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+SIX
+                               METAPHYSICAL
+                              _MEDITATIONS_;
+
+                           Wherein it is Proved
+                             That there is a
+                                   GOD.
+                          And that Mans MIND is
+                      really distinct from his BODY.
+
+                       Written Originally in Latin
+                         By _RENATUS DES-CARTES_.
+
+                    Hereunto are added the OBJECTIONS
+                      made against these Meditations
+
+                            By _THOMAS HOBBES_
+                             Of _Malmesbury_.
+
+                        With the AUTHORS Answers.
+
+                 All Faithfully Translated into ENGLISH,
+                         with a short Account of
+                           _Des-Cartes's Life_.
+
+                          By _WILLIAM MOLYNEUX_.
+
+             _London_, Printed by _B.G._ for _Benj. Tooke_ at
+               the _Ship_ in St. _Pauls_ Church-yard, 1680.
+
+Some Books sold by _John Lawrence_, at the _Angel_ in _Cornhill_, near
+the _Royal Exchange_.
+
+A Collection of Letters for the improvement of Husbandry and Trade,
+intended to be continued Monthly, by _John Houghton_, fellow of the
+_Royal Society_, 'tis designed that every Letter shall be usefull to
+Mankind, and by degrees for most persons of both Sexes.
+
+The _Merchant Royal_, (a very pleasant Sermon) Preached before the King
+at _White-Hall_, upon the Nuptials of an Honourable Lord and his Lady, in
+Quarto, price 6_d._
+
+_Humane Prudence_, or the Art by which a man may raise himself and
+Fortune to Granduer, by _A. B._, the second Edition, with the Addition of
+a Table; in Twelves, price Bound, 1_s._
+
+THE TRANSLATORS PREFACE.
+
+TO THE READERS.
+
+_Had honor or applause and not the publick advantage of English Readers
+been the design of this Undertaking, the consideration of the common Fate
+of Translations had discouraged Me from permitting this even to have seen
+the light; for meer Versions do alwayes carry with them this Property,
+that if not well done they may much disgrace, but if well, not much
+commend the doers._
+
+_And certainly I might well have expected the same chance, had this
+been the Translation of an History, Play or Romance; wherein there is
+requisite not onely a bare version but a conformation of Idiom and
+language, manner and customary expression; But the nature of this
+present Work will not admit of the like liberty, and therefore, I hope,
+amongst Judicious Readers it may be exempt from the common Fate of
+Translations; for if we look upon it as a Philosophical or Metaphysical
+Tract, or rather as (really it is) a Physico-Mathematical Argumentation,
+we shall find that a great strictness of Expression is requisite to be
+observed therein. So that had a Translator taken upon him to use his own
+liberty of Phrase, he would thereby have endanger'd the sense and force
+of the Arguments; for Politeness of language might as well be expected in
+a Translation of ~Euclide~ as in this. And all that are acquainted with
+this famous Authors design, do very well know, that it was his intention
+in these Meditations ~Mathematically to demonstrate~, that there is a
+~God~, and that mans ~mind~ is ~incorporeal~. And it was his opinion,
+that metaphysicks may as clearly be demonstrated as mathematicks, as
+witness his expression in the Dedicatory Epistle of this Work to the
+~Sorbone~ Doctors, ~Eas~ (Rationes scilicet) ~quibus hic utor certitudine
+& evidentiâ Geometricas æquare, vel etiam superare existimem~; That he
+reputed his Arguments used in these Meditations, to equal if not excell
+Geometrical certainty._
+
+_And this, I suppose, is sufficient to make the Reader, not expect herein
+any smoothness of phrase or quaintness of Expression; what is here
+delivered in English is immediately taken, as it is naturally in the
+Original. The words, we hope, may be apposite enough, and fit to express
+what is here designed, and I think it a derogation from the Authors skill
+to draw the Picture of his mind in any other Colours, than what his own
+Copy expresses._
+
+_Thus far in vindication of the Philosophical plain stile and rough
+Language of the following Translation. I shall add a line or two, first
+relating to the Readers, secondly of the Author, and lastly of the
+Meditations themselves, together with the Motives which excited me to
+this Work._
+
+_As to the Readers, 'tis, I suppose, so evident that candour of mind,
+and freedome from prejudice is requisite to all that desire to advantage
+themselves by reading other mens notions, that it need not be here
+insisted on with much earnestness; yet considering the Antiquity of this
+subject, and the novelty of the Arguments here produced, it seems to be
+more than ordinarily requisite for an impartial perusal of the ensuing
+Tract. Neither are the following Meditations to be slightly passed over,
+but with diligence and attention to be read; for as in mathematical
+demonstration, the careless missing of any one single Position may
+render the Conclusion obscure and sometimes inconsequent, so in these
+metaphysical Demonstrations, which (as, before has been noted from
+the illustrious Author thereof) for certainty do equal, if not excel
+Geometrical Propositions, the slight attention to any one particular
+Argument may frustrate the design of the whole discourse._
+
+_The Reasoning therefore here being close and solid, and (as in
+Mathematicks) the knowledge of the latter depending on the knowledge
+of what went before, 'tis the duty of every Reader seriously to attend
+the Particulars, as also the connexion of the whole. Let him weigh the
+Arguments and perpend the Conclusions, and after a clear and distinct
+Knowledge, lett him pass his judgement._
+
+_And to this end I shall make it my request to every Reader, that he
+would not be content with a single perusal of the following Discourses,
+but that he would often repeat his reading them over; for by this means
+the force of those Arguments, which at first may by chance escape the
+most diligent and attentive Peruser, by a second or third Essay may
+offer themselves more fully to his Consideration. This was the desire
+of our Author in an other of his pieces, I mean his ~Principles of
+Philosophy~, which I am sure do not require so strict an attention of
+mind, as these abstracted speculations; and therefore if it were his
+Request in that case, we may Reasonably think that 'twas no less his
+desire in this._
+
+_When we come to speak of the Incomparable Author of these Meditations,
+we have reason to lament our own Ignorance, and to blame the Ingratitude
+of the Age wherein he lived, for not transmitting to Posterity more
+certain and ample Records of the Life and Conversation of this Excellent
+Philosopher, all that has been Written in this kind gives us only so
+much light into the Life of this Prodigious Man, as may make us wish for
+more; imparting which, I shall recommend the Readers to a further enquiry
+into the inward Thoughts, (largly discover'd in the Writings) of our
+Famous Author, of whose outward actions and condition we have so small
+knowledge._
+
+_Renatus Des-Cartes was born on the last day of ~March~ in the year 1596.
+at ~Tours~, or at ~Castrum Eraldum~ a Town near ~Tours~ in ~France~;
+He came of an Antient and Noble Family, being by Descent ~Lord~ of
+~Perron~, His Father was a Senator of his Country, and a Man of no mean
+estate, leaving to this his only Son by a second Wife between six and
+seven thousand pounds a year._
+
+_He was Educated in his younger years according to the manner of his
+Country (and as he himself recommends in one of his Epistles, ~viz.
