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+The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle
+
+By Aristotle
+
+Introduction by J. A. Smith
+
+Contents
+
+ INTRODUCTION
+
+ ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS
+ BOOK I
+ BOOK II
+ BOOK III
+ BOOK IV
+ BOOK V
+ BOOK VI
+ BOOK VII
+ BOOK VIII
+ BOOK IX
+ BOOK X
+ NOTES
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+The _Ethics_ of Aristotle is one half of a single treatise of which his
+_Politics_ is the other half. Both deal with one and the same subject.
+This subject is what Aristotle calls in one place the "philosophy of
+human affairs;" but more frequently Political or Social Science. In the
+two works taken together we have their author's whole theory of human
+conduct or practical activity, that is, of all human activity which is
+not directed merely to knowledge or truth. The two parts of this
+treatise are mutually complementary, but in a literary sense each is
+independent and self-contained. The proem to the _Ethics_ is an
+introduction to the whole subject, not merely to the first part; the
+last chapter of the _Ethics_ points forward to the _Politics_, and
+sketches for that part of the treatise the order of enquiry to be
+pursued (an order which in the actual treatise is not adhered to).
+
+The principle of distribution of the subject-matter between the two
+works is far from obvious, and has been much debated. Not much can be
+gathered from their titles, which in any case were not given to them by
+their author. Nor do these titles suggest any very compact unity in the
+works to which they are applied: the plural forms, which survive so
+oddly in English (Ethic_s_, Politic_s_), were intended to indicate the
+treatment within a single work of a _group_ of connected questions. The
+unity of the first group arises from their centring round the topic of
+character, that of the second from their connection with the existence
+and life of the city or state. We have thus to regard the _Ethics_ as
+dealing with one group of problems and the _Politics_ with a second,
+both falling within the wide compass of Political Science. Each of
+these groups falls into sub-groups which roughly correspond to the
+several books in each work. The tendency to take up one by one the
+various problems which had suggested themselves in the wide field
+obscures both the unity of the subject-matter and its proper
+articulation. But it is to be remembered that what is offered us is
+avowedly rather an enquiry than an exposition of hard and fast
+doctrine.
+
+Nevertheless each work aims at a relative completeness, and it is
+important to observe the relation of each to the other. The distinction
+is not that the one treats of Moral and the other of Political
+Philosophy, nor again that the one deals with the moral activity of the
+individual and the other with that of the State, nor once more that the
+one gives us the theory of human conduct, while the other discusses its
+application in practice, though not all of these misinterpretations are
+equally erroneous. The clue to the right interpretation is given by
+Aristotle himself, where in the last chapter of the _Ethics_ he is
+paving the way for the _Politics_. In the _Ethics_ he has not confined
+himself to the abstract or isolated individual, but has always thought
+of him, or we might say, in his social and political context, with a
+given nature due to race and heredity and in certain surroundings. So
+viewing him he has studied the nature and formation of his
+character--all that he can make himself or be made by others to be.
+Especially he has investigated the various admirable forms of human
+character and the mode of their production. But all this, though it
+brings more clearly before us what goodness or virtue is, and how it is
+to be reached, remains mere theory or talk. By itself it does not
+enable us to become, or to help others to become, good. For this it is
+necessary to bring into play the great force of the Political Community
+or State, of which the main instrument is Law. Hence arises the demand
+for the necessary complement to the _Ethics, i.e._, a treatise devoted
+to the questions which centre round the enquiry; by what organisation
+of social or political forces, by what laws or institutions can we best
+secure the greatest amount of good character?
+
+We must, however, remember that the production of good character is not
+the end of either individual or state action: that is the aim of the
+one and the other because good character is the indispensable condition
+and chief determinant of happiness, itself the goal of all human doing.
+The end of all action, individual or collective, is the greatest
+happiness of the greatest number. There is, Aristotle insists, no
+difference of kind between the good of one and the good of many or all.
+The sole difference is one of amount or scale. This does not mean
+simply that the State exists to secure in larger measure the objects of
+degree which the isolated individual attempts, but is too feeble, to
+secure without it. On the contrary, it rather insists that whatever
+goods society alone enables a man to secure have always had to the
+individual--whether he realised it or not--the value which, when so
+secured, he recognises them to possess. The best and happiest life for
+the individual is that which the State renders possible, and this it
+does mainly by revealing to him the value of new objects of desire and
+educating him to appreciate them. To Aristotle or to Plato the State
+is, above all, a large and powerful educative agency which gives the
+individual increased opportunities of self-development and greater
+capacities for the enjoyment of life.
+
+Looking forward, then, to the life of the State as that which aids
+support, and combines the efforts of the individual to obtain
+happiness, Aristotle draws no hard and fast distinction between the
+spheres of action of Man as individual and Man as citizen. Nor does the
+division of his discussion into the _Ethics_ and the _Politics_ rest
+upon any such distinction. The distinction implied is rather between
+two stages in the life of the civilised man--the stage of preparation
+for the full life of the adult citizen, and the stage of the actual
+exercise or enjoyment of citizenship. Hence the _Ethics_, where his
+attention is directed upon the formation of character, is largely and
+centrally a treatise on Moral Education. It discusses especially those
+admirable human qualities which fit a man for life in an organised
+civic community, which makes him "a good citizen," and considers how
+they can be fostered or created and their opposites prevented.
+
+This is the kernel of the _Ethics_, and all the rest is subordinate to
+this main interest and purpose. Yet "the rest" is not irrelevant; the
+whole situation in which character grows and operates is concretely
+conceived. There is a basis of what we should call Psychology, sketched
+in firm outlines, the deeper presuppositions and the wider issues of
+human character and conduct are not ignored, and there is no little of
+what we should call Metaphysics. But neither the Psychology nor the
+Metaphysics is elaborated, and only so much is brought forward as
+appears necessary to put the main facts in their proper perspective and
+setting. It is this combination of width of outlook with close
+observation of the concrete facts of conduct which gives its abiding
+value to the work, and justifies the view of it as containing
+Aristotle's Moral Philosophy. Nor is it important merely as summing up
+the moral judgments and speculations of an age now long past. It seizes
+and dwells upon those elements and features in human practice which are
+most essential and permanent, and it is small wonder that so much in it
+survives in our own ways of regarding conduct and speaking of it. Thus
+it still remains one of the classics of Moral Philosophy, nor is its
+value likely soon to be exhausted.
+
+As was pointed out above, the proem (Book I., cc. i-iii.) is a prelude
+to the treatment of the whole subject covered by the _Ethics_ and the
+_Politics_ together. It sets forth the purpose of the enquiry,
+describes the spirit in which it is to be undertaken and what ought to
+be the expectation of the reader, and lastly states the necessary
+conditions of studying it with profit. The aim of it is the acquisition
+and propagation of a certain kind of knowledge (science), but this
+knowledge and the thinking which brings it about are subsidiary to a
+practical end. The knowledge aimed at is of what is best for man and of
+the conditions of its realisation. Such knowledge is that which in its
+consumate form we find in great statesmen, enabling them to organise
+and administer their states and regulate by law the life of the
+citizens to their advantage and happiness, but it is the same kind of
+knowledge which on a smaller scale secures success in the management of
+the family or of private life.
+
+It is characteristic of such knowledge that it should be deficient in
+"exactness," in precision of statement, and closeness of logical
+concatenation. We must not look for a mathematics of conduct. The
+subject-matter of Human Conduct is not governed by necessary and
+uniform laws. But this does not mean that it is subject to no laws.
+There are general principles at work in it, and these can be formulated
+in "rules," which rules can be systematised or unified. It is
+all-important to remember that practical or moral rules are only
+general and always admit of exceptions, and that they arise not from
+the mere complexity of the facts, but from the liability of the facts
+to a certain unpredictable variation. At their very best, practical
+rules state probabilities, not certainties; a relative constancy of
+connection is all that exists, but it is enough to serve as a guide in
+life. Aristotle here holds the balance between a misleading hope of
+reducing the subject-matter of conduct to a few simple rigorous
+abstract principles, with conclusions necessarily issuing from them,
+and the view that it is the field of operation of inscrutable forces
+acting without predictable regularity. He does not pretend to find in
+it absolute uniformities, or to deduce the details from his principles.
+Hence, too, he insists on the necessity of experience as the source or
+test of all that he has to say. Moral experience--the actual possession
+and exercise of good character--is necessary truly to understand moral
+principles and profitably to apply them. The mere intellectual
+apprehension of them is not possible, or if possible, profitless.
+
+The _Ethics_ is addressed to students who are presumed both to have
+enough general education to appreciate these points, and also to have a
+solid foundation of good habits. More than that is not required for the
+profitable study of it.
+
+If the discussion of the nature and formation of character be regarded
+as the central topic of the _Ethics_, the contents of Book I., cc.
+iv.-xii. may be considered as still belonging to the introduction and
+setting, but these chapters contain matter of profound importance and
+have exercised an enormous influence upon subsequent thought. They lay
+down a principle which governs all Greek thought about human life, viz.
+that it is only intelligible when viewed as directed towards some end
+or good. This is the Greek way of expressing that all human life
+involves an ideal element--something which it is not yet and which under
+certain conditions it is to be. In that sense Greek Moral Philosophy is
+essentially idealistic. Further it is always assumed that all human
+practical activity is directed or "oriented" to a _single_ end, and
+that that end is knowable or definable in advance of its realisation.
+To know it is not merely a matter of speculative interest, it is of the
+highest practical moment for only in the light of it can life be duly
+guided, and particularly only so can the state be properly organised
+and administered. This explains the stress laid throughout by Greek
+Moral Philosophy upon the necessity of knowledge as a condition of the
+best life. This knowledge is not, though it includes knowledge of the
+nature of man and his circumstances, it is knowledge of what is best--of
+man's supreme end or good.
+
+But this end is not conceived as presented to him by a superior power
+nor even as something which _ought_ to be. The presentation of the
+Moral Ideal as Duty is almost absent. From the outset it is identified
+with the object of desire, of what we not merely judge desirable but
+actually do desire, or that which would, if realised, satisfy human
+desire. In fact it is what we all, wise and simple, agree in naming
+"Happiness" (Welfare or Well-being)
+
+In what then does happiness consist? Aristotle summarily sets aside the
+more or less popular identifications of it with abundance of physical
+pleasures, with political power and honour, with the mere possession of
+such superior gifts or attainments as normally entitle men to these,
+with wealth. None of these can constitute the end or good of man as
+such. On the other hand, he rejects his master Plato's conception of a
+good which is the end of the whole universe, or at least dismisses it
+as irrelevant to his present enquiry. The good towards which all human
+desires and practical activities are directed must be one conformable
+to man's special nature and circumstances and attainable by his
+efforts. There is in Aristotle's theory of human conduct no trace of
+Plato's "other worldliness", he brings the moral ideal in Bacon's
+phrase down to "right earth"--and so closer to the facts and problems of
+actual human living. Turning from criticism of others he states his own
+positive view of Happiness, and, though he avowedly states it merely in
+outline his account is pregnant with significance. Human Happiness lies
+in activity or energising, and that in a way peculiar to man with his
+given nature and his given circumstances, it is not theoretical, but
+practical: it is the activity not of reason but still of a being who
+possesses reason and applies it, and it presupposes in that being the
+development, and not merely the natural possession, of certain relevant
+powers and capacities. The last is the prime condition of successful
+living and therefore of satisfaction, but Aristotle does not ignore
+other conditions, such as length of life, wealth and good luck, the
+absence or diminution of which render happiness not impossible, but
+difficult of attainment.
+
+It is interesting to compare this account of Happiness with Mill's in
+_Utilitarianism_. Mill's is much the less consistent: at times he
+distinguishes and at times he identifies, happiness, pleasure,
+contentment, and satisfaction. He wavers between belief in its general
+attainability and an absence of hopefulness. He mixes up in an
+arbitrary way such ingredients as "not expecting more from life than it
+is capable of bestowing," "mental cultivation," "improved laws," etc.,
+and in fact leaves the whole conception vague, blurred, and uncertain.
+Aristotle draws the outline with a firmer hand and presents a more
+definite ideal. He allows for the influence on happiness of conditions
+only partly, if at all, within the control of man, but he clearly makes
+the man positive determinant of man's happiness he in himself, and more
+particularly in what he makes directly of his own nature, and so
+indirectly of his circumstances. "'Tis in ourselves that we are thus or
+thus" But once more this does not involve an artificial or abstract
+isolation of the individual moral agent from his relation to other
+persons or things from his context in society and nature, nor ignore
+the relative dependence of his life upon a favourable environment.
+
+The main factor which determines success or failure in human life is
+the acquisition of certain powers, for Happiness is just the exercise
+or putting forth of these in actual living, everything else is
+secondary and subordinate. These powers arise from the due development
+of certain natural aptitudes which belong (in various degrees) to human
+nature as such and therefore to all normal human beings. In their
+developed form they are known as virtues (the Greek means simply
+"goodnesses," "perfections," "excellences," or "fitnesses"), some of
+them are physical, but others are psychical, and among the latter some,
+and these distinctively or peculiarly human, are "rational," _i e_,
+presuppose the possession and exercise of mind or intelligence. These
+last fall into two groups, which Aristotle distinguishes as Goodnesses
+of Intellect and Goodnesses of Character. They have in common that they
+all excite in us admiration and praise of their possessors, and that
+they are not natural endowments, but acquired characteristics But they
+differ in important ways. (1) the former are excellences or developed
+powers of the reason as such--of that in us which sees and formulates
+laws, rules, regularities systems, and is content in the vision of
+them, while the latter involve a submission or obedience to such rules
+of something in us which is in itself capricious and irregular, but
+capable of regulation, viz our instincts and feelings, (2) the former
+are acquired by study and instruction, the latter by discipline. The
+latter constitute "character," each of them as a "moral virtue"
+(literally "a goodness of character"), and upon them primarily depends
+the realisation of happiness. This is the case at least for the great
+majority of men, and for all men their possession is an indispensable
+basis of the best, _i e_, the most desirable life. They form the chief
+or central subject-matter of the _Ethics_.
+
+Perhaps the truest way of conceiving Aristotle's meaning here is to
+regard a moral virtue as a form of obedience to a maxim or rule of
+conduct accepted by the agent as valid for a class of recurrent
+situations in human life. Such obedience requires knowledge of the rule
+and acceptance of it _as the rule_ of the agent's own actions, but not
+necessarily knowledge of its ground or of its systematic connexion with
+other similarly known and similarly accepted rules (It may be remarked
+that the Greek word usually translated "reason," means in almost all
+cases in the _Ethics_ such a rule, and not the faculty which
+apprehends, formulates, considers them).
+
+The "moral virtues and vices" make up what we call character, and the
+important questions arise: (1) What is character? and (2) How is it
+formed? (for character in this sense is not a natural endowment; it is
+formed or produced). Aristotle deals with these questions in the
+reverse order. His answers are peculiar and distinctive--not that they
+are absolutely novel (for they are anticipated in Plato), but that by
+him they are for the first time distinctly and clearly formulated.
+
+(1.) Character, good or bad, is produced by what Aristotle calls
+"habituation," that is, it is the result of the repeated doing of acts
+which have a similar or common quality. Such repetition acting upon
+natural aptitudes or propensities gradually fixes them in one or other
+of two opposite directions, giving them a bias towards good or evil.
+Hence the several acts which determine goodness or badness of character
+must be done in a certain way, and thus the formation of good character
+requires discipline and direction from without. Not that the agent
+himself contributes nothing to the formation of his character, but that
+at first he needs guidance. The point is not so much that the process
+cannot be safely left to Nature, but that it cannot be entrusted to
+merely intellectual instruction. The process is one of assimilation,
+largely by imitation and under direction and control. The result is a
+growing understanding of what is done, a choice of it for its own sake,
+a fixity and steadiness of purpose. Right acts and feelings become,
+through habit, easier and more pleasant, and the doing of them a
+"second nature." The agent acquires the power of doing them freely,
+willingly, more and more "of himself."
+
+But what are "right" acts? In the first place, they are those that
+conform to a rule--to the right rule, and ultimately to reason. The
+Greeks never waver from the conviction that in the end moral conduct is
+essentially reasonable conduct. But there is a more significant way of
+describing their "rightness," and here for the first time Aristotle
+introduces his famous "Doctrine of the Mean." Reasoning from the
+analogy of "right" physical acts, he pronounces that rightness always
+means adaptation or adjustment to the special requirements of a
+situation. To this adjustment he gives a quantitative interpretation.
+To do (or to feel) what is right in a given situation is to do or to
+feel just the amount required--neither more nor less: to do wrong is to
+do or to feel too much or too little--to fall short of or over-shoot, "a
+mean" determined by the situation. The repetition of acts which lie in
+the mean is the cause of the formation of each and every "goodness of
+character," and for this "rules" can be given.
+
+(2) What then is a "moral virtue," the result of such a process duly
+directed? It is no mere mood of feeling, no mere liability to emotion,
+no mere natural aptitude or endowment, it is a permanent _state_ of the
+agent's self, or, as we might in modern phrase put it, of his will, it
+consists in a steady self-imposed obedience to a rule of action in
+certain situations which frequently recur in human life. The rule
+prescribes the control and regulation within limits of the agent's
+natural impulses to act and feel thus and thus. The situations fall
+into groups which constitute the "fields" of the several "moral
+virtues", for each there is a rule, conformity to which secures
+rightness in the individual acts. Thus the moral ideal appears as a
+code of rules, accepted by the agent, but as yet _to him_ without
+rational justification and without system or unity. But the rules
+prescribe no mechanical uniformity: each within its limits permits
+variety, and the exactly right amount adopted to the requirements of
+the individual situation (and every actual situation is individual)
+must be determined by the intuition of the moment. There is no attempt
+to reduce the rich possibilities of right action to a single monotonous
+type. On the contrary, there are acknowledged to be many forms of moral
+virtue, and there is a long list of them, with their correlative vices
+enumerated.
+
+The Doctrine of the Mean here takes a form in which it has impressed
+subsequent thinkers, but which has less importance than is usually
+ascribed to it. In the "Table of the Virtues and Vices," each of the
+virtues is flanked by two opposite vices, which are respectively the
+excess and defect of that which in due measure constitutes the virtue.
+Aristotle tries to show that this is the case in regard to every virtue
+named and recognised as such, but his treatment is often forced and the
+endeavour is not very successful. Except as a convenient principle of
+arrangement of the various forms of praiseworthy or blameworthy
+characters, generally acknowledged as such by Greek opinion, this form
+of the doctrine is of no great significance.
+
+Books III-V are occupied with a survey of the moral virtues and vices.
+These seem to have been undertaken in order to verify in detail the
+general account, but this aim is not kept steadily in view. Nor is
+there any well-considered principle of classification. What we find is
+a sort of portrait-gallery of the various types of moral excellence
+which the Greeks of the author's age admired and strove to encourage.
+The discussion is full of acute, interesting and sometimes profound
+observations. Some of the types are those which are and will be admired
+at all times, but others are connected with peculiar features of Greek
+life which have now passed away. The most important is that of Justice
+or the Just Man, to which we may later return. But the discussion is
+preceded by an attempt to elucidate some difficult and obscure points
+in the general account of moral virtue and action (Book III, cc i-v).
+This section is concerned with the notion of Responsibility. The
+discussion designedly excludes what we may call the metaphysical issues
+of the problem, which here present themselves, it moves on the level of
+thought of the practical man, the statesman, and the legislator.
+Coercion and ignorance of relevant circumstances render acts
+involuntary and exempt their doer from responsibility, otherwise the
+act is voluntary and the agent responsible, choice or preference of
+what is done, and inner consent to the deed, are to be presumed.
+Neither passion nor ignorance of the right rule can extenuate
+responsibility. But there is a difference between acts done voluntarily
+and acts done of _set_ choice or purpose. The latter imply
+Deliberation. Deliberation involves thinking, thinking out means to
+ends: in deliberate acts the whole nature of the agent consents to and
+enters into the act, and in a peculiar sense they are his, they _are_
+him in action, and the most significant evidence of what he is.
+Aristotle is unable wholly to avoid allusion to the metaphysical
+difficulties and what he does here say upon them is obscure and
+unsatisfactory. But he insists upon the importance in moral action of
+the agent's inner consent, and on the reality of his individual
+responsibility. For his present purpose the metaphysical difficulties
+are irrelevant.
+
+The treatment of Justice in Book V has always been a source of great
+difficulty to students of the _Ethics_. Almost more than any other part
+of the work it has exercised influence upon mediaeval and modern
+thought upon the subject. The distinctions and divisions have become
+part of the stock-in-trade of would be philosophic jurists. And yet,
+oddly enough, most of these distinctions have been misunderstood and
+the whole purport of the discussion misconceived. Aristotle is here
+dealing with justice in a restricted sense viz as that special goodness
+of character which is required of every adult citizen and which can be
+produced by early discipline or habituation. It is the temper or
+habitual attitude demanded of the citizen for the due exercise of his
+functions as taking part in the administration of the civic
+community--as a member of the judicature and executive. The Greek
+citizen was only exceptionally, and at rare intervals if ever, a
+law-maker while at any moment he might be called upon to act as a judge
+(juryman or arbitrator) or as an administrator. For the work of a
+legislator far more than the moral virtue of justice or fairmindedness
+was necessary, these were requisite to the rarer and higher
+"intellectual virtue" of practical wisdom. Then here, too, the
+discussion moves on a low level, and the raising of fundamental
+problems is excluded. Hence "distributive justice" is concerned not
+with the large question of the distribution of political power and
+privileges among the constituent members or classes of the state but
+with the smaller questions of the distribution among those of casual
+gains and even with the division among private claimants of a common
+fund or inheritance, while "corrective justice" is concerned solely
+with the management of legal redress. The whole treatment is confused
+by the unhappy attempt to give a precise mathematical form to the
+principles of justice in the various fields distinguished. Still it
+remains an interesting first endeavour to give greater exactness to
+some of the leading conceptions of jurisprudence.
+
+Book VI appears to have in view two aims: (1) to describe goodness of
+intellect and discover its highest form or forms; (2) to show how this
+is related to goodness of character, and so to conduct generally. As
+all thinking is either theoretical or practical, goodness of intellect
+has _two_ supreme forms--Theoretical and Practical Wisdom. The first,
+which apprehends the eternal laws of the universe, has no direct
+relation to human conduct: the second is identical with that master
+science of human life of which the whole treatise, consisting of the
+_Ethics_ and the _Politics_, is an exposition. It is this science which
+supplies the right rules of conduct Taking them as they emerge in and
+from practical experience, it formulates them more precisely and
+organises them into a system where they are all seen to converge upon
+happiness. The mode in which such knowledge manifests itself is in the
+power to show that such and such rules of action follow from the very
+nature of the end or good for man. It presupposes and starts from a
+clear conception of the end and the wish for it as conceived, and it
+proceeds by a deduction which is dehberation writ large. In the man of
+practical wisdom this process has reached its perfect result, and the
+code of right rules is apprehended as a system with a single principle
+and so as something wholly rational or reasonable He has not on each
+occasion to seek and find the right rule applicable to the situation,
+he produces it at once from within himself, and can at need justify it
+by exhibiting its rationale, _i.e._ , its connection with the end. This
+is the consummate form of reason applied to conduct, but there are
+minor forms of it, less independent or original, but nevertheless of
+great value, such as the power to think out the proper cause of policy
+in novel circumstances or the power to see the proper line of treatment
+to follow in a court of law.
+
+The form of the thinking which enters into conduct is that which
+terminates in the production of a rule which declares some means to the
+end of life. The process presupposes _(a)_ a clear and just
+apprehension of the nature of that end--such as the _Ethics_ itself
+endeavours to supply; _(b)_ a correct perception of the conditions of
+action, _(a)_ at least is impossible except to a man whose character
+has been duly formed by discipline; it arises only in a man who has
+acquired moral virtue. For such action and feeling as forms bad
+character, blinds the eye of the soul and corrupts the moral principle,
+and the place of practical wisdom is taken by that parody of itself
+which Aristotle calls "cleverness"--the "wisdom" of the unscrupulous man
+of the world. Thus true practical wisdom and true goodness of character
+are interdependent; neither is genuinely possible or "completely"
+present without the other. This is Aristotle's contribution to the
+discussion of the question, so central in Greek Moral Philosophy, of
+the relation of the intellectual and the passionate factors in conduct.
+
+Aristotle is not an intuitionist, but he recognises the implication in
+conduct of a direct and immediate apprehension both of the end and of
+the character of his circumstances under which it is from moment to
+moment realised. The directness of such apprehension makes it analogous
+to sensation or sense-perception; but it is on his view in the end due
+to the existence or activity in man of that power in him which is the
+highest thing in his nature, and akin to or identical with the divine
+nature--mind, or intelligence. It is this which reveals to us what is
+best for us--the ideal of a happiness which is the object of our real
+wish and the goal of all our efforts. But beyond and above the
+practical ideal of what is best _for man_ begins to show itself another
+and still higher ideal--that of a life not distinctively human or in a
+narrow sense practical, yet capable of being participated in by man
+even under the actual circumstances of this world. For a time, however,
+this further and higher ideal is ignored.
+
+The next book (Book VII.), is concerned partly with moral conditions,
+in which the agent seems to rise above the level of moral virtue or
+fall below that of moral vice, but partly and more largely with
+conditions in which the agent occupies a middle position between the
+two. Aristotle's attention is here directed chiefly towards the
+phenomena of "Incontinence," weakness of will or imperfect
+self-control. This condition was to the Greeks a matter of only too
+frequent experience, but it appeared to them peculiarly difficult to
+understand. How can a man know what is good or best for him, and yet
+chronically fail to act upon his knowledge? Socrates was driven to the
+paradox of denying the possibility, but the facts are too strong for
+him. Knowledge of the right rule may be present, nay the rightfulness
+of its authority may be acknowledged, and yet time after time it may be
+disobeyed; the will may be good and yet overmastered by the force of
+desire, so that the act done is contrary to the agent's will.
+Nevertheless the act may be the agent's, and the will therefore divided
+against itself. Aristotle is aware of the seriousness and difficulty of
+the problem, but in spite of the vividness with which he pictures, and
+the acuteness with which he analyses, the situation in which such
+action occurs, it cannot be said that he solves the problem. It is time
+that he rises above the abstract view of it as a conflict between
+reason and passion, recognising that passion is involved in the
+knowledge which in conduct prevails or is overborne, and that the force
+which leads to the wrong act is not blind or ignorant passion, but
+always has some reason in it. But he tends to lapse back into the
+abstraction, and his final account is perplexed and obscure. He finds
+the source of the phenomenon in the nature of the desire for bodily
+pleasures, which is not irrational but has something rational in it.
+Such pleasures are not necessarily or inherently bad, as has sometimes
+been maintained; on the contrary, they are good, but only in certain
+amounts or under certain conditions, so that the will is often misled,
+hesitates, and is lost.
+
+Books VIII. and IX. (on Friendship) are almost an interruption of the
+argument. The subject-matter of them was a favourite topic of ancient
+writers, and the treatment is smoother and more orderly than elsewhere
+in the _Ethics_. The argument is clear, and may be left without comment
+to the readers. These books contain a necessary and attractive
+complement to the somewhat dry account of Greek morality in the
+preceding books, and there are in them profound reflections on what may
+be called the metaphysics of friendship or love.
+
+At the beginning of Book X. we return to the topic of Pleasure, which
+is now regarded from a different point of view. In Book VII. the
+antagonists were those who over-emphasised the irrationality or badness
+of Pleasure: here it is rather those who so exaggerate its value as to
+confuse or identify it with the good or Happiness. But there is offered
+us in this section much more than criticism of the errors of others.
+Answers are given both to the psychological question, "What is
+Pleasure?" and to the ethical question, "What is its value?" Pleasure,
+we are told, is the natural concomitant and index of perfect activity,
+distinguishable but inseparable from it--"the activity of a subject at
+its best acting upon an object at its best." It is therefore always and
+in itself a good, but its value rises and falls with that of the
+activity with which it is conjoined, and which it intensifies and
+perfects. Hence it follows that the highest and best pleasures are
+those which accompany the highest and best activity.
+
+Pleasure is, therefore, a necessary element in the best life, but it is
+not the whole of it nor the principal ingredient. The value of a life
+depends upon the nature and worth of the activity which it involves;
+given the maximum of full free action, the maximum of pleasure
+necessary follows. But on what sort of life is such activity possible?
+This leads us back to the question, What is happiness? In what life can
+man find the fullest satisfaction for his desires? To this question
+Aristotle gives an answer which cannot but surprise us after what has
+preceded. True Happiness, great satisfaction, cannot be found by man in
+any form of "practical" life, no, not in the fullest and freest
+exercise possible of the "moral virtues," not in the life of the
+citizen or of the great soldier or statesman. To seek it there is to
+court failure and disappointment. It is to be found in the life of the
+onlooker, the disinterested spectator; or, to put it more distinctly,
+"in the life of the philosopher, the life of scientific and philosophic
+contemplation." The highest and most satisfying form of life possible
+to man is "the contemplative life"; it is only in a secondary sense and
+for those incapable of their life, that the practical or moral ideal is
+the best. It is time that such a life is not distinctively human, but
+it is the privilege of man to partake in it, and such participation, at
+however rare intervals and for however short a period, is the highest
+Happiness which human life can offer. All other activities have value
+only because and in so far as they render _this_ life possible.
+
+But it must not be forgotten that Aristotle conceives of this life as
+one of intense activity or energising: it is just this which gives it
+its supremacy. In spite of the almost religious fervour with which he
+speaks of it ("the most orthodox of his disciples" paraphrases his
+meaning by describing its content as "the service and vision of God"),
+it is clear that he identified it with the life of the philosopher, as
+he understood it, a life of ceaseless intellectual activity in which at
+least at times all the distractions and disturbances inseparable from
+practical life seemed to disappear and become as nothing. This ideal
+was partly an inheritance from the more ardent idealism of his master
+Plato, but partly it was the expression of personal experience.
+
+The nobility of this ideal cannot be questioned; the conception of the
+end of man or a life lived for truth--of a life blissfully absorbed in
+the vision of truth--is a lofty and inspiring one. But we cannot resist
+certain criticisms upon its presentation by Aristotle: (1) the relation
+of it to the lower ideal of practice is left somewhat obscure; (2) it
+is described in such a way as renders its realisation possible only to
+a gifted few, and under exceptional circumstances; (3) it seems in
+various ways, as regards its content, to be unnecessarily and
+unjustifiably limited. But it must be borne in mind that this is a
+first endeavour to determine its principle, and that similar failures
+have attended the attempts to describe the "religious" or the
+"spiritual" ideals of life, which have continually been suggested by
+the apparently inherent limitations of the "practical" or "moral" life,
+which is the subject of Moral Philosophy.
+
+The Moral Ideal to those who have most deeply reflected on it leads to
+the thought of an Ideal beyond and above it, which alone gives it
+meaning, but which seems to escape from definite conception by man. The
+richness and variety of this Ideal ceaselessly invite, but as
+ceaselessly defy, our attempts to imprison it in a definite formula or
+portray it in detailed imagination. Yet the thought of it is and
+remains inexpungable from our minds.
+
+This conception of the best life is not forgotten in the _Politics_ The
+end of life in the state is itself well-living and well-doing--a life
+which helps to produce the best life The great agency in the production
+of such life is the State operating through Law, which is Reason backed
+by Force. For its greatest efficiency there is required the development
+of a science of legislation. The main drift of what he says here is
+that the most desirable thing would be that the best reason of the
+community should be embodied in its laws. But so far as that is not
+possible, it still is true that anyone who would make himself and
+others better must become a miniature legislator--must study the general
+principles of law, morality, and education. The conception of πολιτικὴ 
+with which he opened the _Ethics_ would serve as a guide to a father
+educating his children as well as to the legislator legislating for the
+state. Finding in his predecessors no developed doctrine on this
+subject, Aristotle proposes himself to undertake the construction of
+it, and sketches in advance the programme of the _Politics_ in the
+concluding sentence of the _Ethics_ His ultimate object is to answer
+the questions, What is the best form of Polity, how should each be
+constituted, and what laws and customs should it adopt and employ? Not
+till this answer is given will "the philosophy of human affairs" be
+complete.
+
+On looking back it will be seen that the discussion of the central
+topic of the nature and formation of character has expanded into a
+Philosophy of Human Conduct, merging at its beginning and end into
+metaphysics The result is a Moral Philosophy set against a background
+of Political Theory and general Philosophy. The most characteristic
+features of this Moral Philosophy are due to the fact of its
+essentially teleological view of human life and action: (1) Every human
+activity, but especially every human practical activity, is directed
+towards a simple End discoverable by reflection, and this End is
+conceived of as the object of universal human desire, as something to
+be enjoyed, not as something which ought to be done or enacted.
+Anstotle's Moral Philosophy is not hedonistic but it is eudæmomstic,
+the end is the enjoyment of Happiness, not the fulfilment of Duty. (2)
+Every human practical activity derives its value from its efficiency as
+a means to that end, it is good or bad, right or wrong, as it conduces
+or fails to conduce to Happiness Thus his Moral Philosophy is
+essentially utilitarian or prudential Right action presupposes Thought
+or Thinking, partly on the development of a clearer and distincter
+conception of the end of desire, partly as the deduction from that of
+rules which state the normally effective conditions of its realisation.
+The thinking involved in right conduct is calculation--calculation of
+means to an end fixed by nature and foreknowable Action itself is at
+its best just the realisation of a scheme preconceived and thought out
+beforehand, commending itself by its inherent attractiveness or promise
+of enjoyment.
+
+This view has the great advantage of exhibiting morality as essentially
+reasonable, but the accompanying disadvantage of lowering it into a
+somewhat prosaic and unideal Prudentialism, nor is it saved from this
+by the tacking on to it, by a sort of after-thought, of the second and
+higher Ideal--an addition which ruins the coherence of the account
+without really transmuting its substance The source of our
+dissatisfaction with the whole theory lies deeper than in its tendency
+to identify the end with the maximum of enjoyment or satisfaction, or
+to regard the goodness or badness of acts and feelings as lying solely
+in their efficacy to produce such a result It arises from the
+application to morality of the distinction of means and end For this
+distinction, for all its plausibility and usefulness in ordinary
+thought and speech, cannot finally be maintained In morality--and this
+is vital to its character--everything is both means and end, and so
+neither in distinction or separation, and all thinking about it which
+presupposes the finality of this distinction wanders into misconception
+and error. The thinking which really matters in conduct is not a
+thinking which imaginatively forecasts ideals which promise to fulfil
+desire, or calculates means to their attainment--that is sometimes
+useful, sometimes harmful, and always subordinate, but thinking which
+reveals to the agent the situation in which he is to act, both, that
+is, the universal situation on which as man he always and everywhere
+stands, and the ever-varying and ever-novel situation in which he as
+this individual, here and now, finds himself. In such knowledge of
+given or historic fact lie the natural determinants of his conduct, in
+such knowledge alone lies the condition of his freedom and his good.
+
+But this does not mean that Moral Philosophy has not still much to
+learn from Aristotle's _Ethics_. The work still remains one of the best
+introductions to a study of its important subject-matter, it spreads
+before us a view of the relevant facts, it reduces them to manageable
+compass and order, it raises some of the central problems, and makes
+acute and valuable suggestions towards their solution. Above all, it
+perpetually incites to renewed and independent reflection upon them.
+
+J. A. SMITH
+
+ The following is a list of the works of Aristotle:--
+
+First edition of works (with omission of Rhetorica, Poetica, and second
+book of Economica), 5 vols by Aldus Manutius, Venice, 1495 8, re
+impression supervised by Erasmus and with certain corrections by
+Grynaeus (including Rhetorica and Poetica), 1531, 1539, revised 1550,
+later editions were followed by that of Immanuel Bekker and Brandis
+(Greek and Latin), 5 vols. The 5th vol contains the Index by Bomtz,
+1831-70, Didot edition (Greek and Latin), 5 vols 1848 74
+
+ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS Edited by T Taylor, with Porphyry's Introduction,
+9 vols, 1812, under editorship of J A Smith and W D Ross, II vols,
+1908-31, Loeb editions Ethica, Rhetorica, Poetica, Physica, Politica,
+Metaphysica, 1926-33
+
+Later editions of separate works _De Anima_ Torstrik, 1862,
+Trendelenburg, 2nd edition, 1877, with English translation, L Wallace,
+1882, Biehl, 1884, 1896, with English, R D Hicks, 1907 _Ethica_ J S
+Brewer (Nicomachean), 1836, W E Jelf, 1856, J F T Rogers, 1865, A
+Grant, 1857 8, 1866, 1874, 1885, E Moore, 1871, 1878, 4th edition,
+1890, Ramsauer (Nicomachean), 1878, Susemihl, 1878, 1880, revised by O
+Apelt, 1903, A Grant, 1885, I Bywater (Nicomachean), 1890, J Burnet,
+1900
+
+_Historia Animalium_ Schneider, 1812, Aubert and Wimmer, 1860;
+Dittmeyer, 1907
+
+_Metaphysica_ Schwegler, 1848, W Christ, 1899
+
+_Organon_ Waitz, 1844 6
+
+_Poetica_ Vahlen, 1867, 1874, with Notes by E Moore, 1875, with English
+translation by E R Wharton, 1883, 1885, Uberweg, 1870, 1875, with
+German translation, Susemihl, 1874, Schmidt, 1875, Christ, 1878, I
+Bywater, 1898, T G Tucker, 1899
+
+_De Republica Athenientium_ Text and facsimile of Papyrus, F G Kenyon,
+1891, 3rd edition, 1892, Kaibel and Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, 1891, 3rd
+edition, 1898, Van Herwerden and Leeuwen (from Kenyon's text), 1891,
+Blass, 1892, 1895, 1898, 1903, J E Sandys, 1893
+
+_Politica_ Susemihl, 1872, with German, 1878, 3rd edition, 1882,
+Susemihl and Hicks, 1894, etc, O Immisch, 1909
+
+_Physica_ C Prantl, 1879
+
+_Rhetorica_ Stahr, 1862, Sprengel (with Latin text), 1867, Cope and
+Sandys, 1877, Roemer, 1885, 1898
+
+ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF ONE OR MORE WORKS De Anima (with Parva
+Naturalia), by W A Hammond, 1902 Ethica Of Morals to Nicomachus, by E
+Pargiter, 1745, with Politica by J Gillies, 1797, 1804, 1813, with
+Rhetorica and Poetica, by T Taylor, 1818, and later editions
+Nicomachean Ethics, 1819, mainly from text of Bekker by D P Chase,
+1847, revised 1861, and later editions, with an introductory essay by G
+H Lewes (Camelot Classics) 1890, re-edited by J M Mitchell (New
+Universal Library), 1906, 1910, by R W Browne (Bohn's Classical
+Library), 1848, etc, by R Williams, 1869, 1876, by W M Hatch and others
+(with translation of paraphrase attributed to Andronicus of Rhodes),
+edited by E Hatch, 1879 by F H Peters, 1881, J E C Welldon, 1892, J
+Gillies (Lubbock's Hundred Books) 1893 Historia Animalium, by R
+Creswell (Bonn's Classical Library) 1848, with Treatise on Physiognomy,
+by T Taylor, 1809 Metaphysica, by T Taylor, 1801, by J H M Mahon
+(Bohn's Classical Library), 1848 Organon, with Porphyry's Introduction,
+by O F Owen (Bohn's Classical Library), 1848 Posterior Analytics, E
+Poste, 1850, E S Bourchier, 1901, On Fallacies, E Poste, 1866 Parva
+Naturaha (Greek and English), by G R T Ross, 1906, with De Anima, by W
+A Hammond, 1902 Youth and Old Age, Life and Death and Respiration, W
+Ogle 1897 Poetica, with Notes from the French of D Acier, 1705, by H J
+Pye, 1788, 1792, T Twining, 1789, 1812, with Preface and Notes by H
+Hamilton, 1851, Treatise on Rhetorica and Poetica, by T Hobbes (Bohn's
+Classical Library), 1850, by Wharton, 1883 (see Greek version), S H
+Butcher, 1895, 1898, 3rd edition, 1902, E S Bourchier, 1907, by Ingram
+Bywater, 1909 De Partibus Animalium, W Ogle, 1882 De Republica
+Athenientium, by E Poste, 1891, F G Kenyon, 1891, T J Dymes, 1891 De
+Virtutibus et Vitus, by W Bridgman, 1804 Politica, from the French of
+Regius, 1598, by W Ellis, 1776, 1778, 1888 (Morley's Universal
+Library), 1893 (Lubbock's Hundred Books) by E Walford (with Æconomics,
+and Life by Dr Gillies), (Bohn's Classical Library), 1848, J E. C.
+Welldon, 1883, B Jowett, 1885, with Introduction and Index by H W C
+Davis, 1905, Books i iii iv (vii) from Bekker's text by W E Bolland,
+with Introduction by A Lang, 1877. Problemata (with writings of other
+philosophers), 1597, 1607, 1680, 1684, etc. Rhetorica, A summary by T
+Hobbes, 1655 (?), new edition, 1759, by the translators of the Art of
+Thinking, 1686, 1816, by D M Crimmin, 1812, J Gillies, 1823, Anon 1847,
+J E C Welldon, 1886, R C Jebb, with Introduction and Supplementary
+Notes by J E Sandys, 1909 (see under Poetica and Ethica). Secreta
+Secretorum (supposititious work), Anon 1702, from the Hebrew version by
+M Gaster, 1907, 1908. Version by Lydgate and Burgh, edited by R Steele
+(E E T S), 1894, 1898.
+
+LIFE, ETC J W Blakesley, 1839, A Crichton (Jardine's Naturalist's
+Library), 1843, JS Blackie, Four Phases of Morals, Socrates, Aristotle,
+etc, 1871, G Grote, Aristotle, edited by A Bain and G C Robertson,
+1872, 1880, E Wallace, Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle, 1875,
+1880, A Grant (Ancient Classics for English readers), 1877, T Davidson,
+Aristotle and Ancient Educational Ideals (Great Educators), 1892, F
+Sewall, Swedenborg and Aristotle, 1895, W A Heidel, The Necessary and
+the Contingent of the Aristotelian System (University of Chicago
+Contributions to Philosophy), 1896, F W Bain, On the Realisation of the
+Possible, and the Spirit of Aristotle, 1899, J H Hyslop, The Ethics of
+the Greek Philosophers, etc (Evolution of Ethics), 1903, M V Williams,
+Six Essays on the Platonic Theory of Knowledge as expounded in the
+later dialogues and reviewed by Aristotle, 1908, J M Watson,
+Aristotle's Criticism of Plato, 1909 A E Taylor, Aristotle, 1919, W D
+Ross, Aristotle, 1923.
+
+ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS
+
+BOOK I
+
+Chapter I.
+
+Every art, and every science reduced to a teachable form, and in like
+manner every action and moral choice, aims, it is thought, at some
+good: for which reason a common and by no means a bad description of
+the Chief Good is, "that which all things aim at."
+
+Now there plainly is a difference in the Ends proposed: for in some
+cases they are acts of working, and in others certain works or tangible
+results beyond and beside the acts of working: and where there are
+certain Ends beyond and beside the actions, the works are in their
+nature better than the acts of working. Again, since actions and arts
+and sciences are many, the Ends likewise come to be many: of the
+healing art, for instance, health; of the ship-building art, a vessel;
+of the military art, victory; and of domestic management, wealth; are
+respectively the Ends.
+
+And whatever of such actions, arts, or sciences range under some one
+faculty (as under that of horsemanship the art of making bridles, and
+all that are connected with the manufacture of horse-furniture in
+general; this itself again, and every action connected with war, under
+the military art; and in the same way others under others), in all
+such, the Ends of the master-arts are more choice-worthy than those
+ranging under them, because it is with a view to the former that the
+latter are pursued.
+
+(And in this comparison it makes no difference whether the acts of
+working are themselves the Ends of the actions, or something further
+beside them, as is the case in the arts and sciences we have been just
+speaking of.)
+
+Since then of all things which may be done there is some one End which
+we desire for its own sake, and with a view to which we desire
+everything else; and since we do not choose in all instances with a
+further End in view (for then men would go on without limit, and so the
+desire would be unsatisfied and fruitless), this plainly must be the
+Chief Good, _i.e._ the best thing of all.
+
+Surely then, even with reference to actual life and conduct, the
+knowledge of it must have great weight; and like archers, with a mark
+in view, we shall be more likely to hit upon what is right: and if so,
+we ought to try to describe, in outline at least, what it is and of
+which of the sciences and faculties it is the End.
+
+Now one would naturally suppose it to be the End of that which is most
+commanding and most inclusive: and to this description, πολιτικὴ[1]
+plainly answers: for this it is that determines which of the sciences
+should be in the communities, and which kind individuals are to learn,
+and what degree of proficiency is to be required. Again; we see also
+ranging under this the most highly esteemed faculties, such as the art
+military, and that of domestic management, and Rhetoric. Well then,
+since this uses all the other practical sciences, and moreover lays
+down rules as to what men are to do, and from what to abstain, the End
+of this must include the Ends of the rest, and so must be The Good of
+Man. And grant that this is the same to the individual and to the
+community, yet surely that of the latter is plainly greater and more
+perfect to discover and preserve: for to do this even for a single
+individual were a matter for contentment; but to do it for a whole
+nation, and for communities generally, were more noble and godlike.
+
+Such then are the objects proposed by our treatise, which is of the
+nature of πολιτικὴ: and I conceive I shall have spoken on them
+satisfactorily, if they be made as distinctly clear as the nature of
+the subject-matter will admit: for exactness must not be looked for in
+all discussions alike, any more than in all works of handicraft. Now
+the notions of nobleness and justice, with the examination of which
+πολιτικὴ is concerned, admit of variation and error to such a degree,
+that they are supposed by some to exist conventionally only, and not in
+the nature of things: but then, again, the things which are allowed to
+be goods admit of a similar error, because harm comes to many from
+them: for before now some have perished through wealth, and others
+through valour.
+
+We must be content then, in speaking of such things and from such data,
+to set forth the truth roughly and in outline; in other words, since we
+are speaking of general matter and from general data, to draw also
+conclusions merely general. And in the same spirit should each person
+receive what we say: for the man of education will seek exactness so
+far in each subject as the nature of the thing admits, it being plainly
+much the same absurdity to put up with a mathematician who tries to
+persuade instead of proving, and to demand strict demonstrative
+reasoning of a Rhetorician.
+
+Now each man judges well what he knows, and of these things he is a
+good judge: on each particular matter then he is a good judge who has
+been instructed in _it_, and in a general way the man of general mental
+cultivation.[2]
+
+Hence the young man is not a fit student of Moral Philosophy, for he
+has no experience in the actions of life, while all that is said
+presupposes and is concerned with these: and in the next place, since
+he is apt to follow the impulses of his passions, he will hear as
+though he heard not, and to no profit, the end in view being practice
+and not mere knowledge.
+
+And I draw no distinction between young in years, and youthful in
+temper and disposition: the defect to which I allude being no direct
+result of the time, but of living at the beck and call of passion, and
+following each object as it rises.[3] For to them that are such the
+knowledge comes to be unprofitable, as to those of imperfect
+self-control: but, to those who form their desires and act in
+accordance with reason, to have knowledge on these points must be very
+profitable.
+
+Let thus much suffice by way of preface on these three points, the
+student, the spirit in which our observations should be received, and
+the object which we propose.
+
+Chapter II.
+
+And now, resuming the statement with which we commenced, since all
+knowledge and moral choice grasps at good of some kind or another, what
+good is that which we say πολιτικὴ aims at? or, in other words, what is
+the highest of all the goods which are the objects of action?
+
+So far as name goes, there is a pretty general agreement: for HAPPINESS
+both the multitude and the refined few call it, and "living well" and
+"doing well" they conceive to be the same with "being happy;" but about
+the Nature of this Happiness, men dispute, and the multitude do not in
+their account of it agree with the wise. For some say it is some one of
+those things which are palpable and apparent, as pleasure or wealth or
+honour; in fact, some one thing, some another; nay, oftentimes the same
+man gives a different account of it; for when ill, he calls it health;
+when poor, wealth: and conscious of their own ignorance, men admire
+those who talk grandly and above their comprehension. Some again held
+it to be something by itself, other than and beside these many good
+things, which is in fact to all these the cause of their being good.
+
+Now to sift all the opinions would be perhaps rather a fruitless task;
+so it shall suffice to sift those which are most generally current, or
+are thought to have some reason in them.
+
+And here we must not forget the difference between reasoning from
+principles, and reasoning to principles: for with good cause did Plato
+too doubt about this, and enquire whether the right road is from
+principles or to principles, just as in the racecourse from the judges
+to the further end, or _vice versâ_.
+
+Of course, we must begin with what is known; but then this is of two
+kinds, what we _do_ know, and what we _may_ know:[5] perhaps then as
+individuals we must begin with what we _do_ know. Hence the necessity
+that he should have been well trained in habits, who is to study, with
+any tolerable chance of profit, the principles of nobleness and justice
+and moral philosophy generally. For a principle is a matter of fact,
+and if the fact is sufficiently clear to a man there will be no need in
+addition of the reason for the fact. And he that has been thus trained
+either has principles already, or can receive them easily: as for him
+who neither has nor can receive them, let him hear his sentence from
+Hesiod:
+
+He is best of all who of himself conceiveth all things;
+Good again is he too who can adopt a good suggestion;
+But whoso neither of himself conceiveth nor hearing from another
+Layeth it to heart;--he is a useless man.
+
+Chapter III.
+
+But to return from this digression.
+
+Now of the Chief Good (_i.e._ of Happiness) men seem to form their
+notions from the different modes of life, as we might naturally expect:
+the many and most low conceive it to be pleasure, and hence they are
+content with the life of sensual enjoyment. For there are three lines
+of life which stand out prominently to view: that just mentioned, and
+the life in society, and, thirdly, the life of contemplation.
+
+Now the many are plainly quite slavish, choosing a life like that of
+brute animals: yet they obtain some consideration, because many of the
+great share the tastes of Sardanapalus. The refined and active again
+conceive it to be honour: for this may be said to be the end of the
+life in society: yet it is plainly too superficial for the object of
+our search, because it is thought to rest with those who pay rather
+than with him who receives it, whereas the Chief Good we feel
+instinctively must be something which is our own, and not easily to be
+taken from us.
+
+And besides, men seem to pursue honour, that they may believe
+themselves to be good:[6] for instance, they seek to be honoured by the
+wise, and by those among whom they are known, and for virtue: clearly
+then, in the opinion at least of these men, virtue is higher than
+honour. In truth, one would be much more inclined to think this to be
+the end of the life in society; yet this itself is plainly not
+sufficiently final: for it is conceived possible, that a man possessed
+of virtue might sleep or be inactive all through his life, or, as a
+third case, suffer the greatest evils and misfortunes: and the man who
+should live thus no one would call happy, except for mere disputation's
+sake.[7]
+
+And for these let thus much suffice, for they have been treated of at
+sufficient length in my Encyclia.[8]
+
+A third line of life is that of contemplation, concerning which we
+shall make our examination in the following pages.[9]
+
+As for the life of money-making, it is one of constraint, and wealth
+manifestly is not the good we are seeking, because it is for use, that
+is, for the sake of something further: and hence one would rather
+conceive the forementioned ends to be the right ones, for men rest
+content with them for their own sakes. Yet, clearly, they are not the
+objects of our search either, though many words have been wasted on
+them.[10] So much then for these.
+
+Again, the notion of one Universal Good (the same, that is, in all
+things), it is better perhaps we should examine, and discuss the
+meaning of it, though such an enquiry is unpleasant, because they are
+friends of ours who have introduced these εἴδη.[11] Still perhaps it
+may appear better, nay to be our duty where the safety of the truth is
+concerned, to upset if need be even our own theories, specially as we
+are lovers of wisdom: for since both are dear to us, we are bound to
+prefer the truth. Now they who invented this doctrine of εἴδη, did not
+apply it to those things in which they spoke of priority and
+posteriority, and so they never made any ἰδέα of numbers; but good is
+predicated in the categories of Substance, Quality, and Relation; now
+that which exists of itself, i.e. Substance, is prior in the nature of
+things to that which is relative, because this latter is an off-shoot,
+as it were, and result of that which is; on their own principle then
+there cannot be a common ἰδέα in the case of these.
+
+In the next place, since good is predicated in as many ways as there
+are modes of existence [for it is predicated in the category of
+Substance, as God, Intellect--and in that of Quality, as The Virtues--and
+in that of Quantity, as The Mean--and in that of Relation, as The
+Useful--and in that of Time, as Opportunity--and in that of Place, as
+Abode; and other such like things], it manifestly cannot be something
+common and universal and one in all: else it would not have been
+predicated in all the categories, but in one only.
+
+Thirdly, since those things which range under one ἰδέα are also under
+the cognisance of one science, there would have been, on their theory,
+only one science taking cognisance of all goods collectively: but in
+fact there are many even for those which range under one category: for
+instance, of Opportunity or Seasonableness (which I have before
+mentioned as being in the category of Time), the science is, in war,
+generalship; in disease, medical science; and of the Mean (which I
+quoted before as being in the category of Quantity), in food, the
+medical science; and in labour or exercise, the gymnastic science. A
+person might fairly doubt also what in the world they mean by very-this
+that or the other, since, as they would themselves allow, the account
+of the humanity is one and the same in the very-Man, and in any
+individual Man: for so far as the individual and the very-Man are both
+Man, they will not differ at all: and if so, then very-good and any
+particular good will not differ, in so far as both are good. Nor will
+it do to say, that the eternity of the very-good makes it to be more
+good; for what has lasted white ever so long, is no whiter than what
+lasts but for a day.
+
+No. The Pythagoreans do seem to give a more credible account of the
+matter, who place "One" among the goods in their double list of goods
+and bads:[12] which philosophers, in fact, Speusippus[13] seems to have
+followed.
+
+But of these matters let us speak at some other time. Now there is
+plainly a loophole to object to what has been advanced, on the plea
+that the theory I have attacked is not by its advocates applied to all
+good: but those goods only are spoken of as being under one ἰδέα, which
+are pursued, and with which men rest content simply for their own
+sakes: whereas those things which have a tendency to produce or
+preserve them in any way, or to hinder their contraries, are called
+good because of these other goods, and after another fashion. It is
+manifest then that the goods may be so called in two senses, the one
+class for their own sakes, the other because of these.
+
+Very well then, let us separate the independent goods from the
+instrumental, and see whether they are spoken of as under one ἰδέα.
+But the question next arises, what kind of goods are we to call
+independent? All such as are pursued even when separated from other
+goods, as, for instance, being wise, seeing, and certain pleasures and
+honours (for these, though we do pursue them with some further end in
+view, one would still place among the independent goods)? or does it
+come in fact to this, that we can call nothing independent good except
+the ἰδέα, and so the concrete of it will be nought?
+
+If, on the other hand, these are independent goods, then we shall
+require that the account of the goodness be the same clearly in all,
+just as that of the whiteness is in snow and white lead. But how stands
+the fact? Why of honour and wisdom and pleasure the accounts are
+distinct and different in so far as they are good. The Chief Good then
+is not something common, and after one ἰδέα.
+
+But then, how does the name come to be common (for it is not seemingly
+a case of fortuitous equivocation)? Are different individual things
+called good by virtue of being from one source, or all conducing to one
+end, or rather by way of analogy, for that intellect is to the soul as
+sight to the body, and so on? However, perhaps we ought to leave these
+questions now, for an accurate investigation of them is more properly
+the business of a different philosophy. And likewise respecting the
+ἰδέα: for even if there is some one good predicated in common of all
+things that are good, or separable and capable of existing
+independently, manifestly it cannot be the object of human action or
+attainable by Man; but we are in search now of something that is
+so.[14]
+
+It may readily occur to any one, that it would be better to attain a
+knowledge of it with a view to such concrete goods as are attainable
+and practical, because, with this as a kind of model in our hands, we
+shall the better know what things are good for us individually, and
+when we know them, we shall attain them.
+
+Some plausibility, it is true, this argument possesses, but it is
+contradicted by the facts of the Arts and Sciences; for all these,
+though aiming at some good, and seeking that which is deficient, yet
+pretermit the knowledge of it: now it is not exactly probable that all
+artisans without exception should be ignorant of so great a help as
+this would be, and not even look after it; neither is it easy to see
+wherein a weaver or a carpenter will be profited in respect of his
+craft by knowing the very-good, or how a man will be the more apt to
+effect cures or to command an army for having seen the ἰδέα itself. For
+manifestly it is not health after this general and abstract fashion
+which is the subject of the physician's investigation, but the health
+of Man, or rather perhaps of this or that man; for he has to heal
+individuals.--Thus much on these points.
+
+Chapter IV.
+
+And now let us revert to the Good of which we are in search: what can
+it be? for manifestly it is different in different actions and arts:
+for it is different in the healing art and in the art military, and
+similarly in the rest. What then is the Chief Good in each? Is it not
+"that for the sake of which the other things are done?" and this in the
+healing art is health, and in the art military victory, and in that of
+house-building a house, and in any other thing something else; in
+short, in every action and moral choice the End, because in all cases
+men do everything else with a view to this. So that if there is some
+one End of all things which are and may be done, this must be the Good
+proposed by doing, or if more than one, then these.
+
+Thus our discussion after some traversing about has come to the same
+point which we reached before. And this we must try yet more to clear
+up.
+
+Now since the ends are plainly many, and of these we choose some with a
+view to others (wealth, for instance, musical instruments, and, in
+general, all instruments), it is clear that all are not final: but the
+Chief Good is manifestly something final; and so, if there is some one
+only which is final, this must be the object of our search: but if
+several, then the most final of them will be it.
+
+Now that which is an object of pursuit in itself we call more final
+than that which is so with a view to something else; that again which
+is never an object of choice with a view to something else than those
+which are so both in themselves and with a view to this ulterior
+object: and so by the term "absolutely final," we denote that which is
+an object of choice always in itself, and never with a view to any
+other.
+
+And of this nature Happiness is mostly thought to be, for this we
+choose always for its own sake, and never with a view to anything
+further: whereas honour, pleasure, intellect, in fact every excellence
+we choose for their own sakes, it is true (because we would choose each
+of these even if no result were to follow), but we choose them also
+with a view to happiness, conceiving that through their instrumentality
+we shall be happy: but no man chooses happiness with a view to them,
+nor in fact with a view to any other thing whatsoever.
+
+The same result[15] is seen to follow also from the notion of
+self-sufficiency, a quality thought to belong to the final good. Now by
+sufficient for Self, we mean not for a single individual living a
+solitary life, but for his parents also and children and wife, and, in
+general, friends and countrymen; for man is by nature adapted to a
+social existence. But of these, of course, some limit must be fixed:
+for if one extends it to parents and descendants and friends' friends,
+there is no end to it. This point, however, must be left for future
+investigation: for the present we define that to be self-sufficient
+"which taken alone makes life choice-worthy, and to be in want of
+nothing;" now of such kind we think Happiness to be: and further, to be
+most choice-worthy of all things; not being reckoned with any other
+thing,[16] for if it were so reckoned, it is plain we must then allow
+it, with the addition of ever so small a good, to be more choice-worthy
+than it was before:[17] because what is put to it becomes an addition of so
+much more good, and of goods the greater is ever the more
+choice-worthy.
+
+So then Happiness is manifestly something final and self-sufficient,
+being the end of all things which are and may be done.
+
+Chapter V.
+
+But, it may be, to call Happiness the Chief Good is a mere truism, and
+what is wanted is some clearer account of its real nature. Now this
+object may be easily attained, when we have discovered what is the work
+of man; for as in the case of flute-player, statuary, or artisan of any
+kind, or, more generally, all who have any work or course of action,
+their Chief Good and Excellence is thought to reside in their work, so
+it would seem to be with man, if there is any work belonging to him.
+
+Are we then to suppose, that while carpenter and cobbler have certain
+works and courses of action, Man as Man has none, but is left by Nature
+without a work? or would not one rather hold, that as eye, hand, and
+foot, and generally each of his members, has manifestly some special
+work; so too the whole Man, as distinct from all these, has some work
+of his own?[18]
+
+What then can this be? not mere life, because that plainly is shared
+with him even by vegetables, and we want what is peculiar to him. We
+must separate off then the life of mere nourishment and growth, and
+next will come the life of sensation: but this again manifestly is
+common to horses, oxen, and every animal. There remains then a kind of
+life of the Rational Nature apt to act: and of this Nature there are
+two parts denominated Rational, the one as being obedient to Reason,
+the other as having and exerting it. Again, as this life is also spoken
+of in two ways,[19] we must take that which is in the way of actual
+working, because this is thought to be most properly entitled to the
+name. If then the work of Man is a working of the soul in accordance
+with reason, or at least not independently of reason, and we say that
+the work of any given subject, and of that subject good of its kind,
+are the same in kind (as, for instance, of a harp-player and a good
+harp-player, and so on in every case, adding to the work eminence in
+the way of excellence; I mean, the work of a harp-player is to play the
+harp, and of a good harp-player to play it well); if, I say, this is
+so, and we assume the work of Man to be life of a certain kind, that is
+to say a working of the soul, and actions with reason, and of a good
+man to do these things well and nobly, and in fact everything is
+finished off well in the way of the excellence which peculiarly belongs
+to it: if all this is so, then the Good of Man comes to be "a working
+of the Soul in the way of Excellence," or, if Excellence admits of
+degrees, in the way of the best and most perfect Excellence.
+
+And we must add, ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ;[20] for as it is not one swallow or one
+fine day that makes a spring, so it is not one day or a short time that
+makes a man blessed and happy.
+
+Let this then be taken for a rough sketch of the Chief Good: since it
+is probably the right way to give first the outline, and fill it in
+afterwards. And it would seem that any man may improve and connect what
+is good in the sketch, and that time is a good discoverer and
+co-operator in such matters: it is thus in fact that all improvements
+in the various arts have been brought about, for any man may fill up a
+deficiency.
+
+You must remember also what has been already stated, and not seek for
+exactness in all matters alike, but in each according to the
+subject-matter, and so far as properly belongs to the system. The
+carpenter and geometrician, for instance, enquire into the right line
+in different fashion: the former so far as he wants it for his work,
+the latter enquires into its nature and properties, because he is
+concerned with the truth.
+
+So then should one do in other matters, that the incidental matters may
+not exceed the direct ones.
+
+And again, you must not demand the reason either in all things
+alike,[21] because in some it is sufficient that the fact has been well
+demonstrated, which is the case with first principles; and the fact is
+the first step, _i.e._ starting-point or principle.
+
+And of these first principles some are obtained by induction, some by
+perception,[22] some by a course of habituation, others in other
+different ways. And we must try to trace up each in their own nature,
+and take pains to secure their being well defined, because they have
+great influence on what follows: it is thought, I mean, that the
+starting-point or principle is more than half the whole matter, and
+that many of the points of enquiry come simultaneously into view
+thereby.
+
+Chapter VI.
+
+We must now enquire concerning Happiness, not only from our conclusion
+and the data on which our reasoning proceeds, but likewise from what is
+commonly said about it: because with what is true all things which
+really are are in harmony, but with that which is false the true very
+soon jars.
+
+Now there is a common division of goods into three classes; one being
+called external, the other two those of the soul and body respectively,
+and those belonging to the soul we call most properly and specially
+good. Well, in our definition we assume that the actions and workings
+of the soul constitute Happiness, and these of course belong to the
+soul. And so our account is a good one, at least according to this
+opinion, which is of ancient date, and accepted by those who profess
+philosophy. Rightly too are certain actions and workings said to be the
+end, for thus it is brought into the number of the goods of the soul
+instead of the external. Agreeing also with our definition is the
+common notion, that the happy man lives well and does well, for it has
+been stated by us to be pretty much a kind of living well and doing
+well.
+
+And further, the points required in Happiness are found in combination
+in our account of it.
+
+For some think it is virtue, others practical wisdom, others a kind of
+scientific philosophy; others that it is these, or else some one of
+them, in combination with pleasure, or at least not independently of
+it; while others again take in external prosperity.
+
+Of these opinions, some rest on the authority of numbers or antiquity,
+others on that of few, and those men of note: and it is not likely that
+either of these classes should be wrong in all points, but be right at
+least in some one, or even in most.
+
+Now with those who assert it to be Virtue (Excellence), or some kind of
+Virtue, our account agrees: for working in the way of Excellence surely
+belongs to Excellence.
+
+And there is perhaps no unimportant difference between conceiving of
+the Chief Good as in possession or as in use, in other words, as a mere
+state or as a working. For the state or habit[23] may possibly exist in
+a subject without effecting any good, as, for instance, in him who is
+asleep, or in any other way inactive; but the working cannot so, for it
+will of necessity act, and act well. And as at the Olympic games it is
+not the finest and strongest men who are crowned, but they who enter
+the lists, for out of these the prize-men are selected; so too in life,
+of the honourable and the good, it is they who act who rightly win the
+prizes.[24]
+
+Their life too is in itself pleasant: for the feeling of pleasure is a
+mental sensation, and that is to each pleasant of which he is said to
+be fond: a horse, for instance, to him who is fond of horses, and a
+sight to him who is fond of sights: and so in like manner just acts to
+him who is fond of justice, and more generally the things in accordance
+with virtue to him who is fond of virtue. Now in the case of the
+multitude of men the things which they individually esteem pleasant
+clash, because they are not such by nature, whereas to the lovers of
+nobleness those things are pleasant which are such by nature: but the
+actions in accordance with virtue are of this kind, so that they are
+pleasant both to the individuals and also in themselves.
+
+So then their life has no need of pleasure as a kind of additional
+appendage, but involves pleasure in itself. For, besides what I have
+just mentioned, a man is not a good man at all who feels no pleasure in
+noble actions,[25] just as no one would call that man just who does not
+feel pleasure in acting justly, or liberal who does not in liberal
+actions, and similarly in the case of the other virtues which might be
+enumerated: and if this be so, then the actions in accordance with
+virtue must be in themselves pleasurable. Then again they are certainly
+good and noble, and each of these in the highest degree; if we are to
+take as right the judgment of the good man, for he judges as we have
+said.
