403db8006014ce93905b0a16bf1d1411acc9e14edf09518bd5967ff4bc202805d4c2810810a093e996a0f56c9a3e3e593c783f68528c1a282ff6f4925902bb2b3d4cdd04b873663bf5fd9dd53b5df462e0424d038f249b10a99c0523200f8c92c3e8a178a25ee8e23b71308c88ec2cfe047e",
+	},
+	{ //key-32 plaintext=138
+		"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308",
+		"e1934f5db57cc983e6b180e7",
+		"67c6697351ff4aec29cdbaabf2fbe3467cc254f81be8e78d765a2e63339fc99a66320db73158a35a255d051758e95ed4abb2cdc69bb454110e827441213ddc8770e93ea141e1fc673e017e97eadc6b968f385c2aecb03bfb32af3c54ec18db5c021afe43fbfaaa3afb29d1e6053c7c9475d8be6189f95cbba8990f95b1ebf1b3aabbccddee",
+		"0a8a18a7150e940c3d87b38e73baee9a5c049ee21795663e264b694a949822b639092d0e67015e86363583fcf0ca645af9f43375f05fdb4ce84f411dcbca73c2220dea03a20115d2e51398344b16bee1ed7c499b353d6c597af8",
+		"e8318fe5aada811280804f35fb2a89e54bf32b4e55ba7b953547dadb39421d1dc39c7c127c6008b208010177f02fc093c8bbb8b3834d0e060d96dda96ba386c7c01224a4cac1edebffda4f9a64692bfbffb9f7c2999069fab84205224978a10d815d5ab8fa31e4e11630ba01c3b6cb99bef5772357ce86b83b4fb45ea7146402d560b6ad07de635b9366865e788a6bcdb132dcd079",
+	},
+	{ // key=16, plaintext=13
+		"fe9bb47deb3a61e423c2231841cfd1fb",
+		"4d328eb776f500a2f7fb47aa",
+		"f1cc3818e421876bb6b8bbd6c9",
+		"",
+		"b88c5c1977b35b517b0aeae96743fd4727fe5cdb4b5b42818dea7ef8c9",
+	},
+	{ // key=16, plaintext=13
+		"6703df3701a7f54911ca72e24dca046a",
+		"12823ab601c350ea4bc2488c",
+		"793cd125b0b84a043e3ac67717",
+		"",
+		"b2051c80014f42f08735a7b0cd38e6bcd29962e5f2c13626b85a877101",
+	},
+	{ // key=24, plaintext=13
+		"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c",
+		"12823ab601c350ea4bc2488c",
+		"793cd125b0b84a043e3ac67717",
+		"",
+		"e888c2f438caedd4189d26c59f53439b8a7caec29e98c33ebf7e5712d6",
+	},
+	{ // key=32, plaintext=13
+		"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308",
+		"12823ab601c350ea4bc2488c",
+		"793cd125b0b84a043e3ac67717",
+		"",
+		"e796c39074c7783a38193e3f8d46b355adacca7198d16d879fbfeac6e3",
+	},
+
+	// These cases test non-standard nonce sizes.
+	{ // key=16, plaintext=0
+		"1672c3537afa82004c6b8a46f6f0d026",
+		"05",
+		"",
+		"",
+		"8e2ad721f9455f74d8b53d3141f27e8e",
+	},
+	{ //key=16, plaintext=32
+		"9a4fea86a621a91ab371e492457796c0",
+		"75",
+		"ca6131faf0ff210e4e693d6c31c109fc5b6f54224eb120f37de31dc59ec669b6",
+		"4f6e2585c161f05a9ae1f2f894e9f0ab52b45d0f",
+		"5698c0a384241d30004290aac56bb3ece6fe8eacc5c4be98954deb9c3ff6aebf5d50e1af100509e1fba2a5e8a0af9670",
+	},
+	{ //key=24, plaintext=32
+		"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c",
+		"75",
+		"ca6131faf0ff210e4e693d6c31c109fc5b6f54224eb120f37de31dc59ec669b6",
+		"4f6e2585c161f05a9ae1f2f894e9f0ab52b45d0f",
+		"2709b357ec8334a074dbd5c4c352b216cfd1c8bd66343c5d43bfc6bd3b2b6cd0e3a82315d56ea5e4961c9ef3bc7e4042",
+	},
+	{ //key=32, plaintext=32
+		"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308",
+		"75",
+		"ca6131faf0ff210e4e693d6c31c109fc5b6f54224eb120f37de31dc59ec669b6",
+		"4f6e2585c161f05a9ae1f2f894e9f0ab52b45d0f",
+		"d73bebe722c5e312fe910ba71d5a6a063a4297203f819103dfa885a8076d095545a999affde3dbac2b5be6be39195ed0",
+	},
+	{ // key=16, plaintext=0
+		"d0f1f4defa1e8c08b4b26d576392027c",
+		"42b4f01eb9f5a1ea5b1eb73b0fb0baed54f387ecaa0393c7d7dffc6af50146ecc021abf7eb9038d4303d91f8d741a11743166c0860208bcc02c6258fd9511a2fa626f96d60b72fcff773af4e88e7a923506e4916ecbd814651e9f445adef4ad6a6b6c7290cc13b956130eef5b837c939fcac0cbbcc9656cd75b13823ee5acdac",
+		"",
+		"",
+		"7ab49b57ddf5f62c427950111c5c4f0d",
+	},
+	{ //key=16, plaintext=13
+		"4a0c00a3d284dea9d4bf8b8dde86685e",
+		"f8cbe82588e784bcacbe092cd9089b51e01527297f635bf294b3aa787d91057ef23869789698ac960707857f163ecb242135a228ad93964f5dc4a4d7f88fd7b3b07dd0a5b37f9768fb05a523639f108c34c661498a56879e501a2321c8a4a94d7e1b89db255ac1f685e185263368e99735ebe62a7f2931b47282be8eb165e4d7",
+		"6d4bf87640a6a48a50d28797b7",
+		"8d8c7ffc55086d539b5a8f0d1232654c",
+		"0d803ec309482f35b8e6226f2b56303239298e06b281c2d51aaba3c125",
+	},
+	{ //key=16, plaintext=128
+		"0e18a844ac5bf38e4cd72d9b0942e506",
+		"0870d4b28a2954489a0abcd5",
+		"67c6697351ff4aec29cdbaabf2fbe3467cc254f81be8e78d765a2e63339fc99a66320db73158a35a255d051758e95ed4abb2cdc69bb454110e827441213ddc8770e93ea141e1fc673e017e97eadc6b968f385c2aecb03bfb32af3c54ec18db5c021afe43fbfaaa3afb29d1e6053c7c9475d8be6189f95cbba8990f95b1ebf1b3",
+		"05eff700e9a13ae5ca0bcbd0484764bd1f231ea81c7b64c514735ac55e4b79633b706424119e09dcaad4acf21b10af3b33cde3504847155cbb6f2219ba9b7df50be11a1c7f23f829f8a41b13b5ca4ee8983238e0794d3d34bc5f4e77facb6c05ac86212baa1a55a2be70b5733b045cd33694b3afe2f0e49e4f321549fd824ea9",
+		"cace28f4976afd72e3c5128167eb788fbf6634dda0a2f53148d00f6fa557f5e9e8f736c12e450894af56cb67f7d99e1027258c8571bd91ee3b7360e0d508aa1f382411a16115f9c05251cc326d4016f62e0eb8151c048465b0c6c8ff12558d43310e18b2cb1889eec91557ce21ba05955cf4c1d4847aadfb1b0a83f3a3b82b7efa62a5f03c5d6eda381a85dd78dbc55c",
+	},
+	{ //key=24, plaintext=128
+		"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c",
+		"0870d4b28a2954489a0abcd5",
+		"67c6697351ff4aec29cdbaabf2fbe3467cc254f81be8e78d765a2e63339fc99a66320db73158a35a255d051758e95ed4abb2cdc69bb454110e827441213ddc8770e93ea141e1fc673e017e97eadc6b968f385c2aecb03bfb32af3c54ec18db5c021afe43fbfaaa3afb29d1e6053c7c9475d8be6189f95cbba8990f95b1ebf1b3",
+		"05eff700e9a13ae5ca0bcbd0484764bd1f231ea81c7b64c514735ac55e4b79633b706424119e09dcaad4acf21b10af3b33cde3504847155cbb6f2219ba9b7df50be11a1c7f23f829f8a41b13b5ca4ee8983238e0794d3d34bc5f4e77facb6c05ac86212baa1a55a2be70b5733b045cd33694b3afe2f0e49e4f321549fd824ea9",
+		"303157d398376a8d51e39eabdd397f45b65f81f09acbe51c726ae85867e1675cad178580bb31c7f37c1af3644bd36ac436e9459139a4903d95944f306e415da709134dccde9d2b2d7d196b6740c196d9d10caa45296cf577a6e15d7ddf3576c20c503617d6a9e6b6d2be09ae28410a1210700a463a5b3b8d391abe9dac217e76a6f78306b5ebe759a5986b7d6682db0b",
+	},
+	{ //key=32, plaintext=128
+		"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308",
+		"0870d4b28a2954489a0abcd5",
+		"67c6697351ff4aec29cdbaabf2fbe3467cc254f81be8e78d765a2e63339fc99a66320db73158a35a255d051758e95ed4abb2cdc69bb454110e827441213ddc8770e93ea141e1fc673e017e97eadc6b968f385c2aecb03bfb32af3c54ec18db5c021afe43fbfaaa3afb29d1e6053c7c9475d8be6189f95cbba8990f95b1ebf1b3",
+		"05eff700e9a13ae5ca0bcbd0484764bd1f231ea81c7b64c514735ac55e4b79633b706424119e09dcaad4acf21b10af3b33cde3504847155cbb6f2219ba9b7df50be11a1c7f23f829f8a41b13b5ca4ee8983238e0794d3d34bc5f4e77facb6c05ac86212baa1a55a2be70b5733b045cd33694b3afe2f0e49e4f321549fd824ea9",
+		"e4f13934744125b9c35935ed4c5ac7d0c16434d52eadef1da91c6abb62bc757f01e3e42f628f030d750826adceb961f0675b81de48376b181d8781c6a0ccd0f34872ef6901b97ff7c2e152426b3257fb91f6a43f47befaaf7a2136fd0c97de8c48517ce047a5641141092c717b151b44f0794a164b5861f0a77271d1bdbc332e9e43d3b9828ccfdbd4ae338da5baf7a9",
+	},
+
+	{ //key=16, plaintext=512
+		"1f6c3a3bc0542aabba4ef8f6c7169e73",
+		"f3584606472b260e0dd2ebb2",
+		"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",
+		"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",
+		"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",
+	},
+	{ //key=24, plaintext=512
+		"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c",
+		"f3584606472b260e0dd2ebb2",
+		"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",
+		"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",
+		"9daa466c7174dfde72b435fb6041ed7ff8ab8b1b96edb90437c3cc2e7e8a7c2c3629bae3bcaede99ee926ef4c55571e504e1c516975f6c719611c4da74acc23bbc79b3a67491f84d573e0293aa0cf5d775dde93fc466d5babd3e93a6506c0261021ac184f571ab190df83c32b41a67eaaa8dde27c02b08f15cabc75e46d1f9634f32f9233b2cb975386ff3a5e16b6ea2e2e4215cb33beb4de39a861d7f4a02165cd763f8252b2d60ac45d65a70735a8806a8fec3ca9d37c2cdcb21d2bd5c08d350e4bbdfb11dca344b9bee17e71ee0df3449fd9f9581c6b5483843b457534afb4240585f38ac22aa59a68a167fed6f1be0a5b072b2461f16c976b9aa0f5f2f5988818b01faa025ac7788212d92d222f7c14fe6e8f644c8cd117bb8def5a0217dad4f05cbb334ff9ccf819a4a085ed7c19928ddc40edc931b47339f456ccd423b5c0c1cdc96278006b29de945cdceb0737771e14562fff2aba40606f6046da5031647308682060412812317962bb68be3b42876f0905d52da51ec6345677fe86613828f488cc5685a4b973e48babd109a56d1a1effb286133dc2a94b4ada5707d3a7825941fea1a7502693afc7fe5d810bb0050d98aa6b80801e13b563954a35c31f57d5ba1ddb1a2be26426e2fe7bcd13ba183d80ac1c556b7ec2069b01de1450431a1c2e27848e1f5f4af013bce9080aebd2bb0f1de9f7bb460771c266d48ff4cf84a66f82630657db861c032971079",
+	},
+	{ //key=32, plaintext=512
+		"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308",
+		"f3584606472b260e0dd2ebb2",
+		"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",
+		"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",
+		"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",
+	},
+
+	{ //key=16, plaintext=293
+		"0795d80bc7f40f4d41c280271a2e4f7f",
+		"ff824c906594aff365d3cb1f",
+		"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",
+		"98a47a430d8fd74dc1829a91e3481f8ed024d8ba34c9b903321b04864db333e558ae28653dffb2",
+		"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",
+	},
+	{ //key=24, plaintext=293
+		"e2e001a36c60d2bf40d69ff5b2b1161ea218db263be16a4e",
+		"84230643130d05425826641e",
+		"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",
+		"d5d7316b8fdee152942148bff007c22e4b2022c6bc7be3c18c5f2e52e004e0b5dc12206bf002bd",
+		"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",
+	},
+	{ //key=32, plaintext=293
+		"5394e890d37ba55ec9d5f327f15680f6a63ef5279c79331643ad0af6d2623525",
+		"815e840b7aca7af3b324583f",
+		"8e63067cd15359f796b43c68f093f55fdf3589fc5f2fdfad5f9d156668a617f7091d73da71cdd207810e6f71a165d0809a597df9885ca6e8f9bb4e616166586b83cc45f49917fc1a256b8bc7d05c476ab5c4633e20092619c4747b26dad3915e9fd65238ee4e5213badeda8a3a22f5efe6582d0762532026c89b4ca26fdd000eb45347a2a199b55b7790e6b1b2dba19833ce9f9522c0bcea5b088ccae68dd99ae0203c81b9f1dd3181c3e2339e83ccd1526b67742b235e872bea5111772aab574ae7d904d9b6355a79178e179b5ae8edc54f61f172bf789ea9c9af21f45b783e4251421b077776808f04972a5e801723cf781442378ce0e0568f014aea7a882dcbcb48d342be53d1c2ebfb206b12443a8a587cc1e55ca23beca385d61d0d03e9d84cbc1b0a",
+		"0feccdfae8ed65fa31a0858a1c466f79e8aa658c2f3ba93c3f92158b4e30955e1c62580450beff",
+		"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",
+	},
+	// These cases test non-standard tag sizes.
+	{
+		"89c54b0d3bc3c397d5039058c220685f",
+		"bc7f45c00868758d62d4bb4d",
+		"582670b0baf5540a3775b6615605bd05",
+		"48d16cda0337105a50e2ed76fd18e114",
+		"fc2d4c4eee2209ddbba6663c02765e6955e783b00156f5da0446e2970b877f",
+	},
+	{
+		"bad6049678bf75c9087b3e3ae7e72c13",
+		"a0a017b83a67d8f1b883e561",
+		"a1be93012f05a1958440f74a5311f4a1",
+		"f7c27b51d5367161dc2ff1e9e3edc6f2",
+		"36f032f7e3dc3275ca22aedcdc68436b99a2227f8bb69d45ea5d8842cd08",
+	},
+	{
+		"66a3c722ccf9709525650973ecc100a9",
+		"1621d42d3a6d42a2d2bf9494",
+		"61fa9dbbed2190fbc2ffabf5d2ea4ff8",
+		"d7a9b6523b8827068a6354a6d166c6b9",
+		"fef3b20f40e08a49637cc82f4c89b8603fd5c0132acfab97b5fff651c4",
+	},
+	{
+		"562ae8aadb8d23e0f271a99a7d1bd4d1",
+		"f7a5e2399413b89b6ad31aff",
+		"bbdc3504d803682aa08a773cde5f231a",
+		"2b9680b886b3efb7c6354b38c63b5373",
+		"e2b7e5ed5ff27fc8664148f5a628a46dcbf2015184fffb82f2651c36",
+	},
+	{
+		"11754cd72aec309bf52f7687212e8957",
+		"",
+		"",
+		"",
+		"250327c674aaf477aef2675748cf6971",
+	},
+}
+
+func TestAESGCM(t *testing.T) {
+	for i, test := range aesGCMTests {
+		key, _ := hex.DecodeString(test.key)
+		aes, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+
+		nonce, _ := hex.DecodeString(test.nonce)
+		plaintext, _ := hex.DecodeString(test.plaintext)
+		ad, _ := hex.DecodeString(test.ad)
+		tagSize := (len(test.result) - len(test.plaintext)) / 2
+
+		var aesgcm cipher.AEAD
+		switch {
+		// Handle non-standard tag sizes
+		case tagSize != 16:
+			aesgcm, err = cipher.NewGCMWithTagSize(aes, tagSize)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+
+		// Handle 0 nonce size (expect error and continue)
+		case len(nonce) == 0:
+			aesgcm, err = cipher.NewGCMWithNonceSize(aes, 0)
+			if err == nil {
+				t.Fatal("expected error for zero nonce size")
+			}
+			continue
+
+		// Handle non-standard nonce sizes
+		case len(nonce) != 12:
+			aesgcm, err = cipher.NewGCMWithNonceSize(aes, len(nonce))
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+
+		default:
+			aesgcm, err = cipher.NewGCM(aes)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+		}
+
+		ct := aesgcm.Seal(nil, nonce, plaintext, ad)
+		if ctHex := hex.EncodeToString(ct); ctHex != test.result {
+			t.Errorf("#%d: got %s, want %s", i, ctHex, test.result)
+			continue
+		}
+
+		plaintext2, err := aesgcm.Open(nil, nonce, ct, ad)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("#%d: Open failed", i)
+			continue
+		}
+
+		if !bytes.Equal(plaintext, plaintext2) {
+			t.Errorf("#%d: plaintext's don't match: got %x vs %x", i, plaintext2, plaintext)
+			continue
+		}
+
+		if len(ad) > 0 {
+			ad[0] ^= 0x80
+			if _, err := aesgcm.Open(nil, nonce, ct, ad); err == nil {
+				t.Errorf("#%d: Open was successful after altering additional data", i)
+			}
+			ad[0] ^= 0x80
+		}
+
+		nonce[0] ^= 0x80
+		if _, err := aesgcm.Open(nil, nonce, ct, ad); err == nil {
+			t.Errorf("#%d: Open was successful after altering nonce", i)
+		}
+		nonce[0] ^= 0x80
+
+		ct[0] ^= 0x80
+		if _, err := aesgcm.Open(nil, nonce, ct, ad); err == nil {
+			t.Errorf("#%d: Open was successful after altering ciphertext", i)
+		}
+		ct[0] ^= 0x80
+	}
+}
+
+func TestGCMInvalidTagSize(t *testing.T) {
+	key, _ := hex.DecodeString("ab72c77b97cb5fe9a382d9fe81ffdbed")
+
+	aes, _ := aes.NewCipher(key)
+
+	for _, tagSize := range []int{0, 1, aes.BlockSize() + 1} {
+		aesgcm, err := cipher.NewGCMWithTagSize(aes, tagSize)
+		if aesgcm != nil || err == nil {
+			t.Fatalf("NewGCMWithNonceAndTagSize was successful with an invalid %d-byte tag size", tagSize)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestTagFailureOverwrite(t *testing.T) {
+	// The AESNI GCM code decrypts and authenticates concurrently and so
+	// overwrites the output buffer before checking the authentication tag.
+	// In order to be consistent across platforms, all implementations
+	// should do this and this test checks that.
+
+	key, _ := hex.DecodeString("ab72c77b97cb5fe9a382d9fe81ffdbed")
+	nonce, _ := hex.DecodeString("54cc7dc2c37ec006bcc6d1db")
+	ciphertext, _ := hex.DecodeString("0e1bde206a07a9c2c1b65300f8c649972b4401346697138c7a4891ee59867d0c")
+
+	aes, _ := aes.NewCipher(key)
+	aesgcm, _ := cipher.NewGCM(aes)
+
+	dst := make([]byte, len(ciphertext)-16)
+	for i := range dst {
+		dst[i] = 42
+	}
+
+	result, err := aesgcm.Open(dst[:0], nonce, ciphertext, nil)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("Bad Open still resulted in nil error.")
+	}
+
+	if result != nil {
+		t.Fatal("Failed Open returned non-nil result.")
+	}
+
+	for i := range dst {
+		if dst[i] != 0 {
+			t.Fatal("Failed Open didn't zero dst buffer")
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestGCMCounterWrap(t *testing.T) {
+	// Test that the last 32-bits of the counter wrap correctly.
+	tests := []struct {
+		nonce, tag string
+	}{
+		{"0fa72e25", "37e1948cdfff09fbde0c40ad99fee4a7"},   // counter: 7eb59e4d961dad0dfdd75aaffffffff0
+		{"afe05cc1", "438f3aa9fee5e54903b1927bca26bbdf"},   // counter: 75d492a7e6e6bfc979ad3a8ffffffff4
+		{"9ffecbef", "7b88ca424df9703e9e8611071ec7e16e"},   // counter: c8bb108b0ecdc71747b9d57ffffffff5
+		{"ffc3e5b3", "38d49c86e0abe853ac250e66da54c01a"},   // counter: 706414d2de9b36ab3b900a9ffffffff6
+		{"cfdd729d", "e08402eaac36a1a402e09b1bd56500e8"},   // counter: cd0b96fe36b04e750584e56ffffffff7
+		{"010ae3d486", "5405bb490b1f95d01e2ba735687154bc"}, // counter: e36c18e69406c49722808104fffffff8
+		{"01b1107a9d", "939a585f342e01e17844627492d44dbf"}, // counter: e6d56eaf9127912b6d62c6dcffffffff
+	}
+	key, err := aes.NewCipher(make([]byte, 16))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	plaintext := make([]byte, 16*17+1)
+	for i, test := range tests {
+		nonce, _ := hex.DecodeString(test.nonce)
+		want, _ := hex.DecodeString(test.tag)
+		aead, err := cipher.NewGCMWithNonceSize(key, len(nonce))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		got := aead.Seal(nil, nonce, plaintext, nil)
+		if !bytes.Equal(got[len(plaintext):], want) {
+			t.Errorf("test[%v]: got: %x, want: %x", i, got[len(plaintext):], want)
+		}
+		_, err = aead.Open(nil, nonce, got, nil)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("test[%v]: authentication failed", i)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+var _ cipher.Block = (*wrapper)(nil)
+
+type wrapper struct {
+	block cipher.Block
+}
+
+func (w *wrapper) BlockSize() int          { return w.block.BlockSize() }
+func (w *wrapper) Encrypt(dst, src []byte) { w.block.Encrypt(dst, src) }
+func (w *wrapper) Decrypt(dst, src []byte) { w.block.Decrypt(dst, src) }
+
+// wrap wraps the Block interface so that it does not fulfill
+// any optimizing interfaces such as gcmAble.
+func wrap(b cipher.Block) cipher.Block {
+	return &wrapper{b}
+}
+
+func TestGCMAsm(t *testing.T) {
+	// Create a new pair of AEADs, one using the assembly implementation
+	// and one using the generic Go implementation.
+	newAESGCM := func(key []byte) (asm, generic cipher.AEAD, err error) {
+		block, err := aes.NewCipher(key[:])
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, nil, err
+		}
+		asm, err = cipher.NewGCM(block)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, nil, err
+		}
+		generic, err = cipher.NewGCM(wrap(block))
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, nil, err
+		}
+		return asm, generic, nil
+	}
+
+	// check for assembly implementation
+	var key [16]byte
+	asm, generic, err := newAESGCM(key[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if reflect.TypeOf(asm) == reflect.TypeOf(generic) {
+		t.Skipf("no assembly implementation of GCM")
+	}
+
+	// generate permutations
+	type pair struct{ align, length int }
+	lengths := []int{0, 156, 8192, 8193, 8208}
+	keySizes := []int{16, 24, 32}
+	alignments := []int{0, 1, 2, 3}
+	if testing.Short() {
+		keySizes = []int{16}
+		alignments = []int{1}
+	}
+	perms := make([]pair, 0)
+	for _, l := range lengths {
+		for _, a := range alignments {
+			if a != 0 && l == 0 {
+				continue
+			}
+			perms = append(perms, pair{align: a, length: l})
+		}
+	}
+
+	// run test for all permutations
+	test := func(ks int, pt, ad []byte) error {
+		key := make([]byte, ks)
+		if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, key); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		asm, generic, err := newAESGCM(key)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, pt); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, ad); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		nonce := make([]byte, 12)
+		if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, nonce); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		want := generic.Seal(nil, nonce, pt, ad)
+		got := asm.Seal(nil, nonce, pt, ad)
+		if !bytes.Equal(want, got) {
+			return errors.New("incorrect Seal output")
+		}
+		got, err = asm.Open(nil, nonce, want, ad)
+		if err != nil {
+			return errors.New("authentication failed")
+		}
+		if !bytes.Equal(pt, got) {
+			return errors.New("incorrect Open output")
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	for _, a := range perms {
+		ad := make([]byte, a.align+a.length)
+		ad = ad[a.align:]
+		for _, p := range perms {
+			pt := make([]byte, p.align+p.length)
+			pt = pt[p.align:]
+			for _, ks := range keySizes {
+				if err := test(ks, pt, ad); err != nil {
+					t.Error(err)
+					t.Errorf("	key size: %v", ks)
+					t.Errorf("	plaintext alignment: %v", p.align)
+					t.Errorf("	plaintext length: %v", p.length)
+					t.Errorf("	additionalData alignment: %v", a.align)
+					t.Fatalf("	additionalData length: %v", a.length)
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/cipher/io.go

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package cipher
+
+import "io"
+
+// The Stream* objects are so simple that all their members are public. Users
+// can create them themselves.
+
+// StreamReader wraps a [Stream] into an [io.Reader]. It calls XORKeyStream
+// to process each slice of data which passes through.
+type StreamReader struct {
+	S Stream
+	R io.Reader
+}
+
+func (r StreamReader) Read(dst []byte) (n int, err error) {
+	n, err = r.R.Read(dst)
+	r.S.XORKeyStream(dst[:n], dst[:n])
+	return
+}
+
+// StreamWriter wraps a [Stream] into an io.Writer. It calls XORKeyStream
+// to process each slice of data which passes through. If any [StreamWriter.Write]
+// call returns short then the StreamWriter is out of sync and must be discarded.
+// A StreamWriter has no internal buffering; [StreamWriter.Close] does not need
+// to be called to flush write data.