+Epist. 90. partis secundæ~ to One for the Instruction of his Son) in the
+Aristotelian principles of Philosophy, a whole course whereof he had
+run through at the Age of seventeen in the Schools of ~Flexia~, or ~La
+Flesche~ a Town in the Province of ~Anjou~, famous for the Colledge of
+Jesuites there establish'd by ~Henry~ the ~4th~._
+
+_But to this he did not Continue long devoted, giving early testimonies
+of his dislike to the unsatisfactory Notions, and verbose emptiness of
+the Peripatetick Philosophy; He used therefore his utmost endeavours (as
+he himself testifies in his ~Dissertatio de Methodo~) to get loose from
+those Chains and Fetters of Mind to which the weakness of his tender
+years had subjected him._
+
+_To this end he betook himself to a long course of Travel, that by the
+variety of Objects, which he was likely to meet with in his journeys,
+the memory of his past Notions might be blotted out; In his travel he
+applied himself much to the study of the Art Military, and Mathematicks;
+In the latter he has left the World large testimonies of his Excellence
+in his ~Book of Geometry~; and in the former we have reason to believe
+him most expert, for He was personally present at some Sieges and Battles
+both in ~France~ and ~Germany~, as particularly at the Siege of ~Rochel~,
+of ~Gava~ near ~Genoa~, of ~Breda~, at the Battle of ~Prague~, ~&c.~ so
+that we may conclude that he had a Genius fitted (according to the Motto
+of the noble ~Sir W. Raliegh~) ~Tam Marti, quam Mercurio~, For the Pike
+as well as Pen. And as the Glorious Roman Emperour became a ~Cæsar~ by
+his Book as well as Sword, by the Conquests of his mind as well as those
+of his arm; so our Famous Author was ~Ex Utroque Clarus~._
+
+_In his Travels he spent many years, in all which time he was not Idle,
+but highly improved himself by his converse with the ~Beaux Esprits~,
+which he met with in several Regions he visited; The first Place he
+betook himself to, was ~Italy~, then he went into ~Denmark, Germany,
+Hungary, &c.~ And after a Long but advantagious Peregrination he
+return'd to ~Amsterdam~, where he intended to take up his Rest, had he
+not been called by the French King upon very Honourable terms to ~Paris~;
+During his Continuance there he so order'd his annual Revenue, that he
+might be supplied by the hands of a Friend wherever he was. He staid at
+~Paris~ three years, and then retired Himself to a solitary village in
+~Holland~ called ~Egmond~, where he lived twenty five years, during which
+time he apply'd himself wholly to the Restauration of true Philosophy,
+wherein he gave the World such mighty testimonies of his Excellence,
+that in a short time he became celebrated in the mouths of all Learned
+Men. Neither were the Courts of Princes silent in his deserved Praises;
+for after a Retirement of twenty five years he was Invited by ~Christina
+Queen of Sweedland~ to her Court; Thither upon the intreaty of this brave
+and Learned Princess he betook himself, where he had not continued Long
+before he was struck with a Peripneumonia or Inflammation of the Lungs
+(contracted, as it is thought by the long Discourses which he used to
+hold bare headed with the Queen, continuing them sometimes till far in
+the Night,) of which unhappy distemper he Died the seventh Day after he
+sicken'd._
+
+_Thus Expired this Wonder of his Own and succeeding Ages, desired and
+lamented by all men, Æqual'd by none. He was buried in a costly Monument
+consisting of four sides, upon which were inscribed Epitaphs; bestow'd
+upon him by many Renown'd Persons._
+
+_What shall we now say sufficient to express our Grief for the untimely
+Decease of this Worthy Philosopher? But Especially what shall we now do
+to recover our Loss? Let us endeavour to Redeem what we have lost by well
+Husbanding and careful improvement of what is left; which may be done
+in Part by a Diligent Perusal of the Works written by this Excellent
+Author; This, This only is the way of Reviving him again, and of giving
+him Immortality in spight of his untimely Fate. And so let him for ever
+live celebrated by the Deserved Praises of all ingenious Enquirers after
+truth, and Learning._
+
+_Let us therefore cast our eye upon the Present Work of this
+extroardinary Philosopher, and therein let us admire his profound
+Judgment and vigorous Fancy, for if we seriously consider it, we shall
+hardly find a more solid close piece of Reasoning either in this or
+Foregoing ages; ~Here~, what was commonly asserted without proof, is not
+only proved but ~Mathematically~ Demonstrated, ~viz.~ That ~God is the
+Fountain and Original of Truth~; His sharp Wit, like ~Hannibals~ Vinegar,
+hath eaten thro the Mazing and overtowring hills of Errors, a Plain and
+Pleasant Way to the Divine seat of Knowledge._
+
+_In fine, such is the Excellence of these six Meditations, that I cannot
+resemble his Performance herein better than to the Six Days Work of the
+Supream Architect; and certainly next to the Creation of All things out
+of Nothing, the Restauration of Truth out of Errors is the most Divine
+Work; so that (with Reverence be it spoken) the Incomparable ~Des-Cartes~
+does hereby deserve as it were the name of a Creatour. In the first
+Meditation we are Presented with a Rude and Indigested Chaos of Errours
+and Doubts, till the Divine spirit of the Noble ~Des-Cartes~ (pardon
+the Boldness of the Expression) ~moves upon the confused face of these
+Waters~, and thereout produces some ~clear~ and ~distinct Light~; by
+which ~Sun-shine~ he proceeds to bring forth and cherish other ~Branches
+of Truth~; Till at last by a six Days Labour he Establishes this Fair
+Fabrick (as I may call it) of the ~Intellectual World~ on foundations
+that shall never be shaken. Then sitting down with rest and satisfaction
+he looks upon this his Off-spring and Pronounces it ~Good~._
+
+_These Things Consider'd, I need not make any long Apologies for my
+undertaking a translation thereof; The excellency of the Original is
+sufficient to vindicate my endeavours to present the English World with
+a Copy, and he that shall blame my Intentions of Communicating the
+Methods of Truth to those that have only the English Tongue, may as well
+find fault with those English that propagate the Christian Religion
+among savage Indians, and translate the Scriptures into their Language,
+because they have not the English Tongue. To understand Latin is no (or
+at most a very small) part of Learning, and that which certainly every
+Cobler in ~Rome~ was once endow'd with; and therefore must there then
+be no translations out of Greek into Latin? I doubt not, but there are
+many Persons in our Nations, who tho wanting Latin, are notwithstanding
+very capable of the most abstracted speculations; the late disturbances
+of our Kingdomes occasion'd many Youths, who were then in a fair way
+of Instruction, to forsake their learning, and divert their intentions
+from Literature to Arms, and yet many of these have afterwards become
+Men of extraordinary nary abilities and qualifications for learning
+notwithstanding their deficiency in the Roman Tongue. And I see no Reason
+why it should not be the desire, and consequently the endeavour of
+every true English man, to make his language as universal as is now the
+~French~, into which the best Books in all sorts of Learning, both Poetry
+and Prose, are daily translated out of all languages, but especially
+out of Greek and Latine. Among which these Meditations are to be found,
+entituled, ~Les Meditations Metaphysiques De Rene Des Cartes touchant
+la Premiere Philosophie~. This was translated out of the Authors Latine
+into French by ~Monsieur le D. D. L. N. S.~ The several Objections also,
+which were made by divers learned Persons against these Meditations, with
+the Authors Answers, were translated into French by ~M. B. L. R.~ And, I
+hope, no one will assert, that the French are more fit to receive those
+metaphysical Notions delivered herein than the English Nation._
+
+_But 'twas none of the smallest motives I had to this undertaking, that
+tho some famous English Authours have taken notice of the Arguments here
+produced (for the proof of a ~Deity~ drawn from the ~Idea~ we have of
+~God~ in our Mind, ~&c.~) Particularly the most excellent and learned
+~Dr. Stillingfleet~ in the first Chapter of the third Book in his
+~Origines Sacræ~, who refers his Readers to a further search into these
+Meditations in the ~400 page~ of that Discourse; as also the Reverend Dr.
+~Henry More~ in his ~Antidote against Atheism~, and more fully in his
+~Appendix~ annex'd thereto, hath treated of our Authors demonstration;
+and yet nothing of the genuine original from whence they have borrowed
+all their Copies (tho some of them drawn in a larger size, yet I question
+whether so expressive) nothing of our Authors proper management hath ever
+appear'd in English. Those that assert these Arguments to have been long
+before thought upon by some of the Fathers, I shall refer to our Authors
+just vindication of himself in his several Answers to Objections made
+against these Discourses._
+
+_And here I shall dismiss the Reader detaining him no longer from
+that satisfaction which he may reasonably expect from the perusal of
+the following Meditations; this Translation is dedicated to no one in
+particular, but is humbly submitted to the moderate censure of all candid
+Readers, by_
+
+                                                      Their humble servant
+                                                      Will. Molyneux.
+
+_Dublin Feb. 19. 1679/80._
+
+The Contents.
+
+  Meditation 1. _Of Things Doubtful._                              Pag. 1.
+
+  Meditat. 2. _Of the Nature of Mans Mind, and that 'tis easier
+    Proved to Be then our Body._                                    p. 11.
+
+  Meditat. 3. _Of God, and that there Is a God._                    p. 27.
+
+  Meditat. 4. _Of Truth and Falshood._                              p. 55.
+
+  Meditat. 5. _Of the Essence of Things Material, and herein
+    again of God, and that He does Exist._                          p. 70.
+
+  Meditat. 6. _Of Corporeal Beings and their Existence, as also
+    of the Real Difference between Mind and Body._                  p. 83.
+
+  _Objections and Answers._                                        p. 155.
+
+ERRATA.
+
+Pag. 1. line 8. dele _off_. p. 3. l. 21. _there wants the sign
+of Interrogation_. p. 8. l. 10. r. _Premeditated_. ib. l. 14. r.
+_falshoods_. p. 18. l. 15. r. _that it may_. p. 20. l. 11. r. _suffers_.
+_In the two or three first chapters there are ~Astericks~ wanting_.
+p. 33. l. 10. dele I. p. 39. l. 25. r. _formally_. p. 49. l. 14 r.
+_Duration_ and _Continuance_. p. 54. l. 2 _for the Point put a Comma_. p.
+61. l. ult. r. _I enquire_. p. 91. r. _in the margin_ _doubted_. p. 124.
+l. 6. r. _have no affinity_.
+
+Transcriber's Note: These errata have been corrected, along with some
+obvious typos. The spelling in this book is not only of its time, but
+also wildly variable, and has been left well alone. Upright text within
+_italic_ passages is marked ~like this~.
+
+THE
+
+Metaphysical Meditations
+
+OF
+
+_Renatus Des-Cartes_, &c.
+
+MEDITAT. I.
+
+_Of Things Doubtful._
+
+Some years past I perceived how many _Falsities_ I admitted as _Truths_
+in my Younger years, and how _Dubious_ those things were which I raised
+from thence; and therefore I thought it requisite (if I had a designe
+to establish any thing that should prove _firme_ and _permanent_ in
+sciences) that once in my life I should clearly cast aside all my former
+opinions, and begin a new from some _First principles_. But this seemed a
+great Task, and I still expected that maturity of years, then which none
+could be more apt to receive Learning; upon which Account I waited so
+long, that at last I should deservedly be blamed had I spent that time in
+_Deliberation_ which remain'd only for _Action_.