+
+Thus then Happiness is most excellent, most noble, and most pleasant,
+and these attributes are not separated as in the well-known Delian
+inscription--
+
+"Most noble is that which is most just, but best is health;
+And naturally most pleasant is the obtaining one's desires."
+
+For all these co-exist in the best acts of working: and we say that
+Happiness is these, or one, that is, the best of them.
+
+Still[26] it is quite plain that it does require the addition of
+external goods, as we have said: because without appliances it is
+impossible, or at all events not easy, to do noble actions: for
+friends, money, and political influence are in a manner instruments
+whereby many things are done: some things there are again a deficiency
+in which mars blessedness; good birth, for instance, or fine offspring,
+or even personal beauty: for he is not at all capable of Happiness who
+is very ugly, or is ill-born, or solitary and childless; and still less
+perhaps supposing him to have very bad children or friends, or to have
+lost good ones by death. As we have said already, the addition of
+prosperity of this kind does seem necessary to complete the idea of
+Happiness; hence some rank good fortune, and others virtue, with
+Happiness.
+
+Chapter VII.
+
+And hence too a question is raised, whether it is a thing that can be
+learned, or acquired by habituation or discipline of some other kind,
+or whether it comes in the way of divine dispensation, or even in the
+way of chance.
+
+Now to be sure, if anything else is a gift of the Gods to men, it is
+probable that Happiness is a gift of theirs too, and specially because
+of all human goods it is the highest. But this, it may be, is a
+question belonging more properly to an investigation different from
+ours:[27] and it is quite clear, that on the supposition of its not
+being sent from the Gods direct, but coming to us by reason of virtue
+and learning of a certain kind, or discipline, it is yet one of the
+most Godlike things; because the prize and End of virtue is manifestly
+somewhat most excellent, nay divine and blessed.
+
+It will also on this supposition be widely participated, for it may
+through learning and diligence of a certain kind exist in all who have
+not been maimed[28] for virtue.
+
+And if it is better we should be happy thus than as a result of chance,
+this is in itself an argument that the case is so; because those things
+which are in the way of nature, and in like manner of art, and of every
+cause, and specially the best cause, are by nature in the best way
+possible: to leave them to chance what is greatest and most noble would
+be very much out of harmony with all these facts.[29]
+
+The question may be determined also by a reference to our definition of
+Happiness, that it is a working of the soul in the way of excellence or
+virtue of a certain kind: and of the other goods, some we must have to
+begin with, and those which are co-operative and useful are given by
+nature as instruments.[30]
+
+These considerations will harmonise also with what we said at the
+commencement: for we assumed the End of πολιτικὴ to be most excellent:
+now this bestows most care on making the members of the community of a
+certain character; good that is and apt to do what is honourable.
+
+With good reason then neither ox nor horse nor any other brute animal
+do we call happy, for none of them can partake in such working: and for
+this same reason a child is not happy either, because by reason of his
+tender age he cannot yet perform such actions: if the term is applied,
+it is by way of anticipation.
+
+For to constitute Happiness, there must be, as we have said, complete
+virtue and a complete life: for many changes and chances of all kinds
+arise during a life, and he who is most prosperous may become involved
+in great misfortunes in his old age, as in the heroic poems the tale is
+told of Priam: but the man who has experienced such fortune and died in
+wretchedness, no man calls happy.
+
+Chapter VIII.
+
+Are we then to call no man happy while he lives, and, as Solon would
+have us, look to the end? And again, if we are to maintain this
+position, is a man then happy when he is dead? or is not this a
+complete absurdity, specially in us who say Happiness is a working of a
+certain kind?
+
+If on the other hand we do not assert that the dead man is happy, and
+Solon does not mean this, but only that one would then be safe in
+pronouncing a man happy, as being thenceforward out of the reach of
+evils and misfortunes, this too admits of some dispute, since it is
+thought that the dead has somewhat both of good and evil (if, as we
+must allow, a man may have when alive but not aware of the
+circumstances), as honour and dishonour, and good and bad fortune of
+children and descendants generally.
+
+Nor is this view again without its difficulties: for, after a man has
+lived in blessedness to old age and died accordingly, many changes may
+befall him in right of his descendants; some of them may be good and
+obtain positions in life accordant to their merits, others again quite
+the contrary: it is plain too that the descendants may at different
+intervals or grades stand in all manner of relations to the
+ancestors.[31] Absurd indeed would be the position that even the dead
+man is to change about with them and become at one time happy and at
+another miserable. Absurd however it is on the other hand that the
+affairs of the descendants should in no degree and during no time
+affect the ancestors.
+
+But we must revert to the point first raised,[32] since the present
+question will be easily determined from that.
+
+If then we are to look to the end and then pronounce the man blessed,
+not as being so but as having been so at some previous time, surely it
+is absurd that when he _is_ happy the truth is not to be asserted of
+him, because we are unwilling to pronounce the living happy by reason
+of their liability to changes, and because, whereas we have conceived
+of happiness as something stable and no way easily changeable, the fact
+is that good and bad fortune are constantly circling about the same
+people: for it is quite plain, that if we are to depend upon the
+fortunes of men, we shall often have to call the same man happy, and a
+little while after miserable, thus representing our happy man,
+
+"Chameleon-like, and based on rottenness."
+
+Is not this the solution? that to make our sentence dependent on the
+changes of fortune, is no way right: for not in them stands the well,
+or the ill, but though human life needs these as accessories (which we
+have allowed already), the workings in the way of virtue are what
+determine Happiness, and the contrary the contrary.
+
+And, by the way, the question which has been here discussed, testifies
+incidentally to the truth of our account of Happiness.[33] For to
+nothing does a stability of human results attach so much as it does to
+the workings in the way of virtue, since these are held to be more
+abiding even than the sciences: and of these last again[34] the most
+precious are the most abiding, because the blessed live in them most
+and most continuously, which seems to be the reason why they are not
+forgotten. So then this stability which is sought will be in the happy
+man, and he will be such through life, since always, or most of all, he
+will be doing and contemplating the things which are in the way of
+virtue: and the various chances of life he will bear most nobly, and at
+all times and in all ways harmoniously, since he is the truly good man,
+or in the terms of our proverb "a faultless cube."
+
+And whereas the incidents of chance are many, and differ in greatness
+and smallness, the small pieces of good or ill fortune evidently do not
+affect the balance of life, but the great and numerous, if happening
+for good, will make life more blessed (for it is their nature to
+contribute to ornament, and the using of them comes to be noble and
+excellent), but if for ill, they bruise as it were and maim the
+blessedness: for they bring in positive pain, and hinder many acts of
+working. But still, even in these, nobleness shines through when a man
+bears contentedly many and great mischances not from insensibility to
+pain but because he is noble and high-spirited.
+
+And if, as we have said, the acts of working are what determine the
+character of the life, no one of the blessed can ever become wretched,
+because he will never do those things which are hateful and mean. For
+the man who is truly good and sensible bears all fortunes, we presume,
+becomingly, and always does what is noblest under the circumstances,
+just as a good general employs to the best advantage the force he has
+with him; or a good shoemaker makes the handsomest shoe he can out of
+the leather which has been given him; and all other good artisans
+likewise. And if this be so, wretched never can the happy man come to
+be: I do not mean to say he will be blessed should he fall into
+fortunes like those of Priam.
+
+Nor, in truth, is he shifting and easily changeable, for on the one
+hand from his happiness he will not be shaken easily nor by ordinary
+mischances, but, if at all, by those which are great and numerous; and,
+on the other, after such mischances he cannot regain his happiness in a
+little time; but, if at all, in a long and complete period, during
+which he has made himself master of great and noble things.
+
+Why then should we not call happy the man who works in the way of
+perfect virtue, and is furnished with external goods sufficient for
+acting his part in the drama of life:[35] and this during no ordinary
+period but such as constitutes a complete life as we have been
+describing it.
+
+Or we must add, that not only is he to live so, but his death must be
+in keeping with such life, since the future is dark to us, and
+Happiness we assume to be in every way an end and complete. And, if
+this be so, we shall call them among the living blessed who have and
+will have the things specified, but blessed _as Men_.[36]
+
+On these points then let it suffice to have denned thus much.
+
+Chapter IX.
+
+Now that the fortunes of their descendants, and friends generally,
+contribute nothing towards forming the condition of the dead, is
+plainly a very heartless notion, and contrary to the current opinions.
+
+But since things which befall are many, and differ in all kinds of
+ways, and some touch more nearly, others less, to go into minute
+particular distinctions would evidently be a long and endless task: and
+so it may suffice to speak generally and in outline.
+
+If then, as of the misfortunes which happen to one's self, some have a
+certain weight and turn the balance of life, while others are, so to
+speak, lighter; so it is likewise with those which befall all our
+friends alike; if further, whether they whom each suffering befalls be
+alive or dead makes much more difference than in a tragedy the
+presupposing or actual perpetration of the various crimes and horrors,
+we must take into our account this difference also, and still more
+perhaps the doubt concerning the dead whether they really partake of
+any good or evil; it seems to result from all these considerations,
+that if anything does pierce the veil and reach them, be the same good
+or bad, it must be something trivial and small, either in itself or to
+them; or at least of such a magnitude or such a kind as neither to make
+happy them that are not so otherwise, nor to deprive of their
+blessedness them that are.[37]
+
+It is plain then that the good or ill fortunes of their friends do
+affect the dead somewhat: but in such kind and degree as neither to
+make the happy unhappy nor produce any other such effect.
+
+Chapter X.
+
+Having determined these points, let us examine with respect to
+Happiness, whether it belongs to the class of things praiseworthy or
+things precious; for to that of faculties[38] it evidently does not.
+
+Now it is plain that everything which is a subject of praise is praised
+for being of a certain kind and bearing a certain relation to something
+else: for instance, the just, and the valiant, and generally the good
+man, and virtue itself, we praise because of the actions and the
+results: and the strong man, and the quick runner, and so forth, we
+praise for being of a certain nature and bearing a certain relation to
+something good and excellent (and this is illustrated by attempts to
+praise the gods; for they are presented in a ludicrous aspect[39] by
+being referred to our standard, and this results from the fact, that
+all praise does, as we have said, imply reference to a standard). Now
+if it is to such objects that praise belongs, it is evident that what
+is applicable to the best objects is not praise, but something higher
+and better: which is plain matter of fact, for not only do we call the
+gods blessed and happy, but of men also we pronounce those blessed who
+most nearly resemble the gods. And in like manner in respect of goods;
+no man thinks of praising Happiness as he does the principle of
+justice, but calls it blessed, as being somewhat more godlike and more
+excellent.
+
+Eudoxus[40] too is thought to have advanced a sound argument in support
+of the claim of pleasure to the highest prize: for the fact that,
+though it is one of the good things, it is not praised, he took for an
+indication of its superiority to those which are subjects of praise: a
+superiority he attributed also to a god and the Chief Good, on the
+ground that they form the standard to which everything besides is
+referred. For praise applies to virtue, because it makes men apt to do
+what is noble; but encomia to definite works of body or mind.[41]
+
+However, it is perhaps more suitable to a regular treatise on encomia
+to pursue this topic with exactness: it is enough for our purpose that
+from what has been said it is evident that Happiness belongs to the
+class of things precious and final. And it seems to be so also because
+of its being a starting-point; which it is, in that with a view to it
+we all do everything else that is done; now the starting-point and
+cause of good things we assume to be something precious and divine.
+
+Chapter XI.
+
+Moreover, since Happiness is a kind of working of the soul in the way
+of perfect Excellence, we must enquire concerning Excellence: for so
+probably shall we have a clearer view concerning Happiness; and again,
+he who is really a statesman is generally thought to have spent most
+pains on this, for he wishes to make the citizens good and obedient to
+the laws. (For examples of this class we have the lawgivers of the
+Cretans and Lacedæmonians and whatever other such there have been.)
+But if this investigation belongs properly to πολιτικὴ, then clearly
+the enquiry will be in accordance with our original design.
+
+Well, we are to enquire concerning Excellence, _i.e._ Human Excellence
+of course, because it was the Chief Good of Man and the Happiness of
+Man that we were enquiring of just now.
+
+And by Human Excellence we mean not that of man's body but that of his
+soul; for we call Happiness a working of the Soul.
+
+And if this is so, it is plain that some knowledge of the nature of the
+Soul is necessary for the statesman, just as for the oculist a
+knowledge of the whole body, and the more so in proportion as πολιτικὴ
+is more precious and higher than the healing art: and in fact
+physicians of the higher class do busy themselves much with the
+knowledge of the body.
+
+So then the statesman is to consider the nature of the Soul: but he
+must do so with these objects in view, and so far only as may suffice
+for the objects of his special enquiry: for to carry his speculations
+to a greater exactness is perhaps a task more laborious than falls
+within his province.
+
+In fact, the few statements made on the subject in my popular treatises
+are quite enough, and accordingly we will adopt them here: as, that the
+Soul consists of two parts, the Irrational and the Rational (as to
+whether these are actually divided, as are the parts of the body, and
+everything that is capable of division; or are only metaphysically
+speaking two, being by nature inseparable, as are convex and concave
+circumferences, matters not in respect of our present purpose). And of
+the Irrational, the one part seems common to other objects, and in fact
+vegetative; I mean the cause of nourishment and growth (for such a
+faculty of the Soul one would assume to exist in all things that
+receive nourishment, even in embryos, and this the same as in the
+perfect creatures; for this is more likely than that it should be a
+different one).
+
+Now the Excellence of this manifestly is not peculiar to the human
+species but common to others: for this part and this faculty is thought
+to work most in time of sleep, and the good and bad man are least
+distinguishable while asleep; whence it is a common saying that during
+one half of life there is no difference between the happy and the
+wretched; and this accords with our anticipations, for sleep is an
+inactivity of the soul, in so far as it is denominated good or bad,
+except that in some wise some of its movements find their way through
+the veil and so the good come to have better dreams than ordinary men.
+But enough of this: we must forego any further mention of the nutritive
+part, since it is not naturally capable of the Excellence which is
+peculiarly human.
+
+And there seems to be another Irrational Nature of the Soul, which yet
+in a way partakes of Reason. For in the man who controls his appetites,
+and in him who resolves to do so and fails, we praise the Reason or
+Rational part of the Soul, because it exhorts aright and to the best
+course: but clearly there is in them, beside the Reason, some other
+natural principle which fights with and strains against the Reason.
+(For in plain terms, just as paralysed limbs of the body when their
+owners would move them to the right are borne aside in a contrary
+direction to the left, so is it in the case of the Soul, for the
+impulses of men who cannot control their appetites are to contrary
+points: the difference is that in the case of the body we do see what
+is borne aside but in the case of the soul we do not. But, it may be,
+not the less[42] on that account are we to suppose that there is in the
+Soul also somewhat besides the Reason, which is opposed to this and
+goes against it; as to _how_ it is different, that is irrelevant.)
+
+But of Reason this too does evidently partake, as we have said: for
+instance, in the man of self-control it obeys Reason: and perhaps in
+the man of perfected self-mastery,[43] or the brave man, it is yet
+more obedient; in them it agrees entirely with the Reason.
+
+So then the Irrational is plainly twofold: the one part, the merely
+vegetative, has no share of Reason, but that of desire, or appetition
+generally, does partake of it in a sense, in so far as it is obedient
+to it and capable of submitting to its rule. (So too in common phrase
+we say we have λόγος of our father or friends, and this in a different
+sense from that in which we say we have λόγος of mathematics.)[44]
+
+Now that the Irrational is in some way persuaded by the Reason,
+admonition, and every act of rebuke and exhortation indicate. If then
+we are to say that this also has Reason, then the Rational, as well as
+the Irrational, will be twofold, the one supremely and in itself, the
+other paying it a kind of filial regard.
+
+The Excellence of Man then is divided in accordance with this
+difference: we make two classes, calling the one Intellectual, and the
+other Moral; pure science, intelligence, and practical
+wisdom--Intellectual: liberality, and perfected self-mastery--Moral: in
+speaking of a man's Moral character, we do not say he is a scientific
+or intelligent but a meek man, or one of perfected self-mastery: and we
+praise the man of science in right of his mental state;[45] and of
+these such as are praiseworthy we call Excellences.
+
+BOOK II
+
+Chapter I.
+
+Well: human Excellence is of two kinds, Intellectual and Moral:[1] now
+the Intellectual springs originally, and is increased subsequently,
+from teaching (for the most part that is[2]), and needs therefore
+experience and time; whereas the Moral comes from custom, and so the
+Greek term denoting it is but a slight deflection from the term
+denoting custom in that language.
+
+From this fact it is plain that not one of the Moral Virtues comes to
+be in us merely by nature: because of such things as exist by nature,
+none can be changed by custom: a stone, for instance, by nature
+gravitating downwards, could never by custom be brought to ascend, not
+even if one were to try and accustom it by throwing it up ten thousand
+times; nor could file again be brought to descend, nor in fact could
+anything whose nature is in one way be brought by custom to be in
+another. The Virtues then come to be in us neither by nature, nor in
+despite of nature,[3] but we are furnished by nature with a capacity
+for receiving themu and are perfected in them through custom.
+
+Again, in whatever cases we get things by nature, we get the faculties
+first and perform the acts of working afterwards; an illustration of
+which is afforded by the case of our bodily senses, for it was not from
+having often seen or heard that we got these senses, but just the
+reverse: we had them and so exercised them, but did not have them
+because we had exercised them. But the Virtues we get by first
+performing single acts of working, which, again, is the case of other
+things, as the arts for instance; for what we have to make when we have
+learned how, these we learn how to make by making: men come to be
+builders, for instance, by building; harp-players, by playing on the
+harp: exactly so, by doing just actions we come to be just; by doing
+the actions of self-mastery we come to be perfected in self-mastery;
+and by doing brave actions brave.
+
+And to the truth of this testimony is borne by what takes place in
+communities: because the law-givers make the individual members good
+men by habituation, and this is the intention certainly of every
+law-giver, and all who do not effect it well fail of their intent; and
+herein consists the difference between a good Constitution and a bad.
+
+Again, every Virtue is either produced or destroyed from and by the
+very same circumstances: art too in like manner; I mean it is by
+playing the harp that both the good and the bad harp-players are
+formed: and similarly builders and all the rest; by building well men
+will become good builders; by doing it badly bad ones: in fact, if this
+had not been so, there would have been no need of instructors, but all
+men would have been at once good or bad in their several arts without
+them.
+
+So too then is it with the Virtues: for by acting in the various
+relations in which we are thrown with our fellow men, we come to be,
+some just, some unjust: and by acting in dangerous positions and being
+habituated to feel fear or confidence, we come to be, some brave,
+others cowards.
+
+Similarly is it also with respect to the occasions of lust and anger:
+for some men come to be perfected in self-mastery and mild, others
+destitute of all self-control and passionate; the one class by behaving
+in one way under them, the other by behaving in another. Or, in one
+word, the habits are produced from the acts of working like to them:
+and so what we have to do is to give a certain character to these
+particular acts, because the habits formed correspond to the
+differences of these.
+
+So then, whether we are accustomed this way or that straight from
+childhood, makes not a small but an important difference, or rather I
+would say it makes all the difference.
+
+Chapter II.
+
+Since then the object of the present treatise is not mere speculation,
+as it is of some others (for we are enquiring not merely that we may
+know what virtue is but that we may become virtuous, else it would have
+been useless), we must consider as to the particular actions how we are
+to do them, because, as we have just said, the quality of the habits
+that shall be formed depends on these.
+
+Now, that we are to act in accordance with Right Reason is a general
+maxim, and may for the present be taken for granted: we will speak of
+it hereafter, and say both what Right Reason is, and what are its
+relations to the other virtues.[4]
+
+But let this point be first thoroughly understood between us, that all
+which can be said on moral action must be said in outline, as it were,
+and not exactly: for as we remarked at the commencement, such reasoning
+only must be required as the nature of the subject-matter admits of,
+and matters of moral action and expediency have no fixedness any more
+than matters of health. And if the subject in its general maxims is
+such, still less in its application to particular cases is exactness
+attainable:[5] because these fall not under any art or system of rules,
+but it must be left in each instance to the individual agents to look
+to the exigencies of the particular case, as it is in the art of
+healing, or that of navigating a ship. Still, though the present
+subject is confessedly such, we must try and do what we can for it.
+
+First then this must be noted, that it is the nature of such things to
+be spoiled by defect and excess; as we see in the case of health and
+strength (since for the illustration of things which cannot be seen we
+must use those that can), for excessive training impairs the strength
+as well as deficient: meat and drink, in like manner, in too great or
+too small quantities, impair the health: while in due proportion they
+cause, increase, and preserve it.
+
+Thus it is therefore with the habits of perfected Self-Mastery and
+Courage and the rest of the Virtues: for the man who flies from and
+fears all things, and never stands up against anything, comes to be a
+coward; and he who fears nothing, but goes at everything, comes to be
+rash. In like manner too, he that tastes of every pleasure and abstains
+from none comes to lose all self-control; while he who avoids all, as
+do the dull and clownish, comes as it were to lose his faculties of
+perception: that is to say, the habits of perfected Self-Mastery and
+Courage are spoiled by the excess and defect, but by the mean state are
+preserved.
+
+Furthermore, not only do the origination, growth, and marring of the
+habits come from and by the same circumstances, but also the acts of
+working after the habits are formed will be exercised on the same: for
+so it is also with those other things which are more directly matters
+of sight, strength for instance: for this comes by taking plenty of
+food and doing plenty of work, and the man who has attained strength is
+best able to do these: and so it is with the Virtues, for not only do
+we by abstaining from pleasures come to be perfected in Self-Mastery,
+but when we have come to be so we can best abstain from them: similarly
+too with Courage: for it is by accustoming ourselves to despise objects
+of fear and stand up against them that we come to be brave; and after
+we have come to be so we shall be best able to stand up against such
+objects.
+
+And for a test of the formation of the habits we must take the pleasure
+or pain which succeeds the acts; for he is perfected in Self-Mastery
+who not only abstains from the bodily pleasures but is glad to do so;
+whereas he who abstains but is sorry to do it has not Self-Mastery: he
+again is brave who stands up against danger, either with positive
+pleasure or at least without any pain; whereas he who does it with pain
+is not brave.[6]
+
+For Moral Virtue has for its object-matter pleasures and pains, because
+by reason of pleasure we do what is bad, and by reason of pain decline
+doing what is right (for which cause, as Plato observes, men should
+have been trained straight from their childhood to receive pleasure and
+pain from proper objects, for this is the right education). Again:
+since Virtues have to do with actions and feelings, and on every
+feeling and every action pleasure and pain follow, here again is
+another proof that Virtue has for its object-matter pleasure and pain.
+The same is shown also by the fact that punishments are effected
+through the instrumentality of these; because they are of the nature of
+remedies, and it is the nature of remedies to be the contraries of the
+ills they cure. Again, to quote what we said before: every habit of the
+Soul by its very nature has relation to, and exerts itself upon, things
+of the same kind as those by which it is naturally deteriorated or
+improved: now such habits do come to be vicious by reason of pleasures
+and pains, that is, by men pursuing or avoiding respectively, either
+such as they ought not, or at wrong times, or in wrong manner, and so
+forth (for which reason, by the way, some people define the Virtues as
+certain states of impassibility and utter quietude,[7] but they are
+wrong because they speak without modification, instead of adding "as
+they ought," "as they ought not," and "when," and so on). Virtue then
+is assumed to be that habit which is such, in relation to pleasures and
+pains, as to effect the best results, and Vice the contrary.
+
+The following considerations may also serve to set this in a clear
+light. There are principally three things moving us to choice and three
+to avoidance, the honourable, the expedient, the pleasant; and their
+three contraries, the dishonourable, the hurtful, and the painful: now
+the good man is apt to go right, and the bad man wrong, with respect to
+all these of course, but most specially with respect to pleasure:
+because not only is this common to him with all animals but also it is
+a concomitant of all those things which move to choice, since both the
+honourable and the expedient give an impression of pleasure.
+
+Again, it grows up with us all from infancy, and so it is a hard matter
+to remove from ourselves this feeling, engrained as it is into our very
+life.
+
+Again, we adopt pleasure and pain (some of us more, and some less) as
+the measure even of actions: for this cause then our whole business
+must be with them, since to receive right or wrong impressions of
+pleasure and pain is a thing of no little importance in respect of the
+actions. Once more; it is harder, as Heraclitus says, to fight against
+pleasure than against anger: now it is about that which is more than
+commonly difficult that art comes into being, and virtue too, because
+in that which is difficult the good is of a higher order: and so for
+this reason too both virtue and moral philosophy generally must wholly
+busy themselves respecting pleasures and pains, because he that uses
+these well will be good, he that does so ill will be bad.
+
+Let us then be understood to have stated, that Virtue has for its
+object-matter pleasures and pains, and that it is either increased or
+marred by the same circumstances (differently used) by which it is
+originally generated, and that it exerts itself on the same
+circumstances out of which it was generated.
+
+Chapter III.
+
+Now I can conceive a person perplexed as to the meaning of our
+statement, that men must do just actions to become just, and those of
+self-mastery to acquire the habit of self-mastery; "for," he would say,
+"if men are doing the actions they have the respective virtues already,
+just as men are grammarians or musicians when they do the actions of
+either art." May we not reply by saying that it is not so even in the
+case of the arts referred to: because a man may produce something
+grammatical either by chance or the suggestion of another; but then
+only will he be a grammarian when he not only produces something
+grammatical but does so grammarian-wise, _i.e._ in virtue of the
+grammatical knowledge he himself possesses.
+
+Again, the cases of the arts and the virtues are not parallel: because
+those things which are produced by the arts have their excellence in
+themselves, and it is sufficient therefore that these when produced
+should be in a certain state: but those which are produced in the way
+of the virtues, are, strictly speaking, actions of a certain kind (say
+of Justice or perfected Self-Mastery), not merely if in themselves they
+are in a certain state but if also he who does them does them being
+himself in a certain state, first if knowing what he is doing, next if
+with deliberate preference, and with such preference for the things'
+own sake; and thirdly if being himself stable and unapt to change. Now
+to constitute possession of the arts these requisites are not reckoned
+in, excepting the one point of knowledge: whereas for possession of the
+virtues knowledge avails little or nothing, but the other requisites
+avail not a little, but, in fact, are all in all, and these requisites
+as a matter of fact do come from oftentimes doing the actions of
+Justice and perfected Self-Mastery.
+
+The facts,[8] it is true, are called by the names of these habits when
+they are such as the just or perfectly self-mastering man would do; but
+he is not in possession of the virtues who merely does these facts, but
+he who also so does them as the just and self-mastering do them.
+
+We are right then in saying, that these virtues are formed in a man by
+his doing the actions; but no one, if he should leave them undone,
+would be even in the way to become a good man. Yet people in general do
+not perform these actions, but taking refuge in talk they flatter
+themselves they are philosophising, and that they will so be good men:
+acting in truth very like those sick people who listen to the doctor
+with great attention but do nothing that he tells them: just as these
+then cannot be well bodily under such a course of treatment, so neither
+can those be mentally by such philosophising.
+
+Chapter IV.
+
+Next, we must examine what Virtue is.[9] Well, since the things which
+come to be in the mind are, in all, of three kinds, Feelings,
+Capacities, States, Virtue of course must belong to one of the three
+classes.
+
+By Feelings, I mean such as lust, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy,
+friendship, hatred, longing, emulation, compassion, in short all such
+as are followed by pleasure or pain: by Capacities, those in right of
+which we are said to be capable of these feelings; as by virtue of
+which we are able to have been made angry, or grieved, or to have
+compassionated; by States, those in right of which we are in a certain
+relation good or bad to the aforementioned feelings; to having been
+made angry, for instance, we are in a wrong relation if in our anger we
+were too violent or too slack, but if we were in the happy medium we
+are in a right relation to the feeling. And so on of the rest.
+
+Now Feelings neither the virtues nor vices are, because in right of the
+Feelings we are not denominated either good or bad, but in right of the
+virtues and vices we are.
+
+Again, in right of the Feelings we are neither praised nor blamed,[10]
+(for a man is not commended for being afraid or being angry, nor blamed
+for being angry merely but for being so in a particular way), but in
+right of the virtues and vices we are.
+
+Again, both anger and fear we feel without moral choice, whereas the
+virtues are acts of moral choice, or at least certainly not independent
+of it.
+
+Moreover, in right of the Feelings we are said to be moved, but in
+right of the virtues and vices not to be moved, but disposed, in a
+certain way.
+
+And for these same reasons they are not Capacities, for we are not
+called good or bad merely because we are able to feel, nor are we
+praised or blamed.
+
+And again, Capacities we have by nature, but we do not come to be good
+or bad by nature, as we have said before.
+
+Since then the virtues are neither Feelings nor Capacities, it remains
+that they must be States.
+
+Chapter V.
+
+Now what the genus of Virtue is has been said; but we must not merely
+speak of it thus, that it is a state but say also what kind of a state
+it is.
+
+We must observe then that all excellence makes that whereof it is the
+excellence both to be itself in a good state and to perform its work
+well. The excellence of the eye, for instance, makes both the eye good
+and its work also: for by the excellence of the eye we see well. So too
+the excellence of the horse makes a horse good, and good in speed, and
+in carrying his rider, and standing up against the enemy. If then this
+is universally the case, the excellence of Man, i.e. Virtue, must be a
+state whereby Man comes to be good and whereby he will perform well his
+proper work. Now how this shall be it is true we have said already, but
+still perhaps it may throw light on the subject to see what is its
+characteristic nature.
+
+In all quantity then, whether continuous or discrete,[11] one may take
+the greater part, the less, or the exactly equal, and these either with
+reference to the thing itself, or relatively to us: and the exactly
+equal is a mean between excess and defect. Now by the mean of the
+thing, _i.e._ absolute mean, I denote that which is equidistant from
+either extreme (which of course is one and the same to all), and by the
+mean relatively to ourselves, that which is neither too much nor too
+little for the particular individual. This of course is not one nor the
+same to all: for instance, suppose ten is too much and two too little,
+people take six for the absolute mean; because it exceeds the smaller
+sum by exactly as much as it is itself exceeded by the larger, and this
+mean is according to arithmetical proportion.[12]
+
+But the mean relatively to ourselves must not be so found ; for it does
+not follow, supposing ten minæ[13] is too large a quantity to eat and
+two too small, that the trainer will order his man six; because for the
+person who is to take it this also may be too much or too little: for
+Milo it would be too little, but for a man just commencing his athletic
+exercises too much: similarly too of the exercises themselves, as
+running or wrestling.
+
+So then it seems every one possessed of skill avoids excess and defect,
+but seeks for and chooses the mean, not the absolute but the relative.
+
+Now if all skill thus accomplishes well its work by keeping an eye on
+the mean, and bringing the works to this point (whence it is common
+enough to say of such works as are in a good state, "one cannot add to
+or take ought from them," under the notion of excess or defect
+destroying goodness but the mean state preserving it), and good
+artisans, as we say, work with their eye on this, and excellence, like
+nature, is more exact and better than any art in the world, it must
+have an aptitude to aim at the mean.
+
+It is moral excellence, _i.e._ Virtue, of course which I mean, because
+this it is which is concerned with feelings and actions, and in these
+there can be excess and defect and the mean: it is possible, for
+instance, to feel the emotions of fear, confidence, lust, anger,
+compassion, and pleasure and pain generally, too much or too little,
+and in either case wrongly; but to feel them when we ought, on what
+occasions, towards whom, why, and as, we should do, is the mean, or in
+other words the best state, and this is the property of Virtue.
+
+In like manner too with respect to the actions, there may be excess and
+defect and the mean. Now Virtue is concerned with feelings and actions,
+in which the excess is wrong and the defect is blamed but the mean is
+praised and goes right; and both these circumstances belong to Virtue.
+Virtue then is in a sense a mean state, since it certainly has an
+aptitude for aiming at the mean.
+
+Again, one may go wrong in many different ways (because, as the
+Pythagoreans expressed it, evil is of the class of the infinite, good
+of the finite), but right only in one; and so the former is easy, the
+latter difficult; easy to miss the mark, but hard to hit it: and for
+these reasons, therefore, both the excess and defect belong to Vice,
+and the mean state to Virtue; for, as the poet has it,
+
+"Men may be bad in many ways,
+But good in one alone."
+
+Chapter VI.
+
+Virtue then is "a state apt to exercise deliberate choice, being in the
+relative mean, determined by reason, and[14] as the man of practical
+wisdom would determine."
+
+It is a middle state between too faulty ones, in the way of excess on
+one side and of defect on the other: and it is so moreover, because the
+faulty states on one side fall short of, and those on the other exceed,
+what is right, both in the case of the feelings and the actions; but
+Virtue finds, and when found adopts, the mean.
+
+And so, viewing it in respect of its essence and definition, Virtue is
+a mean state; but in reference to the chief good and to excellence it
+is the highest state possible.
+
+But it must not be supposed that every action or every feeling is
+capable of subsisting in this mean state, because some there are which
+are so named as immediately to convey the notion of badness, as
+malevolence, shamelessness, envy; or, to instance in actions, adultery,
+theft, homicide; for all these and suchlike are blamed because they are
+in themselves bad, not the having too much or too little of them.
+
+In these then you never can go right, but must always be wrong: nor in
+such does the right or wrong depend on the selection of a proper
+person, time, or manner (take adultery for instance), but simply doing
+any one soever of those things is being wrong.
+
+You might as well require that there should be determined a mean state,
+an excess and a defect in respect of acting unjustly, being cowardly,
+or giving up all control of the passions: for at this rate there will
+be of excess and defect a mean state; of excess, excess; and of defect,
+defect.
+
+But just as of perfected self-mastery and courage there is no excess
+and defect, because the mean is in one point of view the highest
+possible state, so neither of those faulty states can you have a mean
+state, excess, or defect, but howsoever done they are wrong: you
+cannot, in short, have of excess and defect a mean state, nor of a mean
+state excess and defect.
+
+Chapter VII.
+
+It is not enough, however, to state this in general terms, we must also
+apply it to particular instances, because in treatises on moral conduct
+general statements have an air of vagueness, but those which go into
+detail one of greater reality: for the actions after all must be in
+detail, and the general statements, to be worth anything, must hold
+good here.
+
+We must take these details then from the well-known scheme.[15]
+
+I. In respect of fears and confidence or boldness:
+
+The Mean state is Courage: men may exceed, of course, either in absence
+of fear or in positive confidence: the former has no name (which is a
+common case), the latter is called rash: again, the man who has too
+much fear and too little confidence is called a coward.
+
+II. In respect of pleasures and pains (but not all, and perhaps fewer
+pains than pleasures):
+
+The Mean state here is perfected Self-Mastery, the defect total absence
+of Self-control. As for defect in respect of pleasure, there are really
+no people who are chargeable with it, so, of course, there is really no
+name for such characters, but, as they are conceivable, we will give
+them one and call them insensible.
+
+III. In respect of giving and taking wealth[16] (_a_):
+
+The mean state is Liberality, the excess Prodigality, the defect
+Stinginess: here each of the extremes involves really an excess and
+defect contrary to each other: I mean, the prodigal gives out too much
+and takes in too little, while the stingy man takes in too much and
+gives out too little. (It must be understood that we are now giving
+merely an outline and summary, intentionally: and we will, in a later
+part of the treatise, draw out the distinctions with greater
+exactness.)
+
+IV. In respect of wealth (b):
+
+There are other dispositions besides these just mentioned; a mean state
+called Munificence (for the munificent man differs from the liberal,
+the former having necessarily to do with great wealth, the latter with
+but small); the excess called by the names either of Want of taste or
+Vulgar Profusion, and the defect Paltriness (these also differ from the
+extremes connected with liberality, and the manner of their difference
+shall also be spoken of later).
+
+V. In respect of honour and dishonour (a):
+
+The mean state Greatness of Soul, the excess which may be called
+χαυνότης,[17] and the defect Littleness of Soul.
+
+VI. In respect of honour and dishonour (b):
+
+Now there is a state bearing the same relation to Greatness of Soul as
+we said just now Liberality does to Munificence, with the difference
+that is of being about a small amount of the same thing: this state
+having reference to small honour, as Greatness of Soul to great honour;
+a man may, of course, grasp at honour either more than he should or
+less; now he that exceeds in his grasping at it is called ambitious, he
+that falls short unambitious, he that is just as he should be has no
+proper name: nor in fact have the states, except that the disposition
+of the ambitious man is called ambition. For this reason those who are
+in either extreme lay claim to the mean as a debateable land, and we
+call the virtuous character sometimes by the name ambitious,[18]
+sometimes by that of unambitious, and we commend sometimes the one and
+sometimes the other. Why we do it shall be said in the subsequent part
+of the treatise; but now we will go on with the rest of the virtues
+after the plan we have laid down.
+
+VII. In respect of anger:
+
+Here too there is excess, defect, and a mean state; but since they may
+be said to have really no proper names, as we call the virtuous
+character Meek, we will call the mean state Meekness, and of the
+extremes, let the man who is excessive be denominated Passionate, and
+the faulty state Passionateness, and him who is deficient Angerless,
+and the defect Angerlessness.
+
+There are also three other mean states, having some mutual resemblance,
+but still with differences; they are alike in that they all have for
+their object-matter intercourse of words and deeds, and they differ in
+that one has respect to truth herein, the other two to what is
+pleasant; and this in two ways, the one in relaxation and amusement,
+the other in all things which occur in daily life. We must say a word
+or two about these also, that we may the better see that in all matters
+the mean is praiseworthy, while the extremes are neither right nor
+worthy of praise but of blame.
+
+Now of these, it is true, the majority have really no proper names, but
+still we must try, as in the other cases, to coin some for them for the
+sake of clearness and intelligibleness.
+
+I. In respect of truth:
+
+ The man who is in the mean state we will call Truthful, and his state
+ Truthfulness, and as to the disguise of truth, if it be on the side of
+ exaggeration, Braggadocia, and him that has it a Braggadocio; if on
+ that of diminution, Reserve and Reserved shall be the terms.
+
+II. In respect of what is pleasant in the way of relaxation or
+amusement.
+
+The mean state shall be called Easy-pleasantry, and the character
+accordingly a man of Easy-pleasantry; the excess Buffoonery, and the
+man a Buffoon; the man deficient herein a Clown, and his state
+Clownishness.
+
+III. In respect of what is pleasant in daily life.
+
+He that is as he should be may be called Friendly, and his mean state
+Friendliness: he that exceeds, if it be without any interested motive,
+somewhat too Complaisant, if with such motive, a Flatterer: he that is
+deficient and in all instances unpleasant, Quarrelsome and Cross.
+
+There are mean states likewise in feelings and matters concerning them.
+Shamefacedness, for instance, is no virtue, still a man is praised for
+being shamefaced: for in these too the one is denominated the man in
+the mean state, the other in the excess; the Dumbfoundered, for
+instance, who is overwhelmed with shame on all and any occasions: the
+man who is in the defect, _i.e._ who has no shame at all in his
+composition, is called Shameless: but the right character Shamefaced.
+
+Indignation against successful vice,[19] again, is a state in the mean
+between Envy and Malevolence: they all three have respect to pleasure
+and pain produced by what happens to one's neighbour: for the man who
+has this right feeling is annoyed at undeserved success of others,
+while the envious man goes beyond him and is annoyed at all success of
+others, and the malevolent falls so far short of feeling annoyance that
+he even rejoices [at misfortune of others].
+
+But for the discussion of these also there will be another opportunity,
+as of Justice too, because the term is used in more senses than one. So
+after this we will go accurately into each and say how they are mean
+states: and in like manner also with respect to the Intellectual
+Excellences.
+
+Chapter VIII.
+
+Now as there are three states in each case, two faulty either in the
+way of excess or defect, and one right, which is the mean state, of
+course all are in a way opposed to one another; the extremes, for
+instance, not only to the mean but also to one another, and the mean to
+the extremes: for just as the half is greater if compared with the less
+portion, and less if compared with the greater, so the mean states,
+compared with the defects, exceed, whether in feelings or actions, and
+_vice versa_. The brave man, for instance, shows as rash when compared
+with the coward, and cowardly when compared with the rash; similarly
+too the man of perfected self-mastery, viewed in comparison with the
+man destitute of all perception, shows like a man of no self-control,
+but in comparison with the man who really has no self-control, he looks
+like one destitute of all perception: and the liberal man compared with
+the stingy seems prodigal, and by the side of the prodigal, stingy.
+
+And so the extreme characters push away, so to speak, towards each
+other the man in the mean state; the brave man is called a rash man by
+the coward, and a coward by the rash man, and in the other cases
+accordingly. And there being this mutual opposition, the contrariety
+between the extremes is greater than between either and the mean,
+because they are further from one another than from the mean, just as
+the greater or less portion differ more from each other than either
+from the exact half.
+
+Again, in some cases an extreme will bear a resemblance to the mean;
+rashness, for instance, to courage, and prodigality to liberality; but
+between the extremes there is the greatest dissimilarity. Now things
+which are furthest from one another[20] are defined to be contrary, and
+so the further off the more contrary will they be.
+
+Further: of the extremes in some cases the excess, and in others the
+defect, is most opposed to the mean: to courage, for instance, not
+rashness which is the excess, but cowardice which is the defect;
+whereas to perfected self-mastery not insensibility which is the defect
+but absence of all self-control which is the excess.
+
+And for this there are two reasons to be given; one from the nature of
+the thing itself, because from the one extreme being nearer and more
+like the mean, we do not put this against it, but the other; as, for
+instance, since rashness is thought to be nearer to courage than
+cowardice is, and to resemble it more, we put cowardice against courage
+rather than rashness, because those things which are further from the
+mean are thought to be more contrary to it. This then is one reason
+arising from the thing itself; there is another arising from our own
+constitution and make: for in each man's own case those things give the
+impression of being more contrary to the mean to which we individually
+have a natural bias. Thus we have a natural bias towards pleasures, for
+which reason we are much more inclined to the rejection of all
+self-control, than to self-discipline.
+
+These things then to which the bias is, we call more contrary, and so
+total want of self-control (the excess) is more contrary than the
+defect is to perfected self-mastery.
+
+Chapter IX.
+
+Now that Moral Virtue is a mean state, and how it is so, and that it
+lies between two faulty states, one in the way of excess and another in
+the way of defect, and that it is so because it has an aptitude to aim
+at the mean both in feelings and actions, all this has been set forth
+fully and sufficiently.
+
+And so it is hard to be good: for surely hard it is in each instance to
+find the mean, just as to find the mean point or centre of a circle is
+not what any man can do, but only he who knows how: just so to be
+angry, to give money, and be expensive, is what any man can do, and
+easy: but to do these to the right person, in due proportion, at the
+right time, with a right object, and in the right manner, this is not
+as before what any man can do, nor is it easy; and for this cause
+goodness is rare, and praiseworthy, and noble.
+
+Therefore he who aims at the mean should make it his first care to keep
+away from that extreme which is more contrary than the other to the
+mean; just as Calypso in Homer advises Ulysses,
+
+"Clear of this smoke and surge thy barque direct;"
+
+because of the two extremes the one is always more, and the other less,
+erroneous; and, therefore, since to hit exactly on the mean is
+difficult, one must take the least of the evils as the safest plan;[21]
+and this a man will be doing, if he follows this method.
+
+We ought also to take into consideration our own natural bias; which
+varies in each man's case, and will be ascertained from the pleasure
+and pain arising in us. Furthermore, we should force ourselves off in
+the contrary direction, because we shall find ourselves in the mean
+after we have removed ourselves far from the wrong side, exactly as men
+do in straightening bent timber.[22]
+
+But in all cases we must guard most carefully against what is pleasant,
+and pleasure itself, because we are not impartial judges of it.
+
+We ought to feel in fact towards pleasure as did the old counsellors
+towards Helen, and in all cases pronounce a similar sentence; for so by
+sending it away from us, we shall err the less.[23]
+
+Well, to speak very briefly, these are the precautions by adopting
+which we shall be best able to attain the mean.
+
+Still, perhaps, after all it is a matter of difficulty, and specially
+in the particular instances: it is not easy, for instance, to determine
+exactly in what manner, with what persons, for what causes, and for
+what length of time, one ought to feel anger: for we ourselves
+sometimes praise those who are defective in this feeling, and we call
+them meek; at another, we term the hot-tempered manly and spirited.
+
+Then, again, he who makes a small deflection from what is right, be it
+on the side of too much or too little, is not blamed, only he who makes
+a considerable one; for he cannot escape observation. But to what point
+or degree a man must err in order to incur blame, it is not easy to
+determine exactly in words: nor in fact any of those points which are
+matter of perception by the Moral Sense: such questions are matters of
+detail, and the decision of them rests with the Moral Sense.[24]
+
+At all events thus much is plain, that the mean state is in all things
+praiseworthy, and that practically we must deflect sometimes towards
+excess sometimes towards defect, because this will be the easiest
+method of hitting on the mean, that is, on what is right.
+
+BOOK III
+
+Chapter I.
+
+Now since Virtue is concerned with the regulation of feelings and
+actions, and praise and blame arise upon such as are voluntary, while
+for the involuntary allowance is made, and sometimes compassion is
+excited, it is perhaps a necessary task for those who are investigating
+the nature of Virtue to draw out the distinction between what is
+voluntary and what involuntary; and it is certainly useful for
+legislators, with respect to the assigning of honours and punishments.
+
+Involuntary actions then are thought to be of two kinds, being done
+either on compulsion, or by reason of ignorance. An action is, properly
+speaking, compulsory, when the origination is external to the agent,
+being such that in it the agent (perhaps we may more properly say the
+patient) contributes nothing; as if a wind were to convey you anywhere,
+or men having power over your person.
+
+But when actions are done, either from fear of greater evils, or from
+some honourable motive, as, for instance, if you were ordered to commit
+some base act by a despot who had your parents or children in his
+power, and they were to be saved upon your compliance or die upon your
+refusal, in such cases there is room for a question whether the actions
+are voluntary or involuntary.
+
+A similar question arises with respect to cases of throwing goods
+overboard in a storm: abstractedly no man throws away his property
+willingly, but with a view to his own and his shipmates' safety any one
+would who had any sense.
+
+The truth is, such actions are of a mixed kind, but are most like
+voluntary actions; for they are choice-worthy at the time when they are
+being done, and the end or object of the action must be taken with
+reference to the actual occasion. Further, we must denominate an action
+voluntary or involuntary at the time of doing it: now in the given case
+the man acts voluntarily, because the originating of the motion of his
+limbs in such actions rests with himself; and where the origination is
+in himself it rests with himself to do or not to do.
+
+Such actions then are voluntary, though in the abstract perhaps
+involuntary because no one would choose any of such things in and by
+itself.
+
+But for such actions men sometimes are even praised, as when they
+endure any disgrace or pain to secure great and honourable equivalents;
+if _vice versâ_, then they are blamed, because it shows a base mind to
+endure things very disgraceful for no honourable object, or for a
+trifling one.
+
+For some again no praise is given, but allowance is made; as where a
+man does what he should not by reason of such things as overstrain the
+powers of human nature, or pass the limits of human endurance.
+
+Some acts perhaps there are for which compulsion cannot be pleaded, but
+a man should rather suffer the worst and die; how absurd, for instance,
+are the pleas of compulsion with which Alcmaeon in Euripides' play
+excuses his matricide!
+
+But it is difficult sometimes to decide what kind of thing should be
+chosen instead of what, or what endured in preference to what, and much
+moreso to abide by one's decisions: for in general the alternatives are
+painful, and the actions required are base, and so praise or blame is
+awarded according as persons have been compelled or no.
+
+What kind of actions then are to be called compulsory? may we say,
+simply and abstractedly whenever the cause is external and the agent
+contributes nothing; and that where the acts are in themselves such as
+one would not wish but choice-worthy at the present time and in
+preference to such and such things, and where the origination rests
+with the agent, the actions are in themselves involuntary but at the
+given time and in preference to such and such things voluntary; and
+they are more like voluntary than involuntary, because the actions
+consist of little details, and these are voluntary.
+
+But what kind of things one ought to choose instead of what, it is not
+easy to settle, for there are many differences in particular instances.
+
+But suppose a person should say, things pleasant and honourable exert a
+compulsive force (for that they are external and do compel); at that
+rate every action is on compulsion, because these are universal motives
+of action.
+
+Again, they who act on compulsion and against their will do so with
+pain; but they who act by reason of what is pleasant or honourable act
+with pleasure.
+
+It is truly absurd for a man to attribute his actions to external
+things instead of to his own capacity for being easily caught by
+them;[1] or, again, to ascribe the honourable to himself, and the base
+ones to pleasure.
+
+So then that seems to be compulsory "whose origination is from without,
+the party compelled contributing nothing."
+
+Chapter II.
+
+Now every action of which ignorance is the cause is not-voluntary, but
+that only is involuntary which is attended with pain and remorse; for
+clearly the man who has done anything by reason of ignorance, but is
+not annoyed at his own action, cannot be said to have done it _with_
+his will because he did not know he was doing it, nor again _against_
+his will because he is not sorry for it.
+
+So then of the class "acting by reason of ignorance," he who feels
+regret afterwards is thought to be an involuntary agent, and him that
+has no such feeling, since he certainly is different from the other, we
+will call a not-voluntary agent; for as there is a real difference it
+is better to have a proper name.
+
+Again, there seems to be a difference between acting _because of_
+ignorance and acting _with_ ignorance: for instance, we do not usually
+assign ignorance as the cause of the actions of the drunken or angry
+man, but either the drunkenness or the anger, yet they act not
+knowingly but with ignorance.
+
+Again, every bad man is ignorant what he ought to do and what to leave
+undone, and by reason of such error men become unjust and wholly evil.
+
+Again, we do not usually apply the term involuntary when a man is
+ignorant of his own true interest;[2] because ignorance which affects
+moral choice[3] constitutes depravity but not involuntariness: nor does
+any ignorance of principle (because for this men are blamed) but
+ignorance in particular details, wherein consists the action and
+wherewith it is concerned, for in these there is both compassion and
+allowance, because he who acts in ignorance of any of them acts in a
+proper sense involuntarily.
+
+It may be as well, therefore, to define these particular details; what
+they are, and how many; viz. who acts, what he is doing, with respect
+to what or in what, sometimes with what, as with what instrument, and
+with what result;[4] as that of preservation, for instance, and how, as
+whether softly or violently.
+
+All these particulars, in one and the same case, no man in his senses
+could be ignorant of; plainly not of the agent, being himself. But what
+he is doing a man may be ignorant, as men in speaking say a thing
+escaped them unawares; or as Aeschylus did with respect to the
+Mysteries, that he was not aware that it was unlawful to speak of them;
+or as in the case of that catapult accident the other day the man said
+he discharged it merely to display its operation. Or a person might
+suppose a son to be an enemy, as Merope did; or that the spear really
+pointed was rounded off; or that the stone was a pumice; or in striking
+with a view to save might kill; or might strike when merely wishing to
+show another, as people do in sham-fighting.
+
+Now since ignorance is possible in respect to all these details in
+which the action consists, he that acted in ignorance of any of them is
+thought to have acted involuntarily, and he most so who was in
+ignorance as regards the most important, which are thought to be those
+in which the action consists, and the result.
+
+Further, not only must the ignorance be of this kind, to constitute an
+action involuntary, but it must be also understood that the action is
+followed by pain and regret.
+
+Chapter III.
+
+Now since all involuntary action is either upon compulsion or by reason
+of ignorance, Voluntary Action would seem to be "that whose origination
+is in the agent, he being aware of the particular details in which the
+action consists."
+
+For, it may be, men are not justified by calling those actions
+involuntary, which are done by reason of Anger or Lust.
+
+Because, in the first place, if this be so no other animal but man, and
+not even children, can be said to act voluntarily. Next, is it meant
+that we never act voluntarily when we act from Lust or Anger, or that
+we act voluntarily in doing what is right and involuntarily in doing
+what is discreditable? The latter supposition is absurd, since the
+cause is one and the same. Then as to the former, it is a strange thing
+to maintain actions to be involuntary which we are bound to grasp at:
+now there are occasions on which anger is a duty,[5] and there are
+things which we are bound to lust after,[6] health, for instance, and
+learning.
+
+Again, whereas actions strictly involuntary are thought to be attended
+with pain, those which are done to gratify lust are thought to be
+pleasant.
+
+Again: how does the involuntariness make any difference[7] between
+wrong actions done from deliberate calculation, and those done by
+reason of anger? for both ought to be avoided, and the irrational
+feelings are thought to be just as natural to man as reason, and so of
+course must be such actions of the individual as are done from Anger
+and Lust. It is absurd then to class these actions among the
+involuntary.
+
+Chapter IV.
+
+Having thus drawn out the distinction between voluntary and involuntary
+action our next step is to examine into the nature of Moral Choice,
+because this seems most intimately connected with Virtue and to be a
+more decisive test of moral character than a man's acts are.
+
+Now Moral Choice is plainly voluntary, but the two are not
+co-extensive, voluntary being the more comprehensive term; for first,
+children and all other animals share in voluntary action but not in
+Moral Choice; and next, sudden actions we call voluntary but do not
+ascribe them to Moral Choice.
+
+Nor do they appear to be right who say it is lust or anger, or wish, or
+opinion of a certain kind; because, in the first place, Moral Choice is
+not shared by the irrational animals while Lust and Anger are. Next;
+the man who fails of self-control acts from Lust but not from Moral
+Choice; the man of self-control, on the contrary, from Moral Choice,
+not from Lust. Again: whereas Lust is frequently opposed to Moral
+Choice, Lust is not to Lust.
+
+Lastly: the object-matter of Lust is the pleasant and the painful, but
+of Moral Choice neither the one nor the other. Still less can it be
+Anger, because actions done from Anger are thought generally to be
+least of all consequent on Moral Choice.
+
+Nor is it Wish either, though appearing closely connected with it;
+because, in the first place, Moral Choice has not for its objects
+impossibilities, and if a man were to say he chose them he would be
+thought to be a fool; but Wish may have impossible things for its
+objects, immortality for instance.
+
+Wish again may be exercised on things in the accomplishment of which
+one's self could have nothing to do, as the success of any particular
+actor or athlete; but no man chooses things of this nature, only such
+as he believes he may himself be instrumental in procuring.
+
+Further: Wish has for its object the End rather, but Moral Choice the
+means to the End; for instance, we wish to be healthy but we choose the
+means which will make us so; or happiness again we wish for, and
+commonly say so, but to say we choose is not an appropriate term,
+because, in short, the province of Moral Choice seems to be those
+things which are in our own power.
+
+Neither can it be Opinion; for Opinion is thought to be unlimited in
+its range of objects, and to be exercised as well upon things eternal
+and impossible as on those which are in our own power: again, Opinion
+is logically divided into true and false, not into good and bad as
+Moral Choice is.
+
+However, nobody perhaps maintains its identity with Opinion simply; but
+it is not the same with opinion of any kind,[8] because by choosing good
+and bad things we are constituted of a certain character, but by having
+opinions on them we are not.
+
+Again, we choose to take or avoid, and so on, but we opine what a thing
+is, or for what it is serviceable, or how; but we do not opine to take
+or avoid.
+
+Further, Moral Choice is commended rather for having a right object
+than for being judicious, but Opinion for being formed in accordance
+with truth.
+
+Again, we choose such things as we pretty well know to be good, but we
+form opinions respecting such as we do not know at all.
+
+And it is not thought that choosing and opining best always go
+together, but that some opine the better course and yet by reason of
+viciousness choose not the things which they should.
+
+It may be urged, that Opinion always precedes or accompanies Moral
+Choice; be it so, this makes no difference, for this is not the point
+in question, but whether Moral Choice is the same as Opinion of a
+certain kind.
+
+Since then it is none of the aforementioned things, what is it, or how
+is it characterised? Voluntary it plainly is, but not all voluntary
+action is an object of Moral Choice. May we not say then, it is "that
+voluntary which has passed through a stage of previous deliberation?"
+because Moral Choice is attended with reasoning and intellectual
+process. The etymology of its Greek name seems to give a hint of it,
+being when analysed "chosen in preference to somewhat else."
+
+Chapter V.
+
+Well then; do men deliberate about everything, and is anything soever
+the object of Deliberation, or are there some matters with respect to
+which there is none? (It may be as well perhaps to say, that by "object
+of Deliberation" is meant such matter as a sensible man would
+deliberate upon, not what any fool or madman might.)
+
+Well: about eternal things no one deliberates; as, for instance, the
+universe, or the incommensurability of the diameter and side of a
+square.
+
+Nor again about things which are in motion but which always happen in
+the same way either necessarily, or naturally, or from some other
+cause, as the solstices or the sunrise.
+
+Nor about those which are variable, as drought and rains; nor
+fortuitous matters, as finding of treasure.
+
+Nor in fact even about all human affairs; no Lacedæmonian, for
+instance, deliberates as to the best course for the Scythian government
+to adopt; because in such cases we have no power over the result.
+
+But we do deliberate respecting such practical matters as are in our
+own power (which are what are left after all our exclusions).
+
+I have adopted this division because causes seem to be divisible into
+nature, necessity, chance, and moreover intellect, and all human
+powers.
+
+And as man in general deliberates about what man in general can effect,
+so individuals do about such practical things as can be effected
+through their own instrumentality.
+
+Again, we do not deliberate respecting such arts or sciences as are
+exact and independent: as, for instance, about written characters,
+because we have no doubt how they should be formed; but we do
+deliberate on all buch things as are usually done through our own
+instrumentality, but not invariably in the same way; as, for instance,
+about matters connected with the healing art, or with money-making;
+and, again, more about piloting ships than gymnastic exercises, because
+the former has been less exactly determined, and so forth; and more
+about arts than sciences, because we more frequently doubt respecting
+the former.
+
+So then Deliberation takes place in such matters as are under general
+laws, but still uncertain how in any given case they will issue, _i.e._
+in which there is some indefiniteness; and for great matters we
+associate coadjutors in counsel, distrusting our ability to settle them
+alone.
+
+Further, we deliberate not about Ends, but Means to Ends. No physician,
+for instance, deliberates whether he will cure, nor orator whether he
+will persuade, nor statesman whether he will produce a good
+constitution, nor in fact any man in any other function about his
+particular End; but having set before them a certain End they look how
+and through what means it may be accomplished: if there is a choice of
+means, they examine further which are easiest and most creditable; or,
+if there is but one means of accomplishing the object, then how it may
+be through this, this again through what, till they come to the first
+cause; and this will be the last found; for a man engaged in a process
+of deliberation seems to seek and analyse, as a man, to solve a
+problem, analyses the figure given him. And plainly not every search is
+Deliberation, those in mathematics to wit, but every Deliberation is a
+search, and the last step in the analysis is the first in the
+constructive process. And if in the course of their search men come
+upon an impossibility, they give it up; if money, for instance, be
+necessary, but cannot be got: but if the thing appears possible they
+then attempt to do it.
+
+And by possible I mean what may be done through our own instrumentality
+(of course what may be done through our friends is through our own
+instrumentality in a certain sense, because the origination in such
+cases rests with us). And the object of search is sometimes the
+necessary instruments, sometimes the method of using them; and
+similarly in the rest sometimes through what, and sometimes how or
+through what.[9]
+
+So it seems, as has been said, that Man is the originator of his
+actions; and Deliberation has for its object whatever may be done
+through one's own instrumentality, and the actions are with a view to
+other things; and so it is, not the End, but the Means to Ends on which
+Deliberation is employed.
+
+Nor, again, is it employed on matters of detail, as whether the
+substance before me is bread, or has been properly cooked; for these
+come under the province of sense, and if a man is to be always
+deliberating, he may go on _ad infinitum_.
+
+Further, exactly the same matter is the object both of Deliberation and
+Moral Choice; but that which is the object of Moral Choice is
+thenceforward separated off and definite,[10] because by object of
+Moral Choice is denoted that which after Deliberation has been
+preferred to something else: for each man leaves off searching how he
+shall do a thing when he has brought the origination up to himself,
+_i.e_. to the governing principle in himself,[11] because it is this
+which makes the choice. A good illustration of this is furnished by the
+old regal constitutions which Homer drew from, in which the Kings would
+announce to the commonalty what they had determined before.
+
+Now since that which is the object of Moral Choice is something in our
+own power, which is the object of deliberation and the grasping of the
+Will, Moral Choice must be "a grasping after something in our own power
+consequent upon Deliberation:" because after having deliberated we
+decide, and then grasp by our Will in accordance with the result of our
+deliberation.[12]
+
+Let this be accepted as a sketch of the nature and object of Moral
+Choice, that object being "Means to Ends."
+
+Chapter VI.
+
+That Wish has for its object-matter the End, has been already stated;
+but there are two opinions respecting it; some thinking that its object
+is real good, others whatever impresses the mind with a notion of good.
+
+Now those who maintain that the object of Wish is real good are beset
+by this difficulty, that what is wished for by him who chooses wrongly
+is not really an object of Wish (because, on their theory, if it is an
+object of wish, it must be good, but it is, in the case supposed,
+evil). Those who maintain, on the contrary, that that which impresses
+the mind with a notion of good is properly the object of Wish, have to
+meet this difficulty, that there is nothing naturally an object of Wish
+but to each individual whatever seems good to him; now different people
+have different notions, and it may chance contrary ones.
+
+But, if these opinions do not satisfy us, may we not say that,
+abstractedly and as a matter of objective truth, the really good is the
+object of Wish, but to each individual whatever impresses his mind with
+the notion of good.[13] And so to the good man that is an object of
+Wish which is really and truly so, but to the bad man anything may be;
+just as physically those things are wholesome to the healthy which are
+really so, but other things to the sick. And so too of bitter and
+sweet, and hot and heavy, and so on. For the good man judges in every
+instance correctly, and in every instance the notion conveyed to his
+mind is the true one.
+
+For there are fair and pleasant things peculiar to, and so varying
+with, each state; and perhaps the most distinguishing characteristic of
+the good man is his seeing the truth in every instance, he being, in
+fact, the rule and measure of these matters.
+
+The multitude of men seem to be deceived by reason of pleasure, because
+though it is not really a good it impresses their minds with the notion
+of goodness, so they choose what is pleasant as good and avoid pain as
+an evil.
+
+Chapter VII.
+
+Now since the End is the object of Wish, and the means to the End of
+Deliberation and Moral Choice, the actions regarding these matters must
+be in the way of Moral Choice, _i.e._ voluntary: but the acts of
+working out the virtues are such actions, and therefore Virtue is in
+our power.
+
+And so too is Vice: because wherever it is in our power to do it is
+also in our power to forbear doing, and _vice versâ_: therefore if the
+doing (being in a given case creditable) is in our power, so too is the
+forbearing (which is in the same case discreditable), and _vice versâ_.
+
+But if it is in our power to do and to forbear doing what is creditable
+or the contrary, and these respectively constitute the being good or
+bad, then the being good or vicious characters is in our power.
+
+As for the well-known saying, "No man voluntarily is wicked or
+involuntarily happy," it is partly true, partly false; for no man is
+happy against his will, of course, but wickedness is voluntary. Or must
+we dispute the statements lately made, and not say that Man is the
+originator or generator of his actions as much as of his children?
+
+But if this is matter of plain manifest fact, and we cannot refer our
+actions to any other originations beside those in our own power, those
+things must be in our own power, and so voluntary, the originations of
+which are in ourselves.
+
+Moreover, testimony seems to be borne to these positions both privately
+by individuals, and by law-givers too, in that they chastise and punish
+those who do wrong (unless they do so on compulsion, or by reason of
+ignorance which is not self-caused), while they honour those who act
+rightly, under the notion of being likely to encourage the latter and
+restrain the former. But such things as are not in our own power,
+_i.e._ not voluntary, no one thinks of encouraging us to do, knowing it
+to be of no avail for one to have been persuaded not to be hot (for
+instance), or feel pain, or be hungry, and so forth, because we shall
+have those sensations all the same.
+
+And what makes the case stronger is this: that they chastise for the
+very fact of ignorance, when it is thought to be self-caused; to the
+drunken, for instance, penalties are double, because the origination in
+such case lies in a man's own self: for he might have helped getting
+drunk, and this is the cause of his ignorance.
+
+Again, those also who are ignorant of legal regulations which they are
+bound to know, and which are not hard to know, they chastise; and
+similarly in all other cases where neglect is thought to be the cause
+of the ignorance, under the notion that it was in their power to
+prevent their ignorance, because they might have paid attention.
+
+But perhaps a man is of such a character that he cannot attend to such
+things: still men are themselves the causes of having become such
+characters by living carelessly, and also of being unjust or destitute
+of self-control, the former by doing evil actions, the latter by
+spending their time in drinking and such-like; because the particular
+acts of working form corresponding characters, as is shown by those who
+are practising for any contest or particular course of action, for such
+men persevere in the acts of working.
+
+As for the plea, that a man did not know that habits are produced from
+separate acts of working, we reply, such ignorance is a mark of
+excessive stupidity.
+
+Furthermore, it is wholly irrelevant to say that the man who acts
+unjustly or dissolutely does not _wish_ to attain the habits of these
+vices: for if a man wittingly does those things whereby he must become
+unjust he is to all intents and purposes unjust voluntarily; but he
+cannot with a wish cease to be unjust and become just. For, to take the
+analogous case, the sick man cannot with a wish be well again, yet in a
+supposable case he is voluntarily ill because he has produced his
+sickness by living intemperately and disregarding his physicians. There
+was a time then when he might have helped being ill, but now he has let
+himself go he cannot any longer; just as he who has let a stone out of
+his hand cannot recall it,[14] and yet it rested with him to aim and
+throw it, because the origination was in his power. Just so the unjust
+man, and he who has lost all self-control, might originally have helped
+being what they are, and so they are voluntarily what they are; but now
+that they are become so they no longer have the power of being
+otherwise.
+
+And not only are mental diseases voluntary, but the bodily are so in
+some men, whom we accordingly blame: for such as are naturally deformed
+no one blames, only such as are so by reason of want of exercise, and
+neglect: and so too of weakness and maiming: no one would think of
+upbraiding, but would rather compassionate, a man who is blind by
+nature, or from disease, or from an accident; but every one would blame
+him who was so from excess of wine, or any other kind of intemperance.