+type StreamWriter struct {
+	S   Stream
+	W   io.Writer
+	Err error // unused
+}
+
+func (w StreamWriter) Write(src []byte) (n int, err error) {
+	c := make([]byte, len(src))
+	w.S.XORKeyStream(c, src)
+	n, err = w.W.Write(c)
+	if n != len(src) && err == nil { // should never happen
+		err = io.ErrShortWrite
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// Close closes the underlying Writer and returns its Close return value, if the Writer
+// is also an io.Closer. Otherwise it returns nil.
+func (w StreamWriter) Close() error {
+	if c, ok := w.W.(io.Closer); ok {
+		return c.Close()
+	}
+	return nil
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/cipher/ofb.go

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// OFB (Output Feedback) Mode.
+
+package cipher
+
+import (
+	"crypto/internal/alias"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+)
+
+type ofb struct {
+	b       Block
+	cipher  []byte
+	out     []byte
+	outUsed int
+}
+
+// NewOFB returns a [Stream] that encrypts or decrypts using the block cipher b
+// in output feedback mode. The initialization vector iv's length must be equal
+// to b's block size.
+func NewOFB(b Block, iv []byte) Stream {
+	blockSize := b.BlockSize()
+	if len(iv) != blockSize {
+		panic("cipher.NewOFB: IV length must equal block size")
+	}
+	bufSize := streamBufferSize
+	if bufSize < blockSize {
+		bufSize = blockSize
+	}
+	x := &ofb{
+		b:       b,
+		cipher:  make([]byte, blockSize),
+		out:     make([]byte, 0, bufSize),
+		outUsed: 0,
+	}
+
+	copy(x.cipher, iv)
+	return x
+}
+
+func (x *ofb) refill() {
+	bs := x.b.BlockSize()
+	remain := len(x.out) - x.outUsed
+	if remain > x.outUsed {
+		return
+	}
+	copy(x.out, x.out[x.outUsed:])
+	x.out = x.out[:cap(x.out)]
+	for remain < len(x.out)-bs {
+		x.b.Encrypt(x.cipher, x.cipher)
+		copy(x.out[remain:], x.cipher)
+		remain += bs
+	}
+	x.out = x.out[:remain]
+	x.outUsed = 0
+}
+
+func (x *ofb) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) {
+	if len(dst) < len(src) {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: output smaller than input")
+	}
+	if alias.InexactOverlap(dst[:len(src)], src) {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: invalid buffer overlap")
+	}
+	for len(src) > 0 {
+		if x.outUsed >= len(x.out)-x.b.BlockSize() {
+			x.refill()
+		}
+		n := subtle.XORBytes(dst, src, x.out[x.outUsed:])
+		dst = dst[n:]
+		src = src[n:]
+		x.outUsed += n
+	}
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/cipher/ofb_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// OFB AES test vectors.
+
+// See U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
+// Special Publication 800-38A, ``Recommendation for Block Cipher
+// Modes of Operation,'' 2001 Edition, pp. 52-55.
+
+package cipher_test
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/aes"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+type ofbTest struct {
+	name string
+	key  []byte
+	iv   []byte
+	in   []byte
+	out  []byte
+}
+
+var ofbTests = []ofbTest{
+	// NIST SP 800-38A pp 52-55
+	{
+		"OFB-AES128",
+		commonKey128,
+		commonIV,
+		commonInput,
+		[]byte{
+			0x3b, 0x3f, 0xd9, 0x2e, 0xb7, 0x2d, 0xad, 0x20, 0x33, 0x34, 0x49, 0xf8, 0xe8, 0x3c, 0xfb, 0x4a,
+			0x77, 0x89, 0x50, 0x8d, 0x16, 0x91, 0x8f, 0x03, 0xf5, 0x3c, 0x52, 0xda, 0xc5, 0x4e, 0xd8, 0x25,
+			0x97, 0x40, 0x05, 0x1e, 0x9c, 0x5f, 0xec, 0xf6, 0x43, 0x44, 0xf7, 0xa8, 0x22, 0x60, 0xed, 0xcc,
+			0x30, 0x4c, 0x65, 0x28, 0xf6, 0x59, 0xc7, 0x78, 0x66, 0xa5, 0x10, 0xd9, 0xc1, 0xd6, 0xae, 0x5e,
+		},
+	},
+	{
+		"OFB-AES192",
+		commonKey192,
+		commonIV,
+		commonInput,
+		[]byte{
+			0xcd, 0xc8, 0x0d, 0x6f, 0xdd, 0xf1, 0x8c, 0xab, 0x34, 0xc2, 0x59, 0x09, 0xc9, 0x9a, 0x41, 0x74,
+			0xfc, 0xc2, 0x8b, 0x8d, 0x4c, 0x63, 0x83, 0x7c, 0x09, 0xe8, 0x17, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x10, 0x04, 0x01,
+			0x8d, 0x9a, 0x9a, 0xea, 0xc0, 0xf6, 0x59, 0x6f, 0x55, 0x9c, 0x6d, 0x4d, 0xaf, 0x59, 0xa5, 0xf2,
+			0x6d, 0x9f, 0x20, 0x08, 0x57, 0xca, 0x6c, 0x3e, 0x9c, 0xac, 0x52, 0x4b, 0xd9, 0xac, 0xc9, 0x2a,
+		},
+	},
+	{
+		"OFB-AES256",
+		commonKey256,
+		commonIV,
+		commonInput,
+		[]byte{
+			0xdc, 0x7e, 0x84, 0xbf, 0xda, 0x79, 0x16, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0xcd, 0x84, 0x86, 0x98, 0x5d, 0x38, 0x60,
+			0x4f, 0xeb, 0xdc, 0x67, 0x40, 0xd2, 0x0b, 0x3a, 0xc8, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0xd8, 0x2a, 0x4f, 0xb0, 0x8d,
+			0x71, 0xab, 0x47, 0xa0, 0x86, 0xe8, 0x6e, 0xed, 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x1c, 0x5b, 0xba, 0x97, 0xc4, 0x08,
+			0x01, 0x26, 0x14, 0x1d, 0x67, 0xf3, 0x7b, 0xe8, 0x53, 0x8f, 0x5a, 0x8b, 0xe7, 0x40, 0xe4, 0x84,
+		},
+	},
+}
+
+func TestOFB(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tt := range ofbTests {
+		test := tt.name
+
+		c, err := aes.NewCipher(tt.key)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("%s: NewCipher(%d bytes) = %s", test, len(tt.key), err)
+			continue
+		}
+
+		for j := 0; j <= 5; j += 5 {
+			plaintext := tt.in[0 : len(tt.in)-j]
+			ofb := cipher.NewOFB(c, tt.iv)
+			ciphertext := make([]byte, len(plaintext))
+			ofb.XORKeyStream(ciphertext, plaintext)
+			if !bytes.Equal(ciphertext, tt.out[:len(plaintext)]) {
+				t.Errorf("%s/%d: encrypting\ninput % x\nhave % x\nwant % x", test, len(plaintext), plaintext, ciphertext, tt.out)
+			}
+		}
+
+		for j := 0; j <= 5; j += 5 {
+			ciphertext := tt.out[0 : len(tt.in)-j]
+			ofb := cipher.NewOFB(c, tt.iv)
+			plaintext := make([]byte, len(ciphertext))
+			ofb.XORKeyStream(plaintext, ciphertext)
+			if !bytes.Equal(plaintext, tt.in[:len(ciphertext)]) {
+				t.Errorf("%s/%d: decrypting\nhave % x\nwant % x", test, len(ciphertext), plaintext, tt.in)
+			}
+		}
+
+		if t.Failed() {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/des/block.go

@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package des
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"sync"
+)
+
+func cryptBlock(subkeys []uint64, dst, src []byte, decrypt bool) {
+	b := binary.BigEndian.Uint64(src)
+	b = permuteInitialBlock(b)
+	left, right := uint32(b>>32), uint32(b)
+
+	left = (left << 1) | (left >> 31)
+	right = (right << 1) | (right >> 31)
+
+	if decrypt {
+		for i := 0; i < 8; i++ {
+			left, right = feistel(left, right, subkeys[15-2*i], subkeys[15-(2*i+1)])
+		}
+	} else {
+		for i := 0; i < 8; i++ {
+			left, right = feistel(left, right, subkeys[2*i], subkeys[2*i+1])
+		}
+	}
+
+	left = (left << 31) | (left >> 1)
+	right = (right << 31) | (right >> 1)
+
+	// switch left & right and perform final permutation
+	preOutput := (uint64(right) << 32) | uint64(left)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(dst, permuteFinalBlock(preOutput))
+}
+
+// DES Feistel function. feistelBox must be initialized via
+// feistelBoxOnce.Do(initFeistelBox) first.
+func feistel(l, r uint32, k0, k1 uint64) (lout, rout uint32) {
+	var t uint32
+
+	t = r ^ uint32(k0>>32)
+	l ^= feistelBox[7][t&0x3f] ^
+		feistelBox[5][(t>>8)&0x3f] ^
+		feistelBox[3][(t>>16)&0x3f] ^
+		feistelBox[1][(t>>24)&0x3f]
+
+	t = ((r << 28) | (r >> 4)) ^ uint32(k0)
+	l ^= feistelBox[6][(t)&0x3f] ^
+		feistelBox[4][(t>>8)&0x3f] ^
+		feistelBox[2][(t>>16)&0x3f] ^
+		feistelBox[0][(t>>24)&0x3f]
+
+	t = l ^ uint32(k1>>32)
+	r ^= feistelBox[7][t&0x3f] ^
+		feistelBox[5][(t>>8)&0x3f] ^
+		feistelBox[3][(t>>16)&0x3f] ^
+		feistelBox[1][(t>>24)&0x3f]
+
+	t = ((l << 28) | (l >> 4)) ^ uint32(k1)
+	r ^= feistelBox[6][(t)&0x3f] ^
+		feistelBox[4][(t>>8)&0x3f] ^
+		feistelBox[2][(t>>16)&0x3f] ^
+		feistelBox[0][(t>>24)&0x3f]
+
+	return l, r
+}
+
+// feistelBox[s][16*i+j] contains the output of permutationFunction
+// for sBoxes[s][i][j] << 4*(7-s)
+var feistelBox [8][64]uint32
+
+var feistelBoxOnce sync.Once
+
+// general purpose function to perform DES block permutations.
+func permuteBlock(src uint64, permutation []uint8) (block uint64) {
+	for position, n := range permutation {
+		bit := (src >> n) & 1
+		block |= bit << uint((len(permutation)-1)-position)
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+func initFeistelBox() {
+	for s := range sBoxes {
+		for i := 0; i < 4; i++ {
+			for j := 0; j < 16; j++ {
+				f := uint64(sBoxes[s][i][j]) << (4 * (7 - uint(s)))
+				f = permuteBlock(f, permutationFunction[:])
+
+				// Row is determined by the 1st and 6th bit.
+				// Column is the middle four bits.
+				row := uint8(((i & 2) << 4) | i&1)
+				col := uint8(j << 1)
+				t := row | col
+
+				// The rotation was performed in the feistel rounds, being factored out and now mixed into the feistelBox.
+				f = (f << 1) | (f >> 31)
+
+				feistelBox[s][t] = uint32(f)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// permuteInitialBlock is equivalent to the permutation defined
+// by initialPermutation.
+func permuteInitialBlock(block uint64) uint64 {
+	// block = b7 b6 b5 b4 b3 b2 b1 b0 (8 bytes)
+	b1 := block >> 48
+	b2 := block << 48
+	block ^= b1 ^ b2 ^ b1<<48 ^ b2>>48
+
+	// block = b1 b0 b5 b4 b3 b2 b7 b6
+	b1 = block >> 32 & 0xff00ff
+	b2 = (block & 0xff00ff00)
+	block ^= b1<<32 ^ b2 ^ b1<<8 ^ b2<<24 // exchange b0 b4 with b3 b7
+
+	// block is now b1 b3 b5 b7 b0 b2 b4 b6, the permutation:
+	//                  ...  8
+	//                  ... 24
+	//                  ... 40
+	//                  ... 56
+	//  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  0
+	// 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16
+	//                  ... 32
+	//                  ... 48
+
+	// exchange 4,5,6,7 with 32,33,34,35 etc.
+	b1 = block & 0x0f0f00000f0f0000
+	b2 = block & 0x0000f0f00000f0f0
+	block ^= b1 ^ b2 ^ b1>>12 ^ b2<<12
+
+	// block is the permutation:
+	//
+	//   [+8]         [+40]
+	//
+	//  7  6  5  4
+	// 23 22 21 20
+	//  3  2  1  0
+	// 19 18 17 16    [+32]
+
+	// exchange 0,1,4,5 with 18,19,22,23
+	b1 = block & 0x3300330033003300
+	b2 = block & 0x00cc00cc00cc00cc
+	block ^= b1 ^ b2 ^ b1>>6 ^ b2<<6
+
+	// block is the permutation:
+	// 15 14
+	// 13 12
+	// 11 10
+	//  9  8
+	//  7  6
+	//  5  4
+	//  3  2
+	//  1  0 [+16] [+32] [+64]
+
+	// exchange 0,2,4,6 with 9,11,13,15:
+	b1 = block & 0xaaaaaaaa55555555
+	block ^= b1 ^ b1>>33 ^ b1<<33
+
+	// block is the permutation:
+	// 6 14 22 30 38 46 54 62
+	// 4 12 20 28 36 44 52 60
+	// 2 10 18 26 34 42 50 58
+	// 0  8 16 24 32 40 48 56
+	// 7 15 23 31 39 47 55 63
+	// 5 13 21 29 37 45 53 61
+	// 3 11 19 27 35 43 51 59
+	// 1  9 17 25 33 41 49 57
+	return block
+}
+
+// permuteFinalBlock is equivalent to the permutation defined
+// by finalPermutation.
+func permuteFinalBlock(block uint64) uint64 {
+	// Perform the same bit exchanges as permuteInitialBlock
+	// but in reverse order.
+	b1 := block & 0xaaaaaaaa55555555
+	block ^= b1 ^ b1>>33 ^ b1<<33
+
+	b1 = block & 0x3300330033003300
+	b2 := block & 0x00cc00cc00cc00cc
+	block ^= b1 ^ b2 ^ b1>>6 ^ b2<<6
+
+	b1 = block & 0x0f0f00000f0f0000
+	b2 = block & 0x0000f0f00000f0f0
+	block ^= b1 ^ b2 ^ b1>>12 ^ b2<<12
+
+	b1 = block >> 32 & 0xff00ff
+	b2 = (block & 0xff00ff00)
+	block ^= b1<<32 ^ b2 ^ b1<<8 ^ b2<<24
+
+	b1 = block >> 48
+	b2 = block << 48
+	block ^= b1 ^ b2 ^ b1<<48 ^ b2>>48
+	return block
+}
+
+// creates 16 28-bit blocks rotated according
+// to the rotation schedule.
+func ksRotate(in uint32) (out []uint32) {
+	out = make([]uint32, 16)
+	last := in
+	for i := 0; i < 16; i++ {
+		// 28-bit circular left shift
+		left := (last << (4 + ksRotations[i])) >> 4
+		right := (last << 4) >> (32 - ksRotations[i])
+		out[i] = left | right
+		last = out[i]
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// creates 16 56-bit subkeys from the original key.
+func (c *desCipher) generateSubkeys(keyBytes []byte) {
+	feistelBoxOnce.Do(initFeistelBox)
+
+	// apply PC1 permutation to key
+	key := binary.BigEndian.Uint64(keyBytes)
+	permutedKey := permuteBlock(key, permutedChoice1[:])
+
+	// rotate halves of permuted key according to the rotation schedule
+	leftRotations := ksRotate(uint32(permutedKey >> 28))
+	rightRotations := ksRotate(uint32(permutedKey<<4) >> 4)
+
+	// generate subkeys
+	for i := 0; i < 16; i++ {
+		// combine halves to form 56-bit input to PC2
+		pc2Input := uint64(leftRotations[i])<<28 | uint64(rightRotations[i])
+		// apply PC2 permutation to 7 byte input
+		c.subkeys[i] = unpack(permuteBlock(pc2Input, permutedChoice2[:]))
+	}
+}
+
+// Expand 48-bit input to 64-bit, with each 6-bit block padded by extra two bits at the top.
+// By doing so, we can have the input blocks (four bits each), and the key blocks (six bits each) well-aligned without
+// extra shifts/rotations for alignments.
+func unpack(x uint64) uint64 {
+	return ((x>>(6*1))&0xff)<<(8*0) |
+		((x>>(6*3))&0xff)<<(8*1) |
+		((x>>(6*5))&0xff)<<(8*2) |
+		((x>>(6*7))&0xff)<<(8*3) |
+		((x>>(6*0))&0xff)<<(8*4) |
+		((x>>(6*2))&0xff)<<(8*5) |
+		((x>>(6*4))&0xff)<<(8*6) |
+		((x>>(6*6))&0xff)<<(8*7)
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/des/cipher.go

@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package des
+
+import (
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/internal/alias"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"strconv"
+)
+
+// The DES block size in bytes.
+const BlockSize = 8
+
+type KeySizeError int
+
+func (k KeySizeError) Error() string {
+	return "crypto/des: invalid key size " + strconv.Itoa(int(k))
+}
+
+// desCipher is an instance of DES encryption.
+type desCipher struct {
+	subkeys [16]uint64
+}
+
+// NewCipher creates and returns a new [cipher.Block].
+func NewCipher(key []byte) (cipher.Block, error) {
+	if len(key) != 8 {
+		return nil, KeySizeError(len(key))
+	}
+
+	c := new(desCipher)
+	c.generateSubkeys(key)
+	return c, nil
+}
+
+func (c *desCipher) BlockSize() int { return BlockSize }
+
+func (c *desCipher) Encrypt(dst, src []byte) {
+	if len(src) < BlockSize {
+		panic("crypto/des: input not full block")
+	}
+	if len(dst) < BlockSize {
+		panic("crypto/des: output not full block")
+	}
+	if alias.InexactOverlap(dst[:BlockSize], src[:BlockSize]) {
+		panic("crypto/des: invalid buffer overlap")
+	}
+	cryptBlock(c.subkeys[:], dst, src, false)
+}
+
+func (c *desCipher) Decrypt(dst, src []byte) {
+	if len(src) < BlockSize {
+		panic("crypto/des: input not full block")
+	}
+	if len(dst) < BlockSize {
+		panic("crypto/des: output not full block")
+	}
+	if alias.InexactOverlap(dst[:BlockSize], src[:BlockSize]) {
+		panic("crypto/des: invalid buffer overlap")
+	}
+	cryptBlock(c.subkeys[:], dst, src, true)
+}
+
+// A tripleDESCipher is an instance of TripleDES encryption.
+type tripleDESCipher struct {
+	cipher1, cipher2, cipher3 desCipher
+}
+
+// NewTripleDESCipher creates and returns a new [cipher.Block].
+func NewTripleDESCipher(key []byte) (cipher.Block, error) {
+	if len(key) != 24 {
+		return nil, KeySizeError(len(key))
+	}
+
+	c := new(tripleDESCipher)
+	c.cipher1.generateSubkeys(key[:8])
+	c.cipher2.generateSubkeys(key[8:16])
+	c.cipher3.generateSubkeys(key[16:])
+	return c, nil
+}
+
+func (c *tripleDESCipher) BlockSize() int { return BlockSize }
+
+func (c *tripleDESCipher) Encrypt(dst, src []byte) {
+	if len(src) < BlockSize {
+		panic("crypto/des: input not full block")
+	}
+	if len(dst) < BlockSize {
+		panic("crypto/des: output not full block")
+	}
+	if alias.InexactOverlap(dst[:BlockSize], src[:BlockSize]) {
+		panic("crypto/des: invalid buffer overlap")
+	}
+
+	b := binary.BigEndian.Uint64(src)
+	b = permuteInitialBlock(b)
+	left, right := uint32(b>>32), uint32(b)
+
+	left = (left << 1) | (left >> 31)
+	right = (right << 1) | (right >> 31)
+
+	for i := 0; i < 8; i++ {
+		left, right = feistel(left, right, c.cipher1.subkeys[2*i], c.cipher1.subkeys[2*i+1])
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < 8; i++ {
+		right, left = feistel(right, left, c.cipher2.subkeys[15-2*i], c.cipher2.subkeys[15-(2*i+1)])
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < 8; i++ {
+		left, right = feistel(left, right, c.cipher3.subkeys[2*i], c.cipher3.subkeys[2*i+1])
+	}
+
+	left = (left << 31) | (left >> 1)
+	right = (right << 31) | (right >> 1)
+
+	preOutput := (uint64(right) << 32) | uint64(left)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(dst, permuteFinalBlock(preOutput))
+}
+
+func (c *tripleDESCipher) Decrypt(dst, src []byte) {
+	if len(src) < BlockSize {
+		panic("crypto/des: input not full block")
+	}
+	if len(dst) < BlockSize {
+		panic("crypto/des: output not full block")
+	}
+	if alias.InexactOverlap(dst[:BlockSize], src[:BlockSize]) {
+		panic("crypto/des: invalid buffer overlap")
+	}
+
+	b := binary.BigEndian.Uint64(src)
+	b = permuteInitialBlock(b)
+	left, right := uint32(b>>32), uint32(b)
+
+	left = (left << 1) | (left >> 31)
+	right = (right << 1) | (right >> 31)
+
+	for i := 0; i < 8; i++ {
+		left, right = feistel(left, right, c.cipher3.subkeys[15-2*i], c.cipher3.subkeys[15-(2*i+1)])
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < 8; i++ {
+		right, left = feistel(right, left, c.cipher2.subkeys[2*i], c.cipher2.subkeys[2*i+1])
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < 8; i++ {
+		left, right = feistel(left, right, c.cipher1.subkeys[15-2*i], c.cipher1.subkeys[15-(2*i+1)])
+	}
+
+	left = (left << 31) | (left >> 1)
+	right = (right << 31) | (right >> 1)
+
+	preOutput := (uint64(right) << 32) | uint64(left)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(dst, permuteFinalBlock(preOutput))
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/des/const.go

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package des implements the Data Encryption Standard (DES) and the
+// Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) as defined
+// in U.S. Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 46-3.
+//
+// DES is cryptographically broken and should not be used for secure
+// applications.
+package des
+
+// Used to perform an initial permutation of a 64-bit input block.
+var initialPermutation = [64]byte{
+	6, 14, 22, 30, 38, 46, 54, 62,
+	4, 12, 20, 28, 36, 44, 52, 60,
+	2, 10, 18, 26, 34, 42, 50, 58,
+	0, 8, 16, 24, 32, 40, 48, 56,
+	7, 15, 23, 31, 39, 47, 55, 63,
+	5, 13, 21, 29, 37, 45, 53, 61,
+	3, 11, 19, 27, 35, 43, 51, 59,
+	1, 9, 17, 25, 33, 41, 49, 57,
+}
+
+// Used to perform a final permutation of a 4-bit preoutput block. This is the
+// inverse of initialPermutation
+var finalPermutation = [64]byte{
+	24, 56, 16, 48, 8, 40, 0, 32,
+	25, 57, 17, 49, 9, 41, 1, 33,
+	26, 58, 18, 50, 10, 42, 2, 34,
+	27, 59, 19, 51, 11, 43, 3, 35,
+	28, 60, 20, 52, 12, 44, 4, 36,
+	29, 61, 21, 53, 13, 45, 5, 37,
+	30, 62, 22, 54, 14, 46, 6, 38,
+	31, 63, 23, 55, 15, 47, 7, 39,
+}
+
+// Used to expand an input block of 32 bits, producing an output block of 48
+// bits.
+var expansionFunction = [48]byte{
+	0, 31, 30, 29, 28, 27, 28, 27,
+	26, 25, 24, 23, 24, 23, 22, 21,
+	20, 19, 20, 19, 18, 17, 16, 15,
+	16, 15, 14, 13, 12, 11, 12, 11,
+	10, 9, 8, 7, 8, 7, 6, 5,
+	4, 3, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0, 31,
+}
+
+// Yields a 32-bit output from a 32-bit input
+var permutationFunction = [32]byte{
+	16, 25, 12, 11, 3, 20, 4, 15,
+	31, 17, 9, 6, 27, 14, 1, 22,
+	30, 24, 8, 18, 0, 5, 29, 23,
+	13, 19, 2, 26, 10, 21, 28, 7,
+}
+
+// Used in the key schedule to select 56 bits
+// from a 64-bit input.