+
+This day therefore I conveniently released my mind from all cares, I
+procured to my self a Time Quiet, and free from all Business, I retired
+my self Alone; and now at length will I freely and seriously apply my
+self to the General overthrow of all my former Opinions.
+
+To the Accomplishment of Which, it will not be necessary for me to prove
+them all _false_ (for that perhaps I shall never atcheive) But because my
+reason perswades me, that I must withdraw my assent no less from those
+opinions which seem _not so very certain_ and _undoubted_, then I should
+from those that are _Apparently false_, it will be sufficient if I reject
+all those wherein I find any _Occasion_ of doubt.
+
+Neither to effect this is it necessary, that they all should be run
+over particularly (which would be an endles trouble) but because the
+_Foundation_ being once undermin'd, whatever is built thereon will of
+its own accord come to the ground, I shall therefore immediately assault
+the very _principle_, on which whatever I have believed was _grounded_.
+Viz.
+
+_Whatever I have hitherto admitted as most true, that I received either
+from, or by my Senses; but these I have often found to deceive me, and
+'tis prudence never certainly to trust those that I have (tho but once)
+deceived us._
+
+1 _Doubt._ But tho sometimes the _senses_ deceive us being exercised
+about _remote_ or _small_ objects, yet there are many other things of
+which we cannot doubt tho we know them only by the senses? as that at
+present I am in this place, that I am sitting by a fire, that I have a
+Winter gown on me, that I feel this Paper with my hands; But how can it
+be denied that these hands or this body is mine? Unless I should compare
+my self to those mad men, whose brains are disturbed by such a disorderly
+melancholick vapour, that makes them continually profess themselves to
+be Kings, tho they are very poor, or fancy themselves cloathed in Purple
+Robes, tho they are naked, or that their heads are made of Clay as a
+bottle, or of glass, _&c._ But these are mad men, and I should be as mad
+as they in following their example by fancying these things as they do.
+
+1 _Solution._ This truly would seem very clear to those that never
+_sleep_, and suffer the same things (and sometimes more unlikely) in
+their repose, then these mad men do whilst they are awake; for how often
+am I perswaded in a Dream of these usual occurrences, that I am in this
+place, that I have a Gown on me, that I am sitting by a fire, _&c._ Tho
+all the while I am lying naked between the Sheets.
+
+But now I am certain that I am awake and look upon this Paper, neither
+is this head which I shake asleep, I knowingly and willingly stretch out
+this hand, and am sensible that things so distinct could not happen to
+one that sleeps. As if I could not remember my self to have been deceived
+formerly in my sleep by the like thoughts; which while I consider more
+attentively I am so far convinced of the difficulty of distinguishing
+sleep from waking that I am amazed, and this very amazement almost
+perswades me that I am asleep.
+
+2 _Doubt._ Wherefore let us suppose our selves _asleep_, and that these
+things are not _true_, viz. that we open our eyes, move our heads,
+stretch our hands, and perhaps that we have no such things as hands or a
+body. Yet we must confess, that what we see in a Dream is (as it were)
+_a painted Picture_, which cannot be devised but after the _likeness_ of
+some _real_ thing; and that therefore these Generals at least, _viz._
+eyes, head, hands, and the whole body are things _really existent_ and
+not _imaginary_; For Painters themselves, (even then when they design
+Mermaids and Satyrs in the most unusual shapes) do not give them natures
+altogether new, but only add the divers Parts of different Animals
+together; And if by chance they invent any thing so new that nothing
+was ever seen like it, for that 'tis wholy fictitious and false, yet
+the colours at least of which, they make it must be _true Colours_; so
+upon the same account, tho these General things as eyes, head, hands,
+_&c._ may be imaginary; yet nevertheless we must of necessity confess
+the more _simple_ and _universal_ things to be _True_, of which (as of
+true Colours) these _Images_ of things (whether _true_ or _false_) which
+are in our minds are made; such as are the nature of a body in General,
+and its Extension, also the shape of things extended, with the quantity
+or bigness of them; their number also, and place wherein they are, the
+time in which they continue, and the like, and therefore from hence we
+make no bad conclusion, that _Physick_, both _Natural_, and _Medicinal_,
+_Astronomy_, and all other _sciences_, which depend on the consideration
+of _compound things_, are _Doubtful_. But that _Arithmetick_, _Geometry_,
+and the like (which treat only of the most _simple_, and _General_ things
+not regarding whether they really are or not) have in them something
+_certain_ and _undoubted_; for whether I sleep or wake, _two_ and _three_
+added make five; a _square_ has no more sides than _four_ _&c._ neither
+seems it possible what such _plain truths_ can be _doubted_ off.
+
+2 _Solution._ But all this While there is rooted in my mind a certain old
+opinion of the _being_ of an _Omnipotent God_, by whom I am _created_ in
+the state I am in; and how know I but he caused that there should be no
+Earth, no Heaven, no Body, no Figure, no Magnitude, no Place, and yet
+that all these things should seem to me to be as now they are? And as I
+very often judge others to Erre about those things which they think they
+_Throughly understand_, so why may not I be _deceived_, whenever I add
+_two_ and _three_, or count the sides of a Square, or whatever other easy
+Matter can be thought of?
+
+3. _Doubt_. But perhaps _God wills not_ that I should be _deceived_, for
+he is said to be _Infinitely Good_.
+
+3. _Solution._ Yet if it were _Repugnant_ to his _Goodness_ to create
+me so that I should be _always deceived_, it seems also _unagreeable_
+to his _Goodness_ to permit me to be deceived _at any time_; Which
+last no one will affirme: Some there are truely who had rather deny
+_Gods Omnipotence_, then beleive all things _uncertain_; but there at
+present we may not contradict. And we will suppose all this of _God_ to
+be _false_; yet whether they will suppose me to become what _I_ am by
+Fate, by _Chance_, by a _continued chain_ of _causes_, or any other way,
+because to _erre_ is an _Imperfection_, by how much the less _power_ they
+will Assigne to the _Author_ of my _Being_, so much the more Probable it
+will be, that I am so _Imperfect_ as to be _alwayes deceived_.
+
+To which Arguments I know not what to answer but am forced to confess,
+that there is nothing of all those things which I formerly received as
+_Truths_, whereof at present I may not _doubt_; and this doubt shall not
+be grounded on inadvertency or Levity, but upon strong and Premeditated
+reasons; and therefore I must hereafter (if I designe to discover
+any truths) withdraw my assent from them no less then from _apparent
+falshoods_.
+
+But 'tis not sufficient to think only _Transiently_ on these things, but
+I must take care to _remember_ them; for dayly my old opinions returne
+upon me, and much against my Will almost possesse my Beleife tyed to
+them, as it were by a continued _use_ and _Right_ of _Familiarity_;
+neither shall I ever cease to _assent_ and _trust_ in them, whilst I
+suppose them as in themselves they really are, that is to say, _something
+doubtful_ (as now I have proved) yet notwithstanding _highly Probable_,
+which it is much more Reasonable to beleive then disbeleive.
+
+Wherefore I conceive I should not do amiss, if (with my mind bent clearly
+to the contrary side) I should deceive my self, and suppose them for a
+While altogether _false_ and _Imaginary_; till at length the Weights of
+prejudice being equal in each scale, no ill custome may any more Draw my
+Judgement from the _true Conception_ of things, for I know from hence
+will follow no dangerous Error, and I can't too immoderately pamper my
+own Incredulity, seeing What I am about, concernes not _Practice_ but
+_Speculation_.
+
+To Which end I will suppose, not an _Infinitely perfect God_, the
+_Fountain_ of _truth_, but that some _Evil Spirit_ which is very
+_Powerful_ and _crafty_ has used all his endeavours to _deceive_ me; I
+will conceive, the Heavens, Air, Earth, Colours, Figures, Sounds, and all
+outward things are nothing else but the delusions of Dreams, by which he
+has laid snares to catch my easy beleif; I will consider my self as not
+having hands, Eyes, Flesh, Blood, or Sences, but that _I_ falsely think
+that _I_ have all these; _I_ will continue firmly in this Meditation; and
+tho it lyes not in my power to _discover any truth_, yet this is in my
+power, not to _assent to Falsities_, and with a strong resolution take
+care that the _Mighty deceiver_ (tho never so _powerful_ or _cunning_)
+impose not any thing on my beleife.
+
+But this is a laborious intention, and a certain sloth reduces me to
+the usual course of life, and like a Prisoner who in his sleep perhaps
+enjoy'd an imaginary liberty, and when he begins to suppose that he
+is asleep is afraid to waken, but is willing to be deceived by the
+_Pleasant delusion_; so I willingly fall into my opinions, and am afraid
+to be Roused, least a toilsome waking succeeding a pleasant rest I may
+hereafter live not in the _light_, but in the confused _darkness_ of the
+_doubts_ now raised.
+
+MEDITAT. II.
+
+_~Of the nature of Mans mind~, and that 'tis easier proved to ~be~ then
+our ~body~._
+
+By yesterdays Meditation I am cast into so great _Doubts_, that I shall
+never forget them, and yet I know not how to answer them, but being
+plunged on a suddain into a deep Gulf, I am so amazed that I can neither
+touch the bottome, nor swim at the top.
+
+Nevertheless, I will endeavour once more, and try the way I set on
+yesterday, by removing from me whatever is in the _least doubtful_, as if
+I had certainly discover'd it to be _altogether false_, and will proceed
+till I find out some _certainty_, or if nothing else, yet at least this
+_certainty, That there is nothing sure_.