+It seems, then, that in respect of bodily diseases, those which depend
+on ourselves are censured, those which do not are not censured; and if
+so, then in the case of the mental disorders, those which are censured
+must depend upon ourselves.
+
+But suppose a man to say, "that (by our own admission) all men aim at
+that which conveys to their minds an impression of good, and that men
+have no control over this impression, but that the End impresses each
+with a notion correspondent to his own individual character; that to be
+sure if each man is in a way the cause of his own moral state, so he
+will be also of the kind of impression he receives: whereas, if this is
+not so, no one is the cause to himself of doing evil actions, but he
+does them by reason of ignorance of the true End, supposing that
+through their means he will secure the chief good. Further, that this
+aiming at the End is no matter of one's own choice, but one must be
+born with a power of mental vision, so to speak, whereby to judge
+fairly and choose that which is really good; and he is blessed by
+nature who has this naturally well: because it is the most important
+thing and the fairest, and what a man cannot get or learn from another
+but will have such as nature has given it; and for this to be so given
+well and fairly would be excellence of nature in the highest and truest
+sense."
+
+If all this be true, how will Virtue be a whit more voluntary than
+Vice? Alike to the good man and the bad, the End gives its impression
+and is fixed by nature or howsoever you like to say, and they act so
+and so, referring everything else to this End.
+
+Whether then we suppose that the End impresses each man's mind with
+certain notions not merely by nature, but that there is somewhat also
+dependent on himself; or that the End is given by nature, and yet
+Virtue is voluntary because the good man does all the rest voluntarily,
+Vice must be equally so; because his own agency equally attaches to the
+bad man in the actions, even if not in the selection of the End.
+
+If then, as is commonly said, the Virtues are voluntary (because we at
+least cooperate[15] in producing our moral states, and we assume the
+End to be of a certain kind according as we are ourselves of certain
+characters), the Vices must be voluntary also, because the cases are
+exactly similar.
+
+Chapter VIII.
+
+Well now, we have stated generally respecting the Moral Virtues, the
+genus (in outline), that they are mean states, and that they are
+habits, and how they are formed, and that they are of themselves
+calculated to act upon the circumstances out of which they were formed,
+and that they are in our own power and voluntary, and are to be done so
+as right Reason may direct.
+
+But the particular actions and the habits are not voluntary in the same
+sense; for of the actions we are masters from beginning to end
+(supposing of course a knowledge of the particular details), but only
+of the origination of the habits, the addition by small particular
+accessions not being cognisiable (as is the case with sicknesses):
+still they are voluntary because it rested with us to use our
+circumstances this way or that.
+
+Chapter IX.
+
+Here we will resume the particular discussion of the Moral Virtues, and
+say what they are, what is their object-matter, and how they stand
+respectively related to it: of course their number will be thereby
+shown.
+
+First, then, of Courage. Now that it is a mean state, in respect of
+fear and boldness, has been already said: further, the objects of our
+fears are obviously things fearful or, in a general way of statement,
+evils; which accounts for the common definition of fear, viz.
+"expectation of evil."
+
+Of course we fear evils of all kinds: disgrace, for instance, poverty,
+disease, desolateness, death; but not all these seem to be the
+object-matter of the Brave man, because there are things which to fear
+is right and noble, and not to fear is base; disgrace, for example,
+since he who fears this is a good man and has a sense of honour, and he
+who does not fear it is shameless (though there are those who call him
+Brave by analogy, because he somewhat resembles the Brave man who
+agrees with him in being free from fear); but poverty, perhaps, or
+disease, and in fact whatever does not proceed from viciousness, nor is
+attributable to his own fault, a man ought not to fear: still, being
+fearless in respect of these would not constitute a man Brave in the
+proper sense of the term.
+
+Yet we do apply the term[16] in right of the similarity of the cases;
+for there are men who, though timid in the dangers of war, are liberal
+men and are stout enough to face loss of wealth.
+
+And, again, a man is not a coward for fearing insult to his wife or
+children, or envy, or any such thing; nor is he a Brave man for being
+bold when going to be scourged.
+
+What kind of fearful things then do constitute the object-matter of the
+Brave man? first of all, must they not be the greatest, since no man is
+more apt to withstand what is dreadful. Now the object of the greatest
+dread is death, because it is the end of all things, and the dead man
+is thought to be capable neither of good nor evil. Still it would seem
+that the Brave man has not for his object-matter even death in every
+circumstance; on the sea, for example, or in sickness: in what
+circumstances then? must it not be in the most honourable? now such is
+death in war, because it is death in the greatest and most honourable
+danger; and this is confirmed by the honours awarded in communities,
+and by monarchs.
+
+He then may be most properly denominated Brave who is fearless in
+respect of honourable death and such sudden emergencies as threaten
+death; now such specially are those which arise in the course of war.
+
+It is not meant but that the Brave man will be fearless also on the sea
+(and in sickness), but not in the same way as sea-faring men; for these
+are light-hearted and hopeful by reason of their experience, while
+landsmen though Brave are apt to give themselves up for lost and
+shudder at the notion of such a death: to which it should be added that
+Courage is exerted in circumstances which admit of doing something to
+help one's self, or in which death would be honourable; now neither of
+these requisites attach to destruction by drowning or sickness.
+
+Chapter X.
+
+Again, fearful is a term of relation, the same thing not being so to
+all, and there is according to common parlance somewhat so fearful as
+to be beyond human endurance: this of course would be fearful to every
+man of sense, but those objects which are level to the capacity of man
+differ in magnitude and admit of degrees, so too the objects of
+confidence or boldness.
+
+Now the Brave man cannot be frighted from his propriety (but of course
+only so far as he is man); fear such things indeed he will, but he will
+stand up against them as he ought and as right reason may direct, with
+a view to what is honourable, because this is the end of the virtue.
+
+Now it is possible to fear these things too much, or too little, or
+again to fear what is not really fearful as if it were such. So the
+errors come to be either that a man fears when he ought not to fear at
+all, or that he fears in an improper way, or at a wrong time, and so
+forth; and so too in respect of things inspiring confidence. He is
+Brave then who withstands, and fears, and is bold, in respect of right
+objects, from a right motive, in right manner, and at right times:
+since the Brave man suffers or acts as he ought and as right reason may
+direct.
+
+Now the end of every separate act of working is that which accords with
+the habit, and so to the Brave man Courage; which is honourable;
+therefore such is also the End, since the character of each is
+determined by the End.[17]
+
+So honour is the motive from which the Brave man withstands things
+fearful and performs the acts which accord with Courage.
+
+Of the characters on the side of Excess, he who exceeds in utter
+absence of fear has no appropriate name (I observed before that many
+states have none), but he would be a madman or inaccessible to pain if
+he feared nothing, neither earthquake, nor the billows, as they tell of
+the Celts.
+
+He again who exceeds in confidence in respect of things fearful is
+rash. He is thought moreover to be a braggart, and to advance unfounded
+claims to the character of Brave: the relation which the Brave man
+really bears to objects of fear this man wishes to appear to bear, and
+so imitates him in whatever points he can; for this reason most of them
+exhibit a curious mixture of rashness and cowardice; because, affecting
+rashness in these circumstances, they do not withstand what is truly
+fearful.
+
+The man moreover who exceeds in feeling fear is a coward, since there
+attach to him the circumstances of fearing wrong objects, in wrong
+ways, and so forth. He is deficient also in feeling confidence, but he
+is most clearly seen as exceeding in the case of pains; he is a
+fainthearted kind of man, for he fears all things: the Brave man is
+just the contrary, for boldness is the property of the light-hearted
+and hopeful.
+
+So the coward, the rash, and the Brave man have exactly the same
+object-matter, but stand differently related to it: the two
+first-mentioned respectively exceed and are deficient, the last is in a
+mean state and as he ought to be. The rash again are precipitate, and,
+being eager before danger, when actually in it fall away, while the
+Brave are quick and sharp in action, but before are quiet and composed.
+
+Well then, as has been said, Courage is a mean state in respect of
+objects inspiring boldness or fear, in the circumstances which have
+been stated, and the Brave man chooses his line and withstands danger
+either because to do so is honourable, or because not to do so is base.
+But dying to escape from poverty, or the pangs of love, or anything
+that is simply painful, is the act not of a Brave man but of a coward;
+because it is mere softness to fly from what is toilsome, and the
+suicide braves the terrors of death not because it is honourable but to
+get out of the reach of evil.
+
+Chapter XI.
+
+Courage proper is somewhat of the kind I have described, but there are
+dispositions, differing in five ways,[18] which also bear in common
+parlance the name of Courage.
+
+We will take first that which bears most resemblance to the true, the
+Courage of Citizenship, so named because the motives which are thought
+to actuate the members of a community in braving danger are the
+penalties and disgrace held out by the laws to cowardice, and the
+dignities conferred on the Brave; which is thought to be the reason why
+those are the bravest people among whom cowards are visited with
+disgrace and the Brave held in honour.
+
+Such is the kind of Courage Homer exhibits in his characters; Diomed
+and Hector for example. The latter says,
+
+"Polydamas will be the first to fix
+Disgrace upon me."
+
+Diomed again,
+
+"For Hector surely will hereafter say,
+Speaking in Troy, Tydides by my hand"--
+
+This I say most nearly resembles the Courage before spoken of, because
+it arises from virtue, from a feeling of shame, and a desire of what is
+noble (that is, of honour), and avoidance of disgrace which is base.
+
+In the same rank one would be inclined to place those also who act
+under compulsion from their commanders; yet are they really lower,
+because not a sense of honour but fear is the motive from which they
+act, and what they seek to avoid is not that which is base but that
+which is simply painful: commanders do in fact compel their men
+sometimes, as Hector says (to quote Homer again),
+
+"But whomsoever I shall find cowering afar from the fight,
+The teeth of dogs he shall by no means escape."
+
+Those commanders who station staunch troops by doubtful ones,[19] or
+who beat their men if they flinch, or who draw their troops up in line
+with the trenches, or other similar obstacles, in their rear, do in
+effect the same as Hector, for they all use compulsion.
+
+But a man is to be Brave, not on compulsion, but from a sense of
+honour.
+
+In the next place, Experience and Skill in the various particulars is
+thought to be a species of Courage: whence Socrates also thought that
+Courage was knowledge.[20]
+
+This quality is exhibited of course by different men under different
+circumstances, but in warlike matters, with which we are now concerned,
+it is exhibited by the soldiers ("the regulars"): for there are, it
+would seem, many things in war of no real importance[21] which these
+have been constantly used to see; so they have a show of Courage
+because other people are not aware of the real nature of these things.
+Then again by reason of their skill they are better able than any
+others to inflict without suffering themselves, because they are able
+to use their arms and have such as are most serviceable both with a
+view to offence and defence: so that their case is parallel to that of
+armed men fighting with unarmed or trained athletes with amateurs,
+since in contests of this kind those are the best fighters, not who are
+the bravest men, but who are the strongest and are in the best
+condition.
+
+In fact, the regular troops come to be cowards whenever the danger is
+greater than their means of meeting it; supposing, for example, that
+they are inferior in numbers and resources: then they are the first to
+fly, but the mere militia stand and fall on the ground (which as you
+know really happened at the Hermæum),[22] for in the eyes of these
+flight was disgraceful and death preferable to safety bought at such a
+price: while "the regulars" originally went into the danger under a
+notion of their own superiority, but on discovering their error they
+took to flight,[23] having greater fear of death than of disgrace; but
+this is not the feeling of the Brave man.
+
+Thirdly, mere Animal Spirit is sometimes brought under the term
+Courage: they are thought to be Brave who are carried on by mere Animal
+Spirit, as are wild beasts against those who have wounded them, because
+in fact the really Brave have much Spirit, there being nothing like it
+for going at danger of any kind; whence those frequent expressions in
+Homer, "infused strength into his spirit," "roused his strength and
+spirit," or again, "and keen strength in his nostrils," "his blood
+boiled:" for all these seem to denote the arousing and impetuosity of
+the Animal Spirit.
+
+Now they that are truly Brave act from a sense of honour, and this
+Animal Spirit co-operates with them; but wild beasts from pain, that is
+because they have been wounded, or are frightened; since if they are
+quietly in their own haunts, forest or marsh, they do not attack men.
+Surely they are not Brave because they rush into danger when goaded on
+by pain and mere Spirit, without any view of the danger: else would
+asses be Brave when they are hungry, for though beaten they will not
+then leave their pasture: profligate men besides do many bold actions
+by reason of their lust. We may conclude then that they are not Brave
+who are goaded on to meet danger by pain and mere Spirit; but still
+this temper which arises from Animal Spirit appears to be most natural,
+and would be Courage of the true kind if it could have added to it
+moral choice and the proper motive.
+
+So men also are pained by a feeling of anger, and take pleasure in
+revenge; but they who fight from these causes may be good fighters, but
+they are not truly Brave (in that they do not act from a sense of
+honour, nor as reason directs, but merely from the present feeling),
+still they bear some resemblance to that character.
+
+Nor, again, are the Sanguine and Hopeful therefore Brave: since their
+boldness in dangers arises from their frequent victories over numerous
+foes. The two characters are alike, however, in that both are
+confident; but then the Brave are so from the afore-mentioned causes,
+whereas these are so from a settled conviction of their being superior
+and not likely to suffer anything in return (they who are intoxicated
+do much the same, for they become hopeful when in that state); but when
+the event disappoints their expectations they run away: now it was said
+to be the character of a Brave man to withstand things which are
+fearful to man or produce that impression, because it is honourable so
+to do and the contrary is dishonourable.
+
+For this reason it is thought to be a greater proof of Courage to be
+fearless and undisturbed under the pressure of sudden fear than under
+that which may be anticipated, because Courage then comes rather from a
+fixed habit, or less from preparation: since as to foreseen dangers a
+man might take his line even from calculation and reasoning, but in
+those which are sudden he will do so according to his fixed habit of
+mind.
+
+Fifthly and lastly, those who are acting under Ignorance have a show of
+Courage and are not very far from the Hopeful; but still they are
+inferior inasmuch as they have no opinion of themselves; which the
+others have, and therefore stay and contest a field for some little
+time; but they who have been deceived fly the moment they know things
+to be otherwise than they supposed, which the Argives experienced when
+they fell on the Lacedæmonians, taking them for the men of Sicyon.
+
+Chapter XII.
+
+We have described then what kind of men the Brave are, and what they
+who are thought to be, but are not really, Brave.
+
+It must be remarked, however, that though Courage has for its
+object-matter boldness and fear it has not both equally so, but objects
+of fear much more than the former; for he that under pressure of these
+is undisturbed and stands related to them as he ought is better
+entitled to the name of Brave than he who is properly affected towards
+objects of confidence. So then men are termed Brave for withstanding
+painful things.
+
+It follows that Courage involves pain and is justly praised, since it
+is a harder matter to withstand things that are painful than to abstain
+from such as are pleasant.
+
+It must not be thought but that the End and object of Courage is
+pleasant, but it is obscured by the surrounding circumstances: which
+happens also in the gymnastic games; to the boxers the End is pleasant
+with a view to which they act, I mean the crown and the honours; but
+the receiving the blows they do is painful and annoying to flesh and
+blood, and so is all the labour they have to undergo; and, as these
+drawbacks are many, the object in view being small appears to have no
+pleasantness in it.
+
+If then we may say the same of Courage, of course death and wounds must
+be painful to the Brave man and against his will: still he endures
+these because it is honourable so to do or because it is dishonourable
+not to do so. And the more complete his virtue and his happiness so
+much the more will he be pained at the notion of death: since to such a
+man as he is it is best worth while to live, and he with full
+consciousness is deprived of the greatest goods by death, and this is a
+painful idea. But he is not the less Brave for feeling it to be so, nay
+rather it may be he is shown to be more so because he chooses the
+honour that may be reaped in war in preference to retaining safe
+possession of these other goods. The fact is that to act with pleasure
+does not belong to all the virtues, except so far as a man realises the
+End of his actions.
+
+But there is perhaps no reason why not such men should make the best
+soldiers, but those who are less truly Brave but have no other good to
+care for: these being ready to meet danger and bartering their lives
+against small gain.
+
+Let thus much be accepted as sufficient on the subject of Courage; the
+true nature of which it is not difficult to gather, in outline at
+least, from what has been said.
+
+Chapter XIII.
+
+Next let us speak of Perfected Self-Mastery, which seems to claim the
+next place to Courage, since these two are the Excellences of the
+Irrational part of the Soul.
+
+That it is a mean state, having for its object-matter Pleasures, we
+have already said (Pains being in fact its object-matter in a less
+degree and dissimilar manner), the state of utter absence of
+self-control has plainly the same object-matter; the next thing then is
+to determine what kind of Pleasures.
+
+Let Pleasures then be understood to be divided into mental and bodily:
+instances of the former being love of honour or of learning: it being
+plain that each man takes pleasure in that of these two objects which
+he has a tendency to like, his body being no way affected but rather
+his intellect. Now men are not called perfectly self-mastering or
+wholly destitute of self-control in respect of pleasures of this class:
+nor in fact in respect of any which are not bodily; those for example
+who love to tell long stories, and are prosy, and spend their days
+about mere chance matters, we call gossips but not wholly destitute of
+self-control, nor again those who are pained at the loss of money or
+friends.
+
+It is bodily Pleasures then which are the object-matter of Perfected
+Self-Mastery, but not even all these indifferently: I mean, that they
+who take pleasure in objects perceived by the Sight, as colours, and
+forms, and painting, are not denominated men of Perfected Self-Mastery,
+or wholly destitute of self-control; and yet it would seem that one may
+take pleasure even in such objects, as one ought to do, or excessively,
+or too little.
+
+So too of objects perceived by the sense of Hearing; no one applies the
+terms before quoted respectively to those who are excessively pleased
+with musical tunes or acting, or to those who take such pleasure as
+they ought.
+
+Nor again to those persons whose pleasure arises from the sense of
+Smell, except incidentally:[24] I mean, we do not say men have no
+self-control because they take pleasure in the scent of fruit, or
+flowers, or incense, but rather when they do so in the smells of
+unguents and sauces: since men destitute of self-control take pleasure
+herein, because hereby the objects of their lusts are recalled to their
+imagination (you may also see other men take pleasure in the smell of
+food when they are hungry): but to take pleasure in such is a mark of
+the character before named since these are objects of desire to him.
+
+Now not even brutes receive pleasure in right of these senses, except
+incidentally. I mean, it is not the scent of hares' flesh but the
+eating it which dogs take pleasure in, perception of which pleasure is
+caused by the sense of Smell. Or again, it is not the lowing of the ox
+but eating him which the lion likes; but of the fact of his nearness
+the lion is made sensible by the lowing, and so he appears to take
+pleasure in this. In like manner, he has no pleasure in merely seeing
+or finding a stag or wild goat, but in the prospect of a meal.
+
+The habits of Perfect Self-Mastery and entire absence of self-control
+have then for their object-matter such pleasures as brutes also share
+in, for which reason they are plainly servile and brutish: they are
+Touch and Taste.
+
+But even Taste men seem to make little or no use of; for to the sense
+of Taste belongs the distinguishing of flavours; what men do, in fact,
+who are testing the quality of wines or seasoning "made dishes."
+
+But men scarcely take pleasure at all in these things, at least those
+whom we call destitute of self-control do not, but only in the actual
+enjoyment which arises entirely from the sense of Touch, whether in
+eating or in drinking, or in grosser lusts. This accounts for the wish
+said to have been expressed once by a great glutton, "that his throat
+had been formed longer than a crane's neck," implying that his pleasure
+was derived from the Touch.
+
+The sense then with which is connected the habit of absence of
+self-control is the most common of all the senses, and this habit would
+seem to be justly a matter of reproach, since it attaches to us not in
+so far as we are men but in so far as we are animals. Indeed it is
+brutish to take pleasure in such things and to like them best of all;
+for the most respectable of the pleasures arising from the touch have
+been set aside; those, for instance, which occur in the course of
+gymnastic training from the rubbing and the warm bath: because the
+touch of the man destitute of self-control is not indifferently of
+_any_ part of the body but only of particular parts.
+
+Now of lusts or desires some are thought to be universal, others
+peculiar and acquired; thus desire for food is natural since every one
+who really needs desires also food, whether solid or liquid, or both
+(and, as Homer says, the man in the prime of youth needs and desires
+intercourse with the other sex); but when we come to this or that
+particular kind, then neither is the desire universal nor in all men is
+it directed to the same objects. And therefore the conceiving of such
+desires plainly attaches to us as individuals. It must be admitted,
+however, that there is something natural in it: because different
+things are pleasant to different men and a preference of some
+particular objects to chance ones is universal. Well then, in the case
+of the desires which are strictly and properly natural few men go wrong
+and all in one direction, that is, on the side of too much: I mean, to
+eat and drink of such food as happens to be on the table till one is
+overfilled is exceeding in quantity the natural limit, since the
+natural desire is simply a supply of a real deficiency.
+
+For this reason these men are called belly-mad, as filling it beyond
+what they ought, and it is the slavish who become of this character.
+
+But in respect of the peculiar pleasures many men go wrong and in many
+different ways; for whereas the term "fond of so and so" implies either
+taking pleasure in wrong objects, or taking pleasure excessively, or as
+the mass of men do, or in a wrong way, they who are destitute of all
+self-control exceed in all these ways; that is to say, they take
+pleasure in some things in which they ought not to do so (because they
+are properly objects of detestation), and in such as it is right to
+take pleasure in they do so more than they ought and as the mass of men
+do.
+
+Well then, that excess with respect to pleasures is absence of
+self-control, and blameworthy, is plain. But viewing these habits on
+the side of pains, we find that a man is not said to have the virtue
+for withstanding them (as in the case of Courage), nor the vice for not
+withstanding them; but the man destitute of self-control is such,
+because he is pained more than he ought to be at not obtaining things
+which are pleasant (and thus his pleasure produces pain to him), and
+the man of Perfected Self-Mastery is such in virtue of not being pained
+by their absence, that is, by having to abstain from what is pleasant.
+
+Now the man destitute of self-control desires either all pleasant
+things indiscriminately or those which are specially pleasant, and he
+is impelled by his desire to choose these things in preference to all
+others; and this involves pain, not only when he misses the attainment
+of his objects but, in the very desiring them, since all desire is
+accompanied by pain. Surely it is a strange case this, being pained by
+reason of pleasure.
+
+As for men who are defective on the side of pleasure, who take less
+pleasure in things than they ought, they are almost imaginary
+characters, because such absence of sensual perception is not natural
+to man: for even the other animals distinguish between different kinds
+of food, and like some kinds and dislike others. In fact, could a man
+be found who takes no pleasure in anything and to whom all things are
+alike, he would be far from being human at all: there is no name for
+such a character because it is simply imaginary.
+
+But the man of Perfected Self-Mastery is in the mean with respect to
+these objects: that is to say, he neither takes pleasure in the things
+which delight the vicious man, and in fact rather dislikes them, nor at
+all in improper objects; nor to any great degree in any object of the
+class; nor is he pained at their absence; nor does he desire them; or,
+if he does, only in moderation, and neither more than he ought, nor at
+improper times, and so forth; but such things as are conducive to
+health and good condition of body, being also pleasant, these he will
+grasp at in moderation and as he ought to do, and also such other
+pleasant things as do not hinder these objects, and are not unseemly or
+disproportionate to his means; because he that should grasp at such
+would be liking such pleasures more than is proper; but the man of
+Perfected Self-Mastery is not of this character, but regulates his
+desires by the dictates of right reason.
+
+Chapter XIV.
+
+Now the vice of being destitute of all Self-Control seems to be more
+truly voluntary than Cowardice, because pleasure is the cause of the
+former and pain of the latter, and pleasure is an object of choice,
+pain of avoidance. And again, pain deranges and spoils the natural
+disposition of its victim, whereas pleasure has no such effect and is
+more voluntary and therefore more justly open to reproach.
+
+It is so also for the following reason; that it is easier to be inured
+by habit to resist the objects of pleasure, there being many things of
+this kind in life and the process of habituation being unaccompanied by
+danger; whereas the case is the reverse as regards the objects of fear.
+
+Again, Cowardice as a confirmed habit would seem to be voluntary in a
+different way from the particular instances which form the habit;
+because it is painless, but these derange the man by reason of pain so
+that he throws away his arms and otherwise behaves himself unseemly,
+for which reason they are even thought by some to exercise a power of
+compulsion.
+
+But to the man destitute of Self-Control the particular instances are
+on the contrary quite voluntary, being done with desire and direct
+exertion of the will, but the general result is less voluntary: since
+no man desires to form the habit.
+
+The name of this vice (which signifies etymologically unchastened-ness)
+we apply also to the faults of children, there being a certain
+resemblance between the cases: to which the name is primarily applied,
+and to which secondarily or derivatively, is not relevant to the
+present subject, but it is evident that the later in point of time must
+get the name from the earlier. And the metaphor seems to be a very good
+one; for whatever grasps after base things, and is liable to great
+increase, ought to be chastened; and to this description desire and the
+child answer most truly, in that children also live under the direction
+of desire and the grasping after what is pleasant is most prominently
+seen in these.
+
+Unless then the appetite be obedient and subjected to the governing
+principle it will become very great: for in the fool the grasping after
+what is pleasant is insatiable and undiscriminating; and every acting
+out of the desire increases the kindred habit, and if the desires are
+great and violent in degree they even expel Reason entirely; therefore
+they ought to be moderate and few, and in no respect to be opposed to
+Reason. Now when the appetite is in such a state we denominate it
+obedient and chastened.
+
+In short, as the child ought to live with constant regard to the orders
+of its educator, so should the appetitive principle with regard to
+those of Reason.
+
+So then in the man of Perfected Self-Mastery, the appetitive principle
+must be accordant with Reason: for what is right is the mark at which
+both principles aim: that is to say, the man of perfected self-mastery
+desires what he ought in right manner and at right times, which is
+exactly what Reason directs. Let this be taken for our account of
+Perfected Self-Mastery.
+
+BOOK IV
+
+Chapter I.
+
+We will next speak of Liberality. Now this is thought to be the mean
+state, having for its object-matter Wealth: I mean, the Liberal man is
+praised not in the circumstances of war, nor in those which constitute
+the character of perfected self-mastery, nor again in judicial
+decisions, but in respect of giving and receiving Wealth, chiefly the
+former. By the term Wealth I mean "all those things whose worth is
+measured by money."
+
+Now the states of excess and defect in regard of Wealth are
+respectively Prodigality and Stinginess: the latter of these terms we
+attach invariably to those who are over careful about Wealth, but the
+former we apply sometimes with a complex notion; that is to say, we
+give the name to those who fail of self-control and spend money on the
+unrestrained gratification of their passions; and this is why they are
+thought to be most base, because they have many vices at once.
+
+It must be noted, however, that this is not a strict and proper use of
+the term, since its natural etymological meaning is to denote him who
+has one particular evil, viz. the wasting his substance: he is unsaved
+(as the term literally denotes) who is wasting away by his own fault;
+and this he really may be said to be; the destruction of his substance
+is thought to be a kind of wasting of himself, since these things are
+the means of living. Well, this is our acceptation of the term
+Prodigality.
+
+Again. Whatever things are for use may be used well or ill, and Wealth
+belongs to this class. He uses each particular thing best who has the
+virtue to whose province it belongs: so that he will use Wealth best
+who has the virtue respecting Wealth, that is to say, the Liberal man.
+
+Expenditure and giving are thought to be the using of money, but
+receiving and keeping one would rather call the possessing of it. And
+so the giving to proper persons is more characteristic of the Liberal
+man, than the receiving from proper quarters and forbearing to receive
+from the contrary. In fact generally, doing well by others is more
+characteristic of virtue than being done well by, and doing things
+positively honourable than forbearing to do things dishonourable; and
+any one may see that the doing well by others and doing things
+positively honourable attaches to the act of giving, but to that of
+receiving only the being done well by or forbearing to do what is
+dishonourable.
+
+Besides, thanks are given to him who gives, not to him who merely
+forbears to receive, and praise even more. Again, forbearing to receive
+is easier than giving, the case of being too little freehanded with
+one's own being commoner than taking that which is not one's own.
+
+And again, it is they who give that are denominated Liberal, while they
+who forbear to receive are commended, not on the score of Liberality
+but of just dealing, while for receiving men are not, in fact, praised
+at all.
+
+And the Liberal are liked almost best of all virtuous characters,
+because they are profitable to others, and this their profitableness
+consists in their giving.
+
+Furthermore: all the actions done in accordance with virtue are
+honourable, and done from the motive of honour: and the Liberal man,
+therefore, will give from a motive of honour, and will give rightly; I
+mean, to proper persons, in right proportion, at right times, and
+whatever is included in the term "right giving:" and this too with
+positive pleasure, or at least without pain, since whatever is done in
+accordance with virtue is pleasant or at least not unpleasant, most
+certainly not attended with positive pain.
+
+But the man who gives to improper people, or not from a motive of
+honour but from some other cause, shall be called not Liberal but
+something else. Neither shall he be so denominated who does it with
+pain: this being a sign that he would prefer his wealth to the
+honourable action, and this is no part of the Liberal man's character;
+neither will such an one receive from improper sources, because the so
+receiving is not characteristic of one who values not wealth: nor again
+will he be apt to ask, because one who does kindnesses to others does
+not usually receive them willingly; but from proper sources (his own
+property, for instance) he will receive, doing this not as honourable
+but as necessary, that he may have somewhat to give: neither will he be
+careless of his own, since it is his wish through these to help others
+in need: nor will he give to chance people, that he may have wherewith
+to give to those to whom he ought, at right times, and on occasions
+when it is honourable so to do.
+
+Again, it is a trait in the Liberal man's character even to exceed very
+much in giving so as to leave too little for himself, it being
+characteristic of such an one not to have a thought of self.
+
+Now Liberality is a term of relation to a man's means, for the
+Liberal-ness depends not on the amount of what is given but on the
+moral state of the giver which gives in proportion to his means. There
+is then no reason why he should not be the more Liberal man who gives
+the less amount, if he has less to give out of.
+
+Again, they are thought to be more Liberal who have inherited, not
+acquired for themselves, their means; because, in the first place, they
+have never experienced want, and next, all people love most their own
+works, just as parents do and poets.
+
+It is not easy for the Liberal man to be rich, since he is neither apt
+to receive nor to keep but to lavish, and values not wealth for its own
+sake but with a view to giving it away. Hence it is commonly charged
+upon fortune that they who most deserve to be rich are least so. Yet
+this happens reasonably enough; it is impossible he should have wealth
+who does not take any care to have it, just as in any similar case.
+
+Yet he will not give to improper people, nor at wrong times, and so on:
+because he would not then be acting in accordance with Liberality, and
+if he spent upon such objects, would have nothing to spend on those on
+which he ought: for, as I have said before, he is Liberal who spends in
+proportion to his means, and on proper objects, while he who does so in
+excess is prodigal (this is the reason why we never call despots
+prodigal, because it does not seem to be easy for them by their gifts
+and expenditure to go beyond their immense possessions).
+
+To sum up then. Since Liberality is a mean state in respect of the
+giving and receiving of wealth, the Liberal man will give and spend on
+proper objects, and in proper proportion, in great things and in small
+alike, and all this with pleasure to himself; also he will receive from
+right sources, and in right proportion: because, as the virtue is a
+mean state in respect of both, he will do both as he ought, and, in
+fact, upon proper giving follows the correspondent receiving, while
+that which is not such is contrary to it. (Now those which follow one
+another come to co-exist in the same person, those which are contraries
+plainly do not.)
+
+Again, should it happen to him to spend money beyond what is needful,
+or otherwise than is well, he will be vexed, but only moderately and as
+he ought; for feeling pleasure and pain at right objects, and in right
+manner, is a property of Virtue.
+
+The Liberal man is also a good man to have for a partner in respect of
+wealth: for he can easily be wronged, since he values not wealth, and
+is more vexed at not spending where he ought to have done so than at
+spending where he ought not, and he relishes not the maxim of
+Simonides.
+
+Chapter II.
+
+But the Prodigal man goes wrong also in these points, for he is neither
+pleased nor pained at proper objects or in proper manner, which will
+become more plain as we proceed.
+
+We have said already that Prodigality and Stinginess are respectively
+states of excess and defect, and this in two things, giving and
+receiving (expenditure of course we class under giving). Well now,
+Prodigality exceeds in giving and forbearing to receive and is
+deficient in receiving, while Stinginess is deficient in giving and
+exceeds in receiving, but it is in small things.
+
+The two parts of Prodigality, to be sure, do not commonly go together;
+it is not easy, I mean, to give to all if you receive from none,
+because private individuals thus giving will soon find their means run
+short, and such are in fact thought to be prodigal. He that should
+combine both would seem to be no little superior to the Stingy man: for
+he may be easily cured, both by advancing in years, and also by the
+want of means, and he may come thus to the mean: he has, you see,
+already the _facts_ of the Liberal man, he gives and forbears to
+receive, only he does neither in right manner or well. So if he could
+be wrought upon by habituation in this respect, or change in any other
+way, he would be a real Liberal man, for he will give to those to whom
+he should, and will forbear to receive whence he ought not. This is the
+reason too why he is thought not to be low in moral character, because
+to exceed in giving and in forbearing to receive is no sign of badness
+or meanness, but only of folly.
+
+Well then, he who is Prodigal in this fashion is thought far superior
+to the Stingy man for the aforementioned reasons, and also because he
+does good to many, but the Stingy man to no one, not even to himself.
+But most Prodigals, as has been said, combine with their other faults
+that of receiving from improper sources, and on this point are Stingy:
+and they become grasping, because they wish to spend and cannot do this
+easily, since their means soon run short and they are necessitated to
+get from some other quarter; and then again, because they care not for
+what is honourable, they receive recklessly, and from all sources
+indifferently, because they desire to give but care not how or whence.
+
+And for this reason their givings are not Liberal, inasmuch as they are
+not honourable, nor purely disinterested, nor done in right fashion;
+but they oftentimes make those rich who should be poor, and to those
+who are quiet respectable kind of people they will give nothing, but to
+flatterers, or those who subserve their pleasures in any way, they will
+give much. And therefore most of them are utterly devoid of
+self-restraint; for as they are open-handed they are liberal in
+expenditure upon the unrestrained gratification of their passions, and
+turn off to their pleasures because they do not live with reference to
+what is honourable.
+
+Thus then the Prodigal, if unguided, slides into these faults; but if
+he could get care bestowed on him he might come to the mean and to what
+is right.
+
+Stinginess, on the contrary, is incurable: old age, for instance, and
+incapacity of any kind, is thought to make people Stingy; and it is
+more congenial to human nature than Prodigality, the mass of men being
+fond of money rather than apt to give: moreover it extends far and has
+many phases, the modes of stinginess being thought to be many. For as
+it consists of two things, defect of giving and excess of receiving,
+everybody does not have it entire, but it is sometimes divided, and one
+class of persons exceed in receiving, the other are deficient in
+giving. I mean those who are designated by such appellations as
+sparing, close-fisted, niggards, are all deficient in giving; but other
+men's property they neither desire nor are willing to receive, in some
+instances from a real moderation and shrinking from what is base.
+
+There are some people whose motive, either supposed or alleged, for
+keeping their property is this, that they may never be driven to do
+anything dishonourable: to this class belongs the skinflint, and every
+one of similar character, so named from the excess of not-giving.
+Others again decline to receive their neighbour's goods from a motive
+of fear; their notion being that it is not easy to take other people's
+things yourself without their taking yours: so they are content neither
+to receive nor give.
+
+The other class again who are Stingy in respect of receiving exceed in
+that they receive anything from any source; such as they who work at
+illiberal employments, brothel keepers, and such-like, and usurers who
+lend small sums at large interest: for all these receive from improper
+sources, and improper amounts. Their common characteristic is
+base-gaining, since they all submit to disgrace for the sake of gain
+and that small; because those who receive great things neither whence
+they ought, nor what they ought (as for instance despots who sack
+cities and plunder temples), we denominate wicked, impious, and unjust,
+but not Stingy.
+
+Now the dicer and bath-plunderer and the robber belong to the class of
+the Stingy, for they are given to base gain: both busy themselves and
+submit to disgrace for the sake of gain, and the one class incur the
+greatest dangers for the sake of their booty, while the others make
+gain of their friends to whom they ought to be giving.
+
+So both classes, as wishing to make gain from improper sources, are
+given to base gain, and all such receivings are Stingy. And with good
+reason is Stinginess called the contrary of Liberality: both because it
+is a greater evil than Prodigality, and because men err rather in this
+direction than in that of the Prodigality which we have spoken of as
+properly and completely such.
+
+Let this be considered as what we have to say respecting Liberality and
+the contrary vices.
+
+Chapter III.
+
+Next in order would seem to come a dissertation on Magnificence, this
+being thought to be, like liberality, a virtue having for its
+object-matter Wealth; but it does not, like that, extend to all
+transactions in respect of Wealth, but only applies to such as are
+expensive, and in these circumstances it exceeds liberality in respect
+of magnitude, because it is (what the very name in Greek hints at)
+fitting expense on a large scale: this term is of course relative: I
+mean, the expenditure of equipping and commanding a trireme is not the
+same as that of giving a public spectacle: "fitting" of course also is
+relative to the individual, and the matter wherein and upon which he
+has to spend. And a man is not denominated Magnificent for spending as
+he should do in small or ordinary things, as, for instance,
+
+"Oft to the wandering beggar did I give,"
+
+but for doing so in great matters: that is to say, the Magnificent man
+is liberal, but the liberal is not thereby Magnificent. The falling
+short of such a state is called Meanness, the exceeding it Vulgar
+Profusion, Want of Taste, and so on; which are faulty, not because they
+are on an excessive scale in respect of right objects but, because they
+show off in improper objects, and in improper manner: of these we will
+speak presently. The Magnificent man is like a man of skill, because he
+can see what is fitting, and can spend largely in good taste; for, as
+we said at the commencement, the confirmed habit is determined by the
+separate acts of working, and by its object-matter.
+
+Well, the expenses of the Magnificent man are great and fitting: such
+also are his works (because this secures the expenditure being not
+great merely, but befitting the work). So then the work is to be
+proportionate to the expense, and this again to the work, or even above
+it: and the Magnificent man will incur such expenses from the motive of
+honour, this being common to all the virtues, and besides he will do it
+with pleasure and lavishly; excessive accuracy in calculation being
+Mean. He will consider also how a thing may be done most beautifully
+and fittingly, rather, than for how much it may be done, and how at the
+least expense.
+
+So the Magnificent man must be also a liberal man, because the liberal
+man will also spend what he ought, and in right manner: but it is the
+Great, that is to say tke large scale, which is distinctive of the
+Magnificent man, the object-matter of liberality being the same, and
+without spending more money than another man he will make the work more
+magnificent. I mean, the excellence of a possession and of a work is
+not the same: as a piece of property that thing is most valuable which
+is worth most, gold for instance; but as a work that which is great and
+beautiful, because the contemplation of such an object is admirable,
+and so is that which is Magnificent. So the excellence of a work is
+Magnificence on a large scale. There are cases of expenditure which we
+call honourable, such as are dedicatory offerings to the gods, and the
+furnishing their temples, and sacrifices, and in like manner everything
+that has reference to the Deity, and all such public matters as are
+objects of honourable ambition, as when men think in any case that it
+is their duty to furnish a chorus for the stage splendidly, or fit out
+and maintain a trireme, or give a general public feast.
+
+Now in all these, as has been already stated, respect is had also to
+the rank and the means of the man who is doing them: because they
+should be proportionate to these, and befit not the work only but also
+the doer of the work. For this reason a poor man cannot be a
+Magnificent man, since he has not means wherewith to spend largely and
+yet becomingly; and if he attempts it he is a fool, inasmuch as it is
+out of proportion and contrary to propriety, whereas to be in
+accordance with virtue a thing must be done rightly.
+
+Such expenditure is fitting moreover for those to whom such things
+previously belong, either through themselves or through their ancestors
+or people with whom they are connected, and to the high-born or people
+of high repute, and so on: because all these things imply greatness and
+reputation.
+
+So then the Magnificent man is pretty much as I have described him, and
+Magnificence consists in such expenditures: because they are the
+greatest and most honourable: and of private ones such as come but once
+for all, marriage to wit, and things of that kind; and any occasion
+which engages the interest of the community in general, or of those who
+are in power; and what concerns receiving and despatching strangers;
+and gifts, and repaying gifts: because the Magnificent man is not apt
+to spend upon himself but on the public good, and gifts are pretty much
+in the same case as dedicatory offerings.
+
+It is characteristic also of the Magnificent man to furnish his house
+suitably to his wealth, for this also in a way reflects credit; and
+again, to spend rather upon such works as are of long duration, these
+being most honourable. And again, propriety in each case, because the
+same things are not suitable to gods and men, nor in a temple and a
+tomb. And again, in the case of expenditures, each must be great of its
+kind, and great expense on a great object is most magnificent, that is
+in any case what is great in these particular things.
+
+There is a difference too between greatness of a work and greatness of
+expenditure: for instance, a very beautiful ball or cup is magnificent
+as a present to a child, while the price of it is small and almost
+mean. Therefore it is characteristic of the Magnificent man to do
+magnificently whatever he is about: for whatever is of this kind cannot
+be easily surpassed, and bears a proper proportion to the expenditure.
+
+Such then is the Magnificent man.
+
+The man who is in the state of excess, called one of Vulgar Profusion,
+is in excess because he spends improperly, as has been said. I mean in
+cases requiring small expenditure he lavishes much and shows off out of
+taste; giving his club a feast fit for a wedding-party, or if he has to
+furnish a chorus for a comedy, giving the actors purple to wear in the
+first scene, as did the Megarians. And all such things he will do, not
+with a view to that which is really honourable, but to display his
+wealth, and because he thinks he shall be admired for these things; and
+he will spend little where he ought to spend much, and much where he
+should spend little.
+
+The Mean man will be deficient in every case, and even where he has
+spent the most he will spoil the whole effect for want of some trifle;
+he is procrastinating in all he does, and contrives how he may spend
+the least, and does even that with lamentations about the expense, and
+thinking that he does all things on a greater scale than he ought.
+
+Of course, both these states are faulty, but they do not involve
+disgrace because they are neither hurtful to others nor very unseemly.
+
+Chapter IV.
+
+The very name of Great-mindedness implies, that great things are its
+object-matter; and we will first settle what kind of things. It makes
+no difference, of course, whether we regard the moral state in the
+abstract or as exemplified in an individual.
+
+Well then, he is thought to be Great-minded who values himself highly
+and at the same time justly, because he that does so without grounds is
+foolish, and no virtuous character is foolish or senseless. Well, the
+character I have described is Great-minded. The man who estimates
+himself lowly, and at the same time justly, is modest; but not
+Great-minded, since this latter quality implies greatness, just as
+beauty implies a large bodily conformation while small people are neat
+and well made but not beautiful.
+
+Again, he who values himself highly without just grounds is a Vain man:
+though the name must not be applied to every case of unduly high
+self-estimation. He that values himself below his real worth is
+Small-minded, and whether that worth is great, moderate, or small, his
+own estimate falls below it. And he is the strongest case of this error
+who is really a man of great worth, for what would he have done had his
+worth been less?
+
+The Great-minded man is then, as far as greatness is concerned, at the
+summit, but in respect of propriety he is in the mean, because he
+estimates himself at his real value (the other characters respectively
+are in excess and defect). Since then he justly estimates himself at a
+high, or rather at the highest possible rate, his character will have
+respect specially to one thing: this term "rate" has reference of
+course to external goods: and of these we should assume that to be the
+greatest which we attribute to the gods, and which is the special
+object of desire to those who are in power, and which is the prize
+proposed to the most honourable actions: now honour answers to these
+descriptions, being the greatest of external goods. So the Great-minded
+man bears himself as he ought in respect of honour and dishonour. In
+fact, without need of words, the Great-minded plainly have honour for
+their object-matter: since honour is what the great consider themselves
+specially worthy of, and according to a certain rate.
+
+The Small-minded man is deficient, both as regards himself, and also as
+regards the estimation of the Great-minded: while the Vain man is in
+excess as regards himself, but does not get beyond the Great-minded
+man. Now the Great-minded man, being by the hypothesis worthy of the
+greatest things, must be of the highest excellence, since the better a
+man is the more is he worth, and he who is best is worth the most: it
+follows then, that to be truly Great-minded a man must be good, and
+whatever is great in each virtue would seem to belong to the
+Great-minded. It would no way correspond with the character of the
+Great-minded to flee spreading his hands all abroad; nor to injure any
+one; for with what object in view will he do what is base, in whose
+eyes nothing is great? in short, if one were to go into particulars,
+the Great-minded man would show quite ludicrously unless he were a good
+man: he would not be in fact deserving of honour if he were a bad man,
+honour being the prize of virtue and given to the good.
+
+This virtue, then, of Great-mindedness seems to be a kind of ornament
+of all the other virtues, in that it makes them better and cannot be
+without them; and for this reason it is a hard matter to be really and
+truly Great-minded; for it cannot be without thorough goodness and
+nobleness of character.
+
+Honour then and dishonour are specially the object-matter of the
+Great-minded man: and at such as is great, and given by good men, he
+will be pleased moderately as getting his own, or perhaps somewhat less
+for no honour can be quite adequate to perfect virtue: but still he
+will accept this because they have nothing higher to give him. But such
+as is given by ordinary people and on trifling grounds he will entirely
+despise, because these do not come up to his deserts: and dishonour
+likewise, because in his case there cannot be just ground for it.
+
+Now though, as I have said, honour is specially the object-matter of
+the Great-minded man, I do not mean but that likewise in respect of
+wealth and power, and good or bad fortune of every kind, he will bear
+himself with moderation, fall out how they may, and neither in
+prosperity will he be overjoyed nor in adversity will he be unduly
+pained. For not even in respect of honour does he so bear himself; and
+yet it is the greatest of all such objects, since it is the cause of
+power and wealth being choice-worthy, for certainly they who have them
+desire to receive honour through them. So to whom honour even is a
+small thing to him will all other things also be so; and this is why
+such men are thought to be supercilious.
+
+It seems too that pieces of good fortune contribute to form this
+character of Great-mindedness: I mean, the nobly born, or men of
+influence, or the wealthy, are considered to be entitled to honour, for
+they are in a position of eminence and whatever is eminent by good is
+more entitled to honour: and this is why such circumstances dispose men
+rather to Great-mindedness, because they receive honour at the hands of
+some men.
+
+Now really and truly the good man alone is entitled to honour; only if
+a man unites in himself goodness with these external advantages he is
+thought to be more entitled to honour: but they who have them without
+also having virtue are not justified in their high estimate of
+themselves, nor are they rightly denominated Great-minded; since
+perfect virtue is one of the indispensable conditions to such &
+character.
+
+Further, such men become supercilious and insolent, it not being easy
+to bear prosperity well without goodness; and not being able to bear
+it, and possessed with an idea of their own superiority to others, they
+despise them, and do just whatever their fancy prompts; for they mimic
+the Great-minded man, though they are not like him, and they do this in
+such points as they can, so without doing the actions which can only
+flow from real goodness they despise others. Whereas the Great-minded
+man despises on good grounds (for he forms his opinions truly), but the
+mass of men do it at random.
+
+Moreover, he is not a man to incur little risks, nor does he court
+danger, because there are but few things he has a value for; but he
+will incur great dangers, and when he does venture he is prodigal of
+his life as knowing that there are terms on which it is not worth his
+while to live. He is the sort of man to do kindnesses, but he is
+ashamed to receive them; the former putting a man in the position of
+superiority, the latter in that of inferiority; accordingly he will
+greatly overpay any kindness done to him, because the original actor
+will thus be laid under obligation and be in the position of the party
+benefited. Such men seem likewise to remember those they have done
+kindnesses to, but not those from whom they have received them: because
+he who has received is inferior to him who has done the kindness and
+our friend wishes to be superior; accordingly he is pleased to hear of
+his own kind acts but not of those done to himself (and this is why, in
+Homer, Thetis does not mention to Jupiter the kindnesses she had done
+him, nor did the Lacedæmonians to the Athenians but only the benefits
+they had received).
+
+Further, it is characteristic of the Great-minded man to ask favours
+not at all, or very reluctantly, but to do a service very readily; and
+to bear himself loftily towards the great or fortunate, but towards
+people of middle station affably; because to be above the former is
+difficult and so a grand thing, but to be above the latter is easy; and
+to be high and mighty towards the former is not ignoble, but to do it
+towards those of humble station would be low and vulgar; it would be
+like parading strength against the weak.
+
+And again, not to put himself in the way of honour, nor to go where
+others are the chief men; and to be remiss and dilatory, except in the
+case of some great honour or work; and to be concerned in few things,
+and those great and famous. It is a property of him also to be open,
+both in his dislikes and his likings, because concealment is a
+consequent of fear. Likewise to be careful for reality rather than
+appearance, and talk and act openly (for his contempt for others makes
+him a bold man, for which same reason he is apt to speak the truth,
+except where the principle of reserve comes in), but to be reserved
+towards the generality of men.
+
+And to be unable to live with reference to any other but a friend;
+because doing so is servile, as may be seen in that all flatterers are
+low and men in low estate are flatterers. Neither is his admiration
+easily excited, because nothing is great in his eyes; nor does he bear
+malice, since remembering anything, and specially wrongs, is no part of
+Great-mindedness, but rather overlooking them; nor does he talk of
+other men; in fact, he will not speak either of himself or of any
+other; he neither cares to be praised himself nor to have others
+blamed; nor again does he praise freely, and for this reason he is not
+apt to speak ill even of his enemies except to show contempt and
+insolence.
+
+And he is by no means apt to make laments about things which cannot be
+helped, or requests about those which are trivial; because to be thus
+disposed with respect to these things is consequent only upon real
+anxiety about them. Again, he is the kind of man to acquire what is
+beautiful and unproductive rather than what is productive and
+profitable: this being rather the part of an independent man.
+
+Also slow motion, deep-toned voice, and deliberate style of speech, are
+thought to be characteristic of the Great-minded man: for he who is
+earnest about few things is not likely to be in a hurry, nor he who
+esteems nothing great to be very intent: and sharp tones and quickness
+are the result of these.
+
+Chapter V.
+
+This then is my idea of the Great-minded man; and he who is in the
+defect is a Small-minded man, he who is in the excess a Vain man.
+However, as we observed in respect of the last character we discussed,
+these extremes are not thought to be vicious exactly, but only
+mistaken, for they do no harm.
+
+The Small-minded man, for instance, being really worthy of good
+deprives himself of his deserts, and seems to have somewhat faulty from
+not having a sufficiently high estimate of his own desert, in fact from
+self-ignorance: because, but for this, he would have grasped after what
+he really is entitled to, and that is good. Still such characters are
+not thought to be foolish, but rather laggards. But the having such an
+opinion of themselves seems to have a deteriorating effect on the
+character: because in all cases men's aims are regulated by their
+supposed desert, and thus these men, under a notion of their own want
+of desert, stand aloof from honourable actions and courses, and
+similarly from external goods.
+
+But the Vain are foolish and self-ignorant, and that palpably: because
+they attempt honourable things, as though they were worthy, and then
+they are detected. They also set themselves off, by dress, and
+carriage, and such-like things, and desire that their good
+circumstances may be seen, and they talk of them under the notion of
+receiving honour thereby. Small-mindedness rather than Vanity is
+opposed to Great-mindedness, because it is more commonly met with and
+is worse.
+
+Chapter VI.
+
+Well, the virtue of Great-mindedness has for its object great Honour,
+as we have said: and there seems to be a virtue having Honour also for
+its object (as we stated in the former book), which may seem to bear to
+Great-mindedness the same relation that Liberality does to
+Magnificence: that is, both these virtues stand aloof from what is
+great but dispose us as we ought to be disposed towards moderate and
+small matters. Further: as in giving and receiving of wealth there is a
+mean state, an excess, and a defect, so likewise in grasping after
+Honour there is the more or less than is right, and also the doing so
+from right sources and in right manner.
+
+For we blame the lover of Honour as aiming at Honour more than he
+ought, and from wrong sources; and him who is destitute of a love of
+Honour as not choosing to be honoured even for what is noble. Sometimes
+again we praise the lover of Honour as manly and having a love for what
+is noble, and him who has no love for it as being moderate and modest
+(as we noticed also in the former discussion of these virtues).
+
+It is clear then that since "Lover of so and so" is a term capable of
+several meanings, we do not always denote the same quality by the term
+"Lover of Honour;" but when we use it as a term of commendation we
+denote more than the mass of men are; when for blame more than a man
+should be.
+
+And the mean state having no proper name the extremes seem to dispute
+for it as unoccupied ground: but of course where there is excess and
+defect there must be also the mean. And in point of fact, men do grasp
+at Honour more than they should, and less, and sometimes just as they
+ought; for instance, this state is praised, being a mean state in
+regard of Honour, but without any appropriate name. Compared with what
+is called Ambition it shows like a want of love for Honour, and
+compared with this it shows like Ambition, or compared with both, like
+both faults: nor is this a singular case among the virtues. Here the
+extreme characters appear to be opposed, because the mean has no name
+appropriated to it.
+
+Chapter VII.
+
+Meekness is a mean state, having for its object-matter Anger: and as
+the character in the mean has no name, and we may almost say the same
+of the extremes, we give the name of Meekness (leaning rather to the
+defect, which has no name either) to the character in the mean.
+
+The excess may be called an over-aptness to Anger: for the passion is
+Anger, and the producing causes many and various. Now he who is angry
+at what and with whom he ought, and further, in right manner and time,
+and for proper length of time, is praised, so this Man will be Meek
+since Meekness is praised. For the notion represented by the term Meek
+man is the being imperturbable, and not being led away by passion, but
+being angry in that manner, and at those things, and for that length of
+time, which Reason may direct. This character however is thought to err
+rather on the side of defect, inasmuch as he is not apt to take revenge
+but rather to make allowances and forgive. And the defect, call it
+Angerlessness or what you will, is blamed: I mean, they who are not
+angry at things at which they ought to be angry are thought to be
+foolish, and they who are angry not in right manner, nor in right time,
+nor with those with whom they ought; for a man who labours under this
+defect is thought to have no perception, nor to be pained, and to have
+no tendency to avenge himself, inasmuch as he feels no anger: now to
+bear with scurrility in one's own person, and patiently see one's own
+friends suffer it, is a slavish thing.
+
+As for the excess, it occurs in all forms; men are angry with those
+with whom, and at things with which, they ought not to be, and more
+than they ought, and too hastily, and for too great a length of time. I
+do not mean, however, that these are combined in any one person: that
+would in fact be impossible, because the evil destroys itself, and if
+it is developed in its full force it becomes unbearable.
+
+Now those whom we term the Passionate are soon angry, and with people
+with whom and at things at which they ought not, and in an excessive
+degree, but they soon cool again, which is the best point about them.
+And this results from their not repressing their anger, but repaying
+their enemies (in that they show their feeings by reason of their
+vehemence), and then they have done with it.
+
+The Choleric again are excessively vehement, and are angry at
+everything, and on every occasion; whence comes their Greek name
+signifying that their choler lies high.
+
+The Bitter-tempered are hard to reconcile and keep their anger for a
+long while, because they repress the feeling: but when they have
+revenged themselves then comes a lull; for the vengeance destroys their
+anger by producing pleasure in lieu of pain. But if this does not
+happen they keep the weight on their minds: because, as it does not
+show itself, no one attempts to reason it away, and digesting anger
+within one's self takes time. Such men are very great nuisances to
+themselves and to their best friends.
+
+Again, we call those Cross-grained who are angry at wrong objects, and
+in excessive degree, and for too long a time, and who are not appeased
+without vengeance or at least punishing the offender.
+
+To Meekness we oppose the excess rather than the defect, because it is
+of more common occurrence: for human nature is more disposed to take
+than to forgo revenge. And the Cross-grained are worse to live with
+[than they who are too phlegmatic].
+
+Now, from what has been here said, that is also plain which was said
+before. I mean, it is no easy matter to define how, and with what
+persons, and at what kind of things, and how long one ought to be
+angry, and up to what point a person is right or is wrong. For he that
+transgresses the strict rule only a little, whether on the side of too
+much or too little, is not blamed: sometimes we praise those who are
+deficient in the feeling and call them Meek, sometimes we call the
+irritable Spirited as being well qualified for government. So it is not
+easy to lay down, in so many words, for what degree or kind of
+transgression a man is blameable: because the decision is in
+particulars, and rests therefore with the Moral Sense. Thus much,
+however, is plain, that the mean state is praiseworthy, in virtue of
+which we are angry with those with whom, and at those things with
+which, we ought to be angry, and in right manner, and so on; while the
+excesses and defects are blameable, slightly so if only slight, more so
+if greater, and when considerable very blameable.
+
+It is clear, therefore, that the mean state is what we are to hold to.
+
+This then is to be taken as our account of the various moral states
+which have Anger for their object-matter.
+
+Chapter VIII.
+
+Next, as regards social intercourse and interchange of words and acts,
+some men are thought to be Over-Complaisant who, with a view solely to
+giving pleasure, agree to everything and never oppose, but think their
+line is to give no pain to those they are thrown amongst: they, on the
+other hand, are called Cross and Contentious who take exactly the
+contrary line to these, and oppose in everything, and have no care at
+all whether they give pain or not.
+
+Now it is quite clear of course, that the states I have named are
+blameable, and that the mean between them is praiseworthy, in virtue of
+which a man will let pass what he ought as he ought, and also will
+object in like manner. However, this state has no name appropriated,
+but it is most like Friendship; since the man who exhibits it is just
+the kind of man whom we would call the amiable friend, with the
+addition of strong earnest affection; but then this is the very point
+in which it differs from Friendship, that it is quite independent of
+any feeling or strong affection for those among whom the man mixes: I
+mean, that he takes everything as he ought, not from any feeling of
+love or hatred, but simply because his natural disposition leads him to
+do so; he will do it alike to those whom he does know and those whom he
+does not, and those with whom he is intimate and those with whom he is
+not; only in each case as propriety requires, because it is not fitting
+to care alike for intimates and strangers, nor again to pain them
+alike.
+
+It has been stated in a general way that his social intercourse will be
+regulated by propriety, and his aim will be to avoid giving pain and to
+contribute to pleasure, but with a constant reference to what is noble
+and expedient.
+
+His proper object-matter seems to be the pleasures and pains which
+arise out of social intercourse, but whenever it is not honourable or
+even hurtful to him to contribute to pleasure, in these instances he
+will run counter and prefer to give pain.
+
+Or if the things in question involve unseemliness to the doer, and this
+not inconsiderable, or any harm, whereas his opposition will cause some
+little pain, here he will not agree but will run counter.
+
+Again, he will regulate differently his intercourse with great men and
+with ordinary men, and with all people according to the knowledge he
+has of them; and in like manner, taking in any other differences which
+may exist, giving to each his due, and in itself preferring to give
+pleasure and cautious not to give pain, but still guided by the
+results, I mean by what is noble and expedient according as they
+preponderate.
+
+Again, he will inflict trifling pain with a view to consequent
+pleasure.
+
+Well, the man bearing the mean character is pretty well such as I have
+described him, but he has no name appropriated to him: of those who try
+to give pleasure, the man who simply and disinterestedly tries to be
+agreeable is called Over-Complaisant, he who does it with a view to
+secure some profit in the way of wealth, or those things which wealth
+may procure, is a Flatterer: I have said before, that the man who is
+"always non-content" is Cross and Contentious. Here the extremes have
+the appearance of being opposed to one another, because the mean has no
+appropriate name.
+
+Chapter IX.
+
+The mean state which steers clear of Exaggeration has pretty much the
+same object-matter as the last we described, and likewise has no name
+appropriated to it. Still it may be as well to go over these states:
+because, in the first place, by a particular discussion of each we
+shall be better acquainted with the general subject of moral character,
+and next we shall be the more convinced that the virtues are mean
+states by seeing that this is universally the case.
+
+In respect then of living in society, those who carry on this
+intercourse with a view to pleasure and pain have been already spoken
+of; we will now go on to speak of those who are True or False, alike in
+their words and deeds and in the claims which they advance.
+
+Now the Exaggerator is thought to have a tendency to lay claim to
+things reflecting credit on him, both when they do not belong to him at
+all and also in greater degree than that in which they really do:
+whereas the Reserved man, on the contrary, denies those which really
+belong to him or else depreciates them, while the mean character being
+a Plain-matter-of-fact person is Truthful in life and word, admitting
+the existence of what does really belong to him and making it neither
+greater nor less than the truth.
+
+It is possible of course to take any of these lines either with or
+without some further view: but in general men speak, and act, and live,
+each according to his particular character and disposition, unless
+indeed a man is acting from any special motive.
+
+Now since falsehood is in itself low and blameable, while truth is
+noble and praiseworthy, it follows that the Truthful man (who is also
+in the mean) is praiseworthy, and the two who depart from strict truth
+are both blameable, but especially the Exaggerator.
+
+We will now speak of each, and first of the Truthful man: I call him
+Truthful, because we are not now meaning the man who is true in his
+agreements nor in such matters as amount to justice or injustice (this
+would come within the province of a different virtue), but, in such as
+do not involve any such serious difference as this, the man we are
+describing is true in life and word simply because he is in a certain
+moral state.
+
+And he that is such must be judged to be a good man: for he that has a
+love for Truth as such, and is guided by it in matters indifferent,
+will be so likewise even more in such as are not indifferent; for
+surely he will have a dread of falsehood as base, since he shunned it
+even in itself: and he that is of such a character is praiseworthy, yet
+he leans rather to that which is below the truth, this having an
+appearance of being in better taste because exaggerations are so
+hateful.
+
+As for the man who lays claim to things above what really belongs to
+him _without_ any special motive, he is like a base man because he
+would not otherwise have taken pleasure in falsehood, but he shows as a
+fool rather than as a knave. But if a man does this _with_ a special
+motive, suppose for honour or glory, as the Braggart does, then he is
+not so very blameworthy, but if, directly or indirectly, for pecuniary
+considerations, he is more unseemly.
+
+Now the Braggart is such not by his power but by his purpose, that is
+to say, in virtue of his moral state, and because he is a man of a
+certain kind; just as there are liars who take pleasure in falsehood
+for its own sake while others lie from a desire of glory or gain. They
+who exaggerate with a view to glory pretend to such qualities as are
+followed by praise or highest congratulation; they who do it with a
+view to gain assume those which their neighbours can avail themselves
+of, and the absence of which can be concealed, as a man's being a
+skilful soothsayer or physician; and accordingly most men pretend to
+such things and exaggerate in this direction, because the faults I have
+mentioned are in them.
+
+The Reserved, who depreciate their own qualities, have the appearance
+of being more refined in their characters, because they are not thought
+to speak with a view to gain but to avoid grandeur: one very common
+trait in such characters is their denying common current opinions, as
+Socrates used to do. There are people who lay claim falsely to small
+things and things the falsity of their pretensions to which is obvious;
+these are called Factotums and are very despicable.
+
+This very Reserve sometimes shows like Exaggeration; take, for
+instance, the excessive plainness of dress affected by the
+Lacedæmonians: in fact, both excess and the extreme of deficiency
+partake of the nature of Exaggeration. But they who practise Reserve in
+moderation, and in cases in which the truth is not very obvious and
+plain, give an impression of refinement. Here it is the Exaggerator (as
+being the worst character) who appears to be opposed to the Truthful
+Man.
+
+Chapter X.
+
+Next, as life has its pauses and in them admits of pastime combined
+with Jocularity, it is thought that in this respect also there is a
+kind of fitting intercourse, and that rules may be prescribed as to the
+kind of things one should say and the manner of saying them; and in
+respect of hearing likewise (and there will be a difference between the
+saying and hearing such and such things). It is plain that in regard to
+these things also there will be an excess and defect and a mean.
+
+Now they who exceed in the ridiculous are judged to be Buffoons and
+Vulgar, catching at it in any and every way and at any cost, and aiming
+rather at raising laughter than at saying what is seemly and at
+avoiding to pain the object of their wit. They, on the other hand, who
+would not for the world make a joke themselves and are displeased with
+such as do are thought to be Clownish and Stern. But they who are
+Jocular in good taste are denominated by a Greek term expressing
+properly ease of movement, because such are thought to be, as one may
+say, motions of the moral character; and as bodies are judged of by
+their motions so too are moral characters.
+
+Now as the ridiculous lies on the surface, and the majority of men take
+more pleasure than they ought in Jocularity and Jesting, the Buffoons
+too get this name of Easy Pleasantry, as if refined and gentlemanlike;
+but that they differ from these, and considerably too, is plain from
+what has been said.
+
+One quality which belongs to the mean state is Tact: it is
+characteristic of a man of Tact to say and listen to such things as are
+fit for a good man and a gentleman to say and listen to: for there are
+things which are becoming for such a one to say and listen to in the
+way of Jocularity, and there is a difference between the Jocularity of
+the Gentleman and that of the Vulgarian; and again, between that of the
+educated and uneducated man. This you may see from a comparison of the
+Old and New Comedy: in the former obscene talk made the fun; in the
+latter it is rather innuendo: and this is no slight difference _as
+regards decency_.
+
+Well then, are we to characterise him who jests well by his saying what
+is becoming a gentleman, or by his avoiding to pain the object of his
+wit, or even by his giving him pleasure? or will not such a definition
+be vague, since different things are hateful and pleasant to different
+men?
+
+Be this as it may, whatever he says such things will he also listen to,
+since it is commonly held that a man will do what he will bear to hear:
+this must, however, be limited; a man will not do quite all that he
+will hear: because jesting is a species of scurrility and there are
+some points of scurrility forbidden by law; it may be certain points of
+jesting should have been also so forbidden. So then the refined and
+gentlemanlike man will bear himself thus as being a law to himself.
+Such is the mean character, whether denominated the man of Tact or of
+Easy Pleasantry.