+var permutedChoice1 = [56]byte{
+	7, 15, 23, 31, 39, 47, 55, 63,
+	6, 14, 22, 30, 38, 46, 54, 62,
+	5, 13, 21, 29, 37, 45, 53, 61,
+	4, 12, 20, 28, 1, 9, 17, 25,
+	33, 41, 49, 57, 2, 10, 18, 26,
+	34, 42, 50, 58, 3, 11, 19, 27,
+	35, 43, 51, 59, 36, 44, 52, 60,
+}
+
+// Used in the key schedule to produce each subkey by selecting 48 bits from
+// the 56-bit input
+var permutedChoice2 = [48]byte{
+	42, 39, 45, 32, 55, 51, 53, 28,
+	41, 50, 35, 46, 33, 37, 44, 52,
+	30, 48, 40, 49, 29, 36, 43, 54,
+	15, 4, 25, 19, 9, 1, 26, 16,
+	5, 11, 23, 8, 12, 7, 17, 0,
+	22, 3, 10, 14, 6, 20, 27, 24,
+}
+
+// 8 S-boxes composed of 4 rows and 16 columns
+// Used in the DES cipher function
+var sBoxes = [8][4][16]uint8{
+	// S-box 1
+	{
+		{14, 4, 13, 1, 2, 15, 11, 8, 3, 10, 6, 12, 5, 9, 0, 7},
+		{0, 15, 7, 4, 14, 2, 13, 1, 10, 6, 12, 11, 9, 5, 3, 8},
+		{4, 1, 14, 8, 13, 6, 2, 11, 15, 12, 9, 7, 3, 10, 5, 0},
+		{15, 12, 8, 2, 4, 9, 1, 7, 5, 11, 3, 14, 10, 0, 6, 13},
+	},
+	// S-box 2
+	{
+		{15, 1, 8, 14, 6, 11, 3, 4, 9, 7, 2, 13, 12, 0, 5, 10},
+		{3, 13, 4, 7, 15, 2, 8, 14, 12, 0, 1, 10, 6, 9, 11, 5},
+		{0, 14, 7, 11, 10, 4, 13, 1, 5, 8, 12, 6, 9, 3, 2, 15},
+		{13, 8, 10, 1, 3, 15, 4, 2, 11, 6, 7, 12, 0, 5, 14, 9},
+	},
+	// S-box 3
+	{
+		{10, 0, 9, 14, 6, 3, 15, 5, 1, 13, 12, 7, 11, 4, 2, 8},
+		{13, 7, 0, 9, 3, 4, 6, 10, 2, 8, 5, 14, 12, 11, 15, 1},
+		{13, 6, 4, 9, 8, 15, 3, 0, 11, 1, 2, 12, 5, 10, 14, 7},
+		{1, 10, 13, 0, 6, 9, 8, 7, 4, 15, 14, 3, 11, 5, 2, 12},
+	},
+	// S-box 4
+	{
+		{7, 13, 14, 3, 0, 6, 9, 10, 1, 2, 8, 5, 11, 12, 4, 15},
+		{13, 8, 11, 5, 6, 15, 0, 3, 4, 7, 2, 12, 1, 10, 14, 9},
+		{10, 6, 9, 0, 12, 11, 7, 13, 15, 1, 3, 14, 5, 2, 8, 4},
+		{3, 15, 0, 6, 10, 1, 13, 8, 9, 4, 5, 11, 12, 7, 2, 14},
+	},
+	// S-box 5
+	{
+		{2, 12, 4, 1, 7, 10, 11, 6, 8, 5, 3, 15, 13, 0, 14, 9},
+		{14, 11, 2, 12, 4, 7, 13, 1, 5, 0, 15, 10, 3, 9, 8, 6},
+		{4, 2, 1, 11, 10, 13, 7, 8, 15, 9, 12, 5, 6, 3, 0, 14},
+		{11, 8, 12, 7, 1, 14, 2, 13, 6, 15, 0, 9, 10, 4, 5, 3},
+	},
+	// S-box 6
+	{
+		{12, 1, 10, 15, 9, 2, 6, 8, 0, 13, 3, 4, 14, 7, 5, 11},
+		{10, 15, 4, 2, 7, 12, 9, 5, 6, 1, 13, 14, 0, 11, 3, 8},
+		{9, 14, 15, 5, 2, 8, 12, 3, 7, 0, 4, 10, 1, 13, 11, 6},
+		{4, 3, 2, 12, 9, 5, 15, 10, 11, 14, 1, 7, 6, 0, 8, 13},
+	},
+	// S-box 7
+	{
+		{4, 11, 2, 14, 15, 0, 8, 13, 3, 12, 9, 7, 5, 10, 6, 1},
+		{13, 0, 11, 7, 4, 9, 1, 10, 14, 3, 5, 12, 2, 15, 8, 6},
+		{1, 4, 11, 13, 12, 3, 7, 14, 10, 15, 6, 8, 0, 5, 9, 2},
+		{6, 11, 13, 8, 1, 4, 10, 7, 9, 5, 0, 15, 14, 2, 3, 12},
+	},
+	// S-box 8
+	{
+		{13, 2, 8, 4, 6, 15, 11, 1, 10, 9, 3, 14, 5, 0, 12, 7},
+		{1, 15, 13, 8, 10, 3, 7, 4, 12, 5, 6, 11, 0, 14, 9, 2},
+		{7, 11, 4, 1, 9, 12, 14, 2, 0, 6, 10, 13, 15, 3, 5, 8},
+		{2, 1, 14, 7, 4, 10, 8, 13, 15, 12, 9, 0, 3, 5, 6, 11},
+	},
+}
+
+// Size of left rotation per round in each half of the key schedule
+var ksRotations = [16]uint8{1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/des/des_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,1563 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package des_test
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/des"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+type CryptTest struct {
+	key []byte
+	in  []byte
+	out []byte
+}
+
+// some custom tests for DES
+var encryptDESTests = []CryptTest{
+	{
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x8c, 0xa6, 0x4d, 0xe9, 0xc1, 0xb1, 0x23, 0xa7}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff},
+		[]byte{0x35, 0x55, 0x50, 0xb2, 0x15, 0x0e, 0x24, 0x51}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef},
+		[]byte{0x61, 0x7b, 0x3a, 0x0c, 0xe8, 0xf0, 0x71, 0x00}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10},
+		[]byte{0x92, 0x31, 0xf2, 0x36, 0xff, 0x9a, 0xa9, 0x5c}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff},
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xca, 0xaa, 0xaf, 0x4d, 0xea, 0xf1, 0xdb, 0xae}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff},
+		[]byte{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff},
+		[]byte{0x73, 0x59, 0xb2, 0x16, 0x3e, 0x4e, 0xdc, 0x58}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff},
+		[]byte{0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef},
+		[]byte{0x6d, 0xce, 0x0d, 0xc9, 0x00, 0x65, 0x56, 0xa3}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff},
+		[]byte{0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10},
+		[]byte{0x9e, 0x84, 0xc5, 0xf3, 0x17, 0x0f, 0x8e, 0xff}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef},
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xd5, 0xd4, 0x4f, 0xf7, 0x20, 0x68, 0x3d, 0x0d}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef},
+		[]byte{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff},
+		[]byte{0x59, 0x73, 0x23, 0x56, 0xf3, 0x6f, 0xde, 0x06}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef},
+		[]byte{0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef},
+		[]byte{0x56, 0xcc, 0x09, 0xe7, 0xcf, 0xdc, 0x4c, 0xef}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef},
+		[]byte{0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10},
+		[]byte{0x12, 0xc6, 0x26, 0xaf, 0x05, 0x8b, 0x43, 0x3b}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10},
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xa6, 0x8c, 0xdc, 0xa9, 0x0c, 0x90, 0x21, 0xf9}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10},
+		[]byte{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff},
+		[]byte{0x2a, 0x2b, 0xb0, 0x08, 0xdf, 0x97, 0xc2, 0xf2}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10},
+		[]byte{0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef},
+		[]byte{0xed, 0x39, 0xd9, 0x50, 0xfa, 0x74, 0xbc, 0xc4}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10},
+		[]byte{0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10},
+		[]byte{0xa9, 0x33, 0xf6, 0x18, 0x30, 0x23, 0xb3, 0x10}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef},
+		[]byte{0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11},
+		[]byte{0x17, 0x66, 0x8d, 0xfc, 0x72, 0x92, 0x53, 0x2d}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef},
+		[]byte{0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		[]byte{0xb4, 0xfd, 0x23, 0x16, 0x47, 0xa5, 0xbe, 0xc0}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0x0e, 0x32, 0x92, 0x32, 0xea, 0x6d, 0x0d, 0x73},
+		[]byte{0x87, 0x87, 0x87, 0x87, 0x87, 0x87, 0x87, 0x87},
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0x73, 0x65, 0x63, 0x52, 0x33, 0x74, 0x24, 0x3b}, // "secR3t$;"
+		[]byte{0x61, 0x20, 0x74, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x31, 0x32}, // "a test12"
+		[]byte{0x37, 0x0d, 0xee, 0x2c, 0x1f, 0xb4, 0xf7, 0xa5}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68}, // "abcdefgh"
+		[]byte{0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68}, // "abcdefgh"
+		[]byte{0x2a, 0x8d, 0x69, 0xde, 0x9d, 0x5f, 0xdf, 0xf9}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68}, // "abcdefgh"
+		[]byte{0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38}, // "12345678"
+		[]byte{0x21, 0xc6, 0x0d, 0xa5, 0x34, 0x24, 0x8b, 0xce}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38}, // "12345678"
+		[]byte{0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68}, // "abcdefgh"
+		[]byte{0x94, 0xd4, 0x43, 0x6b, 0xc3, 0xb5, 0xb6, 0x93}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0x1f, 0x79, 0x90, 0x5f, 0x88, 0x01, 0xc8, 0x88}, // random
+		[]byte{0xc7, 0x46, 0x18, 0x73, 0xaf, 0x48, 0x5f, 0xb3}, // random
+		[]byte{0xb0, 0x93, 0x50, 0x88, 0xf9, 0x92, 0x44, 0x6a}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0xe6, 0xf4, 0xf2, 0xdb, 0x31, 0x42, 0x53, 0x01}, // random
+		[]byte{0xff, 0x3d, 0x25, 0x50, 0x12, 0xe3, 0x4a, 0xc5}, // random
+		[]byte{0x86, 0x08, 0xd3, 0xd1, 0x6c, 0x2f, 0xd2, 0x55}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0x69, 0xc1, 0x9d, 0xc1, 0x15, 0xc5, 0xfb, 0x2b}, // random
+		[]byte{0x1a, 0x22, 0x5c, 0xaf, 0x1f, 0x1d, 0xa3, 0xf9}, // random
+		[]byte{0x64, 0xba, 0x31, 0x67, 0x56, 0x91, 0x1e, 0xa7}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0x6e, 0x5e, 0xe2, 0x47, 0xc4, 0xbf, 0xf6, 0x51}, // random
+		[]byte{0x11, 0xc9, 0x57, 0xff, 0x66, 0x89, 0x0e, 0xf0}, // random
+		[]byte{0x94, 0xc5, 0x35, 0xb2, 0xc5, 0x8b, 0x39, 0x72}},
+}
+
+var weakKeyTests = []CryptTest{
+	{
+		[]byte{0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		[]byte{0x55, 0x74, 0xc0, 0xbd, 0x7c, 0xdf, 0xf7, 0x39}, // random
+		nil},
+	{
+		[]byte{0xfe, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xfe},
+		[]byte{0xe8, 0xe1, 0xa7, 0xc1, 0xde, 0x11, 0x89, 0xaa}, // random
+		nil},
+	{
+		[]byte{0xe0, 0xe0, 0xe0, 0xe0, 0xf1, 0xf1, 0xf1, 0xf1},
+		[]byte{0x50, 0x6a, 0x4b, 0x94, 0x3b, 0xed, 0x7d, 0xdc}, // random
+		nil},
+	{
+		[]byte{0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x0e, 0x0e, 0x0e, 0x0e},
+		[]byte{0x88, 0x81, 0x56, 0x38, 0xec, 0x3b, 0x1c, 0x97}, // random
+		nil},
+	{
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x17, 0xa0, 0x83, 0x62, 0x32, 0xfe, 0x9a, 0x0b}, // random
+		nil},
+	{
+		[]byte{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff},
+		[]byte{0xca, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x1f, 0x50, 0xc5, 0x7b, 0x49}, // random
+		nil},
+	{
+		[]byte{0xe1, 0xe1, 0xe1, 0xe1, 0xf0, 0xf0, 0xf0, 0xf0},
+		[]byte{0xb1, 0xea, 0xad, 0x7d, 0xe7, 0xc3, 0x7a, 0x43}, // random
+		nil},
+	{
+		[]byte{0x1e, 0x1e, 0x1e, 0x1e, 0x0f, 0x0f, 0x0f, 0x0f},
+		[]byte{0xae, 0x74, 0x7d, 0x6f, 0xef, 0x16, 0xbb, 0x81}, // random
+		nil},
+}
+
+var semiWeakKeyTests = []CryptTest{
+	// key and out contain the semi-weak key pair
+	{
+		[]byte{0x01, 0x1f, 0x01, 0x1f, 0x01, 0x0e, 0x01, 0x0e},
+		[]byte{0x12, 0xfa, 0x31, 0x16, 0xf9, 0xc5, 0x0a, 0xe4}, // random
+		[]byte{0x1f, 0x01, 0x1f, 0x01, 0x0e, 0x01, 0x0e, 0x01}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0x01, 0xe0, 0x01, 0xe0, 0x01, 0xf1, 0x01, 0xf1},
+		[]byte{0xb0, 0x4c, 0x7a, 0xee, 0xd2, 0xe5, 0x4d, 0xb7}, // random
+		[]byte{0xe0, 0x01, 0xe0, 0x01, 0xf1, 0x01, 0xf1, 0x01}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0x01, 0xfe, 0x01, 0xfe, 0x01, 0xfe, 0x01, 0xfe},
+		[]byte{0xa4, 0x81, 0xcd, 0xb1, 0x64, 0x6f, 0xd3, 0xbc}, // random
+		[]byte{0xfe, 0x01, 0xfe, 0x01, 0xfe, 0x01, 0xfe, 0x01}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0x1f, 0xe0, 0x1f, 0xe0, 0x0e, 0xf1, 0x0e, 0xf1},
+		[]byte{0xee, 0x27, 0xdd, 0x88, 0x4c, 0x22, 0xcd, 0xce}, // random
+		[]byte{0xe0, 0x1f, 0xe0, 0x1f, 0xf1, 0x0e, 0xf1, 0x0e}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0x1f, 0xfe, 0x1f, 0xfe, 0x0e, 0xfe, 0x0e, 0xfe},
+		[]byte{0x19, 0x3d, 0xcf, 0x97, 0x70, 0xfb, 0xab, 0xe1}, // random
+		[]byte{0xfe, 0x1f, 0xfe, 0x1f, 0xfe, 0x0e, 0xfe, 0x0e}},
+	{
+		[]byte{0xe0, 0xfe, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0xf1, 0xfe, 0xf1, 0xfe},
+		[]byte{0x7c, 0x82, 0x69, 0xe4, 0x1e, 0x86, 0x99, 0xd7}, // random
+		[]byte{0xfe, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0xf1, 0xfe, 0xf1}},
+}
+
+// some custom tests for TripleDES
+var encryptTripleDESTests = []CryptTest{
+	{
+		[]byte{
+			0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+			0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+			0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x92, 0x95, 0xb5, 0x9b, 0xb3, 0x84, 0x73, 0x6e}},
+	{
+		[]byte{
+			0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+			0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+			0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff},
+		[]byte{0xc1, 0x97, 0xf5, 0x58, 0x74, 0x8a, 0x20, 0xe7}},
+	{
+		[]byte{
+			0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+			0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+			0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff},
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x3e, 0x68, 0x0a, 0xa7, 0x8b, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x18}},
+	{
+		[]byte{
+			0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+			0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+			0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff},
+		[]byte{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff},
+		[]byte{0x6d, 0x6a, 0x4a, 0x64, 0x4c, 0x7b, 0x8c, 0x91}},
+	{
+		[]byte{ // "abcdefgh12345678ABCDEFGH"
+			0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68,
+			0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38,
+			0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48},
+		[]byte{0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30}, // "00000000"
+		[]byte{0xe4, 0x61, 0xb7, 0x59, 0x68, 0x8b, 0xff, 0x66}},
+	{
+		[]byte{ // "abcdefgh12345678ABCDEFGH"
+			0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68,
+			0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38,
+			0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48},
+		[]byte{0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38}, // "12345678"
+		[]byte{0xdb, 0xd0, 0x92, 0xde, 0xf8, 0x34, 0xff, 0x58}},
+	{
+		[]byte{ // "abcdefgh12345678ABCDEFGH"
+			0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68,
+			0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38,
+			0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48},
+		[]byte{0xf0, 0xc5, 0x82, 0x22, 0xd3, 0xe6, 0x12, 0xd2}, // random
+		[]byte{0xba, 0xe4, 0x41, 0xb1, 0x3c, 0x37, 0x4d, 0xf4}},
+	{
+		[]byte{ // random
+			0xd3, 0x7d, 0x45, 0xee, 0x22, 0xe9, 0xcf, 0x52,
+			0xf4, 0x65, 0xa2, 0x4f, 0x70, 0xd1, 0x81, 0x8a,
+			0x3d, 0xbe, 0x2f, 0x39, 0xc7, 0x71, 0xd2, 0xe9},
+		[]byte{0x49, 0x53, 0xc3, 0xe9, 0x78, 0xdf, 0x9f, 0xaf}, // random
+		[]byte{0x53, 0x40, 0x51, 0x24, 0xd8, 0x3c, 0xf9, 0x88}},
+	{
+		[]byte{ // random
+			0xcb, 0x10, 0x7d, 0xda, 0x7e, 0x96, 0x57, 0x0a,
+			0xe8, 0xeb, 0xe8, 0x07, 0x8e, 0x87, 0xd3, 0x57,
+			0xb2, 0x61, 0x12, 0xb8, 0x2a, 0x90, 0xb7, 0x2f},
+		[]byte{0xa3, 0xc2, 0x60, 0xb1, 0x0b, 0xb7, 0x28, 0x6e}, // random
+		[]byte{0x56, 0x73, 0x7d, 0xfb, 0xb5, 0xa1, 0xc3, 0xde}},
+}
+
+// NIST Special Publication 800-20, Appendix A
+// Key for use with Table A.1 tests
+var tableA1Key = []byte{
+	0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+	0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+	0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+}
+
+// Table A.1 Resulting Ciphertext from the Variable Plaintext Known Answer Test
+var tableA1Tests = []CryptTest{
+	{nil, // 0
+		[]byte{0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x95, 0xf8, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xdd, 0x31, 0xd9, 0x00}},
+	{nil, // 1
+		[]byte{0x40, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xdd, 0x7f, 0x12, 0x1c, 0xa5, 0x01, 0x56, 0x19}},
+	{nil, // 2
+		[]byte{0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x2e, 0x86, 0x53, 0x10, 0x4f, 0x38, 0x34, 0xea}},
+	{nil, // 3
+		[]byte{0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x4b, 0xd3, 0x88, 0xff, 0x6c, 0xd8, 0x1d, 0x4f}},
+	{nil, // 4
+		[]byte{0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x20, 0xb9, 0xe7, 0x67, 0xb2, 0xfb, 0x14, 0x56}},
+	{nil, // 5
+		[]byte{0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x55, 0x57, 0x93, 0x80, 0xd7, 0x71, 0x38, 0xef}},
+	{nil, // 6
+		[]byte{0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x6c, 0xc5, 0xde, 0xfa, 0xaf, 0x04, 0x51, 0x2f}},
+	{nil, // 7
+		[]byte{0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x0d, 0x9f, 0x27, 0x9b, 0xa5, 0xd8, 0x72, 0x60}},
+	{nil, // 8
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xd9, 0x03, 0x1b, 0x02, 0x71, 0xbd, 0x5a, 0x0a}},
+	{nil, // 9
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x40, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x42, 0x42, 0x50, 0xb3, 0x7c, 0x3d, 0xd9, 0x51}},
+	{nil, // 10
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xb8, 0x06, 0x1b, 0x7e, 0xcd, 0x9a, 0x21, 0xe5}},
+	{nil, // 11
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xf1, 0x5d, 0x0f, 0x28, 0x6b, 0x65, 0xbd, 0x28}},
+	{nil, // 12
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xad, 0xd0, 0xcc, 0x8d, 0x6e, 0x5d, 0xeb, 0xa1}},
+	{nil, // 13
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xe6, 0xd5, 0xf8, 0x27, 0x52, 0xad, 0x63, 0xd1}},
+	{nil, // 14
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xec, 0xbf, 0xe3, 0xbd, 0x3f, 0x59, 0x1a, 0x5e}},
+	{nil, // 15
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xf3, 0x56, 0x83, 0x43, 0x79, 0xd1, 0x65, 0xcd}},
+	{nil, // 16
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x2b, 0x9f, 0x98, 0x2f, 0x20, 0x03, 0x7f, 0xa9}},
+	{nil, // 17
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x88, 0x9d, 0xe0, 0x68, 0xa1, 0x6f, 0x0b, 0xe6}},
+	{nil, // 18
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xe1, 0x9e, 0x27, 0x5d, 0x84, 0x6a, 0x12, 0x98}},
+	{nil, // 19
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x32, 0x9a, 0x8e, 0xd5, 0x23, 0xd7, 0x1a, 0xec}},
+	{nil, // 20
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xe7, 0xfc, 0xe2, 0x25, 0x57, 0xd2, 0x3c, 0x97}},
+	{nil, // 21
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x12, 0xa9, 0xf5, 0x81, 0x7f, 0xf2, 0xd6, 0x5d}},
+	{nil, // 22
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xa4, 0x84, 0xc3, 0xad, 0x38, 0xdc, 0x9c, 0x19}},
+	{nil, // 23
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xfb, 0xe0, 0x0a, 0x8a, 0x1e, 0xf8, 0xad, 0x72}},
+	{nil, // 24
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x75, 0x0d, 0x07, 0x94, 0x07, 0x52, 0x13, 0x63}},
+	{nil, // 25
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x64, 0xfe, 0xed, 0x9c, 0x72, 0x4c, 0x2f, 0xaf}},
+	{nil, // 26
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xf0, 0x2b, 0x26, 0x3b, 0x32, 0x8e, 0x2b, 0x60}},
+	{nil, // 27
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x9d, 0x64, 0x55, 0x5a, 0x9a, 0x10, 0xb8, 0x52}},
+	{nil, // 28
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xd1, 0x06, 0xff, 0x0b, 0xed, 0x52, 0x55, 0xd7}},
+	{nil, // 29
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xe1, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x6b, 0x13, 0x8c, 0x64, 0xa5}},
+	{nil, // 30
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xe4, 0x28, 0x58, 0x11, 0x86, 0xec, 0x8f, 0x46}},
+	{nil, // 31
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xae, 0xb5, 0xf5, 0xed, 0xe2, 0x2d, 0x1a, 0x36}},
+	{nil, // 32
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xe9, 0x43, 0xd7, 0x56, 0x8a, 0xec, 0x0c, 0x5c}},
+	{nil, // 33
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xdf, 0x98, 0xc8, 0x27, 0x6f, 0x54, 0xb0, 0x4b}},
+	{nil, // 34
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xb1, 0x60, 0xe4, 0x68, 0x0f, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x6f}},
+	{nil, // 35
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xfa, 0x07, 0x52, 0xb0, 0x7d, 0x9c, 0x4a, 0xb8}},
+	{nil, // 36
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xca, 0x3a, 0x2b, 0x03, 0x6d, 0xbc, 0x85, 0x02}},
+	{nil, // 37
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x5e, 0x09, 0x05, 0x51, 0x7b, 0xb5, 0x9b, 0xcf}},
+	{nil, // 38
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x81, 0x4e, 0xeb, 0x3b, 0x91, 0xd9, 0x07, 0x26}},
+	{nil, // 39
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x4d, 0x49, 0xdb, 0x15, 0x32, 0x91, 0x9c, 0x9f}},
+	{nil, // 40
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x25, 0xeb, 0x5f, 0xc3, 0xf8, 0xcf, 0x06, 0x21}},
+	{nil, // 41
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xab, 0x6a, 0x20, 0xc0, 0x62, 0x0d, 0x1c, 0x6f}},
+	{nil, // 42
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x79, 0xe9, 0x0d, 0xbc, 0x98, 0xf9, 0x2c, 0xca}},
+	{nil, // 43
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x86, 0x6e, 0xce, 0xdd, 0x80, 0x72, 0xbb, 0x0e}},
+	{nil, // 44
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x8b, 0x54, 0x53, 0x6f, 0x2f, 0x3e, 0x64, 0xa8}},
+	{nil, // 45
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xea, 0x51, 0xd3, 0x97, 0x55, 0x95, 0xb8, 0x6b}},
+	{nil, // 46
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xca, 0xff, 0xc6, 0xac, 0x45, 0x42, 0xde, 0x31}},
+	{nil, // 47
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x8d, 0xd4, 0x5a, 0x2d, 0xdf, 0x90, 0x79, 0x6c}},
+	{nil, // 48
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x10, 0x29, 0xd5, 0x5e, 0x88, 0x0e, 0xc2, 0xd0}},
+	{nil, // 49
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x5d, 0x86, 0xcb, 0x23, 0x63, 0x9d, 0xbe, 0xa9}},
+	{nil, // 50
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x1d, 0x1c, 0xa8, 0x53, 0xae, 0x7c, 0x0c, 0x5f}},
+	{nil, // 51
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xce, 0x33, 0x23, 0x29, 0x24, 0x8f, 0x32, 0x28}},
+	{nil, // 52
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x84, 0x05, 0xd1, 0xab, 0xe2, 0x4f, 0xb9, 0x42}},
+	{nil, // 53
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xe6, 0x43, 0xd7, 0x80, 0x90, 0xca, 0x42, 0x07}},
+	{nil, // 54
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0x48, 0x22, 0x1b, 0x99, 0x37, 0x74, 0x8a, 0x23}},
+	{nil, // 55
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00},
+		[]byte{0xdd, 0x7c, 0x0b, 0xbd, 0x61, 0xfa, 0xfd, 0x54}},
+	{nil, // 56
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80},
+		[]byte{0x2f, 0xbc, 0x29, 0x1a, 0x57, 0x0d, 0xb5, 0xc4}},
+	{nil, // 57
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40},
+		[]byte{0xe0, 0x7c, 0x30, 0xd7, 0xe4, 0xe2, 0x6e, 0x12}},
+	{nil, // 58
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20},
+		[]byte{0x09, 0x53, 0xe2, 0x25, 0x8e, 0x8e, 0x90, 0xa1}},
+	{nil, // 59
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10},
+		[]byte{0x5b, 0x71, 0x1b, 0xc4, 0xce, 0xeb, 0xf2, 0xee}},
+	{nil, // 60
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08},
+		[]byte{0xcc, 0x08, 0x3f, 0x1e, 0x6d, 0x9e, 0x85, 0xf6}},
+	{nil, // 61
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04},
+		[]byte{0xd2, 0xfd, 0x88, 0x67, 0xd5, 0x0d, 0x2d, 0xfe}},
+	{nil, // 62
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02},
+		[]byte{0x06, 0xe7, 0xea, 0x22, 0xce, 0x92, 0x70, 0x8f}},
+	{nil, // 63
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01},
+		[]byte{0x16, 0x6b, 0x40, 0xb4, 0x4a, 0xba, 0x4b, 0xd6}},
+}
+
+// Plaintext for use with Table A.2 tests
+var tableA2Plaintext = []byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}
+
+// Table A.2 Resulting Ciphertext from the Variable Key Known Answer Test
+var tableA2Tests = []CryptTest{
+	{ // 0
+		[]byte{
+			0x80, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x80, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x80, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x95, 0xa8, 0xd7, 0x28, 0x13, 0xda, 0xa9, 0x4d}},
+	{ // 1
+		[]byte{
+			0x40, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x40, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x40, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x0e, 0xec, 0x14, 0x87, 0xdd, 0x8c, 0x26, 0xd5}},
+	{ // 2
+		[]byte{
+			0x20, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x20, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x20, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x7a, 0xd1, 0x6f, 0xfb, 0x79, 0xc4, 0x59, 0x26}},
+	{ // 3
+		[]byte{
+			0x10, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x10, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x10, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xd3, 0x74, 0x62, 0x94, 0xca, 0x6a, 0x6c, 0xf3}},
+	{ // 4
+		[]byte{
+			0x08, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x08, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x08, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x80, 0x9f, 0x5f, 0x87, 0x3c, 0x1f, 0xd7, 0x61}},
+	{ // 5
+		[]byte{
+			0x04, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x04, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x04, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xc0, 0x2f, 0xaf, 0xfe, 0xc9, 0x89, 0xd1, 0xfc}},
+	{ // 6
+		[]byte{
+			0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x46, 0x15, 0xaa, 0x1d, 0x33, 0xe7, 0x2f, 0x10}},
+	{ // 7
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x80, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x80, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x80, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x20, 0x55, 0x12, 0x33, 0x50, 0xc0, 0x08, 0x58}},
+	{ // 8
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x40, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x40, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x40, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xdf, 0x3b, 0x99, 0xd6, 0x57, 0x73, 0x97, 0xc8}},
+	{ // 9
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x20, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x20, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x20, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x31, 0xfe, 0x17, 0x36, 0x9b, 0x52, 0x88, 0xc9}},
+	{ // 10
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x10, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x10, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x10, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xdf, 0xdd, 0x3c, 0xc6, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x16, 0x42}},
+	{ // 11
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x08, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x08, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x08, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x17, 0x8c, 0x83, 0xce, 0x2b, 0x39, 0x9d, 0x94}},
+	{ // 12
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x50, 0xf6, 0x36, 0x32, 0x4a, 0x9b, 0x7f, 0x80}},
+	{ // 13
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xa8, 0x46, 0x8e, 0xe3, 0xbc, 0x18, 0xf0, 0x6d}},
+	{ // 14
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x80, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x80, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x80, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xa2, 0xdc, 0x9e, 0x92, 0xfd, 0x3c, 0xde, 0x92}},
+	{ // 15
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x40, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x40, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x40, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xca, 0xc0, 0x9f, 0x79, 0x7d, 0x03, 0x12, 0x87}},
+	{ // 16
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x20, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x20, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x20, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x90, 0xba, 0x68, 0x0b, 0x22, 0xae, 0xb5, 0x25}},
+	{ // 17