+
+_Archimedes_ required but a _point_ which was _firm_, and _immoveable_
+that he might move the _whole Earth_, so in the perfect undertaking Great
+things may be expected, if I can discover but the _least thing_ that is
+_true_ and _indisputable_.
+
+Wherefore I suppose all things I see are _false_, and believe that
+nothing of those things are really existent, which my deceitful memory
+represents to me; 'tis evident I have no senses, that a Body, Figure,
+Extension, Motion, Place, _&c._ are meer Fictions; what thing therefore
+is there that is _true_? perhaps only _this, That there is nothing
+certain._
+
+[Sidenote: _Doubts and Solutions._]
+
+But how know I that there is nothing _distinct_ from all these things
+(which I have now reckon'd) of which I have no reason to _doubt_? Is
+there no _God_ (or whatever other name I may call him) who has put these
+thoughts into me? Yet why should I think this? When I my self perhaps
+am the _Author_ of them. Upon which Account, therefore must not I be
+something? 'tis but just now that I denied that I had any _senses_, or
+any _Body_. Hold a while--Am I so tied to a _Body_ and _senses_ that I
+cannot _exist_ without them? But I have perswaded my self that there is
+nothing in the World, no Heaven, no Earth, no Souls, no Bodies; and then
+why not, that I _my self am not_? Yet surely if _I_ could perswade my
+self any thing, _I was_.
+
+But there is _I_ know not what sort of _Deceivour_ very _powerful_
+and very _crafty_, who always strives to _deceive_ Me; without Doubt
+therefore _I am_, if he can _decieve me_; And let him _Deceive_ me as
+much as he can, yet he can never make me _not to Be_, whilst _I think
+that I am_. Wherefore _I_ may lay this down as a _Principle, that
+whenever this sentence I am, I exist, is spoken or thought of by Me, 'tis
+necessarily True_.
+
+But _I_ do not yet fully understand _who I am_ that now necessarily
+_exist_, and _I_ must hereafter take care, least _I_ foolishly _mistake_
+some other thing _for my self_, and by that means be _deceived_ in that
+thought, which _I_ defend as the most _certain_ and _evident_ of all.
+
+Wherefore _I_ will again Recollect, what _I_ believed _my self to be_
+heretofore, before _I_ had set upon these Meditations, from which _Notion
+I_ will withdraw whatever may be _Disproved_ by the _Foremention'd
+Reasons_, that in the End, _That_ only may Remain which is _True_ and
+_indisputable_.
+
+What therefore have I heretofore thought my self? _A Man._ But what is a
+man? Shall I answer, a _Rational Animal_? By no means; because afterwards
+it may be asked, what an _Animal_ is? and what _Rational_ is? And so from
+one _question_ I may fall into greater _Difficulties_; neither at present
+have I so much time as to spend it about such Niceties.
+
+But I shall rather here Consider, what heretofore represented it self
+to my thoughts _freely_, and _naturally_, whenever I set my self to
+understand _What I my self was_.
+
+And the first thing I find Representing it self is, that I have _Face_,
+_Hands_, _Arms_, and this whole _frame_ of _parts_ which is seen in my
+_Body_, and which I call my _Body_.
+
+The next thing represented to me was, that I was _nourish'd_, could
+_walk_, had _senses_, and could _Think_; which functions I attributed to
+my _Soul_. Yet what this _soul_ of mine was, I did not fully conceive; or
+else supposed it a small thing like _wind_, or _fire_, or _aire_, infused
+through my _stronger parts_.
+
+As to my _Body_ truly _I_ doubted not, but that _I_ rightly understood
+its _Nature_, which (if _I_ should endeavour to describe as _I_ conceive
+it) _I_ should thus Explain, _viz._ By a _Body_ _I_ mean whatever is
+_capable_ of _Shape_, or can be _contained_ in a _place_, and so fill's
+a space that it excludes all other _Bodys_ out of the same, that which
+may be _touch'd_, _seen_, _heard_, _tasted_, or _smelt_, and that which
+is _capable_ of _various_ _Motions_ and _Modifications_, not from it
+_self_, but from any _other thing moving_ it, for _I_ judged it _against_
+(or rather _above_) the _nature_ of a _Body_ to _move it self_, or
+_perceive_, or _think_, But rather admired that _I_ should find these
+_Operations_ in certain _Bodys_.
+
+But How now (since _I_ suppose a certain _powerful_ and (if it be lawful
+to call him so) _evil deluder_, who useth all his endeavours to deceive
+me in all things) can _I_ affirme that I have any of those things,
+which I have now said belong to the _nature_ of a _Body_? Hold-- Let me
+Consider--, Let me think--, Let me reflect-- I can find no Answer, and I am
+weary with repeating the same things over-again in vain.
+
+But Which of these _Faculties_ did I attribute to my _Soul_, my
+_Nutritive_, or _Motive faculty_? yet now seeing I have no _Body_, these
+also are _meer delusions_. Was it my _sensitive faculty_? But this also
+cannot be perform'd without a _Body_, and I have seem'd to _perceive_
+many things in my _sleep_, of which I afterwards understood my self _not_
+to be _sensible_. Was it my _Cogitative Faculty_? Here I have discovered
+it, 'tis my _Thought_, this alone cannot be separated from Me, I _am_,
+I _exist_,⸺_tis true_, but for what time _Am I_? Why _I am_ as long as
+_I think_; For it May be that When I cease from _thinking_, I may cease
+from being. Now I admit of nothing but what is necessarily true: In
+short therefore I _am_ only a _thinking thing_ that is to say, a _mind_,
+or a _soul_, or _understanding_, or _Reason_, words which formerly _I_
+understood not; I am a _Real thing_, and _Really Existent_, But what sort
+of thing? I have just now said it, _A thinking thing_.
+
+[Sidenote: * _Places noted with their Asterisk are refer'd to in the
+following Objections._]
+
+But am I nothing besides? I will consider⸺I am not that _structure_ of
+_parts_, which is called a Mans _Body_, neither am I any sort of _thin
+Air_ infused into those Parts, nor a _Wind_, nor _Fire_, nor _Vapour_,
+nor _Breath_, nor whatever I my self can feign, for all these things I
+have supposed _not to Be_. Yet my Position stands firm; _Nevertheless I
+am something._ Yet perhaps it so falls out that these very things which
+I suppose not to exist (because to me _unknown_) are in reallity nothing
+_different_ from that very _Self_, which I _know_. I cannot tell, I
+dispute it not now, I can only give my opinion of those things whereof I
+have some knowledge. I am sure that I exist, I ask who I am whom I thus
+know, certainly, the knowledge, of _Me_ (precisely taken) depends not on
+those things, whose existence I am yet ignorant of; and therefore not on
+any other things that I can _feign_ by my _imagination_.
+
+And this very Word (_feign_) puts me in mind of my _error_, for I
+should _feign_ in deed, if I should _imagine_ my self any thing; for to
+_imagine_ is nothing else but to think upon the _shape_ or _image_ of
+a _corporeal_ thing; but now I certainly know that I _am_, and I know
+also that 'tis possible that all these _images_, and generally whatever
+belongs to the _Nature_ of a _Body_ are nothing but _deluding Dreams_.
+Which things Consider'd I should be no less Foolish in saying, _I will
+imagine that I may more throughly understand what I am_, then if I should
+say, _at Present I am awake and perceive something true, but because it
+appears not evidently enough, I shall endeavour to sleep, that in a Dream
+I may perceive it more evidently and truely_.
+
+Wherefore I know that nothing that I can comprehend by my _imagination_,
+can belong to the _Notion_ I have of _my self_, and that I must carefully
+withdraw my mind from those things that it may more _distinctly_ perceive
+its _own Nature_.
+
+Let me ask therefore _What I am, A Thinking Thing_, but What is That?
+That is a thing, _doubting_, _understanding_, _affirming_, _denying_,
+_willing_, _nilling_, _imagining_ also, and _sensitive_. These truely are
+not a few _Properties_, if they all belong to Me. And Why should they Not
+belong to me? For am not I the very same who at present _doubt_ almost of
+All things; yet _understand_ something, which thing onely I _affirm_ to
+be true, I _deny_ all other things, I am _willing_ to know more, I _would
+not_ be deceived, I _imagine_ many things _unwillingly_, and _consider_
+many things as coming to me by my _senses_. Which of all these faculties
+is it, which is not as _true_ as that I _Exist_, tho I should _sleep_, or
+my _Creatour_ should as much as in him lay, strive to _deceive_ Me? which
+of them is it that is _distinct_ from my _thought_? which of them is it
+that can be _seperated_ from _me_? For that I am the same that _doubt_,
+_understand_, and _will_ is so _evident_, that I know not how to explain
+it more _manifestly_, and that I also am the same that _imagine_, for tho
+perhaps (as I have supposed) no thing that can be _imagined_ is _true_,
+yet the _imaginative Power_ it self is _really_ existent, and makes
+up a part of my _Thought_; and last of all that I am the same that am
+_sensitive_, or _perceive corporeal_ things as by my _senses_, yet that
+I now _see_ light, _hear_ a noise, _feel_ heat, these things are false,
+for I suppose my self _asleep_, but I _know_ that I _see_, _hear_, and am
+_heated_, that cannot be _false_; and this it is that in me is _properly_
+called _Sense_, and this strictly taken is the same with _thought_.