+
+But the Buffoon cannot resist the ridiculous, sparing neither himself
+nor any one else so that he can but raise his laugh, saying things of
+such kind as no man of refinement would say and some which he would not
+even tolerate if said by others in his hearing.
+
+The Clownish man is for such intercourse wholly useless: inasmuch as
+contributing nothing jocose of his own he is savage with all who do.
+
+Yet some pause and amusement in life are generally judged to be
+indispensable.
+
+The three mean states which have been described do occur in life, and
+the object-matter of all is interchange of words and deeds. They
+differ, in that one of them is concerned with truth, and the other two
+with the pleasurable: and of these two again, the one is conversant
+with the jocosities of life, the other with all other points of social
+intercourse.
+
+Chapter XI.
+
+To speak of Shame as a Virtue is incorrect, because it is much more
+like a feeling than a moral state. It is defined, we know, to be "a
+kind of fear of disgrace," and its effects are similar to those of the
+fear of danger, for they who feel Shame grow red and they who fear
+death turn pale. So both are evidently in a way physical, which is
+thought to be a mark of a feeling rather than a moral state.
+
+Moreover, it is a feeling not suitable to every age, but only to youth:
+we do think that the young should be Shamefaced, because since they
+live at the beck and call of passion they do much that is wrong and
+Shame acts on them as a check. In fact, we praise such young men as are
+Shamefaced, but no one would ever praise an old man for being given to
+it, inasmuch as we hold that he ought not to do things which cause
+Shame; for Shame, since it arises at low bad actions, does not at all
+belong to the good man, because such ought not to be done at all: nor
+does it make any difference to allege that some things are disgraceful
+really, others only because they are thought so; for neither should be
+done, so that a man ought not to be in the position of feeling Shame.
+In truth, to be such a man as to do anything disgraceful is the part of
+a faulty character. And for a man to be such that he would feel Shame
+if he should do anything disgraceful, and to think that this
+constitutes him a good man, is absurd: because Shame is felt at
+voluntary actions only, and a good man will never voluntarily do what
+is base.
+
+True it is, that Shame may be good on a certain supposition, as "if a
+man should do such things, he would feel Shame:" but then the Virtues
+are good in themselves, and not merely in supposed cases. And, granted
+that impudence and the not being ashamed to do what is disgraceful is
+base, it does not the more follow that it is good for a man to do such
+things and feel Shame.
+
+Nor is Self-Control properly a Virtue, but a kind of mixed state:
+however, all about this shall be set forth in a future Book.
+
+BOOK V
+
+Chapter I.
+
+Now the points for our enquiry in respect of Justice and Injustice are,
+what kind of actions are their object-matter, and what kind of a mean
+state Justice is, and between what points the abstract principle of it,
+i.e. the Just, is a mean. And our enquiry shall be, if you please,
+conducted in the same method as we have observed in the foregoing parts
+of this Treatise.
+
+We see then that all men mean by the term Justice a moral state such
+that in consequence of it men have the capacity of doing what is just,
+and actually do it, and wish it:[1] similarly also with respect to
+Injustice, a moral state such that in consequence of it men do unjustly
+and wish what is unjust: let us also be content then with these as a
+ground-work sketched out.
+
+I mention the two, because the same does not hold with regard to States
+whether of mind or body as with regard to Sciences or Faculties: I mean
+that whereas it is thought that the same Faculty or Science embraces
+contraries, a State will not: from health, for instance, not the
+contrary acts are done but the healthy ones only; we say a man walks
+healthily when he walks as the healthy man would.
+
+However, of the two contrary states the one may be frequently known
+from the other, and oftentimes the states from their subject-matter: if
+it be seen clearly what a good state of body is, then is it also seen
+what a bad state is, and from the things which belong to a good state
+of body the good state itself is seen, and _vice versâ_. If, for
+instance, the good state is firmness of flesh it follows that the bad
+state is flabbiness of flesh; and whatever causes firmness of flesh is
+connected with the good state.
+
+It follows moreover in general,[2] that if of two contrary terms the
+one is used in many senses so also will the other be; as, for instance,
+if "the Just," then also "the Unjust." Now Justice and Injustice do
+seem to be used respectively in many senses, but, because the line of
+demarcation between these is very fine and minute,[3] it commonly
+escapes notice that they are thus used, and it is not plain and
+manifest as where the various significations of terms are widely
+different for in these last the visible difference is great, for
+instance, the word κλεὶς is used equivocally to denote the bone which
+is under the neck of animals and the instrument with which people close
+doors.
+
+Let it be ascertained then in how many senses the term "Unjust man" is
+used. Well, he who violates the law, and he who is a grasping man, and
+the unequal man, are all thought to be Unjust and so manifestly the
+Just man will be, the man who acts according to law, and the equal man
+"The Just" then will be the lawful and the equal, and "the Unjust" the
+unlawful and the unequal.
+
+Well, since the Unjust man is also a grasping man, he will be so, of
+course, with respect to good things, but not of every kind, only those
+which are the subject-matter of good and bad fortune and which are in
+themselves always good but not always to the individual.[4] Yet men
+pray for and pursue these things: this they should not do but pray that
+things which are in the abstract good may be so also to them, and
+choose what is good for themselves.
+
+But the Unjust man does not always choose actually the greater part,
+but even sometimes the less; as in the case of things which are simply
+evil: still, since the less evil is thought to be in a manner a good
+and the grasping is after good, therefore even in this case he is
+thought to be a grasping man, _i.e._ one who strives for more good than
+fairly falls to his share: of course he is also an unequal man, this
+being an inclusive and common term.
+
+Chapter II.
+
+We said that the violator of Law is Unjust, and the keeper of the Law
+Just: further, it is plain that all Lawful things are in a manner Just,
+because by Lawful we understand what have been defined by the
+legislative power and each of these we say is Just. The Laws too give
+directions on all points, aiming either at the common good of all, or
+that of the best, or that of those in power (taking for the standard
+real goodness or adopting some other estimate); in one way we mean by
+Just, those things which are apt to produce and preserve happiness and
+its ingredients for the social community.
+
+Further, the Law commands the doing the deeds not only of the brave man
+(as not leaving the ranks, nor flying, nor throwing away one's arms),
+but those also of the perfectly self-mastering man, as abstinence from
+adultery and wantonness; and those of the meek man, as refraining from
+striking others or using abusive language: and in like manner in
+respect of the other virtues and vices commanding some things and
+forbidding others, rightly if it is a good law, in a way somewhat
+inferior if it is one extemporised.
+
+Now this Justice is in fact perfect Virtue, yet not simply so but as
+exercised towards one's neighbour: and for this reason Justice is
+thought oftentimes to be the best of the Virtues, and
+
+"neither Hesper nor the Morning-star
+So worthy of our admiration:"
+
+and in a proverbial saying we express the same;
+
+"All virtue is in Justice comprehended."
+
+And it is in a special sense perfect Virtue because it is the practice
+of perfect Virtue. And perfect it is because he that has it is able to
+practise his virtue towards his neighbour and not merely on himself; I
+mean, there are many who can practise virtue in the regulation of their
+own personal conduct who are wholly unable to do it in transactions
+with their neighbour. And for this reason that saying of Bias is
+thought to be a good one,
+
+"Rule will show what a man is;"
+
+for he who bears Rule is necessarily in contact with others, i.e. in a
+community. And for this same reason Justice alone of all the Virtues is
+thought to be a good to others, because it has immediate relation to
+some other person, inasmuch as the Just man does what is advantageous
+to another, either to his ruler or fellow-subject. Now he is the basest
+of men who practises vice not only in his own person,[5] but towards
+his friends also; but he the best who practises virtue not merely in
+his own person but towards his neighbour, for this is a matter of some
+difficulty.
+
+However, Justice in this sense is not a part of Virtue but is
+co-extensive with Virtue; nor is the Injustice which answers to it a
+part of Vice but co-extensive with Vice. Now wherein Justice in this
+sense differs from Virtue appears from what has been said: it is the
+same really, but the point of view is not the same: in so far as it has
+respect to one's neighbour it is Justice, in so far as it is such and
+such a moral state it is simply Virtue.
+
+Chapter III.
+
+But the object of our enquiry is Justice, in the sense in which it is a
+part of Virtue (for there is such a thing, as we commonly say), and
+likewise with respect to particular Injustice. And of the existence of
+this last the following consideration is a proof: there are many vices
+by practising which a man acts unjustly, of course, but does not grasp
+at more than his share of good; if, for instance, by reason of
+cowardice he throws away his shield, or by reason of ill-temper he uses
+abusive language, or by reason of stinginess does not give a friend
+pecuniary assistance; but whenever he does a grasping action, it is
+often in the way of none of these vices, certainly not in all of them,
+still in the way of some vice or other (for we blame him), and in the
+way of Injustice. There is then some kind of Injustice distinct from
+that co-extensive with Vice and related to it as a part to a whole, and
+some "Unjust" related to that which is co-extensive with violation of
+the law as a part to a whole.
+
+Again, suppose one man seduces a man's wife with a view to gain and
+actually gets some advantage by it,[6] and another does the same from
+impulse of lust, at an expense of money and damage; this latter will be
+thought to be rather destitute of self-mastery than a grasping man, and
+the former Unjust but not destitute of self-mastery: now why? plainly
+because of his gaining.
+
+Again, all other acts of Injustice we refer to some particular
+depravity, as, if a man commits adultery, to abandonment to his
+passions; if he deserts his comrade, to cowardice; if he strikes
+another, to anger: but if he gains by the act to no other vice than to
+Injustice.
+
+Thus it is clear that there is a kind of Injustice different from and
+besides that which includes all Vice, having the same name because the
+definition is in the same genus; for both have their force in dealings
+with others, but the one acts upon honour, or wealth, or safety, or by
+whatever one name we can include all these things, and is actuated by
+pleasure attendant on gain, while the other acts upon all things which
+constitute the sphere of the good man's action.
+
+Chapter IV.
+
+Now that there is more than one kind of Justice, and that there is one
+which is distinct from and besides that which is co-extensive with,
+Virtue, is plain: we must next ascertain what it is, and what are its
+characteristics.
+
+Well, the Unjust has been divided into the unlawful and the unequal,
+and the Just accordingly into the lawful and the equal: the
+aforementioned Injustice is in the way of the unlawful. And as the
+unequal and the more[7] are not the same, but differing as part to
+whole (because all more is unequal, but not all unequal more), so the
+Unjust and the Injustice we are now in search of are not the same with,
+but other than, those before mentioned, the one being the parts, the
+other the wholes; for this particular Injustice is a part of the
+Injustice co-extensive with Vice, and likewise this Justice of the
+Justice co-extensive with Virtue. So that what we have now to speak of
+is the particular Justice and Injustice, and likewise the particular
+Just and Unjust.
+
+Here then let us dismiss any further consideration of the Justice
+ranking as co-extensive with Virtue (being the practice of Virtue in
+all its bearings towards others), and of the co-relative Injustice
+(being similarly the practice of Vice). It is clear too, that we must
+separate off the Just and the Unjust involved in these: because one may
+pretty well say that most lawful things are those which naturally
+result in action from Virtue in its fullest sense, because the law
+enjoins the living in accordance with each Virtue and forbids living in
+accordance with each Vice. And the producing causes of Virtue in all
+its bearings are those enactments which have been made respecting
+education for society.
+
+By the way, as to individual education, in respect of which a man is
+simply good without reference to others, whether it is the province of
+πολιτικὴ or some other science we must determine at a future time: for
+it may be it is not the same thing to be a good man and a good citizen
+in every case.[8]
+
+Chapter V.
+
+Now of the Particular Justice, and the Just involved in it, one species
+is that which is concerned in the distributions of honour, or wealth,
+or such other things as are to be shared among the members of the
+social community (because in these one man as compared with another may
+have either an equal or an unequal share), and the other is that which
+is Corrective in the various transactions between man and man.
+
+And of this latter there are two parts: because of transactions some
+are voluntary and some involuntary; voluntary, such as follow; selling,
+buying, use, bail, borrowing, deposit, hiring: and this class is called
+voluntary because the origination of these transactions is voluntary.
+
+The involuntary again are either such as effect secrecy; as theft,
+adultery, poisoning, pimping, kidnapping of slaves, assassination,
+false witness; or accompanied with open violence; as insult, bonds,
+death, plundering, maiming, foul language, slanderous abuse.
+
+Chapter VI.
+
+Well, the unjust man we have said is unequal, and the abstract "Unjust"
+unequal: further, it is plain that there is some mean of the unequal,
+that is to say, the equal or exact half (because in whatever action
+there is the greater and the less there is also the equal, i.e. the
+exact half). If then the Unjust is unequal the Just is equal, which all
+must allow without further proof: and as the equal is a mean the Just
+must be also a mean. Now the equal implies two terms at least: it
+follows then that the Just is both a mean and equal, and these to
+certain persons; and, in so far as it is a mean, between certain things
+(that is, the greater and the less), and, so far as it is equal,
+between two, and in so far as it is just it is so to certain persons.
+The Just then must imply four terms at least, for those[9]  to which it
+is just are two, and the terms representing the things are two.
+
+And there will be the same equality between the terms representing the
+persons, as between those representing the things: because as the
+latter are to one another so are the former: for if the persons are not
+equal they must not have equal shares; in fact this is the very source
+of all the quarrelling and wrangling in the world, when either they who
+are equal have and get awarded to them things not equal, or being not
+equal those things which are equal. Again, the necessity of this
+equality of ratios is shown by the common phrase "according to rate,"
+for all agree that the Just in distributions ought to be according to
+some rate: but what that rate is to be, all do not agree; the democrats
+are for freedom, oligarchs for wealth, others for nobleness of birth,
+and the aristocratic party for virtue.
+
+The Just, then, is a certain proportionable thing. For proportion does
+not apply merely to number in the abstract,[10] but to number
+generally, since it is equality of ratios, and implies four terms at
+least (that this is the case in what may be called discrete proportion
+is plain and obvious, but it is true also in continual proportion, for
+this uses the one term as two, and mentions it twice; thus A:B:C may be
+expressed A:B::B:C. In the first, B is named twice; and so, if, as in
+the second, B is actually written twice, the proportionals will be
+four): and the Just likewise implies four terms at the least, and the
+ratio between the two pair of terms is the same, because the persons
+and the things are divided similarly. It will stand then thus,
+A:B::C:D, and then permutando A:C::B:D, and then (supposing C and D to
+represent the things) A+C:B+D::A:B. The distribution in fact consisting
+in putting together these terms thus: and if they are put together so
+as to preserve this same ratio, the distribution puts them together
+justly.[11] So then the joining together of the first and third and
+second and fourth proportionals is the Just in the distribution, and
+this Just is the mean relatively to that which violates the
+proportionate, for the proportionate is a mean and the Just is
+proportionate. Now mathematicians call this kind of proportion
+geometrical: for in geometrical proportion the whole is to the whole as
+each part to each part. Furthermore this proportion is not continual,
+because the person and thing do not make up one term.
+
+The Just then is this proportionate, and the Unjust that which violates
+the proportionate; and so there comes to be the greater and the less:
+which in fact is the case in actual transactions, because he who acts
+unjustly has the greater share and he who is treated unjustly has the
+less of what is good: but in the case of what is bad this is reversed:
+for the less evil compared with the greater comes to be reckoned for
+good, because the less evil is more choice-worthy than the greater, and
+what is choice-worthy is good, and the more so the greater good.
+
+This then is the one species of the Just.
+
+Chapter VII.
+
+And the remaining one is the Corrective, which arises in voluntary as
+well as involuntary transactions. Now this just has a different form
+from the aforementioned; for that which is concerned in distribution of
+common property is always according to the aforementioned proportion: I
+mean that, if the division is made out of common property, the shares
+will bear the same proportion to one another as the original
+contributions did: and the Unjust which is opposite to this Just is
+that which violates the proportionate.
+
+But the Just which arises in transactions between men is an equal in a
+certain sense, and the Unjust an unequal, only not in the way of that
+proportion but of arithmetical.[12] Because it makes no difference
+whether a robbery, for instance, is committed by a good man on a bad or
+by a bad man on a good, nor whether a good or a bad man has committed
+adultery: the law looks only to the difference created by the injury
+and treats the men as previously equal, where the one does and the
+other suffers injury, or the one has done and the other suffered harm.
+And so this Unjust, being unequal, the judge endeavours to reduce to
+equality again, because really when the one party has been wounded and
+the other has struck him, or the one kills and the other dies, the
+suffering and the doing are divided into unequal shares; well, the
+judge tries to restore equality by penalty, thereby taking from the
+gain.
+
+For these terms gain and loss are applied to these cases, though
+perhaps the term in some particular instance may not be strictly
+proper, as gain, for instance, to the man who has given a blow, and
+loss to him who has received it: still, when the suffering has been
+estimated, the one is called loss and the other gain.
+
+And so the equal is a mean between the more and the less, which
+represent gain and loss in contrary ways (I mean, that the more of good
+and the less of evil is gain, the less of good and the more of evil is
+loss): between which the equal was stated to be a mean, which equal we
+say is Just: and so the Corrective Just must be the mean between loss
+and gain. And this is the reason why, upon a dispute arising, men have
+recourse to the judge: going to the judge is in fact going to the Just,
+for the judge is meant to be the personification of the Just.[13] And
+men seek a judge as one in the mean, which is expressed in a name given
+by some to judges (μεσίδιοι, or middle-men) under the notion that if
+they can hit on the mean they shall hit on the Just. The Just is then
+surely a mean since the judge is also.
+
+So it is the office of a judge to make things equal, and the line, as
+it were, having been unequally divided, he takes from the greater part
+that by which it exceeds the half, and adds this on to the less. And
+when the whole is divided into two exactly equal portions then men say
+they have their own, when they have gotten the equal; and the equal is
+a mean between the greater and the less according to arithmetical
+equality.
+
+This, by the way, accounts for the etymology of the term by which we in
+Greek express the ideas of Just and Judge; (δίκαιον quasi δίχαιον, that
+is in two parts, and δικάστης quasi διχάστης, he who divides into two
+parts). For when from one of two equal magnitudes somewhat has been
+taken and added to the other, this latter exceeds the former by twice
+that portion: if it had been merely taken from the former and not added
+to the latter, then the latter would have exceeded the former only by
+that one portion; but in the other case, the greater exceeds the mean
+by one, and the mean exceeds also by one that magnitude from which the
+portion was taken. By this illustration, then, we obtain a rule to
+determine what one ought to take from him who has the greater, and what
+to add to him who has the less. The excess of the mean over the less
+must be added to the less, and the excess of the greater over the mean
+be taken from the greater.
+
+Thus let there be three straight lines equal to one another. From one
+of them cut off a portion, and add as much to another of them. The
+whole line thus made will exceed the remainder of the first-named line,
+by twice the portion added, and will exceed the untouched line by that
+portion.[14] And these terms loss and gain are derived from voluntary
+exchange: that is to say, the having more than what was one's own is
+called gaining, and the having less than one's original stock is called
+losing; for instance, in buying or selling, or any other transactions
+which are guaranteed by law: but when the result is neither more nor
+less, but exactly the same as there was originally,[15] people say they
+have their own, and neither lose nor gain.
+
+So then the Just we have been speaking of is a mean between loss and
+gain arising in involuntary transactions; that is, it is the having the
+same after the transaction as one had before it took place.
+
+Chapter VIII.
+
+There are people who have a notion that Reciprocation is simply just,
+as the Pythagoreans said: for they defined the Just simply and without
+qualification as "That which reciprocates with another." But this
+simple Reciprocation will not fit on either to the Distributive Just,
+or the Corrective (and yet this is the interpretation they put on the
+Rhadamanthian rule of Just,
+
+If a man should suffer what he hath done, then there would be
+straightforward justice;")
+
+for in many cases differences arise: as, for instance, suppose one in
+authority has struck a man, he is not to be struck in turn; or if a man
+has struck one in authority, he must not only be struck but punished
+also.[16] And again, the voluntariness or involuntariness of actions
+makes a great difference.
+
+But in dealings of exchange such a principle of Justice as this
+Reciprocation forms the bond of union, but then it must be
+Reciprocation according to proportion and not exact equality, because
+by proportionate reciprocity of action the social community is held
+together, For either Reciprocation of evil is meant, and if this be not
+allowed it is thought to be a servile condition of things: or else
+Reciprocation of good, and if this be not effected then there is no
+admission to participation which is the very bond of their union.
+
+And this is the moral of placing the Temple of the Graces (χάριτες) in
+the public streets; to impress the notion that there may be requital,
+this being peculiar to χάρις[17] because a man ought to requite with a
+good turn the man who has done him a favour and then to become himself
+the originator of another χάρις, by doing him a favour.
+
+Now the acts of mutual giving in due proportion may be represented by
+the diameters of a parallelogram, at the four angles of which the
+parties and their wares are so placed that the side connecting the
+parties be opposite to that connecting the wares, and each party be
+connected by one side with his own ware, as in the accompanying
+diagram.
+
+ [Illustration]
+
+The builder is to receive from the shoemaker of his ware, and to give
+him of his own: if then there be first proportionate equality, and
+_then_ the Reciprocation takes place, there will be the just result
+which we are speaking of: if not, there is not the equal, nor will the
+connection stand: for there is no reason why the ware of the one may
+not be better than that of the other, and therefore before the exchange
+is made they must have been equalised. And this is so also in the other
+arts: for they would have been destroyed entirely if there were not a
+correspondence in point of quantity and quality between the producer
+and the consumer. For, we must remember, no dealing arises between two
+of the same kind, two physicians, for instance; but say between a
+physician and agriculturist, or, to state it generally, between those
+who are different and not equal, but these of course must have been
+equalised before the exchange can take place.
+
+It is therefore indispensable that all things which can be exchanged
+should be capable of comparison, and for this purpose money has come
+in, and comes to be a kind of medium, for it measures all things and so
+likewise the excess and defect; for instance, how many shoes are equal
+to a house or a given quantity of food. As then the builder to the
+shoemaker, so many shoes must be to the house (or food, if instead of a
+builder an agriculturist be the exchanging party); for unless there is
+this proportion there cannot be exchange or dealing, and this
+proportion cannot be unless the terms are in some way equal; hence the
+need, as was stated above, of some one measure of all things. Now this
+is really and truly the Demand for them, which is the common bond of
+all such dealings. For if the parties were not in want at all or not
+similarly of one another's wares, there would either not be any
+exchange, or at least not the same.
+
+And money has come to be, by general agreement, a representative of
+Demand: and the account of its Greek name νομισμα is this, that it is
+what it is not naturally but by custom or law (νόμος), and it rests
+with us to change its value, or make it wholly useless.
+
+Very well then, there will be Reciprocation when the terms have been
+equalised so as to stand in this proportion; Agriculturist : Shoemaker
+: : wares of Shoemaker : wares of Agriculturist; but you must bring
+them to this form of proportion when they exchange, otherwise the one
+extreme will combine both exceedings of the mean:[18] but when they
+have exactly their own then they are equal and have dealings, because
+the same equality can come to be in their case. Let A represent an
+agriculturist, C food, B a shoemaker, D his wares equalised with A's.
+Then the proportion will be correct, A:B::C:D; _now_ Reciprocation will
+be practicable, if it were not, there would have been no dealing.
+
+Now that what connects men in such transactions is Demand, as being
+some one thing, is shown by the fact that, when either one does not
+want the other or neither want one another, they do not exchange at
+all: whereas they do[19] when one wants what the other man has, wine
+for instance, giving in return corn for exportation.
+
+And further, money is a kind of security to us in respect of exchange
+at some future time (supposing that one wants nothing now that we shall
+have it when we do): the theory of money being that whenever one brings
+it one can receive commodities in exchange: of course this too is
+liable to depreciation, for its purchasing power is not always the
+same, but still it is of a more permanent nature than the commodities
+it represents. And this is the reason why all things should have a
+price set upon them, because thus there may be exchange at any time,
+and if exchange then dealing. So money, like a measure, making all
+things commensurable equalises them: for if there was not exchange
+there would not have been dealing, nor exchange if there were not
+equality, nor equality if there were not the capacity of being
+commensurate: it is impossible that things so greatly different should
+be really commensurate, but we can approximate sufficiently for all
+practical purposes in reference to Demand. The common measure must be
+some one thing, and also from agreement (for which reason it is called
+νόμισμα), for this makes all things commensurable: in fact, all things
+are measured by money. Let B represent ten minæ, A a house worth five
+minæ, or in other words half B, C a bed worth 1/10th of B: it is clear
+then how many beds are equal to one house, namely, five.
+
+It is obvious also that exchange was thus conducted before the
+existence of money: for it makes no difference whether you give for a
+house five beds or the price of five beds.
+
+Chapter IX.
+
+We have now said then what the abstract Just and Unjust are, and these
+having been defined it is plain that just acting is a mean between
+acting unjustly and being acted unjustly towards: the former being
+equivalent to having more, and the latter to having less.
+
+But Justice, it must be observed, is a mean state not after the same
+manner as the forementioned virtues, but because it aims at producing
+the mean, while Injustice occupies _both_ the extremes.
+
+And Justice is the moral state in virtue of which the just man is said
+to have the aptitude for practising the Just in the way of moral
+choice, and for making division between, himself and another, or
+between two other men, not so as to give to himself the greater and to
+his neighbour the less share of what is choice-worthy and contrariwise
+of what is hurtful, but what is proportionably equal, and in like
+manner when adjudging the rights of two other men.
+
+Injustice is all this with respect to the Unjust: and since the Unjust
+is excess or defect of what is good or hurtful respectively, in
+violation of the proportionate, therefore Injustice is both excess and
+defect because it aims at producing excess and defect; excess, that is,
+in a man's own case of what is simply advantageous, and defect of what
+is hurtful: and in the case of other men in like manner generally
+speaking, only that the proportionate is violated not always in one
+direction as before but whichever way it happens in the given case. And
+of the Unjust act the less is being acted unjustly towards, and the
+greater the acting unjustly towards others.[20]
+
+Let this way of describing the nature of Justice and Injustice, and
+likewise the Just and the Unjust generally, be accepted as sufficient.
+
+Chapter X.
+
+[Again, since a man may do unjust acts and not yet have formed a
+character of injustice, the question arises whether a man is unjust in
+each particular form of injustice, say a thief, or adulterer, or
+robber, by doing acts of a given character.
+
+We may say, I think, that this will not of itself make any difference;
+a man may, for instance, have had connection with another's wife,
+knowing well with whom he was sinning, but he may have done it not of
+deliberate choice but from the impulse of passion: of course he acts
+unjustly, but he has not necessarily formed an unjust character: that
+is, he may have stolen yet not be a thief; or committed an act of
+adultery but still not be an adulterer, and so on in other cases which
+might be enumerated.][21]
+
+Of the relation which Reciprocation bears to the Just we have already
+spoken: and here it should be noticed that the Just which we are
+investigating is both the Just in the abstract and also as exhibited in
+Social Relations, which latter arises in the case of those who live in
+communion with a view to independence and who are free and equal either
+proportionately or numerically.[22]
+
+It follows then that those who are not in this position have not among
+themselves the Social Just, but still Just of some kind and resembling
+that other. For Just implies mutually acknowledged law, and law the
+possibility of injustice, for adjudication is the act of distinguishing
+between the Just and the Unjust.
+
+And among whomsoever there is the possibility of injustice among these
+there is that of acting unjustly; but it does not hold conversely that
+injustice attaches to all among whom there is the possibility of acting
+unjustly, since by the former we mean giving one's self the larger
+share of what is abstractedly good and the less of what is abstractedly
+evil.
+
+This, by the way, is the reason why we do not allow a man to govern,
+but Principle, because a man governs for himself and comes to be a
+despot: but the office of a ruler is to be guardian of the Just and
+therefore of the Equal. Well then, since he seems to have no peculiar
+personal advantage, supposing him a Just man, for in this case he does
+not allot to himself the larger share of what is abstractedly good
+unless it falls to his share proportionately (for which reason he
+really governs for others, and so Justice, men say, is a good not to
+one's self so much as to others, as was mentioned before), therefore
+some compensation must be given him, as there actually is in the shape
+of honour and privilege; and wherever these are not adequate there
+rulers turn into despots.
+
+But the Just which arises in the relations of Master and Father, is not
+identical with, but similar to, these; because there is no possibility
+of injustice towards those things which are absolutely one's own; and a
+slave or child (so long as this last is of a certain age and not
+separated into an independent being), is, as it were, part of a man's
+self, and no man chooses to hurt himself, for which reason there cannot
+be injustice towards one's own self: therefore neither is there the
+social Unjust or Just, which was stated to be in accordance with law
+and to exist between those among whom law naturally exists, and these
+were said to be they to whom belongs equality of ruling and being
+ruled.
+
+Hence also there is Just rather between a man and his wife than between
+a man and his children or slaves; this is in fact the Just arising in
+domestic relations: and this too is different from the Social Just.
+
+Further, this last-mentioned Just is of two kinds, natural and
+conventional; the former being that which has everywhere the same force
+and does not depend upon being received or not; the latter being that
+which originally may be this way or that indifferently but not after
+enactment: for instance, the price of ransom being fixed at a mina, or
+the sacrificing a goat instead of two sheep; and again, all cases of
+special enactment, as the sacrificing to Brasidas as a hero; in short,
+all matters of special decree.
+
+But there are some men who think that all the Justs are of this latter
+kind, and on this ground: whatever exists by nature, they say, is
+unchangeable and has everywhere the same force; fire, for instance,
+burns not here only but in Persia as well, but the Justs they see
+changed in various places.
+
+Now this is not really so, and yet it is in a way (though among the
+gods perhaps by no means): still even amongst ourselves there is
+somewhat existing by nature: allowing that everything is subject to
+change, still there is that which does exist by nature, and that which
+does not.[23]
+
+Nay, we may go further, and say that it is practically plain what among
+things which can be otherwise does exist by nature, and what does not
+but is dependent upon enactment and conventional, even granting that
+both are alike subject to be changed: and the same distinctive
+illustration will apply to this and other cases; the right hand is
+naturally the stronger, still some men may become equally strong in
+both.
+
+A parallel may be drawn between the Justs which depend upon convention
+and expedience, and measures; for wine and corn measures are not equal
+in all places, but where men buy they are large, and where these same
+sell again they are smaller: well, in like manner the Justs which are
+not natural, but of human invention, are not everywhere the same, for
+not even the forms of government are, and yet there is one only which
+by nature would be best in all places.
+
+Chapter XI.
+
+Now of Justs and Lawfuls each bears to the acts which embody and
+exemplify it the relation of an universal to a particular; the acts
+being many, but each of the principles only singular because each is an
+universal. And so there is a difference between an unjust act and the
+abstract Unjust, and the just act and the abstract Just: I mean, a
+thing is unjust in itself, by nature or by ordinance; well, when this
+has been embodied in act, there is an unjust act, but not till then,
+only some unjust thing.[24] And similarly of a just act. (Perhaps
+δικαιοπράγημα is more correctly the common or generic term for just
+act, the word δικαίωμα, which I have here used, meaning generally and
+properly the act corrective of the unjust act.) Now as to each of them,
+what kinds there are, and how many, and what is their object-matter, we
+must examine afterwards.
+
+For the present we proceed to say that, the Justs and the Unjusts being
+what have been mentioned, a man is said to act unjustly or justly when
+he embodies these abstracts in voluntary actions, but when in
+involuntary, then he neither acts unjustly or justly except
+accidentally; I mean that the being just or unjust is really only
+accidental to the agents in such cases.
+
+So both unjust and just actions are limited by the being voluntary or
+the contrary: for when an embodying of the Unjust is voluntary, then it
+is blamed and is at the same time also an unjust action: but, if
+voluntariness does not attach, there will be a thing which is in itself
+unjust but not yet an unjust action.
+
+By voluntary, I mean, as we stated before, whatsoever of things in his
+own power a man does with knowledge, and the absence of ignorance as to
+the person to whom, or the instrument with which, or the result with
+which he does; as, for instance, whom he strikes, what he strikes him
+with, and with what probable result; and each of these points again,
+not accidentally nor by compulsion; as supposing another man were to
+seize his hand and strike a third person with it, here, of course, the
+owner of the hand acts not voluntarily, because it did not rest with
+him to do or leave undone: or again, it is conceivable that the person
+struck may be his father, and he may know that it is a man, or even one
+of the present company, whom he is striking, but not know that it is
+his father. And let these same distinctions be supposed to be carried
+into the case of the result and in fact the whole of any given action.
+In fine then, that is involuntary which is done through ignorance, or
+which, not resulting from ignorance, is not in the agent's control or
+is done on compulsion.
+
+I mention these cases, because there are many natural things which we
+do and suffer knowingly but still no one of which is either voluntary
+or involuntary, growing old, or dying, for instance.
+
+Again, accidentality may attach to the unjust in like manner as to the
+just acts. For instance, a man may have restored what was deposited
+with him, but against his will and from fear of the consequences of a
+refusal: we must not say that he either does what is just, or does
+justly, except accidentally: and in like manner the man who through
+compulsion and against his will fails to restore a deposit, must be
+said to do unjustly, or to do what is unjust, accidentally only.
+
+Again, voluntary actions we do either from deliberate choice or without
+it; from it, when we act from previous deliberation; without it, when
+without any previous deliberation. Since then hurts which may be done
+in transactions between man and man are threefold, those mistakes which
+are attended with ignorance are, when a man either does a thing not to
+the man to whom he meant to do it, or not the thing he meant to do, or
+not with the instrument, or not with the result which he intended:
+either he did not think he should hit him at all, or not with this, or
+this is not the man he thought he should hit, or he did not think this
+would be the result of the blow but a result has followed which he did
+not anticipate; as, for instance, he did it not to wound but merely to
+prick him; or it is not the man whom, or the way in which, he meant.
+
+Now when the hurt has come about contrary to all reasonable
+expectation, it is a Misadventure; when though not contrary to
+expectation yet without any viciousness, it is a Mistake; for a man
+makes a mistake when the origination of the cause rests with himself,
+he has a misadventure when it is external to himself. When again he
+acts with knowledge, but not from previous deliberation, it is an
+unjust action; for instance, whatever happens to men from anger or
+other passions which are necessary or natural: for when doing these
+hurts or making these mistakes they act unjustly of course and their
+actions are unjust, still they are not yet confirmed unjust or wicked
+persons by reason of these, because the hurt did not arise from
+depravity in the doer of it: but when it does arise from deliberate
+choice, then the doer is a confirmed unjust and depraved man.
+
+And on this principle acts done from anger are fairly judged not to be
+from malice prepense, because it is not the man who acts in wrath who
+is the originator really but he who caused his wrath. And again, the
+question at issue in such cases is not respecting the fact but
+respecting the justice of the case, the occasion of anger being a
+notion of injury.[25] I mean, that the parties do not dispute about the
+fact, as in questions of contract (where one of the two must be a
+rogue, unless real forgetfulness can be pleaded), but, admitting the
+fact, they dispute on which side the justice of the case lies (the one
+who plotted against the other, _i.e._ the real aggressor, of course,
+cannot be ignorant),[26] so that the one thinks there is injustice
+committed while the other does not.
+
+Well then, a man acts unjustly if he has hurt another of deliberate
+purpose, and he who commits such acts of injustice is _ipso facto_ an
+unjust character when they are in violation of the proportionate or the
+equal; and in like manner also a man is a just character when he acts
+justly of deliberate purpose, and he does act justly if he acts
+voluntarily.
+
+Then as for involuntary acts of harm, they are either such as are
+excusable or such as are not: under the former head come all errors
+done not merely in ignorance but from ignorance; under the latter all
+that are done not from ignorance but in ignorance caused by some
+passion which is neither natural nor fairly attributable to human
+infirmity.
+
+Chapter XII.
+
+Now a question may be raised whether we have spoken with sufficient
+distinctness as to being unjustly dealt with, and dealing unjustly
+towards others.
+
+First, whether the case is possible which Euripides has put, saying
+somewhat strangely,
+
+"My mother he hath slain;  the tale is short,
+Either he willingly did slay her willing,
+Or else with her will but against his own."
+
+I mean then, is it really possible for a person to be unjustly dealt
+with with his own consent, or must every case of being unjustly dealt
+with be against the will of the sufferer as every act of unjust dealing
+is voluntary?
+
+And next, are cases of being unjustly dealt with to be ruled all one
+way as every act of unjust dealing is voluntary? or may we say that
+some cases are voluntary and some involuntary?
+
+Similarly also as regards being justly dealt with: all just acting is
+voluntary, so that it is fair to suppose that the being dealt with
+unjustly or justly must be similarly opposed, as to being either
+voluntary or involuntary.
+
+Now as for being justly dealt with, the position that every case of
+this is voluntary is a strange one, for some are certainly justly dealt
+with without their will.[27] The fact is a man may also fairly raise
+this question, whether in every case he who has suffered what is unjust
+is therefore unjustly dealt with, or rather that the case is the same
+with suffering as it is with acting; namely that in both it is possible
+to participate in what is just, but only accidentally. Clearly the case
+of what is unjust is similar: for doing things in themselves unjust is
+not identical with acting unjustly, nor is suffering them the same as
+being unjustly dealt with. So too of acting justly and being justly
+dealt with, since it is impossible to be unjustly dealt with unless
+some one else acts unjustly or to be justly dealt with unless some one
+else acts justly.
+
+Now if acting unjustly is simply "hurting another voluntarily" (by
+which I mean, knowing whom you are hurting, and wherewith, and how you
+are hurting him), and the man who fails of self-control voluntarily
+hurts himself, then this will be a case of being voluntarily dealt
+unjustly with, and it will be possible for a man to deal unjustly with
+himself. (This by the way is one of the questions raised, whether it is
+possible for a man to deal unjustly with himself.) Or again, a man may,
+by reason of failing of self-control, receive hurt from another man
+acting voluntarily, and so here will be another case of being unjustly
+dealt with voluntarily.
+
+The solution, I take it, is this: the definition of being unjustly
+dealt with is not correct, but we must add, to the hurting with the
+knowledge of the person hurt and the instrument and the manner of
+hurting him, the fact of its being against the wish of the man who is
+hurt.
+
+So then a man may be hurt and suffer what is in itself unjust
+voluntarily, but unjustly dealt with voluntarily no man can be: since
+no man wishes to be hurt, not even he who fails of self-control, who
+really acts contrary to his wish: for no man wishes for that which he
+does not _think_ to be good, and the man who fails of self-control does
+not what he thinks he ought to do.
+
+And again, he that gives away his own property (as Homer says Glaucus
+gave to Diomed, "armour of gold for brass, armour worth a hundred oxen
+for that which was worth but nine") is not unjustly dealt with, because
+the giving rests entirely with himself; but being unjustly dealt with
+does not, there must be some other person who is dealing unjustly
+towards him.
+
+With respect to being unjustly dealt with then, it is clear that it is
+not voluntary.
+
+Chapter XIII.
+
+There remain yet two points on which we purposed to speak: first, is he
+chargeable with an unjust act who in distribution has _given_ the
+larger share to one party contrary to the proper rate, or he that _has_
+the larger share? next, can a man deal unjustly by himself?
+
+In the first question, if the first-named alternative is possible and
+it is the distributor who acts unjustly and not he who has the larger
+share, then supposing that a person knowingly and willingly gives more
+to another than to himself here is a case of a man dealing unjustly by
+himself; which, in fact, moderate men are thought to do, for it is a
+characteristic of the equitable man to take less than his due.
+
+Is not this the answer? that the case is not quite fairly stated,
+because of some other good, such as credit or the abstract honourable,
+in the supposed case the man did get the larger share. And again, the
+difficulty is solved by reference to the definition of unjust dealing:
+for the man suffers nothing contrary to his own wish, so that, on this
+score at least, he is not unjustly dealt with, but, if anything, he is
+hurt only.
+
+It is evident also that it is the distributor who acts unjustly and not
+the man who has the greater share: because the mere fact of the
+abstract Unjust attaching to what a man does, does not constitute
+unjust action, but the doing this voluntarily: and voluntariness
+attaches to that quarter whence is the origination of the action, which
+clearly is in the distributor not in the receiver. And again the term
+doing is used in several senses; in one sense inanimate objects kill,
+or the hand, or the slave by his master's bidding; so the man in
+question does not act unjustly but does things which are in themselves
+unjust.
+
+Again, suppose that a man has made a wrongful award in ignorance; in
+the eye of the law he does not act unjustly nor is his awarding unjust,
+but yet he is in a certain sense: for the Just according to law and
+primary or natural Just are not coincident: but, if he knowingly
+decided unjustly, then he himself as well as the receiver got the
+larger share, that is, either of favour from the receiver or private
+revenge against the other party: and so the man who decided unjustly
+from these motives gets a larger share, in exactly the same sense as a
+man would who received part of the actual matter of the unjust action:
+because in this case the man who wrongly adjudged, say a field, did not
+actually get land but money by his unjust decision.
+
+Chapter XIV.
+
+Now men suppose that acting Unjustly rests entirely with themselves,
+and conclude that acting Justly is therefore also easy. But this is not
+really so; to have connection with a neighbour's wife, or strike one's
+neighbour, or give the money with one's hand, is of course easy and
+rests with one's self: but the doing these acts with certain inward
+dispositions neither is easy nor rests entirely with one's self. And in
+like way, the knowing what is Just and what Unjust men think no great
+instance of wisdom because it is not hard to comprehend those things of
+which the laws speak. They forget that these are not Just actions,
+except accidentally: to be Just they must be done and distributed in a
+certain manner: and this is a more difficult task than knowing what
+things are wholesome; for in this branch of knowledge it is an easy
+matter to know honey, wine, hellebore, cautery, or the use of the
+knife, but the knowing how one should administer these with a view to
+health, and to whom and at what time, amounts in fact to being a
+physician.
+
+From this very same mistake they suppose also, that acting Unjustly is
+equally in the power of the Just man, for the Just man no less, nay
+even more, than the Unjust, may be able to do the particular acts; he
+may be able to have intercourse with a woman or strike a man; or the
+brave man to throw away his shield and turn his back and run this way
+or that. True: but then it is not the mere doing these things which
+constitutes acts of cowardice or injustice (except accidentally), but
+the doing them with certain inward dispositions: just as it is not the
+mere using or not using the knife, administering or not administering
+certain drugs, which constitutes medical treatment or curing, but doing
+these things in a certain particular way.
+
+Again the abstract principles of Justice have their province among
+those who partake of what is abstractedly good, and can have too much
+or too little of these.[28] Now there are beings who cannot have too
+much of them, as perhaps the gods; there are others, again, to whom no
+particle of them is of use, those who are incurably wicked to whom all
+things are hurtful; others to whom they are useful to a certain degree:
+for this reason then the province of Justice is among _Men_.
+
+Chapter XV.
+
+We have next to speak of Equity and the Equitable, that is to say, of
+the relations of Equity to Justice and the Equitable to the Just; for
+when we look into the matter the two do not appear identical nor yet
+different in kind; and we sometimes commend the Equitable and the man
+who embodies it in his actions, so that by way of praise we commonly
+transfer the term also to other acts instead of the term good, thus
+showing that the more Equitable a thing is the better it is: at other
+times following a certain train of reasoning we arrive at a difficulty,
+in that the Equitable though distinct from the Just is yet
+praiseworthy; it seems to follow either that the Just is not good or
+the Equitable not Just, since they are by hypothesis different; or if
+both are good then they are identical.
+
+This is a tolerably fair statement of the difficulty which on these
+grounds arises in respect of the Equitable; but, in fact, all these may
+be reconciled and really involve no contradiction: for the Equitable is
+Just, being also better than one form of Just, but is not better than
+the Just as though it were different from it in kind: Just and
+Equitable then are identical, and, both being good, the Equitable is
+the better of the two.
+
+What causes the difficulty is this; the Equitable is Just, but not the
+Just which is in accordance with written law, being in fact a
+correction of that kind of Just. And the account of this is, that every
+law is necessarily universal while there are some things which it is
+not possible to speak of rightly in any universal or general statement.
+Where then there is a necessity for general statement, while a general
+statement cannot apply rightly to all cases, the law takes the
+generality of cases, being fully aware of the error thus involved; and
+rightly too notwithstanding, because the fault is not in the law, or in
+the framer of the law, but is inherent in the nature of the thing,
+because the matter of all action is necessarily such.
+
+When then the law has spoken in general terms, and there arises a case
+of exception to the general rule, it is proper, in so far as the
+lawgiver omits the case and by reason of his universality of statement
+is wrong, to set right the omission by ruling it as the lawgiver
+himself would rule were he there present, and would have provided by
+law had he foreseen the case would arise. And so the Equitable is Just
+but better than one form of Just; I do not mean the abstract Just but
+the error which arises out of the universality of statement: and this
+is the nature of the Equitable, "a correction of Law, where Law is
+defective by reason of its universality."
+
+This is the reason why not all things are according to law, because
+there are things about which it is simply impossible to lay down a law,
+and so we want special enactments for particular cases. For to speak
+generally, the rule of the undefined must be itself undefined also,
+just as the rule to measure Lesbian building is made of lead: for this
+rule shifts according to the form of each stone and the special
+enactment according to the facts of the case in question.
+
+It is clear then what the Equitable is; namely that it is Just but
+better than one form of Just: and hence it appears too who the
+Equitable man is: he is one who has a tendency to choose and carry out
+these principles, and who is not apt to press the letter of the law on
+the worse side but content to waive his strict claims though backed by
+the law: and this moral state is Equity, being a species of Justice,
+not a different moral state from Justice.
+
+Chapter XVI.
+
+The answer to the second of the two questions indicated above, "whether
+it is possible for a man to deal unjustly by himself," is obvious from
+what has been already stated.
+
+In the first place, one class of Justs is those which are enforced by
+law in accordance with Virtue in the most extensive sense of the term:
+for instance, the law does not bid a man kill himself; and whatever it
+does not bid it forbids: well, whenever a man does hurt contrary to the
+law (unless by way of requital of hurt), voluntarily, i.e. knowing to
+whom he does it and wherewith, he acts Unjustly. Now he that from rage
+kills himself, voluntarily, does this in contravention of Right Reason,
+which the law does not permit. He therefore acts Unjustly: but towards
+whom? towards the Community, not towards himself (because he suffers
+with his own consent, and no man can be Unjustly dealt with with his
+own consent), and on this principle the Community punishes him; that is
+a certain infamy is attached to the suicide as to one who acts Unjustly
+towards the Community.
+
+Next, a man cannot deal Unjustly by himself in the sense in which a man
+is Unjust who only does Unjust acts without being entirely bad (for the
+two things are different, because the Unjust man is in a way bad, as
+the coward is, not as though he were chargeable with badness in the
+full extent of the term, and so he does not act Unjustly in this
+sense), because if it were so then it would be possible for the same
+thing to have been taken away from and added to the same person:[29]
+but this is really not possible, the Just and the Unjust always
+implying a plurality of persons.
+
+Again, an Unjust action must be voluntary, done of deliberate purpose,
+and aggressive (for the man who hurts because he has first suffered and
+is merely requiting the same is not thought to act Unjustly), but here
+the man does to himself and suffers the same things at the same time.
+
+Again, it would imply the possibility of being Unjustly dealt with with
+one's own consent.
+
+And, besides all this, a man cannot act Unjustly without his act
+falling under some particular crime; now a man cannot seduce his own
+wife, commit a burglary on his own premises, or steal his own property.
+
+After all, the general answer to the question is to allege what was
+settled respecting being Unjustly dealt with with one's own consent.
+
+Chapter XVII.
+
+It is obvious, moreover, that being Unjustly dealt by and dealing
+Unjustly by others are both wrong; because the one is having less, the
+other having more, than the mean, and the case is parallel to that of
+the healthy in the healing art, and that of good condition in the art
+of training: but still the dealing Unjustly by others is the worst of
+the two, because this involves wickedness and is blameworthy;
+wickedness, I mean, either wholly, or nearly so (for not all voluntary
+wrong implies injustice), but the being Unjustly dealt by does not
+involve wickedness or injustice.
+
+In itself then, the being Unjustly dealt by is the least bad, but
+accidentally it may be the greater evil of the two. However, scientific
+statement cannot take in such considerations; a pleurisy, for instance,
+is called a greater physical evil than a bruise: and yet this last may
+be the greater accidentally; it may chance that a bruise received in a
+fall may cause one to be captured by the enemy and slain.
+
+Further: Just, in the way of metaphor and similitude, there may be I do
+not say between a man and himself exactly but between certain parts of
+his nature; but not Just of every kind, only such as belongs to the
+relation of master and slave, or to that of the head of a family. For
+all through this treatise the rational part of the Soul has been viewed
+as distinct from the irrational.
+
+Now, taking these into consideration, there is thought to be a
+possibility of injustice towards one's self, because herein it is
+possible for men to suffer somewhat in contradiction of impulses really
+their own; and so it is thought that there is Just of a certain kind
+between these parts mutually, as between ruler and ruled.
+
+Let this then be accepted as an account of the distinctions which we
+recognise respecting Justice and the rest of the moral virtues.[30]
+
+BOOK VI
+
+Chapter I.
+
+Having stated in a former part of this treatise that men should choose
+the mean instead of either the excess or defect, and that the mean is
+according to the dictates of Right Reason; we will now proceed to
+explain this term.
+
+For in all the habits which we have expressly mentioned, as likewise in
+all the others, there is, so to speak, a mark with his eye fixed on
+which the man who has Reason tightens or slacks his rope;[1] and there
+is a certain limit of those mean states which we say are in accordance
+with Right Reason, and lie between excess on the one hand and defect on
+the other.
+
+Now to speak thus is true enough but conveys no very definite meaning:
+as, in fact, in all other pursuits requiring attention and diligence on
+which skill and science are brought to bear; it is quite true of course
+to say that men are neither to labour nor relax too much or too little,
+but in moderation, and as Right Reason directs; yet if this were all a
+man had he would not be greatly the wiser; as, for instance, if in
+answer to the question, what are proper applications to the body, he
+were to be told, "Oh! of course, whatever the science of medicine, and
+in such manner as the physician, directs."
+
+And so in respect of the mental states it is requisite not merely that
+this should be true which has been already stated, but further that it
+should be expressly laid down what Right Reason is, and what is the
+definition of it.
+
+Chapter II.
+
+Now in our division of the Excellences of the Soul, we said there were
+two classes, the Moral and the Intellectual: the former we have already
+gone through; and we will now proceed to speak of the others, premising
+a few words respecting the Soul itself. It was stated before, you will
+remember, that the Soul consists of two parts, the Rational, and
+Irrational: we must now make a similar division of the Rational.
+
+Let it be understood then that there are two parts of the Soul
+possessed of Reason; one whereby we realise those existences whose
+causes cannot be otherwise than they are, and one whereby we realise
+those which can be otherwise than they are,[2] (for there must be,
+answering to things generically different, generically different parts
+of the soul naturally adapted to each, since these parts of the soul
+possess their knowledge in virtue of a certain resemblance and
+appropriateness in themselves to the objects of which they are
+percipients);[3] and let us name the former, "that which is apt to
+know," the latter, "that which is apt to calculate" (because
+deliberating and calculating are the same, and no one ever deliberates
+about things which cannot be otherwise than they are: and so the
+Calculative will be one part of the Rational faculty of the soul).
+
+We must discover, then, which is the best state of each of these,
+because that will be the Excellence of each; and this again is relative
+to the work each has to do.[4]
+
+There are in the Soul three functions on which depend moral action and
+truth; Sense, Intellect, Appetition, whether vague Desire or definite
+Will. Now of these Sense is the originating cause of no moral action,
+as is seen from the fact that brutes have Sense but are in no way
+partakers of moral action.[5]
+
+[Intellect and Will are thus connected,] what in the Intellectual
+operation is Affirmation and Negation that in the Will is Pursuit and
+Avoidance, And so, since Moral Virtue is a State apt to exercise Moral
+Choice and Moral Choice is Will consequent on deliberation, the Reason
+must be true and the Will right, to constitute good Moral Choice, and
+what the Reason affirms the Will must pursue.[6]
+
+Now this Intellectual operation and this Truth is what bears upon Moral
+Action; of course truth and falsehood must be the good and the bad of
+that Intellectual Operation which is purely Speculative, and concerned
+neither with action nor production, because this is manifestly the work
+of every Intellectual faculty, while of the faculty which is of a mixed
+Practical and Intellectual nature, the work is that Truth which, as I
+have described above, corresponds to the right movement of the Will.
+
+Now the starting-point of moral action is Moral Choice, (I mean, what
+actually sets it in motion, not the final cause,)[7] and of Moral
+Choice, Appetition, and Reason directed to a certain result: and thus
+Moral Choice is neither independent of intellect, i. e. intellectual
+operation, nor of a certain moral state: for right or wrong action
+cannot be, independently of operation of the Intellect, and moral
+character.
+
+But operation of the Intellect by itself moves nothing, only when
+directed to a certain result, i. e. exercised in Moral Action: (I say
+nothing of its being exercised in production, because this function is
+originated by the former: for every one who makes makes with a view to
+somewhat further; and that which is or may be made, is not an End in
+itself, but only relatively to somewhat else, and belonging to some
+one:[8] whereas that which is or may be done is an End in itself,
+because acting well is an End in itself, and this is the object of the
+Will,) and so Moral Choice is either[9] Intellect put in a position of
+Will-ing, or Appetition subjected to an Intellectual Process. And such
+a Cause is Man.
+
+But nothing which is done and past can be the object of Moral Choice;
+for instance, no man chooses to have sacked Troy; because, in fact, no
+one ever deliberates about what is past, but only about that which is
+future, and which may therefore be influenced, whereas what has been
+cannot not have been: and so Agathon is right in saying
+
+"Of this alone is Deity bereft,
+To make undone whatever hath been done."
+
+Thus then Truth is the work of both the Intellectual Parts of the Soul;
+those states therefore are the Excellences of each in which each will
+best attain truth.
+
+Chapter III.
+
+Commencing then from the point stated above we will now speak of these
+Excellences again. Let those faculties whereby the Soul attains truth
+in Affirmation or Negation, be assumed to be in number five:[10] viz.
+Art, Knowledge, Practical Wisdom, Science, Intuition: (Supposition and
+Opinion I do not include, because by these one may go wrong.)
+
+What Knowledge is, is plain from the following of considerations, if
+one is to speak accurately, instead of being led away by resemblances.
+For we all conceive that what we strictly speaking know, cannot be
+otherwise than it is, because as to those things which can be otherwise
+than they are, we are uncertain whether they are or are not, the moment
+they cease to be within the sphere of our actual observation.
+
+So then, whatever comes within the range of Knowledge is by necessity,
+and therefore eternal, (because all things are so which exist
+necessarily,) and all eternal things are without beginning, and
+indestructible.
+
+Again, all Knowledge is thought to be capable of being taught, and what
+comes within its range capable of being learned. And all teaching is
+based upon previous knowledge; (a statement you will find in the
+Analytics also,)[11] for there are two ways of teaching, by Syllogism
+and by Induction. In fact. Induction is the source of universal
+propositions, and Syllogism reasons from these universals.[12]
+Syllogism then may reason from principles which cannot be themselves
+proved Syllogistically: and therefore must by Induction.
+
+So Knowledge is "a state or mental faculty apt to demonstrate
+syllogistically," &c. as in the Analytics:[13] because a man, strictly
+and properly speaking, _knows_, when he establishes his conclusion in a
+certain way, and the principles are known to him: for if they are not
+better known to him than the conclusion, such knowledge as he has will
+be merely accidental.
+
+Let thus much be accepted as a definition of Knowledge.
+
+Chapter IV.
+
+Matter which may exist otherwise than it actually does in any given
+case (commonly called Contingent) is of two kinds, that which is the
+object of Making, and that which is the object of Doing; now Making and
+Doing are two different things (as we show in the exoteric treatise),
+and so that state of mind, conjoined with Reason, which is apt to Do,
+is distinct from that also conjoined with Reason, which is apt to Make:
+and for this reason they are not included one by the other, that is,
+Doing is not Making, nor Making Doing.[14] Now[15] as Architecture is
+an Art, and is the same as "a certain state of mind, conjoined with
+Reason, which is apt to Make," and as there is no Art which is not such
+a state, nor any such state which is not an Art, Art, in its strict and
+proper sense, must be "a state of mind, conjoined with true Reason, apt
+to Make."
+
+Now all Art has to do with production, and contrivance, and seeing how
+any of those things may be produced which may either be or not be, and
+the origination of which rests with the maker and not with the thing
+made.
+
+And, so neither things which exist or come into being necessarily, nor
+things in the way of nature, come under the province of Art, because
+these are self-originating. And since Making and Doing are distinct,
+Art must be concerned with the former and not the latter. And in a
+certain sense Art and Fortune are concerned with the same things, as,
+Agathon says by the way,
+
+"Art Fortune loves, and is of her beloved."
+
+So Art, as has been stated, is "a certain state of mind, apt to Make,
+conjoined with true Reason;" its absence, on the contrary, is the same
+state conjoined with false Reason, and both are employed upon
+Contingent matter.
+
+Chapter V.
+
+As for Practical Wisdom, we shall ascertain its nature by examining to
+what kind of persons we in common language ascribe it.[16]
+
+It is thought then to be the property of the Practically Wise man to be
+able to deliberate well respecting what is good and expedient for
+himself, not in any definite line,[17] as what is conducive to health
+or strength, but what to living well. A proof of this is that we call
+men Wise in this or that, when they calculate well with a view to some
+good end in a case where there is no definite rule. And so, in a
+general way of speaking, the man who is good at deliberation will be
+Practically Wise. Now no man deliberates respecting things which cannot
+be otherwise than they are, nor such as lie not within the range of his
+own action: and so, since Knowledge requires strict demonstrative
+reasoning, of which Contingent matter does not admit (I say Contingent
+matter, because all matters of deliberation must be Contingent and
+deliberation cannot take place with respect to things which are
+Necessarily), Practical Wisdom cannot be Knowledge nor Art; nor the
+former, because what falls under the province of Doing must be
+Contingent; not the latter, because Doing and Making are different in
+kind.
+
+It remains then that it must be "a state of mind true, conjoined with
+Reason, and apt to Do, having for its object those things which are
+good or bad for Man:" because of Making something beyond itself is
+always the object, but cannot be of Doing because the very well-doing
+is in itself an End.
+
+For this reason we think Pericles and men of that stamp to be
+Practically Wise, because they can see what is good for themselves and
+for men in general, and we also think those to be such who are skilled
+in domestic management or civil government. In fact, this is the reason
+why we call the habit of perfected self-mastery by the name which in
+Greek it bears, etymologically signifying "that which preserves the
+Practical Wisdom:" for what it does preserve is the Notion I have
+mentioned, _i.e._ of one's own true interest.[18]
+
+For it is not every kind of Notion which the pleasant and the painful
+corrupt and pervert, as, for instance, that "the three angles of every
+rectilineal triangle are equal to two right angles," but only those
+bearing on moral action.
+
+For the Principles of the matters of moral action are the final cause
+of them:[19] now to the man who has been corrupted by reason of
+pleasure or pain the Principle immediately becomes obscured, nor does
+he see that it is his duty to choose and act in each instance with a
+view to this final cause and by reason of it: for viciousness has a
+tendency to destroy the moral Principle: and so Practical Wisdom must
+be "a state conjoined with reason, true, having human good for its
+object, and apt to do."
+
+Then again Art admits of degrees of excellence, but Practical Wisdom
+does not:[20] and in Art he who goes wrong purposely is preferable to
+him who does so unwittingly,[21] but not so in respect of Practical
+Wisdom or the other Virtues. It plainly is then an Excellence of a
+certain kind, and not an Art.
+
+Now as there are two parts of the Soul which have Reason, it must be
+the Excellence of the Opinionative [which we called before calculative
+or deliberative], because both Opinion and Practical Wisdom are
+exercised upon Contingent matter. And further, it is not simply a state
+conjoined with Reason, as is proved by the fact that such a state may
+be forgotten and so lost while Practical Wisdom cannot.
+
+Chapter VI.
+
+Now Knowledge is a conception concerning universals and Necessary
+matter, and there are of course certain First Principles in all trains
+of demonstrative reasoning (that is of all Knowledge because this is
+connected with reasoning): that faculty, then, which takes in the first
+principles of that which comes under the range of Knowledge, cannot be
+either Knowledge, or Art, or Practical Wisdom: not Knowledge, because
+what is the object of Knowledge must be derived from demonstrative
+reasoning; not either of the other two, because they are exercised upon
+Contingent matter only. Nor can it be Science which takes in these,
+because the Scientific Man must in some cases depend on demonstrative
+Reasoning.
+
+It comes then to this: since the faculties whereby we always attain
+truth and are never deceived when dealing with matter Necessary or even
+Contingent are Knowledge, Practical Wisdom, Science, and Intuition, and
+the faculty which takes in First Principles cannot be any of the three
+first; the last, namely Intuition, must be it which performs this
+function.
+
+Chapter VII.
+
+Science is a term we use principally in two meanings: in the first
+place, in the Arts we ascribe it to those who carry their arts to the
+highest accuracy;[22] Phidias, for instance, we call a Scientific or
+cunning sculptor; Polycleitus a Scientific or cunning statuary;
+meaning, in this instance, nothing else by Science than an excellence
+of art: in the other sense, we think some to be Scientific in a general
+way, not in any particular line or in any particular thing, just as
+Homer says of a man in his Margites; "Him the Gods made neither a
+digger of the ground, nor ploughman, nor in any other way Scientific."
+
+So it is plain that Science must mean the most accurate of all
+Knowledge; but if so, then the Scientific man must not merely know the
+deductions from the First Principles but be in possession of truth
+respecting the First Principles. So that Science must be equivalent to
+Intuition and Knowledge; it is, so to speak, Knowledge of the most
+precious objects, _with a head on_.[23]
+
+I say of the most precious things, because it is absurd to suppose
+πολιτικὴ,[24] or Practical Wisdom, to be the highest, unless it can be
+shown that Man is the most excellent of all that exists in the
+Universe. Now if "healthy" and "good" are relative terms, differing
+when applied to men or to fish, but "white" and "straight" are the same
+always, men must allow that the Scientific is the same always, but the
+Practically Wise varies: for whatever provides all things well for
+itself, to this they would apply the term Practically Wise, and commit
+these matters to it; which is the reason, by the way, that they call
+some brutes Practically Wise, such that is as plainly have a faculty of
+forethought respecting their own subsistence.
+
+And it is quite plain that Science and πολιτικὴ cannot be identical:
+because if men give the name of Science to that faculty which is
+employed upon what is expedient for themselves, there will be many
+instead of one, because there is not one and the same faculty employed
+on the good of all animals collectively, unless in the same sense as
+you may say there is one art of healing with respect to all living
+beings.
+
+If it is urged that man is superior to all other animals, that makes no
+difference: for there are many other things more Godlike in their
+nature than Man, as, most obviously, the elements of which the Universe
+is composed.[25]
+
+It is plain then that Science is the union of Knowledge and Intuition,
+and has for its objects those things which are most precious in their
+nature. Accordingly, Anexagoras, Thales, and men of that stamp, people
+call Scientific, but not Practically Wise because they see them
+ignorant of what concerns themselves; and they say that what they know
+is quite out of the common run certainly, and wonderful, and hard, and
+very fine no doubt, but still useless because they do not seek after
+what is good for them as men.
+
+Chapter VIII.
+
+But Practical Wisdom is employed upon human matters, and such as are
+objects of deliberation (for we say, that to deliberate well is most
+peculiarly the work of the man who possesses this Wisdom), and no man
+deliberates about things which cannot be otherwise than they are, nor
+about any save those that have some definite End and this End good
+resulting from Moral Action; and the man to whom we should give the
+name of Good in Counsel, simply and without modification, is he who in
+the way of calculation has a capacity for attaining that of practical
+goods which is the best for Man.
+
+Nor again does Practical Wisdom consist in a knowledge of general
+principles only, but it is necessary that one should know also the
+particular details, because it is apt to act, and action is concerned
+with details: for which reason sometimes men who have not much
+knowledge are more practical than others who have; among others, they
+who derive all they know from actual experience: suppose a man to know,
+for instance, that light meats are easy of digestion and wholesome, but
+not what kinds of meat are light, he will not produce a healthy state;
+that man will have a much better chance of doing so, who knows that the
+flesh of birds is light and wholesome. Since then Practical Wisdom is
+apt to act, one ought to have both kinds of knowledge, or, if only one,
+the knowledge of details rather than of Principles. So there will be in
+respect of Practical Wisdom the distinction of supreme and
+subordinate.[26]
+
+Further: πολιτικὴ and Practical Wisdom are the same mental state, but
+the point of view is not the same.
+
+Of Practical Wisdom exerted upon a community that which I would call
+the Supreme is the faculty of Legislation; the subordinate, which is
+concerned with the details, generally has the common name πολιτικὴ, and
+its functions are Action and Deliberation (for the particular enactment
+is a matter of action, being the ultimate issue of this branch of
+Practical Wisdom, and therefore people commonly say, that these men
+alone are really engaged in government, because they alone act, filling
+the same place relatively to legislators, that workmen do to a
+master).[27]
+
+Again, that is thought to be Practical Wisdom in the most proper sense
+which has for its object the interest of the Individual: and this
+usually appropriates the common name: the others are called
+respectively Domestic Management, Legislation, Executive Government
+divided into two branches, Deliberative and Judicial.[28] Now of
+course, knowledge for one's self is one kind of knowledge, but it
+admits of many shades of difference: and it is a common notion that the
+man who knows and busies himself about his own concerns merely is the
+man of Practical Wisdom, while they who extend their solicitude to
+society at large are considered meddlesome.