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x10, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x10, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x10, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xce, 0x7a, 0x24, 0xf3, 0x50, 0xe2, 0x80, 0xb6}},
+	{ // 18
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x08, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x08, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x08, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x88, 0x2b, 0xff, 0x0a, 0xa0, 0x1a, 0x0b, 0x87}},
+	{ // 19
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x25, 0x61, 0x02, 0x88, 0x92, 0x45, 0x11, 0xc2}},
+	{ // 20
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xc7, 0x15, 0x16, 0xc2, 0x9c, 0x75, 0xd1, 0x70}},
+	{ // 21
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x80, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x80, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x80, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x51, 0x99, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0x52, 0xc9, 0xf0, 0x59}},
+	{ // 22
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x40, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x40, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x40, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xc2, 0x2f, 0x0a, 0x29, 0x4a, 0x71, 0xf2, 0x9f}},
+	{ // 23
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x20, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x20, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x20, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xee, 0x37, 0x14, 0x83, 0x71, 0x4c, 0x02, 0xea}},
+	{ // 24
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x10, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x10, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x10, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xa8, 0x1f, 0xbd, 0x44, 0x8f, 0x9e, 0x52, 0x2f}},
+	{ // 25
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x08, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x08, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x08, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x4f, 0x64, 0x4c, 0x92, 0xe1, 0x92, 0xdf, 0xed}},
+	{ // 26
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x1a, 0xfa, 0x9a, 0x66, 0xa6, 0xdf, 0x92, 0xae}},
+	{ // 27
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xb3, 0xc1, 0xcc, 0x71, 0x5c, 0xb8, 0x79, 0xd8}},
+	{ // 28
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x80, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x80, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x80, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x19, 0xd0, 0x32, 0xe6, 0x4a, 0xb0, 0xbd, 0x8b}},
+	{ // 29
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x40, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x40, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x40, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x3c, 0xfa, 0xa7, 0xa7, 0xdc, 0x87, 0x20, 0xdc}},
+	{ // 30
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x20, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x20, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x20, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xb7, 0x26, 0x5f, 0x7f, 0x44, 0x7a, 0xc6, 0xf3}},
+	{ // 31
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x10, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x10, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x10, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x9d, 0xb7, 0x3b, 0x3c, 0x0d, 0x16, 0x3f, 0x54}},
+	{ // 32
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x08, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x08, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x08, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x81, 0x81, 0xb6, 0x5b, 0xab, 0xf4, 0xa9, 0x75}},
+	{ // 33
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x93, 0xc9, 0xb6, 0x40, 0x42, 0xea, 0xa2, 0x40}},
+	{ // 34
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x55, 0x70, 0x53, 0x08, 0x29, 0x70, 0x55, 0x92}},
+	{ // 35
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x80, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x80, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x80, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x86, 0x38, 0x80, 0x9e, 0x87, 0x87, 0x87, 0xa0}},
+	{ // 36
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x40, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x40, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x40, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x41, 0xb9, 0xa7, 0x9a, 0xf7, 0x9a, 0xc2, 0x08}},
+	{ // 37
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x20, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x20, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x20, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x7a, 0x9b, 0xe4, 0x2f, 0x20, 0x09, 0xa8, 0x92}},
+	{ // 38
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x10, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x10, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x10, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x29, 0x03, 0x8d, 0x56, 0xba, 0x6d, 0x27, 0x45}},
+	{ // 39
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x08, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x08, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x08, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x54, 0x95, 0xc6, 0xab, 0xf1, 0xe5, 0xdf, 0x51}},
+	{ // 40
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xae, 0x13, 0xdb, 0xd5, 0x61, 0x48, 0x89, 0x33}},
+	{ // 41
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x02, 0x4d, 0x1f, 0xfa, 0x89, 0x04, 0xe3, 0x89}},
+	{ // 42
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x80, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x80, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x80, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xd1, 0x39, 0x97, 0x12, 0xf9, 0x9b, 0xf0, 0x2e}},
+	{ // 43
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x40, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x40, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x40, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x14, 0xc1, 0xd7, 0xc1, 0xcf, 0xfe, 0xc7, 0x9e}},
+	{ // 44
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x20, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x20, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x20, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x1d, 0xe5, 0x27, 0x9d, 0xae, 0x3b, 0xed, 0x6f}},
+	{ // 45
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x10, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x10, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x10, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xe9, 0x41, 0xa3, 0x3f, 0x85, 0x50, 0x13, 0x03}},
+	{ // 46
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x08, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x08, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x08, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xda, 0x99, 0xdb, 0xbc, 0x9a, 0x03, 0xf3, 0x79}},
+	{ // 47
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xb7, 0xfc, 0x92, 0xf9, 0x1d, 0x8e, 0x92, 0xe9}},
+	{ // 48
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x01},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xae, 0x8e, 0x5c, 0xaa, 0x3c, 0xa0, 0x4e, 0x85}},
+	{ // 49
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x80,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x80,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x80},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x9c, 0xc6, 0x2d, 0xf4, 0x3b, 0x6e, 0xed, 0x74}},
+	{ // 50
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x40,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x40,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x40},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xd8, 0x63, 0xdb, 0xb5, 0xc5, 0x9a, 0x91, 0xa0}},
+	{ // 50
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x20,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x20,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x20},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xa1, 0xab, 0x21, 0x90, 0x54, 0x5b, 0x91, 0xd7}},
+	{ // 52
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x10,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x10,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x10},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x08, 0x75, 0x04, 0x1e, 0x64, 0xc5, 0x70, 0xf7}},
+	{ // 53
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x08,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x08,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x08},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x5a, 0x59, 0x45, 0x28, 0xbe, 0xbe, 0xf1, 0xcc}},
+	{ // 54
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xfc, 0xdb, 0x32, 0x91, 0xde, 0x21, 0xf0, 0xc0}},
+	{ // 55
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02,
+			0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x86, 0x9e, 0xfd, 0x7f, 0x9f, 0x26, 0x5a, 0x09}},
+}
+
+// Plaintext for use with Table A.3 tests
+var tableA3Plaintext = []byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}
+
+// Table A.3 Values To Be Used for the Permutation Operation Known Answer Test
+var tableA3Tests = []CryptTest{
+	{ // 0
+		[]byte{
+			0x10, 0x46, 0x91, 0x34, 0x89, 0x98, 0x01, 0x31,
+			0x10, 0x46, 0x91, 0x34, 0x89, 0x98, 0x01, 0x31,
+			0x10, 0x46, 0x91, 0x34, 0x89, 0x98, 0x01, 0x31,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x88, 0xd5, 0x5e, 0x54, 0xf5, 0x4c, 0x97, 0xb4}},
+	{ // 1
+		[]byte{
+			0x10, 0x07, 0x10, 0x34, 0x89, 0x98, 0x80, 0x20,
+			0x10, 0x07, 0x10, 0x34, 0x89, 0x98, 0x80, 0x20,
+			0x10, 0x07, 0x10, 0x34, 0x89, 0x98, 0x80, 0x20,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x0c, 0x0c, 0xc0, 0x0c, 0x83, 0xea, 0x48, 0xfd}},
+	{ // 2
+		[]byte{
+			0x10, 0x07, 0x10, 0x34, 0xc8, 0x98, 0x01, 0x20,
+			0x10, 0x07, 0x10, 0x34, 0xc8, 0x98, 0x01, 0x20,
+			0x10, 0x07, 0x10, 0x34, 0xc8, 0x98, 0x01, 0x20,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x83, 0xbc, 0x8e, 0xf3, 0xa6, 0x57, 0x01, 0x83}},
+	{ // 3
+		[]byte{
+			0x10, 0x46, 0x10, 0x34, 0x89, 0x98, 0x80, 0x20,
+			0x10, 0x46, 0x10, 0x34, 0x89, 0x98, 0x80, 0x20,
+			0x10, 0x46, 0x10, 0x34, 0x89, 0x98, 0x80, 0x20,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xdf, 0x72, 0x5d, 0xca, 0xd9, 0x4e, 0xa2, 0xe9}},
+	{ // 4
+		[]byte{
+			0x10, 0x86, 0x91, 0x15, 0x19, 0x19, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x10, 0x86, 0x91, 0x15, 0x19, 0x19, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x10, 0x86, 0x91, 0x15, 0x19, 0x19, 0x01, 0x01,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xe6, 0x52, 0xb5, 0x3b, 0x55, 0x0b, 0xe8, 0xb0}},
+	{ // 5
+		[]byte{
+			0x10, 0x86, 0x91, 0x15, 0x19, 0x58, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x10, 0x86, 0x91, 0x15, 0x19, 0x58, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x10, 0x86, 0x91, 0x15, 0x19, 0x58, 0x01, 0x01,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xaf, 0x52, 0x71, 0x20, 0xc4, 0x85, 0xcb, 0xb0}},
+	{ // 6
+		[]byte{
+			0x51, 0x07, 0xb0, 0x15, 0x19, 0x58, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x51, 0x07, 0xb0, 0x15, 0x19, 0x58, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x51, 0x07, 0xb0, 0x15, 0x19, 0x58, 0x01, 0x01,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x0f, 0x04, 0xce, 0x39, 0x3d, 0xb9, 0x26, 0xd5}},
+	{ // 7
+		[]byte{
+			0x10, 0x07, 0xb0, 0x15, 0x19, 0x19, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x10, 0x07, 0xb0, 0x15, 0x19, 0x19, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x10, 0x07, 0xb0, 0x15, 0x19, 0x19, 0x01, 0x01,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xc9, 0xf0, 0x0f, 0xfc, 0x74, 0x07, 0x90, 0x67}},
+	{ // 8
+		[]byte{
+			0x31, 0x07, 0x91, 0x54, 0x98, 0x08, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x31, 0x07, 0x91, 0x54, 0x98, 0x08, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x31, 0x07, 0x91, 0x54, 0x98, 0x08, 0x01, 0x01,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x7c, 0xfd, 0x82, 0xa5, 0x93, 0x25, 0x2b, 0x4e}},
+	{ // 9
+		[]byte{
+			0x31, 0x07, 0x91, 0x94, 0x98, 0x08, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x31, 0x07, 0x91, 0x94, 0x98, 0x08, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x31, 0x07, 0x91, 0x94, 0x98, 0x08, 0x01, 0x01,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xcb, 0x49, 0xa2, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0x13, 0x63, 0xe3}},
+	{ // 10
+		[]byte{
+			0x10, 0x07, 0x91, 0x15, 0xb9, 0x08, 0x01, 0x40,
+			0x10, 0x07, 0x91, 0x15, 0xb9, 0x08, 0x01, 0x40,
+			0x10, 0x07, 0x91, 0x15, 0xb9, 0x08, 0x01, 0x40,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x00, 0xb5, 0x88, 0xbe, 0x70, 0xd2, 0x3f, 0x56}},
+	{ // 11
+		[]byte{
+			0x31, 0x07, 0x91, 0x15, 0x98, 0x08, 0x01, 0x40,
+			0x31, 0x07, 0x91, 0x15, 0x98, 0x08, 0x01, 0x40,
+			0x31, 0x07, 0x91, 0x15, 0x98, 0x08, 0x01, 0x40,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x40, 0x6a, 0x9a, 0x6a, 0xb4, 0x33, 0x99, 0xae}},
+	{ // 12
+		[]byte{
+			0x10, 0x07, 0xd0, 0x15, 0x89, 0x98, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x10, 0x07, 0xd0, 0x15, 0x89, 0x98, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x10, 0x07, 0xd0, 0x15, 0x89, 0x98, 0x01, 0x01,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x6c, 0xb7, 0x73, 0x61, 0x1d, 0xca, 0x9a, 0xda}},
+	{ // 13
+		[]byte{
+			0x91, 0x07, 0x91, 0x15, 0x89, 0x98, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x91, 0x07, 0x91, 0x15, 0x89, 0x98, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x91, 0x07, 0x91, 0x15, 0x89, 0x98, 0x01, 0x01,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x67, 0xfd, 0x21, 0xc1, 0x7d, 0xbb, 0x5d, 0x70}},
+	{ // 14
+		[]byte{
+			0x91, 0x07, 0xd0, 0x15, 0x89, 0x19, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x91, 0x07, 0xd0, 0x15, 0x89, 0x19, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x91, 0x07, 0xd0, 0x15, 0x89, 0x19, 0x01, 0x01,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x95, 0x92, 0xcb, 0x41, 0x10, 0x43, 0x07, 0x87}},
+	{ // 15
+		[]byte{
+			0x10, 0x07, 0xd0, 0x15, 0x98, 0x98, 0x01, 0x20,
+			0x10, 0x07, 0xd0, 0x15, 0x98, 0x98, 0x01, 0x20,
+			0x10, 0x07, 0xd0, 0x15, 0x98, 0x98, 0x01, 0x20,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xa6, 0xb7, 0xff, 0x68, 0xa3, 0x18, 0xdd, 0xd3}},
+	{ // 16
+		[]byte{
+			0x10, 0x07, 0x94, 0x04, 0x98, 0x19, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x10, 0x07, 0x94, 0x04, 0x98, 0x19, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x10, 0x07, 0x94, 0x04, 0x98, 0x19, 0x01, 0x01,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x4d, 0x10, 0x21, 0x96, 0xc9, 0x14, 0xca, 0x16}},
+	{ // 17
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x07, 0x91, 0x04, 0x91, 0x19, 0x04, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x07, 0x91, 0x04, 0x91, 0x19, 0x04, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x07, 0x91, 0x04, 0x91, 0x19, 0x04, 0x01,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x2d, 0xfa, 0x9f, 0x45, 0x73, 0x59, 0x49, 0x65}},
+	{ // 18
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x07, 0x91, 0x04, 0x91, 0x19, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x07, 0x91, 0x04, 0x91, 0x19, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x07, 0x91, 0x04, 0x91, 0x19, 0x01, 0x01,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xb4, 0x66, 0x04, 0x81, 0x6c, 0x0e, 0x07, 0x74}},
+	{ // 19
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x07, 0x94, 0x04, 0x91, 0x19, 0x04, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x07, 0x94, 0x04, 0x91, 0x19, 0x04, 0x01,
+			0x01, 0x07, 0x94, 0x04, 0x91, 0x19, 0x04, 0x01,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x6e, 0x7e, 0x62, 0x21, 0xa4, 0xf3, 0x4e, 0x87}},
+	{ // 20
+		[]byte{
+			0x19, 0x07, 0x92, 0x10, 0x98, 0x1a, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x19, 0x07, 0x92, 0x10, 0x98, 0x1a, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x19, 0x07, 0x92, 0x10, 0x98, 0x1a, 0x01, 0x01,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xaa, 0x85, 0xe7, 0x46, 0x43, 0x23, 0x31, 0x99}},
+	{ // 21
+		[]byte{
+			0x10, 0x07, 0x91, 0x19, 0x98, 0x19, 0x08, 0x01,
+			0x10, 0x07, 0x91, 0x19, 0x98, 0x19, 0x08, 0x01,
+			0x10, 0x07, 0x91, 0x19, 0x98, 0x19, 0x08, 0x01,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x2e, 0x5a, 0x19, 0xdb, 0x4d, 0x19, 0x62, 0xd6}},
+	{ // 22
+		[]byte{
+			0x10, 0x07, 0x91, 0x19, 0x98, 0x1a, 0x08, 0x01,
+			0x10, 0x07, 0x91, 0x19, 0x98, 0x1a, 0x08, 0x01,
+			0x10, 0x07, 0x91, 0x19, 0x98, 0x1a, 0x08, 0x01,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x23, 0xa8, 0x66, 0xa8, 0x09, 0xd3, 0x08, 0x94}},
+	{ // 23
+		[]byte{
+			0x10, 0x07, 0x92, 0x10, 0x98, 0x19, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x10, 0x07, 0x92, 0x10, 0x98, 0x19, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x10, 0x07, 0x92, 0x10, 0x98, 0x19, 0x01, 0x01,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xd8, 0x12, 0xd9, 0x61, 0xf0, 0x17, 0xd3, 0x20}},
+	{ // 24
+		[]byte{
+			0x10, 0x07, 0x91, 0x15, 0x98, 0x19, 0x01, 0x0b,
+			0x10, 0x07, 0x91, 0x15, 0x98, 0x19, 0x01, 0x0b,
+			0x10, 0x07, 0x91, 0x15, 0x98, 0x19, 0x01, 0x0b,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x05, 0x56, 0x05, 0x81, 0x6e, 0x58, 0x60, 0x8f}},
+	{ // 25
+		[]byte{
+			0x10, 0x04, 0x80, 0x15, 0x98, 0x19, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x10, 0x04, 0x80, 0x15, 0x98, 0x19, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x10, 0x04, 0x80, 0x15, 0x98, 0x19, 0x01, 0x01,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xab, 0xd8, 0x8e, 0x8b, 0x1b, 0x77, 0x16, 0xf1}},
+	{ // 26
+		[]byte{
+			0x10, 0x04, 0x80, 0x15, 0x98, 0x19, 0x01, 0x02,
+			0x10, 0x04, 0x80, 0x15, 0x98, 0x19, 0x01, 0x02,
+			0x10, 0x04, 0x80, 0x15, 0x98, 0x19, 0x01, 0x02,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x53, 0x7a, 0xc9, 0x5b, 0xe6, 0x9d, 0xa1, 0xe1}},
+	{ // 27
+		[]byte{
+			0x10, 0x04, 0x80, 0x15, 0x98, 0x19, 0x01, 0x08,
+			0x10, 0x04, 0x80, 0x15, 0x98, 0x19, 0x01, 0x08,
+			0x10, 0x04, 0x80, 0x15, 0x98, 0x19, 0x01, 0x08,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xae, 0xd0, 0xf6, 0xae, 0x3c, 0x25, 0xcd, 0xd8}},
+	{ // 28
+		[]byte{
+			0x10, 0x02, 0x91, 0x15, 0x98, 0x10, 0x01, 0x04,
+			0x10, 0x02, 0x91, 0x15, 0x98, 0x10, 0x01, 0x04,
+			0x10, 0x02, 0x91, 0x15, 0x98, 0x10, 0x01, 0x04,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xb3, 0xe3, 0x5a, 0x5e, 0xe5, 0x3e, 0x7b, 0x8d}},
+	{ // 29
+		[]byte{
+			0x10, 0x02, 0x91, 0x15, 0x98, 0x19, 0x01, 0x04,
+			0x10, 0x02, 0x91, 0x15, 0x98, 0x19, 0x01, 0x04,
+			0x10, 0x02, 0x91, 0x15, 0x98, 0x19, 0x01, 0x04,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x61, 0xc7, 0x9c, 0x71, 0x92, 0x1a, 0x2e, 0xf8}},
+	{ // 30
+		[]byte{
+			0x10, 0x02, 0x91, 0x15, 0x98, 0x10, 0x02, 0x01,
+			0x10, 0x02, 0x91, 0x15, 0x98, 0x10, 0x02, 0x01,
+			0x10, 0x02, 0x91, 0x15, 0x98, 0x10, 0x02, 0x01,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0xe2, 0xf5, 0x72, 0x8f, 0x09, 0x95, 0x01, 0x3c}},
+	{ // 31
+		[]byte{
+			0x10, 0x02, 0x91, 0x16, 0x98, 0x10, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x10, 0x02, 0x91, 0x16, 0x98, 0x10, 0x01, 0x01,
+			0x10, 0x02, 0x91, 0x16, 0x98, 0x10, 0x01, 0x01,
+		},
+		nil,
+		[]byte{0x1a, 0xea, 0xc3, 0x9a, 0x61, 0xf0, 0xa4, 0x64}},
+}
+
+// Table A.4 Values To Be Used for the Substitution Table Known Answer Test
+var tableA4Tests = []CryptTest{
+	{ // 0
+		[]byte{
+			0x7c, 0xa1, 0x10, 0x45, 0x4a, 0x1a, 0x6e, 0x57,
+			0x7c, 0xa1, 0x10, 0x45, 0x4a, 0x1a, 0x6e, 0x57,
+			0x7c, 0xa1, 0x10, 0x45, 0x4a, 0x1a, 0x6e, 0x57},
+		[]byte{0x01, 0xa1, 0xd6, 0xd0, 0x39, 0x77, 0x67, 0x42},
+		[]byte{0x69, 0x0f, 0x5b, 0x0d, 0x9a, 0x26, 0x93, 0x9b}},
+	{ // 1
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x31, 0xd9, 0x61, 0x9d, 0xc1, 0x37, 0x6e,
+			0x01, 0x31, 0xd9, 0x61, 0x9d, 0xc1, 0x37, 0x6e,
+			0x01, 0x31, 0xd9, 0x61, 0x9d, 0xc1, 0x37, 0x6e},
+		[]byte{0x5c, 0xd5, 0x4c, 0xa8, 0x3d, 0xef, 0x57, 0xda},
+		[]byte{0x7a, 0x38, 0x9d, 0x10, 0x35, 0x4b, 0xd2, 0x71}},
+	{ // 2
+		[]byte{
+			0x07, 0xa1, 0x13, 0x3e, 0x4a, 0x0b, 0x26, 0x86,
+			0x07, 0xa1, 0x13, 0x3e, 0x4a, 0x0b, 0x26, 0x86,
+			0x07, 0xa1, 0x13, 0x3e, 0x4a, 0x0b, 0x26, 0x86},
+		[]byte{0x02, 0x48, 0xd4, 0x38, 0x06, 0xf6, 0x71, 0x72},
+		[]byte{0x86, 0x8e, 0xbb, 0x51, 0xca, 0xb4, 0x59, 0x9a}},
+	{ // 3
+		[]byte{
+			0x38, 0x49, 0x67, 0x4c, 0x26, 0x02, 0x31, 0x9e,
+			0x38, 0x49, 0x67, 0x4c, 0x26, 0x02, 0x31, 0x9e,
+			0x38, 0x49, 0x67, 0x4c, 0x26, 0x02, 0x31, 0x9e},
+		[]byte{0x51, 0x45, 0x4b, 0x58, 0x2d, 0xdf, 0x44, 0x0a},
+		[]byte{0x71, 0x78, 0x87, 0x6e, 0x01, 0xf1, 0x9b, 0x2a}},
+	{ // 4
+		[]byte{
+			0x04, 0xb9, 0x15, 0xba, 0x43, 0xfe, 0xb5, 0xb6,
+			0x04, 0xb9, 0x15, 0xba, 0x43, 0xfe, 0xb5, 0xb6,
+			0x04, 0xb9, 0x15, 0xba, 0x43, 0xfe, 0xb5, 0xb6},
+		[]byte{0x42, 0xfd, 0x44, 0x30, 0x59, 0x57, 0x7f, 0xa2},
+		[]byte{0xaf, 0x37, 0xfb, 0x42, 0x1f, 0x8c, 0x40, 0x95}},
+	{ // 5
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x13, 0xb9, 0x70, 0xfd, 0x34, 0xf2, 0xce,
+			0x01, 0x13, 0xb9, 0x70, 0xfd, 0x34, 0xf2, 0xce,
+			0x01, 0x13, 0xb9, 0x70, 0xfd, 0x34, 0xf2, 0xce},
+		[]byte{0x05, 0x9b, 0x5e, 0x08, 0x51, 0xcf, 0x14, 0x3a},
+		[]byte{0x86, 0xa5, 0x60, 0xf1, 0x0e, 0xc6, 0xd8, 0x5b}},
+	{ // 6
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x70, 0xf1, 0x75, 0x46, 0x8f, 0xb5, 0xe6,
+			0x01, 0x70, 0xf1, 0x75, 0x46, 0x8f, 0xb5, 0xe6,
+			0x01, 0x70, 0xf1, 0x75, 0x46, 0x8f, 0xb5, 0xe6},
+		[]byte{0x07, 0x56, 0xd8, 0xe0, 0x77, 0x47, 0x61, 0xd2},
+		[]byte{0x0c, 0xd3, 0xda, 0x02, 0x00, 0x21, 0xdc, 0x09}},
+	{ // 7
+		[]byte{
+			0x43, 0x29, 0x7f, 0xad, 0x38, 0xe3, 0x73, 0xfe,
+			0x43, 0x29, 0x7f, 0xad, 0x38, 0xe3, 0x73, 0xfe,
+			0x43, 0x29, 0x7f, 0xad, 0x38, 0xe3, 0x73, 0xfe},
+		[]byte{0x76, 0x25, 0x14, 0xb8, 0x29, 0xbf, 0x48, 0x6a},
+		[]byte{0xea, 0x67, 0x6b, 0x2c, 0xb7, 0xdb, 0x2b, 0x7a}},
+	{ // 8
+		[]byte{
+			0x07, 0xa7, 0x13, 0x70, 0x45, 0xda, 0x2a, 0x16,
+			0x07, 0xa7, 0x13, 0x70, 0x45, 0xda, 0x2a, 0x16,
+			0x07, 0xa7, 0x13, 0x70, 0x45, 0xda, 0x2a, 0x16},
+		[]byte{0x3b, 0xdd, 0x11, 0x90, 0x49, 0x37, 0x28, 0x02},
+		[]byte{0xdf, 0xd6, 0x4a, 0x81, 0x5c, 0xaf, 0x1a, 0x0f}},
+	{ // 9
+		[]byte{
+			0x04, 0x68, 0x91, 0x04, 0xc2, 0xfd, 0x3b, 0x2f,
+			0x04, 0x68, 0x91, 0x04, 0xc2, 0xfd, 0x3b, 0x2f,
+			0x04, 0x68, 0x91, 0x04, 0xc2, 0xfd, 0x3b, 0x2f},
+		[]byte{0x26, 0x95, 0x5f, 0x68, 0x35, 0xaf, 0x60, 0x9a},
+		[]byte{0x5c, 0x51, 0x3c, 0x9c, 0x48, 0x86, 0xc0, 0x88}},
+	{ // 10
+		[]byte{
+			0x37, 0xd0, 0x6b, 0xb5, 0x16, 0xcb, 0x75, 0x46,
+			0x37, 0xd0, 0x6b, 0xb5, 0x16, 0xcb, 0x75, 0x46,
+			0x37, 0xd0, 0x6b, 0xb5, 0x16, 0xcb, 0x75, 0x46},
+		[]byte{0x16, 0x4d, 0x5e, 0x40, 0x4f, 0x27, 0x52, 0x32},
+		[]byte{0x0a, 0x2a, 0xee, 0xae, 0x3f, 0xf4, 0xab, 0x77}},
+	{ // 11
+		[]byte{
+			0x1f, 0x08, 0x26, 0x0d, 0x1a, 0xc2, 0x46, 0x5e,
+			0x1f, 0x08, 0x26, 0x0d, 0x1a, 0xc2, 0x46, 0x5e,
+			0x1f, 0x08, 0x26, 0x0d, 0x1a, 0xc2, 0x46, 0x5e},
+		[]byte{0x6b, 0x05, 0x6e, 0x18, 0x75, 0x9f, 0x5c, 0xca},
+		[]byte{0xef, 0x1b, 0xf0, 0x3e, 0x5d, 0xfa, 0x57, 0x5a}},
+	{ // 12
+		[]byte{
+			0x58, 0x40, 0x23, 0x64, 0x1a, 0xba, 0x61, 0x76,
+			0x58, 0x40, 0x23, 0x64, 0x1a, 0xba, 0x61, 0x76,
+			0x58, 0x40, 0x23, 0x64, 0x1a, 0xba, 0x61, 0x76},
+		[]byte{0x00, 0x4b, 0xd6, 0xef, 0x09, 0x17, 0x60, 0x62},
+		[]byte{0x88, 0xbf, 0x0d, 0xb6, 0xd7, 0x0d, 0xee, 0x56}},
+	{ // 13
+		[]byte{
+			0x02, 0x58, 0x16, 0x16, 0x46, 0x29, 0xb0, 0x07,
+			0x02, 0x58, 0x16, 0x16, 0x46, 0x29, 0xb0, 0x07,
+			0x02, 0x58, 0x16, 0x16, 0x46, 0x29, 0xb0, 0x07},
+		[]byte{0x48, 0x0d, 0x39, 0x00, 0x6e, 0xe7, 0x62, 0xf2},
+		[]byte{0xa1, 0xf9, 0x91, 0x55, 0x41, 0x02, 0x0b, 0x56}},
+	{ // 14
+		[]byte{
+			0x49, 0x79, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0x79, 0xb3, 0x25, 0x8f,
+			0x49, 0x79, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0x79, 0xb3, 0x25, 0x8f,
+			0x49, 0x79, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0x79, 0xb3, 0x25, 0x8f},
+		[]byte{0x43, 0x75, 0x40, 0xc8, 0x69, 0x8f, 0x3c, 0xfa},
+		[]byte{0x6f, 0xbf, 0x1c, 0xaf, 0xcf, 0xfd, 0x05, 0x56}},
+	{ // 15
+		[]byte{
+			0x4f, 0xb0, 0x5e, 0x15, 0x15, 0xab, 0x73, 0xa7,
+			0x4f, 0xb0, 0x5e, 0x15, 0x15, 0xab, 0x73, 0xa7,
+			0x4f, 0xb0, 0x5e, 0x15, 0x15, 0xab, 0x73, 0xa7},
+		[]byte{0x07, 0x2d, 0x43, 0xa0, 0x77, 0x07, 0x52, 0x92},
+		[]byte{0x2f, 0x22, 0xe4, 0x9b, 0xab, 0x7c, 0xa1, 0xac}},
+	{ // 16
+		[]byte{
+			0x49, 0xe9, 0x5d, 0x6d, 0x4c, 0xa2, 0x29, 0xbf,
+			0x49, 0xe9, 0x5d, 0x6d, 0x4c, 0xa2, 0x29, 0xbf,
+			0x49, 0xe9, 0x5d, 0x6d, 0x4c, 0xa2, 0x29, 0xbf},
+		[]byte{0x02, 0xfe, 0x55, 0x77, 0x81, 0x17, 0xf1, 0x2a},
+		[]byte{0x5a, 0x6b, 0x61, 0x2c, 0xc2, 0x6c, 0xce, 0x4a}},
+	{ // 17
+		[]byte{
+			0x01, 0x83, 0x10, 0xdc, 0x40, 0x9b, 0x26, 0xd6,
+			0x01, 0x83, 0x10, 0xdc, 0x40, 0x9b, 0x26, 0xd6,
+			0x01, 0x83, 0x10, 0xdc, 0x40, 0x9b, 0x26, 0xd6},
+		[]byte{0x1d, 0x9d, 0x5c, 0x50, 0x18, 0xf7, 0x28, 0xc2},
+		[]byte{0x5f, 0x4c, 0x03, 0x8e, 0xd1, 0x2b, 0x2e, 0x41}},
+	{ // 18
+		[]byte{
+			0x1c, 0x58, 0x7f, 0x1c, 0x13, 0x92, 0x4f, 0xef,
+			0x1c, 0x58, 0x7f, 0x1c, 0x13, 0x92, 0x4f, 0xef,
+			0x1c, 0x58, 0x7f, 0x1c, 0x13, 0x92, 0x4f, 0xef},
+		[]byte{0x30, 0x55, 0x32, 0x28, 0x6d, 0x6f, 0x29, 0x5a},
+		[]byte{0x63, 0xfa, 0xc0, 0xd0, 0x34, 0xd9, 0xf7, 0x93}},
+}
+
+func newCipher(key []byte) cipher.Block {
+	c, err := des.NewCipher(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic("NewCipher failed: " + err.Error())
+	}
+	return c
+}
+
+// Use the known weak keys to test DES implementation
+func TestWeakKeys(t *testing.T) {
+	for i, tt := range weakKeyTests {
+		var encrypt = func(in []byte) (out []byte) {
+			c := newCipher(tt.key)
+			out = make([]byte, len(in))
+			c.Encrypt(out, in)
+			return
+		}
+
+		// Encrypting twice with a DES weak
+		// key should reproduce the original input
+		result := encrypt(tt.in)
+		result = encrypt(result)
+
+		if !bytes.Equal(result, tt.in) {
+			t.Errorf("#%d: result: %x want: %x", i, result, tt.in)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Use the known semi-weak key pairs to test DES implementation
+func TestSemiWeakKeyPairs(t *testing.T) {
+	for i, tt := range semiWeakKeyTests {
+		var encrypt = func(key, in []byte) (out []byte) {
+			c := newCipher(key)
+			out = make([]byte, len(in))
+			c.Encrypt(out, in)
+			return
+		}
+
+		// Encrypting with one member of the semi-weak pair
+		// and then encrypting the result with the other member
+		// should reproduce the original input.