+
+By these Considerations I begin a little better to _understand My self_
+what I am; But yet it _seems_, and I cannot but _think_ that _Corporeal
+Things_ (whose _Images_ are formed in my _thought_, and which by my
+_senses_, I perceive) are much more _distinctly known_, then that
+_confused Notion_ of _My Self_ which _imagination_ cannot afford me. And
+yet 'tis strange that things _doubtful_, _unknown_, _distinct from Me_,
+should be _apprehended_ more _clearly_ by _Me_, then a Thing that is
+_True_, then a thing that is _known_, or then _I my self_; But the Reason
+is, that my Mind loves to wander, and suffers not it self to be bounded
+within the strict limits of _Truth_.
+
+Let it therefore Wander, and once more let me give it the Free Reins,
+that hereafter being conveniently curbed, it may suffer it self to be
+more easily Govern'd.
+
+Let me consider those things which of all Things I formerly conceived
+most _evident_, that is to say, _Bodies_ which we touch, which we see,
+not bodies in General (for those _General_ Conceptions are usually
+_Confused_) but some one _Body_ in particular.
+
+Let us chuse for example this piece of _Bees-wax_, it was lately taken
+from the _Comb_, it has not yet lost all the _tast_ of the _Honey_,
+it retains something of the _smell_ of the _Flowers_ from whence 'twas
+gather'd, its _colour_, _shape_, and _bigness_ are manifest, 'tis _hard_,
+'tis _cold_, 'tis _easily felt_, and if you will knock it with your
+finger, 'twill _make a noise_: In fine, it hath all things requisite to
+the most perfect notion of a _Body_.
+
+But behold whilst I am speaking, 'tis put to the Fire, its _tast_ is
+purged away, the _smell_ is vanish'd, the _colour_ is changed, the
+_shape_ is alter'd, its _bulk_ is increased, its become _soft_, 'tis
+_hot_, it can scarce be _felt_, and now (though you strike it) it makes
+no _noise_. Does it yet continue the same Wax? surely it does, this
+all confess, no one denies it, no one doubts it. What therefore was
+there in it that was so evidently known? surely none of those things
+which I _perceived_ by my _senses_; for what I _smelt_, _tasted_,
+have _seen_, _felt_, or _heard_, are all _vanish'd_, and yet the _Wax
+remains_. Perhaps 'twas this only that I now think on, _viz._ that the
+_Wax_ it self was not that _tast of Honey_, that _smell of Flowers_,
+that _whiteness_, that _shape_, or that _sound_, but it was a _Body_
+which awhile before appear'd to me _so_ and _so modified_, but now
+_otherwise_. But what is it strictly that I thus imagine? let me
+consider: And having rejected whatever belongs not to the Wax, let me
+see what will remain, _viz._ this only, a _thing extended_, _flexible_,
+and _mutable_. But what is this _flexible_, and _mutable_? is it that
+I _imagine_ that this Wax from being _round_ may be made _square_, or
+from being _square_ can be made _triangular_? No, this is not it; for I
+conceive it capable of _innumerable_ such _changes_, and yet I cannot by
+my _imagination_ run over these _Innumerables_; Wherefore this notion
+of its _mutability_ proceeds not from my _imagination_. What then is
+_extended_? is not its _Extension_ also _unknown_? For when it _melts_
+'tis _greater_, when it _boils_ 'tis _greater_, and yet _greater_ when
+the heat is increas'd; and I should not rightly judge of the Wax, did I
+not think it capable of more various _Extensions_ than I can _imagine_.
+It remains therefore for me only to confess, that I cannot _imagine_ what
+this Wax is, but that I _perceive_ with my _Mind_ what it is. I speak
+of this _particular_ Wax, for of Wax in _general_ the _notion_ is more
+_clear_.
+
+But what Wax is this that I only conceive by my mind? 'Tis the same
+which I see, which I touch, which I imagine, and in fine, the same
+which at first I judged it to be. But this is to be noted, that the
+_perception_ thereof is not _sight_, the _touch_, or the _imagination_
+thereof; neither was it ever so, though at first it seem'd so. But the
+_perception_ thereof is the _inspection_ or _beholding_ of the Mind only,
+which may be either _imperfect_ and _confused_, as formerly it was; or
+_clear_ and _distinct_, as now it is; the _more_ or the _less_ I consider
+the Composition of the Wax.
+
+In the interim, I cannot but admire how prone my mind is to erre; for
+though I revolve these things with my self _silently_, and _without
+speaking_, yet am I intangled in _meer words_, and am almost deceived
+by the usual way of _expression_; for we commonly say, _that we see the
+Wax it self if it be present_, and not, _that we judge it present by
+its colour or shape_; from whence I should immediately thus conclude,
+therefore the Wax is known by the _sight_ of the _eye_, and not by the
+_inspection_ of the _mind_ only. Thus I should have concluded, had not
+I by chance look'd out of my window, and seen men passing by in the
+Street; which men I as usually say that I _see_, as I do now, that I
+_see_ this Wax; and yet I see nothing but their Hair and Garments, which
+perhaps may cover only _artificial Machines_ and _movements_, but I judge
+them to be men; so that what I thought I only _saw_ with my eyes, I
+comprehend by my _Judicative Faculty_, which is _my Soul_. But it becomes
+not one, who desires to be wiser than the Vulgar, to draw matter of
+_doubt_ from those ways of _expression_, which the Vulgar have invented.
+
+Wherefore let us proceed and consider, whether I perceived more
+_perfectly_ and _evidently_ what the Wax was, when I first look'd on't,
+and believed that I knew it by my outward _senses_, or at least by my
+_common sense_ (as they call it) that is to say, _by my imagination_; or
+whether at present I _better understand_ it, after I have more diligently
+enquired both _what it is_, and how it may be _known_. Surely it would be
+a foolish thing to make it matter of doubt to know which of these parts
+are true; What was there in my first _perception_ that was _distinct?_
+What was there that seem'd not incident to every other Animal? But now
+when I distinguish the Wax from its outward adherents, and consider it
+as if it were naked, with it's coverings pull'd off, then I cannot but
+really perceive it with my mind, though yet perhaps my judgment may erre.
+
+But what shall I now say as to my _mind_, or my _self_? (for as yet
+I admit nothing as belonging to me but a _mind_.) Why (shall I say?)
+should not I, who seem to perceive this Wax so _distinctly_, know my
+_self_ not only more _truly_ and more _certainly_, but more _distinctly_
+and _evidently_? For if I judge that _this Wax exists_, because I _see_
+this Wax; surely it will be much more _evident_, that I _my self exist_,
+because _I see this Wax_; for it may be that this that I see is not
+really Wax, also it may be that I have no eyes wherewith to see any
+thing; but it cannot be, when I _see_, or (which is the same thing) when
+_I think that I see_, that I who _think_ should not _exist_. The same
+thing will follow if I _judge that this Wax exists_, because I _touch_,
+or _imagine_ it, &c. And what has been said of Wax, may be apply'd to all
+other outward things.
+
+Moreover, if the _notion_ of Wax seems more _distinct_ after it is made
+known to me, not only by my _sight_ or _touch_, but by more and other
+causes; How much the more _distinctly_ must I confess my _self known_
+unto my _self_, seeing that all sort of reasoning which furthers me in
+the _perception_ of _Wax_, or any other _Body_, does also encrease the
+proofs of the _nature_ of my _Mind_. But there are so many more things
+in the very _Mind_ it self, by which the _notion_ of it may be made more
+_distinct_, that those things which drawn from _Body_ conduce to its
+knowledge are scarce to be _mention'd_.
+
+And now behold of my own accord am I come to the place I would be in;
+for seeing I have now discover'd that _Bodies themselves_ are not
+_properly perceived_ by our _senses_ or _imagination_, but only by our
+_understanding_, and are not therefore _perceived_, because they are
+_felt_ or _seen_, but because they are _understood_; it plainly appears
+to me, that nothing can possibly be _perceived_ by _me easier_, or more
+_evidently_, than my _Mind_.
+
+But because I cannot so soon shake off the Acquaintance of my former
+Opinion, I am willing to stop here, that this my new knowledge may be
+better fixt in my memory the longer I meditate thereon.
+
+MEDITAT. III.
+
+_Of GOD, and that there is a God._
+
+Now will I shut my eyes, I will stop my ears, and withdraw all my senses,
+I will blot out the Images of _corporeal_ things clearly from my mind,
+or (because that can scarce be accomplish'd) I will give no heed to
+them, as being _vain_ and _false_, and by discoursing with my self, and
+prying more rightly into my own Nature, will endeavour to make my self by
+degrees more known and familiar to my self.
+
+I am a _Thinking Thing_, that is to say, _doubting_, _affirming_,
+_denying_, _understanding_ few things, _ignorant_ of many things,
+_willing_, _nilling_, _imagining_ also, and _sensitive_. For (as before
+I have noted) though perhaps whatever I _imagine_, or am sensible of,
+as without me, _Is not_; yet that _manner_ of _thinking_ which I
+call _sense_ and _imagination_ (as they are only certain _Modes_ of
+_Thinking_) I am certain are in Me. So that in these few Words I have
+mention'd whatever I _know_, or at least Whatever as yet I _perceive_ my
+self to _know_.