+
+Euripides has thus embodied this sentiment; "How," says one of his
+Characters, "How foolish am I, who whereas I might have shared equally,
+idly numbered among the multitude of the army *** for them that are
+busy and meddlesome [Jove hates]," because the generality of mankind
+seek their own good and hold that this is their proper business. It is
+then from this opinion that the notion has arisen that such men are the
+Practically-Wise. And yet it is just possible that the good of the
+individual cannot be secured independently of connection with a family
+or a community. And again, how a man should manage his own affairs is
+sometimes not quite plain, and must be made a matter of enquiry.[29]
+
+A corroboration of what I have said is[30] the fact, that the young
+come to be geometricians, and mathematicians, and Scientific in such
+matters, but it is not thought that a young man can come to be
+possessed of Practical Wisdom: now the reason is, that this Wisdom has
+for its object particular facts, which come to be known from
+experience, which a young man has not because it is produced only by
+length of time.
+
+By the way, a person might also enquire,[31] why a boy may be made a
+mathematician but not Scientific or a natural philosopher. Is not this
+the reason? that mathematics are taken in by the process of
+abstraction, but the principles of Science[32] and natural philosophy
+must be gained by experiment; and the latter young men talk of but do
+not realise, while the nature of the former is plain and clear.
+
+Again, in matter of practice, error attaches either to the general
+rule, in the process of deliberation, or to the particular fact: for
+instance, this would be a general rule, "All water of a certain gravity
+is bad;" the particular fact, "this water is of that gravity."
+
+And that Practical Wisdom is not Knowledge is plain, for it has to do
+with the ultimate issue,[33] as has been said, because every object of
+action is of this nature.
+
+To Intuition it is opposed, for this takes in those principles which
+cannot be proved by reasoning, while Practical Wisdom is concerned with
+the ultimate particular fact which cannot be realised by Knowledge but
+by Sense; I do not mean one of the five senses, but the same by which
+we take in the mathematical fact, that no rectilineal figure can be
+contained by less than three lines, i.e. that a triangle is the
+ultimate figure, because here also is a stopping point.
+
+This however is Sense rather than Practical Wisdom, which is of another
+kind.[34]
+
+Chapter IX.
+
+Now the acts of enquiring and deliberating differ, though deliberating
+is a kind of enquiring. We ought to ascertain about Good Counsel
+likewise what it is, whether a kind of Knowledge, or Opinion, or Happy
+Conjecture, or some other kind of faculty. Knowledge it obviously is
+not, because men do not enquire about what they know, and Good Counsel
+is a kind of deliberation, and the man who is deliberating is enquiring
+and calculating.
+
+Neither is it Happy Conjecture; because this is independent of
+reasoning, and a rapid operation; but men deliberate a long time, and
+it is a common saying that one should execute speedily what has been
+resolved upon in deliberation, but deliberate slowly.
+
+Quick perception of causes[35] again is a different faculty from good
+counsel, for it is a species of Happy Conjecture. Nor is Good Counsel
+Opinion of any kind.
+
+Well then, since he who deliberates ill goes wrong, and he who
+deliberates well does so rightly, it is clear that Good Counsel is
+rightness of some kind, but not of Knowledge nor of Opinion: for
+Knowledge cannot be called right because it cannot be wrong, and
+Rightness of Opinion is Truth: and again, all which is the object of
+opinion is definitely marked out.[36]
+
+Still, however, Good Counsel is not independent of Reason, Does it
+remain then that it is a rightness of Intellectual Operation simply,
+because this does not amount to an assertion; and the objection to
+Opinion was that it is not a process of enquiry but already a definite
+assertion; whereas whosoever deliberates, whether well or ill, is
+engaged in enquiry and calculation.
+
+Well, Good Counsel is a Rightness of deliberation, and so the first
+question must regard the nature and objects of deliberation. Now
+remember Rightness is an equivocal term; we plainly do not mean
+Rightness of any kind whatever; the ἀκρατὴς, for instance, or the bad
+man, will obtain by his calculation what he sets before him as an
+object, and so he may be said to have deliberated _rightly_ in one
+sense, but will have attained a great evil. Whereas to have deliberated
+well is thought to be a good, because Good Counsel is Rightness of
+deliberation of such a nature as is apt to attain good.
+
+But even this again you may get by false reasoning, and hit upon the
+right effect though not through right means,[37] your middle term being
+fallacious: and so neither will this be yet Good Counsel in consequence
+of which you get what you ought but not through proper means.
+
+Again, one man may hit on a thing after long deliberation, another
+quickly. And so that before described will not be yet Good Counsel, but
+the Rightness must be with reference to what is expedient; and you must
+have a proper end in view, pursue it in a right manner and right time.
+
+Once more. One may deliberate well either generally or towards some
+particular End.[38] Good counsel in the general then is that which goes
+right towards that which is the End in a general way of consideration;
+in particular, that which does so towards some particular End.
+
+Since then deliberating well is a quality of men possessed of Practical
+Wisdom, Good Counsel must be "Rightness in respect of what conduces to
+a given End, of which[39] Practical Wisdom is the true conception."
+
+Chapter X.
+
+There is too the faculty of Judiciousness, and also its absence, in
+virtue of which we call men Judicious or the contrary.
+
+Now Judiciousness is neither entirely identical with Knowledge or
+Opinion (for then all would have been Judicious), nor is it any one
+specific science, as medical science whose object matter is things
+wholesome; or geometry whose object matter is magnitude: for it has not
+for its object things which always exist and are immutable, nor of
+those things which come into being just any which may chance; but those
+in respect of which a man might doubt and deliberate.
+
+And so it has the same object matter as Practical Wisdom; yet the two
+faculties are not identical, because Practical Wisdom has the capacity
+for commanding and taking the initiative, for its End is "what one
+should do or not do:" but Judiciousness is only apt to decide upon
+suggestions (though we do in Greek put "well" on to the faculty and its
+concrete noun, these really mean exactly the same as the plain words),
+and Judiciousness is neither the having Practical Wisdom, nor attaining
+it: but just as learning is termed συνιέναι when a man uses his
+knowledge, so judiciousness consists in employing the Opinionative
+faculty in judging concerning those things which come within the
+province of Practical Wisdom, when another enunciates them; and not
+judging merely, but judging well (for εὐ and καλῶς mean exactly the
+same thing). And the Greek name of this faculty is derived from the use
+of the term συνιέναι in learning: μανθάνειν and συνιέναι being often
+used as synonymous.
+
+The faculty called γνώμη,[40] in right of which we call men εὐγνώμονες,
+or say they have γνώμη, is "the right judgment of the equitable man." A
+proof of which is that we most commonly say that the equitable man has
+a tendency to make allowance, and the making allowance in certain cases
+is equitable. And συγγνώμη (the word denoting allowance) is right γνώμη
+having a capacity of making equitable decisions, By "right" I mean that
+of the Truthful man.
+
+Chapter XI.
+
+Now all these mental states[41] tend to the same object, as indeed
+common language leads us to expect: I mean, we speak of γνώμη,
+Judiciousness, Practical Wisdom, and Practical Intuition, attributing
+the possession of γνώμη and Practical Intuition to the same Individuals
+whom we denominate Practically-Wise and Judicious: because all these
+faculties are employed upon the extremes,[42] i.e. on particular
+details; and in right of his aptitude for deciding on the matters which
+come within the province of the Practically-Wise, a man is Judicious
+and possessed of good γνώμη; i.e. he is disposed to make allowance, for
+considerations of equity are entertained by all good men alike in
+transactions with their fellows.
+
+And all matters of Moral Action belong to the class of particulars,
+otherwise called extremes: for the man of Practical Wisdom must know
+them, and Judiciousness and γνώμη are concerned with matters of Moral
+Actions, which are extremes.
+
+Intuition, moreover, takes in the extremes at both ends:[43] I mean,
+the first and last terms must be taken in not by reasoning but by
+Intuition [so that Intuition comes to be of two kinds], and that which
+belongs to strict demonstrative reasonings takes in immutable, i.e.
+Necessary, first terms; while that which is employed in practical
+matters takes in the extreme, the Contingent, and the minor
+Premiss:[44] for the minor Premisses are the source of the Final Cause,
+Universals being made up out of Particulars.[45] To take in these, of
+course, we must have Sense, i.e. in other words Practical Intuition.
+
+And for this reason these are thought to be simply gifts of nature; and
+whereas no man is thought to be Scientific by nature, men are thought
+to have γνώμη, and Judiciousness, and Practical Intuition: a proof of
+which is that we think these faculties are a consequence even of
+particular ages, and this given age has Practical Intuition and γνώμη,
+we say, as if under the notion that nature is the cause. And thus
+Intuition is both the beginning and end, because the proofs are based
+upon the one kind of extremes and concern the other.
+
+And so[46] one should attend to the undemonstrable dicta and opinions
+of the skilful, the old and the Practically-Wise, no less than to those
+which are based on strict reasoning, because they see aright, having
+gained their power of moral vision from experience.
+
+Chapter XII.
+
+Well, we have now stated the nature and objects of Practical Wisdom and
+Science respectively, and that they belong each to a different part of
+the Soul. But I can conceive a person questioning their utility.
+"Science," he would say, "concerns itself with none of the causes of
+human happiness (for it has nothing to do with producing anything):
+Practical Wisdom has this recommendation, I grant, but where is the
+need of it, since its province is those things which are just and
+honourable, and good for man, and these are the things which the good
+man as such does; but we are not a bit the more apt to do them because
+we know them, since the Moral Virtues are Habits; just as we are not
+more apt to be healthy or in good condition from mere knowledge of what
+relates to these (I mean,[47] of course, things so called not from
+their producing health, etc., but from their evidencing it in a
+particular subject), for we are not more apt to be healthy and in good
+condition merely from knowing the art of medicine or training.
+
+"If it be urged that _knowing what is_ good does not by itself make a
+Practically-Wise man but _becoming_ good; still this Wisdom will be no
+use either to those that are good, and so have it already, or to those
+who have it not; because it will make no difference to them whether
+they have it themselves or put themselves under the guidance of others
+who have; and we might be contented to be in respect of this as in
+respect of health: for though we wish to be healthy still we do not set
+about learning the art of healing.
+
+"Furthermore, it would seem to be strange that, though lower in the
+scale than Science, it is to be its master; which it is, because
+whatever produces results takes the rule and directs in each matter."
+
+This then is what we are to talk about, for these are the only points
+now raised.
+
+Now first we say that being respectively Excellences of different parts
+of the Soul they must be choice-worthy, even on the supposition that
+they neither of them produce results.
+
+In the next place we say that they _do_ produce results; that Science
+makes Happiness, not as the medical art but as healthiness makes
+health:[48] because, being a part of Virtue in its most extensive
+sense, it makes a man happy by being possessed and by working.
+
+Next, Man's work _as Man_ is accomplished by virtue of Practical Wisdom
+and Moral Virtue, the latter giving the right aim and direction, the
+former the right means to its attainment;[49] but of the fourth part of
+the Soul, the mere nutritive principle, there is no such Excellence,
+because nothing is in its power to do or leave undone.[50]
+
+As to our not being more apt to do what is noble and just by reason of
+possessing Practical Wisdom, we must begin a little higher up,[51]
+taking this for our starting-point. As we say that men may do things in
+themselves just and yet not be just men; for instance, when men do what
+the laws require of them, either against their will, or by reason of
+ignorance or something else, at all events not for the sake of the
+things themselves; and yet they do what they ought and all that the
+good man should do; so it seems that to be a good man one must do each
+act in a particular frame of mind, I mean from Moral Choice and for the
+sake of the things themselves which are done. Now it is Virtue which
+makes the Moral Choice right, but whatever is naturally required to
+carry out that Choice comes under the province not of Virtue but of a
+different faculty. We must halt, as it were, awhile, and speak more
+clearly on these points.
+
+There is then a certain faculty, commonly named Cleverness, of such a
+nature as to be able to do and attain whatever conduces to _any_ given
+purpose: now if that purpose be a good one the faculty is praiseworthy;
+if otherwise, it goes by a name which, denoting strictly the ability,
+implies the willingness to do _anything_; we accordingly call the
+Practically-Wise Clever, and also those who can and will do
+anything.[52]
+
+Now Practical Wisdom is not identical with Cleverness, nor is it
+without this power of adapting means to ends: but this Eye of the Soul
+(as we may call it) does not attain its proper state without goodness,
+as we have said before and as is quite plain, because the syllogisms
+into which Moral Action may be analysed have for their Major
+Premiss,[53] "since ---- is the End and the Chief Good"[54] (fill up the
+blank with just anything you please, for we merely want to exhibit the
+Form, so that anything will do), but _how_ this blank should be filled
+is seen only by the good man: because Vice distorts the moral vision
+and causes men to be deceived in respect of practical principles.[55]
+
+It is clear, therefore, that a man cannot be a Practically-Wise,
+without being a good, man.
+
+We must enquire again also about Virtue: for it may be divided into
+Natural Virtue and Matured, which two bear to each other a relation
+similar to that which Practical Wisdom bears to Cleverness, one not of
+identity but resemblance. I speak of Natural Virtue, because men hold
+that each of the moral dispositions attach to us all somehow by nature:
+we have dispositions[56] towards justice, self-mastery and courage, for
+instance, immediately from our birth: but still we seek Goodness in its
+highest sense as something distinct from these, and that these
+dispositions should attach to us in a somewhat different fashion.[57]
+Children and brutes have these natural states, but then they are
+plainly hurtful unless combined with an intellectual element: at least
+thus much is matter of actual experience and observation, that as a
+strong body destitute of sight must, if set in motion, fall violently
+because it has not sight, so it is also in the case we are considering:
+but if it can get the intellectual element it then excels in acting.
+Just so the Natural State of Virtue, being like this strong body, will
+then be Virtue in the highest sense when it too is combined with the
+intellectual element.
+
+So that, as in the case of the Opinionative faculty, there are two
+forms, Cleverness and Practical Wisdom; so also in the case of the
+Moral there are two, Natural Virtue and Matured; and of these the
+latter cannot be formed without Practical Wisdom.[58]
+
+This leads some to say that all the Virtues are merely intellectual
+Practical Wisdom, and Socrates was partly right in his enquiry and
+partly wrong: wrong in that he thought all the Virtues were merely
+intellectual Practical Wisdom, right in saying they were not
+independent of that faculty.
+
+A proof of which is that now all, in defining Virtue, add on the
+"state" [mentioning also to what standard it has reference, namely
+that] "which is accordant with Right Reason:" now "right" means in
+accordance with Practical Wisdom. So then all seem to have an
+instinctive notion that that state which is in accordance with
+Practical Wisdom is Virtue; however, we must make a slight change in
+their statement, because that state is Virtue, not merely which is in
+accordance with but which implies the possession of Right Reason;
+which, upon such matters, is Practical Wisdom. The difference between
+us and Socrates is this: he thought the Virtues were reasoning
+processes (_i.e._ that they were all instances of Knowledge in its
+strict sense), but we say they imply the possession of Reason.
+
+From what has been said then it is clear that one cannot be, strictly
+speaking, good without Practical Wisdom nor Practically-Wise without
+moral goodness.
+
+And by the distinction between Natural and Matured Virtue one can meet
+the reasoning by which it might be argued "that the Virtues are
+separable because the same man is not by nature most inclined to all at
+once so that he will have acquired this one before he has that other:"
+we would reply that this is possible with respect to the Natural
+Virtues but not with respect to those in right of which a man is
+denominated simply good: because they will all belong to him together
+with the one faculty of Practical Wisdom.
+
+It is plain too that even had it not been apt to act we should have
+needed it, because it is the Excellence of a part of the Soul; and that
+the moral choice cannot be right independently of Practical Wisdom and
+Moral Goodness; because this gives the right End, that causes the doing
+these things which conduce to the End.
+
+Then again, it is not Master of Science (i.e. of the superior part of
+the Soul), just as neither is the healing art Master of health; for it
+does not make use of it, but looks how it may come to be: so it
+commands for the sake of it but does not command it.
+
+The objection is, in fact, about as valid as if a man should say
+πολιτικὴ governs the gods because it gives orders about all things in
+the communty.
+
+APPENDIX
+
+On ἐπισπήμη, from I. Post. Analyt. chap. i. and ii.
+
+(Such parts only are translated as throw light on the Ethics.)
+
+All teaching, and all intellectual learning, proceeds on the basis of
+previous knowledge, as will appear on an examination of all. The
+Mathematical Sciences, and every other system, draw their conclusions
+in this method. So too of reasonings, whether by syllogism, or
+induction: for both teach through what is previously known, the former
+assuming the premisses as from wise men, the latter proving universals
+from the evidentness of the particulars. In like manner too
+rhetoricians persuade, either through examples (which amounts to
+induction), or through enthymemes (which amounts to syllogism).
+
+ CHAP. II
+
+Well, we suppose that we _know_ things (in the strict and proper sense
+of the word) when we suppose ourselves to know the cause by reason of
+which the thing is to be the cause of it; and that this cannot be
+otherwise. It is plain that the idea intended to be conveyed by the
+term _knowing_ is something of this kind; because they who do not
+really know suppose themselves thus related to the matter in hand and
+they who do know really are so that of whatsoever there is properly
+speaking Knowledge this cannot be otherwise than it is Whether or no
+there is another way of knowing we will say afterwards, but we do say
+that we know through demonstration, by which I mean a syllogism apt to
+produce Knowledge, i.e. in right of which through having it, we know.
+
+If Knowledge then is such as we have described it, the Knowledge
+produced by demonstrative reasoning must be drawn from premisses _true_
+and _first_, and _incapable of syllogistic proof_, and _better known_,
+and _prior in order of time_, and _causes of the conclusion_, for so
+the principles will be akin to the conclusion demonstrated.
+
+(Syllogism, of course there may be without such premisses, but it will
+not be demonstration because it will not produce knowledge).
+
+_True_, they must be, because it is impossible to know that which is
+not.
+
+_First_, that is indemonstrable, because, if demonstrable, he cannot be
+said to _know_ them who has no demonstration of them for knowing such
+things as are demonstrable is the same as having demonstration of them.
+
+_Causes_ they must be, and _better known_, and _prior_ in time,
+_causes_, because we then know when we are acquainted with the cause,
+and _prior_, if causes, and _known beforehand_, not merely comprehended
+in idea but known to exist (The terms prior, and better known, bear two
+senses for _prior by nature_ and _prior relatively to ourselves_ are
+not the same, nor _better known by nature_, and _better known to us_ I
+mean, by _prior_ and _better known relatively to ourselves_, such
+things as are nearer to sensation, but abstractedly so such as are
+further Those are furthest which are most universal those nearest which
+are particulars, and these are mutually opposed.)
+
+And by _first_, I mean _principles akin to the conclusion_, for
+principle means the same as first And the principle or first step in
+demonstration is a proposition incapable of syllogistic proof, _i.e._
+one to which there is none prior. Now of such syllogistic principles I
+call that a θέσις which you cannot demonstrate, and which is
+unnecessary with a view to learning something else. That which is
+necessary in order to learn something else is an Axiom.
+
+Further, since one is to believe and know the thing by having a
+syllogism of the kind called demonstration, and what constitutes it to
+be such is the nature of the premisses, it is necessary not merely to
+_know before_, but to _know better than the conclusion_, either all or
+at least some of, the principles, because that which is the cause of a
+quality inhering in something else always inheres itself more as the
+cause of our loving is itself more lovable. So, since the principles
+are the cause of our knowing and behoving we know and believe them
+more, because by reason of them we know also the conclusion following.
+
+Further: the man who is to have the Knowledge which comes through
+demonstration must not merely know and believe his principles better
+than he does his conclusion, but he must believe nothing more firmly
+than the contradictories of those principles out of which the contrary
+fallacy may be constructed: since he who _knows_, is to be simply and
+absolutely infallible.
+
+BOOK VII
+
+Chapter I.
+
+Next we must take a different point to start from,[1] and observe that
+of what is to be avoided in respect of moral character there are three
+forms; Vice, Imperfect Self-Control, and Brutishness. Of the two former
+it is plain what the contraries are, for we call the one Virtue, the
+other Self-Control; and as answering to Brutishness it will be most
+suitable to assign Superhuman, i.e. heroical and godlike Virtue, as, in
+Homer, Priam says of Hector "that he was very excellent, nor was he
+like the offspring of mortal man, but of a god." and so, if, as is
+commonly said, men are raised to the position of gods by reason of very
+high excellence in Virtue, the state opposed to the Brutish will
+plainly be of this nature: because as brutes are not virtuous or
+vicious so neither are gods; but the state of these is something more
+precious than Virtue, of the former something different in kind from
+Vice.
+
+And as, on the one hand, it is a rare thing for a man to be godlike (a
+term the Lacedæmonians are accustomed to use when they admire a man
+exceedingly; σεῖος ἀνὴρ  they call him), so the brutish man is rare;
+the character is found most among barbarians, and some cases of it are
+caused by disease or maiming; also such men as exceed in vice all
+ordinary measures we therefore designate by this opprobrious term.
+Well, we must in a subsequent place make some mention of this
+disposition, and Vice has been spoken of before: for the present we
+must speak of Imperfect Self-Control and its kindred faults of Softness
+and Luxury, on the one hand, and of Self-Control and Endurance on the
+other; since we are to conceive of them, not as being the same states
+exactly as Virtue and Vice respectively, nor again as differing in
+kind.
+
+And we should adopt the same course as before, i.e. state the
+phenomena, and, after raising and discussing difficulties which suggest
+themselves, then exhibit, if possible, all the opinions afloat
+respecting these affections of the moral character; or, if not all, the
+greater part and the most important: for we may consider we have
+illustrated the matter sufficiently when the difficulties have been
+solved, and such theories as are most approved are left as a residuum.
+
+The chief points may be thus enumerated. It is thought,
+
+I. That Self-Control and Endurance belong to the class of things good
+and praiseworthy, while Imperfect Self-Control and Softness belong to
+that of things low and blameworthy.
+
+II. That the man of Self-Control is identical with the man who is apt
+to abide by his resolution, and the man of Imperfect Self-Control with
+him who is apt to depart from his resolution.
+
+III. That the man of Imperfect Self-Control does things at the
+instigation of his passions, knowing them to be wrong, while the man of
+Self-Control, knowing his lusts to be wrong, refuses, by the influence
+of reason, to follow their suggestions.
+
+IV. That the man of Perfected Self-Mastery unites the qualities of
+Self-Control and Endurance, and some say that every one who unites
+these is a man of Perfect Self-Mastery, others do not.
+
+V. Some confound the two characters of the man who has _no_
+Self-Control, and the man of _Imperfect Self-Control_, while others
+distinguish between them.
+
+VI. It is sometimes said that the man of Practical Wisdom cannot be a
+man of Imperfect Self-Control, sometimes that men who are Practically
+Wise and Clever are of Imperfect Self-Control.
+
+VII. Again, men are said to be of Imperfect Self-Control, not simply
+but with the addition of the thing wherein, as in respect of anger, of
+honour, and gain.
+
+These then are pretty well the common statements.
+
+Chapter II.
+
+Now a man may raise a question as to the nature of the right conception
+in violation of which a man fails of Self-Control.
+
+That he can so fail when _knowing_ in the strict sense what is right
+some say is impossible: for it is a strange thing, as Socrates thought,
+that while Knowledge is present in his mind something else should
+master him and drag him about like a slave. Socrates in fact contended
+generally against the theory, maintaining there is no such state as
+that of Imperfect Self-Control, for that no one acts contrary to what
+is best conceiving it to be best but by reason of ignorance what is
+best.
+
+With all due respect to Socrates, his account of the matter is at
+variance with plain facts, and we must enquire with respect to the
+affection, if it be caused by ignorance what is the nature of the
+ignorance: for that the man so failing does not suppose his acts to be
+right before he is under the influence of passion is quite plain.[2]
+
+There are people who partly agree with Socrates and partly not: that
+nothing can be stronger than Knowledge they agree, but that no man acts
+in contravention of his conviction of what is better they do not agree;
+and so they say that it is not Knowledge, but only Opinion, which the
+man in question has and yet yields to the instigation of his pleasures.
+
+But then, if it is Opinion and not Knowledge, that is it the opposing
+conception be not strong but only mild (as in the case of real doubt),
+the not abiding by it in the face of strong lusts would be excusable:
+but wickedness is not excusable, nor is anything which deserves blame.
+
+Well then, is it Practical Wisdom which in this case offers opposition:
+for that is the strongest principle? The supposition is absurd, for we
+shall have the same man uniting Practical Wisdom and Imperfect
+Self-Control, and surely no single person would maintain that it is
+consistent with the character of Practical Wisdom to do voluntarily
+what is very wrong; and besides we have shown before that the very mark
+of a man of this character is aptitude to act, as distinguished from
+mere knowledge of what is right; because he is a man conversant with
+particular details, and possessed of all the other virtues.
+
+Again, if the having strong and bad lusts is necessary to the idea of
+the man of Self-Control, this character cannot be identical with the
+man of Perfected Self-Mastery, because the having strong desires or bad
+ones does not enter into the idea of this latter character: and yet the
+man of Self-Control must have such: for suppose them good; then the
+moral state which should hinder a man from following their suggestions
+must be bad, and so Self-Control would not be in all cases good:
+suppose them on the other hand to be weak and not wrong, it would be
+nothing grand; nor anything great, supposing them to be wrong and weak.
+
+Again, if Self-Control makes a man apt to abide by all opinions without
+exception, it may be bad, as suppose the case of a false opinion: and
+if Imperfect Self-Control makes a man apt to depart from all without
+exception, we shall have cases where it will be good; take that of
+Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes of Sophocles, for instance: he is to be
+praised for not abiding by what he was persuaded to by Ulysses, because
+he was pained at being guilty of falsehood.
+
+Or again, false sophistical reasoning presents a difficulty: for
+because men wish to prove paradoxes that they may be counted clever
+when they succeed, the reasoning that has been used becomes a
+difficulty: for the intellect is fettered; a man being unwilling to
+abide by the conclusion because it does not please his judgment, but
+unable to advance because he cannot disentangle the web of sophistical
+reasoning.
+
+Or again, it is conceivable on this supposition that folly joined with
+Imperfect Self-Control may turn out, in a given case, goodness: for by
+reason of his imperfection of self-control a man acts in a way which
+contradicts his notions; now his notion is that what is really good is
+bad and ought not to be done; and so he will eventually do what is good
+and not what is bad.
+
+Again, on the same supposition, the man who acting on conviction
+pursues and chooses things because they are pleasant must be thought a
+better man than he who does so not by reason of a quasi-rational
+conviction but of Imperfect Self-Control: because he is more open to
+cure by reason of the possibility of his receiving a contrary
+conviction. But to the man of Imperfect Self-Control would apply the
+proverb, "when water chokes, what should a man drink then?" for had he
+never been convinced at all in respect of what he does,[3] then by a
+conviction in a contrary direction he might have stopped in his course;
+but now though he has had convictions he notwithstanding acts against
+them.
+
+Again, if any and every thing is the object-matter of Imperfect and
+Perfect Self-Control, who is the man of Imperfect Self-Control simply?
+because no one unites all cases of it, and we commonly say that some
+men are so simply, not adding any particular thing in which they are
+so.
+
+Well, the difficulties raised are pretty near such as I have described
+them, and of these theories we must remove some and leave others as
+established; because the solving of a difficulty is a positive act of
+establishing something as true.
+
+Chapter III.
+
+Now we must examine first whether men of Imperfect Self-Control act
+with a knowledge of what is right or not: next, if with such knowledge,
+in what sense; and next what are we to assume is the object-matter of
+the man of Imperfect Self-Control, and of the man of Self-Control; I
+mean, whether pleasure and pain of all kinds or certain definite ones;
+and as to Self-Control and Endurance, whether these are designations of
+the same character or different. And in like manner we must go into all
+questions which are connected with the present.
+
+But the real starting point of the enquiry is, whether the two
+characters of Self-Control and Imperfect Self-Control are distinguished
+by their object-matter, or their respective relations to it. I mean,
+whether the man of Imperfect Self-Control is such simply by virtue of
+having such and such object-matter; or not, but by virtue of his being
+related to it in such and such a way, or by virtue of both: next,
+whether Self-Control and Imperfect Self-Control are unlimited in their
+object-matter: because he who is designated without any addition a man
+of Imperfect Self-Control is not unlimited in his object-matter, but
+has exactly the same as the man who has lost all Self-Control: nor is
+he so designated because of his relation to this object-matter merely
+(for then his character would be identical with that just mentioned,
+loss of all Self-Control), but because of his relation to it being such
+and such. For the man who has lost all Self-Control is led on with
+deliberate moral choice, holding that it is his line to pursue pleasure
+as it rises: while the man of Imperfect Self-Control does not think
+that he ought to pursue it, but does pursue it all the same.
+
+Now as to the notion that it is True Opinion and not Knowledge in
+contravention of which men fail in Self-Control, it makes no difference
+to the point in question, because some of those who hold Opinions have
+no doubt about them but suppose themselves to have accurate Knowledge;
+if then it is urged that men holding Opinions will be more likely than
+men who have Knowledge to act in contravention of their conceptions, as
+having but a moderate belief in them; we reply, Knowledge will not
+differ in this respect from Opinion: because some men believe their own
+Opinions no less firmly than others do their positive Knowledge:
+Heraclitus is a case in point.
+
+Rather the following is the account of it: the term _knowing_ has two
+senses; both the man who does not use his Knowledge, and he who does,
+are said to _know_: there will be a difference between a man's acting
+wrongly, who though possessed of Knowledge does not call it into
+operation, and his doing so who has it and actually exercises it: the
+latter is a strange case, but the mere having, if not exercising,
+presents no anomaly.
+
+Again, as there are two kinds of propositions affecting action,[4]
+universal and particular, there is no reason why a man may not act
+against his Knowledge, having both propositions in his mind, using the
+universal but not the particular, for the particulars are the objects
+of moral action.
+
+There is a difference also in universal propositions;[5] a universal
+proposition may relate partly to a man's self and partly to the thing
+in question: take the following for instance; "dry food is good for
+every man," this may have the two minor premisses, "this is a man," and
+"so and so is dry food;" but whether a given substance is so and so a
+man either has not the Knowledge or does not exert it. According to
+these different senses there will be an immense difference, so that for
+a man to _know_ in the one sense, and yet act wrongly, would be nothing
+strange, but in any of the other senses it would be a matter for
+wonder.
+
+Again, men may have Knowledge in a way different from any of those
+which have been now stated: for we constantly see a man's state so
+differing by having and not using Knowledge, that he has it in a sense
+and also has not; when a man is asleep, for instance, or mad, or drunk:
+well, men under the actual operation of passion are in exactly similar
+conditions; for anger, lust, and some other such-like things,
+manifestly make changes even in the body, and in some they even cause
+madness; it is plain then that we must say the men of Imperfect
+Self-Control are in a state similar to these.
+
+And their saying what embodies Knowledge is no proof of their actually
+then exercising it, because they who are under the operation of these
+passions repeat demonstrations; or verses of Empedocles,[6] just as
+children, when first learning, string words together, but as yet know
+nothing of their meaning, because they must grow into it, and this is a
+process requiring time: so that we must suppose these men who fail in
+Self-Control to say these moral sayings just as actors do.
+
+Furthermore, a man may look at the account of the phænomenon in the
+following way, from an examination of the actual working of the mind:
+All action may be analysed into a syllogism, in which the one premiss
+is an universal maxim and the other concerns particulars of which Sense
+[moral or physical, as the case may be] is cognisant: now when one
+results from these two, it follows necessarily that, as far as theory
+goes the mind must assert the conclusion, and in practical propositions
+the man must act accordingly.
+
+For instance, let the universal be, "All that is sweet should be
+tasted," the particular, "This is sweet;" it follows necessarily that
+he who is able and is not hindered should not only draw, but put in
+practice, the conclusion "This is to be tasted." When then there is in
+the mind one universal proposition forbidding to taste, and the other
+"All that is sweet is pleasant" with its minor "This is sweet" (which
+is the one that really works), and desire happens to be in the man, the
+first universal bids him avoid this but the desire leads him on to
+taste; for it has the power of moving the various organs: and so it
+results that he fails in Self-Control, in a certain sense under the
+influence of Reason and Opinion not contrary in itself to Reason but
+only accidentally so; because it is the desire that is contrary to
+Right Reason, but not the Opinion:[7] and so for this reason brutes are
+not accounted of Imperfect Self-Control, because they have no power of
+conceiving universals but only of receiving and retaining particular
+impressions.
+
+As to the manner in which the ignorance is removed and the man of
+Imperfect Self-Control recovers his Knowledge, the account is the same
+as with respect to him who is drunk or asleep, and is not peculiar to
+this affection, so physiologists[8] are the right people to apply to.
+But whereas the minor premiss of every practical syllogism is an
+opinion on matter cognisable by Sense and determines the actions; he
+who is under the influence of passion either has not this, or so has it
+that his having does not amount to _knowing_ but merely saying, as a
+man when drunk might repeat Empedocles' verses; and because the minor
+term[9] is neither universal, nor is thought to have the power of
+producing Knowledge in like manner as the universal term: and so the
+result which Socrates was seeking comes out, that is to say, the
+affection does not take place in the presence of that which is thought
+to be specially and properly Knowledge, nor is this dragged about by
+reason of the affection, but in the presence of that Knowledge which is
+conveyed by Sense.
+
+Let this account then be accepted of the question respecting the
+failure in Self-Control, whether it is with Knowledge, and the manner
+in which such failure is possible or not, though a man possesses
+Knowledge.
+
+Chapter IV.
+
+The next question to be discussed is whether there is a character to be
+designated by the term "of Imperfect Self-Control" simply, or whether
+all who are so are to be accounted such, in respect of some particular
+thing; and, if there is such a character, what is his object-matter.
+
+Now that pleasures and pains are the object-matter of men of
+Self-Control and of Endurance, and also of men of Imperfect
+Self-Control and Softness, is plain.
+
+Further, things which produce pleasure are either necessary, or objects
+of choice in themselves but yet admitting of excess. All bodily things
+which produce pleasure are necessary; and I call such those which
+relate to food and other grosser appetities, in short such bodily
+things as we assumed were the Object-matter of absence of Self-Control
+and of Perfected Self-Mastery.
+
+The other class of objects are not necessary, but objects of choice in
+themselves: I mean, for instance, victory, honour, wealth, and
+such-like good or pleasant things. And those who are excessive in their
+liking for such things contrary to the principle of Right Reason which
+is in their own breasts we do not designate men of Imperfect
+Self-Control simply, but with the addition of the thing wherein, as in
+respect of money, or gain, or honour, or anger, and not simply; because
+we consider them as different characters and only having that title in
+right of a kind of resemblance (as when we add to a man's name
+"conqueror in the Olympic games" the account of him as Man differs but
+little from the account of him as the Man who conquered in the Olympic
+games, but still it is different). And a proof of the real difference
+between these so designated with an addition and those simply so called
+is this, that Imperfect Self-Control is blamed, not as an error merely
+but also as being a vice, either wholly or partially; but none of these
+other cases is so blamed.
+
+But of those who have for their object-matter the bodily enjoyments,
+which we say are also the object-matter of the man of Perfected
+Self-Mastery and the man who has lost all Self-Control, he that pursues
+excessive pleasures and too much avoids[10] things which are painful
+(as hunger and thirst, heat and cold, and everything connected with
+touch and taste), not from moral choice but in spite of his moral
+choice and intellectual conviction, is termed "a man of Imperfect
+Self-Control," not with the addition of any particular object-matter as
+we do in respect of want of control of anger but simply.
+
+And a proof that the term is thus applied is that the kindred term
+"Soft" is used in respect of these enjoyments but not in respect of any
+of those others. And for this reason we put into the same rank the man
+of Imperfect Self-Control, the man who has lost it entirely, the man
+who has it, and the man of Perfected Self-Mastery; but not any of those
+other characters, because the former have for their object-matter the
+same pleasures and pains: but though they have the same object-matter,
+they are not related to it in the same way, but two of them act upon
+moral choice, two without it. And so we should say that man is more
+entirely given up to his passions who pursues excessive pleasures, and
+avoids moderate pains, being either not at all, or at least but little,
+urged by desire, than the man who does so because his desire is very
+strong: because we think what would the former be likely to do if he
+had the additional stimulus of youthful lust and violent pain
+consequent on the want of those pleasures which we have denominated
+necessary?
+
+Well then, since of desires and pleasures there are some which are in
+kind honourable and good (because things pleasant are divisible, as we
+said before, into such as are naturally objects of choice, such as are
+naturally objects of avoidance, and such as are in themselves
+indifferent, money, gain, honour, victory, for instance); in respect of
+all such and those that are indifferent, men are blamed not merely[11]
+for being affected by or desiring or liking them, but for exceeding in
+any way in these feelings.
+
+And so they are blamed, whosoever in spite of Reason are mastered by,
+that is pursue, any object, though in its nature noble and good; they,
+for instance, who are more earnest than they should be respecting
+honour, or their children or parents; not but what these are good
+objects and men are praised for being earnest about them: but still
+they admit of excess; for instance, if any one, as Niobe did, should
+fight even against the gods, or feel towards his father as Satyrus, who
+got therefrom the nickname of φιλοπάτωρ, because he was thought to be
+very foolish.
+
+Now depravity there is none in regard of these things, for the reason
+assigned above, that each of them in itself is a thing naturally
+choice-worthy, yet the excesses in respect of them are wrong and matter
+for blame: and similarly there is no Imperfect Self-Control in respect
+of these things; that being not merely a thing that should be avoided
+but blameworthy.
+
+But because of the resemblance of the affection to the Imperfection of
+Self-Control the term is used with the addition in each case of the
+particular object-matter, just as men call a man a bad physician, or
+bad actor, whom they would not think of calling simply bad. As then in
+these cases we do not apply the term simply because each of the states
+is not a vice, but only like a vice in the way of analogy,[12] so it is
+plain that in respect of Imperfect Self-Control and Self-Control we
+must limit the names to those states which have the same object-matter
+as Perfected Self-Mastery and utter loss of Self-Control, and that we
+do apply it to the case of anger only in the way of resemblance: for
+which reason, with an addition, we designate a man of Imperfect
+Self-Control in respect of anger, as of honour or of gain.
+
+Chapter V.
+
+As there are some things naturally pleasant, and of these two kinds;
+those, namely, which are pleasant generally, and those which are so
+relatively to particular kinds of animals and men; so there are others
+which are not naturally pleasant but which come to be so in consequence
+either of maimings, or custom, or depraved natural tastes: and one may
+observe moral states similar to those we have been speaking of, having
+respectively these classes of things for their object-matter.
+
+I mean the Brutish, as in the case of the female who, they say, would
+rip up women with child and eat the foetus; or the tastes which are
+found among the savage tribes bordering on the Pontus, some liking raw
+flesh, and some being cannibals, and some lending one another their
+children to make feasts of; or what is said of Phalaris. These are
+instances of Brutish states, caused in some by disease or madness;
+take, for instance, the man who sacrificed and ate his mother, or him
+who devoured the liver of his fellow-servant. Instances again of those
+caused by disease or by custom, would be, plucking out of hair, or
+eating one's nails, or eating coals and earth.[13] Now wherever nature
+is really the cause no one would think of calling men of Imperfect
+Self-Control, ... nor, in like manner, such as are in a diseased state
+through custom.
+
+The having any of these inclinations is something foreign to what is
+denominated Vice, just as Brutishness is: and when a man has them his
+mastering them is not properly Self-Control, nor his being mastered by
+them Imperfection of Self-Control in the proper sense, but only in the
+way of resemblance; just as we may say a man of ungovernable wrath
+fails of Self-Control in respect of anger but not simply fails of
+Self-Control. For all excessive folly, cowardice, absence of
+Self-Control, or irritability, are either Brutish or morbid. The man,
+for instance, who is naturally afraid of all things, even if a mouse
+should stir, is cowardly after a Brutish sort; there was a man again
+who, by reason of disease, was afraid of a cat: and of the fools, they
+who are naturally destitute of Reason and live only by Sense are
+Brutish, as are some tribes of the far-off barbarians, while others who
+are so by reason of diseases, epileptic or frantic, are in morbid
+states.
+
+So then, of these inclinations, a man may sometimes merely have one
+without yielding to it: I mean, suppose that Phalaris had restrained
+his unnatural desire to eat a child: or he may both have and yield to
+it. As then Vice when such as belongs to human nature is called Vice
+simply, while the other is so called with the addition of "brutish" or
+"morbid," but not simply Vice, so manifestly there is Brutish and
+Morbid Imperfection of Self-Control, but that alone is entitled to the
+name without any qualification which is of the nature of utter absence
+of Self-Control, as it is found in Man.
+
+Chapter VI.
+
+It is plain then that the object-matter of Imperfect Self-Control and
+Self-Control is restricted to the same as that of utter absence of
+Self-Control and that of Perfected Self-Mastery, and that the rest is
+the object-matter of a different species so named metaphorically and
+not simply: we will now examine the position, "that Imperfect
+Self-Control in respect of Anger is less disgraceful than that in
+respect of Lusts."
+
+In the first place, it seems that Anger does in a way listen to Reason
+but mishears it; as quick servants who run out before they have heard
+the whole of what is said and then mistake the order; dogs, again, bark
+at the slightest stir, before they have seen whether it be friend or
+foe; just so Anger, by reason of its natural heat and quickness,
+listening to Reason, but without having heard the command of Reason,
+rushes to its revenge. That is to say, Reason or some impression on the
+mind shows there is insolence or contempt[14] in the offender, and then
+Anger, reasoning as it were that one ought to fight against what is
+such, fires up immediately: whereas Lust, if Reason or Sense, as the
+case may be, merely says a thing is sweet, rushes to the enjoyment of
+it: and so Anger follows Reason in a manner, but Lust does not and is
+therefore more disgraceful: because he that cannot control his anger
+yields in a manner to Reason, but the other to his Lust and not to
+Reason at all.
+
+Again, a man is more excusable for following such desires as are
+natural, just as he is for following such Lusts as are common to all
+and to that degree in which they are common. Now Anger and irritability
+are more natural than Lusts when in excess and for objects not
+necessary. (This was the ground of the defence the man made who beat
+his father, "My father," he said, "used to beat his, and his father his
+again, and this little fellow here," pointing to his child, "will beat
+me when he is grown a man: it runs in the family." And the father, as
+he was being dragged along, bid his son leave off beating him at the
+door, because he had himself been used to drag his father so far and no
+farther.)
+
+Again, characters are less unjust in proportion as they involve less
+insidiousness. Now the Angry man is not insidious, nor is Anger, but
+quite open: but Lust is: as they say of Venus,
+
+"Cyprus-born Goddess, _weaver of deceits_"
+
+Or Homer of the girdle called the Cestus,
+
+"Persuasiveness _cheating_ e'en the subtlest mind."
+
+And so since this kind of Imperfect Self-Control is more unjust, it is
+also more disgraceful than that in respect of Anger, and is simply
+Imperfect Self-Control, and Vice in a certain sense.
+
+Again, no man feels pain in being insolent, but every one who acts
+through Anger does act with pain; and he who acts insolently does it
+with pleasure. If then those things are most unjust with which we have
+most right to be angry, then Imperfect Self-Control, arising from Lust,
+is more so than that arising from Anger: because in Anger there is no
+insolence.[15]
+
+Well then, it is clear that Imperfect Self-Control in respect of Lusts
+is more disgraceful than that in respect of Anger, and that the
+object-matter of Self-Control, and the Imperfection of it, are bodily
+Lusts and pleasures; but of these last we must take into account the
+differences; for, as was said at the commencement, some are proper to
+the human race and natural both in kind and degree, others Brutish, and
+others caused by maimings and diseases.
+
+Now the first of these only are the object-matter of Perfected
+Self-Mastery and utter absence of Self-Control; and therefore we never
+attribute either of these states to Brutes (except metaphorically, and
+whenever any one kind of animal differs entirely from another in
+insolence, mischievousness, or voracity), because they have not moral
+choice or process of deliberation, but are quite different from that
+kind of creature just as are madmen from other men.
+
+Brutishness is not so low in the scale as Vice, yet it is to be
+regarded with more fear: because it is not that the highest principle
+has been corrupted, as in the human creature, but the subject has it
+not at all.
+
+It is much the same, therefore, as if one should compare an inanimate
+with an animate being, which were the worse: for the badness of that
+which has no principle of origination is always less harmful; now
+Intellect is a principle of origination. A similar case would be the
+comparing injustice and an unjust man together: for in different ways
+each is the worst: a bad man would produce ten thousand times as much
+harm as a bad brute.
+
+Chapter VII.
+
+Now with respect to the pleasures and pains which come to a man through
+Touch and Taste, and the desiring or avoiding such (which we determined
+before to constitute the object-matter of the states of utter absence
+of Self-Control and Perfected Self-Mastery), one may be so disposed as
+to yield to temptations to which most men would be superior, or to be
+superior to those to which most men would yield: in respect of
+pleasures, these characters will be respectively the man of Imperfect
+Self-Control, and the man of Self-Control; and, in respect of pains,
+the man of Softness and the man of Endurance: but the moral state of
+most men is something between the two, even though they lean somewhat
+to the worse characters.
+
+Again, since of the pleasures indicated some are necessary and some are
+not, others are so to a certain degree but not the excess or defect of
+them, and similarly also of Lusts and pains, the man who pursues the
+excess of pleasant things, or such as are in themselves excess, or from
+moral choice, for their own sake, and not for anything else which is to
+result from them, is a man utterly void of Self-Control: for he must be
+incapable of remorse, and so incurable, because he that has not remorse
+is incurable. (He that has too little love of pleasure is the opposite
+character, and the man of Perfected Self-Mastery the mean character.)
+He is of a similar character who avoids the bodily pains, not because
+he _cannot_, but because he _chooses not to_, withstand them.
+
+But of the characters who go wrong without _choosing_ so to do, the one
+is led on by reason of pleasure, the other because he avoids the pain
+it would cost him to deny his lust; and so they are different the one
+from the other. Now every one would pronounce a man worse for doing
+something base without any impulse of desire, or with a very slight
+one, than for doing the same from the impulse of a very strong desire;
+for striking a man when not angry than if he did so in wrath: because
+one naturally says, "What would he have done had he been under the
+influence of passion?" (and on this ground, by the bye, the man utterly
+void of Self-Control is worse than he who has it imperfectly). However,
+of the two characters which have been mentioned,[16] [as included in
+that of utter absence of Self-Control], the one is rather Softness, the
+other properly the man of no Self-Control.
+
+Furthermore, to the character of Imperfect Self-Control is opposed that
+of Self-Control, and to that of Softness that of Endurance: because
+Endurance consists in continued resistance but Self-Control in actual
+mastery, and continued resistance and actual mastery are as different
+as not being conquered is from conquering; and so Self-Control is more
+choice-worthy than Endurance.
+
+Again, he who fails when exposed to those temptations against which the
+common run of men hold out, and are well able to do so, is Soft and
+Luxurious (Luxury being a kind of Softness): the kind of man, I mean,
+to let his robe drag in the dirt to avoid the trouble of lifting it,
+and who, aping the sick man, does not however suppose himself wretched
+though he is like a wretched man. So it is too with respect to
+Self-Control and the Imperfection of it: if a man yields to pleasures
+or pains which are violent and excessive it is no matter for wonder,
+but rather for allowance if he made what resistance he could (instances
+are, Philoctetes in Theodectes' drama when wounded by the viper; or
+Cercyon in the Alope of Carcinus, or men who in trying to suppress
+laughter burst into a loud continuous fit of it, as happened, you
+remember, to Xenophantus), but it is a matter for wonder when a man
+yields to and cannot contend against those pleasures or pains which the
+common herd are able to resist; always supposing his failure not to be
+owing to natural constitution or disease, I mean, as the Scythian kings
+are constitutionally Soft, or the natural difference between the sexes.
+
+Again, the man who is a slave to amusement is commonly thought to be
+destitute of Self-Control, but he really is Soft; because amusement is
+an act of relaxing, being an act of resting, and the character in
+question is one of those who exceed due bounds in respect of this.
+
+Moreover of Imperfect Self-Control there are two forms, Precipitancy
+and Weakness: those who have it in the latter form though they have
+made resolutions do not abide by them by reason of passion; the others
+are led by passion because they have never formed any resolutions at
+all: while there are some who, like those who by tickling themselves
+beforehand get rid of ticklishness, having felt and seen beforehand the
+approach of temptation, and roused up themselves and their resolution,
+yield not to passion; whether the temptation be somewhat pleasant or
+somewhat painful. The Precipitate form of Imperfect Self-Control they
+are most liable to who are constitutionally of a sharp or melancholy
+temperament: because the one by reason of the swiftness, the other by
+reason of the violence, of their passions, do not wait for Reason,
+because they are disposed to follow whatever notion is impressed upon
+their minds.
+
+Again, the man utterly destitute of Self-Control, as was observed
+before, is not given to remorse: for it is part of his character that
+he abides by his moral choice: but the man of Imperfect Self-Control is
+almost made up of remorse: and so the case is not as we determined it
+before, but the former is incurable and the latter may be cured: for
+depravity is like chronic diseases, dropsy and consumption for
+instance, but Imperfect Self-Control is like acute disorders: the
+former being a continuous evil, the latter not so. And, in fact,
+Imperfect Self-Control and Confirmed Vice are different in kind: the
+latter being imperceptible to its victim, the former not so.[17]
+
+But, of the different forms of Imperfect Self-Control, those are better
+who are carried off their feet by a sudden access of temptation than
+they who have Reason but do not abide by it; these last being overcome
+by passion less in degree, and not wholly without premeditation as are
+the others: for the man of Imperfect Self-Control is like those who are
+soon intoxicated and by little wine and less than the common run of
+men.
+
+Well then, that Imperfection of Self-Control is not Confirmed
+Viciousness is plain: and yet perhaps it is such in a way, because in
+one sense it is contrary to moral choice and in another the result of
+it:[18] at all events, in respect of the actions, the case is much like
+what Demodocus said of the Miletians. "The people of Miletus are not
+fools, but they do just the kind of things that fools do;" and so they
+of Imperfect Self-Control are not unjust, but they do unjust acts.
+
+But to resume. Since the man of Imperfect Self-Control is of such a
+character as to follow bodily pleasures in excess and in defiance of
+Right Reason, without acting on any deliberate conviction, whereas the
+man utterly destitute of Self-Control does act upon a conviction which
+rests on his natural inclination to follow after these pleasures; the
+former may be easily persuaded to a different course, but the latter
+not: for Virtue and Vice respectively preserve and corrupt the moral
+principle; now the motive is the principle or starting point in moral
+actions, just as axioms and postulates are in mathematics: and neither
+in morals nor mathematics is it Reason which is apt to teach the
+principle; but Excellence, either natural or acquired by custom, in
+holding right notions with respect to the principle. He who does this
+in morals is the man of Perfected Self-Mastery, and the contrary
+character is the man utterly destitute of Self-Control.
+
+Again, there is a character liable to be taken off his feet in defiance
+of Right Reason because of passion; whom passion so far masters as to
+prevent his acting in accordance with Right Reason, but not so far as
+to make him be convinced that it is his proper line to follow after
+such pleasures without limit: this character is the man of Imperfect
+Self- Control, better than he who is utterly destitute of it, and not a
+bad man simply and without qualification: because in him the highest
+and best part, i.e. principle, is preserved: and there is another
+character opposed to him who is apt to abide by his resolutions, and
+not to depart from them; at all events, not at the instigation of
+passion.
+
+It is evident then from all this, that Self-Control is a good state and
+the Imperfection of it a bad one.
+
+Chapter VIII.
+
+Next comes the question, whether a man is a man of Self-Control for
+abiding by his conclusions and moral choice be they of what kind they
+may, or only by the right one; or again, a man of Imperfect
+Self-Control for not abiding by his conclusions and moral choice be
+they of whatever kind; or, to put the case we did before, is he such
+for not abiding by false conclusions and wrong moral choice?
+
+Is not this the truth, that _incidentally_ it is by conclusions and
+moral choice of any kind that the one character abides and the other
+does not, but _per se_ true conclusions and right moral choice:[19] to
+explain what is meant by incidentally, and _per se_; suppose a man
+chooses or pursues this thing for the sake of that, he is said to
+pursue and choose that _per se_, but this only incidentally. For the
+term _per se_ we use commonly the word "simply," and so, in a way, it
+is opinion of any kind soever by which the two characters respectively
+abide or not, but he is "simply" entitled to the designations who
+abides or not by the true opinion.
+
+There are also people, who have a trick of abiding by their, own
+opinions, who are commonly called Positive, as they who are hard to be
+persuaded, and whose convictions are not easily changed: now these
+people bear some resemblance to the character of Self-Control, just as
+the prodigal to the liberal or the rash man to the brave, but they are
+different in many points. The man of Self-Control does not change by
+reason of passion and lust, yet when occasion so requires he will be
+easy of persuasion: but the Positive man changes not at the call of
+Reason, though many of this class take up certain desires and are led
+by their pleasures. Among the class of Positive are the Opinionated,
+the Ignorant, and the Bearish: the first, from the motives of pleasure
+and pain: I mean, they have the pleasurable feeling of a kind of
+victory in not having their convictions changed, and they are pained
+when their decrees, so to speak, are reversed: so that, in fact, they
+rather resemble the man of Imperfect Self-Control than the man of
+Self-Control.
+
+Again, there are some who depart from their resolutions not by reason
+of any Imperfection of Self-Control; take, for instance, Neoptolemus in
+the Philoctetes of Sophocles. Here certainly pleasure was the motive of
+his departure from his resolution, but then it was one of a noble sort:
+for to be truthful was noble in his eyes and he had been persuaded by
+Ulysses to lie.
+
+So it is not every one who acts from the motive of pleasure who is
+utterly destitute of Self-Control or base or of Imperfect Self-Control,
+only he who acts from the impulse of a base pleasure.
+
+Chapter IX.
+
+Moreover as there is a character who takes less pleasure than he ought
+in bodily enjoyments, and he also fails to abide by the conclusion of
+his Reason,[20] the man of Self-Control is the mean between him and the
+man of Imperfect Self-Control: that is to say, the latter fails to
+abide by them because of somewhat too much, the former because of
+somewhat too little; while the man of Self-Control abides by them, and
+never changes by reason of anything else than such conclusions.
+
+Now of course since Self-Control is good both the contrary States must
+be bad, as indeed they plainly are: but because the one of them is seen
+in few persons, and but rarely in them, Self-Control comes to be viewed
+as if opposed only to the Imperfection of it, just as Perfected
+Self-Mastery is thought to be opposed only to utter want of
+Self-Control.
+
+Again, as many terms are used in the way of similitude, so people have
+come to talk of the Self-Control of the man of Perfected Self-Mastery
+in the way of similitude: for the man of Self-Control and the man of
+Perfected Self-Mastery have this in common, that they do nothing
+against Right Reason on the impulse of bodily pleasures, but then the
+former has bad desires, the latter not; and the latter is so
+constituted as not even to feel pleasure contrary to his Reason, the
+former feels but does not yield to it.
+
+Like again are the man of Imperfect Self-Control and he who is utterly
+destitute of it, though in reality distinct: both follow bodily
+pleasures, but the latter under a notion that it is the proper line for
+him to take, his former without any such notion.
+
+And it is not possible for the same man to be at once a man of
+Practical Wisdom and of Imperfect Self-Control: because the character
+of Practical Wisdom includes, as we showed before, goodness of moral
+character. And again, it is not knowledge merely, but aptitude for
+action, which constitutes Practical Wisdom: and of this aptitude the
+man of Imperfect Self-Control is destitute. But there is no reason why
+the Clever man should not be of Imperfect Self-Control: and the reason
+why some men are occasionally thought to be men of Practical Wisdom,
+and yet of Imperfect Self-Control, is this, that Cleverness differs
+from Practical Wisdom in the way I stated in a former book, and is very
+near it so far as the intellectual element is concerned but differs in
+respect of the moral choice.
+
+Nor is the man of Imperfect Self-Control like the man who both has and
+calls into exercise his knowledge, but like the man who, having it, is
+overpowered by sleep or wine. Again, he acts voluntarily (because he
+knows, in a certain sense, what he does and the result of it), but he
+is not a confirmed bad man, for his moral choice is good, so he is at
+all events only half bad. Nor is he unjust, because he does not act
+with deliberate intent: for of the two chief forms of the character,
+the one is not apt to abide by his deliberate resolutions, and the
+other, the man of constitutional strength of passion, is not apt to
+deliberate at all.
+
+So in fact the man of Imperfect Self-Control is like a community which
+makes all proper enactments, and has admirable laws, only does not act
+on them, verifying the scoff of Anaxandrides,
+
+"That State did will it, which cares nought for laws;"
+
+whereas the bad man is like one which acts upon its laws, but then
+unfortunately they are bad ones.
+
+Imperfection of Self-Control and Self-Control, after all, are above the
+average state of men; because he of the latter character is more true
+to his Reason, and the former less so, than is in the power of most
+men.
+
+Again, of the two forms of Imperfect Self-Control that is more easily
+cured which they have who are constitutionally of strong passions, than
+that of those who form resolutions and break them; and they that are so
+through habituation than they that are so naturally; since of course
+custom is easier to change than nature, because the very resemblance of
+custom to nature is what constitutes the difficulty of changing it; as
+Evenus says,
+
+"Practice, I say, my friend, doth long endure,
+And at the last is even very nature."
+
+We have now said then what Self-Control is, what Imperfection of
+Self-Control, what Endurance, and what Softness, and how these states
+are mutually related.
+
+APPENDIX.
+Book VII. Chapters 12 to 15. (Bekker.)
+
+To consider the subject of Pleasure and Pain falls within the province
+of the Social-Science Philosopher, since he it is who has to fix the
+Master-End which is to guide us in dominating any object absolutely
+evil or good.
+
+But we may say more: an enquiry into their nature is absolutely
+necessary. First, because we maintained that Moral Virtue and Moral
+Vice are both concerned with Pains and Pleasures: next, because the
+greater part of mankind assert that Happiness must include Pleasure
+(which by the way accounts for the word they use, μακάριος; χαίρειν
+being the root of that word).
+
+Now some hold that no one Pleasure is good, either in itself or as a
+matter of result, because Good and Pleasure are not identical. Others
+that some Pleasures are good but the greater number bad. There is yet a
+third view; granting that every Pleasure is good, still the Chief Good
+cannot possibly be Pleasure.
+
+In support of the first opinion (that Pleasure is utterly not-good) it
+is urged that:
+
+1. Every Pleasure is a sensible process towards a complete state; but
+no such process is akin to the end to be attained: _e.g._ no process of
+building to the completed house.
+
+2. The man of Perfected Self-Mastery avoids Pleasures.
+
+3. The man of Practical Wisdom aims at avoiding Pain, not at attaining
+Pleasure.
+
+4. Pleasures are an impediment to thought, and the more so the more
+keenly they are felt. An obvious instance will readily occur.
+
+5. Pleasure cannot be referred to any Art: and yet every good is the
+result of some Art.
+
+6. Children and brutes pursue Pleasures.
+
+In support of the second (that not all Pleasures are good), That there
+are some base and matter of reproach, and some even hurtful: because
+some things that are pleasant produce disease.
+
+In support of the third (that Pleasure is not the Chief Good), That it
+is not an End but a process towards creating an End.
+
+This is, I think, a fair account of current views on the matter.
+
+But that the reasons alleged do not prove it either to be not-good or
+the Chief Good is plain from the following considerations.
+
+First. Good being either absolute or relative, of course the natures
+and states embodying it will be so too; therefore also the movements
+and the processes of creation. So, of those which are thought to be bad
+some will be bad absolutely, but relatively not bad, perhaps even
+choice-worthy; some not even choice-worthy relatively to any particular
+person, only at certain times or for a short time but not in themselves
+choice-worthy.
+
+Others again are not even Pleasures at all though they produce that
+impression on the mind: all such I mean as imply pain and whose purpose
+is cure; those of sick people, for instance.
+
+Next, since Good may be either an active working or a state, those
+[κινήσεις or γενέσεις] which tend to place us in our natural state are
+pleasant incidentally because of that tendency: but the active working
+is really in the desires excited in the remaining (sound) part of our
+state or nature: for there are Pleasures which have no connection with
+pain or desire: the acts of contemplative intellect, for instance, in
+which case there is no deficiency in the nature or state of him who
+performs the acts.
+
+A proof of this is that the same pleasant thing does not produce the
+sensation of Pleasure when the natural state is being filled up or
+completed as when it is already in its normal condition: in this latter
+case what give the sensation are things pleasant _per se_, in the
+former even those things which are contrary. I mean, you find people
+taking pleasure in sharp or bitter things of which no one is naturally
+or in itself pleasant; of course not therefore the Pleasures arising
+from them, because it is obvious that as is the classification of
+pleasant things such must be that of the Pleasures arising from them.
+
+Next, it does not follow that there must be something else better than
+any given pleasure because (as some say) the End must be better than
+the process which creates it. For it is not true that all Pleasures are
+processes or even attended by any process, but (some are) active
+workings or even Ends: in fact they result not from our coming to be
+something but from our using our powers. Again, it is not true that the
+End is, in every case, distinct from the process: it is true only in
+the case of such processes as conduce to the perfecting of the natural
+state.
+
+For which reason it is wrong to say that Pleasure is "a sensible
+process of production." For "process etc." should be substituted
+"active working of the natural state," for "sensible" "unimpeded." The
+reason of its being thought to be a "process etc." is that it is good
+in the highest sense: people confusing "active working" and "process,"
+whereas they really are distinct.
+
+Next, as to the argument that there are bad Pleasures because some
+things which are pleasant are also hurtful to health, it is the same as
+saying that some healthful things are bad for "business." In this
+sense, of course, both may be said to be bad, but then this does not
+make them out to be bad _simpliciter_: the exercise of the pure
+Intellect sometimes hurts a man's health: but what hinders Practical
+Wisdom or any state whatever is, not the Pleasure peculiar to, but some
+Pleasure foreign to it: the Pleasures arising from the exercise of the
+pure Intellect or from learning only promote each.
+
+Next. "No Pleasure is the work of any Art." What else would you expect?
+No active working is the work of any Art, only the faculty of so
+working. Still the perfumer's Art or the cook's are thought to belong
+to Pleasure.
+
+Next. "The man of Perfected Self-Mastery avoids Pleasures." "The man of
+Practical Wisdom aims at escaping Pain rather than at attaining
+Pleasure."
+
+"Children and brutes pursue Pleasures."
+
+One answer will do for all.
+
+We have already said in what sense all Pleasures are good _per se_ and
+in what sense not all are good: it is the latter class that brutes and
+children pursue, such as are accompanied by desire and pain, that is
+the bodily Pleasures (which answer to this description) and the
+excesses of them: in short, those in respect of which the man utterly
+destitute of Self-Control is thus utterly destitute. And it is the
+absence of the pain arising from these Pleasures that the man of
+Practical Wisdom aims at. It follows that these Pleasures are what the
+man of Perfected Self-Mastery avoids: for obviously he has Pleasures
+peculiarly his own.
+
+Then again, it is allowed that Pain is an evil and a thing to be
+avoided partly as bad _per se_, partly as being a hindrance in some
+particular way. Now the contrary of that which is to be avoided, _quâ_
+it is to be avoided, _i.e._ evil, is good. Pleasure then must be _a_
+good.
+
+The attempted answer of Speusippus, "that Pleasure may be opposed and
+yet not contrary to Pain, just as the greater portion of any magnitude
+is contrary to the less but only opposed to the exact half," will not
+hold: for he cannot say that Pleasure is identical with evil of any
+kind.
+
+Again. Granting that some Pleasures are low, there is no reason why
+some particular Pleasure may not be very good, just as some particular
+Science may be although there are some which are low.
+
+Perhaps it even follows, since each state may have active working
+unimpeded, whether the active workings of all be Happiness or that of
+some one of them, that this active working, if it be unimpeded, must be
+choice-worthy: now Pleasure is exactly this. So that the Chief Good may
+be Pleasure of some kind, though most Pleasures be (let us assume) low
+_per se_.
+
+And for this reason all men think the happy life is pleasant, and
+interweave Pleasure with Happiness. Reasonably enough: because
+Happiness is perfect, but no impeded active working is perfect; and
+therefore the happy man needs as an addition the goods of the body and
+the goods external and fortune that in these points he may not be
+fettered. As for those who say that he who is being tortured on the
+wheel, or falls into great misfortunes is happy provided only he be
+good, they talk nonsense, whether they mean to do so or not. On the
+other hand, because fortune is needed as an addition, some hold good
+fortune to be identical with Happiness: which it is not, for even this
+in excess is a hindrance, and perhaps then has no right to be called
+good fortune since it is good only in so far as it contributes to
+Happiness.
+
+The fact that all animals, brute and human alike, pursue Pleasure, is
+some presumption of its being in a sense the Chief Good;
+
+("There must be something in what most folks say,") only as one and the
+same nature or state neither is nor is thought to be the best, so
+neither do all pursue the same Pleasure, Pleasure nevertheless all do.
+Nay further, what they pursue is, perhaps, not what they think nor what
+they would say they pursue, but really one and the same: for in all
+there is some instinct above themselves. But the bodily Pleasures have
+received the name exclusively, because theirs is the most frequent form
+and that which is universally partaken of; and so, because to many
+these alone are known they believe them to be the only ones which
+exist.
+
+It is plain too that, unless Pleasure and its active working be good,
+it will not be true that the happy man's life embodies Pleasure: for
+why will he want it on the supposition that it is not good and that he
+can live even with Pain? because, assuming that Pleasure is not good,
+then Pain is neither evil nor good, and so why should he avoid it?
+
+Besides, the life of the good man is not more pleasurable than any
+other unless it be granted that his active workings are so too.
+
+Some enquiry into the bodily Pleasures is also necessary for those who
+say that some Pleasures, to be sure, are highly choice-worthy (the good
+ones to wit), but not the bodily Pleasures; that is, those which are
+the object-matter of the man utterly destitute of Self-Control.
+
+If so, we ask, why are the contrary Pains bad? they cannot be (on their
+assumption) because the contrary of bad is good.