+		result := encrypt(tt.key, tt.in)
+		result = encrypt(tt.out, result)
+
+		if !bytes.Equal(result, tt.in) {
+			t.Errorf("#%d: result: %x want: %x", i, result, tt.in)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDESEncryptBlock(t *testing.T) {
+	for i, tt := range encryptDESTests {
+		c := newCipher(tt.key)
+		out := make([]byte, len(tt.in))
+		c.Encrypt(out, tt.in)
+
+		if !bytes.Equal(out, tt.out) {
+			t.Errorf("#%d: result: %x want: %x", i, out, tt.out)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDESDecryptBlock(t *testing.T) {
+	for i, tt := range encryptDESTests {
+		c := newCipher(tt.key)
+		plain := make([]byte, len(tt.in))
+		c.Decrypt(plain, tt.out)
+
+		if !bytes.Equal(plain, tt.in) {
+			t.Errorf("#%d: result: %x want: %x", i, plain, tt.in)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEncryptTripleDES(t *testing.T) {
+	for i, tt := range encryptTripleDESTests {
+		c, _ := des.NewTripleDESCipher(tt.key)
+		out := make([]byte, len(tt.in))
+		c.Encrypt(out, tt.in)
+
+		if !bytes.Equal(out, tt.out) {
+			t.Errorf("#%d: result: %x want: %x", i, out, tt.out)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDecryptTripleDES(t *testing.T) {
+	for i, tt := range encryptTripleDESTests {
+		c, _ := des.NewTripleDESCipher(tt.key)
+
+		plain := make([]byte, len(tt.in))
+		c.Decrypt(plain, tt.out)
+
+		if !bytes.Equal(plain, tt.in) {
+			t.Errorf("#%d: result: %x want: %x", i, plain, tt.in)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Defined in Pub 800-20
+func TestVariablePlaintextKnownAnswer(t *testing.T) {
+	for i, tt := range tableA1Tests {
+		c, _ := des.NewTripleDESCipher(tableA1Key)
+
+		out := make([]byte, len(tt.in))
+		c.Encrypt(out, tt.in)
+
+		if !bytes.Equal(out, tt.out) {
+			t.Errorf("#%d: result: %x want: %x", i, out, tt.out)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Defined in Pub 800-20
+func TestVariableCiphertextKnownAnswer(t *testing.T) {
+	for i, tt := range tableA1Tests {
+		c, _ := des.NewTripleDESCipher(tableA1Key)
+
+		plain := make([]byte, len(tt.out))
+		c.Decrypt(plain, tt.out)
+
+		if !bytes.Equal(plain, tt.in) {
+			t.Errorf("#%d: result: %x want: %x", i, plain, tt.in)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Defined in Pub 800-20
+// Encrypting the Table A.1 ciphertext with the
+// 0x01... key produces the original plaintext
+func TestInversePermutationKnownAnswer(t *testing.T) {
+	for i, tt := range tableA1Tests {
+		c, _ := des.NewTripleDESCipher(tableA1Key)
+
+		plain := make([]byte, len(tt.in))
+		c.Encrypt(plain, tt.out)
+
+		if !bytes.Equal(plain, tt.in) {
+			t.Errorf("#%d: result: %x want: %x", i, plain, tt.in)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Defined in Pub 800-20
+// Decrypting the Table A.1 plaintext with the
+// 0x01... key produces the corresponding ciphertext
+func TestInitialPermutationKnownAnswer(t *testing.T) {
+	for i, tt := range tableA1Tests {
+		c, _ := des.NewTripleDESCipher(tableA1Key)
+
+		out := make([]byte, len(tt.in))
+		c.Decrypt(out, tt.in)
+
+		if !bytes.Equal(out, tt.out) {
+			t.Errorf("#%d: result: %x want: %x", i, out, tt.out)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Defined in Pub 800-20
+func TestVariableKeyKnownAnswerEncrypt(t *testing.T) {
+	for i, tt := range tableA2Tests {
+		c, _ := des.NewTripleDESCipher(tt.key)
+
+		out := make([]byte, len(tableA2Plaintext))
+		c.Encrypt(out, tableA2Plaintext)
+
+		if !bytes.Equal(out, tt.out) {
+			t.Errorf("#%d: result: %x want: %x", i, out, tt.out)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Defined in Pub 800-20
+func TestVariableKeyKnownAnswerDecrypt(t *testing.T) {
+	for i, tt := range tableA2Tests {
+		c, _ := des.NewTripleDESCipher(tt.key)
+
+		out := make([]byte, len(tt.out))
+		c.Decrypt(out, tt.out)
+
+		if !bytes.Equal(out, tableA2Plaintext) {
+			t.Errorf("#%d: result: %x want: %x", i, out, tableA2Plaintext)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Defined in Pub 800-20
+func TestPermutationOperationKnownAnswerEncrypt(t *testing.T) {
+	for i, tt := range tableA3Tests {
+		c, _ := des.NewTripleDESCipher(tt.key)
+
+		out := make([]byte, len(tableA3Plaintext))
+		c.Encrypt(out, tableA3Plaintext)
+
+		if !bytes.Equal(out, tt.out) {
+			t.Errorf("#%d: result: %x want: %x", i, out, tt.out)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Defined in Pub 800-20
+func TestPermutationOperationKnownAnswerDecrypt(t *testing.T) {
+	for i, tt := range tableA3Tests {
+		c, _ := des.NewTripleDESCipher(tt.key)
+
+		out := make([]byte, len(tt.out))
+		c.Decrypt(out, tt.out)
+
+		if !bytes.Equal(out, tableA3Plaintext) {
+			t.Errorf("#%d: result: %x want: %x", i, out, tableA3Plaintext)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Defined in Pub 800-20
+func TestSubstitutionTableKnownAnswerEncrypt(t *testing.T) {
+	for i, tt := range tableA4Tests {
+		c, _ := des.NewTripleDESCipher(tt.key)
+
+		out := make([]byte, len(tt.in))
+		c.Encrypt(out, tt.in)
+
+		if !bytes.Equal(out, tt.out) {
+			t.Errorf("#%d: result: %x want: %x", i, out, tt.out)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Defined in Pub 800-20
+func TestSubstitutionTableKnownAnswerDecrypt(t *testing.T) {
+	for i, tt := range tableA4Tests {
+		c, _ := des.NewTripleDESCipher(tt.key)
+
+		out := make([]byte, len(tt.out))
+		c.Decrypt(out, tt.out)
+
+		if !bytes.Equal(out, tt.in) {
+			t.Errorf("#%d: result: %x want: %x", i, out, tt.in)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func BenchmarkEncrypt(b *testing.B) {
+	tt := encryptDESTests[0]
+	c, err := des.NewCipher(tt.key)
+	if err != nil {
+		b.Fatal("NewCipher:", err)
+	}
+	out := make([]byte, len(tt.in))
+	b.SetBytes(int64(len(out)))
+	b.ResetTimer()
+	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+		c.Encrypt(out, tt.in)
+	}
+}
+
+func BenchmarkDecrypt(b *testing.B) {
+	tt := encryptDESTests[0]
+	c, err := des.NewCipher(tt.key)
+	if err != nil {
+		b.Fatal("NewCipher:", err)
+	}
+	out := make([]byte, len(tt.out))
+	b.SetBytes(int64(len(out)))
+	b.ResetTimer()
+	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+		c.Decrypt(out, tt.out)
+	}
+}
+
+func BenchmarkTDESEncrypt(b *testing.B) {
+	tt := encryptTripleDESTests[0]
+	c, err := des.NewTripleDESCipher(tt.key)
+	if err != nil {
+		b.Fatal("NewCipher:", err)
+	}
+	out := make([]byte, len(tt.in))
+	b.SetBytes(int64(len(out)))
+	b.ResetTimer()
+	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+		c.Encrypt(out, tt.in)
+	}
+}
+
+func BenchmarkTDESDecrypt(b *testing.B) {
+	tt := encryptTripleDESTests[0]
+	c, err := des.NewTripleDESCipher(tt.key)
+	if err != nil {
+		b.Fatal("NewCipher:", err)
+	}
+	out := make([]byte, len(tt.out))
+	b.SetBytes(int64(len(out)))
+	b.ResetTimer()
+	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+		c.Decrypt(out, tt.out)
+	}
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/des/example_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package des_test
+
+import "crypto/des"
+
+func ExampleNewTripleDESCipher() {
+	// NewTripleDESCipher can also be used when EDE2 is required by
+	// duplicating the first 8 bytes of the 16-byte key.
+	ede2Key := []byte("example key 1234")
+
+	var tripleDESKey []byte
+	tripleDESKey = append(tripleDESKey, ede2Key[:16]...)
+	tripleDESKey = append(tripleDESKey, ede2Key[:8]...)
+
+	_, err := des.NewTripleDESCipher(tripleDESKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+
+	// See crypto/cipher for how to use a cipher.Block for encryption and
+	// decryption.
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/des/internal_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+// Copyright 2023 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package des
+
+import "testing"
+
+func TestInitialPermute(t *testing.T) {
+	for i := uint(0); i < 64; i++ {
+		bit := uint64(1) << i
+		got := permuteInitialBlock(bit)
+		want := uint64(1) << finalPermutation[63-i]
+		if got != want {
+			t.Errorf("permute(%x) = %x, want %x", bit, got, want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestFinalPermute(t *testing.T) {
+	for i := uint(0); i < 64; i++ {
+		bit := uint64(1) << i
+		got := permuteFinalBlock(bit)
+		want := uint64(1) << initialPermutation[63-i]
+		if got != want {
+			t.Errorf("permute(%x) = %x, want %x", bit, got, want)
+		}
+	}
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/dsa/dsa.go

@@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package dsa implements the Digital Signature Algorithm, as defined in FIPS 186-3.
+//
+// The DSA operations in this package are not implemented using constant-time algorithms.
+//
+// Deprecated: DSA is a legacy algorithm, and modern alternatives such as
+// Ed25519 (implemented by package crypto/ed25519) should be used instead. Keys
+// with 1024-bit moduli (L1024N160 parameters) are cryptographically weak, while
+// bigger keys are not widely supported. Note that FIPS 186-5 no longer approves
+// DSA for signature generation.
+package dsa
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"math/big"
+
+	"crypto/internal/randutil"
+)
+
+// Parameters represents the domain parameters for a key. These parameters can
+// be shared across many keys. The bit length of Q must be a multiple of 8.
+type Parameters struct {
+	P, Q, G *big.Int
+}
+
+// PublicKey represents a DSA public key.
+type PublicKey struct {
+	Parameters
+	Y *big.Int
+}
+
+// PrivateKey represents a DSA private key.
+type PrivateKey struct {
+	PublicKey
+	X *big.Int
+}
+
+// ErrInvalidPublicKey results when a public key is not usable by this code.
+// FIPS is quite strict about the format of DSA keys, but other code may be
+// less so. Thus, when using keys which may have been generated by other code,
+// this error must be handled.
+var ErrInvalidPublicKey = errors.New("crypto/dsa: invalid public key")
+
+// ParameterSizes is an enumeration of the acceptable bit lengths of the primes
+// in a set of DSA parameters. See FIPS 186-3, section 4.2.
+type ParameterSizes int
+
+const (
+	L1024N160 ParameterSizes = iota
+	L2048N224
+	L2048N256
+	L3072N256
+)
+
+// numMRTests is the number of Miller-Rabin primality tests that we perform. We
+// pick the largest recommended number from table C.1 of FIPS 186-3.
+const numMRTests = 64
+
+// GenerateParameters puts a random, valid set of DSA parameters into params.
+// This function can take many seconds, even on fast machines.
+func GenerateParameters(params *Parameters, rand io.Reader, sizes ParameterSizes) error {
+	// This function doesn't follow FIPS 186-3 exactly in that it doesn't
+	// use a verification seed to generate the primes. The verification
+	// seed doesn't appear to be exported or used by other code and
+	// omitting it makes the code cleaner.
+
+	var L, N int
+	switch sizes {
+	case L1024N160:
+		L = 1024
+		N = 160
+	case L2048N224:
+		L = 2048
+		N = 224
+	case L2048N256:
+		L = 2048
+		N = 256
+	case L3072N256:
+		L = 3072
+		N = 256
+	default:
+		return errors.New("crypto/dsa: invalid ParameterSizes")
+	}
+
+	qBytes := make([]byte, N/8)
+	pBytes := make([]byte, L/8)
+
+	q := new(big.Int)
+	p := new(big.Int)
+	rem := new(big.Int)
+	one := new(big.Int)
+	one.SetInt64(1)
+
+GeneratePrimes:
+	for {
+		if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, qBytes); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+
+		qBytes[len(qBytes)-1] |= 1
+		qBytes[0] |= 0x80
+		q.SetBytes(qBytes)
+
+		if !q.ProbablyPrime(numMRTests) {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		for i := 0; i < 4*L; i++ {
+			if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, pBytes); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+
+			pBytes[len(pBytes)-1] |= 1
+			pBytes[0] |= 0x80
+
+			p.SetBytes(pBytes)
+			rem.Mod(p, q)
+			rem.Sub(rem, one)
+			p.Sub(p, rem)
+			if p.BitLen() < L {
+				continue
+			}
+
+			if !p.ProbablyPrime(numMRTests) {
+				continue
+			}
+
+			params.P = p
+			params.Q = q
+			break GeneratePrimes
+		}
+	}
+
+	h := new(big.Int)
+	h.SetInt64(2)
+	g := new(big.Int)
+
+	pm1 := new(big.Int).Sub(p, one)
+	e := new(big.Int).Div(pm1, q)
+
+	for {
+		g.Exp(h, e, p)
+		if g.Cmp(one) == 0 {
+			h.Add(h, one)
+			continue
+		}
+
+		params.G = g
+		return nil
+	}
+}
+
+// GenerateKey generates a public&private key pair. The Parameters of the
+// [PrivateKey] must already be valid (see [GenerateParameters]).
+func GenerateKey(priv *PrivateKey, rand io.Reader) error {
+	if priv.P == nil || priv.Q == nil || priv.G == nil {
+		return errors.New("crypto/dsa: parameters not set up before generating key")
+	}
+
+	x := new(big.Int)
+	xBytes := make([]byte, priv.Q.BitLen()/8)
+
+	for {
+		_, err := io.ReadFull(rand, xBytes)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		x.SetBytes(xBytes)
+		if x.Sign() != 0 && x.Cmp(priv.Q) < 0 {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	priv.X = x
+	priv.Y = new(big.Int)
+	priv.Y.Exp(priv.G, x, priv.P)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// fermatInverse calculates the inverse of k in GF(P) using Fermat's method.
+// This has better constant-time properties than Euclid's method (implemented
+// in math/big.Int.ModInverse) although math/big itself isn't strictly
+// constant-time so it's not perfect.
+func fermatInverse(k, P *big.Int) *big.Int {
+	two := big.NewInt(2)
+	pMinus2 := new(big.Int).Sub(P, two)
+	return new(big.Int).Exp(k, pMinus2, P)
+}
+
+// Sign signs an arbitrary length hash (which should be the result of hashing a
+// larger message) using the private key, priv. It returns the signature as a
+// pair of integers. The security of the private key depends on the entropy of
+// rand.
+//
+// Note that FIPS 186-3 section 4.6 specifies that the hash should be truncated
+// to the byte-length of the subgroup. This function does not perform that
+// truncation itself.
+//
+// Be aware that calling Sign with an attacker-controlled [PrivateKey] may
+// require an arbitrary amount of CPU.
+func Sign(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash []byte) (r, s *big.Int, err error) {
+	randutil.MaybeReadByte(rand)
+
+	// FIPS 186-3, section 4.6
+
+	n := priv.Q.BitLen()
+	if priv.Q.Sign() <= 0 || priv.P.Sign() <= 0 || priv.G.Sign() <= 0 || priv.X.Sign() <= 0 || n%8 != 0 {
+		err = ErrInvalidPublicKey
+		return
+	}
+	n >>= 3
+
+	var attempts int
+	for attempts = 10; attempts > 0; attempts-- {
+		k := new(big.Int)
+		buf := make([]byte, n)
+		for {
+			_, err = io.ReadFull(rand, buf)
+			if err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+			k.SetBytes(buf)
+			// priv.Q must be >= 128 because the test above
+			// requires it to be > 0 and that
+			//    ceil(log_2(Q)) mod 8 = 0
+			// Thus this loop will quickly terminate.
+			if k.Sign() > 0 && k.Cmp(priv.Q) < 0 {
+				break
+			}
+		}
+
+		kInv := fermatInverse(k, priv.Q)
+
+		r = new(big.Int).Exp(priv.G, k, priv.P)
+		r.Mod(r, priv.Q)
+
+		if r.Sign() == 0 {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		z := k.SetBytes(hash)
+
+		s = new(big.Int).Mul(priv.X, r)
+		s.Add(s, z)
+		s.Mod(s, priv.Q)
+		s.Mul(s, kInv)
+		s.Mod(s, priv.Q)
+
+		if s.Sign() != 0 {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Only degenerate private keys will require more than a handful of
+	// attempts.
+	if attempts == 0 {
+		return nil, nil, ErrInvalidPublicKey
+	}
+
+	return
+}
+
+// Verify verifies the signature in r, s of hash using the public key, pub. It
+// reports whether the signature is valid.
+//
+// Note that FIPS 186-3 section 4.6 specifies that the hash should be truncated
+// to the byte-length of the subgroup. This function does not perform that
+// truncation itself.