+
+Now will I look about me more carefully to see Whether there Be not some
+other Thing in Me, of Which I have not yet taken Notice. I am sure That
+I am a _Thinking Thing_, and therefore Do not I know what is Required to
+make _certain_ of any Thing? I Answer, that in this My _first knowledge_
+'tis Nothing but a _clear_, and _distinct perception_ of What I affirm,
+Which would not be sufficient to make me _certain_ of the _Truth_ of
+a Thing, if it were _Possible_ that any thing that I so _clearly_ and
+_distinctly_ Perceive should be _false_. Wherefore I may lay this Down as
+a _Principle_. _Whatever I Clearly and Distinctly perceive is certainly
+True._
+
+But I have formerly Admitted of many Things as very _Certain_ and
+_manifest_, Which I afterwards found to be _doubtful_. Therefore What
+sort of Things were they? _Viz._ Heaven, Earth, Stars, and all other
+things which I perceived by my _Senses_. But What did I Perceive of
+These _Clearly? Viz._ That I had the _Ideas_ or _Thoughts_ of these
+things in my mind, and at Present I cannot deny that I have these _Ideas_
+in Me. But there was some other thing Which I affirm'd, and Which (by
+Reason of the common Way of Belief) I thought that I _Clearly_ Perceived;
+Which nevertheless, I did not really Perceive; And that was, that there
+were Certain Things _Without Me_ from whence these _Ideas Proceeded_, and
+to which they were exactly like. And this it was, Wherein I was either
+_Deceived_, or if by Chance I Judged _truly_, yet it Proceeded not from
+the strength of my _Perception_.
+
+But When I was exercised about any single and easie Proposition in
+Arithmetick or Geometry, as that two and three added make five, Did not
+I Perceive them _Clearly_ enough to make me affirm them True? Truly
+concerning these I had no other Reason afterwards to _Doubt_, but That I
+thought Perhaps there may be a _God_ who might have so created me, that
+I should be _Deceived_ even in those things which seem'd most _Clear_ to
+me. And as often as this Pre-conceived opinion of _Gods great Power_
+comes into my Mind, I cannot but Confess that he may easily cause me to
+Err even in those things which I Think I perceive most _Evidently_ with
+my Mind; yet as often as I Consider the Things themselves, which I Judge
+my self to perceive so _Clearly_, I am so fully Perswaded by them, that I
+easily Break out into these Expressions, Let Who can Deceive Me, yet he
+shall never Cause me _Not to Be_ whilst _I think that I Am_, or that it
+shall ever be True, _that I never was_, Whilst at Present 'tis True _that
+I am_, or Perhaps, that Two and Three added make More or Less then Five;
+for in These things I Percieve a Manifest Repugnancy; And truely seeing
+I have no reason to Think any _God_ a _Deceiver_, Nor as yet fully know
+Whether there Be _any God_, or _Not_, 'Tis but a slight and (as I may
+say) Metaphysical Reason of Doubt, which depends only on that opinion of
+which I am not yet Perswaded.
+
+Wherefore That this Hindrance may be taken away, When I have time I ought
+to Enquire, Whether there _Be a God_, And if there be One, Whether he can
+be a _Deceiver_, For whilst I am _Ignorant_ of this, I cannot possibly
+be fully _Certain_ of any Other thing.
+
+But now Method seems to Require Me to Rank all My Thoughts under certain
+Heads, and to search in Which of them _Truth_ or _Falshood_ properly
+Consists. Some of them are (as it were) the _Images_ of Things, and to
+these alone the Name of an _Idea_ properly belongs, as When I think upon
+a Man, A Chimera or Monster, Heaven, an Angel, or _God_. But there are
+others of them, that have _superadded Forms_ to them, as when I Will,
+when I Fear, when I Affirm, when I Deny. I know I have alwayes (when ever
+I think) some certain Thing as the _subject_ or _object_ of my Thought,
+but in this last sort of thoughts there is something _more_ which I Think
+upon then Barely the likeness of the Thing. And of these Thoughts some
+are called _Wills_ and _Affections_, and Others of them _Judgments_.
+
+Now as touching _Ideas_, if they be Consider'd alone as they are in
+themselves, without _Respect_ to any other Things, they cannot Properly
+be _false_; for Whether I _Imagine_ a Goat or a Chimera, 'tis as
+_Certain_ that I _Imagine_ one as t'other. Also in the _Will_ and
+_Affections_ I need not Fear any _Falshood_, For tho I should _Wish_ for
+_evil Things_, or Things that are Not, it is not therefore _Not true_
+that I Wish for them.
+
+Wherefore there onely Remains my _Judgments_ of Things, in which I
+must take Care that I be not _deceived_. Now the Chief and most usual
+_Error_ that I discover in them is, That I _Judge_ Those _Ideas_ that
+are _within_ me to be _Conformable_ and like to certain things that are
+_without_ Me; for truely if I Consider those Ideas as certain _Modes_ of
+my _Thought_, without Respect to any other Thing, they will scarce afford
+me an Occasion of _Erring_.
+
+Of these _Ideas_ some are _Innate_, some _Adventitious_, and some Others
+seem to Me as Created by my self; For that I understand what _A Thing_
+Is, What is _Truth_, What a _Thought_, seems to Proceed meerly from my
+own _Nature_. But that I now _hear_ a Noise, _see_ the Sun, or _feel_
+heat, _I_ have alwayes _Judged_ to Proceed from Things _External_. But
+Lastly, Mermaids, Griffins, and such like Monsters, are _made meerly_ by
+_My self_. And yet _I_ may well think all of them either _Adventitious_,
+or all of them _Innate_, or all of them _made by my self_, for I have not
+as yet discover'd their true _Original_.
+
+But _I_ ought cheifly to search after those of them which _I_ count
+_Adventitious_, and which I consider as coming from _outward objects_,
+that I may know what reason I have to think them _like_ the things
+themselves, which they _represent_. Viz. _Nature so teaches Me_; and also
+I know that they _depend_ not on my _Will_, and therefore _not on me_;
+for they are often present with me against my inclinations, or (as they
+say) in spite of my teeth, as now whether _I will_ or _no_ I feel heat,
+and therefore I think that the _sense_ or _Idea_ of heat is propagated
+to me by a _thing_ really _distinct_ from _my self_, and that is by the
+_heat_ of the _Fire_ at which I sit; And nothing is more obvious then for
+me to judge that That thing should transmit its own _Likeness_ into me,
+rather then that any other thing should be transmitted by it. Which sort
+of arguments whether firme enough or not I shall now Trie.
+
+When I here say, that _nature so teaches me_, I understand only, that
+I am as it were _willingly forced_ to beleive it, and not that 'tis
+_discover'd_ to me to be _true_ by any _natural light_; for these two
+differ very much. For whatever is discover'd to me by the _Light_
+of _nature_ (as that it necessarily Follows _that I am_, because _I
+think_) cannot possibly be _doubted_; Because I am endowed with no other
+_Faculty_, in which I may put so great confidence, as I can in the
+_Light_ of _nature_; or _which_ can possibly tell me, that those things
+are _false_, which _natural light_ teaches me to be _true_; and as to
+my _natural Inclinations_, I have heretofore often judged my self led
+by them to the election of the _worst part_, when I was in the choosing
+_one_ of two Goods; and therefore I see no reason why I should ever
+_trust_ them in any other thing.
+
+And then, tho these _Ideas depend not_ on my _will_, it does not
+therefore follow that they _necessarily proceed_ from _things external_.
+For as, Altho those _Inclinations_ (which I but now mention'd) are in me,
+yet they seem _distinct_ and _different_ from my _will_; so perhaps there
+may be in me some other _faculty_ (to me _unknown_) which may prove the
+_Efficient cause_ of these _Ideas_, as hitherto I have observed them
+to be formed in me whilst I _dream_, without the help of any _External
+Object_.
+
+And last of all, tho they should _proceed_ from things which are
+_different_ from me, it does not therefore follow that they must be
+_like_ those things. For often times I have found the _thing_ and the
+_Idea differing_ much. As for example, I find in my self two divers
+_Ideas_ of the Sun, _one_ as _received_ by my _senses_ (and which cheifly
+I reckon among those I call adventitious) by which it appears to me very
+_smal_, * _another_ as taken from the arguments of Astronomers (that is
+to say, _consequentially collected_, or some other ways made by me from
+certain _natural notions_) by which 'tis rendred something bigger then
+the Globe of the Earth. Certainly both of these cannot be _like_ that sun
+which is _without me_, and my reason perswades me, that that _Idea_ is
+most _unlike_ the Sun, which seems to _proceed Immediately_ from it self.
+
+All which things sufficiently prove, that I have hitherto (not from a
+_true judgement_, but from a _blind impulse_) beleived that there are
+certain things _different_ from my self, and which have sent their
+_Ideas_ or _Images_ into me by the Organs of my _senses_, or some other
+way.