+
+May we not say that the necessary bodily Pleasures are good in the
+sense in which that which is not-bad is good? or that they are good
+only up to a certain point? because such states or movements as cannot
+have too much of the better cannot have too much of Pleasure, but those
+which can of the former can also of the latter. Now the bodily
+Pleasures do admit of excess: in fact the low bad man is such because
+he pursues the excess of them instead of those which are necessary
+(meat, drink, and the objects of other animal appetites do give
+pleasure to all, but not in right manner or degree to all). But his
+relation to Pain is exactly the contrary: it is not excessive Pain, but
+Pain at all, that he avoids [which makes him to be in this way too a
+bad low man], because only in the case of him who pursues excessive
+Pleasure is Pain contrary to excessive Pleasure.
+
+It is not enough however merely to state the truth, we should also show
+how the false view arises; because this strengthens conviction. I mean,
+when we have given a probable reason why that impresses people as true
+which really is not true, it gives them a stronger conviction of the
+truth. And so we must now explain why the bodily Pleasures appear to
+people to be more choice-worthy than any others.
+
+The first obvious reason is, that bodily Pleasure drives out Pain; and
+because Pain is felt in excess men pursue Pleasure in excess, _i.e._
+generally bodily Pleasure, under the notion of its being a remedy for
+that Pain. These remedies, moreover, come to be violent ones; which is
+the very reason they are pursued, since the impression they produce on
+the mind is owing to their being looked at side by side with their
+contrary.
+
+And, as has been said before, there are the two following reasons why
+bodily Pleasure is thought to be not-good.
+
+1. Some Pleasures of this class are actings of a low nature, whether
+congenital as in brutes, or acquired by custom as in low bad men.
+
+2. Others are in the nature of cures, cures that is of some deficiency;
+now of course it is better to have [the healthy state] originally than
+that it should accrue afterwards.
+
+(But some Pleasures result when natural states are being perfected:
+these therefore are good as a matter of result.)
+
+Again, the very fact of their being violent causes them to be pursued
+by such as can relish no others: such men in fact create violent
+thirsts for themselves (if harmless ones then we find no fault, if
+harmful then it is bad and low) because they have no other things to
+take pleasure in, and the neutral state is distasteful to some people
+constitutionally; for toil of some kind is inseparable from life, as
+physiologists testify, telling us that the acts of seeing or hearing
+are painful, only that we are used to the pain and do not find it out.
+
+Similarly in youth the constant growth produces a state much like that
+of vinous intoxication, and youth is pleasant. Again, men of the
+melancholic temperament constantly need some remedial process (because
+the body, from its temperament, is constantly being worried), and they
+are in a chronic state of violent desire. But Pleasure drives out Pain;
+not only such Pleasure as is directly contrary to Pain but even any
+Pleasure provided it be strong: and this is how men come to be utterly
+destitute of Self-Mastery, _i.e._ low and bad.
+
+But those Pleasures which are unconnected with Pains do not admit of
+excess: _i.e._ such as belong to objects which are naturally pleasant
+and not merely as a matter of result: by the latter class I mean such
+as are remedial, and the reason why these are thought to be pleasant is
+that the cure results from the action in some way of that part of the
+constitution which remains sound. By "pleasant naturally" I mean such
+as put into action a nature which is pleasant.
+
+The reason why no one and the same thing is invariably pleasant is that
+our nature is, not simple, but complex, involving something different
+from itself (so far as we are corruptible beings). Suppose then that
+one part of this nature be doing something, this something is, to the
+other part, unnatural: but, if there be an equilibrium of the two
+natures, then whatever is being done is indifferent. It is obvious that
+if there be any whose nature is simple and not complex, to such a being
+the same course of acting will always be the most pleasurable.
+
+For this reason it is that the Divinity feels Pleasure which is always
+one, _i.e._ simple: not motion merely but also motionlessness acts, and
+Pleasure resides rather in the absence than in the presence of motion.
+
+The reason why the Poet's dictum "change is of all things most
+pleasant" is true, is "a baseness in our blood;" for as the bad man is
+easily changeable, bad must be also the nature that craves change,
+_i.e._ it is neither simple nor good.
+
+We have now said our say about Self-Control and its opposite; and about
+Pleasure and Pain. What each is, and how the one set is good the other
+bad. We have yet to speak of Friendship.
+
+BOOK VIII
+
+Chapter I.
+
+Next would seem properly to follow a dissertation on Friendship:
+because, in the first place, it is either itself a virtue or connected
+with virtue; and next it is a thing most necessary for life, since no
+one would choose to live without friends though he should have all the
+other good things in the world: and, in fact, men who are rich or
+possessed of authority and influence are thought to have special need
+of friends: for where is the use of such prosperity if there be taken
+away the doing of kindnesses of which friends are the most usual and
+most commendable objects? Or how can it be kept or preserved without
+friends? because the greater it is so much the more slippery and
+hazardous: in poverty moreover and all other adversities men think
+friends to be their only refuge.
+
+Furthermore, Friendship helps the young to keep from error: the old, in
+respect of attention and such deficiencies in action as their weakness
+makes them liable to; and those who are in their prime, in respect of
+noble deeds ("They _two_ together going," Homer says, you may
+remember), because they are thus more able to devise plans and carry
+them out.
+
+Again, it seems to be implanted in us by Nature: as, for instance, in
+the parent towards the offspring and the offspring towards the parent
+(not merely in the human species, but likewise in birds and most
+animals), and in those of the same tribe towards one another, and
+specially in men of the same nation; for which reason we commend those
+men who love their fellows: and one may see in the course of travel how
+close of kin and how friendly man is to man.
+
+Furthermore, Friendship seems to be the bond of Social Communities, and
+legislators seem to be more anxious to secure it than Justice even. I
+mean, Unanimity is somewhat like to Friendship, and this they certainly
+aim at and specially drive out faction as being inimical.
+
+Again, where people are in Friendship Justice is not required;[1] but,
+on the other hand, though they are just they need Friendship in
+addition, and that principle which is most truly just is thought to
+partake of the nature of Friendship.
+
+Lastly, not only is it a thing necessary but honourable likewise: since
+we praise those who are fond of friends, and the having numerous
+friends is thought a matter of credit to a man; some go so far as to
+hold, that "good man" and "friend" are terms synonymous.
+
+Chapter II.
+
+Yet the disputed points respecting it are not few: some men lay down
+that it is a kind of resemblance, and that men who are like one another
+are friends: whence come the common sayings, "Like will to like,"
+"Birds of a feather," and so on. Others, on the contrary, say, that all
+such come under the maxim, "Two of a trade never agree."[2]
+
+Again, some men push their enquiries on these points higher and reason
+physically: as Euripides, who says,
+
+"The earth by drought consumed doth love the rain,
+And the great heaven, overcharged with rain,
+Doth love to fall in showers upon the earth."
+
+Heraclitus, again, maintains, that "contrariety is expedient, and that
+the best agreement arises from things differing, and that all things
+come into being in the way of the principle of antagonism."
+
+Empedocles, among others, in direct opposition to these, affirms, that
+"like aims at like."
+
+These physical questions we will take leave to omit, inasmuch as they
+are foreign to the present enquiry; and we will examine such as are
+proper to man and concern moral characters and feelings: as, for
+instance, "Does Friendship arise among all without distinction, or is
+it impossible for bad men to be friends?" and, "Is there but one
+species of Friendship, or several?" for they who ground the opinion
+that there is but one on the fact that Friendship admits of degrees
+hold that upon insufficient proof; because things which are different
+in species admit likewise of degrees (on this point we have spoken
+before).
+
+Chapter III.
+
+Our view will soon be cleared on these points when we have ascertained
+what is properly the object-matter of Friendship: for it is thought
+that not everything indiscriminately, but some peculiar matter alone,
+is the object of this affection; that is to say, what is good, or
+pleasurable, or useful. Now it would seem that that is useful through
+which accrues any good or pleasure, and so the objects of Friendship,
+as absolute Ends, are the good and the pleasurable.
+
+A question here arises; whether it is good absolutely or that which is
+good to the individuals, for which men feel Friendship (these two being
+sometimes distinct): and similarly in respect of the pleasurable. It
+seems then that each individual feels it towards that which is good to
+himself, and that abstractedly it is the real good which is the object
+of Friendship, and to each individual that which is good to each. It
+comes then to this; that each individual feels Friendship not for what
+_is_ but for that which _conveys to his mind the impression of being_
+good to himself. But this will make no real difference, because that
+which is truly the object of Friendship will also convey this
+impression to the mind.
+
+There are then three causes from which men feel Friendship: but the
+term is not applied to the case of fondness for things inanimate
+because there is no requital of the affection nor desire for the good
+of those objects: it certainly savours of the ridiculous to say that a
+man fond of wine wishes well to it: the only sense in which it is true
+being that he wishes it to be kept safe and sound for his own use and
+benefit.[3] But to the friend they say one should wish all good for his
+sake. And when men do thus wish good to another (he not reciprocating
+the feeling), people call them Kindly; because Friendship they describe
+as being "Kindliness between persons who reciprocate it." But must they
+not add that the feeling must be mutually known? for many men are
+kindly disposed towards those whom they have never seen but whom they
+conceive to be amiable or useful: and this notion amounts to the same
+thing as a real feeling between them.
+
+Well, these are plainly Kindly-disposed towards one another: but how
+can one call them friends while their mutual feelings are unknown to
+one another? to complete the idea of Friendship, then, it is requisite
+that they have kindly feelings towards one another, and wish one
+another good from one of the aforementioned causes, and that these
+kindly feelings should be mutually known.
+
+Chapter IV.
+
+As the motives to Friendship differ in kind so do the respective
+feelings and Friendships. The species then of Friendship are three, in
+number equal to the objects of it, since in the line of each there may
+be "mutual affection mutually known."
+
+Now they who have Friendship for one another desire one another's good
+according to the motive of their Friendship; accordingly they whose
+motive is utility have no Friendship for one another really, but only
+in so far as some good arises to them from one another.
+
+And they whose motive is pleasure are in like case: I mean, they have
+Friendship for men of easy pleasantry, not because they are of a given
+character but because they are pleasant to themselves. So then they
+whose motive to Friendship is utility love their friends for what is
+good to themselves; they whose motive is pleasure do so for what is
+pleasurable to themselves; that is to say, not in so far as the friend
+beloved _is_ but in so far as he is useful or pleasurable. These
+Friendships then are a matter of result: since the object is not
+beloved in that he is the man he is but in that he furnishes advantage
+or pleasure as the case may be.
+
+Such Friendships are of course very liable to dissolution if the
+parties do not continue alike: I mean, that the others cease to have
+any Friendship for them when they are no longer pleasurable or useful.
+Now it is the nature of utility not to be permanent but constantly
+varying: so, of course, when the motive which made them friends is
+vanished, the Friendship likewise dissolves; since it existed only
+relatively to those circumstances.
+
+Friendship of this kind is thought to exist principally among the old
+(because men at that time of life pursue not what is pleasurable but
+what is profitable); and in such, of men in their prime and of the
+young, as are given to the pursuit of profit. They that are such have
+no intimate intercourse with one another; for sometimes they are not
+even pleasurable to one another; nor, in fact, do they desire such
+intercourse unless their friends are profitable to them, because they
+are pleasurable only in so far as they have hopes of advantage. With
+these Friendships is commonly ranked that of hospitality.
+
+But the Friendship of the young is thought to be based on the motive of
+pleasure: because they live at the beck and call of passion and
+generally pursue what is pleasurable to themselves and the object of
+the present moment: and as their age changes so likewise do their
+pleasures.
+
+This is the reason why they form and dissolve Friendships rapidly:
+since the Friendship changes with the pleasurable object and such
+pleasure changes quickly.
+
+The young are also much given up to Love; this passion being, in great
+measure, a matter of impulse and based on pleasure: for which cause
+they conceive Friendships and quickly drop them, changing often in the
+same day: but these wish for society and intimate intercourse with
+their friends, since they thus attain the object of their Friendship.
+
+Chapter V.
+
+That then is perfect Friendship which subsists between those who are
+good and whose similarity consists in their goodness: for these men
+wish one another's good in similar ways; in so far as they are good
+(and good they are in themselves); and those are specially friends who
+wish good to their friends for their sakes, because they feel thus
+towards them on their own account and not as a mere matter of result;
+so the Friendship between these men continues to subsist so long as
+they are good; and goodness, we know, has in it a principle of
+permanence.
+
+Moreover, each party is good abstractedly and also relatively to his
+friend, for all good men are not only abstractedly good but also useful
+to one another. Such friends are also mutually pleasurable because all
+good men are so abstractedly, and also relatively to one another,
+inasmuch as to each individual those actions are pleasurable which
+correspond to his nature, and all such as are like them. Now when men
+are good these will be always the same, or at least similar.
+
+Friendship then under these circumstances is permanent, as we should
+reasonably expect, since it combines in itself all the requisite
+qualifications of friends. I mean, that Friendship of whatever kind is
+based upon good or pleasure (either abstractedly or relatively to the
+person entertaining the sentiment of Friendship), and results from a
+similarity of some sort; and to this kind belong all the aforementioned
+requisites in the parties themselves, because in this the parties are
+similar, and so on:[4] moreover, in it there is the abstractedly good
+and the abstractedly pleasant, and as these are specially the
+object-matter of Friendship so the feeling and the state of Friendship
+is found most intense and most excellent in men thus qualified.
+
+Rare it is probable Friendships of this kind will be, because men of
+this kind are rare. Besides, all requisite qualifications being
+presupposed, there is further required time and intimacy: for, as the
+proverb says, men cannot know one another "till they have eaten the
+requisite quantity of salt together;" nor can they in fact admit one
+another to intimacy, much less be friends, till each has appeared to
+the other and been proved to be a fit object of Friendship. They who
+speedily commence an interchange of friendly actions may be said to
+wish to be friends, but they are not so unless they are also proper
+objects of Friendship and mutually known to be such: that is to say, a
+desire for Friendship may arise quickly but not Friendship itself.
+
+Well, this Friendship is perfect both in respect of the time and in all
+other points; and exactly the same and similar results accrue to each
+party from the other; which ought to be the case between friends.
+
+The friendship based upon the pleasurable is, so to say, a copy of
+this, since the good are sources of pleasure to one another: and that
+based on utility likewise, the good being also useful to one another.
+Between men thus connected Friendships are most permanent when the same
+result accrues to both from one another, pleasure, for instance; and
+not merely so but from the same source, as in the case of two men of
+easy pleasantry; and not as it is in that of a lover and the object of
+his affection, these not deriving their pleasure from the same causes,
+but the former from seeing the latter and the latter from receiving the
+attentions of the former: and when the bloom of youth fades the
+Friendship sometimes ceases also, because then the lover derives no
+pleasure from seeing and the object of his affection ceases to receive
+the attentions which were paid before: in many cases, however, people
+so connected continue friends, if being of similar tempers they have
+come from custom to like one another's disposition.
+
+Where people do not interchange pleasure but profit in matters of Love,
+the Friendship is both less intense in degree and also less permanent:
+in fact, they who are friends because of advantage commonly part when
+the advantage ceases; for, in reality, they never were friends of one
+another but of the advantage.
+
+So then it appears that from motives of pleasure or profit bad men may
+be friends to one another, or good men to bad men or men of neutral
+character to one of any character whatever: but disinterestedly, for
+the sake of one another, plainly the good alone can be friends; because
+bad men have no pleasure even in themselves unless in so far as some
+advantage arises.
+
+And further, the Friendship of the good is alone superior to calumny;
+it not being easy for men to believe a third person respecting one whom
+they have long tried and proved: there is between good men mutual
+confidence, and the feeling that one's friend would never have done one
+wrong, and all other such things as are expected in Friendship really
+worthy the name; but in the other kinds there is nothing to prevent all
+such suspicions.
+
+I call them Friendships, because since men commonly give the name of
+friends to those who are connected from motives of profit (which is
+justified by political language, for alliances between states are
+thought to be contracted with a view to advantage), and to those who
+are attached to one another by the motive of pleasure (as children
+are), we may perhaps also be allowed to call such persons friends, and
+say there are several species of Friendship; primarily and specially
+that of the good, in that they are good, and the rest only in the way
+of resemblance: I mean, people connected otherwise are friends in that
+way in which there arises to them somewhat good and some mutual
+resemblance (because, we must remember the pleasurable is good to those
+who are fond of it).
+
+These secondary Friendships, however, do not combine very well; that is
+to say, the same persons do not become friends by reason of advantage
+and by reason of the pleasurable, for these matters of result are not
+often combined. And Friendship having been divided into these kinds,
+bad men will be friends by reason of pleasure or profit, this being
+their point of resemblance; while the good are friends for one
+another's sake, that is, in so far as they are good.
+
+These last may be termed abstractedly and simply friends, the former as
+a matter of result and termed friends from their resemblance to these
+last.
+
+Chapter VI.
+
+Further; just as in respect of the different virtues some men are
+termed good in respect of a certain inward state, others in respect of
+acts of working, so is it in respect of Friendship: I mean, they who
+live together take pleasure in, and impart good to, one another: but
+they who are asleep or are locally separated do not perform acts, but
+only are in such a state as to act in a friendly way if they acted at
+all: distance has in itself no direct effect upon Friendship, but only
+prevents the acting it out: yet, if the absence be protracted, it is
+thought to cause a forgetfulness even of the Friendship: and hence it
+has been said, "many and many a Friendship doth want of intercourse
+destroy."
+
+Accordingly, neither the old nor the morose appear to be calculated for
+Friendship, because the pleasurableness in them is small, and no one
+can spend his days in company with that which is positively painful or
+even not pleasurable; since to avoid the painful and aim at the
+pleasurable is one of the most obvious tendencies of human nature. They
+who get on with one another very fairly, but are not in habits of
+intimacy, are rather like people having kindly feelings towards one
+another than friends; nothing being so characteristic of friends as the
+living with one another, because the necessitous desire assistance, and
+the happy companionship, they being the last persons in the world for
+solitary existence: but people cannot spend their time together unless
+they are mutually pleasurable and take pleasure in the same objects, a
+quality which is thought to appertain to the Friendship of
+companionship.
+
+Chapter VII.
+
+The connection then subsisting between the good is Friendship _par
+excellence_, as has already been frequently said: since that which is
+abstractedly good or pleasant is thought to be an object of Friendship
+and choice-worthy, and to each individual whatever is such to him; and
+the good man to the good man for both these reasons.
+
+(Now the entertaining the sentiment is like a feeling, but Friendship
+itself like a state: because the former may have for its object even
+things inanimate, but requital of Friendship is attended with moral
+choice which proceeds from a moral state: and again, men wish good to
+the objects of their Friendship for their sakes, not in the way of a
+mere feeling but of moral state.)
+
+And the good, in loving their friend, love their own good (inasmuch as
+the good man, when brought into that relation, becomes a good to him
+with whom he is so connected), so that either party loves his own good,
+and repays his friend equally both in wishing well and in the
+pleasurable: for equality is said to be a tie of Friendship. Well,
+these points belong most to the Friendship between good men.
+
+But between morose or elderly men Friendship is less apt to arise,
+because they are somewhat awkward-tempered, and take less pleasure in
+intercourse and society; these being thought to be specially friendly
+and productive of Friendship: and so young men become friends quickly,
+old men not so (because people do not become friends with any, unless
+they take pleasure in them); and in like manner neither do the morose.
+Yet men of these classes entertain kindly feelings towards one another:
+they wish good to one another and render mutual assistance in respect
+of their needs, but they are not quite friends, because they neither
+spend their time together nor take pleasure in one another, which
+circumstances are thought specially to belong to Friendship.
+
+To be a friend to many people, in the way of the perfect Friendship, is
+not possible; just as you cannot be in love with many at once: it is,
+so to speak, a state of excess which naturally has but one object; and
+besides, it is not an easy thing for one man to be very much pleased
+with many people at the same time, nor perhaps to find many really
+good. Again, a man needs experience, and to be in habits of close
+intimacy, which is very difficult.
+
+But it _is_ possible to please many on the score of advantage and
+pleasure: because there are many men of the kind, and the services may
+be rendered in a very short time.
+
+Of the two imperfect kinds that which most resembles the perfect is the
+Friendship based upon pleasure, in which the same results accrue from
+both and they take pleasure in one another or in the same objects; such
+as are the Friendships of the young, because a generous spirit is most
+found in these. The Friendship because of advantage is the connecting
+link of shopkeepers.
+
+Then again, the very happy have no need of persons who are profitable,
+but of pleasant ones they have because they wish to have people to live
+intimately with; and what is painful they bear for a short time indeed,
+but continuously no one could support it, nay, not even the Chief Good
+itself, if it were painful to him individually: and so they look out
+for pleasant friends: perhaps they ought to require such to be good
+also; and good moreover to themselves individually, because then they
+will have all the proper requisites of Friendship.
+
+Men in power are often seen to make use of several distinct friends:
+for some are useful to them and others pleasurable, but the two are not
+often united: because they do not, in fact, seek such as shall combine
+pleasantness and goodness, nor such as shall be useful for honourable
+purposes: but with a view to attain what is pleasant they look out for
+men of easy-pleasantry; and again, for men who are clever at executing
+any business put into their hands: and these qualifications are not
+commonly found united in the same man.
+
+It has been already stated that the good man unites the qualities of
+pleasantness and usefulness: but then such a one will not be a friend
+to a superior unless he be also his superior in goodness: for if this
+be not the case, he cannot, being surpassed in one point, make things
+equal by a proportionate degree of Friendship.[5] And characters who
+unite superiority of station and goodness are not common.
+
+Chapter VIII.
+
+Now all the kinds of Friendship which have been already mentioned exist
+in a state of equality, inasmuch as either the same results accrue to
+both and they wish the same things to one another, or else they barter
+one thing against another; pleasure, for instance, against profit: it
+has been said already that Friendships of this latter kind are less
+intense in degree and less permanent.
+
+And it is their resemblance or dissimilarity to the same thing which
+makes them to be thought to be and not to be Friendships: they show
+like Friendships in right of their likeness to that which is based on
+virtue (the one kind having the pleasurable, the other the profitable,
+both of which belong also to the other); and again, they do not show
+like Friendships by reason of their unlikeness to that true kind; which
+unlikeness consists herein, that while that is above calumny and so
+permanent these quickly change and differ in many other points.
+
+But there is another form of Friendship, that, namely, in which the one
+party is superior to the other; as between father and son, elder and
+younger, husband and wife, ruler and ruled. These also differ one from
+another: I mean, the Friendship between parents and children is not the
+same as between ruler and the ruled, nor has the father the same
+towards the son as the son towards the father, nor the husband towards
+the wife as she towards him; because the work, and therefore the
+excellence, of each of these is different, and different therefore are
+the causes of their feeling Friendship; distinct and different
+therefore are their feelings and states of Friendship.
+
+And the same results do not accrue to each from the other, nor in fact
+ought they to be looked for: but, when children render to their parents
+what they ought to the authors of their being, and parents to their
+sons what they ought to their offspring, the Friendship between such
+parties will be permanent and equitable.
+
+Further; the feeling of Friendship should be in a due proportion in all
+Friendships which are between superior and inferior; I mean, the better
+man, or the more profitable, and so forth, should be the object of a
+stronger feeling than he himself entertains, because when the feeling
+of Friendship comes to be after a certain rate then equality in a
+certain sense is produced, which is thought to be a requisite in
+Friendship.
+
+(It must be remembered, however, that the equal is not in the same case
+as regards Justice and Friendship: for in strict Justice the exactly
+proportioned equal ranks first, and the actual numerically equal ranks
+second, while in Friendship this is exactly reversed.)
+
+And that equality is thus requisite is plainly shown by the occurrence
+of a great difference of goodness or badness, or prosperity, or
+something else: for in this case, people are not any longer friends,
+nay they do not even feel that they ought to be. The clearest
+illustration is perhaps the case of the gods, because they are most
+superior in all good things. It is obvious too, in the case of kings,
+for they who are greatly their inferiors do not feel entitled to be
+friends to them; nor do people very insignificant to be friends to
+those of very high excellence or wisdom. Of course, in such cases it is
+out of the question to attempt to define up to what point they may
+continue friends: for you may remove many points of agreement and the
+Friendship last nevertheless; but when one of the parties is very far
+separated (as a god from men), it cannot continue any longer.
+
+This has given room for a doubt, whether friends do really wish to
+their friends the very highest goods, as that they may be gods:
+because, in case the wish were accomplished, they would no longer have
+them for friends, nor in fact would they have the good things they had,
+because friends are good things. If then it has been rightly said that
+a friend wishes to his friend good things for that friend's sake, it
+must be understood that he is to remain such as he now is: that is to
+say, he will wish the greatest good to him of which as man he is
+capable: yet perhaps not all, because each man desires good for himself
+most of all.
+
+It is thought that desire for honour makes the mass of men wish rather
+to be the objects of the feeling of Friendship than to entertain it
+themselves (and for this reason they are fond of flatterers, a
+flatterer being a friend inferior or at least pretending to be such and
+rather to entertain towards another the feeling of Friendship than to
+be himself the object of it), since the former is thought to be nearly
+the same as being honoured, which the mass of men desire. And yet men
+seem to choose honour, not for its own sake, but incidentally:[6] I
+mean, the common run of men delight to be honoured by those in power
+because of the hope it raises; that is they think they shall get from
+them anything they may happen to be in want of, so they delight in
+honour as an earnest of future benefit. They again who grasp at honour
+at the hands of the good and those who are really acquainted with their
+merits desire to confirm their own opinion about themselves: so they
+take pleasure in the conviction that they are good, which is based on
+the sentence of those who assert it. But in being the objects of
+Friendship men delight for its own sake, and so this may be judged to
+be higher than being honoured and Friendship to be in itself
+choice-worthy. Friendship, moreover, is thought to consist in feeling,
+rather than being the object of, the sentiment of Friendship, which is
+proved by the delight mothers have in the feeling: some there are who
+give their children to be adopted and brought up by others, and knowing
+them bear this feeling towards them never seeking to have it returned,
+if both are not possible; but seeming to be content with seeing them
+well off and bearing this feeling themselves towards them, even though
+they, by reason of ignorance, never render to them any filial regard or
+love.
+
+Since then Friendship stands rather in the entertaining, than in being
+the object of, the sentiment, and they are praised who are fond of
+their friends, it seems that entertaining the sentiment is the
+Excellence of friends; and so, in whomsoever this exists in due
+proportion these are stable friends and their Friendship is permanent.
+And in this way may they who are unequal best be friends, because they
+may thus be made equal.
+
+Equality, then, and similarity are a tie to Friendship, and specially
+the similarity of goodness, because good men, being stable in
+themselves, are also stable as regards others, and neither ask
+degrading services nor render them, but, so to say, rather prevent
+them: for it is the part of the good neither to do wrong themselves nor
+to allow their friends in so doing.
+
+The bad, on the contrary, have no principle of stability: in fact, they
+do not even continue like themselves: only they come to be friends for
+a short time from taking delight in one another's wickedness. Those
+connected by motives of profit, or pleasure, hold together somewhat
+longer: so long, that is to say, as they can give pleasure or profit
+mutually.
+
+The Friendship based on motives of profit is thought to be most of all
+formed out of contrary elements: the poor man, for instance, is thus a
+friend of the rich, and the ignorant of the man of information; that is
+to say, a man desiring that of which he is, as it happens, in want,
+gives something else in exchange for it. To this same class we may
+refer the lover and beloved, the beautiful and the ill-favoured. For
+this reason lovers sometimes show in a ridiculous light by claiming to
+be the objects of as intense a feeling as they themselves entertain: of
+course if they are equally fit objects of Friendship they are perhaps
+entitled to claim this, but if they have nothing of the kind it is
+ridiculous.
+
+Perhaps, moreover, the contrary does not aim at its contrary for its
+own sake but incidentally: the mean is really what is grasped at; it
+being good for the dry, for instance, not to become wet but to attain
+the mean, and so of the hot, etc.
+
+However, let us drop these questions, because they are in fact somewhat
+foreign to our purpose.
+
+Chapter IX.
+
+It seems too, as was stated at the commencement, that Friendship and
+Justice have the same object-matter, and subsist between the same
+persons: I mean that in every Communion there is thought to be some
+principle of Justice and also some Friendship: men address as friends,
+for instance, those who are their comrades by sea, or in war, and in
+like manner also those who are brought into Communion with them in
+other ways: and the Friendship, because also the Justice, is
+co-extensive with the Communion, This justifies the common proverb,
+"the goods of friends are common," since Friendship rests upon
+Communion.
+
+Now brothers and intimate companions have all in common, but other
+people have their property separate, and some have more in common and
+others less, because the Friendships likewise differ in degree. So too
+do the various principles of Justice involved, not being the same
+between parents and children as between brothers, nor between
+companions as between fellow-citizens merely, and so on of all the
+other conceivable Friendships. Different also are the principles of
+Injustice as regards these different grades, and the acts become
+intensified by being done to friends; for instance, it is worse to rob
+your companion than one who is merely a fellow-citizen; to refuse help
+to a brother than to a stranger; and to strike your father than any one
+else. So then the Justice naturally increases with the degree of
+Friendship, as being between the same parties and of equal extent.
+
+All cases of Communion are parts, so to say, of the great Social one,
+since in them men associate with a view to some advantage and to
+procure some of those things which are needful for life; and the great
+Social Communion is thought originally to have been associated and to
+continue for the sake of some advantage: this being the point at which
+legislators aim, affirming that to be just which is generally
+expedient.
+
+All the other cases of Communion aim at advantage in particular points;
+the crew of a vessel at that which is to result from the voyage which
+is undertaken with a view to making money, or some such object;
+comrades in war at that which is to result from the war, grasping
+either at wealth or victory, or it may be a political position; and
+those of the same tribe, or Demus, in like manner.
+
+Some of them are thought to be formed for pleasure's sake, those, for
+instance, of bacchanals or club-fellows, which are with a view to
+Sacrifice or merely company. But all these seem to be ranged under the
+great Social one, inasmuch as the aim of this is, not merely the
+expediency of the moment but, for life and at all times; with a view to
+which the members of it institute sacrifices and their attendant
+assemblies, to render honour to the gods and procure for themselves
+respite from toil combined with pleasure. For it appears that
+sacrifices and religious assemblies in old times were made as a kind of
+first-fruits after the ingathering of the crops, because at such
+seasons they had most leisure.
+
+So then it appears that all the instances of Communion are parts of the
+great Social one: and corresponding Friendships will follow upon such
+Communions.
+
+Chapter X.
+
+Of Political Constitutions there are three kinds; and equal in number
+are the deflections from them, being, so to say, corruptions of them.
+
+The former are Kingship, Aristocracy, and that which recognises the
+principle of wealth, which it seems appropriate to call Timocracy (I
+give to it the name of a political constitution because people commonly
+do so). Of these the best is Monarchy, and Timocracy the worst.
+
+From Monarchy the deflection is Despotism; both being Monarchies but
+widely differing from each other; for the Despot looks to his own
+advantage, but the King to that of his subjects: for he is in fact no
+King who is not thoroughly independent and superior to the rest in all
+good things, and he that is this has no further wants: he will not then
+have to look to his own advantage but to that of his subjects, for he
+that is not in such a position is a mere King elected by lot for the
+nonce.
+
+But Despotism is on a contrary footing to this Kingship, because the
+Despot pursues his own good: and in the case of this its inferiority is
+most evident, and what is worse is contrary to what is best. The
+Transition to Despotism is made from Kingship, Despotism being a
+corrupt form of Monarchy, that is to say, the bad King comes to be a
+Despot.
+
+From Aristocracy to Oligarchy the transition is made by the fault of
+the Rulers in distributing the public property contrary to right
+proportion; and giving either all that is good, or the greatest share,
+to themselves; and the offices to the same persons always, making
+wealth their idol; thus a few bear rule and they bad men in the place
+of the best.
+
+From Timocracy the transition is to Democracy, they being contiguous:
+for it is the nature of Timocracy to be in the hands of a multitude,
+and all in the same grade of property are equal. Democracy is the least
+vicious of all, since herein the form of the constitution undergoes
+least change.
+
+Well, these are generally the changes to which the various
+Constitutions are liable, being the least in degree and the easiest to
+make.
+
+Likenesses, and, as it were, models of them, one may find even in
+Domestic life: for instance, the Communion between a Father and his
+Sons presents the figure of Kingship, because the children are the
+Father's care: and hence Homer names Jupiter Father because Kingship is
+intended to be a paternal rule. Among the Persians, however, the
+Father's rule is Despotic, for they treat their Sons as slaves. (The
+relation of Master to Slaves is of the nature of Despotism because the
+point regarded herein is the Master's interest): this now strikes me to
+be as it ought, but the Persian custom to be mistaken; because for
+different persons there should be different rules.
+
+Between Husband and Wife the relation takes the form of Aristocracy,
+because he rules by right and in such points only as the Husband
+should, and gives to the Wife all that befits her to have. Where the
+Husband lords it in everything he changes the relation into an
+Oligarchy; because he does it contrary to right and not as being the
+better of the two. In some instances the Wives take the reins of
+government, being heiresses: here the rule is carried on not in right
+of goodness but by reason of wealth and power, as it is in Oligarchies.
+
+Timocracy finds its type in the relation of Brothers: they being equal
+except as to such differences as age introduces: for which reason, if
+they are very different in age, the Friendship comes to be no longer a
+fraternal one: while Democracy is represented specially by families
+which have no head (all being there equal), or in which the proper head
+is weak and so every member does that which is right in his own eyes.
+
+Chapter XI.
+
+Attendant then on each form of Political Constitution there plainly is
+Friendship exactly co-extensive with the principle of Justice; that
+between a King and his Subjects being in the relation of a superiority
+of benefit, inasmuch as he benefits his subjects; it being assumed that
+he is a good king and takes care of their welfare as a shepherd tends
+his flock; whence Homer (to quote him again) calls Agamemnon, "shepherd
+of the people." And of this same kind is the Paternal Friendship, only
+that it exceeds the former in the greatness of the benefits done;
+because the father is the author of being (which is esteemed the
+greatest benefit) and of maintenance and education (these things are
+also, by the way, ascribed to ancestors generally): and by the law of
+nature the father has the right of rule over his sons, ancestors over
+their descendants, and the king over his subjects.
+
+These friendships are also between superiors and inferiors, for which
+reason parents are not merely loved but also honoured. The principle of
+Justice also between these parties is not exactly the same but
+according to proportiton, because so also is the Friendship.
+
+Now between Husband and Wife there is the same Friendship as in
+Aristocracy: for the relation is determined by relative excellence, and
+the better person has the greater good and each has what befits: so too
+also is the principle of Justice between them.
+
+The Fraternal Friendship is like that of Companions, because brothers
+are equal and much of an age, and such persons have generally like
+feelings and like dispositions. Like to this also is the Friendship of
+a Timocracy, because the citizens are intended to be equal and
+equitable: rule, therefore, passes from hand to hand, and is
+distributed on equal terms: so too is the Friendship accordingly.
+
+In the deflections from the constitutional forms, just as the principle
+of Justice is but small so is the Friendship also: and least of all in
+the most perverted form: in Despotism there is little or no Friendship.
+For generally wherever the ruler and the ruled have nothing in common
+there is no Friendship because there is no Justice; but the case is as
+between an artisan and his tool, or between soul and body, and master
+and slave; all these are benefited by those who use them, but towards
+things inanimate there is neither Friendship nor Justice: nor even
+towards a horse or an ox, or a slave _quâ_ slave, because there is
+nothing in common: a slave as such is an animate tool, a tool an
+inanimate slave. _Quâ_ slave, then, there is no Friendship towards him,
+only _quâ_ man: for it is thought that there is some principle of
+Justice between every man, and every other who can share in law and be
+a party to an agreement; and so somewhat of Friendship, in so far as he
+is man. So in Despotisms the Friendships and the principle of Justice
+are inconsiderable in extent, but in Democracies they are most
+considerable because they who are equal have much in common.
+
+Chapter XII.
+
+Now of course all Friendship is based upon Communion, as has been
+already stated: but one would be inclined to separate off from the rest
+the Friendship of Kindred, and that of Companions: whereas those of men
+of the same city, or tribe, or crew, and all such, are more peculiarly,
+it would seem, based upon Communion, inasmuch as they plainly exist in
+right of some agreement expressed or implied: among these one may rank
+also the Friendship of Hospitality,
+
+The Friendship of Kindred is likewise of many kinds, and appears in all
+its varieties to depend on the Parental: parents, I mean, love their
+children as being a part of themselves, children love their parents as
+being themselves somewhat derived from them. But parents know their
+offspring more than these know that they are from the parents, and the
+source is more closely bound to that which is produced than that which
+is produced is to that which formed it: of course, whatever is derived
+from one's self is proper to that from which it is so derived (as, for
+instance, a tooth or a hair, or any other thing whatever to him that
+has it): but the source to it is in no degree proper, or in an inferior
+degree at least.
+
+Then again the greater length of time comes in: the parents love their
+offspring from the first moment of their being, but their offspring
+them only after a lapse of time when they have attained intelligence or
+instinct. These considerations serve also to show why mothers have
+greater strength of affection than fathers.
+
+Now parents love their children as themselves (since what is derived
+from themselves becomes a kind of other Self by the fact of
+separation), but children their parents as being sprung from them. And
+brothers love one another from being sprung from the same; that is,
+their sameness with the common stock creates a sameness with one
+another;[7] whence come the phrases, "same blood," "root," and so on.
+In fact they are the same, in a sense, even in the separate distinct
+individuals.
+
+Then again the being brought up together, and the nearness of age, are
+a great help towards Friendship, for a man likes one of his own age and
+persons who are used to one another are companions, which accounts for
+the resemblance between the Friendship of Brothers and that of
+Companions.
+
+And cousins and all other relatives derive their bond of union from
+these, that is to say, from their community of origin: and the strength
+of this bond varies according to their respective distances from the
+common ancestor.
+
+Further: the Friendship felt by children towards parents, and by men
+towards the gods, is as towards something good and above them; because
+these have conferred the greatest possible benefits, in that they are
+the causes of their being and being nourished, and of their having been
+educated after they were brought into being.
+
+And Friendship of this kind has also the pleasurable and the profitable
+more than that between persons unconnected by blood, in proportion as
+their life is also more shared in common. Then again in the Fraternal
+Friendship there is all that there is in that of Companions, and more
+in the good, and generally in those who are alike; in proportion as
+they are more closely tied and from their very birth have a feeling of
+affection for one another to begin with, and as they are more like in
+disposition who spring from the same stock and have grown up together
+and been educated alike: and besides this they have the greatest
+opportunities in respect of time for proving one another, and can
+therefore depend most securely upon the trial.
+
+Between Husband and Wife there is thought to be Friendship by a law of
+nature: man being by nature disposed to pair, more than to associate in
+Communities: in proportion as the family is prior in order of time and
+more absolutely necessary than the Community. And procreation is more
+common to him with other animals; all the other animals have Communion
+thus far, but human creatures cohabit not merely for the sake of
+procreation but also with a view to life in general::[8] because in
+this connection the works are immediately divided, and some belong to
+the man, others to the woman: thus they help one the other, putting
+what is peculiar to each into the common stock.
+
+And for these reasons this Friendship is thought to combine the
+profitable and the pleasurable: it will be also based upon virtue if
+they are good people; because each has goodness and they may take
+delight in this quality in each other. Children too are thought to be a
+tie: accordingly the childless sooner separate, for the children are a
+good common to both and anything in common is a bond of union.
+
+The question how a man is to live with his wife, or (more generally)
+one friend with another, appears to be no other than this, how it is
+just that they should: because plainly there is not the same principle
+of Justice between a friend and friend, as between strangers, or
+companions, or mere chance fellow-travellers.
+
+Chapter XIII.
+
+There are then, as was stated at the commencement of this book, three
+kinds of Friendship, and in each there may be friends on a footing of
+equality and friends in the relation of superior and inferior; we find,
+I mean, that people who are alike in goodness, become friends, and
+better with worse, and so also pleasant people; again, because of
+advantage people are friends, either balancing exactly their mutual
+profitableness or differing from one another herein. Well then, those
+who are equal should in right of this equality be equalised also by the
+degree of their Friendship and the other points, and those who are on a
+footing of inequality by rendering Friendship in proportion to the
+superiority of the other party.
+
+Fault-finding and blame arises, either solely or most naturally, in
+Friendship of which utility is the motive: for they who are friends by
+reason of goodness, are eager to do kindnesses to one another because
+this is a natural result of goodness and Friendship; and when men are
+vying with each other for this End there can be no fault-finding nor
+contention: since no one is annoyed at one who entertains for him the
+sentiment of Friendship and does kindnesses to him, but if of a refined
+mind he requites him with kind actions. And suppose that one of the two
+exceeds the other, yet as he is attaining his object he will not find
+fault with his friend, for good is the object of each party.
+
+Neither can there well be quarrels between men who are friends for
+pleasure's sake: because supposing them to delight in living together
+then both attain their desire; or if not a man would be put in a
+ridiculous light who should find fault with another for not pleasing
+him, since it is in his power to forbear intercourse with him. But the
+Friendship because of advantage is very liable to fault-finding;
+because, as the parties use one another with a view to advantage, the
+requirements are continually enlarging, and they think they have less
+than of right belongs to them, and find fault because though justly
+entitled they do not get as much as they want: while they who do the
+kindnesses, can never come up to the requirements of those to whom they
+are being done.
+
+It seems also, that as the Just is of two kinds, the unwritten and the
+legal, so Friendship because of advantage is of two kinds, what may be
+called the Moral, and the Legal: and the most fruitful source of
+complaints is that parties contract obligations and discharge them not
+in the same line of Friendship. The Legal is upon specified conditions,
+either purely tradesmanlike from hand to hand or somewhat more
+gentlemanly as regards time but still by agreement a _quid pro quo_.
+
+In this Legal kind the obligation is clear and admits of no dispute,
+the friendly element is the delay in requiring its discharge: and for
+this reason in some countries no actions can be maintained at Law for
+the recovery of such debts, it being held that they who have dealt on
+the footing of credit must be content to abide the issue.
+
+That which may be termed the Moral kind is not upon specified
+conditions, but a man gives as to his friend and so on: but still he
+expects to receive an equivalent, or even more, as though he had not
+given but lent: he also will find fault, because he does not get the
+obligation discharged in the same way as it was contracted.
+
+Now this results from the fact, that all men, or the generality at
+least, _wish_ what is honourable, but, when tested, _choose_ what is
+profitable; and the doing kindnesses disinterestedly is honourable
+while receiving benefits is profitable. In such cases one should, if
+able, make a return proportionate to the good received, and do so
+willingly, because one ought not to make a disinterested friend[9] of a
+man against his inclination: one should act, I say, as having made a
+mistake originally in receiving kindness from one from whom one ought
+not to have received it, he being not a friend nor doing the act
+disinterestedly; one should therefore discharge one's self of the
+obligation as having received a kindness on specified terms: and if
+able a man would engage to repay the kindness, while if he were unable
+even the doer of it would not expect it of him: so that if he is able
+he ought to repay it. But one ought at the first to ascertain from whom
+one is receiving kindness, and on what understanding, that on that same
+understanding one may accept it or not.
+
+A question admitting of dispute is whether one is to measure a kindness
+by the good done to the receiver of it, and make this the standard by
+which to requite, or by the kind intention of the doer?
+
+For they who have received kindnesses frequently plead in depreciation
+that they have received from their benefactors such things as were
+small for them to give, or such as they themselves could have got from
+others: while the doers of the kindnesses affirm that they gave the
+best they had, and what could not have been got from others, and under
+danger, or in such-like straits.
+
+May we not say, that as utility is the motive of the Friendship the
+advantage conferred on the receiver must be the standard? because he it
+is who requests the kindness and the other serves him in his need on
+the understanding that he is to get an equivalent: the assistance
+rendered is then exactly proportionate to the advantage which the
+receiver has obtained, and he should therefore repay as much as he
+gained by it, or even more, this being more creditable.
+
+In Friendships based on goodness, the question, of course, is never
+raised, but herein the motive of the doer seems to be the proper
+standard, since virtue and moral character depend principally on
+motive.
+
+Chapter XIV.
+
+Quarrels arise also in those Friendships in which the parties are
+unequal because each party thinks himself entitled to the greater
+share, and of course, when this happens, the Friendship is broken up.
+
+The man who is better than the other thinks that having the greater
+share pertains to him of right, for that more is always awarded to the
+good man: and similarly the man who is more profitable to another than
+that other to him: "one who is useless," they say, "ought not to share
+equally, for it comes to a tax, and not a Friendship, unless the fruits
+of the Friendship are reaped in proportion to the works done:" their
+notion being, that as in a money partnership they who contribute more
+receive more so should it be in Friendship likewise.
+
+On the other hand, the needy man and the less virtuous advance the
+opposite claim: they urge that "it is the very business of a good
+friend to help those who are in need, else what is the use of having a
+good or powerful friend if one is not to reap the advantage at all?"
+
+Now each seems to advance a right claim and to be entitled to get more
+out of the connection than the other, only _not more of the same
+thing_: but the superior man should receive more respect, the needy man
+more profit: respect being the reward of goodness and beneficence,
+profit being the aid of need.
+
+This is plainly the principle acted upon in Political Communities: he
+receives no honour who gives no good to the common stock: for the
+property of the Public is given to him who does good to the Public, and
+honour is the property of the Public; it is not possible both to make
+money out of the Public and receive honour likewise; because no one
+will put up with the less in every respect: so to him who suffers loss
+as regards money they award honour, but money to him who can be paid by
+gifts: since, as has been stated before, the observing due proportion
+equalises and preserves Friendship.
+
+Like rules then should be observed in the intercourse of friends who
+are unequal; and to him who advantages another in respect of money, or
+goodness, that other should repay honour, making requital according to
+his power; because Friendship requires what is possible, not what is
+strictly due, this being not possible in all cases, as in the honours
+paid to the gods and to parents: no man could ever make the due return
+in these cases, and so he is thought to be a good man who pays respect
+according to his ability.
+
+For this reason it may be judged never to be allowable for a son to
+disown his father, whereas a father may his son: because he that owes
+is bound to pay; now a son can never, by anything he has done, fully
+requite the benefits first conferred on him by his father, and so is
+always a debtor. But they to whom anything is owed may cast off their
+debtors: therefore the father may his son. But at the same time it must
+perhaps be admitted, that it seems no father ever _would_ sever himself
+utterly from a son, except in a case of exceeding depravity: because,
+independently of the natural Friendship, it is like human nature not to
+put away from one's self the assistance which a son might render. But
+to the son, if depraved, assisting his father is a thing to be avoided,
+or at least one which he will not be very anxious to do; most men being
+willing enough to receive kindness, but averse to doing it as
+unprofitable.
+
+Let thus much suffice on these points.
+
+BOOK IX
+
+Chapter I.
+
+Well, in all the Friendships the parties to which are dissimilar it is
+the proportionate which equalises and preserves the Friendship, as has
+been already stated: I mean, in the Social Friendship the cobbler, for
+instance, gets an equivalent for his shoes after a certain rate; and
+the weaver, and all others in like manner. Now in this case a common
+measure has been provided in money, and to this accordingly all things
+are referred and by this are measured: but in the Friendship of Love
+the complaint is sometimes from the lover that, though he loves
+exceedingly, his love is not requited; he having perhaps all the time
+nothing that can be the object of Friendship: again, oftentimes from
+the object of love that he who as a suitor promised any and every thing
+now performs nothing. These cases occur because the Friendship of the
+lover for the beloved object is based upon pleasure, that of the other
+for him upon utility, and in one of the parties the requisite quality
+is not found: for, as these are respectively the grounds of the
+Friendship, the Friendship comes to be broken up because the motives to
+it cease to exist: the parties loved not one another but qualities in
+one another which are not permanent, and so neither are the
+Friendships: whereas the Friendship based upon the moral character of
+the parties, being independent and disinterested, is permanent, as we
+have already stated.
+
+Quarrels arise also when the parties realise different results and not
+those which they desire; for the not attaining one's special object is
+all one, in this case, with getting nothing at all: as in the
+well-known case where a man made promises to a musician, rising in
+proportion to the excellence of his music; but when, the next morning,
+the musician claimed the performance of his promises, he said that he
+had given him pleasure for pleasure: of course, if each party had
+intended this, it would have been all right: but if the one desires
+amusement and the other gain, and the one gets his object but the other
+not, the dealing cannot be fair: because a man fixes his mind upon what
+he happens to want, and will give so and so for that specific thing.
+
+The question then arises, who is to fix the rate? the man who first
+gives, or the man who first takes? because, _primâ facie_, the man who
+first gives seems to leave the rate to be fixed by the other party.
+This, they say, was in fact the practice of Protagoras: when he taught
+a man anything he would bid the learner estimate the worth of the
+knowledge gained by his own private opinion; and then he used to take
+so much from him. In such cases some people adopt the rule,
+
+"With specified reward a friend should be content."
+
+They are certainly fairly found fault with who take the money in
+advance and then do nothing of what they said they would do, their
+promises having been so far beyond their ability; for such men do not
+perform what they agreed, The Sophists, however, are perhaps obliged to
+take this course, because no one would give a sixpence for their
+knowledge. These then, I say, are fairly found fault with, because they
+do not what they have already taken money for doing.
+
+In cases where no stipulation as to the respective services is made
+they who disinterestedly do the first service will not raise the
+question (as we have said before), because it is the nature of
+Friendship, based on mutual goodness to be reference to the intention
+of the other, the intention being characteristic of the true friend and
+of goodness.
+
+And it would seem the same rule should be laid down for those who are
+connected with one another as teachers and learners of philosophy; for
+here the value of the commodity cannot be measured by money, and, in
+fact, an exactly equivalent price cannot be set upon it, but perhaps it
+is sufficient to do what one can, as in the case of the gods or one's
+parents.
+
+But where the original giving is not upon these terms but avowedly for
+some return, the most proper course is perhaps for the requital to be
+such as _both_ shall allow to be proportionate, and, where this cannot
+be, then for the receiver to fix the value would seem to be not only
+necessary but also fair: because when the first giver gets that which
+is equivalent to the advantage received by the other, or to what he
+would have given to secure the pleasure he has had, then he has the
+value from him: for not only is this seen to be the course adopted in
+matters of buying and selling but also in some places the law does not
+allow of actions upon voluntary dealings; on the principle that when
+one man has trusted another he must be content to have the obligation
+discharged in the same spirit as he originally contracted it: that is
+to say, it is thought fairer for the trusted, than for the trusting,
+party, to fix the value. For, in general, those who have and those who
+wish to get things do not set the same value on them: what is their
+own, and what they give in each case, appears to them worth a great
+deal: but yet the return is made according to the estimate of those who
+have received first, it should perhaps be added that the receiver
+should estimate what he has received, not by the value he sets upon it
+now that he has it, but by that which he set upon it before he obtained
+it.
+
+Chapter II.
+
+Questions also arise upon such points as the following: Whether one's
+father has an unlimited claim on one's services and obedience, or
+whether the sick man is to obey his physician? or, in an election of a
+general, the warlike qualities of the candidates should be alone
+regarded?
+
+In like manner whether one should do a service rather to one's friend
+or to a good man? whether one should rather requite a benefactor or
+give to one's companion, supposing that both are not within one's
+power?
+
+Is not the true answer that it is no easy task to determine all such
+questions accurately, inasmuch as they involve numerous differences of
+all kinds, in respect of amount and what is honourable and what is
+necessary? It is obvious, of course, that no one person can unite in
+himself all claims. Again, the requital of benefits is, in general, a
+higher duty than doing unsolicited kindnesses to one's companion; in
+other words, the discharging of a debt is more obligatory upon one than
+the duty of giving to a companion. And yet this rule may admit of
+exceptions; for instance, which is the higher duty? for one who has
+been ransomed out of the hands of robbers to ransom in return his
+ransomer, be he who he may, or to repay him on his demand though he has
+not been taken by robbers, or to ransom his own father? for it would
+seem that a man ought to ransom his father even in preference to
+himself.
+
+Well then, as has been said already, as a general rule the debt should
+be discharged, but if in a particular case the giving greatly
+preponderates as being either honourable or necessary, we must be
+swayed by these considerations: I mean, in some cases the requital of
+the obligation previously existing may not be equal; suppose, for
+instance, that the original benefactor has conferred a kindness on a
+good man, knowing him to be such, whereas this said good man has to
+repay it believing him to be a scoundrel.
+
+And again, in certain cases no obligation lies on a man to lend to one
+who has lent to him; suppose, for instance, that a bad man lent to him,
+as being a good man, under the notion that he should get repaid,
+whereas the said good man has no hope of repayment from him being a bad
+man. Either then the case is really as we have supposed it and then the
+claim is not equal, or it is not so but supposed to be; and still in so
+acting people are not to be thought to act wrongly. In short, as has
+been oftentimes stated before, all statements regarding feelings and
+actions can be definite only in proportion as their object-matter is
+so; it is of course quite obvious that all people have not the same
+claim upon one, nor are the claims of one's father unlimited; just as
+Jupiter does not claim all kinds of sacrifice without distinction: and
+since the claims of parents, brothers, companions, and benefactors, are
+all different, we must give to each what belongs to and befits each.
+
+And this is seen to be the course commonly pursued: to marriages men
+commonly invite their relatives, because these are from a common stock
+and therefore all the actions in any way pertaining thereto are common
+also: and to funerals men think that relatives ought to assemble in
+preference to other people, for the same reason.
+
+And it would seem that in respect of maintenance it is our duty to
+assist our parents in preference to all others, as being their debtors,
+and because it is more honourable to succour in these respects the
+authors of our existence than ourselves. Honour likewise we ought to
+pay to our parents just as to the gods, but then, not all kinds of
+honour: not the same, for instance, to a father as to a mother: nor
+again to a father the honour due to a scientific man or to a general
+but that which is a father's due, and in like manner to a mother that
+which is a mother's.
+
+To all our elders also the honour befitting their age, by rising up in
+their presence, turning out of the way for them, and all similar marks
+of respect: to our companions again, or brothers, frankness and free
+participation in all we have. And to those of the same family, or
+tribe, or city, with ourselves, and all similarly connected with us, we
+should constantly try to render their due, and to discriminate what
+belongs to each in respect of nearness of connection, or goodness, or
+intimacy: of course in the case of those of the same class the
+discrimination is easier; in that of those who are in different classes
+it is a matter of more trouble. This, however, should not be a reason
+for giving up the attempt, but we must observe the distinctions so far
+as it is practicable to do so.
+
+Chapter III.
+
+A question is also raised as to the propriety of dissolving or not
+dissolving those Friendships the parties to which do not remain what
+they were when the connection was formed.
+
+Now surely in respect of those whose motive to Friendship is utility or
+pleasure there can be nothing wrong in breaking up the connection when
+they no longer have those qualities; because they were friends [not of
+one another, but] of those qualities: and, these having failed, it is
+only reasonable to expect that they should cease to entertain the
+sentiment.
+
+But a man has reason to find fault if the other party, being really
+attached to him because of advantage or pleasure, pretended to be so
+because of his moral character: in fact, as we said at the
+commencement, the most common source of quarrels between friends is
+their not being friends on the same grounds as they suppose themselves
+to be.
+
+Now when a man has been deceived in having supposed himself to excite
+the sentiment of Friendship by reason of his moral character, the other
+party doing nothing to indicate he has but himself to blame: but when
+he has been deceived by the pretence of the other he has a right to
+find fault with the man who has so deceived him, aye even more than
+with utterers of false coin, in proportion to the greater preciousness
+of that which is the object-matter of the villany.
+
+But suppose a man takes up another as being a good man, who turns out,
+and is found by him, to be a scoundrel, is he bound still to entertain
+Friendship for him? or may we not say at once it is impossible? since
+it is not everything which is the object-matter of Friendship, but only
+that which is good; and so there is no obligation to be a bad man's
+friend, nor, in fact, ought one to be such: for one ought not to be a
+lover of evil, nor to be assimilated to what is base; which would be
+implied, because we have said before, like is friendly to like.
+
+Are we then to break with him instantly? not in all cases; only where
+our friends are incurably depraved; when there is a chance of amendment
+we are bound to aid in repairing the moral character of our friends
+even more than their substance, in proportion as it is better and more
+closely related to Friendship. Still he who should break off the
+connection is not to be judged to act wrongly, for he never was a
+friend to such a character as the other now is, and therefore, since
+the man is changed and he cannot reduce him to his original state, he
+backs out of the connection.
+
+To put another case: suppose that one party remains what he was when
+the Friendship was formed, while the other becomes morally improved and
+widely different from his friend in goodness; is the improved character
+to treat the other as a friend?
+
+May we not say it is impossible? The case of course is clearest where
+there is a great difference, as in the Friendships of boys: for suppose
+that of two boyish friends the one still continues a boy in mind and
+the other becomes a man of the highest character, how can they be
+friends? since they neither are pleased with the same objects nor like
+and dislike the same things: for these points will not belong to them
+as regards one another, and without them it was assumed they cannot be
+friends because they cannot live in intimacy: and of the case of those
+who cannot do so we have spoken before.
+
+Well then, is the improved party to bear himself towards his former
+friend in no way differently to what he would have done had the
+connection never existed?
+
+Surely he ought to bear in mind the intimacy of past times, and just as
+we think ourselves bound to do favours for our friends in preference to
+strangers, so to those who have been friends and are so no longer we
+should allow somewhat on the score of previous Friendship, whenever the
+cause of severance is not excessive depravity on their part.
+
+Chapter IV.
+
+Now the friendly feelings which are exhibited towards our friends, and
+by which Friendships are characterised, seem to have sprung out of
+those which we entertain toward ourselves.
+
+I mean, people define a friend to be "one who intends and does what is
+good (or what he believes to be good) to another for that other's
+sake," or "one who wishes his friend to be and to live for that
+friend's own sake" (which is the feeling of mothers towards their
+children, and of friends who have come into collision). Others again,
+"one who lives with another and chooses the same objects," or "one who
+sympathises with his friend in his sorrows and in his joys" (this too
+is especially the case with mothers).
+
+Well, by some one of these marks people generally characterise
+Friendship: and each of these the good man has towards himself, and all
+others have them in so far as they suppose themselves to be good. (For,
+as has been said before, goodness, that is the good man, seems to be a
+measure to every one else.)
+
+For he is at unity in himself, and with every part of his soul he
+desires the same objects; and he wishes for himself both what is, and
+what he believes to be, good; and he does it (it being characteristic
+of the good man to work at what is good), and for the sake of himself,
+inasmuch as he does it for the sake of his Intellectual Principle which
+is generally thought to be a man's Self. Again, he wishes himself And
+specially this Principle whereby he is an intelligent being, to live
+and be preserved in life, because existence is a good to him that is a
+good man.
+
+But it is to himself that each individual wishes what is good, and no
+man, conceiving the possibility of his becoming other than he now is,
+chooses that that New Self should have all things indiscriminately: a
+god, for instance, has at the present moment the Chief Good, but he has
+it in right of being whatever he actually now is: and the Intelligent
+Principle must be judged to be each man's Self, or at least eminently
+so [though other Principles help, of course, to constitute him the man
+he is].
+
+Furthermore, the good man wishes to continue to live with himself; for
+he can do it with pleasure, in that his memories of past actions are
+full of delight and his anticipations of the future are good and such
+are pleasurable. Then, again, he has good store of matter for his
+Intellect to contemplate, and he most especially sympathises with his
+Self in its griefs and joys, because the objects which give him pain
+and pleasure are at all times the same, not one thing to-day and a
+different one to-morrow: because he is not given to repentance,[1] if
+one may so speak. It is then because each of these feelings are
+entertained by the good man towards his own Self and a friend feels
+towards a friend as towards himself (a friend being in fact another
+Self), that Friendship is thought to be some one of these things and
+they are accounted friends in whom they are found. Whether or no there
+can really be Friendship between a man and his Self is a question we
+will not at present entertain: there may be thought to be Friendship,
+in so far as there are two or more of the aforesaid requisites, and
+because the highest degree of Friendship, in the usual acceptation of
+that term, resembles the feeling entertained by a man towards himself.
+
+But it may be urged that the aforesaid requisites are to all appearance
+found in the common run of men, though they are men of a low stamp.
+
+May it not be answered, that they share in them only in so far as they
+please themselves, and conceive themselves to be good? for certainly,
+they are not either really, or even apparently, found in any one of
+those who are very depraved and villainous; we may almost say not even
+in those who are bad men at all: for they are at variance with
+themselves and lust after different things from those which in cool
+reason they wish for, just as men who fail of Self-Control: I mean,
+they choose things which, though hurtful, are pleasurable, in
+preference to those which in their own minds they believe to be good:
+others again, from cowardice and indolence, decline to do what still
+they are convinced is best for them: while they who from their
+depravity have actually done many dreadful actions hate and avoid life,
+and accordingly kill themselves: and the wicked seek others in whose
+company to spend their time, but fly from themselves because they have
+many unpleasant subjects of memory, and can only look forward to others
+like them when in solitude but drown their remorse in the company of
+others: and as they have nothing to raise the sentiment of Friendship
+so they never feel it towards themselves.
+
+Neither, in fact, can they who are of this character sympathise with
+their Selves in their joys and sorrows, because their soul is, as it
+were, rent by faction, and the one principle, by reason of the
+depravity in them, is grieved at abstaining from certain things, while
+the other and better principle is pleased thereat; and the one drags
+them this way and the other that way, as though actually tearing them
+asunder.[2] And though it is impossible actually to have at the same
+time the sensations of pain and pleasure; yet after a little time the
+man is sorry for having been pleased, and he could wish that those
+objects had not given him pleasure; for the wicked are full of remorse.
+
+It is plain then that the wicked man cannot be in the position of a
+friend even towards himself, because he has in himself nothing which
+can excite the sentiment of Friendship. If then to be thus is
+exceedingly wretched it is a man's duty to flee from wickedness with
+all his might and to strive to be good, because thus may he be friends
+with himself and may come to be a friend to another.
+
+Chapter V.
+
+Kindly Feeling, though resembling Friendship, is not identical with it,
+because it may exist in reference to those whom we do not know and
+without the object of it being aware of its existence, which Friendship
+cannot. (This, by the way, has also been said before.) And further, it
+is not even Affection because it does not imply intensity nor yearning,
+which are both consequences of Affection. Again Affection requires
+intimacy but Kindly Feeling may arise quite suddenly, as happens
+sometimes in respect of men against whom people are matched in any way,
+I mean they come to be kindly disposed to them and sympathise in their
+wishes, but still they would not join them in any action, because, as
+we said, they conceive this feeling of kindness suddenly and so have
+but a superficial liking.
+
+What it does seem to be is the starting point of a Friendship; just as
+pleasure, received through the sight, is the commencement of Love: for
+no one falls in love without being first pleased with the personal
+appearance of the beloved object, and yet he who takes pleasure in it
+does not therefore necessarily love, but when he wearies for the object
+in its absence and desires its presence. Exactly in the same way men
+cannot be friends without having passed through the stage of Kindly
+Feeling, and yet they who are in that stage do not necessarily advance
+to Friendship: they merely have an inert wish for the good of those
+toward whom they entertain the feeling, but would not join them in any
+action, nor put themselves out of the way for them. So that, in a
+metaphorical way of speaking, one might say that it is dormant
+Friendship, and when it has endured for a space and ripened into
+intimacy comes to be real Friendship; but not that whose object is
+advantage or pleasure, because such motives cannot produce even Kindly
+Feeling.
+
+I mean, he who has received a kindness requites it by Kindly Feeling
+towards his benefactor, and is right in so doing: but he who wishes
+another to be prosperous, because he has hope of advantage through his
+instrumentality, does not seem to be kindly disposed to that person but
+rather to himself; just as neither is he his friend if he pays court to
+him for any interested purpose.
+
+Kindly Feeling always arises by reason of goodness and a certain
+amiability, when one man gives another the notion of being a fine
+fellow, or brave man, etc., as we said was the case sometimes with
+those matched against one another.
+
+Chapter VI.
+
+Unity of Sentiment is also plainly connected with Friendship, and
+therefore is not the same as Unity of Opinion, because this might exist
+even between people unacquainted with one another.
+
+Nor do men usually say people are united in sentiment merely because
+they agree in opinion on _any_ point, as, for instance, on points of
+astronomical science (Unity of Sentiment herein not having any
+connection with Friendship), but they say that Communities have Unity
+of Sentiment when they agree respecting points of expediency and take
+the same line and carry out what has been determined in common
+consultation.
+
+Thus we see that Unity of Sentiment has for its object matters of
+action, and such of these as are of importance, and of mutual, or, in
+the case of single States, common, interest: when, for instance, all
+agree in the choice of magistrates, or forming alliance with the
+Lacedæmonians, or appointing Pittacus ruler (that is to say, supposing
+he himself was willing). But when each wishes himself to be in power
+(as the brothers in the Phœnissæ), they quarrel and form parties: for,
+plainly, Unity of Sentiment does not merely imply that each entertains
+the same idea be it what it may, but that they do so in respect of the
+same object, as when both the populace and the sensible men of a State
+desire that the best men should be in office, because then all attain
+their object.
+
+Thus Unity of Sentiment is plainly a social Friendship, as it is also
+said to be: since it has for its object-matter things expedient and
+relating to life.
+
+And this Unity exists among the good: for they have it towards
+themselves and towards one another, being, if I may be allowed the
+expression, in the same position: I mean, the wishes of such men are
+steady and do not ebb and flow like the Euripus, and they wish what is
+just and expedient and aim at these things in common.
+
+The bad, on the contrary, can as little have Unity of Sentiment as they
+can be real friends, except to a very slight extent, desiring as they
+do unfair advantage in things profitable while they shirk labour and
+service for the common good: and while each man wishes for these things
+for himself he is jealous of and hinders his neighbour: and as they do
+not watch over the common good it is lost. The result is that they
+quarrel while they are for keeping one another to work but are not
+willing to perform their just share.
+
+Chapter VII.
+
+Benefactors are commonly held to have more Friendship for the objects
+of their kindness than these for them: and the fact is made a subject
+of discussion and enquiry, as being contrary to reasonable expectation.