+func Verify(pub *PublicKey, hash []byte, r, s *big.Int) bool {
+	// FIPS 186-3, section 4.7
+
+	if pub.P.Sign() == 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	if r.Sign() < 1 || r.Cmp(pub.Q) >= 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+	if s.Sign() < 1 || s.Cmp(pub.Q) >= 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	w := new(big.Int).ModInverse(s, pub.Q)
+	if w == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	n := pub.Q.BitLen()
+	if n%8 != 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+	z := new(big.Int).SetBytes(hash)
+
+	u1 := new(big.Int).Mul(z, w)
+	u1.Mod(u1, pub.Q)
+	u2 := w.Mul(r, w)
+	u2.Mod(u2, pub.Q)
+	v := u1.Exp(pub.G, u1, pub.P)
+	u2.Exp(pub.Y, u2, pub.P)
+	v.Mul(v, u2)
+	v.Mod(v, pub.P)
+	v.Mod(v, pub.Q)
+
+	return v.Cmp(r) == 0
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/dsa/dsa_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package dsa
+
+import (
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"math/big"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func testSignAndVerify(t *testing.T, i int, priv *PrivateKey) {
+	hashed := []byte("testing")
+	r, s, err := Sign(rand.Reader, priv, hashed)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("%d: error signing: %s", i, err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	if !Verify(&priv.PublicKey, hashed, r, s) {
+		t.Errorf("%d: Verify failed", i)
+	}
+}
+
+func testParameterGeneration(t *testing.T, sizes ParameterSizes, L, N int) {
+	var priv PrivateKey
+	params := &priv.Parameters
+
+	err := GenerateParameters(params, rand.Reader, sizes)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("%d: %s", int(sizes), err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	if params.P.BitLen() != L {
+		t.Errorf("%d: params.BitLen got:%d want:%d", int(sizes), params.P.BitLen(), L)
+	}
+
+	if params.Q.BitLen() != N {
+		t.Errorf("%d: q.BitLen got:%d want:%d", int(sizes), params.Q.BitLen(), L)
+	}
+
+	one := new(big.Int)
+	one.SetInt64(1)
+	pm1 := new(big.Int).Sub(params.P, one)
+	quo, rem := new(big.Int).DivMod(pm1, params.Q, new(big.Int))
+	if rem.Sign() != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("%d: p-1 mod q != 0", int(sizes))
+	}
+	x := new(big.Int).Exp(params.G, quo, params.P)
+	if x.Cmp(one) == 0 {
+		t.Errorf("%d: invalid generator", int(sizes))
+	}
+
+	err = GenerateKey(&priv, rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("error generating key: %s", err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	testSignAndVerify(t, int(sizes), &priv)
+}
+
+func TestParameterGeneration(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("skipping parameter generation test in short mode")
+	}
+
+	testParameterGeneration(t, L1024N160, 1024, 160)
+	testParameterGeneration(t, L2048N224, 2048, 224)
+	testParameterGeneration(t, L2048N256, 2048, 256)
+	testParameterGeneration(t, L3072N256, 3072, 256)
+}
+
+func fromHex(s string) *big.Int {
+	result, ok := new(big.Int).SetString(s, 16)
+	if !ok {
+		panic(s)
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+func TestSignAndVerify(t *testing.T) {
+	priv := PrivateKey{
+		PublicKey: PublicKey{
+			Parameters: Parameters{
+				P: fromHex("A9B5B793FB4785793D246BAE77E8FF63CA52F442DA763C440259919FE1BC1D6065A9350637A04F75A2F039401D49F08E066C4D275A5A65DA5684BC563C14289D7AB8A67163BFBF79D85972619AD2CFF55AB0EE77A9002B0EF96293BDD0F42685EBB2C66C327079F6C98000FBCB79AACDE1BC6F9D5C7B1A97E3D9D54ED7951FEF"),
+				Q: fromHex("E1D3391245933D68A0714ED34BBCB7A1F422B9C1"),
+				G: fromHex("634364FC25248933D01D1993ECABD0657CC0CB2CEED7ED2E3E8AECDFCDC4A25C3B15E9E3B163ACA2984B5539181F3EFF1A5E8903D71D5B95DA4F27202B77D2C44B430BB53741A8D59A8F86887525C9F2A6A5980A195EAA7F2FF910064301DEF89D3AA213E1FAC7768D89365318E370AF54A112EFBA9246D9158386BA1B4EEFDA"),
+			},
+			Y: fromHex("32969E5780CFE1C849A1C276D7AEB4F38A23B591739AA2FE197349AEEBD31366AEE5EB7E6C6DDB7C57D02432B30DB5AA66D9884299FAA72568944E4EEDC92EA3FBC6F39F53412FBCC563208F7C15B737AC8910DBC2D9C9B8C001E72FDC40EB694AB1F06A5A2DBD18D9E36C66F31F566742F11EC0A52E9F7B89355C02FB5D32D2"),
+		},
+		X: fromHex("5078D4D29795CBE76D3AACFE48C9AF0BCDBEE91A"),
+	}
+
+	testSignAndVerify(t, 0, &priv)
+}
+
+func TestSignAndVerifyWithBadPublicKey(t *testing.T) {
+	pub := PublicKey{
+		Parameters: Parameters{
+			P: fromHex("A9B5B793FB4785793D246BAE77E8FF63CA52F442DA763C440259919FE1BC1D6065A9350637A04F75A2F039401D49F08E066C4D275A5A65DA5684BC563C14289D7AB8A67163BFBF79D85972619AD2CFF55AB0EE77A9002B0EF96293BDD0F42685EBB2C66C327079F6C98000FBCB79AACDE1BC6F9D5C7B1A97E3D9D54ED7951FEF"),
+			Q: fromHex("FA"),
+			G: fromHex("634364FC25248933D01D1993ECABD0657CC0CB2CEED7ED2E3E8AECDFCDC4A25C3B15E9E3B163ACA2984B5539181F3EFF1A5E8903D71D5B95DA4F27202B77D2C44B430BB53741A8D59A8F86887525C9F2A6A5980A195EAA7F2FF910064301DEF89D3AA213E1FAC7768D89365318E370AF54A112EFBA9246D9158386BA1B4EEFDA"),
+		},
+		Y: fromHex("32969E5780CFE1C849A1C276D7AEB4F38A23B591739AA2FE197349AEEBD31366AEE5EB7E6C6DDB7C57D02432B30DB5AA66D9884299FAA72568944E4EEDC92EA3FBC6F39F53412FBCC563208F7C15B737AC8910DBC2D9C9B8C001E72FDC40EB694AB1F06A5A2DBD18D9E36C66F31F566742F11EC0A52E9F7B89355C02FB5D32D2"),
+	}
+
+	if Verify(&pub, []byte("testing"), fromHex("2"), fromHex("4")) {
+		t.Errorf("Verify unexpected success with non-existent mod inverse of Q")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSigningWithDegenerateKeys(t *testing.T) {
+	// Signing with degenerate private keys should not cause an infinite
+	// loop.
+	badKeys := []struct {
+		p, q, g, y, x string
+	}{
+		{"00", "01", "00", "00", "00"},
+		{"01", "ff", "00", "00", "00"},
+	}
+
+	for i, test := range badKeys {
+		priv := PrivateKey{
+			PublicKey: PublicKey{
+				Parameters: Parameters{
+					P: fromHex(test.p),
+					Q: fromHex(test.q),
+					G: fromHex(test.g),
+				},
+				Y: fromHex(test.y),
+			},
+			X: fromHex(test.x),
+		}
+
+		hashed := []byte("testing")
+		if _, _, err := Sign(rand.Reader, &priv, hashed); err == nil {
+			t.Errorf("#%d: unexpected success", i)
+		}
+	}
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/ecdh/ecdh.go

@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package ecdh implements Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman over
+// NIST curves and Curve25519.
+package ecdh
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/internal/boring"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"sync"
+)
+
+type Curve interface {
+	// GenerateKey generates a random PrivateKey.
+	//
+	// Most applications should use [crypto/rand.Reader] as rand. Note that the
+	// returned key does not depend deterministically on the bytes read from rand,
+	// and may change between calls and/or between versions.
+	GenerateKey(rand io.Reader) (*PrivateKey, error)
+
+	// NewPrivateKey checks that key is valid and returns a PrivateKey.
+	//
+	// For NIST curves, this follows SEC 1, Version 2.0, Section 2.3.6, which
+	// amounts to decoding the bytes as a fixed length big endian integer and
+	// checking that the result is lower than the order of the curve. The zero
+	// private key is also rejected, as the encoding of the corresponding public
+	// key would be irregular.
+	//
+	// For X25519, this only checks the scalar length.
+	NewPrivateKey(key []byte) (*PrivateKey, error)
+
+	// NewPublicKey checks that key is valid and returns a PublicKey.
+	//
+	// For NIST curves, this decodes an uncompressed point according to SEC 1,
+	// Version 2.0, Section 2.3.4. Compressed encodings and the point at
+	// infinity are rejected.
+	//
+	// For X25519, this only checks the u-coordinate length. Adversarially
+	// selected public keys can cause ECDH to return an error.
+	NewPublicKey(key []byte) (*PublicKey, error)
+
+	// ecdh performs an ECDH exchange and returns the shared secret. It's exposed
+	// as the PrivateKey.ECDH method.
+	//
+	// The private method also allow us to expand the ECDH interface with more
+	// methods in the future without breaking backwards compatibility.
+	ecdh(local *PrivateKey, remote *PublicKey) ([]byte, error)
+
+	// privateKeyToPublicKey converts a PrivateKey to a PublicKey. It's exposed
+	// as the PrivateKey.PublicKey method.
+	//
+	// This method always succeeds: for X25519, the zero key can't be
+	// constructed due to clamping; for NIST curves, it is rejected by
+	// NewPrivateKey.
+	privateKeyToPublicKey(*PrivateKey) *PublicKey
+}
+
+// PublicKey is an ECDH public key, usually a peer's ECDH share sent over the wire.
+//
+// These keys can be parsed with [crypto/x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey] and encoded
+// with [crypto/x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey]. For NIST curves, they then need to
+// be converted with [crypto/ecdsa.PublicKey.ECDH] after parsing.
+type PublicKey struct {
+	curve     Curve
+	publicKey []byte
+	boring    *boring.PublicKeyECDH
+}
+
+// Bytes returns a copy of the encoding of the public key.
+func (k *PublicKey) Bytes() []byte {
+	// Copy the public key to a fixed size buffer that can get allocated on the
+	// caller's stack after inlining.
+	var buf [133]byte
+	return append(buf[:0], k.publicKey...)
+}
+
+// Equal returns whether x represents the same public key as k.
+//
+// Note that there can be equivalent public keys with different encodings which
+// would return false from this check but behave the same way as inputs to ECDH.
+//
+// This check is performed in constant time as long as the key types and their
+// curve match.
+func (k *PublicKey) Equal(x crypto.PublicKey) bool {
+	xx, ok := x.(*PublicKey)
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+	return k.curve == xx.curve &&
+		subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(k.publicKey, xx.publicKey) == 1
+}
+
+func (k *PublicKey) Curve() Curve {
+	return k.curve
+}
+
+// PrivateKey is an ECDH private key, usually kept secret.
+//
+// These keys can be parsed with [crypto/x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey] and encoded
+// with [crypto/x509.MarshalPKCS8PrivateKey]. For NIST curves, they then need to
+// be converted with [crypto/ecdsa.PrivateKey.ECDH] after parsing.
+type PrivateKey struct {
+	curve      Curve
+	privateKey []byte
+	boring     *boring.PrivateKeyECDH
+	// publicKey is set under publicKeyOnce, to allow loading private keys with
+	// NewPrivateKey without having to perform a scalar multiplication.
+	publicKey     *PublicKey
+	publicKeyOnce sync.Once
+}
+
+// ECDH performs an ECDH exchange and returns the shared secret. The [PrivateKey]
+// and [PublicKey] must use the same curve.
+//
+// For NIST curves, this performs ECDH as specified in SEC 1, Version 2.0,
+// Section 3.3.1, and returns the x-coordinate encoded according to SEC 1,
+// Version 2.0, Section 2.3.5. The result is never the point at infinity.
+//
+// For [X25519], this performs ECDH as specified in RFC 7748, Section 6.1. If
+// the result is the all-zero value, ECDH returns an error.
+func (k *PrivateKey) ECDH(remote *PublicKey) ([]byte, error) {
+	if k.curve != remote.curve {
+		return nil, errors.New("crypto/ecdh: private key and public key curves do not match")
+	}
+	return k.curve.ecdh(k, remote)
+}
+
+// Bytes returns a copy of the encoding of the private key.
+func (k *PrivateKey) Bytes() []byte {
+	// Copy the private key to a fixed size buffer that can get allocated on the
+	// caller's stack after inlining.
+	var buf [66]byte
+	return append(buf[:0], k.privateKey...)
+}
+
+// Equal returns whether x represents the same private key as k.
+//
+// Note that there can be equivalent private keys with different encodings which
+// would return false from this check but behave the same way as inputs to [ECDH].
+//
+// This check is performed in constant time as long as the key types and their
+// curve match.
+func (k *PrivateKey) Equal(x crypto.PrivateKey) bool {
+	xx, ok := x.(*PrivateKey)
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+	return k.curve == xx.curve &&
+		subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(k.privateKey, xx.privateKey) == 1
+}
+
+func (k *PrivateKey) Curve() Curve {
+	return k.curve
+}
+
+func (k *PrivateKey) PublicKey() *PublicKey {
+	k.publicKeyOnce.Do(func() {
+		if k.boring != nil {
+			// Because we already checked in NewPrivateKey that the key is valid,
+			// there should not be any possible errors from BoringCrypto,
+			// so we turn the error into a panic.
+			// (We can't return it anyhow.)
+			kpub, err := k.boring.PublicKey()
+			if err != nil {
+				panic("boringcrypto: " + err.Error())
+			}
+			k.publicKey = &PublicKey{
+				curve:     k.curve,
+				publicKey: kpub.Bytes(),
+				boring:    kpub,
+			}
+		} else {
+			k.publicKey = k.curve.privateKeyToPublicKey(k)
+		}
+	})
+	return k.publicKey
+}
+
+// Public implements the implicit interface of all standard library private
+// keys. See the docs of [crypto.PrivateKey].
+func (k *PrivateKey) Public() crypto.PublicKey {
+	return k.PublicKey()
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/ecdh/ecdh_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,525 @@
+// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package ecdh_test
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/ecdh"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"fmt"
+	"internal/testenv"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"regexp"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20"
+)
+
+// Check that PublicKey and PrivateKey implement the interfaces documented in
+// crypto.PublicKey and crypto.PrivateKey.
+var _ interface {
+	Equal(x crypto.PublicKey) bool
+} = &ecdh.PublicKey{}
+var _ interface {
+	Public() crypto.PublicKey
+	Equal(x crypto.PrivateKey) bool
+} = &ecdh.PrivateKey{}
+
+func TestECDH(t *testing.T) {
+	testAllCurves(t, func(t *testing.T, curve ecdh.Curve) {
+		aliceKey, err := curve.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		bobKey, err := curve.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+
+		alicePubKey, err := curve.NewPublicKey(aliceKey.PublicKey().Bytes())
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Error(err)
+		}
+		if !bytes.Equal(aliceKey.PublicKey().Bytes(), alicePubKey.Bytes()) {
+			t.Error("encoded and decoded public keys are different")
+		}
+		if !aliceKey.PublicKey().Equal(alicePubKey) {
+			t.Error("encoded and decoded public keys are different")
+		}
+
+		alicePrivKey, err := curve.NewPrivateKey(aliceKey.Bytes())
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Error(err)
+		}
+		if !bytes.Equal(aliceKey.Bytes(), alicePrivKey.Bytes()) {
+			t.Error("encoded and decoded private keys are different")
+		}
+		if !aliceKey.Equal(alicePrivKey) {
+			t.Error("encoded and decoded private keys are different")
+		}
+
+		bobSecret, err := bobKey.ECDH(aliceKey.PublicKey())
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		aliceSecret, err := aliceKey.ECDH(bobKey.PublicKey())
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+
+		if !bytes.Equal(bobSecret, aliceSecret) {
+			t.Error("two ECDH computations came out different")
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+type countingReader struct {
+	r io.Reader
+	n int
+}
+
+func (r *countingReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
+	n, err := r.r.Read(p)
+	r.n += n
+	return n, err
+}
+
+func TestGenerateKey(t *testing.T) {
+	testAllCurves(t, func(t *testing.T, curve ecdh.Curve) {
+		r := &countingReader{r: rand.Reader}
+		k, err := curve.GenerateKey(r)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+
+		// GenerateKey does rejection sampling. If the masking works correctly,
+		// the probability of a rejection is 1-ord(G)/2^ceil(log2(ord(G))),
+		// which for all curves is small enough (at most 2^-32, for P-256) that
+		// a bit flip is more likely to make this test fail than bad luck.
+		// Account for the extra MaybeReadByte byte, too.
+		if got, expected := r.n, len(k.Bytes())+1; got > expected {
+			t.Errorf("expected GenerateKey to consume at most %v bytes, got %v", expected, got)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+var vectors = map[ecdh.Curve]struct {
+	PrivateKey, PublicKey string
+	PeerPublicKey         string
+	SharedSecret          string
+}{
+	// NIST vectors from CAVS 14.1, ECC CDH Primitive (SP800-56A).
+	ecdh.P256(): {
+		PrivateKey: "7d7dc5f71eb29ddaf80d6214632eeae03d9058af1fb6d22ed80badb62bc1a534",
+		PublicKey: "04ead218590119e8876b29146ff89ca61770c4edbbf97d38ce385ed281d8a6b230" +
+			"28af61281fd35e2fa7002523acc85a429cb06ee6648325389f59edfce1405141",
+		PeerPublicKey: "04700c48f77f56584c5cc632ca65640db91b6bacce3a4df6b42ce7cc838833d287" +
+			"db71e509e3fd9b060ddb20ba5c51dcc5948d46fbf640dfe0441782cab85fa4ac",
+		SharedSecret: "46fc62106420ff012e54a434fbdd2d25ccc5852060561e68040dd7778997bd7b",
+	},
+	ecdh.P384(): {
+		PrivateKey: "3cc3122a68f0d95027ad38c067916ba0eb8c38894d22e1b15618b6818a661774ad463b205da88cf699ab4d43c9cf98a1",
+		PublicKey: "049803807f2f6d2fd966cdd0290bd410c0190352fbec7ff6247de1302df86f25d34fe4a97bef60cff548355c015dbb3e5f" +
+			"ba26ca69ec2f5b5d9dad20cc9da711383a9dbe34ea3fa5a2af75b46502629ad54dd8b7d73a8abb06a3a3be47d650cc99",
+		PeerPublicKey: "04a7c76b970c3b5fe8b05d2838ae04ab47697b9eaf52e764592efda27fe7513272734466b400091adbf2d68c58e0c50066" +
+			"ac68f19f2e1cb879aed43a9969b91a0839c4c38a49749b661efedf243451915ed0905a32b060992b468c64766fc8437a",
+		SharedSecret: "5f9d29dc5e31a163060356213669c8ce132e22f57c9a04f40ba7fcead493b457e5621e766c40a2e3d4d6a04b25e533f1",
+	},
+	// For some reason all field elements in the test vector (both scalars and
+	// base field elements), but not the shared secret output, have two extra
+	// leading zero bytes (which in big-endian are irrelevant). Removed here.
+	ecdh.P521(): {
+		PrivateKey: "017eecc07ab4b329068fba65e56a1f8890aa935e57134ae0ffcce802735151f4eac6564f6ee9974c5e6887a1fefee5743ae2241bfeb95d5ce31ddcb6f9edb4d6fc47",
+		PublicKey: "0400602f9d0cf9e526b29e22381c203c48a886c2b0673033366314f1ffbcba240ba42f4ef38a76174635f91e6b4ed34275eb01c8467d05ca80315bf1a7bbd945f550a5" +
+			"01b7c85f26f5d4b2d7355cf6b02117659943762b6d1db5ab4f1dbc44ce7b2946eb6c7de342962893fd387d1b73d7a8672d1f236961170b7eb3579953ee5cdc88cd2d",
+		PeerPublicKey: "0400685a48e86c79f0f0875f7bc18d25eb5fc8c0b07e5da4f4370f3a9490340854334b1e1b87fa395464c60626124a4e70d0f785601d37c09870ebf176666877a2046d" +
+			"01ba52c56fc8776d9e8f5db4f0cc27636d0b741bbe05400697942e80b739884a83bde99e0f6716939e632bc8986fa18dccd443a348b6c3e522497955a4f3c302f676",
+		SharedSecret: "005fc70477c3e63bc3954bd0df3ea0d1f41ee21746ed95fc5e1fdf90930d5e136672d72cc770742d1711c3c3a4c334a0ad9759436a4d3c5bf6e74b9578fac148c831",
+	},
+	// X25519 test vector from RFC 7748, Section 6.1.
+	ecdh.X25519(): {
+		PrivateKey:    "77076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c2a",
+		PublicKey:     "8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a",
+		PeerPublicKey: "de9edb7d7b7dc1b4d35b61c2ece435373f8343c85b78674dadfc7e146f882b4f",
+		SharedSecret:  "4a5d9d5ba4ce2de1728e3bf480350f25e07e21c947d19e3376f09b3c1e161742",
+	},
+}
+
+func TestVectors(t *testing.T) {
+	testAllCurves(t, func(t *testing.T, curve ecdh.Curve) {
+		v := vectors[curve]
+		key, err := curve.NewPrivateKey(hexDecode(t, v.PrivateKey))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if !bytes.Equal(key.PublicKey().Bytes(), hexDecode(t, v.PublicKey)) {
+			t.Error("public key derived from the private key does not match")
+		}
+		peer, err := curve.NewPublicKey(hexDecode(t, v.PeerPublicKey))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		secret, err := key.ECDH(peer)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if !bytes.Equal(secret, hexDecode(t, v.SharedSecret)) {
+			t.Errorf("shared secret does not match: %x %x %s %x", secret, sha256.Sum256(secret), v.SharedSecret,
+				sha256.Sum256(hexDecode(t, v.SharedSecret)))
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func hexDecode(t *testing.T, s string) []byte {
+	b, err := hex.DecodeString(s)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal("invalid hex string:", s)
+	}
+	return b
+}
+
+func TestString(t *testing.T) {
+	testAllCurves(t, func(t *testing.T, curve ecdh.Curve) {
+		s := fmt.Sprintf("%s", curve)
+		if s[:1] != "P" && s[:1] != "X" {
+			t.Errorf("unexpected Curve string encoding: %q", s)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func TestX25519Failure(t *testing.T) {
+	identity := hexDecode(t, "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000")
+	lowOrderPoint := hexDecode(t, "e0eb7a7c3b41b8ae1656e3faf19fc46ada098deb9c32b1fd866205165f49b800")
+	randomScalar := make([]byte, 32)
+	rand.Read(randomScalar)
+
+	t.Run("identity point", func(t *testing.T) { testX25519Failure(t, randomScalar, identity) })
+	t.Run("low order point", func(t *testing.T) { testX25519Failure(t, randomScalar, lowOrderPoint) })
+}
+
+func testX25519Failure(t *testing.T, private, public []byte) {
+	priv, err := ecdh.X25519().NewPrivateKey(private)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	pub, err := ecdh.X25519().NewPublicKey(public)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	secret, err := priv.ECDH(pub)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Error("expected ECDH error")
+	}
+	if secret != nil {
+		t.Errorf("unexpected ECDH output: %x", secret)
+	}
+}
+
+var invalidPrivateKeys = map[ecdh.Curve][]string{
+	ecdh.P256(): {
+		// Bad lengths.
+		"",
+		"01",
+		"01010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101",
+		"000101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101",
+		strings.Repeat("01", 200),
+		// Zero.
+		"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
+		// Order of the curve and above.
+		"ffffffff00000000ffffffffffffffffbce6faada7179e84f3b9cac2fc632551",
+		"ffffffff00000000ffffffffffffffffbce6faada7179e84f3b9cac2fc632552",
+		"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff",
+	},
+	ecdh.P384(): {
+		// Bad lengths.
+		"",
+		"01",
+		"0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101",
+		"00010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101",
+		strings.Repeat("01", 200),
+		// Zero.
+		"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
+		// Order of the curve and above.
+		"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffc7634d81f4372ddf581a0db248b0a77aecec196accc52973",
+		"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffc7634d81f4372ddf581a0db248b0a77aecec196accc52974",
+		"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff",
+	},
+	ecdh.P521(): {
+		// Bad lengths.
+		"",
+		"01",
+		"0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101",
+		"00010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101",
+		strings.Repeat("01", 200),
+		// Zero.
+		"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
+		// Order of the curve and above.
+		"01fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffa51868783bf2f966b7fcc0148f709a5d03bb5c9b8899c47aebb6fb71e91386409",
+		"01fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffa51868783bf2f966b7fcc0148f709a5d03bb5c9b8899c47aebb6fb71e9138640a",
+		"11fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffa51868783bf2f966b7fcc0148f709a5d03bb5c9b8899c47aebb6fb71e91386409",
+		"03fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff4a30d0f077e5f2cd6ff980291ee134ba0776b937113388f5d76df6e3d2270c812",
+	},
+	ecdh.X25519(): {
+		// X25519 only rejects bad lengths.
+		"",
+		"01",
+		"01010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101",
+		"000101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101",
+		strings.Repeat("01", 200),
+	},
+}
+
+func TestNewPrivateKey(t *testing.T) {
+	testAllCurves(t, func(t *testing.T, curve ecdh.Curve) {
+		for _, input := range invalidPrivateKeys[curve] {
+			k, err := curve.NewPrivateKey(hexDecode(t, input))
+			if err == nil {
+				t.Errorf("unexpectedly accepted %q", input)
+			} else if k != nil {
+				t.Error("PrivateKey was not nil on error")
+			} else if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "boringcrypto") {
+				t.Errorf("boringcrypto error leaked out: %v", err)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+var invalidPublicKeys = map[ecdh.Curve][]string{
+	ecdh.P256(): {
+		// Bad lengths.
+		"",
+		"04",
+		strings.Repeat("04", 200),
+		// Infinity.
+		"00",
+		// Compressed encodings.
+		"036b17d1f2e12c4247f8bce6e563a440f277037d812deb33a0f4a13945d898c296",
+		"02e2534a3532d08fbba02dde659ee62bd0031fe2db785596ef509302446b030852",
+		// Points not on the curve.
+		"046b17d1f2e12c4247f8bce6e563a440f277037d812deb33a0f4a13945d898c2964fe342e2fe1a7f9b8ee7eb4a7c0f9e162bce33576b315ececbb6406837bf51f6",
+		"0400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
+	},
+	ecdh.P384(): {
+		// Bad lengths.
+		"",
+		"04",
+		strings.Repeat("04", 200),
+		// Infinity.
+		"00",
+		// Compressed encodings.
+		"03aa87ca22be8b05378eb1c71ef320ad746e1d3b628ba79b9859f741e082542a385502f25dbf55296c3a545e3872760ab7",
+		"0208d999057ba3d2d969260045c55b97f089025959a6f434d651d207d19fb96e9e4fe0e86ebe0e64f85b96a9c75295df61",
+		// Points not on the curve.
+		"04aa87ca22be8b05378eb1c71ef320ad746e1d3b628ba79b9859f741e082542a385502f25dbf55296c3a545e3872760ab73617de4a96262c6f5d9e98bf9292dc29f8f41dbd289a147ce9da3113b5f0b8c00a60b1ce1d7e819d7a431d7c90ea0e60",
+		"04000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
+	},
+	ecdh.P521(): {
+		// Bad lengths.
+		"",
+		"04",
+		strings.Repeat("04", 200),
+		// Infinity.
+		"00",
+		// Compressed encodings.