+
+But I have yet an other Way of inquiring, whether any of those Things
+(whose _Ideas_ I have _within_ Me) are Really Existent _without_ Me;
+And that is Thus: As those _Ideas_ are only _Modes_ of _Thinking_, I
+acknowledge no _Inequality_ between them, and they all proceed from me
+in the _same Manner_. But as _one_ Represents _one thing_, an _other_,
+an _other Thing_, 'tis Evident there is a _Great difference_ between
+them. * For without doubt, Those of them which Represent _Substances_
+are something _More_, or (as I may say) have _More_ of _Objective
+Reallity_ in them, then those that Represent only _Modes_ or _Accidents_;
+and again, _That_ by Which I understand a _Mighty God_, _Eternal_,
+_Infinite_, _Omniscient_, _Omnipotent Creatour_ of all things besides
+himself, has certainly in it _more Objective Reallity_, then Those
+_Ideas_ by which _Finite Substances_ are Exhibited.
+
+But Now, it is evident by the _Light_ of _Nature_ that there must be
+_as much_ at least in the _Total efficient Cause_, as there is in the
+_Effect_ of _that Cause_; For from Whence can the _effect_ have its
+_Reallity_, but from the _Cause_? and how can the _Cause_ give it that
+_Reallity_, unless _it self have_ it?
+
+And from hence it follows, that neither a _Thing_ can be made out of
+_Nothing_, Neither a Thing which is _more Perfect_ (that is, Which has in
+it self _more Reallity_) _proceed_ from That Which is _Less Perfect_.
+
+And this is _Clearly_ True, not only in those _Effects_ whose _Actual_
+or _Formal Reallity_ is Consider'd, But in Those _Ideas_ also, Whose
+_Objective Reallity_ is only Respected; That is to say, for Example of
+Illustration, it is not only impossible that a stone, Which _was not_,
+should now begin _to Be_, unless it were produced by _something_, in
+Which, Whatever goes to the Making a Stone, is either _Formally_ or
+_Virtually_; neither can _heat_ be Produced in any Thing, which before
+was _not hot_, but by a Thing which is at least of as equal a _degree_ of
+_Perfection_ as _heat_ is; But also 'tis Impossible that I should have
+an _Idea_ of Heat, or of a _Stone_, unless it were put into me by some
+_Cause_, in which there is at Least as much _Reallity_, as I Conceive
+there is in heat or a Stone. For tho that _Cause_ transfers none of its
+own _Actual_ or _Formal Reality_ into my _Idea_, I must not from thence
+conclude that 'tis _less real_; but I may think that the _nature_ of the
+_Idea_ it self is such, that of it self it requires no other _formal
+reality_, but what it has from my _thought_, of which 'tis a _mode_. But
+that this Idea has _this_ or _that objective reallity_, rather then any
+_other_, proceeds clearly from some _cause_, in which there ought to be
+at least as much _formal reallity_, as there is of _objective reallity_
+in the _Idea_ it self. For if we suppose any thing in the _Idea_, which
+was not in its _cause_, it must of necessity have this from _nothing_;
+but (tho it be a most _Imperfect manner_ of _existing_, by which the
+thing is _objectively_ in the _Intellect_ by an _Idea_, yet) it is not
+_altogether nothing_, and therefore cannot proceed from _nothing_.
+
+Neither ought I to doubt, seeing the _reallity_ which I perceive in
+my _Ideas_ is only an _objective reallity_, that therefore it must of
+necessity follow, that the same _reallity_ should be in the _causes_
+of these _Ideas formally_. But I may conclude, that 'tis sufficient
+that this _reallity_ be in the very _causes_ only _objectively_. For as
+that _objective manner_ of _being_ appertains to the very _nature_ of
+an _Idea_, so that _formal manner_ of _being_ appertains to the very
+_nature_ of a _cause_ of _Ideas_, at least to the _first_ and _chiefest
+causes_ of them; For tho perhaps one _Idea_ may receive its birth from
+an other, yet we cannot proceed in _Infinitum_, but at last we must
+arrive at some _first Idea_, whose _cause_ is (as it were) an _Original
+copy_, in which all the _objective reallity_ of the _Idea_ is _formally
+contain'd_. So that I plainly discover by the _light_ of _nature_, that
+the _Ideas_, which are in me, are (as it were) _Pictures_, which may
+easily _come short_ of the _perfection_ of those things from whence they
+are taken, but cannot _contain_ any thing _greater_ or _more perfect_
+then them: And the _longer_ and _more diligently_ I pry into these
+things, so much the more _clearly_ and _distinctly_ do I discover them to
+be _true_.
+
+But what shall I conclude from hence? Thus, that if the _objective
+reallity_ of any of my _Ideas_ be _such_, that it cannot be in me either
+_formally_ or _eminently_, and that therefore I cannot be the _cause_
+of _that Idea_, from hence it necessarily Follows, that _I alone_ do
+not only _exist_, but that some other thing, which is _cause_ of that
+_Idea_, does _exist also_.
+
+But if I can find no _such Idea_ in me, I have no argument to perswade
+me of the _existence_ of any thing besides my self for I have diligently
+enquired, and hitherto I could discover no other _perswasive_.
+
+Some of these _Ideas_ there are (besides that which represents _my self_
+to _my self_, of which in this place I cannot doubt) which represent
+to me, one of them a _God_, others of them _Corporeal_ and _Inanimate_
+things, some of them _Angels_, others _Animals_, and lastly some of them
+which exhibite to me _men like my self_.
+
+As touching those that represent _Men_ or _Angels_ or _Animals_, I easily
+understand that they may be _made up_ of those _Ideas_ which I have of
+_my self_, of _Corporeal_ things, and of _God_, tho there were neither
+_man_ (but my self) nor _Angel_, nor _Animal_ in being.
+
+And as to the _Ideas_ of _Corporeal_ things, I find nothing in them of
+that _perfection_, but it may proceed from my self; for if I look into
+them more narrowly, and examine them more particularly, as yesterday
+(_in the second Medit._) I did the _Idea_ of Wax, I find there are but
+few things which I perceive _clearly_ and _distinctly_ in them, viz.
+_Magnitude_ or _extension_ in _Longitude_, _Latitude_, and _Profundity_,
+the _Figure_ or _shape_ which arises from the _termination_ of that
+_Extension_, the _Position_ or _place_ which divers _Figured Bodies_
+have in _respect_ of each other, their _motion_ or _change of place_; to
+which may be added, their _substance_, _continuance_, and _number_; as to
+the other, such as are, _Light_, _Colours_, _Sounds_, _Smels_, _Tasts_,
+_Heat_, and _Cold_, with the other _tactile qualities_, I have but very
+_obscure_ and _confused thoughts_ of them, so that I know not, whether
+they are _true_ or _false_, that is to say, whether the _Ideas_ I have of
+them are the _Ideas_ of _things_ which _really are_, or _are not_. For
+altho _falshood formally_ and _properly_ so called, consists only in the
+_judgement_ (as before I have observed) yet there is an other sort of
+_material falshood_ in _Ideas_, when they represent a _thing_ as _really
+existent_, tho it does _not exist_; so, for example, the _Ideas_ I have
+of _heat_ and _cold_ are so _obscure_ and _confused_, that I cannot
+collect from them, whether _cold_ be a _privation_ of _heat_, or _heat_ a
+_privation_ of _cold_, or whether either of them be a _real quality_, or
+whether neither of them be _real_. And since every _Idea_ must be _like_
+the thing it represents, if it be _true_ that _cold_ is nothing but the
+_privation_ of _heat_, that _Idea_ which represents it to me as a thing
+_real_ and _positive_ may deservedly be called _false_. The same may be
+apply'd to other Ideas.
+
+And now I see no necessity why I should assigne any other _Author_ of
+these _Ideas_ but _my self_; for if they are _false_, that is, represent
+things that _are not_, I know by the _light_ of _nature_ that they
+proceed from _nothing_; that is to say, I harbour them upon no other
+account, but because my _nature_ is _deficient_ in something, and
+_imperfect_. But if they are _true_, yet seeing I discover so little
+_reality_ in them, that that very _reality_ scarce _seems_ to _be realy_,
+I see no reason why I my self should not be the _Author_ of them.
+
+But also some of those very _Ideas_ of _Corporeal_ things which are
+_clear_ and _distinct_, I may seem to have borrow'd from the _Idea_ I
+have of _my self_, viz. _Substance_, _duration_, _number_, and the like;
+For when I conceive a _stone_ to be a _substance_ (that is, _a thing
+apt of it self to exist_) and also that I _my self_ am a _substance_,
+tho I conceive _my self_ a _thinking substance_ and _not extended_, and
+the _stone_ an _extended substance_ and _not thinking_, by which there
+is a great _diversity_ between both the _conceptions_, yet they _agree_
+in this, that they are _both substances_. So when I conceive my self as
+_now_ in being, and also remember, that _heretofore_ I _have been_; and
+since I have _divers_ thoughts, which I can _number_ or _count_; from
+hence it is that I come by the notions of _duration_ and _number_; which
+afterwards I apply to other things.
+
+As to those other things, of which the _Idea_ of a _body_ is made up, as
+_extension_, _figure_, _place_ and _motion_, they are not _formally_ in
+me, seeing I am only a _thinking thing_; yet seeing they are only certain
+_modes_ of _substance_, and I my self also am a _substance_, they may
+seem to be in me _eminently_.