+
+The account of the matter which satisfies most persons is that the one
+are debtors and the others creditors: and therefore that, as in the
+case of actual loans the debtors wish their creditors out of the way
+while the creditors are anxious for the preservation of their debtors,
+so those who have done kindnesses desire the continued existence of the
+people they have done them to, under the notion of getting a return of
+their good offices, while these are not particularly anxious about
+requital.
+
+Epicharmus, I suspect, would very probably say that they who give this
+solution judge from their own baseness; yet it certainly is like human
+nature, for the generality of men have short memories on these points,
+and aim rather at receiving than conferring benefits.
+
+But the real cause, it would seem, rests upon nature, and the case is
+not parallel to that of creditors; because in this there is no
+affection to the persons, but merely a wish for their preservation with
+a view to the return: whereas, in point of fact, they who have done
+kindnesses feel friendship and love for those to whom they have done
+them, even though they neither are, nor can by possibility hereafter
+be, in a position to serve their benefactors.
+
+And this is the case also with artisans; every one, I mean, feels more
+affection for his own work than that work possibly could for him if it
+were animate. It is perhaps specially the case with poets: for these
+entertain very great affection for their poems, loving them as their
+own children. It is to this kind of thing I should be inclined to
+compare the case of benefactors: for the object of their kindness is
+their own work, and so they love this more than this loves its creator.
+
+And the account of this is that existence is to all a thing
+choice-worthy and an object of affection; now we exist by acts of
+working, that is, by living and acting; he then that has created a
+given work exists, it may be said, by his act of working: therefore he
+loves his work because he loves existence. And this is natural, for the
+work produced displays in act what existed before potentially.
+
+Then again, the benefactor has a sense of honour in right of his
+action, so that he may well take pleasure in him in whom this resides;
+but to him who has received the benefit there is nothing honourable in
+respect of his benefactor, only something advantageous which is both
+less pleasant and less the object of Friendship.
+
+Again, pleasure is derived from the actual working out of a present
+action, from the anticipation of a future one, and from the
+recollection of a past one: but the highest pleasure and special object
+of affection is that which attends on the actual working. Now the
+benefactor's work abides (for the honourable is enduring), but the
+advantage of him who has received the kindness passes away.
+
+Again, there is pleasure in recollecting honourable actions, but in
+recollecting advantageous ones there is none at all or much less (by
+the way though, the contrary is true of the expectation of advantage).
+
+Further, the entertaining the feeling of Friendship is like acting on
+another; but being the object of the feeling is like being acted upon.
+
+So then, entertaining the sentiment of Friendship, and all feelings
+connected with it, attend on those who, in the given case of a
+benefaction, are the superior party.
+
+Once more: all people value most what has cost them much labour in the
+production; for instance, people who have themselves made their money
+are fonder of it than those who have inherited it: and receiving
+kindness is, it seems, unlaborious, but doing it is laborious. And this
+is the reason why the female parents are most fond of their offspring;
+for their part in producing them is attended with most labour, and they
+know more certainly that they are theirs. This feeling would seem also
+to belong to benefactors.
+
+Chapter VIII.
+
+A question is also raised as to whether it is right to love one's Self
+best, or some one else: because men find fault with those who love
+themselves best, and call them in a disparaging way lovers of Self; and
+the bad man is thought to do everything he does for his own sake
+merely, and the more so the more depraved he is; accordingly men
+reproach him with never doing anything unselfish: whereas the good man
+acts from a sense of honour (and the more so the better man he is), and
+for his friend's sake, and is careless of his own interest.
+
+But with these theories facts are at variance, and not unnaturally: for
+it is commonly said also that a man is to love most him who is most his
+friend, and he is most a friend who wishes good to him to whom he
+wishes it for that man's sake even though no one knows. Now these
+conditions, and in fact all the rest by which a friend is
+characterised, belong specially to each individual in respect of his
+Self: for we have said before that all the friendly feelings are
+derived to others from those which have Self primarily for their
+object. And all the current proverbs support this view; for instance,
+"one soul," "the goods of friends are common," "equality is a tie of
+Friendship," "the knee is nearer than the shin." For all these things
+exist specially with reference to a man's own Self: he is specially a
+friend to himself and so he is bound to love himself the most.
+
+It is with good reason questioned which of the two parties one should
+follow, both having plausibility on their side. Perhaps then, in
+respect of theories of this kind, the proper course is to distinguish
+and define how far each is true, and in what way. If we could ascertain
+the sense in which each uses the term "Self-loving," this point might
+be cleared up.
+
+Well now, they who use it disparagingly give the name to those who, in
+respect of wealth, and honours, and pleasures of the body, give to
+themselves the larger share: because the mass of mankind grasp after
+these and are earnest about them as being the best things; which is the
+reason why they are matters of contention. They who are covetous in
+regard to these gratify their lusts and passions in general, that is to
+say the irrational part of their soul: now the mass of mankind are so
+disposed, for which reason the appellation has taken its rise from that
+mass which is low and bad. Of course they are justly reproached who are
+Self-loving in this sense.
+
+And that the generality of men are accustomed to apply the term to
+denominate those who do give such things to themselves is quite plain:
+suppose, for instance, that a man were anxious to do, more than other
+men, acts of justice, or self-mastery, or any other virtuous acts, and,
+in general, were to secure to himself that which is abstractedly noble
+and honourable, no one would call him Self-loving, nor blame him.
+
+Yet might such an one be judged to be more truly Self-loving: certainly
+he gives to himself the things which are most noble and most good, and
+gratifies that Principle of his nature which is most rightfully
+authoritative, and obeys it in everything: and just as that which
+possesses the highest authority is thought to constitute a Community or
+any other system, so also in the case of Man: and so he is most truly
+Self-loving who loves and gratifies this Principle.
+
+Again, men are said to have, or to fail of having, self-control,
+according as the Intellect controls or not, it being plainly implied
+thereby that this Principle constitutes each individual; and people are
+thought to have done of themselves, and voluntarily, those things
+specially which are done with Reason.
+
+It is plain, therefore, that this Principle does, either entirely or
+specially constitute the individual man, and that the good man
+specially loves this. For this reason then he must be specially
+Self-loving, in a kind other than that which is reproached, and as far
+superior to it as living in accordance with Reason is to living at the
+beck and call of passion, and aiming at the truly noble to aiming at
+apparent advantage.
+
+Now all approve and commend those who are eminently earnest about
+honourable actions, and if all would vie with one another in respect of
+the καλὸν, and be intent upon doing what is most truly noble and
+honourable, society at large would have all that is proper while each
+individual in particular would have the greatest of goods, Virtue being
+assumed to be such.
+
+And so the good man ought to be Self-loving: because by doing what is
+noble he will have advantage himself and will do good to others: but
+the bad man ought not to be, because he will harm himself and his
+neighbours by following low and evil passions. In the case of the bad
+man, what he ought to do and what he does are at variance, but the good
+man does what he ought to do, because all Intellect chooses what is
+best for itself and the good man puts himself under the direction of
+Intellect.
+
+Of the good man it is true likewise that he does many things for the
+sake of his friends and his country, even to the extent of dying for
+them, if need be: for money and honours, and, in short, all the good
+things which others fight for, he will throw away while eager to secure
+to himself the καλὸν: he will prefer a brief and great joy to a tame
+and enduring one, and to live nobly for one year rather than ordinarily
+for many, and one great and noble action to many trifling ones. And
+this is perhaps that which befals men who die for their country and
+friends; they choose great glory for themselves: and they will lavish
+their own money that their friends may receive more, for hereby the
+friend gets the money but the man himself the καλὸν; so, in fact he
+gives to himself the greater good. It is the same with honours and
+offices; all these things he will give up to his friend, because this
+reflects honour and praise on himself: and so with good reason is he
+esteemed a fine character since he chooses the honourable before all
+things else. It is possible also to give up the opportunities of action
+to a friend; and to have caused a friend's doing a thing may be more
+noble than having done it one's self.
+
+In short, in all praiseworthy things the good man does plainly give to
+himself a larger share of the honourable. In this sense it is right to
+be Self-loving, in the vulgar acceptation of the term it is not.
+
+Chapter IX.
+
+A question is raised also respecting the Happy man, whether he will
+want Friends, or no?
+
+Some say that they who are blessed and independent have no need of
+Friends, for they already have all that is good, and so, as being
+independent, want nothing further: whereas the notion of a friend's
+office is to be as it were a second Self and procure for a man what he
+cannot get by himself: hence the saying,
+
+"When Fortune gives us good, what need we Friends?"
+
+On the other hand, it looks absurd, while we are assigning to the Happy
+man all other good things, not to give him Friends, which are, after
+all, thought to be the greatest of external goods.
+
+Again, if it is more characteristic of a friend to confer than to
+receive kindnesses, and if to be beneficent belongs to the good man and
+to the character of virtue, and if it is more noble to confer
+kindnesses on friends than strangers, the good man will need objects
+for his benefactions. And out of this last consideration springs a
+question whether the need of Friends be greater in prosperity or
+adversity, since the unfortunate man wants people to do him kindnesses
+and they who are fortunate want objects for their kind acts.
+
+Again, it is perhaps absurd to make our Happy man a solitary, because
+no man would choose the possession of all goods in the world on the
+condition of solitariness, man being a social animal and formed by
+nature for living with others: of course the Happy man has this
+qualification since he has all those things which are good by nature:
+and it is obvious that the society of friends and good men must be
+preferable to that of strangers and ordinary people, and we conclude,
+therefore, that the Happy man does need Friends.
+
+But then, what do they mean whom we quoted first, and how are they
+right? Is it not that the mass of mankind mean by Friends those who are
+useful? and of course the Happy man will not need such because he has
+all good things already; neither will he need such as are Friends with
+a view to the pleasurable, or at least only to a slight extent; because
+his life, being already pleasurable, does not want pleasure imported
+from without; and so, since the Happy man does not need Friends of
+these kinds, he is thought not to need any at all.
+
+But it may be, this is not true: for it was stated originally, that
+Happiness is a kind of Working; now Working plainly is something that
+must come into being, not be already there like a mere piece of
+property.
+
+If then the being happy consists in living and working, and the good
+man's working is in itself excellent and pleasurable (as we said at the
+commencement of the treatise), and if what is our own reckons among
+things pleasurable, and if we can view our neighbours better than
+ourselves and their actions better than we can our own, then the
+actions of their Friends who are good men are pleasurable to the good;
+inasmuch as they have both the requisites which are naturally pleasant.
+So the man in the highest state of happiness will need Friends of this
+kind, since he desires to contemplate good actions, and actions of his
+own, which those of his friend, being a good man, are.
+
+Again, common opinion requires that the Happy man live with pleasure to
+himself: now life is burthensome to a man in solitude, for it is not
+easy to work continuously by one's self, but in company with, and in
+regard to others, it is easier, and therefore the working, being
+pleasurable in itself will be more continuous (a thing which should be
+in respect of the Happy man); for the good man, in that he is good
+takes pleasure in the actions which accord with Virtue and is annoyed
+at those which spring from Vice, just as a musical man is pleased with
+beautiful music and annoyed by bad. And besides, as Theognis says,
+Virtue itself may be improved by practice, from living with the good.
+
+And, upon the following considerations more purely metaphysical, it
+will probably appear that the good friend is naturally choice-worthy to
+the good man. We have said before, that whatever is naturally good is
+also in itself good and pleasant to the good man; now the fact of
+living, so far as animals are concerned, is characterised generally by
+the power of sentience, in man it is characterised by that of
+sentience, or of rationality (the faculty of course being referred to
+the actual operation of the faculty, certainly the main point is the
+actual operation of it); so that living seems mainly to consist in the
+act of sentience or exerting rationality: now the fact of living is in
+itself one of the things that are good and pleasant (for it is a
+definite totality, and whatever is such belongs to the nature of good),
+but what is naturally good is good to the good man: for which reason it
+seems to be pleasant to all. (Of course one must not suppose a life
+which is depraved and corrupted, nor one spent in pain, for that which
+is such is indefinite as are its inherent qualities: however, what is
+to be said of pain will be clearer in what is to follow.)
+
+If then the fact of living is in itself good and pleasant (and this
+appears from the fact that all desire it, and specially those who are
+good and in high happiness; their course of life being most
+choice-worthy and their existence most choice-worthy likewise), then
+also he that sees perceives that he sees; and he that hears perceives
+that he hears; and he that walks perceives that he walks; and in all
+the other instances in like manner there is a faculty which reflects
+upon and perceives the fact that we are working, so that we can
+perceive that we perceive and intellectually know that we
+intellectually know: but to perceive that we perceive or that we
+intellectually know is to perceive that we exist, since existence was
+defined to be perceiving or intellectually knowing. Now to perceive
+that one lives is a thing pleasant in itself, life being a thing
+naturally good, and the perceiving of the presence in ourselves of
+things naturally good being pleasant.
+
+Therefore the fact of living is choice-worthy, and to the good
+specially so since existence is good and pleasant to them: for they
+receive pleasure from the internal consciousness of that which in
+itself is good.
+
+But the good man is to his friend as to himself, friend being but a
+name for a second Self; therefore as his own existence is choice-worthy
+to each so too, or similarly at least, is his friend's existence. But
+the ground of one's own existence being choice-worthy is the perceiving
+of one's self being good, any such perception being in itself pleasant.
+Therefore one ought to be thoroughly conscious of one's friend's
+existence, which will result from living with him, that is sharing in
+his words and thoughts: for this is the meaning of the term as applied
+to the human species, not mere feeding together as in the case of
+brutes.
+
+If then to the man in a high state of happiness existence is in itself
+choice-worthy, being naturally good and pleasant, and so too a friend's
+existence, then the friend also must be among things choice-worthy. But
+whatever is choice-worthy to a man he should have or else he will be in
+this point deficient. The man therefore who is to come up to our notion
+"Happy" will need good Friends.
+
+Chapter X.
+
+Are we then to make our friends as numerous as possible? or, as in
+respect of acquaintance it is thought to have been well said "have not
+thou many acquaintances yet be not without;" so too in respect of
+Friendship may we adopt the precept, and say that a man should not be
+without friends, nor again have exceeding many friends?
+
+Now as for friends who are intended for use, the maxim I have quoted
+will, it seems, fit in exceedingly well, because to requite the
+services of many is a matter of labour, and a whole life would not be
+long enough to do this for them. So that, if more numerous than what
+will suffice for one's own life, they become officious, and are
+hindrances in respect of living well: and so we do not want them. And
+again of those who are to be for pleasure a few are quite enough, just
+like sweetening in our food.
+
+But of the good are we to make as many as ever we can, or is there any
+measure of the number of friends, as there is of the number to
+constitute a Political Community? I mean, you cannot make one out of
+ten men, and if you increase the number to one hundred thousand it is
+not any longer a Community. However, the number is not perhaps some one
+definite number but any between certain extreme limits.
+
+Well, of friends likewise there is a limited number, which perhaps may
+be laid down to be the greatest number with whom it would be possible
+to keep up intimacy; this being thought to be one of the greatest marks
+of Friendship, and it being quite obvious that it is not possible to be
+intimate with many, in other words, to part one's self among many. And
+besides it must be remembered that they also are to be friends to one
+another if they are all to live together: but it is a matter of
+difficulty to find this in many men at once.
+
+It comes likewise to be difficult to bring home to one's self the joys
+and sorrows of many: because in all probability one would have to
+sympathise at the same time with the joys of this one and the sorrows
+of that other.
+
+Perhaps then it is well not to endeavour to have very many friends but
+so many as are enough for intimacy: because, in fact, it would seem not
+to be possible to be very much a friend to many at the same time: and,
+for the same reason, not to be in love with many objects at the same
+time: love being a kind of excessive Friendship which implies but one
+object: and all strong emotions must be limited in the number towards
+whom they are felt.
+
+And if we look to facts this seems to be so: for not many at a time
+become friends in the way of companionship, all the famous Friendships
+of the kind are between _two_ persons: whereas they who have many
+friends, and meet everybody on the footing of intimacy, seem to be
+friends really to no one except in the way of general society; I mean
+the characters denominated as over-complaisant.
+
+To be sure, in the way merely of society, a man may be a friend to many
+without being necessarily over-complaisant, but being truly good: but
+one cannot be a friend to many because of their virtue, and for the
+persons' own sake; in fact, it is a matter for contentment to find even
+a few such.
+
+Chapter XI.
+
+Again: are friends most needed in prosperity or in adversity? they are
+required, we know, in both states, because the unfortunate need help
+and the prosperous want people to live with and to do kindnesses to:
+for they have a desire to act kindly to some one.
+
+To have friends is more necessary in adversity, and therefore in this
+case useful ones are wanted; and to have them in prosperity is more
+honourable, and this is why the prosperous want good men for friends,
+it being preferable to confer benefits on, and to live with, these. For
+the very presence of friends is pleasant even in adversity: since men
+when grieved are comforted by the sympathy of their friends.
+
+And from this, by the way, the question might be raised, whether it is
+that they do in a manner take part of the weight of calamities, or only
+that their presence, being pleasurable, and the consciousness of their
+sympathy, make the pain of the sufferer less.
+
+However, we will not further discuss whether these which have been
+suggested or some other causes produce the relief, at least the effect
+we speak of is a matter of plain fact.
+
+But their presence has probably a mixed effect: I mean, not only is the
+very seeing friends pleasant, especially to one in misfortune, and
+actual help towards lessening the grief is afforded (the natural
+tendency of a friend, if he is gifted with tact, being to comfort by
+look and word, because he is well acquainted with the sufferer's temper
+and disposition and therefore knows what things give him pleasure and
+pain), but also the perceiving a friend to be grieved at his
+misfortunes causes the sufferer pain, because every one avoids being
+cause of pain to his friends. And for this reason they who are of a
+manly nature are cautious not to implicate their friends in their pain;
+and unless a man is exceedingly callous to the pain of others he cannot
+bear the pain which is thus caused to his friends: in short, he does
+not admit men to wail with him, not being given to wail at all: women,
+it is true, and men who resemble women, like to have others to groan
+with them, and love such as friends and sympathisers. But it is plain
+that it is our duty in all things to imitate the highest character.
+
+On the other hand, the advantages of friends in our prosperity are the
+pleasurable intercourse and the consciousness that they are pleased at
+our good fortune.
+
+It would seem, therefore, that we ought to call in friends readily on
+occasion of good fortune, because it is noble to be ready to do good to
+others: but on occasion of bad fortune, we should do so with
+reluctance; for we should as little as possible make others share in
+our ills; on which principle goes the saying, "I am unfortunate, let
+that suffice." The most proper occasion for calling them in is when
+with small trouble or annoyance to themselves they can be of very great
+use to the person who needs them.
+
+But, on the contrary, it is fitting perhaps to go to one's friends in
+their misfortunes unasked and with alacrity (because kindness is the
+friend's office and specially towards those who are in need and who do
+not demand it as a right, this being more creditable and more pleasant
+to both); and on occasion of their good fortune to go readily, if we
+can forward it in any way (because men need their friends for this
+likewise), but to be backward in sharing it, any great eagerness to
+receive advantage not being creditable.
+
+One should perhaps be cautious not to present the appearance of
+sullenness in declining the sympathy or help of friends, for this
+happens occasionally.
+
+It appears then that the presence of friends is, under all
+circumstances, choice-worthy.
+
+Chapter XII.
+
+May we not say then that, as seeing the beloved object is most prized
+by lovers and they choose this sense rather than any of the others
+because Love
+
+"Is engendered in the eyes,
+With gazing fed,"
+
+in like manner intimacy is to friends most choice-worthy, Friendship
+being communion? Again, as a man is to himself so is he to his friend;
+now with respect to himself the perception of his own existence is
+choice-worthy, therefore is it also in respect of his friend.
+
+And besides, their Friendship is acted out in intimacy, and so with
+good reason they desire this. And whatever in each man's opinion
+constitutes existence, or whatsoever it is for the sake of which they
+choose life, herein they wish their friends to join with them; and so
+some men drink together, others gamble, others join in gymnastic
+exercises or hunting, others study philosophy together: in each case
+spending their days together in that which they like best of all things
+in life, for since they wish to be intimate with their friends they do
+and partake in those things whereby they think to attain this object.
+
+Therefore the Friendship of the wicked comes to be depraved; for, being
+unstable, they share in what is bad and become depraved in being made
+like to one another: but the Friendship of the good is good, growing
+with their intercourse; they improve also, as it seems, by repeated
+acts, and by mutual correction, for they receive impress from one
+another in the points which give them pleasure; whence says the Poet,
+
+"Thou from the good, good things shalt surely learn."
+
+Here then we will terminate our discourse of Friendship. The next thing
+is to go into the subject of Pleasure.
+
+BOOK X
+
+Chapter I.
+
+Next, it would seem, follows a discussion respecting Pleasure, for it
+is thought to be most closely bound up with our kind: and so men train
+the young, guiding them on their course by the rudders of Pleasure and
+Pain. And to like and dislike what one ought is judged to be most
+important for the formation of good moral character: because these
+feelings extend all one's life through, giving a bias towards and
+exerting an influence on the side of Virtue and Happiness, since men
+choose what is pleasant and avoid what is painful.
+
+Subjects such as these then, it would seem, we ought by no means to
+pass by, and specially since they involve much difference of opinion.
+There are those who call Pleasure the Chief Good; there are others who
+on the contrary maintain that it is exceedingly bad;[1] some perhaps
+from a real conviction that such is the case, others from a notion that
+it is better, in reference to our life and conduct, to show up Pleasure
+as bad, even if it is not so really; arguing that, as the mass of men
+have a bias towards it and are the slaves of their pleasures, it is
+right to draw them to the contrary, for that so they may possibly
+arrive at the mean.[2]
+
+I confess I suspect the soundness of this policy; in matters respecting
+men's feelings and actions theories are less convincing than facts:
+whenever, therefore, they are found conflicting with actual experience,
+they not only are despised but involve the truth in their fall: he, for
+instance, who deprecates Pleasure, if once seen to aim at it, gets the
+credit of backsliding to it as being universally such as he said it
+was, the mass of men being incapable of nice distinctions.
+
+Real accounts, therefore, of such matters seem to be most expedient,
+not with a view to knowledge merely but to life and conduct: for they
+are believed as being in harm with facts, and so they prevail with the
+wise to live in accordance with them.
+
+But of such considerations enough: let us now proceed to the current
+maxims respecting Pleasure.
+
+Chapter II.
+
+Now Eudoxus thought Pleasure to be the Chief Good because he saw all,
+rational and irrational alike, aiming at it: and he argued that, since
+in all what was the object of choice must be good and what most so the
+best, the fact of all being drawn to the same thing proved this thing
+to be the best for all: "For each," he said, "finds what is good for
+itself just as it does its proper nourishment, and so that which is
+good for all, and the object of the aim of all, is their Chief Good."
+
+(And his theories were received, not so much for their own sake, as
+because of his excellent moral character; for he was thought to be
+eminently possessed of perfect self-mastery, and therefore it was not
+thought that he said these things because he was a lover of Pleasure
+but that he really was so convinced.)
+
+And he thought his position was not less proved by the argument from
+the contrary: that is, since Pain was in itself an object of avoidance
+to all the contrary must be in like manner an object of choice.
+
+Again he urged that that is most choice-worthy which we choose, not by
+reason of, or with a view to, anything further; and that Pleasure is
+confessedly of this kind because no one ever goes on to ask to what
+purpose he is pleased, feeling that Pleasure is in itself
+choice-worthy.
+
+Again, that when added to any other good it makes it more
+choice-worthy; as, for instance, to actions of justice, or perfected
+self-mastery; and good can only be increased by itself.
+
+However, this argument at least seems to prove only that it belongs to
+the class of goods, and not that it does so more than anything else:
+for every good is more choicewortby in combination with some other than
+when taken quite alone. In fact, it is by just such an argument that
+Plato proves that Pleasure is not the Chief Good:[3] "For," says he,
+"the life of Pleasure is more choice-worthy in combination with
+Practical Wisdom than apart from it; but, if the compound better then
+simple Pleasure cannot be the Chief Good; because the very Chief Good
+cannot by any addition become choice-worthy than it is already:" and it
+is obvious that nothing else can be the Chief Good, which by
+combination with any of the things in themselves good comes to be more
+choice-worthy.
+
+What is there then of such a nature? (meaning, of course, whereof we
+can partake; because that which we are in search of must be such).
+
+As for those who object that "what all aim at is not necessarily good,"
+I confess I cannot see much in what they say, because what all _think_
+we say _is_. And he who would cut away this ground from under us will
+not bring forward things more dependable: because if the argument had
+rested on the desires of irrational creatures there might have been
+something in what he says, but, since the rational also desire
+Pleasure, how can his objection be allowed any weight? and it may be
+that, even in the lower animals, there is some natural good principle
+above themselves which aims at the good peculiar to them.
+
+Nor does that seem to be sound which is urged respecting the argument
+from the contrary: I mean, some people say "it does not follow that
+Pleasure must be good because Pain is evil, since evil may be opposed
+to evil, and both evil and good to what is indifferent:" now what they
+say is right enough in itself but does not hold in the present
+instance. If both Pleasure and Pain were bad both would have been
+objects of avoidance; or if neither then neither would have been, at
+all events they must have fared alike: but now men do plainly avoid the
+one as bad and choose the other as good, and so there is a complete
+opposition.
+
+Nor again is Pleasure therefore excluded from being good because it
+does not belong to the class of qualities:[4] the acts of Virtue are
+not qualities, neither is Happiness [yet surely both are goods].
+
+Again, they say the Chief Good is limited but Pleasure unlimited, in
+that it admits of degrees.
+
+Now if they judge this from the act of feeling Pleasure then the same
+thing will apply to justice and all the other virtues,[5] in respect of
+which clearly it is said that men are more or less of such and such
+characters (according to the different virtues), they are more just or
+more brave, or one may practise justice and self-mastery more or less.
+
+If, on the other hand, they judge in respect of the Pleasures
+themselves then it may be they miss the true cause, namely that some
+are unmixed and others mixed: for just as health being in itself
+limited, admits of degrees, why should not Pleasure do so and yet be
+limited? in the former case we account for it by the fact that there is
+not the same adjustment of parts in all men, nor one and the same
+always in the same individual: but health, though relaxed, remains up
+to a certain point, and differs in degrees; and of course the same may
+be the case with Pleasure.
+
+Again, assuming the Chief Good to be perfect and all Movements[6] and
+Generations imperfect, they try to shew that Pleasure is a Movement and
+a Generation.
+
+Yet they do not seem warranted in saying even that it is a Movement:
+for to every Movement are thought to belong swiftness and slowness, and
+if not in itself, as to that of the universe, yet relatively: but to
+Pleasure neither of these belongs: for though one may have got quickly
+into the state Pleasure, as into that of anger, one cannot be in the
+state quickly,[7] nor relatively to the state of any other person; but
+we can walk or grow, and so on, quickly or slowly.
+
+Of course it is possible to change into the state of Pleasure quickly
+or slowly, but to act in the state (by which, I mean, have the
+perception of Pleasure) quickly, is not possible.
+
+And how can it be a Generation? because, according to notions generally
+held, not _any_thing is generated from _any_thing, but a thing resolves
+itself into that out of which it was generated: whereas of that of
+which Pleasure is a Generation Pain is a Destruction.
+
+Again, they say that Pain is a lack of something suitable to nature and
+Pleasure a supply of it.
+
+But these are affections of the body: now if Pleasure really is a
+supplying of somewhat suitable to nature, that must feel the Pleasure
+in which the supply takes place, therefore the body of course: yet this
+is not thought to be so: neither then is Pleasure a supplying, only a
+person of course will be pleased when a supply takes place just as he
+will be pained when he is cut short.
+
+This notion would seem to have arisen out of the Pains and Pleasures
+connected with natural nourishment; because, when people have felt a
+lack and so have had Pain first, they, of course, are pleased with the
+supply of their lack.
+
+But this is not the case with all Pleasures: those attendant on
+mathematical studies, for instance, are unconnected with any Pain; and
+of such as attend on the senses those which arise through the sense of
+Smell; and again, many sounds, and sights, and memories, and hopes: now
+of what can these be Generations? because there has been here no lack
+of anything to be afterwards supplied.
+
+And to those who bring forward disgraceful Pleasures we may reply that
+these are not really pleasant things; for it does not follow because
+they are pleasant to the ill-disposed that we are to admit that they
+are pleasant except to them; just as we should not say that those
+things are really wholesome, or sweet, or bitter, which are so to the
+sick, or those objects really white which give that impression to
+people labouring under ophthalmia.[8]
+
+Or we might say thus, that the Pleasures are choice-worthy but not as
+derived from these sources: just as wealth is, but not as the price of
+treason; or health, but not on the terms of eating anything however
+loathsome.
+
+Or again, may we not say that Pleasures differ in kind? those derived
+from honourable objects, for instance are different from those arising
+from disgraceful ones; and it is not possible to experience the
+Pleasure of the just man without being just, or of the musical man
+without being musical; and so on of others.
+
+The distinction commonly drawn between the friend and the flatterer
+would seem to show clearly either that Pleasure is not a good, or that
+there are different kinds of Pleasure: for the former is thought to
+have good as the object of his intercourse, the latter Pleasure only;
+and this last is reproached, but the former men praise as having
+different objects in his intercourse.
+
+Again, no one would choose to live with a child's intellect all his
+life through, though receiving the highest possible Pleasure from such
+objects as children receive it from; or to take Pleasure in doing any
+of the most disgraceful things, though sure never to be pained.
+
+There are many things also about which we should be diligent even
+though they brought no Pleasure; as seeing, remembering, knowing,
+possessing the various Excellences; and the fact that Pleasures do
+follow on these naturally makes no difference, because we should
+certainly choose them even though no Pleasure resulted from them.
+
+It seems then to be plain that Pleasure is not the Chief Good, nor is
+every kind of it choice-worthy: and that there are some choice-worthy
+in themselves, differing in kind, _i.e._ in the sources from which they
+are derived. Let this then suffice by way of an account of the current
+maxims respecting Pleasure and Pain.
+
+Chapter III.
+
+Now what it is, and how characterised, will be more plain if we take up
+the subject afresh.
+
+An act of Sight is thought to be complete at any moment; that is to
+say, it lacks nothing the accession of which subsequently will complete
+its whole nature.
+
+Well, Pleasure resembles this: because it is a whole, as one may say;
+and one could not at any moment of time take a Pleasure whose whole
+nature would be completed by its lasting for a longer time. And for
+this reason it is not a Movement: for all Movement takes place in time
+of certain duration and has a certain End to accomplish; for instance,
+the Movement of house-building[9] is then only complete when the
+builder has produced what he intended, that is, either in the whole
+time [necessary to complete the whole design], or in a given
+portion.[10] But all the subordinate Movements are incomplete in the
+parts of the time, and are different in kind from the whole movement
+and from one another (I mean, for instance, that the fitting the stones
+together is a Movement different from that of fluting the column, and
+both again from the construction of the Temple as a whole: but this
+last is complete as lacking nothing to the result proposed; whereas
+that of the basement, or of the triglyph, is incomplete, because each
+is a Movement of a part merely).
+
+As I said then, they differ in kind, and you cannot at any time you
+choose find a Movement complete in its whole nature, but, if at all, in
+the whole time requisite.
+
+And so it is with the Movement of walking and all others: for, if
+motion be a Movement from one place to another place, then of it too
+there are different kinds, flying, walking, leaping, and such-like. And
+not only so, but there are different kinds even in walking: the
+where-from and where-to are not the same in the whole Course as in a
+portion of it; nor in one portion as in another; nor is crossing this
+line the same as crossing that: because a man is not merely crossing a
+line but a line in a given place, and this is in a different place from
+that.
+
+Of Movement I have discoursed exactly in another treatise. I will now
+therefore only say that it seems not to be complete at any given
+moment; and that most movements are incomplete and specifically
+different, since the whence and whither constitute different species.
+
+But of Pleasure the whole nature is complete at any given moment: it is
+plain then that Pleasure and Movement must be different from one
+another, and that Pleasure belongs to the class of things whole and
+complete. And this might appear also from the impossibility of moving
+except in a definite time, whereas there is none with respect to the
+sensation of Pleasure, for what exists at the very present moment is a
+kind of "whole."
+
+From these considerations then it is plain that people are not
+warranted in saying that Pleasure is a Movement or a Generation:
+because these terms are not applicable to all things, only to such as
+are divisible and not "wholes:" I mean that of an act of Sight there is
+no Generation, nor is there of a point, nor of a monad, nor is any one
+of these a Movement or a Generation: neither then of Pleasure is there
+Movement or Generation, because it is, as one may say, "a whole."[11]
+
+Chapter IV.
+
+Now since every Percipient Faculty works upon the Object answering to
+it, and perfectly the Faculty in a good state upon the most excellent
+of the Objects within its range (for Perfect Working is thought to be
+much what I have described; and we will not raise any question about
+saying "the Faculty" works, instead of, "that subject wherein the
+Faculty resides"), in each case the best Working is that of the Faculty
+in its best state upon the best of the Objects answering to it. And
+this will be, further, most perfect and most pleasant: for Pleasure is
+attendant upon every Percipient Faculty, and in like manner on every
+intellectual operation and speculation; and that is most pleasant which
+is most perfect, and that most perfect which is the Working of the best
+Faculty upon the most excellent of the Objects within its range.
+
+And Pleasure perfects the Working. But Pleasure does not perfect it in
+the same way as the Faculty and Object of Perception do, being good;
+just as health and the physician are not in similar senses causes of a
+healthy state.
+
+And that Pleasure does arise upon the exercise of every Percipient
+Faculty is evident, for we commonly say that sights and sounds are
+pleasant; it is plain also that this is especially the case when the
+Faculty is most excellent and works upon a similar Object: and when
+both the Object and Faculty of Perception are such, Pleasure will
+always exist, supposing of course an agent and a patient.
+
+Furthermore, Pleasure perfects the act of Working not in the way of an
+inherent state but as a supervening finish, such as is bloom in people
+at their prime. Therefore so long as the Object of intellectual or
+sensitive Perception is such as it should be and also the Faculty which
+discerns or realises the Object, there will be Pleasure in the Working:
+because when that which has the capacity of being acted on and that
+which is apt to act are alike and similarly related, the same result
+follows naturally.
+
+How is it then that no one feels Pleasure continuously? is it not that
+he wearies, because all human faculties are incapable of unintermitting
+exertion; and so, of course, Pleasure does not arise either, because
+that follows upon the act of Working. But there are some things which
+please when new, but afterwards not in the like way, for exactly the
+same reason: that at first the mind is roused and works on these
+Objects with its powers at full tension; just as they who are gazing
+stedfastly at anything; but afterwards the act of Working is not of the
+kind it was at first, but careless, and so the Pleasure too is dulled.
+
+Again, a person may conclude that all men grasp at Pleasure, because
+all aim likewise at Life and Life is an act of Working, and every man
+works at and with those things which also he best likes; the musical
+man, for instance, works with his hearing at music; the studious man
+with his intellect at speculative questions, and so forth. And Pleasure
+perfects the acts of Working, and so Life after which men grasp. No
+wonder then that they aim also at Pleasure, because to each it perfects
+Life, which is itself choice-worthy. (We will take leave to omit the
+question whether we choose Life for Pleasure's sake of Pleasure for
+Life's sake; because these two plainly are closely connected and admit
+not of separation; since Pleasure comes not into being without Working,
+and again, every Working Pleasure perfects.)
+
+And this is one reason why Pleasures are thought to differ in kind,
+because we suppose that things which differ in kind must be perfected
+by things so differing: it plainly being the case with the productions
+of Nature and Art; as animals, and trees, and pictures, and statues,
+and houses, and furniture; and so we suppose that in like manner acts
+of Working which are different in kind are perfected by things
+differing in kind. Now Intellectual Workings differ specifically from
+those of the Senses, and these last from one another; therefore so do
+the Pleasures which perfect them.
+
+This may be shown also from the intimate connection subsisting between
+each Pleasure and the Working which it perfects: I mean, that the
+Pleasure proper to any Working increases that Working; for they who
+work with Pleasure sift all things more closely and carry them out to a
+greater degree of nicety; for instance, those men become geometricians
+who take Pleasure in geometry, and they apprehend particular points
+more completely: in like manner men who are fond of music, or
+architecture, or anything else, improve each on his own pursuit,
+because they feel Pleasure in them. Thus the Pleasures aid in
+increasing the Workings, and things which do so aid are proper and
+peculiar: but the things which are proper and peculiar to others
+specifically different are themselves also specifically different.
+
+Yet even more clearly may this be shown from the fact that the
+Pleasures arising from one kind of Workings hinder other Workings; for
+instance, people who are fond of flute-music cannot keep their
+attention to conversation or discourse when they catch the sound of a
+flute; because they take more Pleasure in flute-playing than in the
+Working they are at the time engaged on; in other words, the Pleasure
+attendant on flute-playing destroys the Working of conversation or
+discourse.
+
+Much the same kind of thing takes place in other cases, when a person
+is engaged in two different Workings at the same time: that is, the
+pleasanter of the two keeps pushing out the other, and, if the
+disparity in pleasantness be great, then more and more till a man even
+ceases altogether to work at the other.
+
+This is the reason why, when we are very much pleased with anything
+whatever, we do nothing else, and it is only when we are but moderately
+pleased with one occupation that we vary it with another: people, for
+instance, who eat sweetmeats in the theatre do so most when the
+performance is indifferent.
+
+Since then the proper and peculiar Pleasure gives accuracy to the
+Workings and makes them more enduring and better of their kind, while
+those Pleasures which are foreign to them mar them, it is plain there
+is a wide difference between them: in fact, Pleasures foreign to any
+Working have pretty much the same effect as the Pains proper to it,[12]
+which, in fact, destroy the Workings; I mean, if one man dislikes
+writing, or another calculation, the one does not write, the other does
+not calculate; because, in each case, the Working is attended with some
+Pain: so then contrary effects are produced upon the Workings by the
+Pleasures and Pains proper to them, by which I mean those which arise
+upon the Working, in itself, independently of any other circumstances.
+As for the Pleasures foreign to a Working, we have said already that
+they produce a similar effect to the Pain proper to it; that is they
+destroy the Working, only not in like way.
+
+Well then, as Workings differ from one another in goodness and badness,
+some being fit objects of choice, others of avoidance, and others in
+their nature indifferent, Pleasures are similarly related; since its
+own proper Pleasure attends or each Working: of course that proper to a
+good Working is good, that proper to a bad, bad: for even the desires
+for what is noble are praiseworthy, and for what is base blameworthy.
+
+Furthermore, the Pleasures attendant on Workings are more closely
+connected with them even than the desires after them: for these last
+are separate both in time and nature, but the former are close to the
+Workings, and so indivisible from them as to raise a question whether
+the Working and the Pleasure are identical; but Pleasure does not seem
+to be an Intellectual Operation nor a Faculty of Perception, because
+that is absurd; but yet it gives some the impression of being the same
+from not being separated from these.
+
+As then the Workings are different so are their Pleasures; now Sight
+differs from Touch in purity, and Hearing and Smelling from Taste;
+therefore, in like manner, do their Pleasures; and again, Intellectual
+Pleasures from these Sensual, and the different kinds both of
+Intellectual and Sensual from one another.
+
+It is thought, moreover, that each animal has a Pleasure proper to
+itself, as it has a proper Work; that Pleasure of course which is
+attendant on the Working. And the soundness of this will appear upon
+particular inspection: for horse, dog, and man have different
+Pleasures; as Heraclitus says, an ass would sooner have hay than gold;
+in other words, provender is pleasanter to asses than gold. So then the
+Pleasures of animals specifically different are also specifically
+different, but those of the same, we may reasonably suppose, are
+without difference.
+
+Yet in the case of human creatures they differ not a little: for the
+very same things please some and pain others: and what are painful and
+hateful to some are pleasant to and liked by others. The same is the
+case with sweet things: the same will not seem so to the man in a fever
+as to him who is in health: nor will the invalid and the person in
+robust health have the same notion of warmth. The same is the case with
+other things also.
+
+Now in all such cases that is held to _be_ which impresses the good man
+with the notion of being such and such; and if this is a second maxim
+(as it is usually held to be), and Virtue, that is, the Good man, in
+that he is such, is the measure of everything, then those must be real
+Pleasures which gave him the impression of being so and those things
+pleasant in which he takes Pleasure. Nor is it at all astonishing that
+what are to him unpleasant should give another person the impression of
+being pleasant, for men are liable to many corruptions and marrings;
+and the things in question are not pleasant really, only to these
+particular persons, and to them only as being thus disposed.
+
+Well of course, you may say, it is obvious that we must assert those
+which are confessedly disgraceful to be real Pleasures, except to
+depraved tastes: but of those which are thought to be good what kind,
+or which, must we say is _The Pleasure of Man?_ is not the answer plain
+from considering the Workings, because the Pleasures follow upon these?
+
+If then there be one or several Workings which belong to the perfect
+and blessed man, the Pleasures which perfect these Workings must be
+said to be specially and properly _The Pleasures of Man;_ and all the
+rest in a secondary sense, and in various degrees according as the
+Workings are related to those highest and best ones.
+
+Chapter V.
+
+Now that we have spoken about the Excellences of both kinds, and
+Friendship in its varieties, and Pleasures, it remains to sketch out
+Happiness, since we assume that to be the one End of all human things:
+and we shall save time and trouble by recapitulating what was stated
+before.
+
+Well then, we said that it is not a State merely; because, if it were,
+it might belong to one who slept all his life through and merely
+vegetated, or to one who fell into very great calamities: and so, if
+these possibilities displease us and we would rather put it into the
+rank of some kind of Working (as was also said before), and Workings
+are of different kinds (some being necessary and choice-worthy with a
+view to other things, while others are so in themselves), it is plain
+we must rank Happiness among those choice-worthy for their own sakes
+and not among those which are so with a view to something further:
+because Happiness has no lack of anything but is self-sufficient.
+
+By choice-worthy in themselves are meant those from which nothing is
+sought beyond the act of Working: and of this kind are thought to be
+the actions according to Virtue, because doing what is noble and
+excellent is one of those things which are choice-worthy for their own
+sake alone.
+
+And again, such amusements as are pleasant; because people do not
+choose them with any further purpose: in fact they receive more harm
+than profit from them, neglecting their persons and their property.
+Still the common run of those who are judged happy take refuge in such
+pastimes, which is the reason why they who have varied talent in such
+are highly esteemed among despots; because they make themselves
+pleasant in those things which these aim at, and these accordingly want
+such men.
+
+Now these things are thought to be appurtenances of Happiness because
+men in power spend their leisure herein: yet, it may be, we cannot
+argue from the example of such men: because there is neither Virtue nor
+Intellect necessarily involved in having power, and yet these are the
+only sources of good Workings: nor does it follow that because these
+men, never having tasted pure and generous Pleasure, take refuge in
+bodily ones, we are therefore to believe them to be more choice-worthy:
+for children too believe that those things are most excellent which are
+precious in their eyes.
+
+We may well believe that as children and men have different ideas as to
+what is precious so too have the bad and the good: therefore, as we
+have many times said, those things are really precious and pleasant
+which seem so to the good man: and as to each individual that Working
+is most choice-worthy which is in accordance with his own state to the
+good man that is so which is in accordance with Virtue.
+
+Happiness then stands not in amusement; in fact the very notion is
+absurd of the End being amusement, and of one's toiling and enduring
+hardness all one's life long with a view to amusement: for everything
+in the world, so to speak, we choose with some further End in view,
+except Happiness, for that is the End comprehending all others. Now to
+take pains and to labour with a view to amusement is plainly foolish
+and very childish: but to amuse one's self with a view to steady
+employment afterwards, as Anacharsis says, is thought to be right: for
+amusement is like rest, and men want rest because unable to labour
+continuously.
+
+Rest, therefore, is not an End, because it is adopted with a view to
+Working afterwards.
+
+Again, it is held that the Happy Life must be one in the way of
+Excellence, and this is accompanied by earnestness,[13] and stands not
+in amusement. Moreover those things which are done in earnest, we say,
+are better than things merely ludicrous and joined with amusement: and
+we say that the Working of the better part, or the better man, is more
+earnest; and the Working of the better is at once better and more
+capable of Happiness.
+
+Then, again, as for bodily Pleasures, any ordinary person, or even a
+slave, might enjoy them, just as well as the best man living but
+Happiness no one supposes a slave to share except so far as it is
+implied in life: because Happiness stands not in such pastimes but in
+the Workings in the way of Excellence, as has also been stated before.
+
+Chapter VI.
+
+Now if Happiness is a Working in the way of Excellence of course that
+Excellence must be the highest, that is to say, the Excellence of the
+best Principle. Whether then this best Principle is Intellect or some
+other which is thought naturally to rule and to lead and to conceive of
+noble and divine things, whether being in its own nature divine or the
+most divine of all our internal Principles, the Working of this in
+accordance with its own proper Excellence must be the perfect
+Happiness.
+
+That it is Contemplative has been already stated: and this would seem
+to be consistent with what we said before and with truth: for, in the
+first place, this Working is of the highest kind, since the Intellect
+is the highest of our internal Principles and the subjects with which
+it is conversant the highest of all which fall within the range of our
+knowledge.
+
+Next, it is also most Continuous: for we are better able to contemplate
+than to do anything else whatever, continuously.
+
+Again, we think Pleasure must be in some way an ingredient in
+Happiness, and of all Workings in accordance with Excellence that in
+the way of Science is confessedly most pleasant: at least the pursuit
+of Science is thought to contain Pleasures admirable for purity and
+permanence; and it is reasonable to suppose that the employment is more
+pleasant to those who have mastered, than to those who are yet seeking
+for, it.[14]
+
+And the Self-Sufficiency which people speak of will attach chiefly to
+the Contemplative Working: of course the actual necessaries of life are
+needed alike by the man of science, and the just man, and all the other
+characters; but, supposing all sufficiently supplied with these, the
+just man needs people towards whom, and in concert with whom, to
+practise his justice; and in like manner the man of perfected
+self-mastery, and the brave man, and so on of the rest; whereas the man
+of science can contemplate and speculate even when quite alone, and the
+more entirely he deserves the appellation the more able is he to do so:
+it may be he can do better for having fellow-workers but still he is
+certainly most Self-Sufficient.
+
+Again, this alone would seem to be rested in for its own sake, since
+nothing results from it beyond the fact of having contemplated; whereas
+from all things which are objects of moral action we do mean to get
+something beside the doing them, be the same more or less.
+
+Also, Happiness is thought to stand in perfect rest;[15] for we toil
+that we may rest, and war that we may be at peace. Now all the
+Practical Virtues require either society or war for their Working, and
+the actions regarding these are thought to exclude rest; those of war
+entirely, because no one chooses war, nor prepares for war, for war's
+sake: he would indeed be thought a bloodthirsty villain who should make
+enemies of his friends to secure the existence of fighting and
+bloodshed. The Working also of the statesman excludes the idea of rest,
+and, beside the actual work of government, seeks for power and
+dignities or at least Happiness for the man himself and his
+fellow-citizens: a Happiness distinct[16] from the national Happiness,
+which we evidently seek as being different and distinct.
+
+If then of all the actions in accordance with the various virtues those
+of policy and war are pre-eminent in honour and greatness, and these
+are restless, and aim at some further End and are not choice-worthy for
+their own sakes, but the Working of the Intellect, being apt for
+contemplation, is thought to excel in earnestness, and to aim at no End
+beyond itself and to have Pleasure of its own which helps to increase
+the Working, and if the attributes of Self-Sufficiency, and capacity of
+rest, and unweariedness (as far as is compatible with the infirmity of
+human nature), and all other attributes of the highest Happiness,
+plainly belong to this Working, this must be perfect Happiness, if
+attaining a complete duration of life, which condition is added because
+none of the points of Happiness is incomplete.
+
+But such a life will be higher than mere human nature, because a man
+will live thus, not in so far as he is man but in so far as there is in
+him a divine Principle: and in proportion as this Principle excels his
+composite nature so far does the Working thereof excel that in
+accordance with any other kind of Excellence: and therefore, if pure
+Intellect, as compared with human nature, is divine, so too will the
+life in accordance with it be divine compared with man's ordinary life.
+
+Yet must we not give ear to those who bid one as man to mind only man's
+affairs, or as mortal only mortal things; but, so far as we can, make
+ourselves like immortals and do all with a view to living in accordance
+with the highest Principle in us, for small as it may be in bulk yet in
+power and preciousness it far more excels all the others.
+
+In fact this Principle would seem to constitute each man's "Self,"
+since it is supreme and above all others in goodness it _would_ be
+absurd then for a man not to choose his own life but that of some
+other.
+
+And here will apply an observation made before, that whatever is proper
+to each is naturally best and pleasantest to him: such then is to Man
+the life in accordance with pure Intellect (since this Principle is
+most truly Man), and if so, then it is also the happiest.
+
+And second in degree of Happiness will be that Life which is in
+accordance with the other kind of Excellence, for the Workings in
+accordance with this are proper to Man: I mean, we do actions of
+justice, courage, and the other virtues, towards one another, in
+contracts, services of different kinds, and in all kinds of actions and
+feelings too, by observing what is befitting for each: and all these
+plainly are proper to man. Further, the Excellence of the Moral
+character is thought to result in some points from physical
+circumstances, and to be, in many, very closely connected with the
+passions.
+
+Again, Practical Wisdom[17] and Excellence of the Moral character are
+very closely united; since the Principles of Practical Wisdom are in
+accordance with the Moral Virtues and these are right when they accord
+with Practical Wisdom.
+
+These moreover, as bound up with the passions, must belong to the
+composite nature, and the Excellences or Virtues of the composite
+nature are proper to man: therefore so too will be the life and
+Happiness which is in accordance with them. But that of the Pure
+Intellect is separate and distinct: and let this suffice upon the
+subject, since great exactness is beyond our purpose,
+
+It would seem, moreover, to require supply of external goods to a small
+degree, or certainly less than the Moral Happiness: for, as far as
+necessaries of life are concerned, we will suppose both characters to
+need them equally (though, in point of fact, the man who lives in
+society does take more pains about his person and all that kind of
+thing; there will really be some little difference), but when we come
+to consider their Workings there will be found a great difference.
+
+I mean, the liberal man must have money to do his liberal actions with,
+and the just man to meet his engagements (for mere intentions are
+uncertain, and even those who are unjust make a pretence of _wishing_
+to do justly), and the brave man must have power, if he is to perform
+any of the actions which appertain to his particular Virtue, and the
+man of perfected self-mastery must have opportunity of temptation, else
+how shall he or any of the others display his real character?
+
+(By the way, a question is sometimes raised, whether the moral choice
+or the actions have most to do with Virtue, since it consists in both:
+it is plain that the perfection of virtuous action requires both: but
+for the actions many things are required, and the greater and more
+numerous they are the more.) But as for the man engaged in
+Contemplative Speculation, not only are such things unnecessary for his
+Working, but, so to speak, they are even hindrances: as regards the
+Contemplation at least; because of course in so far as he is Man and
+lives in society he chooses to do what Virtue requires, and so he will
+need such things for maintaining his character as Man though not as a
+speculative philosopher.
+
+And that the perfect Happiness must be a kind of Contemplative Working
+may appear also from the following consideration: our conception of the
+gods is that they are above all blessed and happy: now what kind of
+Moral actions are we to attribute to them? those of justice? nay, will
+they not be set in a ridiculous light if represented as forming
+contracts, and restoring deposits, and so on? well then, shall we
+picture them performing brave actions, withstanding objects of fear and
+meeting dangers, because it is noble to do so? or liberal ones? but to
+whom shall they be giving? and further, it is absurd to think they have
+money or anything of the kind. And as for actions of perfected
+self-mastery, what can theirs be? would it not be a degrading praise
+that they have no bad desires? In short, if one followed the subject
+into all details all the circumstances connected with Moral actions
+would appear trivial and unworthy of Gods.
+
+Still, every one believes that they live, and therefore that they Work
+because it is not supposed that they sleep their time away like
+Endymion: now if from a living being you take away Action, still more
+if Creation, what remains but Contemplation? So then the Working of the
+Gods, eminent in blessedness, will be one apt for Contemplative
+Speculation; and of all human Workings that will have the greatest
+capacity for Happiness which is nearest akin to this.
+
+A corroboration of which position is the fact that the other animals do
+not partake of Happiness, being completely shut out from any such
+Working.
+
+To the Gods then all their life is blessed; and to men in so far as
+there is in it some copy of such Working, but of the other animals none
+is happy because it in no way shares in Contemplative Speculation.
+
+Happiness then is co-extensive with this Contemplative Speculation, and
+in proportion as people have the act of Contemplation so far have they
+also the being happy, not incidentally, but in the way of Contemplative
+Speculation because it is in itself precious.
+
+Chapter VII.
+
+So Happiness must be a kind of Contemplative Speculation; but since it
+is Man we are speaking of he will need likewise External Prosperity,
+because his Nature is not by itself sufficient for Speculation, but
+there must be health of body, and nourishment, and tendance of all
+kinds.
+
+However, it must not be thought, because without external goods a man
+cannot enjoy high Happiness, that therefore he will require many and
+great goods in order to be happy: for neither Self-sufficiency, nor
+Action, stand in Excess, and it is quite possible to act nobly without
+being ruler of sea and land, since even with moderate means a man may
+act in accordance with Virtue.
+
+And this may be clearly seen in that men in private stations are
+thought to act justly, not merely no less than men in power but even
+more: it will be quite enough that just so much should belong to a man
+as is necessary, for his life will be happy who works in accordance
+with Virtue.
+
+Solon perhaps drew a fair picture of the Happy, when he said that they
+are men moderately supplied with external goods, and who have achieved
+the most noble deeds, as he thought, and who have lived with perfect
+self-mastery: for it is quite possible for men of moderate means to act
+as they ought.
+
+Anaxagoras also seems to have conceived of the Happy man not as either
+rich or powerful, saying that he should not wonder if he were accounted
+a strange man in the judgment of the multitude: for they judge by
+outward circumstances of which alone they have any perception.
+
+And thus the opinions of the Wise seem to be accordant with our account
+of the matter: of course such things carry some weight, but truth, in
+matters of moral action, is judged from facts and from actual life, for
+herein rests the decision. So what we should do is to examine the
+preceding statements by referring them to facts and to actual life, and
+when they harmonise with facts we may accept them, when they are at
+variance with them conceive of them as mere theories.
+
+Now he that works in accordance with, and pays observance to, Pure
+Intellect, and tends this, seems likely to be both in the best frame of
+mind and dearest to the Gods: because if, as is thought, any care is
+bestowed on human things by the Gods then it must be reasonable to
+think that they take pleasure in what is best and most akin to
+themselves (and this must be the Pure Intellect); and that they requite
+with kindness those who love and honour this most, as paying observance
+to what is dear to them, and as acting rightly and nobly. And it is
+quite obvious that the man of Science chiefly combines all these: he is
+therefore dearest to the Gods, and it is probable that he is at the
+same time most Happy.
+
+Thus then on this view also the man of Science will be most Happy.
+
+Chapter VIII.
+
+Now then that we have said enough in our sketchy kind of way on these
+subjects; I mean, on the Virtues, and also on Friendship and Pleasure;
+are we to suppose that our original purpose is completed? Must we not
+rather acknowledge, what is commonly said, that in matters of moral
+action mere Speculation and Knowledge is not the real End but rather
+Practice: and if so, then neither in respect of Virtue is Knowledge
+enough; we must further strive to have and exert it, and take whatever
+other means there are of becoming good.
+
+Now if talking and writing were of themselves sufficient to make men
+good, they would justly, as Theognis observes have reaped numerous and
+great rewards, and the thing to do would be to provide them: but in
+point of fact, while they plainly have the power to guide and stimulate
+the generous among the young and to base upon true virtuous principle
+any noble and truly high-minded disposition, they as plainly are
+powerless to guide the mass of men to Virtue and goodness; because it
+is not their nature to be amenable to a sense of shame but only to
+fear; nor to abstain from what is low and mean because it is
+disgraceful to do it but because of the punishment attached to it: in
+fact, as they live at the beck and call of passion, they pursue their
+own proper pleasures and the means of securing them, and they avoid the
+contrary pains; but as for what is noble and truly pleasurable they
+have not an idea of it, inasmuch as they have never tasted of it.
+
+Men such as these then what mere words can transform? No, indeed! it is
+either actually impossible, or a task of no mean difficulty, to alter
+by words what has been of old taken into men's very dispositions: and,
+it may be, it is a ground for contentment if with all the means and
+appliances for goodness in our hands we can attain to Virtue.
+
+The formation of a virtuous character some ascribe to Nature, some to
+Custom, and some to Teaching. Now Nature's part, be it what it may,
+obviously does not rest with us, but belongs to those who in the truest
+sense are fortunate, by reason of certain divine agency,
+
+Then, as for Words and Precept, they, it is to be feared, will not
+avail with all; but it may be necessary for the mind of the disciple to
+have been previously prepared for liking and disliking as he ought;
+just as the soil must, to nourish the seed sown. For he that lives in
+obedience to passion cannot hear any advice that would dissuade him,
+nor, if he heard, understand: now him that is thus how can one reform?
+in fact, generally, passion is not thought to yield to Reason but to
+brute force. So then there must be, to begin with, a kind of affinity
+to Virtue in the disposition; which must cleave to what is honourable
+and loath what is disgraceful. But to get right guidance towards Virtue
+from the earliest youth is not easy unless one is brought up under laws
+of such kind; because living with self-mastery and endurance is not
+pleasant to the mass of men, and specially not to the young. For this
+reason the food, and manner of living generally, ought to be the
+subject of legal regulation, because things when become habitual will
+not be disagreeable.
+
+Yet perhaps it is not sufficient that men while young should get right
+food and tendance, but, inasmuch as they will have to practise and
+become accustomed to certain things even after they have attained to
+man's estate, we shall want laws on these points as well, and, in fine,
+respecting one's whole life, since the mass of men are amenable to
+compulsion rather than Reason, and to punishment rather than to a sense
+of honour.
+
+And therefore some men hold that while lawgivers should employ the
+sense of honour to exhort and guide men to Virtue, under the notion
+that they will then obey who have been well trained in habits; they
+should impose chastisement and penalties on those who disobey and are
+of less promising nature; and the incurable expel entirely: because the
+good man and he who lives under a sense of honour will be obedient to
+reason; and the baser sort, who grasp at pleasure, will be kept in
+check, like beasts of burthen by pain. Therefore also they say that the
+pains should be such as are most contrary to the pleasures which are
+liked.
+
+As has been said already, he who is to be good must have been brought
+up and habituated well, and then live accordingly under good
+institutions, and never do what is low and mean, either against or with
+his will. Now these objects can be attained only by men living in
+accordance with some guiding Intellect and right order, with power to
+back them.
+
+As for the Paternal Rule, it possesses neither strength nor compulsory
+power, nor in fact does the Rule of any one man, unless he is a king or
+some one in like case: but the Law has power to compel, since it is a
+declaration emanating from Practical Wisdom and Intellect. And people
+feel enmity towards their fellow-men who oppose their impulses, however
+rightly they may do so: the Law, on the contrary, is not the object of
+hatred, though enforcing right rules.
+
+The Lacedæmonian is nearly the only State in which the framer of the
+Constitution has made any provision, it would seem, respecting the food
+and manner of living of the people: in most States these points are
+entirely neglected, and each man lives just as he likes, ruling his
+wife and children Cyclops-Fashion.
+
+Of course, the best thing would be that there should be a right Public
+System and that we should be able to carry it out: but, since as a
+public matter those points are neglected, the duty would seem to
+devolve upon each individual to contribute to the cause of Virtue with
+his own children and friends, or at least to make this his aim and
+purpose: and this, it would seem, from what has been said, he will be
+best able to do by making a Legislator of himself: since all public
+systems, it is plain, are formed by the instrumentality of laws and
+those are good which are formed by that of good laws: whether they are
+written or unwritten, whether they are applied to the training of one
+or many, will not, it seems, make any difference, just as it does not
+in music, gymnastics, or any other such accomplishments, which are
+gained by practice.
+
+For just as in Communities laws and customs prevail, so too in families
+the express commands of the Head, and customs also: and even more in
+the latter, because of blood-relationship and the benefits conferred:
+for there you have, to begin with, people who have affection and are
+naturally obedient to the authority which controls them.
+
+Then, furthermore, Private training has advantages over Public, as in
+the case of the healing art: for instance, as a general rule, a man who
+is in a fever should keep quiet, and starve; but in a particular case,
+perhaps, this may not hold good; or, to take a different illustration,
+the boxer will not use the same way of fighting with all antagonists.
+
+It would seem then that the individual will be most exactly attended to
+under Private care, because so each will be more likely to obtain what
+is expedient for him. Of course, whether in the art of healing, or
+gymnastics, or any other, a man will treat individual cases the better
+for being acquainted with general rules; as, "that so and so is good
+for all, or for men in such and such cases:" because general maxims are
+not only said to be but are the object-matter of sciences: still this
+is no reason against the possibility of a man's taking excellent care
+of some _one_ case, though he possesses no scientific knowledge but
+from experience is exactly acquainted with what happens in each point;
+just as some people are thought to doctor themselves best though they
+would be wholly unable to administer relief to others. Yet it may seem
+to be necessary nevertheless, for one who wishes to become a real
+artist and well acquainted with the theory of his profession, to have
+recourse to general principles and ascertain all their capacities: for
+we have already stated that these are the object-matter of sciences.
+
+If then it appears that we may become good through the instrumentality
+of laws, of course whoso wishes to make men better by a system of care
+and training must try to make a Legislator of himself; for to treat
+skilfully just any one who may be put before you is not what any
+ordinary person can do, but, if any one, he who has knowledge; as in
+the healing art, and all others which involve careful practice and
+skill.
+
+Will not then our next business be to enquire from what sources, or how
+one may acquire this faculty of Legislation; or shall we say, that, as
+in similar cases, Statesmen are the people to learn from, since this
+faculty was thought to be a part of the Social Science? Must we not
+admit that the Political Science plainly does not stand on a similar
+footing to that of other sciences and faculties? I mean, that while in
+all other cases those who impart the faculties and themselves exert
+them are identical (physicians and painters for instance) matters of
+Statesmanship the Sophists profess to teach, but not one of them
+practises it, that being left to those actually engaged in it: and
+these might really very well be thought to do it by some singular knack
+and by mere practice rather than by any intellectual process: for they
+neither write nor speak on these matters (though it might be more to
+their credit than composing speeches for the courts or the assembly),
+nor again have they made Statesmen of their own sons or their friends.
+
+One can hardly suppose but that they would have done so if they could,
+seeing that they could have bequeathed no more precious legacy to their
+communities, nor would they have preferred, for themselves or their
+dearest friends, the possession of any faculty rather than this.
+
+Practice, however, seems to contribute no little to its acquisition;
+merely breathing the atmosphere of politics would never have made
+Statesmen of them, and therefore we may conclude that they who would
+acquire a knowledge of Statesmanship must have in addition practice.
+
+But of the Sophists they who profess to teach it are plainly a long way
+off from doing so: in fact, they have no knowledge at all of its nature
+and objects; if they had, they would never have put it on the same
+footing with Rhetoric or even on a lower: neither would they have
+conceived it to be "an easy matter to legislate by simply collecting
+such laws as are famous because of course one could select the best,"
+as though the selection were not a matter of skill, and the judging
+aright a very great matter, as in Music: for they alone, who have
+practical knowledge of a thing, can judge the performances rightly or
+understand with what means and in what way they are accomplished, and
+what harmonises with what: the unlearned must be content with being
+able to discover whether the result is good or bad, as in painting.
+
+Now laws may be called the performances or tangible results of
+Political Science; how then can a man acquire from these the faculty of
+Legislation, or choose the best? we do not see men made physicians by
+compilations: and yet in these treatises men endeavour to give not only
+the cases but also how they may be cured, and the proper treatment in
+each case, dividing the various bodily habits. Well, these are thought
+to be useful to professional men, but to the unprofessional useless. In
+like manner it may be that collections of laws and Constitutions would
+be exceedingly useful to such as are able to speculate on them, and
+judge what is well, and what ill, and what kind of things fit in with
+what others: but they who without this qualification should go through
+such matters cannot have right judgment, unless they have it by
+instinct, though they may become more intelligent in such matters.
+
+Since then those who have preceded us have left uninvestigated the
+subject of Legislation, it will be better perhaps for us to investigate
+it ourselves, and, in fact, the whole subject of Polity, that thus what
+we may call Human Philosophy may be completed as far as in us lies.
+
+First then, let us endeavour to get whatever fragments of good there
+may be in the statements of our predecessors, next, from the Polities
+we have collected, ascertain what kind of things preserve or destroy
+Communities, and what, particular Constitutions; and the cause why some
+are well and others ill managed, for after such enquiry, we shall be
+the better able to take a concentrated view as to what kind of
+Constitution is best, what kind of regulations are best for each, and
+what laws and customs.
+
+NOTES
+
+BOOK I
+
+[1] For this term, as here employed, our language contains no
+equivalent expression except an inconvenient paraphrase.
+
+There are three senses which it bears in this treatise: the first (in
+which it is here employed) is its strict etymological signfication "The
+science of Society," and this includes everything which can bear at all
+upon the well-being of Man in his social capacity, "Quicquid agunt
+homines nostri est farrago libelli." It is in this view that it is
+fairly denominated most commanding and inclusive.
+
+The second sense (in which it occurs next, just below) is "Moral
+Philosophy." Aristotle explains the term in this sense in the Rhetoric
+(1 2) [Greek: hae peri ta aethae pragmateia aen dikaion esti
+prosagoreuen politikaen]. He has principally in view in this treatise
+the moral training of the Individual, the branch of the Science of
+Society which we call Ethics Proper, bearing the same relation to the
+larger Science as the hewing and squaring of the stones to the building
+of the Temple, or the drill of the Recruit to the manoeuvres of the
+field. Greek Philosophy viewed men principally as constituent parts of
+a [Greek: polis], considering this function to be the real End of each,
+and this state as that in which the Individual attained his highest and
+most complete development.