+		"030035b5df64ae2ac204c354b483487c9070cdc61c891c5ff39afc06c5d55541d3ceac8659e24afe3d0750e8b88e9f078af066a1d5025b08e5a5e2fbc87412871902f3",
+		"0200c6858e06b70404e9cd9e3ecb662395b4429c648139053fb521f828af606b4d3dbaa14b5e77efe75928fe1dc127a2ffa8de3348b3c1856a429bf97e7e31c2e5bd66",
+		// Points not on the curve.
+		"0400c6858e06b70404e9cd9e3ecb662395b4429c648139053fb521f828af606b4d3dbaa14b5e77efe75928fe1dc127a2ffa8de3348b3c1856a429bf97e7e31c2e5bd66011839296a789a3bc0045c8a5fb42c7d1bd998f54449579b446817afbd17273e662c97ee72995ef42640c550b9013fad0761353c7086a272c24088be94769fd16651",
+		"04000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
+	},
+	ecdh.X25519(): {},
+}
+
+func TestNewPublicKey(t *testing.T) {
+	testAllCurves(t, func(t *testing.T, curve ecdh.Curve) {
+		for _, input := range invalidPublicKeys[curve] {
+			k, err := curve.NewPublicKey(hexDecode(t, input))
+			if err == nil {
+				t.Errorf("unexpectedly accepted %q", input)
+			} else if k != nil {
+				t.Error("PublicKey was not nil on error")
+			} else if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "boringcrypto") {
+				t.Errorf("boringcrypto error leaked out: %v", err)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func testAllCurves(t *testing.T, f func(t *testing.T, curve ecdh.Curve)) {
+	t.Run("P256", func(t *testing.T) { f(t, ecdh.P256()) })
+	t.Run("P384", func(t *testing.T) { f(t, ecdh.P384()) })
+	t.Run("P521", func(t *testing.T) { f(t, ecdh.P521()) })
+	t.Run("X25519", func(t *testing.T) { f(t, ecdh.X25519()) })
+}
+
+func BenchmarkECDH(b *testing.B) {
+	benchmarkAllCurves(b, func(b *testing.B, curve ecdh.Curve) {
+		c, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(make([]byte, 32), make([]byte, 12))
+		if err != nil {
+			b.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		rand := cipher.StreamReader{
+			S: c, R: zeroReader,
+		}
+
+		peerKey, err := curve.GenerateKey(rand)
+		if err != nil {
+			b.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		peerShare := peerKey.PublicKey().Bytes()
+		b.ResetTimer()
+		b.ReportAllocs()
+
+		var allocationsSink byte
+
+		for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+			key, err := curve.GenerateKey(rand)
+			if err != nil {
+				b.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			share := key.PublicKey().Bytes()
+			peerPubKey, err := curve.NewPublicKey(peerShare)
+			if err != nil {
+				b.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			secret, err := key.ECDH(peerPubKey)
+			if err != nil {
+				b.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			allocationsSink ^= secret[0] ^ share[0]
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func benchmarkAllCurves(b *testing.B, f func(b *testing.B, curve ecdh.Curve)) {
+	b.Run("P256", func(b *testing.B) { f(b, ecdh.P256()) })
+	b.Run("P384", func(b *testing.B) { f(b, ecdh.P384()) })
+	b.Run("P521", func(b *testing.B) { f(b, ecdh.P521()) })
+	b.Run("X25519", func(b *testing.B) { f(b, ecdh.X25519()) })
+}
+
+type zr struct{}
+
+// Read replaces the contents of dst with zeros. It is safe for concurrent use.
+func (zr) Read(dst []byte) (n int, err error) {
+	for i := range dst {
+		dst[i] = 0
+	}
+	return len(dst), nil
+}
+
+var zeroReader = zr{}
+
+const linkerTestProgram = `
+package main
+import "crypto/ecdh"
+import "crypto/rand"
+func main() {
+	curve := ecdh.P384()
+	key, err := curve.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil { panic(err) }
+	_, err = curve.NewPublicKey(key.PublicKey().Bytes())
+	if err != nil { panic(err) }
+	_, err = curve.NewPrivateKey(key.Bytes())
+	if err != nil { panic(err) }
+	_, err = key.ECDH(key.PublicKey())
+	if err != nil { panic(err) }
+	println("OK")
+}
+`
+
+// TestLinker ensures that using one curve does not bring all other
+// implementations into the binary. This also guarantees that govulncheck can
+// avoid warning about a curve-specific vulnerability if that curve is not used.
+func TestLinker(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("test requires running 'go build'")
+	}
+	testenv.MustHaveGoBuild(t)
+
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	hello := filepath.Join(dir, "hello.go")
+	err := os.WriteFile(hello, []byte(linkerTestProgram), 0664)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	run := func(args ...string) string {
+		cmd := exec.Command(args[0], args[1:]...)
+		cmd.Dir = dir
+		out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("%v: %v\n%s", args, err, string(out))
+		}
+		return string(out)
+	}
+
+	goBin := testenv.GoToolPath(t)
+	run(goBin, "build", "-o", "hello.exe", "hello.go")
+	if out := run("./hello.exe"); out != "OK\n" {
+		t.Error("unexpected output:", out)
+	}
+
+	// List all text symbols under crypto/... and make sure there are some for
+	// P384, but none for the other curves.
+	var consistent bool
+	nm := run(goBin, "tool", "nm", "hello.exe")
+	for _, match := range regexp.MustCompile(`(?m)T (crypto/.*)$`).FindAllStringSubmatch(nm, -1) {
+		symbol := strings.ToLower(match[1])
+		if strings.Contains(symbol, "p384") {
+			consistent = true
+		}
+		if strings.Contains(symbol, "p224") || strings.Contains(symbol, "p256") || strings.Contains(symbol, "p521") {
+			t.Errorf("unexpected symbol in program using only ecdh.P384: %s", match[1])
+		}
+	}
+	if !consistent {
+		t.Error("no P384 symbols found in program using ecdh.P384, test is broken")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMismatchedCurves(t *testing.T) {
+	curves := []struct {
+		name  string
+		curve ecdh.Curve
+	}{
+		{"P256", ecdh.P256()},
+		{"P384", ecdh.P384()},
+		{"P521", ecdh.P521()},
+		{"X25519", ecdh.X25519()},
+	}
+
+	for _, privCurve := range curves {
+		priv, err := privCurve.curve.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("failed to generate test key: %s", err)
+		}
+
+		for _, pubCurve := range curves {
+			if privCurve == pubCurve {
+				continue
+			}
+			t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s", privCurve.name, pubCurve.name), func(t *testing.T) {
+				pub, err := pubCurve.curve.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+				if err != nil {
+					t.Fatalf("failed to generate test key: %s", err)
+				}
+				expected := "crypto/ecdh: private key and public key curves do not match"
+				_, err = priv.ECDH(pub.PublicKey())
+				if err.Error() != expected {
+					t.Fatalf("unexpected error: want %q, got %q", expected, err)
+				}
+			})
+		}
+	}
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/ecdh/nist.go

@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
+// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package ecdh
+
+import (
+	"crypto/internal/boring"
+	"crypto/internal/nistec"
+	"crypto/internal/randutil"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"math/bits"
+)
+
+type nistCurve[Point nistPoint[Point]] struct {
+	name        string
+	newPoint    func() Point
+	scalarOrder []byte
+}
+
+// nistPoint is a generic constraint for the nistec Point types.
+type nistPoint[T any] interface {
+	Bytes() []byte
+	BytesX() ([]byte, error)
+	SetBytes([]byte) (T, error)
+	ScalarMult(T, []byte) (T, error)
+	ScalarBaseMult([]byte) (T, error)
+}
+
+func (c *nistCurve[Point]) String() string {
+	return c.name
+}
+
+var errInvalidPrivateKey = errors.New("crypto/ecdh: invalid private key")
+
+func (c *nistCurve[Point]) GenerateKey(rand io.Reader) (*PrivateKey, error) {
+	if boring.Enabled && rand == boring.RandReader {
+		key, bytes, err := boring.GenerateKeyECDH(c.name)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		return newBoringPrivateKey(c, key, bytes)
+	}
+
+	key := make([]byte, len(c.scalarOrder))
+	randutil.MaybeReadByte(rand)
+	for {
+		if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, key); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+
+		// Mask off any excess bits if the size of the underlying field is not a
+		// whole number of bytes, which is only the case for P-521. We use a
+		// pointer to the scalarOrder field because comparing generic and
+		// instantiated types is not supported.
+		if &c.scalarOrder[0] == &p521Order[0] {
+			key[0] &= 0b0000_0001
+		}
+
+		// In tests, rand will return all zeros and NewPrivateKey will reject
+		// the zero key as it generates the identity as a public key. This also
+		// makes this function consistent with crypto/elliptic.GenerateKey.
+		key[1] ^= 0x42
+
+		k, err := c.NewPrivateKey(key)
+		if err == errInvalidPrivateKey {
+			continue
+		}
+		return k, err
+	}
+}
+
+func (c *nistCurve[Point]) NewPrivateKey(key []byte) (*PrivateKey, error) {
+	if len(key) != len(c.scalarOrder) {
+		return nil, errors.New("crypto/ecdh: invalid private key size")
+	}
+	if isZero(key) || !isLess(key, c.scalarOrder) {
+		return nil, errInvalidPrivateKey
+	}
+	if boring.Enabled {
+		bk, err := boring.NewPrivateKeyECDH(c.name, key)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		return newBoringPrivateKey(c, bk, key)
+	}
+	k := &PrivateKey{
+		curve:      c,
+		privateKey: append([]byte{}, key...),
+	}
+	return k, nil
+}
+
+func newBoringPrivateKey(c Curve, bk *boring.PrivateKeyECDH, privateKey []byte) (*PrivateKey, error) {
+	k := &PrivateKey{
+		curve:      c,
+		boring:     bk,
+		privateKey: append([]byte(nil), privateKey...),
+	}
+	return k, nil
+}
+
+func (c *nistCurve[Point]) privateKeyToPublicKey(key *PrivateKey) *PublicKey {
+	boring.Unreachable()
+	if key.curve != c {
+		panic("crypto/ecdh: internal error: converting the wrong key type")
+	}
+	p, err := c.newPoint().ScalarBaseMult(key.privateKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		// This is unreachable because the only error condition of
+		// ScalarBaseMult is if the input is not the right size.
+		panic("crypto/ecdh: internal error: nistec ScalarBaseMult failed for a fixed-size input")
+	}
+	publicKey := p.Bytes()
+	if len(publicKey) == 1 {
+		// The encoding of the identity is a single 0x00 byte. This is
+		// unreachable because the only scalar that generates the identity is
+		// zero, which is rejected by NewPrivateKey.
+		panic("crypto/ecdh: internal error: nistec ScalarBaseMult returned the identity")
+	}
+	return &PublicKey{
+		curve:     key.curve,
+		publicKey: publicKey,
+	}
+}
+
+// isZero returns whether a is all zeroes in constant time.
+func isZero(a []byte) bool {
+	var acc byte
+	for _, b := range a {
+		acc |= b
+	}
+	return acc == 0
+}
+
+// isLess returns whether a < b, where a and b are big-endian buffers of the
+// same length and shorter than 72 bytes.
+func isLess(a, b []byte) bool {
+	if len(a) != len(b) {
+		panic("crypto/ecdh: internal error: mismatched isLess inputs")
+	}
+
+	// Copy the values into a fixed-size preallocated little-endian buffer.
+	// 72 bytes is enough for every scalar in this package, and having a fixed
+	// size lets us avoid heap allocations.
+	if len(a) > 72 {
+		panic("crypto/ecdh: internal error: isLess input too large")
+	}
+	bufA, bufB := make([]byte, 72), make([]byte, 72)
+	for i := range a {
+		bufA[i], bufB[i] = a[len(a)-i-1], b[len(b)-i-1]
+	}
+
+	// Perform a subtraction with borrow.
+	var borrow uint64
+	for i := 0; i < len(bufA); i += 8 {
+		limbA, limbB := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(bufA[i:]), binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(bufB[i:])
+		_, borrow = bits.Sub64(limbA, limbB, borrow)
+	}
+
+	// If there is a borrow at the end of the operation, then a < b.
+	return borrow == 1
+}
+
+func (c *nistCurve[Point]) NewPublicKey(key []byte) (*PublicKey, error) {
+	// Reject the point at infinity and compressed encodings.
+	if len(key) == 0 || key[0] != 4 {
+		return nil, errors.New("crypto/ecdh: invalid public key")
+	}
+	k := &PublicKey{
+		curve:     c,
+		publicKey: append([]byte{}, key...),
+	}
+	if boring.Enabled {
+		bk, err := boring.NewPublicKeyECDH(c.name, k.publicKey)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		k.boring = bk
+	} else {
+		// SetBytes also checks that the point is on the curve.
+		if _, err := c.newPoint().SetBytes(key); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+	return k, nil
+}
+
+func (c *nistCurve[Point]) ecdh(local *PrivateKey, remote *PublicKey) ([]byte, error) {
+	// Note that this function can't return an error, as NewPublicKey rejects
+	// invalid points and the point at infinity, and NewPrivateKey rejects
+	// invalid scalars and the zero value. BytesX returns an error for the point
+	// at infinity, but in a prime order group such as the NIST curves that can
+	// only be the result of a scalar multiplication if one of the inputs is the
+	// zero scalar or the point at infinity.
+
+	if boring.Enabled {
+		return boring.ECDH(local.boring, remote.boring)
+	}
+
+	boring.Unreachable()
+	p, err := c.newPoint().SetBytes(remote.publicKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if _, err := p.ScalarMult(p, local.privateKey); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return p.BytesX()
+}
+
+// P256 returns a [Curve] which implements NIST P-256 (FIPS 186-3, section D.2.3),
+// also known as secp256r1 or prime256v1.
+//
+// Multiple invocations of this function will return the same value, which can
+// be used for equality checks and switch statements.
+func P256() Curve { return p256 }
+
+var p256 = &nistCurve[*nistec.P256Point]{
+	name:        "P-256",
+	newPoint:    nistec.NewP256Point,
+	scalarOrder: p256Order,
+}
+
+var p256Order = []byte{
+	0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+	0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+	0xbc, 0xe6, 0xfa, 0xad, 0xa7, 0x17, 0x9e, 0x84,
+	0xf3, 0xb9, 0xca, 0xc2, 0xfc, 0x63, 0x25, 0x51}
+
+// P384 returns a [Curve] which implements NIST P-384 (FIPS 186-3, section D.2.4),
+// also known as secp384r1.
+//
+// Multiple invocations of this function will return the same value, which can
+// be used for equality checks and switch statements.
+func P384() Curve { return p384 }
+
+var p384 = &nistCurve[*nistec.P384Point]{
+	name:        "P-384",
+	newPoint:    nistec.NewP384Point,
+	scalarOrder: p384Order,
+}
+
+var p384Order = []byte{
+	0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+	0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+	0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+	0xc7, 0x63, 0x4d, 0x81, 0xf4, 0x37, 0x2d, 0xdf,
+	0x58, 0x1a, 0x0d, 0xb2, 0x48, 0xb0, 0xa7, 0x7a,
+	0xec, 0xec, 0x19, 0x6a, 0xcc, 0xc5, 0x29, 0x73}
+
+// P521 returns a [Curve] which implements NIST P-521 (FIPS 186-3, section D.2.5),
+// also known as secp521r1.
+//
+// Multiple invocations of this function will return the same value, which can
+// be used for equality checks and switch statements.
+func P521() Curve { return p521 }
+
+var p521 = &nistCurve[*nistec.P521Point]{
+	name:        "P-521",
+	newPoint:    nistec.NewP521Point,
+	scalarOrder: p521Order,
+}
+
+var p521Order = []byte{0x01, 0xff,
+	0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+	0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+	0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+	0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfa,
+	0x51, 0x86, 0x87, 0x83, 0xbf, 0x2f, 0x96, 0x6b,
+	0x7f, 0xcc, 0x01, 0x48, 0xf7, 0x09, 0xa5, 0xd0,
+	0x3b, 0xb5, 0xc9, 0xb8, 0x89, 0x9c, 0x47, 0xae,
+	0xbb, 0x6f, 0xb7, 0x1e, 0x91, 0x38, 0x64, 0x09}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/ecdh/x25519.go

@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package ecdh
+
+import (
+	"crypto/internal/edwards25519/field"
+	"crypto/internal/randutil"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+)
+
+var (
+	x25519PublicKeySize    = 32
+	x25519PrivateKeySize   = 32
+	x25519SharedSecretSize = 32
+)
+
+// X25519 returns a [Curve] which implements the X25519 function over Curve25519
+// (RFC 7748, Section 5).
+//
+// Multiple invocations of this function will return the same value, so it can
+// be used for equality checks and switch statements.
+func X25519() Curve { return x25519 }
+
+var x25519 = &x25519Curve{}
+
+type x25519Curve struct{}
+
+func (c *x25519Curve) String() string {
+	return "X25519"
+}
+
+func (c *x25519Curve) GenerateKey(rand io.Reader) (*PrivateKey, error) {
+	key := make([]byte, x25519PrivateKeySize)
+	randutil.MaybeReadByte(rand)
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, key); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return c.NewPrivateKey(key)
+}
+
+func (c *x25519Curve) NewPrivateKey(key []byte) (*PrivateKey, error) {
+	if len(key) != x25519PrivateKeySize {
+		return nil, errors.New("crypto/ecdh: invalid private key size")
+	}
+	return &PrivateKey{
+		curve:      c,
+		privateKey: append([]byte{}, key...),
+	}, nil
+}
+
+func (c *x25519Curve) privateKeyToPublicKey(key *PrivateKey) *PublicKey {
+	if key.curve != c {
+		panic("crypto/ecdh: internal error: converting the wrong key type")
+	}
+	k := &PublicKey{
+		curve:     key.curve,
+		publicKey: make([]byte, x25519PublicKeySize),
+	}
+	x25519Basepoint := [32]byte{9}
+	x25519ScalarMult(k.publicKey, key.privateKey, x25519Basepoint[:])
+	return k
+}
+
+func (c *x25519Curve) NewPublicKey(key []byte) (*PublicKey, error) {
+	if len(key) != x25519PublicKeySize {
+		return nil, errors.New("crypto/ecdh: invalid public key")
+	}
+	return &PublicKey{
+		curve:     c,
+		publicKey: append([]byte{}, key...),
+	}, nil
+}
+
+func (c *x25519Curve) ecdh(local *PrivateKey, remote *PublicKey) ([]byte, error) {
+	out := make([]byte, x25519SharedSecretSize)
+	x25519ScalarMult(out, local.privateKey, remote.publicKey)
+	if isZero(out) {
+		return nil, errors.New("crypto/ecdh: bad X25519 remote ECDH input: low order point")
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+func x25519ScalarMult(dst, scalar, point []byte) {
+	var e [32]byte
+
+	copy(e[:], scalar[:])
+	e[0] &= 248
+	e[31] &= 127
+	e[31] |= 64
+
+	var x1, x2, z2, x3, z3, tmp0, tmp1 field.Element
+	x1.SetBytes(point[:])
+	x2.One()
+	x3.Set(&x1)
+	z3.One()
+
+	swap := 0
+	for pos := 254; pos >= 0; pos-- {
+		b := e[pos/8] >> uint(pos&7)
+		b &= 1
+		swap ^= int(b)
+		x2.Swap(&x3, swap)
+		z2.Swap(&z3, swap)
+		swap = int(b)
+
+		tmp0.Subtract(&x3, &z3)
+		tmp1.Subtract(&x2, &z2)
+		x2.Add(&x2, &z2)
+		z2.Add(&x3, &z3)
+		z3.Multiply(&tmp0, &x2)
+		z2.Multiply(&z2, &tmp1)
+		tmp0.Square(&tmp1)
+		tmp1.Square(&x2)
+		x3.Add(&z3, &z2)
+		z2.Subtract(&z3, &z2)
+		x2.Multiply(&tmp1, &tmp0)
+		tmp1.Subtract(&tmp1, &tmp0)
+		z2.Square(&z2)
+
+		z3.Mult32(&tmp1, 121666)
+		x3.Square(&x3)
+		tmp0.Add(&tmp0, &z3)
+		z3.Multiply(&x1, &z2)
+		z2.Multiply(&tmp1, &tmp0)
+	}
+
+	x2.Swap(&x3, swap)
+	z2.Swap(&z3, swap)
+
+	z2.Invert(&z2)
+	x2.Multiply(&x2, &z2)
+	copy(dst[:], x2.Bytes())
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/ecdsa/boring.go

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+//go:build boringcrypto
+
+package ecdsa
+
+import (
+	"crypto/internal/boring"
+	"crypto/internal/boring/bbig"
+	"crypto/internal/boring/bcache"
+	"math/big"
+)
+
+// Cached conversions from Go PublicKey/PrivateKey to BoringCrypto.
+//
+// The first operation on a PublicKey or PrivateKey makes a parallel
+// BoringCrypto key and saves it in pubCache or privCache.
+//
+// We could just assume that once used in a Sign or Verify operation,
+// a particular key is never again modified, but that has not been a
+// stated assumption before. Just in case there is any existing code that
+// does modify the key between operations, we save the original values
+// alongside the cached BoringCrypto key and check that the real key
+// still matches before using the cached key. The theory is that the real
+// operations are significantly more expensive than the comparison.
+
+var pubCache bcache.Cache[PublicKey, boringPub]
+var privCache bcache.Cache[PrivateKey, boringPriv]
+
+func init() {
+	pubCache.Register()
+	privCache.Register()
+}
+
+type boringPub struct {
+	key  *boring.PublicKeyECDSA
+	orig PublicKey
+}
+
+func boringPublicKey(pub *PublicKey) (*boring.PublicKeyECDSA, error) {
+	b := pubCache.Get(pub)
+	if b != nil && publicKeyEqual(&b.orig, pub) {
+		return b.key, nil
+	}
+
+	b = new(boringPub)
+	b.orig = copyPublicKey(pub)
+	key, err := boring.NewPublicKeyECDSA(b.orig.Curve.Params().Name, bbig.Enc(b.orig.X), bbig.Enc(b.orig.Y))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	b.key = key
+	pubCache.Put(pub, b)
+	return key, nil
+}
+
+type boringPriv struct {
+	key  *boring.PrivateKeyECDSA
+	orig PrivateKey
+}
+
+func boringPrivateKey(priv *PrivateKey) (*boring.PrivateKeyECDSA, error) {
+	b := privCache.Get(priv)
+	if b != nil && privateKeyEqual(&b.orig, priv) {
+		return b.key, nil
+	}
+
+	b = new(boringPriv)
+	b.orig = copyPrivateKey(priv)
+	key, err := boring.NewPrivateKeyECDSA(b.orig.Curve.Params().Name, bbig.Enc(b.orig.X), bbig.Enc(b.orig.Y), bbig.Enc(b.orig.D))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	b.key = key
+	privCache.Put(priv, b)
+	return key, nil
+}
+
+func publicKeyEqual(k1, k2 *PublicKey) bool {
+	return k1.X != nil &&
+		k1.Curve.Params() == k2.Curve.Params() &&
+		k1.X.Cmp(k2.X) == 0 &&
+		k1.Y.Cmp(k2.Y) == 0
+}
+
+func privateKeyEqual(k1, k2 *PrivateKey) bool {
+	return publicKeyEqual(&k1.PublicKey, &k2.PublicKey) &&
+		k1.D.Cmp(k2.D) == 0
+}
+
+func copyPublicKey(k *PublicKey) PublicKey {
+	return PublicKey{
+		Curve: k.Curve,
+		X:     new(big.Int).Set(k.X),
+		Y:     new(big.Int).Set(k.Y),
+	}
+}
+
+func copyPrivateKey(k *PrivateKey) PrivateKey {
+	return PrivateKey{
+		PublicKey: copyPublicKey(&k.PublicKey),
+		D:         new(big.Int).Set(k.D),
+	}
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa.go

@@ -0,0 +1,672 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package ecdsa implements the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm, as
+// defined in FIPS 186-4 and SEC 1, Version 2.0.
+//
+// Signatures generated by this package are not deterministic, but entropy is
+// mixed with the private key and the message, achieving the same level of
+// security in case of randomness source failure.
+package ecdsa
+
+// [FIPS 186-4] references ANSI X9.62-2005 for the bulk of the ECDSA algorithm.
+// That standard is not freely available, which is a problem in an open source
+// implementation, because not only the implementer, but also any maintainer,
+// contributor, reviewer, auditor, and learner needs access to it. Instead, this
+// package references and follows the equivalent [SEC 1, Version 2.0].
+//
+// [FIPS 186-4]: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf
+// [SEC 1, Version 2.0]: https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/aes"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/ecdh"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/internal/bigmod"
+	"crypto/internal/boring"
+	"crypto/internal/boring/bbig"
+	"crypto/internal/nistec"
+	"crypto/internal/randutil"
+	"crypto/sha512"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"math/big"
+	"sync"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1"
+)
+
+// PublicKey represents an ECDSA public key.
+type PublicKey struct {
+	elliptic.Curve
+	X, Y *big.Int
+}
+
+// Any methods implemented on PublicKey might need to also be implemented on
+// PrivateKey, as the latter embeds the former and will expose its methods.
+
+// ECDH returns k as a [ecdh.PublicKey]. It returns an error if the key is
+// invalid according to the definition of [ecdh.Curve.NewPublicKey], or if the
+// Curve is not supported by crypto/ecdh.
+func (k *PublicKey) ECDH() (*ecdh.PublicKey, error) {
+	c := curveToECDH(k.Curve)
+	if c == nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("ecdsa: unsupported curve by crypto/ecdh")
+	}
+	if !k.Curve.IsOnCurve(k.X, k.Y) {
+		return nil, errors.New("ecdsa: invalid public key")
+	}
+	return c.NewPublicKey(elliptic.Marshal(k.Curve, k.X, k.Y))
+}
+
+// Equal reports whether pub and x have the same value.
+//
+// Two keys are only considered to have the same value if they have the same Curve value.
+// Note that for example [elliptic.P256] and elliptic.P256().Params() are different
+// values, as the latter is a generic not constant time implementation.
+func (pub *PublicKey) Equal(x crypto.PublicKey) bool {
+	xx, ok := x.(*PublicKey)
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+	return bigIntEqual(pub.X, xx.X) && bigIntEqual(pub.Y, xx.Y) &&
+		// Standard library Curve implementations are singletons, so this check
+		// will work for those. Other Curves might be equivalent even if not
+		// singletons, but there is no definitive way to check for that, and
+		// better to err on the side of safety.
+		pub.Curve == xx.Curve
+}
+
+// PrivateKey represents an ECDSA private key.