+
+The third sense is "The detail of Civil Government," which Aristotle
+expressly states (vi. 8) was the most common acceptation of the term.
+
+[2] Matters of which a man is to judge either belong to some
+definite art or science, or they do not. In the former case he is the
+best judge who has thorough acquaintance with that art or science, in
+the latter, the man whose powers have been developed and matured by
+education. A lame horse one would show to a farmer, not to the best and
+wisest man of one's acquaintance; to the latter, one would apply in a
+difficult case of conduct.
+
+Experience answers to the first, a state of self-control to the latter.
+
+[3] In the last chapter of the third book of this treatise it
+is said of the fool, that his desire of pleasure is not only
+insatiable, but indiscriminate in its objects, πανταχόθεν.
+
+[4] Ἀρχὴ is a word used in this treatise in various significations. The
+primary one is "beginning or first cause," and this runs through all
+its various uses.
+
+"Rule," and sometimes "Rulers," are denoted by this term the initiative
+being a property of Rule.
+
+"Principle" is a very usual signification of it, and in fact the most
+characteristic of the Ethics. The word Principle means
+"starting-point." Every action has two beginnings, that of Resolve οὗ
+ἕνεκα, and that of Action (ὅθεν ἡ κινήσις). I desire praise of men this
+then is the beginning of Resolve. Having considered how it is to be
+attained, I resolve upon some course and this Resolve is the beginning
+of Action.
+
+The beginnings of Resolve, Ἀρχὶ or Motives, when formally stated, are
+the major premisses of what Aristotle calls the συλλογίσμοι τῶν
+πρακτῶν, i.e. the reasoning into which actions may be analysed.
+
+Thus we say that the desire of human praise was the motive of the
+Pharisees, or the principle on which they acted.
+
+Their practical syllogism then would stand thus:
+
+Whatever gains human praise is to be done;
+Public praying and almsgiving gave human praise:
+[ergo] Public praying and almsgiving are to be done.
+
+The major premisses may be stored up in the mind as rules of action,
+and this is what is commonly meant by having principles good or bad.
+
+[5] The difficulty of this passage consists in determining the
+signification of the terms [Greek: gnorima aemin] and [Greek: gnorima
+aplos]
+
+I have translated them without reference to their use elsewhere, as
+denoting respectively what _is_ and what _may_ be known. All truth is
+[Greek: gnorimon aplos], but that alone [Greek: aemin] which we
+individually realise, therefore those principles alone are [Greek:
+gnorima aemin] which _we have received as true_. From this appears
+immediately the necessity of good training as preparatory to the study
+of Moral Philosophy for good training in habits will either work
+principles into our nature, or make us capable of accepting them as
+soon as they are put before us; which no mere intellectual training can
+do. The child who has been used to obey his parents may never have
+heard the fifth Commandment but it is in the very texture of his
+nature, and the first time he hears it he will recognise it as morally
+true and right the principle is in his case a fact, the reason for
+which he is as little inclined to ask as any one would be able to prove
+its truth if he should ask.
+
+But these terms are employed elsewhere (Analytica Post I cap. 11. sect.
+10) to denote respectively particulars and universals The latter are so
+denominated, because principles or laws must be supposed to have
+existed before the instances of their operation. Justice must have
+existed before just actions, Redness before red things, but since what
+we meet with are the concrete instances (from which we gather the
+principles and laws), the particulars are said to be [Greek:
+gnorimotera aemin]
+
+Adopting this signification gives greater unity to the whole passage,
+which will then stand thus. The question being whether we are to assume
+principles, or obtain them by an analysis of facts, Aristotle says, "We
+must begin of course with what is known but then this term denotes
+either particulars or universals perhaps we then must begin with
+particulars and hence the necessity of a previous good training in
+habits, etc. (which of course is beginning with particular facts), for
+a fact is a starting point, and if this be sufficiently clear, there
+will be no want of the reason for the fact in addition"
+
+The objection to this method of translation is, that [Greek: archai]
+occurs immediately afterwards in the sense of "principles."
+
+Utere tuo judicio nihil enim impedio.
+
+[6] Or "prove themselves good," as in the Prior Analytics, ii 25,
+[Greek: apanta pisteuomen k.t l] but the other rendering is supported
+by a passage in Book VIII. chap. ix. [Greek: oi d' upo ton epieikon kai
+eidoton oregomenoi timaes bebaiosai ten oikeian doxan ephientai peri
+auton chairousi de oti eisin agathoi, pisteuontes te ton legonton
+krisei]
+
+[7] [Greek: thesis] meant originally some paradoxical statement by any
+philosopher of name enough to venture on one, but had come to mean any
+dialectical question. Topics, I. chap. ix.
+
+[8] A lost work, supposed to have been so called, because
+containing miscellaneous questions.
+
+[9] It is only quite at the close of the treatise that Aristotle refers
+to this, and allows that [Greek: theoria] constitutes the highest
+happiness because it is the exercise of the highest faculty in man the
+reason of thus deferring the statement being that till the lower, that
+is the moral, nature has been reduced to perfect order, [Greek:
+theoria] cannot have place, though, had it been held out from the
+first, men would have been for making the experiment at once, without
+the trouble of self-discipline.
+
+[10] Or, as some think, "many theories have been founded on them."
+
+[11] The ἰδέα is the archetype, the εἶδος the concrete embodying the
+resemblance of it; hence Aristotle alludes to the theory under both
+names, and this is the reason for retaining the Greek terms.
+
+[12] The list ran thus--
+
+  [Greek:
+  to peras     to apeiron      |    to euthu
+  to perisson  to artion       |    to phos
+  to en        to plethos      |    to tetragonon
+  to dexion    to aristeron    |    to aeremoun
+  to arren     to thelu        |    to agathon
+  ]
+
+[13] Plato's sister's son.
+
+[14] This is the capital defect in Aristotle's eyes, who being
+eminently practical, could not like a theory which not only did not
+necessarily lead to action, but had a tendency to discourage it by
+enabling unreal men to talk finely. If true, the theory is merely a way
+of stating facts, and leads to no action.
+
+[15] _i.e._ the identification of Happiness with the Chief Good.
+
+[16] _i.e._ without the capability of addition.
+
+[17] And then Happiness would at once be shown not to be the Chief
+Good. It is a contradiction in terms to speak of adding to the Chief
+Good. See Book X. chap. 11. [Greek: delon os oud allo ouden tagathon an
+eiae o meta tenos ton kath' auto agathon airetoteron ginetai.]
+
+[18] Compare Bishop Butler's account of "Human Nature as a System" in
+the Preface to his Sermons.
+
+[19] _i.e._ as working or as quiescent.
+
+[20] The mere translation of this term would convey no idea of its
+meaning, I have therefore retained the Greek term. It is afterwards
+explained to include space of time and external appliances requisite
+for the full development of Man's energies; here the time only is
+alluded to.
+
+[21] This principle is more fully stated, with illustrations,
+in the Topics, I. chap. ix.
+
+[22] Either that of the bodily senses, or that of the moral senses.
+"Fire burns," is an instance of the former, "Treason is odious," of the
+latter.
+
+[23] I have thought it worthwhile to vary the interpretation of this
+word, because though "habitus" may be equivalent to all the senses of
+[Greek: exis], "habit" is not, at least according to our colloquial
+usage we commonly denote by "habit" a state formed by habituation.
+
+[24] Another and perhaps more obvious method of rendering this passage
+is to apply [Greek: kalon kagathon] to things, and let them depend
+grammatically on [Greek: epaeboli]. It is to be remembered, however,
+that [Greek: kalos kagathos] bore a special and well-known meaning also
+the comparison is in the text more complete, and the point of the
+passage seems more completely brought out.
+
+[25] "Goodness always implies the love of itself, an affection to
+goodness." (Bishop Butler, Sermon xiii ) Aristotle describes pleasure
+in the Tenth Book of this Treatise as the result of any faculty of
+perception meeting with the corresponding object, vicious pleasure
+being as truly pleasure as the most refined and exalted. If Goodness
+then implies the love of itself, the percipient will always have its
+object present, and pleasure continually result.
+
+[26] In spite of theory, we know as a matter of fact that external
+circumstances are necessary to complete the idea of Happiness not that
+Happiness is capable of addition, but that when we assert it to be
+identical with virtuous action we must understand that it is to have a
+fair field; in fact, the other side of [Greek: bios teleios].
+
+[27] It is remarkable how Aristotle here again shelves what he
+considers an unpractical question. If Happiness were really a direct
+gift from Heaven, independently of human conduct, all motive to
+self-discipline and moral improvement would vanish He shows therefore
+that it is no depreciation of the value of Happiness to suppose it to
+come partly at least from ourselves, and he then goes on with other
+reasons why we should think with him.
+
+[28] This term is important, what has been maimed was once perfect; he
+does not contemplate as possible the case of a man being born incapable
+of virtue, and so of happiness.
+
+[29] [Greek] Plato. Phædon. xlvi.
+
+[30] But why give materials and instruments, if there is no work to do?
+
+[31] The supposed pair of ancestors.
+
+[32] Solon says, "Call no man happy till he is dead." He must mean
+either, The man when dead _is_ happy (a), or, The man when dead _may be
+said to have been happy_ (b). If the former, does he mean positive
+happiness (a)? or only freedom from unhappiness (β)? _We_ cannot allow
+(a), Men's opinions disallow (β), We revert now to the consideration of
+(b).
+
+[33] The difficulty was raised by the clashing of a notion commonly
+held, and a fact universally experienced. Most people conceive that
+Happiness should be abiding, every one knows that fortune is
+changeable. It is the notion which supports the definition, because we
+have therein based Happiness on the most abiding cause.
+
+[34] I have taken τούτον αὐτῶν to refer to ἐπιστημῶν, against Magirus
+and the Paraphrase of Andronicus Rhodius. I would refer to Aristotle's
+account of θεωρία in the Tenth Book, chap. vii. where he expressly says
+of the working of νοῦς or pure intelect, that it is "most continuous."
+
+[35] The term seems to be employed advisedly. The Choragus, of
+course, dressed his actors _for their parts;_ not according to their
+fancies or his own.
+
+Hooker has (E. P. v. ixxvi. 5) a passage which seems to be an admirable
+paraphrase on this.
+
+"Again, that the measure of our outward prosperity be taken by
+proportion with that which every man's estate in this present life
+requireth. External abilities are instruments of action. It contenteth
+wise artificers to have their instruments proportionable to their work,
+rather fit for use than huge and goodly to please the eye. Seeing then
+the actions of a servant do not need that which may be necessary for
+men of calling and place in the world, neither men of inferior
+condition many things which greater personages can hardly want; surely
+they are blessed in worldly respects who have wherewith to perform what
+their station and place asketh, though they have no more."
+
+[36] Always bearing in mind that man "never continueth in one stay."
+
+[37] The meaning is this: personal fortunes, we have said, must be in
+certain weight and number to affect our own happiness, this will be
+true, of course, of those which are reflected on us from our friends:
+and these are the only ones to which the dead are supposed to be
+liable? add then the difference of sensibility which it is fair to
+presume, and there is a very small residuum of joy or sorrow.
+
+[38] This is meant for an exhaustive division of goods, which are
+either so _in esse_ or _in posse_.
+
+If _in esse_, they are either above praise, or subjects of praise.
+Those _in posse_, here called faculties, are good only when rightly
+used. Thus Rhetoric is a faculty which may be used to promote justice
+or abused to support villainy. Money in like way.
+
+[39] The doubt is, whether [Greek] or [Greek] is the subject of the
+sentence. It is translated as above, not merely with reference to the
+sense of this passage, but on a comparison with a similar one in Book
+X. chap 8. [Greek].
+
+[40] Eudoxus, a philosopher holding the doctrine afterwards adopted by
+Epicurus respecting pleasure, but (as Aristotle testifies in the Tenth
+Book) of irreproachable character.
+
+[41] See the Rhetoric, Book I. chap ix.
+
+[42] The unseen is at least as real as the seen.
+
+[43] The terms are borrowed from the Seventh Book and are here used in
+their strict philosophical meaning. The [Greek: enkrates] is he who has
+bad or unruly appetites, but whose reason is strong enough to keep them
+under. The [Greek: akrates] is he whose appetites constantly prevail
+over his reason and previous good resolutions.
+
+By the law of habits the former is constantly approximating to a state
+in which the appetites are wholly quelled. This state is called [Greek:
+sophrosyne], and the man in it [Greek: sophron]. By the same law the
+remonstrances of reason in the latter grow fainter and fainter till
+they are silenced for ever. This state is called [Greek: akolasia], and
+the man in it [Greek: akolastos].
+
+[44] This is untranslateable. As the Greek phrase, [Greek: echein logon
+tinos], really denotes substituting that person's [Greek: logos] for
+one's own, so the Irrational nature in a man of self-control or
+perfected self-mastery substitutes the orders of Reason for its own
+impulses. The other phrase means the actual possession of mathematical
+truths as part of the mental furniture, _i.e._ knowing them.
+
+[45] [Greek: xin] may be taken as opposed to [Greek: energeian], and
+the meaning will be, to show a difference between Moral and
+Intellectual Excellences, that men are commended for merely having the
+latter, but only for exerting and using the former.
+
+BOOK II
+
+[1] Which we call simply virtue.
+
+[2] For nature must of course supply the capacity.
+
+[3] Or "as a simple result of nature."
+
+[4] This is done in the Sixth Book.
+
+[5] It is, in truth, in the application of rules to particular details
+of practice that our moral Responsibility chiefly lies no rule can be
+so framed, that evasion shall be impossible. See Bishop Butler's Sermon
+on the character of Balaam, and that on Self-Deceit.
+
+[6] The words ἀκόλαστος and δειλὸς are not used here in their strict
+significations to denote confirmed states of vice: the ἐγκρατὴς
+necessarily feels pain, because he must always be thwarting passions
+which are a real part of his nature; though this pain will grow less
+and less as he nears the point of σωφροσύνη or perfected Self-Mastery,
+which being attained the pain will then and then only cease entirely.
+So a certain degree of fear is necessary to the _formation_ of true
+courage. All that is meant here is, that no habit of courage or
+self-mastery can be said to be matured, until pain altogether vanishes.
+
+[7] Virtue consists in the due regulation of _all_ the parts of our
+nature our passions are a real part of that nature, and as such have
+their proper office, it is an error then to aim at their extirpation.
+It is true that in a perfect moral state emotion will be rare, but then
+this will have been gained by regular process, being the legitimate
+result of the law that "passive impressions weaken as active habits are
+strengthened, by repetition." If musical instruments are making
+discord, I may silence or I may bring them into harmony in either case
+I get rid of discord, but in the latter I have the positive enjoyment
+of music. The Stoics would have the passions rooted out, Aristotle
+would have them cultivated to use an apt figure (whose I know not),
+They would pluck the blossom off at once, he would leave it to fall in
+due course when the fruit was formed. Of them we might truly say,
+_Solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant_. See on this point Bishop
+Butler's fifth Sermon, and sect. 11. of the chapter on Moral Discipline
+in the first part of his Analogy.
+
+[8] I have adopted this word from our old writers, because our word
+_act_ is so commonly interchanged with _action_. [Greek: Praxis]
+(action) properly denotes the whole process from the conception to the
+performance. [Greek: Pragma] (fact) only the result. The latter may be
+right when the former is wrong if, for example, a murderer was killed
+by his accomplices. Again, the [Greek: praxis] may be _good_ though the
+[Greek: pragma] be wrong, as if a man under erroneous impressions does
+what would have been right if his impressions had been true (subject of
+course to the question how far he is guiltless of his original error),
+but in this case we could not call the [Greek: praxis] _right_. No
+repetition of [Greek: pragmata] goes to form a habit. See Bishop Butler
+on the Theory of Habits m the chapter on Moral Discipline, quoted
+above, sect. 11. "And in like manner as habits belonging to the body,"
+etc.
+
+[9] Being about to give a strict logical definition of Virtue,
+Aristotle ascertains first what is its genus [Greek: ti estin].
+
+[10] That is, not for _merely having_ them, because we did not make
+ourselves.
+
+See Bishop Butler's account of our nature as containing "particular
+propensions," in sect. iv. of the chapter on Moral discipline, and in
+the Preface to the Sermons.
+
+[11] This refers to the division of quantity ([Greek: poson]) in the
+Categories. Those Quantities are called by Aristotle Continuous whose
+parts have position relatively to one another, as a line, surface, or
+solid, those discrete, whose parts have no such relation, as numbers
+themselves, or any string of words grammatically unconnected.
+
+[12] Numbers are in arithmetical proportion (more usually called
+progression), when they increase or decrease by a common difference
+thus, 2, 6, 10 are so, because 2 + 4 = 6, 6 + 4= 10, or _vice versa_,
+10 - 4 = 6, 6 - 4 = 2.
+
+[13] If the mina be taken at 15 oz. avoirdupois, (Dict. of G. and R.
+Antiquities, article _Talentum_,) we must be sadly degenerate in our
+gastric capacity.
+
+[14] The two are necessary, because since the reason itself may be
+perverted, a man must have recourse to an external standard; we may
+suppose his [Greek: logos] originally to have been a sufficient guide,
+but when he has injured his moral perceptions in any degree, he must go
+out of himself for direction.
+
+[15] This is one of the many expressions which seem to imply that this
+treatise is rather a collection of notes of a _vivâ voce_ lecture than
+a set formal treatise. "The table" of virtues and vices probably was
+sketched out and exhibited to the audience.
+
+[16] Afterwards defined as "All things whose value is measured by
+money."
+
+[17] We have no term exactly equivalent; it may be illustrated by
+Horace's use of the term _hiatus_:
+
+"Quid dignum tanto feret hic promissor hiatu?" Opening the mouth wide
+gives a promise of something great to come, if nothing great does come,
+this is a case of [Greek: chaunotes] or fruitless and unmeaning
+_hiatus_; the transference to the present subject is easy.
+
+[18] In like manner _we_ talk of laudable ambition, implying of course
+there may be that which is not laudable.
+
+[19] An expression of Bishop Butler's, which corresponds exactly to the
+definition of [Greek: nemesis] in the Rhetoric.
+
+[20] That is, in the same genus; to be contraries, things must be
+generically connected: [Greek: ta pleiston allelon diestekota ton en to
+auto genei enantia orizontai]. Categories, iv. 15.
+
+[21] "[Greek: Deuteros plous] is a proverb," says the Scholiast on the
+Phaedo, "used of those who do anything safely and cautiously inasmuch
+as they who have miscarried in their first voyage, set about then:
+preparations for the second cautiously," and he then alludes to this
+passage.
+
+[22] That is, you must allow for the _recoil_. "Naturam expellas furca
+tamen usque recurret."
+
+P. 43, l. 2. This illustration sets in so clear a light the doctrines
+entertained respectively by Aristotle, Eudoxus, and the Stoics
+regarding pleasure, that it is worth while to go into it fully.
+
+The reference is to Iliad iii. 154-160. The old counsellors, as Helen
+comes upon the city wall, acknowledge her surpassing beauty, and have
+no difficulty in understanding how both nations should have incurred
+such suffering for her sake still, fair as she is, home she must go,
+that she bring not ruin on themselves and their posterity.
+
+This exactly represents Aristotle's relation to Pleasure he does not,
+with Eudoxus and his followers, exalt it into the Summum Bonum (as
+Paris would risk all for Helen), nor does he the the Stoics call it
+wholly evil, as Hector might have said that the woes Helen had caused
+had "banished all the beauty from her cheek," but, with the aged
+counsellors, admits its charms, but aware of their dangerousness
+resolves to deny himself, he "feels her sweetness, yet defies her
+thrall."
+
+[24] Αἴσθησις is here used as an analogous noun, to denote the faculty
+which, in respect of moral matters, discharges the same function that
+bodily sense does in respect of physical objects. It is worth while to
+notice how in our colloquial language we carry out the same analogy. We
+say of a transaction, that it "looks ugly," "sounds oddly," is a "nasty
+job," "stinks in our nostrils," is a "hard dealing."
+
+BOOK III
+
+[1] A man is not responsible for being [Greek: theratos], because
+"particular propensions, from their very nature, must be felt, the
+objects of them being present, though they cannot be gratified at all,
+or not with the allowance of the moral principle." But he is
+responsible for being [Greek: eutheratos], because, though thus formed,
+he "might have improved and raised himself to an higher and more secure
+state of virtue by the contrary behaviour, by steadily following the
+moral principle, supposed to be one part of his nature, and thus
+withstanding that unavoidable danger of defection which necessarily
+arose from propension, the other part of it. For by thus preserving his
+integrity for some time, his danger would lessen, since propensions, by
+being inured to submit, would do it more easily and of course and his
+security against this lessening danger would increase, since the moral
+principle would gain additional strength by exercise, both which things
+are implied in the notion of virtuous habits." (From the chapter on
+Moral Discipline m the Analogy, sect. iv.) The purpose of this
+disquisition is to refute the Necessitarians; it is resumed in the
+third chapter of this Book.
+
+[2] Virtue is not only the duty, but (by the laws of the Moral
+Government of the World) also the interest of Man, or to express it in
+Bishop Butler's manner, Conscience and Reasonable self-love are the two
+principles in our nature which of right have supremacy over the rest,
+and these two lead in point of fact the same course of action. (Sermon
+II.)
+
+[3] Any ignorance of particular facts affects the rightness not of the
+[Greek: praxis], but of the [Greek: pragma], but ignorance of _i.e._
+incapacity to discern, Principles, shows the Moral Constitution to have
+been depraved, _i.e._ shows Conscience to be perverted, or the sight of
+Self-love to be impaired.
+
+[4] [Greek: eneka] primarily denotes the relation of cause and effect
+all circumstances which in any way contribute to a cert result are
+[Greek: eneka] that result.
+
+From the power which we have or acquire of deducing future results from
+present causes we are enabled to act towards, with a view to produce,
+these results thus [Greek: eneka] comes to mean not causation merely,
+but _designed_ causation and so [Greek: on eneka] is used for Motive,
+or final cause.
+
+It is the primary meaning which is here intended, it would be a
+contradiction in terms to speak of a man's being ignorant of his own
+Motive of action.
+
+When the man "drew a bow at a venture and smote the King of Israel
+between the joints of the harnesss" (i Kings xxii 34) he did it [Greek:
+eneka ton apdkteinai] the King of Israel, in the primary sense of
+[Greek: eneka] that is to say, the King's death was _in fact the
+result_, but could not have been the motive, of the shot, because the
+King was disguised and the shot was at a venture.
+
+[5] Bishop Butler would agree to this: he says of settled deliberate
+anger, "It seems in us plainly connected with a sense of virtue and
+vice, of moral good and evil." See the whole Sermon on Resentment.
+
+[6] Aristotle has, I venture to think, rather quibbled here, by using
+[Greek: epithumia] and its verb, equivocally as there is no following
+his argument without condescending to the same device, I have used our
+word lust in its ancient signification Ps. xxiv. 12, "What man is he
+that lusteth to live?"
+
+[7] The meaning is, that the _onus probandi_ is thrown upon the person
+who maintains the distinction, Aristotle has a _prima facie_ case. The
+whole passage is one of difficulty. Card wells text gives the passage
+from [Greek: dokei de] as a separate argument Bekker's seems to intend
+al 81 ir/jd£eis as a separate argument but if so, the argument would be
+a mere _petitio principii_. I have adopted Cardwell's reading in part,
+but retain the comma at [Greek: dmpho] and have translated the last
+four words as applying to the whole discussion, whereas Cardwell's
+reading seems to restrict them to the last argument.
+
+[8] _i.e._ on objects of Moral Choice, opinion of this kind is not the
+same as Moral Choice, because actions alone form habits and constitute
+character, opinions are in general _signs_ of character, but when they
+begin to be acted on they cease to be opinions, and merge in Moral
+Choice.
+
+"Treason doth never prosper, what's the reason?
+When it doth prosper, none dare call it Treason."
+
+[9] The introduction of the words [Greek: dia tinos] seems a mere
+useless repetition, as in the second chapter [Greek: en tini] added to
+[Greek: peri ti]. These I take for some among the many indications that
+the treatise is a collection of notes for lectures, and not a finished
+or systematic one.
+
+[10] Suppose that three alternatives lay before a man, each of the
+three is of course an object of Deliberation; when he has made his
+choice, the alternative chosen does not cease to be in nature an object
+of Deliberation, but superadds the character of being chosen and so
+distinguished. Three men are admitted candidates for an office, the one
+chosen is the successful candidate, so of the three [Greek: bouleuta],
+the one chosen is the [Greek: bouleuton proaireton].
+
+[11] Compare Bishop Butler's "System of Human Nature," in the Preface
+to the Sermons.
+
+[12] These words, [Greek: ek tou bouleusasthai--bouleusin], contain the
+account of the whole mental machinery of any action. The first step is
+a Wish, implied in the first here mentioned, viz. Deliberation, for it
+has been already laid down that Deliberation has for its object-matter
+means to Ends supposed to be set before the mind, the next step is
+Deliberation, the next Decision, the last the definite extending of the
+mental hand towards the object thus selected, the two last constitute
+[Greek: proairesis] in its full meaning. The word [Greek: orexis] means
+literally "a grasping at or after" now as this physically may be either
+vague or definite, so too may the mental act, consequently the term as
+transferred to the mind has two uses, and denotes either the first
+wish, [Greek: boulaesis], or the last definite movement, Will in its
+strict and proper sense. These two uses are recognised in the Rhetoric
+(I 10), where [Greek: orexis] is divided into [Greek: alogos] and
+[Greek: logistikae].
+
+The illustration then afforded by the polities alluded to is this, as
+the Kings first decided and then announced their decision for
+acceptance and execution by their subjects, so Reason, having decided
+on the course to be taken, communicates its decision to the Will, which
+then proceeds to move [Greek: ta organika merae]. To instance in an
+action of the mixed kind mentioned in the first chapter, safe arrival
+at land is naturally desired, two means are suggested, either a certain
+loss of goods, or trying to save both lives and goods, the question
+being debated, the former is chosen, this decision is communicated to
+the Will, which causes the owner's hands to throw overboard his goods:
+the act is denominated voluntary, because the Will is consenting, but
+in so denominating it, we leave out of sight how that consent was
+obtained. In a purely compulsory case the never gets beyond the stage
+of Wish, for no means are power and deliberation therefore is useless,
+consequently there is neither Decision nor Will, in other words, no
+Choice.
+
+[13] Compare the statement in the Rhetoric, 1 10, [Greek: esti d hae
+men boulaeis agathou orexis (oudeis gar bouletai all ae otan oiaetho
+einai agathon)]
+
+[14] A stone once set in motion cannot be recalled, because it is then
+placed under the operation of natural laws which cannot be controlled
+or altered, so too in Moral declension, there is a point at which
+gravitation operates irretrievably, "there is a certain bound to
+imprudence and misbehaviour which being transgressed, there remains no
+place for repentance in the natural course of things." Bishop Butler's
+Analogy, First Part, chap 11.
+
+[15] Habits being formed by acting in a certain way under certain
+circumstances we can only choose how we will act not what circumstances
+we will have to act under.
+
+[16] "_Moral_ Courage" is our phrase.
+
+[17] The meaning of this passage can scarcely be conveyed except by a
+paraphrase.
+
+"The object of each separate act of working is that which accords with
+the habit they go to form. Courage is the habit which separate acts of
+bravery go to form, therefore the object of these is that which accords
+with Courage, _i.e._ Courage itself. But Courage is honourable (which
+implies that the end and object of it is honour, since things are
+denominated according to their end and object), therefore the object of
+each separate act of bravery is honour."
+
+[18] For true Courage is required, i. Exact appreciation of danger. 2.
+A Proper motive for resisting fear. Each of the Spurious kinds will be
+found to fail in one or other, or both.
+
+[19] This may merely mean, "who give strict orders" not to flinch,
+which would imply the necessity of compulsion The word is capable of
+the sense given above, which seems more forcible.
+
+[20] See Book VI. chap. xiii. near the end [Greek: sokrataes aehen oun
+logous tas aretas oeto einai (epiotaemas gar einai pasas)]
+
+[21] Such as the noise, the rapid movements, and apparent confusion
+which to an inexperienced eye and ear would be alarming. So Livy says
+of the Gauls, v. 37, Nata in _vanos_ tumultus gens.
+
+[22]In Coronea in Bœotia, on the occasion of the citadel being betrayed
+to some Phocians. "The regulars" were Boeotian troops, the [Greek:
+politika] Coroneans.
+
+[23] By the difference of tense it seems Aristotle has mixed up two
+things, beginning to speak of the particular instance, and then carried
+into the general statement again. This it is scarce worth while to
+imitate.
+
+[24] The meaning of the phrase [Greek: kata sumbebaekos], as here used,
+in given in the Seventh Book, chap. X. [Greek: ei gar tis todi dia todi
+aireitai ae diokei, kath ahuto men touto diokei kai aireitai, kata
+sumbebaekos de to proteron].
+
+BOOK V
+
+[1] Each term is important to make up the character of Justice, men
+must have the capacity, do the acts, and do them from moral choice.
+
+[2] But not always. [Greek: Philein], for instance, has two senses, "to
+love" and "to kiss," [Greek: misein] but one. Topics, I. chap. XIII. 5.
+
+[3] _Things_ are [Greek: homonuma] which have only their name in
+common, being in themselves different. The [Greek: homonumia] is
+_close_ therefore when the difference though real is but slight. There
+is no English expression for [Greek: homonumia], "equivocal" being
+applied to a term and not to its various significates.
+
+[4] See Book I. chap. 1. [Greek: toiautaen de tina planaen echei kai
+tagatha k.t.l.]
+
+[5] A man habitually drunk in private is viewed by our law as confining
+his vice to himself, and the law therefore does not attempt to touch
+him; a religious hermit may be viewed as one who confines his virtue to
+his own person.
+
+[6] See the account of Sejanus and Livia. Tac. Annal. IV. 3.
+
+[7] Cardwell's text, which here gives [Greek: paranomon], yields a much
+easier and more natural sense. All Injustice violates law, but only the
+particular kinds violate equality; and therefore the unlawful : the
+unequal :: universal Injustice the particular _i.e._ as whole to part.
+
+There is a reading which also alters the words within the parenthesis,
+but this hardly affects the gist of the passage.
+
+[8] There are two reasons why the characters are not necessarily
+coincident. He is a good citizen, who does his best to carry out the
+[Greek: politeia] under which he lives, but this may be faulty, so
+therefore _pro tanto_ is he.
+
+Again, it is sufficient, so far as the Community is concerned, that he
+does the _facts_ of a good man but for the perfection of his own
+individual character, he must do them virtuously. A man may move
+rightly in his social orbit, without revolving rightly on his own axis.
+
+The question is debated in the Politics, III. 2. Compare also the
+distinction between the brave man, and good soldier (supra, Book III.
+chap. xii.), and also Bishop Butler's first Sermon.
+
+[9] Terms used for persons.
+
+[10] By [Greek:----] is meant numbers themselves, 4, 20, 50, etc, by
+[Greek:----] these numbers exemplified, 4 horses, 20 sheep, etc.
+
+[11] The profits of a mercantile transaction (say £1000) are to be
+divided between A and B, in the ratio of 2 to 3 (which is the real
+point to be settled); then,
+
+A : B :: 400 : 600.
+
+A : 400 :: B : 600 (permutando, and assuming a value for A and B, so as
+to make them commensurable with the respectiy sums).
+
+A+400 : B+600 :: A : B. This represents the actual distribution; its
+fairness depending entirely on that of the first proportion.
+
+[12] _i.e._ where the ratio is that of equality, thus 2 : 2 :: 40 : 40
+
+[13] Her Majesty's "Justices."
+
+[14] I have omitted the next three lines, as they seem to be out of
+place here, and to occur much more naturally afterwards; it not being
+likely that they were originally twice written, one is perhaps at
+liberty to give Aristotle the benefit of the doubt, and conclude that
+he put them where they made the best sense.
+
+[15] This I believe to be the meaning of the passage but do not pretend
+to be able to get it out of the words.
+
+[16] This is apparently contrary to what was said before, but not
+really so. Aristotle does not mean that the man in authority struck
+wrongfully, but he takes the extreme case of simple Reciprocation, and
+in the second case, the man who strikes one in authority commits two
+offences, one against the person (and so far they are equal), and
+another against the office.
+
+[17] χάρις denotes, 1st, a kindly feeling issuing in a gratuitous act
+of kindness, 2ndly, the effect of this act of kindness on a generous
+mind; 3rdly, this effect issuing in a requital of the kindness.
+
+[18] The Shoemaker would get a house while the Builder only had (say)
+one pair of shoes, or at all events not so many as he ought to have.
+Thus the man producing the least valuable ware would get the most
+valuable, and _vice versa_.
+
+Adopting, as I have done, the reading which omits [Greek:----] at
+[Greek:----], we have simply a repetition of the caution, that before
+Reciprocation is attempted, there must be the same ratio between the
+wares as between the persons, _i.e._ the ratio of equality.
+
+If we admit [Greek: ou], the meaning may be, that you must not bring
+into the proportion the difference mentioned above [Greek: eteron kai
+ouk ison], since for the purposes of commerce all men are equal.
+
+Say that the Builder is to the Shoemaker as 10:1. Then there must be
+the same ratio between the wares, consequently the highest artist will
+carry off the most valuable wares, thus combining in himself both
+[Greek: uperochai]. The following are the three cases, given 100 pr.
+shoes = 1 house.
+
+     Builder : Shoemaker : : 1  pr.  shoes      : 1 house--_wrong_.
+     ----          ----          100 pr. shoes      : 1 house--_right_
+     ----          ----          10 (100 pr. shoes) : 1 house--_wrong_.
+
+[19] [Greek] Compare a similar use of [Greek]. De Interpretatione, II.
+2. [Greek].
+
+[20] Every unjust act embodies [Greek: to adikon], which is a violation
+of [Greek: to ison], and so implies a greater and a less share, the
+former being said to fall to the doer, the latter to the sufferer, of
+injury.
+
+[21] This passage certainly occurs awkwardly here. If attached to the
+close of the preceding Chapter it would leave that Chapter incomplete,
+for the question is not gone into, but only stated. As the commencement
+of this Chapter it is yet more out of place; I should propose to insert
+it at the commencement of the following Chapter, to which it forms an
+appropriate introduction.
+
+[22] In a pure democracy men are absolutely, _i.e._ numerically, equal,
+in other forms only proportionately equal. Thus the meanest British
+subject is proportionately equal to the Sovereign, that is to say, is
+as fully secured in his rights as the Sovereign in hers.
+
+[23] Or, according to Cardwell's reading ([Greek: kineton ou mentoi
+pan]) "but amongst ourselves there is Just, which is naturally
+variable, but certainly all Just is not such." The sense of the passage
+is not affected by the reading. In Bekker's text we must take [Greek:
+kineton] to mean the same as [Greek: kinoumenon], _i.e._ "we admit
+there is no Just which has not been sometimes disallowed, still," etc.
+With Cardwell's, [Greek: kineton] will mean "which not only _does_ but
+naturally _may_ vary."
+
+[24] Murder is unjust by the law of nature, Smuggling by enactment.
+Therefore any act which can be referred to either of these heads is an
+unjust act, or, as Bishop Butler phrases it, an act _materially_
+unjust. Thus much may be decided without reference to the agent. See
+the note on page 32, l. 16.
+
+[25] "As distinct from pain or loss." Bishop Butler's Sermon on
+Resentment. See also, Rhet. 11. 2 Def. of [Greek: orgae].
+
+[26] This method of reading the passage is taken from Zell as quoted in
+Cardwell's Notes, and seems to yield the best sense. The Paraphrast
+gives it as follows:
+
+"But the aggressor is not ignorant that he began, and so he feels
+himself to be wrong [and will not acknowledge that he is the
+aggressor], but the other does not."
+
+[27] As when a man is "_justified_ at the Grass Market," _i.e._ hung.
+
+[28] Where the stock of good is limited, if any individual takes more
+than his share some one else must have less than his share; where it is
+infinite, or where there is no good at all this cannot happen.
+
+[29] The reference is to chap. vii. where it was said that the law
+views the parties in a case of particular injustice as originally
+equal, but now unequal, the wrong doer the gainer and the sufferer the
+loser by the wrong, but in the case above supposed there is but _one_
+party.
+
+[30] So in the Politics, 1. 2.
+
+_Hae men gar psuchae tou somatos archei despotikaen archaen, o de nous
+taes orexeos politikaen kai despotikaev._
+
+Compare also Bishop Butler's account of human nature as a system--of the
+different authority of certain principles, and specially the supremacy
+of Conscience.
+
+BOOK VI
+
+[1] I understand the illustration to be taken from the process of
+lowering a weight into its place; a block of marble or stone, for
+instance, in a building.
+
+[2] Called for convenience sake Necessary and Contingent matter.
+
+[3] One man learns Mathematics more easily than another, in common
+language, _he has a turn for_ Mathematics, _i e_ something in his
+mental conformation answers to that science The Phrenologist shows the
+bump denoting this aptitude.
+
+[4] And therefore the question resolves itself into this, "What is the
+work of the Speculative, and what of the Practical, faculty of Reason."
+See the description of _apetae_ II. 5.
+
+[5] _praxis_ is here used in its strict and proper meaning.
+
+[6] That is to say, the Will waits upon deliberation in which Reason is the
+judge; when the decision is pronounced, the Will must act accordingly.
+
+The question at issue always is, _Is this Good?_ because the Will is
+only moved by an impression of Good; the Decision then will be always
+_Aye or No_, and the mental hand is put forth to grasp in the former
+case, and retracted in the later.
+
+So far as what must take place in _every_ Moral Action, right or wrong,
+the Machinery of the mind being supposed uninjured but to constitute a
+good Moral Choice, _i e._. a good Action, the Reason must have said Aye
+when it ought.
+
+The cases of faulty action will be, either when the Machinery is
+perfect but wrongly directed, as in the case of a deliberate crime, or
+when the direction given by the Reason is right but the Will does not
+move in accordance with that direction, in other words, when the
+Machinery is out of order; as in the case of the [Greek: akrates]--video
+meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor.
+
+[7] See the note on [Greek: Arche] on page 4, l. 30.
+
+[8] The cobbler is at his last, why? to make shoes, which are to clothe
+the feet of someone and the price to be paid, _i.e._ the produce of his
+industry, is to enable him to support his wife and children; thus his
+production is subordinate to Moral Action.
+
+[9] It may be fairly presumed that Aristotle would not thus have varied
+his phrase without some real difference of meaning. That difference is
+founded, I think, on the two senses of [Greek: orexis] before alluded
+to (note, p. 53, l. 33). The first impulse of the mind towards Action
+may be given either by a vague desire or by the suggestion of Reason.
+The vague desire passing through the deliberate stage would issue in
+Moral Choice. Reason must enlist the Will before any Action can take
+place.
+
+Reason ought to be the originator in all cases, as Bishop Butler
+observes that Conscience should be. If this were so, every act of Moral
+Choice would be [Greek: orektikos nous].
+
+But one obvious function of the feelings and passions in our composite
+nature is to instigate Action, when Reason and Conscience by themselves
+do not: so that as a matter of fact our Moral Choice is, in general,
+fairly described as [Greek: orexis dianoetike]. See Bishop Butler's
+Sermon II. and the First upon Compassion.
+
+[10] The mind attains truth, either for the sake of truth itself
+([Greek: aplos]), or for the sake of something further ([Greek: eneka
+tinos]). If the first then either syllogistically ([Greek: episteme]),
+non-syllogistically ([Greek: nous]), or by union of the two methods
+([Greek: sophla]). If the second, either with a view to _act_ ([Greek:
+phronesis]), or with a view to _make_ ([Greek: techne]).
+
+Otherwise. The mind contemplates Matter Necessary or Contingent. If
+necessary, Principles ([Greek: nous]), Deductions ([Greek: episteme]),
+or Mixed ([Greek: sophla]). If Contingent, Action ([Greek: phronesis]),
+Production ([Greek: techen]). (Giphanius quoted in Cardwell's notes.)
+
+[11] It is the opening statement of the Post Analytics.
+
+[12] Aristotle in his logical analysis of Induction, Prior. Analytics
+II. 25, defines it to be "the proving the inherence of the major term
+in the middle (_i.e._ proving the truth of the major premiss in fig. 1)
+through the minor term." He presupposes a Syllogism in the first Figure
+with an universal affirmative conclusion, which reasons, of course,
+from an universal, which universal is to be taken as proved by
+Induction. His doctrine turns upon a canon which he there quotes. "If
+of one and the same term two others be predicated, one of which is
+coextensive with that one and the same, the other may be predicated of
+that which is thus coextensive." The fact of this coextensiveness must
+be ascertained by [Greek: nous], in other words, by the Inductive
+Faculty. We will take Aldrich's instance.
+    All Magnets attract iron
+    A B C are Magnets
+    A B C attract iron.
+Presupposed Syllogism reasoning from an universal.
+
+A B C attract iron (Matter of observation and experiment)
+
+All Magnets are A B C (Assumed by [Greek: nous], i.e. the Inductive
+faculty)
+
+All Magnets attract iron (Major premiss of the last Syllogism proved by
+taking the minor term of that for the middle term of this.)
+
+Or, according to the canon quoted above: A B C are Magnets. A B C
+attract iron.
+
+But [Greek: nous] tells me that the term Magnets is coextensive with
+the term A B C, therefore of all Magnets I may predicate that they
+attract iron.
+
+Induction is said by Aristotle to be [Greek: hoia phanton], but he says
+in the same place that for this reason we must _conceive_ ([Greek:
+noehin]) the term containing the particular Instances (as A B C above)
+as composed of all the Individuals.
+
+If Induction implied actual examination of all particular instances it
+would cease to be Reasoning at all and sink into repeated acts of
+Simple Apprehension it is really the bridging over of a chasm, not the
+steps cut in the rock on either side to enable us to walk down into and
+again out of it. It is a branch of probable Reasoning, and its validity
+depends _entirely_ upon the quality of the particular mind which
+performs it. Rapid Induction has always been a distinguishing mark of
+Genius the certainty produced by it is Subjective and not Objective. It
+may be useful to exhibit it Syllogistically, but the Syllogism which
+exhibits it is either nugatory, or contains a premiss _literally_
+false. It will be found useful to compare on the subject of Induction
+_as the term is used by Aristotle_, Analytica Prior. II 25 26 Analytica
+Post. I. 1, 3, and I. Topics VI I and X.
+
+[13] The reference is made to the Post Analyt I II and it is impossible
+to understand the account of [Greek: epistaemae] without a perusal of
+the chapter, the additions to the definition referred to relate to the
+nature of the premisses from which [Greek: epistaemae] draws its
+conclusions they are to be "true, first principles incapable of any
+syllogistic proof, better known than the conclusion, prior to it, and
+causes of it." (See the appendix to this Book.)
+
+[14] This is the test of correct logical division, that the _membra
+dividentia_ shall be opposed, _i.e._ not included the one by the other.
+
+[15] The meaning of the [Greek: hepehi] appears to be this: the appeal
+is made in the first instance to popular language, just as it the case
+of [Greek: epistaemae], and will be in those of [Greek: phronaesis] and
+[Greek: sophia]. We commonly call Architecture an Art, and it is so and
+so, therefore the name Art and this so and so are somehow connected to
+prove that connection to be "coextensiveness," we predicate one of the
+other and then simply convert the proposition, which is the proper test
+of any logical definition, or of any specific property. See the Topics,
+1. vi.
+
+[16] See the parable of the unjust Steward, in which the popular sense
+of [Greek: phronaesis] is strongly brought out; [Greek: ephaenesen ho
+kurios ton oikonomon taes adikias oti phronimos epoiaesen hoti ohi
+viohi tou aionos toutou phronimoteroi, k.t.l.]--Luke xvi. 8.
+
+[17] Compare the [Greek: aplos] and [Greek: kath' ekasta pepaideumenos]
+of Book I. chap. 1.
+
+[18] The two aspects under which Virtue may be considered as claiming
+the allegiance of moral agents are, that of being right, and that of
+being truly expedient, because Conscience and Reasonable Self-Love are
+the two Principles of our moral constitution naturally supreme and
+"Conscience and Self-Love, _if we understand our true happiness_,
+always lead us the same way." Bishop Butler, end of Sermon III.
+
+And again:
+
+"If by _a sense of interest_ is meant a practical regard to what is
+upon the whole our Happiness this is not only coincident with the
+principle of Virtue or Moral Rectitude, but is a part of the idea
+itself. And it is evident this Reasonable Self-Love wants to be
+improved as really as any principle in our nature. So little cause is
+there for Moralists to disclaim this principle." From the note on sect.
+iv. of the chapter on Moral Discipline, Analogy, part I chap. v.
+
+[19] See the note on [Greek: Arche] on page 4, l. 30.
+
+The student will find it worth while to compare this passage with the
+following--Chap. xiii. of this book beginning [Greek: e d' exis to
+ommati touto k. t. l]--vii. 4. [Greek: eti kai ode physikos. k.t.l.]
+vii. 9.--[Greek: ae gar arethae kai ae mochthaeria. k.t.l.]--iii. 7 _ad
+finem_. [Greek: ei de tis legoi. k.t.l.]
+
+[20] This is not quite fair. Used in its strict sense, Art does not
+admit of degrees of excellence any more than Practical Wisdom. In
+popular language we use the term "wiser man," as readily as "better
+artist" really denoting in each case different degrees of approximation
+to Practical Wisdom and Art respectively, [Greek: dia to ginesthai tous
+epainous di anaphoras]. I. 12.
+
+[21] He would be a _better Chymist_ who should poison intentionally,
+than he on whose mind the prevailing impression was that "Epsom Salts
+mean Oxalic Acid, and Syrup of Senna Laudanum."
+
+[22]The term Wisdom is used in our English Translation of the Old
+Testament in the sense first given to [Greek:----] here. "Then wrought
+Bezaleel and Ahohab, and every _wise-hearted man, in whom the Lord put
+wisdom and understanding_ to know how to work all manner of work for
+the service of the Sanctuary" Exodus xxxvi. i.
+
+[23] [Greek:----] and [Greek:----], (in the strict sense, for it is used in
+many different senses in this book) are different parts of the whole
+function [Greek:----], [Greek:----] takes in conclusions, drawn by strict
+reasoning from Principles of a certain kind which [Greek: ----] supplies.
+It is conceivable that a man might go on gaining these principles by
+Intuition and never reasoning from them, and so [Greek: ----] might exist
+independent of [Greek:----], but not this without that. Put the two
+together, the head to the trunk, and you form the living being
+[Greek:----]. There are three branches of [Greek:----] according to Greek
+Philosophy, [Greek:----], [Greek:----], [Greek:----]. Science is perhaps the
+nearest English term, but we have none really equivalent.
+
+[24][Greek:----] is here used in its most extensive sense, [Greek:----]
+would be its chief Instrument.
+
+[25] The faculty concerned with which is [Greek:----].
+
+[26] In every branch of Moral Action in which Practical Wisdom is
+employed there will be general principles, and the application of them,
+but in some branches there are distinct names appropriated to the
+operations of Practical Wisdom, in others there are not.
+
+Thus Practical Wisdom, when employed on the general principles of Civil
+Government, is called Legislation, as administering its particular
+functions it is called simply Government. In Domestic Management, there
+are of course general Rules, and also the particular application of
+them; but here the faculty is called only by one name. So too when
+Self-Interest is the object of Practical Wisdom.
+
+[27] [Greek:----], "our mere Operatives in Public business." (Chalmers.)
+
+[28] Practical Wisdom may be employed either respecting Self, (which is
+[Greek:----] proper) or not-Self, _i.e._ either one's family=[Greek:----],
+or one's community=[Greek:----], but here the supreme and subordinate are
+distinguished, the former is [Greek:----], the latter [Greek:----] proper,
+whose functions are deliberation and the administration of justice.
+
+[29] But where can this be done, if there be no community? see Horace's
+account of the way in which his father made him reap instruction from
+the examples in the society around him. 1. Sat. iv. 105, etc. See also
+Bishop Butler, Analogy, part I. chap. v. sect. iii.
+
+The whole question of the Selfish Morality is treated in Bishop
+Butler's first three and the eleventh Sermons, in which he shows the
+coincidence in _fact_ of enlightened Self-Love and Benevolence _i.e._
+love of others. Compare also what is said in the first Book of this
+treatise, chap. v., about [Greek: autarkeia].
+
+[30] More truly "implied," namely, that Practical Wisdom results from
+experience.
+
+[31] This observation seems to be introduced, simply because suggested
+by the last, and not because at all relevant to the matter in hand.
+
+[32]  An instance of Principles gained [Greek: aisthesei]. (Book 1.
+chap. viii.)
+
+[33] Particulars are called [Greek: eschata] because they are last
+arrived at in the deliberative process, but a little further on we have
+the term applied to first principles, because they stand at one
+extremity, and facts at the other, of the line of action.
+
+[34] I prefer the reading [Greek: e phronesis], which gives this sense,
+"Well, as I have said, Practical Wisdom is this kind of sense, and the
+other we mentioned is different in kind." In a passage so utterly
+unimportant, and thrown in almost colloquially, it is not worth while
+to take much trouble about such a point.
+
+[35] The definition of it in the Organon (Post Analyt. 1. xxiv.), "a
+happy conjecture of the middle term without time to consider of it."
+
+The quaestio states the phenomena, and the middle term the causation
+the rapid ascertaining of which constitutes [Greek: anchinoia]. All
+that receives light from the sun is bright on the side next to the sun.
+The moon receives light from the sun, The moon is bright on the side
+next the sun. The [Greek: anchinoia] consists in rapidly and correctly
+accounting for the observed fact, that the moon is bright on the side
+next to the sun.
+
+[36] Opinion is a complete, deliberation an incomplete, mental act.
+
+[37] The End does not sanctify the Means.
+
+[38] The meaning is, there is one End including all others; and in this
+sense [Greek: phronesis] is concerned with means, not Ends but there
+are also many subordinate Ends which are in fact Means to the Great End
+of all. Good counsel has reference not merely to the grand End, but to
+the subordinate Ends which [Greek: phronesis] selects as being right
+means to the Grand End of all.
+
+[39] The relative [Greek: on] might be referred to [Greek: sumpheron],
+but that [Greek: eubonlia] has been already divided into two kinds, and
+this construction would restrict the name to one of them, namely that
+[Greek: pros ti telos] as opposed to that [Greek: pros to telos aplos].
+
+[40] We have no term which at all approximates to the meaning of this
+word, much less will our language admit of the play upon it which
+connects it with [Greek: suggnomae].
+
+[41] Meaning, of course, all those which relate to Moral Action.
+[Greek: psronaesis ] is equivalent to [Greek: euboulia, ounesis,
+gnomae, and nous] (in the new sense here given to it).
+
+The faculty which guides us truly in all matters of Moral Action is
+[Greek: phronaesis], i.e. Reason directed by Goodness or Goodness
+informed by Reason. But just as every faculty of body and soul is not
+actually in operation at the same time, though the Man is acting, so
+proper names are given to the various Functions of Practical Wisdom.
+
+Is the [Greek: phronimos] forming plans to attain some particular End?
+he is then [Greek: euboulos]--is he passing under review the suggestions
+of others? he is [Greek: sunetos]--is he judging of the acts of others?
+he admits [Greek: gnomae] to temper the strictness of justness--is he
+applying general Rules to particular cases? he is exercising [Greek:
+nous praktikos] or [Greek: agsthaesis]--while in each and all he is
+[Greek: phronimos]?
+
+[42] See note, on p. 140.
+
+[43] There are cases where we must simply accept or reject without
+proof: either when Principles are propounded which are prior to all
+reasoning, or when particular facts are brought before us which are
+simply matters of [Greek: agsthaesis]. Aristotle here brings both these
+cases within the province of [Greek: nous], _i.e._ he calls by this
+name the Faculty which attains Truth in each.
+
+[44] _i.e._ of the [Greek: syllogisimai ton prakton].
+
+[45] See the note on [Greek: Archae] on p. 4,1 30. As a matter of fact
+and mental experience the Major Premiss of the Practica Syllogism is
+wrought into the mind by repeatedly acting upon the Minor Premiss
+(_i.e._ by [Greek: ethismos]).
+
+     All that is pleasant is to be done,
+     This is pleasant,
+     This is to be done
+
+By habitually acting on the Minor Premiss, _i.e._ on the suggestions of
+[Greek: epithymia], a man comes really to hold the Major Premiss.
+Aristotle says of the man destitute of all self-control that he is
+firmly persuaded that it is his proper line to pursue the gratification
+of his bodily appetites, [Greek: dia to toioytos einai oios diokein
+aytas]. And his analysis of [Greek: akrasia] (the state of progress
+towards this utter abandonment to passion) shows that each case of
+previous good resolution succumbing to temptation is attributable to
+[Greek: epithymia] suggesting its own Minor Premiss in place of the
+right one. Book VII. 8 and 5.
+
+[46] The _consequentia_ is this:
+
+There are cases both of principles and facts which cannot admit of
+reasoning, and must be authoritatively determined by [Greek: nous].
+What makes [Greek: nous] to be a true guide? only practice, i.e.
+Experience, and _therefore_, etc.
+
+[47] This is a note to explain [Greek: hygieina] and [Greek: euektika],
+he gives these three uses of the term [Greek: hygieinon] in the Topics,
+I. xiii. 10,
+
+     { [Greek: to men hygieias poiætikon], [Greek: hygieinon legetai]
+     { [Greek: to de phylaktikon],
+     { [Greek: to de sæmantikon].
+
+Of course the same will apply to [Greek: euektikon].
+
+[48] Healthiness is the formal cause of health.
+     Medicine is the efficient cause of health.
+
+See Book X. chap. iv. [Greek: hosper oud hæ hygieia kai ho iatros
+homoios aitia esti tou ugiainein].
+
+[49] [Greek: phronæsis] is here used in a partial sense to signify the
+Intellectual, as distinct from the Moral, element of Practical Wisdom.
+
+[50] This is another case of an observation being thrown in _obiter_,
+not relevant to, but suggested by, the matter in hand.
+
+[51] See Book II. chap. iii. and V. xiii.
+
+[52]The article is supplied at [Greek: panourgous], because the
+abstract word has just been used expressly in a bad sense. "Up to
+anything" is the nearest equivalent to [Greek: panourgos], but too
+nearly approaches to a colloquial vulgarism.
+
+[53] See the note on [Greek: Archæ] on page 4, l. 30.
+
+P. 147, l. 14. And for the Minor, of course,
+
+"This particular action is------."
+
+We may paraphrase [Greek: to telos] by [Greek: ti dei prattein--ti gar
+dei prattein hæ mæ, to telos autæs estin] i.e. [Greek: tæs
+phronæseos].--(Chap. xi. of this Book.)
+
+[55] "Look asquint on the face of truth." Sir T. Browne, Religio
+Medici.
+
+[56] The term [Greek: sophronikoi] must be understood as governing the
+signification of the other two terms, there being no single Greek term
+to denote in either case mere dispositions towards these Virtues.
+
+[57] Compare the passage at the commencement of Book X. [Greek: nun de
+phainontai] [Greek: katokochimon ek tæs aretæs].
+
+[58] It must be remembered, that [Greek: phronæsis] is used throughout
+this chapter in two senses, its proper and complete sense of Practical
+Wisdom, and its incomplete one of merely the Intellectual Element of
+it.
+
+BOOK VII
+
+[1] The account of Virtue and Vice hitherto given represents rather
+what men _may be_ than what they _are_. In this book we take a
+practical view of Virtue and Vice, in their ordinary, every day
+development.
+
+[2] This illustrates the expression, "_Deceits_ of the Flesh."
+
+[3] Another reading omits the [Greek:----]; the meaning of the whole
+passage would be exactly the same--it would then run, "if he had been
+convinced of the rightness of what he does, _i.e._ if he were now
+acting on conviction, he might stop in his course on a change of
+conviction."
+
+[4] Major and minor Premises of the [Greek:----] [Greek----]
+
+[5]Some necessarily implying knowledge of the particular, others not.
+
+[6] As a modern parallel, take old Trumbull in Scott's "Red Gauntlet."
+
+[7] That is, as I understand it, either the major or the minor premise,
+it is true, that "all that is sweet is pleasant," it is true also, that
+"this is sweet," what is contrary to Right Reason is the bringing in
+this minor to the major _i.e._ the universal maxim, forbidding to
+taste. Thus, a man goes to a convivial meeting with the maxim in his
+mind "All excess is to be avoided," at a certain time his [Greek:----]
+tells him "This glass is excess." As a matter of mere reasoning, he
+cannot help receiving the conclusion "This glass is to be avoided," and
+supposing him to be morally sound he would accordingly abstain. But
+[Greek:----], being a simple tendency towards indulgence suggests, in
+place of the minor premise "This is excess," its own premise "This is
+sweet," this again suggests the self-indulgent maxim or principle
+('[Greek:----]), "All that is sweet is to be tasted," and so, by strict
+logical sequence, proves "This glass is to be tasted."
+
+The solution then of the phænomenon of [Greek:----] is this that
+[Greek:----], by its direct action on the animal nature, swamps the
+suggestions of Right Reason.
+
+On the high ground of Universals, [Greek:----] i.e. [Greek:----] easily
+defeats [Greek:----]. The [Greek:----], an hour before he is in temptation,
+would never deliberately prefer the maxim "All that is sweet is to be
+tasted" to "All excess is to be avoided." The [Greek:----] would.
+
+     Horace has a good comment upon this (II Sat 2):
+
+     Quæ virtus et quanta, bom, sit vivere parvo
+     Discite, _non inter lances mensasque nitentes_
+     Verum hic _impransi_ mecum disquirite
+
+Compare also Proverbs XXIII. 31. "Look not thou upon the wine when it
+is red," etc.
+
+[8] As we commonly speak, Metaphysicians. Physiology of course includes
+Metaphysics.
+
+[9] [Greek: oron]. Aristotle's own account of this word (Prior Analyt
+ii. 1) is [Greek: eis on dialuetai hae protasis], but both in the
+account of [Greek: nous] and here it seems that the proposition itself
+is really indicated by it.
+
+[10] The Greek would give "avoids excessive pain," but this is not
+true, for the excess of pain would be ground for excuse the warrant for
+translating as in the text, is the passage occurring just below [Greek:
+diokei tas uperbolas kai pheugei metrias lupas].
+
+[11] Compare Bishop Butler on Particular Propensions, Analogy, Part I
+chap v sect. iv.
+
+[12] That is, they are to the right states as Vice to Virtue.
+
+[14] Consult in connection with this Chapter the Chapter on [Greek:
+orgae] in the Rhetoric, II. 2, and Bishop Butler's Sermon on
+Resentment.
+
+[15] The reasoning here being somewhat obscure from the concisement of
+expression, the following exposition of it is subjoined.
+
+     Actions of Lust are wrong actions done with pleasure,
+     Wrong actions done with pleasure are more justly objects of wrath,[*]
+     Such as are more justly objects of wrath are more unjust,
+     Actions of Lust are more unjust
+
+     [*] [Greek: hubpis] is introduced as the single instance from
+     which this premiss is proved inductively. See the account of it in
+     the Chapter of the Rhetoric referred to in the preceding note.
+
+[16][Greek: ton dae lechthenton]. Considerable difference of opinion
+exists as to the proper meaning of these words. The emendation which
+substitutes [Greek: akrataes] for [Greek: akolastos] removes all
+difficulty, as the clause would then naturally refer to [Greek: ton mae
+proairoumenon] but Zell adheres to the reading in the text of Bekker,
+because the authority of MSS and old editions is all on this side.
+
+I understand [Greek: mallon] as meant to modify the word [Greek:
+malakias], which properly denotes that phase of [Greek: akrasia] (not
+[Greek: akolasia]) which is caused by pain.
+
+The [Greek: akolastos] _deliberately_ pursues pleasure and declines
+pain if there is to be a distinct name for the latter phase, it comes
+under [Greek: malakia] more nearly than any other term, though perhaps
+not quite properly.
+
+Or the words may be understood as referring to the class of wrong acts
+caused by avoidance of pain, whether deliberate or otherwise, and then
+of course the names of [Greek: malakia] and [Greek: akolasia] may be
+fitly given respectively.
+
+[17] "If we went into a hospital where all were sick or dying, we
+should think those least ill who were insensible to pain; a physician
+who knew the whole, would behold them with despair. And there is a
+mortification of the soul as well as of the body, in which the first
+symptoms of returning hope are pain and anguish" Sewell, Sermons to
+Young Men (Sermon xii.)
+
+[18] Before the time of trial comes the man deliberately makes his
+Moral Choice to act rightly, but, at the moment of acting, the powerful
+strain of desire makes him contravene this choice his Will does not act
+in accordance with the affirmation or negation of his Reason. His
+actions are therefore of the mixed kind. See Book III. chap. i, and
+note on page 128.
+
+[19] Let a man be punctual _on principle_ to any one engagement in the
+day, and he must, as a matter of course, keep all his others in their
+due places relatively to this one; and so will often wear an appearance
+of being needlessly punctilious in trifles.
+
+[20] Because he is destitute of these minor springs of action, which
+are intended to supply the defects of the higher principle.
+
+See Bishop Butler's first Sermon on Compassion, and the conclusion of
+note on p. 129.
+
+BOOK VIII
+
+[1] "Owe no man anything, but to _love_ one another for he that loveth
+another _hath fulfilled the Law_." Romans XIII. 8.
+
+[2] [Greek: kerameis]. The Proverb in full is a line from Hesiod,
+[Greek: kahi keramehus keramei koteei kai tektoni tekton].
+
+[3] In this sense, therefore, is it sung of Mrs. Gilpin that she
+
+     "two stone bottles found,
+     To hold the liquor that she _loved_,
+     And keep it safe and sound."
+
+[4] Cardwell's reading, [Greek: tautae gar omoioi, kai ta loipa] is
+here adopted, as yielding a better sense than Bekker's.
+
+[5]The Great man will have a right to look for more Friendship than he
+bestows, but the Good man _can_ feel Friendship only for, and in
+proportion to, the goodness of the other.
+
+[6] See note on page 68, 1. 8.
+
+[7] See I. Topics, Chap. v. on the various senses of [Greek: tauton].
+
+[8] "For the mutual society, help, and comfort that the one ought to
+have of the other, both in prosperity and adversity."
+
+[9] Which one would be assuming he was, if one declined to recognise
+the obligation to requite the favour or kindness.
+
+BOOK IX
+
+[1] "Neither the Son of man, that He should _repent_." Numbers xxiii.
+19.
+
+"In a few instances the Second Intention, or Philosophical employment
+of a Term, is more extensive than the First Intention, or popular use."
+Whately, Logic, iii. 10.
+
+[2] "I have sometimes considered in what troublesome case is that
+Chamberlain in an Inn who being but one is to give attendance to many
+guests. For suppose them all in one chamber, yet, if one shall command
+him to come to the window, and the other to the table, and another to
+the bed, and another to the chimney, and another to come upstairs, and
+another to go downstairs, and all in the same instant, how would he be
+distracted to please them all? And yet such is the sad condition of nay
+soul by nature, not only a servant but a slave unto sin. Pride calls me
+to the window, gluttony to the table, wantonness to the bed, laziness
+to the chimney, ambition commands me to go upstairs, and covetousness
+to come down. Vices, I see, are as well contrary to themselves as to
+Virtue." (Fuller's Good Thoughts in Bad Times. Mix't Contemplations,
+viii.)
+
+BOOK X
+
+[1] See note, p. 43.
+
+[2] See Book II. chap. ix.
+
+[3] See Book I. chap. v. ad finem.
+
+[4] The notion alluded to is that of the [greek: idea]: that there is
+no real substantial good except the [greek: auto agathon], and
+therefore whatever is so called is so named in right of its
+participation in that.
+
+[5] See note on page 136, 1. 15.
+
+P. 238, 1. 24. Movement is, according to Aristotle, of six kinds:
+   From not being to being    .  .  .  .    Generation
+   From being to not being    .  .  .  .    Destruction
+   From being to being more   .  .  .  .    Increase
+   From being to being less   .  .  .  .    Diminution
+   From being here to being there   .  .    Change of Place
+   From being in this way to being in that  Alteration
+
+[7] _A_ may go to sleep quicker than _B_, but cannot _do more sleep_ in
+a given time.
+
+[8] Compare Book III. chap. vi. [Greek: osper kai epi ton somaton, k.
+t. l.]
+
+[9] Which is of course a [Greek: genesis].
+
+[10] That is, subordinate Movements are complete before the whole
+Movement is.
+
+[11] Pleasure is so instantaneous a sensation, that it cannot be
+conceived divisible or incomplete; the longest continued Pleasure is
+only a succession of single sparks, so rapid as to give the appearance
+of a stream, of light.
+
+[12] A man is as effectually hindered from taking a walk by the [Greek:
+allotria haedouae] of reading a novel, as by the [Greek: oikeia lupae]
+of gout in the feet.
+
+[13] I have thus rendered [Greek: spoudae (ouk agnoon to
+hamartanomenon)]; but, though the English term does not represent the
+depth of the Greek one, it is some approximation to the truth to
+connect an earnest serious purpose with Happiness.
+
+[14] Bishop Butler, _contra_ (Sermon XV.).
+
+"Knowledge is not our proper Happiness. Whoever will in the least
+attend to the thing will see that it is the gaining, not the having, of
+it, which is the entertainment of the mind." The two statements may
+however be reconciled. Aristotle may be well understood only to mean,
+that the pursuit of knowledge will be the pleasanter, the freer it is
+from the minor hindrances which attend on _learning_.
+
+[15] The clause immediately following indicates that Aristotle felt
+this statement to be at first sight startling, Happiness having been
+all the way through connected with [Greek: energeia], but the statement
+illustrates and confirms what was said in note on page 6, 1. 15.
+
+[16] That is to say, he aims at producing not merely a happy aggregate,
+but an aggregate of happy individuals. Compare what is said of
+Legislators in the last chapter of Book I and the first of Book II.
+
+[17] See note, page 146, 1. 17.
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