+type PrivateKey struct {
+	PublicKey
+	D *big.Int
+}
+
+// ECDH returns k as a [ecdh.PrivateKey]. It returns an error if the key is
+// invalid according to the definition of [ecdh.Curve.NewPrivateKey], or if the
+// Curve is not supported by [crypto/ecdh].
+func (k *PrivateKey) ECDH() (*ecdh.PrivateKey, error) {
+	c := curveToECDH(k.Curve)
+	if c == nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("ecdsa: unsupported curve by crypto/ecdh")
+	}
+	size := (k.Curve.Params().N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
+	if k.D.BitLen() > size*8 {
+		return nil, errors.New("ecdsa: invalid private key")
+	}
+	return c.NewPrivateKey(k.D.FillBytes(make([]byte, size)))
+}
+
+func curveToECDH(c elliptic.Curve) ecdh.Curve {
+	switch c {
+	case elliptic.P256():
+		return ecdh.P256()
+	case elliptic.P384():
+		return ecdh.P384()
+	case elliptic.P521():
+		return ecdh.P521()
+	default:
+		return nil
+	}
+}
+
+// Public returns the public key corresponding to priv.
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Public() crypto.PublicKey {
+	return &priv.PublicKey
+}
+
+// Equal reports whether priv and x have the same value.
+//
+// See [PublicKey.Equal] for details on how Curve is compared.
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Equal(x crypto.PrivateKey) bool {
+	xx, ok := x.(*PrivateKey)
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+	return priv.PublicKey.Equal(&xx.PublicKey) && bigIntEqual(priv.D, xx.D)
+}
+
+// bigIntEqual reports whether a and b are equal leaking only their bit length
+// through timing side-channels.
+func bigIntEqual(a, b *big.Int) bool {
+	return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(a.Bytes(), b.Bytes()) == 1
+}
+
+// Sign signs digest with priv, reading randomness from rand. The opts argument
+// is not currently used but, in keeping with the crypto.Signer interface,
+// should be the hash function used to digest the message.
+//
+// This method implements crypto.Signer, which is an interface to support keys
+// where the private part is kept in, for example, a hardware module. Common
+// uses can use the [SignASN1] function in this package directly.
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, digest []byte, opts crypto.SignerOpts) ([]byte, error) {
+	return SignASN1(rand, priv, digest)
+}
+
+// GenerateKey generates a new ECDSA private key for the specified curve.
+//
+// Most applications should use [crypto/rand.Reader] as rand. Note that the
+// returned key does not depend deterministically on the bytes read from rand,
+// and may change between calls and/or between versions.
+func GenerateKey(c elliptic.Curve, rand io.Reader) (*PrivateKey, error) {
+	randutil.MaybeReadByte(rand)
+
+	if boring.Enabled && rand == boring.RandReader {
+		x, y, d, err := boring.GenerateKeyECDSA(c.Params().Name)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		return &PrivateKey{PublicKey: PublicKey{Curve: c, X: bbig.Dec(x), Y: bbig.Dec(y)}, D: bbig.Dec(d)}, nil
+	}
+	boring.UnreachableExceptTests()
+
+	switch c.Params() {
+	case elliptic.P224().Params():
+		return generateNISTEC(p224(), rand)
+	case elliptic.P256().Params():
+		return generateNISTEC(p256(), rand)
+	case elliptic.P384().Params():
+		return generateNISTEC(p384(), rand)
+	case elliptic.P521().Params():
+		return generateNISTEC(p521(), rand)
+	default:
+		return generateLegacy(c, rand)
+	}
+}
+
+func generateNISTEC[Point nistPoint[Point]](c *nistCurve[Point], rand io.Reader) (*PrivateKey, error) {
+	k, Q, err := randomPoint(c, rand)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	priv := new(PrivateKey)
+	priv.PublicKey.Curve = c.curve
+	priv.D = new(big.Int).SetBytes(k.Bytes(c.N))
+	priv.PublicKey.X, priv.PublicKey.Y, err = c.pointToAffine(Q)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return priv, nil
+}
+
+// randomPoint returns a random scalar and the corresponding point using the
+// procedure given in FIPS 186-4, Appendix B.5.2 (rejection sampling).
+func randomPoint[Point nistPoint[Point]](c *nistCurve[Point], rand io.Reader) (k *bigmod.Nat, p Point, err error) {
+	k = bigmod.NewNat()
+	for {
+		b := make([]byte, c.N.Size())
+		if _, err = io.ReadFull(rand, b); err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+
+		// Mask off any excess bits to increase the chance of hitting a value in
+		// (0, N). These are the most dangerous lines in the package and maybe in
+		// the library: a single bit of bias in the selection of nonces would likely
+		// lead to key recovery, but no tests would fail. Look but DO NOT TOUCH.
+		if excess := len(b)*8 - c.N.BitLen(); excess > 0 {
+			// Just to be safe, assert that this only happens for the one curve that
+			// doesn't have a round number of bits.
+			if excess != 0 && c.curve.Params().Name != "P-521" {
+				panic("ecdsa: internal error: unexpectedly masking off bits")
+			}
+			b[0] >>= excess
+		}
+
+		// FIPS 186-4 makes us check k <= N - 2 and then add one.
+		// Checking 0 < k <= N - 1 is strictly equivalent.
+		// None of this matters anyway because the chance of selecting
+		// zero is cryptographically negligible.
+		if _, err = k.SetBytes(b, c.N); err == nil && k.IsZero() == 0 {
+			break
+		}
+
+		if testingOnlyRejectionSamplingLooped != nil {
+			testingOnlyRejectionSamplingLooped()
+		}
+	}
+
+	p, err = c.newPoint().ScalarBaseMult(k.Bytes(c.N))
+	return
+}
+
+// testingOnlyRejectionSamplingLooped is called when rejection sampling in
+// randomPoint rejects a candidate for being higher than the modulus.
+var testingOnlyRejectionSamplingLooped func()
+
+// errNoAsm is returned by signAsm and verifyAsm when the assembly
+// implementation is not available.
+var errNoAsm = errors.New("no assembly implementation available")
+
+// SignASN1 signs a hash (which should be the result of hashing a larger message)
+// using the private key, priv. If the hash is longer than the bit-length of the
+// private key's curve order, the hash will be truncated to that length. It
+// returns the ASN.1 encoded signature.
+//
+// The signature is randomized. Most applications should use [crypto/rand.Reader]
+// as rand. Note that the returned signature does not depend deterministically on
+// the bytes read from rand, and may change between calls and/or between versions.
+func SignASN1(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	randutil.MaybeReadByte(rand)
+
+	if boring.Enabled && rand == boring.RandReader {
+		b, err := boringPrivateKey(priv)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		return boring.SignMarshalECDSA(b, hash)
+	}
+	boring.UnreachableExceptTests()
+
+	csprng, err := mixedCSPRNG(rand, priv, hash)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	if sig, err := signAsm(priv, csprng, hash); err != errNoAsm {
+		return sig, err
+	}
+
+	switch priv.Curve.Params() {
+	case elliptic.P224().Params():
+		return signNISTEC(p224(), priv, csprng, hash)
+	case elliptic.P256().Params():
+		return signNISTEC(p256(), priv, csprng, hash)
+	case elliptic.P384().Params():
+		return signNISTEC(p384(), priv, csprng, hash)
+	case elliptic.P521().Params():
+		return signNISTEC(p521(), priv, csprng, hash)
+	default:
+		return signLegacy(priv, csprng, hash)
+	}
+}
+
+func signNISTEC[Point nistPoint[Point]](c *nistCurve[Point], priv *PrivateKey, csprng io.Reader, hash []byte) (sig []byte, err error) {
+	// SEC 1, Version 2.0, Section 4.1.3
+
+	k, R, err := randomPoint(c, csprng)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	// kInv = k⁻¹
+	kInv := bigmod.NewNat()
+	inverse(c, kInv, k)
+
+	Rx, err := R.BytesX()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	r, err := bigmod.NewNat().SetOverflowingBytes(Rx, c.N)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	// The spec wants us to retry here, but the chance of hitting this condition
+	// on a large prime-order group like the NIST curves we support is
+	// cryptographically negligible. If we hit it, something is awfully wrong.
+	if r.IsZero() == 1 {
+		return nil, errors.New("ecdsa: internal error: r is zero")
+	}
+
+	e := bigmod.NewNat()
+	hashToNat(c, e, hash)
+
+	s, err := bigmod.NewNat().SetBytes(priv.D.Bytes(), c.N)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	s.Mul(r, c.N)
+	s.Add(e, c.N)
+	s.Mul(kInv, c.N)
+
+	// Again, the chance of this happening is cryptographically negligible.
+	if s.IsZero() == 1 {
+		return nil, errors.New("ecdsa: internal error: s is zero")
+	}
+
+	return encodeSignature(r.Bytes(c.N), s.Bytes(c.N))
+}
+
+func encodeSignature(r, s []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	var b cryptobyte.Builder
+	b.AddASN1(asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+		addASN1IntBytes(b, r)
+		addASN1IntBytes(b, s)
+	})
+	return b.Bytes()
+}
+
+// addASN1IntBytes encodes in ASN.1 a positive integer represented as
+// a big-endian byte slice with zero or more leading zeroes.
+func addASN1IntBytes(b *cryptobyte.Builder, bytes []byte) {
+	for len(bytes) > 0 && bytes[0] == 0 {
+		bytes = bytes[1:]
+	}
+	if len(bytes) == 0 {
+		b.SetError(errors.New("invalid integer"))
+		return
+	}
+	b.AddASN1(asn1.INTEGER, func(c *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+		if bytes[0]&0x80 != 0 {
+			c.AddUint8(0)
+		}
+		c.AddBytes(bytes)
+	})
+}
+
+// inverse sets kInv to the inverse of k modulo the order of the curve.
+func inverse[Point nistPoint[Point]](c *nistCurve[Point], kInv, k *bigmod.Nat) {
+	if c.curve.Params().Name == "P-256" {
+		kBytes, err := nistec.P256OrdInverse(k.Bytes(c.N))
+		// Some platforms don't implement P256OrdInverse, and always return an error.
+		if err == nil {
+			_, err := kInv.SetBytes(kBytes, c.N)
+			if err != nil {
+				panic("ecdsa: internal error: P256OrdInverse produced an invalid value")
+			}
+			return
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Calculate the inverse of s in GF(N) using Fermat's method
+	// (exponentiation modulo P - 2, per Euler's theorem)
+	kInv.Exp(k, c.nMinus2, c.N)
+}
+
+// hashToNat sets e to the left-most bits of hash, according to
+// SEC 1, Section 4.1.3, point 5 and Section 4.1.4, point 3.
+func hashToNat[Point nistPoint[Point]](c *nistCurve[Point], e *bigmod.Nat, hash []byte) {
+	// ECDSA asks us to take the left-most log2(N) bits of hash, and use them as
+	// an integer modulo N. This is the absolute worst of all worlds: we still
+	// have to reduce, because the result might still overflow N, but to take
+	// the left-most bits for P-521 we have to do a right shift.
+	if size := c.N.Size(); len(hash) >= size {
+		hash = hash[:size]
+		if excess := len(hash)*8 - c.N.BitLen(); excess > 0 {
+			hash = bytes.Clone(hash)
+			for i := len(hash) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
+				hash[i] >>= excess
+				if i > 0 {
+					hash[i] |= hash[i-1] << (8 - excess)
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	_, err := e.SetOverflowingBytes(hash, c.N)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic("ecdsa: internal error: truncated hash is too long")
+	}
+}
+
+// mixedCSPRNG returns a CSPRNG that mixes entropy from rand with the message
+// and the private key, to protect the key in case rand fails. This is
+// equivalent in security to RFC 6979 deterministic nonce generation, but still
+// produces randomized signatures.
+func mixedCSPRNG(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash []byte) (io.Reader, error) {
+	// This implementation derives the nonce from an AES-CTR CSPRNG keyed by:
+	//
+	//    SHA2-512(priv.D || entropy || hash)[:32]
+	//
+	// The CSPRNG key is indifferentiable from a random oracle as shown in
+	// [Coron], the AES-CTR stream is indifferentiable from a random oracle
+	// under standard cryptographic assumptions (see [Larsson] for examples).
+	//
+	// [Coron]: https://cs.nyu.edu/~dodis/ps/merkle.pdf
+	// [Larsson]: https://web.archive.org/web/20040719170906/https://www.nada.kth.se/kurser/kth/2D1441/semteo03/lecturenotes/assump.pdf
+
+	// Get 256 bits of entropy from rand.
+	entropy := make([]byte, 32)
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, entropy); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	// Initialize an SHA-512 hash context; digest...
+	md := sha512.New()
+	md.Write(priv.D.Bytes()) // the private key,
+	md.Write(entropy)        // the entropy,
+	md.Write(hash)           // and the input hash;
+	key := md.Sum(nil)[:32]  // and compute ChopMD-256(SHA-512),
+	// which is an indifferentiable MAC.
+
+	// Create an AES-CTR instance to use as a CSPRNG.
+	block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	// Create a CSPRNG that xors a stream of zeros with
+	// the output of the AES-CTR instance.
+	const aesIV = "IV for ECDSA CTR"
+	return &cipher.StreamReader{
+		R: zeroReader,
+		S: cipher.NewCTR(block, []byte(aesIV)),
+	}, nil
+}
+
+type zr struct{}
+
+var zeroReader = zr{}
+
+// Read replaces the contents of dst with zeros. It is safe for concurrent use.
+func (zr) Read(dst []byte) (n int, err error) {
+	for i := range dst {
+		dst[i] = 0
+	}
+	return len(dst), nil
+}
+
+// VerifyASN1 verifies the ASN.1 encoded signature, sig, of hash using the
+// public key, pub. Its return value records whether the signature is valid.
+func VerifyASN1(pub *PublicKey, hash, sig []byte) bool {
+	if boring.Enabled {
+		key, err := boringPublicKey(pub)
+		if err != nil {
+			return false
+		}
+		return boring.VerifyECDSA(key, hash, sig)
+	}
+	boring.UnreachableExceptTests()
+
+	if err := verifyAsm(pub, hash, sig); err != errNoAsm {
+		return err == nil
+	}
+
+	switch pub.Curve.Params() {
+	case elliptic.P224().Params():
+		return verifyNISTEC(p224(), pub, hash, sig)
+	case elliptic.P256().Params():
+		return verifyNISTEC(p256(), pub, hash, sig)
+	case elliptic.P384().Params():
+		return verifyNISTEC(p384(), pub, hash, sig)
+	case elliptic.P521().Params():
+		return verifyNISTEC(p521(), pub, hash, sig)
+	default:
+		return verifyLegacy(pub, hash, sig)
+	}
+}
+
+func verifyNISTEC[Point nistPoint[Point]](c *nistCurve[Point], pub *PublicKey, hash, sig []byte) bool {
+	rBytes, sBytes, err := parseSignature(sig)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	Q, err := c.pointFromAffine(pub.X, pub.Y)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	// SEC 1, Version 2.0, Section 4.1.4
+
+	r, err := bigmod.NewNat().SetBytes(rBytes, c.N)
+	if err != nil || r.IsZero() == 1 {
+		return false
+	}
+	s, err := bigmod.NewNat().SetBytes(sBytes, c.N)
+	if err != nil || s.IsZero() == 1 {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	e := bigmod.NewNat()
+	hashToNat(c, e, hash)
+
+	// w = s⁻¹
+	w := bigmod.NewNat()
+	inverse(c, w, s)
+
+	// p₁ = [e * s⁻¹]G
+	p1, err := c.newPoint().ScalarBaseMult(e.Mul(w, c.N).Bytes(c.N))
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	// p₂ = [r * s⁻¹]Q
+	p2, err := Q.ScalarMult(Q, w.Mul(r, c.N).Bytes(c.N))
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	// BytesX returns an error for the point at infinity.
+	Rx, err := p1.Add(p1, p2).BytesX()
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	v, err := bigmod.NewNat().SetOverflowingBytes(Rx, c.N)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	return v.Equal(r) == 1
+}
+
+func parseSignature(sig []byte) (r, s []byte, err error) {
+	var inner cryptobyte.String
+	input := cryptobyte.String(sig)
+	if !input.ReadASN1(&inner, asn1.SEQUENCE) ||
+		!input.Empty() ||
+		!inner.ReadASN1Integer(&r) ||
+		!inner.ReadASN1Integer(&s) ||
+		!inner.Empty() {
+		return nil, nil, errors.New("invalid ASN.1")
+	}
+	return r, s, nil
+}
+
+type nistCurve[Point nistPoint[Point]] struct {
+	newPoint func() Point
+	curve    elliptic.Curve
+	N        *bigmod.Modulus
+	nMinus2  []byte
+}
+
+// nistPoint is a generic constraint for the nistec Point types.
+type nistPoint[T any] interface {
+	Bytes() []byte
+	BytesX() ([]byte, error)
+	SetBytes([]byte) (T, error)
+	Add(T, T) T
+	ScalarMult(T, []byte) (T, error)
+	ScalarBaseMult([]byte) (T, error)
+}
+
+// pointFromAffine is used to convert the PublicKey to a nistec Point.
+func (curve *nistCurve[Point]) pointFromAffine(x, y *big.Int) (p Point, err error) {
+	bitSize := curve.curve.Params().BitSize
+	// Reject values that would not get correctly encoded.
+	if x.Sign() < 0 || y.Sign() < 0 {
+		return p, errors.New("negative coordinate")
+	}
+	if x.BitLen() > bitSize || y.BitLen() > bitSize {
+		return p, errors.New("overflowing coordinate")
+	}
+	// Encode the coordinates and let SetBytes reject invalid points.
+	byteLen := (bitSize + 7) / 8
+	buf := make([]byte, 1+2*byteLen)
+	buf[0] = 4 // uncompressed point
+	x.FillBytes(buf[1 : 1+byteLen])
+	y.FillBytes(buf[1+byteLen : 1+2*byteLen])
+	return curve.newPoint().SetBytes(buf)
+}
+
+// pointToAffine is used to convert a nistec Point to a PublicKey.
+func (curve *nistCurve[Point]) pointToAffine(p Point) (x, y *big.Int, err error) {
+	out := p.Bytes()
+	if len(out) == 1 && out[0] == 0 {
+		// This is the encoding of the point at infinity.
+		return nil, nil, errors.New("ecdsa: public key point is the infinity")
+	}
+	byteLen := (curve.curve.Params().BitSize + 7) / 8
+	x = new(big.Int).SetBytes(out[1 : 1+byteLen])
+	y = new(big.Int).SetBytes(out[1+byteLen:])
+	return x, y, nil
+}
+
+var p224Once sync.Once
+var _p224 *nistCurve[*nistec.P224Point]
+
+func p224() *nistCurve[*nistec.P224Point] {
+	p224Once.Do(func() {
+		_p224 = &nistCurve[*nistec.P224Point]{
+			newPoint: func() *nistec.P224Point { return nistec.NewP224Point() },
+		}
+		precomputeParams(_p224, elliptic.P224())
+	})
+	return _p224
+}
+
+var p256Once sync.Once
+var _p256 *nistCurve[*nistec.P256Point]
+
+func p256() *nistCurve[*nistec.P256Point] {
+	p256Once.Do(func() {
+		_p256 = &nistCurve[*nistec.P256Point]{
+			newPoint: func() *nistec.P256Point { return nistec.NewP256Point() },
+		}
+		precomputeParams(_p256, elliptic.P256())
+	})
+	return _p256
+}
+
+var p384Once sync.Once
+var _p384 *nistCurve[*nistec.P384Point]
+
+func p384() *nistCurve[*nistec.P384Point] {
+	p384Once.Do(func() {
+		_p384 = &nistCurve[*nistec.P384Point]{
+			newPoint: func() *nistec.P384Point { return nistec.NewP384Point() },
+		}
+		precomputeParams(_p384, elliptic.P384())
+	})
+	return _p384
+}
+
+var p521Once sync.Once
+var _p521 *nistCurve[*nistec.P521Point]
+
+func p521() *nistCurve[*nistec.P521Point] {
+	p521Once.Do(func() {
+		_p521 = &nistCurve[*nistec.P521Point]{
+			newPoint: func() *nistec.P521Point { return nistec.NewP521Point() },
+		}
+		precomputeParams(_p521, elliptic.P521())
+	})
+	return _p521
+}
+
+func precomputeParams[Point nistPoint[Point]](c *nistCurve[Point], curve elliptic.Curve) {
+	params := curve.Params()
+	c.curve = curve
+	var err error
+	c.N, err = bigmod.NewModulusFromBig(params.N)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+	c.nMinus2 = new(big.Int).Sub(params.N, big.NewInt(2)).Bytes()
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa_legacy.go

@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package ecdsa
+
+import (
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"math/big"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1"
+)
+
+// This file contains a math/big implementation of ECDSA that is only used for
+// deprecated custom curves.
+
+func generateLegacy(c elliptic.Curve, rand io.Reader) (*PrivateKey, error) {
+	k, err := randFieldElement(c, rand)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	priv := new(PrivateKey)
+	priv.PublicKey.Curve = c
+	priv.D = k
+	priv.PublicKey.X, priv.PublicKey.Y = c.ScalarBaseMult(k.Bytes())
+	return priv, nil
+}
+
+// hashToInt converts a hash value to an integer. Per FIPS 186-4, Section 6.4,
+// we use the left-most bits of the hash to match the bit-length of the order of
+// the curve. This also performs Step 5 of SEC 1, Version 2.0, Section 4.1.3.
+func hashToInt(hash []byte, c elliptic.Curve) *big.Int {
+	orderBits := c.Params().N.BitLen()
+	orderBytes := (orderBits + 7) / 8
+	if len(hash) > orderBytes {
+		hash = hash[:orderBytes]
+	}
+
+	ret := new(big.Int).SetBytes(hash)
+	excess := len(hash)*8 - orderBits
+	if excess > 0 {
+		ret.Rsh(ret, uint(excess))
+	}
+	return ret
+}
+
+var errZeroParam = errors.New("zero parameter")
+
+// Sign signs a hash (which should be the result of hashing a larger message)
+// using the private key, priv. If the hash is longer than the bit-length of the
+// private key's curve order, the hash will be truncated to that length. It
+// returns the signature as a pair of integers. Most applications should use
+// [SignASN1] instead of dealing directly with r, s.
+func Sign(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash []byte) (r, s *big.Int, err error) {
+	sig, err := SignASN1(rand, priv, hash)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, err
+	}
+
+	r, s = new(big.Int), new(big.Int)
+	var inner cryptobyte.String
+	input := cryptobyte.String(sig)
+	if !input.ReadASN1(&inner, asn1.SEQUENCE) ||
+		!input.Empty() ||
+		!inner.ReadASN1Integer(r) ||
+		!inner.ReadASN1Integer(s) ||
+		!inner.Empty() {
+		return nil, nil, errors.New("invalid ASN.1 from SignASN1")
+	}
+	return r, s, nil
+}
+
+func signLegacy(priv *PrivateKey, csprng io.Reader, hash []byte) (sig []byte, err error) {
+	c := priv.Curve
+
+	// SEC 1, Version 2.0, Section 4.1.3
+	N := c.Params().N
+	if N.Sign() == 0 {
+		return nil, errZeroParam
+	}
+	var k, kInv, r, s *big.Int
+	for {
+		for {
+			k, err = randFieldElement(c, csprng)
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+
+			kInv = new(big.Int).ModInverse(k, N)
+
+			r, _ = c.ScalarBaseMult(k.Bytes())
+			r.Mod(r, N)
+			if r.Sign() != 0 {
+				break
+			}
+		}
+
+		e := hashToInt(hash, c)
+		s = new(big.Int).Mul(priv.D, r)
+		s.Add(s, e)
+		s.Mul(s, kInv)
+		s.Mod(s, N) // N != 0
+		if s.Sign() != 0 {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	return encodeSignature(r.Bytes(), s.Bytes())
+}
+
+// Verify verifies the signature in r, s of hash using the public key, pub. Its
+// return value records whether the signature is valid. Most applications should
+// use VerifyASN1 instead of dealing directly with r, s.
+func Verify(pub *PublicKey, hash []byte, r, s *big.Int) bool {
+	if r.Sign() <= 0 || s.Sign() <= 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+	sig, err := encodeSignature(r.Bytes(), s.Bytes())
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	return VerifyASN1(pub, hash, sig)
+}
+
+func verifyLegacy(pub *PublicKey, hash []byte, sig []byte) bool {
+	rBytes, sBytes, err := parseSignature(sig)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	r, s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(rBytes), new(big.Int).SetBytes(sBytes)
+
+	c := pub.Curve
+	N := c.Params().N
+
+	if r.Sign() <= 0 || s.Sign() <= 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+	if r.Cmp(N) >= 0 || s.Cmp(N) >= 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	// SEC 1, Version 2.0, Section 4.1.4
+	e := hashToInt(hash, c)
+	w := new(big.Int).ModInverse(s, N)
+
+	u1 := e.Mul(e, w)
+	u1.Mod(u1, N)
+	u2 := w.Mul(r, w)
+	u2.Mod(u2, N)
+
+	x1, y1 := c.ScalarBaseMult(u1.Bytes())
+	x2, y2 := c.ScalarMult(pub.X, pub.Y, u2.Bytes())
+	x, y := c.Add(x1, y1, x2, y2)
+
+	if x.Sign() == 0 && y.Sign() == 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+	x.Mod(x, N)
+	return x.Cmp(r) == 0
+}
+
+var one = new(big.Int).SetInt64(1)
+
+// randFieldElement returns a random element of the order of the given
+// curve using the procedure given in FIPS 186-4, Appendix B.5.2.
+func randFieldElement(c elliptic.Curve, rand io.Reader) (k *big.Int, err error) {
+	// See randomPoint for notes on the algorithm. This has to match, or s390x
+	// signatures will come out different from other architectures, which will
+	// break TLS recorded tests.
+	for {
+		N := c.Params().N
+		b := make([]byte, (N.BitLen()+7)/8)
+		if _, err = io.ReadFull(rand, b); err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		if excess := len(b)*8 - N.BitLen(); excess > 0 {
+			b[0] >>= excess
+		}
+		k = new(big.Int).SetBytes(b)
+		if k.Sign() != 0 && k.Cmp(N) < 0 {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+}

platform/dbops/binaries/go/go/src/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa_noasm.go

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+// Copyright 2020 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+//go:build !s390x
+
+package ecdsa
+
+import "io"
+
+func verifyAsm(pub *PublicKey, hash []byte, sig []byte) error {
+	return errNoAsm
+}
+
+func signAsm(priv *PrivateKey, csprng io.Reader, hash []byte) (sig []byte, err error) {
+	return nil, errNoAsm
+}