+
+* Wherefore there only Remains the _Idea_ of a _God_, wherein I must
+consider whether there be not something included, which cannot possibly
+have its _original_ from me. By the word _God_, I mean a certain
+_Infinite Substance_, _Independent_, _Omniscient_, _Almighty_, by whom
+both _I my self_, and every thing else that _is_ (if any thing do
+_Actualy exist_) was created. All which _Attributes_ are of such an _high
+nature_, that the more attentively I consider them, the less I conceive
+my self possible to be the _Author_ of these notions.
+
+From what therefore has been said I must conclude that there is a _God_;
+for tho the _Idea_ of _substance_ may arise in me, because that I my
+self am a _substance_, yet I could not have the _Idea_ of an _Infinite
+substance_ (seeing I my self am _finite_) unless it proceeded from a
+_substance_ which is _really Infinite_. Neither ought I to think that
+I have no _true Idea_ of _Infinity_, or that I perceive it only by the
+_negation_ of what is _finite_, as I conceive _rest_ and _darkness_ by
+the _negation_ or _absence_ of _motion_ or _light_. But on the contrary
+I plainly understand, that there is _more reality_ in an _Infinite
+substance_, then in a _Finite_; and that therefore the _perception_
+of an _Infinite_ (as _God_) is _antecedent_ to the _notion_ I have of
+a _finite_ (as _my self_). For how should I know that I _doubt_ or
+_desire_, that is to say, that I _want_ something, and that I am _not
+altogether perfect_, unless I had the _Idea_ of a _being more perfect_
+then _my self_, by _comparing_ my self to which I may discover my own
+_Imperfections_.
+
+Neither can it be said that this _Idea_ of _God_ is _false Materialiter_,
+and that therefore it _proceeds_ from _nothing_, as before I observed of
+the _Ideas_ of _heat_ and _cold_, _&c._ For on the contrary, seeing this
+_notion_ is most _clear_ and _distinct_, and contains in it self more
+_objective reality_ then any other _Idea_, none can be more _true_ in
+it self, nor in which less _suspition_ of _falshood_ can be found. This
+_Idea_ (I say) of a _being infinitely perfect_ is most _true_, for tho
+it may be supposed that such a _being_ does _not exist_, yet it cannot
+be supposed that the _Idea_ of such a _being_ exhibites to me nothing
+_real_, as before I have said of the _Idea_ of _cold_. This _Idea_
+also is most _clear_ and _distinct_, for whatever I perceive _clearly_
+and _distinctly_ to be _real_, and _true_, and _perfect_, is wholy
+_contain'd_ in this _Idea_ of _God_.
+
+Neither can it be objected, that I cannot _comprehend_ an _Infinite_, or
+that there are innumerable other things in _God_, which I can neither
+_conceive_, nor in the least _think upon_; for it is of the _very
+nature_ of an _Infinite_ not to be _apprehendable_ by _me_ who am
+_finite_. And 'tis sufficient to me to prove this my _Idea_ of _God_ to
+be the most _true_, the most _clear_, and the most _distinct Idea_ of all
+those _Ideas_ I have, upon this _account_, that I understand that _God_
+is _not to be understood_, and that I judge that whatever I _clearly_
+perceive and know _Implys_ any _perfection_, as also perhaps other
+innumerable _perfections_, which I am ignorant of, are in _God_ either
+_formally_ or _eminently_.
+
+_Doubt._ But perhaps _I am_ something _more_ then I take my self to
+_be_, and perhaps all these _perfections_ which I attribute to _God_,
+are _potentially_ in me, tho at present they do not shew themselves, and
+break into action. For I am now fully experienced that my _Knowledge_ may
+be _encreased_, and I see nothing that hinders why it may not _encrease_
+by degrees in _Infinitum_, nor why by my _knowledge_ so _encreased_ I
+may not attain to the other _perfections_ of _God_; nor lastly, why the
+_power_ or _aptitude_ of _having_ these perfections may not be sufficient
+to produce the _Idea_ of them in _me_.
+
+_Solution._ But none of these will do; for first, tho it be true that
+my _Knowledge_ is capable of being _increased_, and that many things are
+in me _potentially_, which _actually_ are not, yet none of these go to
+the making an _Idea_ of _God_, in which I conceive nothing _potentially_,
+for tis a certain argument of _imperfection_ that a thing _may be
+encreased Gradually_. Moreover, tho my knowledge may be _more_ and _more
+encreased_, yet I know that it can never be _actually Infinite_, for it
+can never arrive to that _height_ of _perfection_, which admits not of
+an _higher degree_. But I conceive God to be _actually_ so _Infinite_,
+that nothing can be _added_ to his _perfections_. And lastly, I perceive
+that the _objective being_ of an _Idea_ cannot be _produced_ only by the
+_potential being_ of a _thing_ (which in proper speech is _nothing_) but
+requires an _actual_ or _formal being_ to its _production_.
+
+Of all which forementioned things there is nothing that is not _evident_
+by the _light_ of _reason_ to any one that will diligently consider them.
+Yet because that (when I am careless, and the _Images_ of _sensible_
+things _blind_ my _understanding_) I do not so easily call to mind the
+reasons, why the _Idea_ of a _being more perfect_ then _my self_ should
+of necessity proceed from a _being_ which is _really more perfect_; It
+will be requisite to enquire further, whether _I_, who have this _Idea_,
+can possibly _be_, unless _such_ a _being_ did _exist_. To which end
+let me aske, _from whence_ should I _be_? From _my self_? or from my
+_Parents_? or from any other thing _less perfect_ then _God_? for nothing
+can be thought or supposed _more perfect_, or _equally perfect_ with
+_God_.
+
+But first, If _I_ were from my self, I should neither _doubt_, nor
+_desire_, nor _want_ any thing, for I should have given my self all those
+_perfections_, of which I have any _Idea_, and consequently I my self
+should be _God_; and I cannot think that those things I _want_, are to
+be acquired with _greater difficulty_ then those things I _have_; but on
+the contrary, 'tis manifest, that it were much more _difficult_ that _I_
+(that is, _a substance_ that _thinks_) should _arise_ out of _nothing_,
+then that I should _acquire_ the _knowledge_ of many things whereof I
+am _Ignorant_, which is only the _accident_ of that _substance_. And
+certainly if I had that _greater thing_ (viz _being_) from my self, I
+should not have _denyed_ my self (not only, those things which may be
+easier acquired, but also) All those things, which I perceived are
+contain'd in the _Idea_ of a _God_; and the reason is, for that no other
+things _seem_ to me to be _more difficultly_ done, and certainly if they
+were _Really more difficult_, they would _seem_ more _difficult_ to me
+(if whatever _I have_, I _have_ from my self) for in those things I
+should find my _Power_ put to a stop.
+
+Neither can I Evade the force of these Arguments by supposing my self to
+_have alwaies Been, what now I am_, and that therefore I need not seek
+for an _Author_ of my _Being_. For the _Duration_ or _Continuance_ of my
+life may be _divided_ into _Innumerable Parts_, each of which does not
+at all _depend_ on the _Other Parts_; Therefore it will not follow, that
+because _a while ago, I was_, I must of necessity _now Be_. I say, this
+will not follow, Unless, I suppose some _Cause_ to _Create me_ (as it
+were) _anew_ for _this_ Moment (that is, _Conserve me_). For 'tis evident
+to one that Considers the Nature of _Duration_, that the same _Power_
+and _Action_ is requisite to the _Conservation_ of a Thing each _Moment_
+of its _Being_, as there is to the _Creation_ of that Thing _anew_, if
+it did _not exist_. So that 'tis one of those _Principles_ which are
+_Evident_ by the _Light_ of _Nature_: that the _Act_ of _Conservation_
+differs only _Ratione_ (as the Philosophers term it) from the _Act of
+Creation_.
+
+Wherefore I ought to ask my self this Question, whether _I_, who _now_
+Am; have any _Power_ to _Cause_ my self to _Be hereafter_? (for had I any
+such _power_, I should certainly _know_ of it, seeing I am nothing but
+a _Thinking Thing_, or at least at present I onely treat of that part
+of me, which is a _Thing_ that _Thinks_) to which, I answer, that I can
+discover no such _Power_ in Me; And consequently, I evidently know that
+_I depend_ on some _Other being distinct_ from _my self_.
+
+But what if _I_ say that perhaps this _Being_ is not _God_, but that
+_I_ am produced either by my _Parents_, or some other _Causes less
+perfect_ then _God_? In answer to which let me consider (as _I_ have
+said before) that 'tis _manifest_ that whatever is in the _effect, so
+much_ at least ought to be in the _cause_; and therefore seeing _I_
+am a thing that _thinks_, and have in me an _Idea_ of _God_, it will
+confessedly follow, that whatever sort of _cause_ I assign of my _own
+Being_, it also must be a _Thinking Thing_, and must have an _Idea_ of
+all those _Perfections_, which I attribute to _God_; Of which _Cause_
+it may be again Asked, whether it be _from it self_, or from any other
+_Cause_? If _from it self_, 'tis evident (from what has been said) that
+it must be _God_; For seeing it has the _Power_ of _Existing of it self_,
+without doubt it has also the _power_ of _actually Possessing_ all those
+_Perfections_ whereof it has an _Idea_ in it self, that is, all those
+_Perfections_ which I conceive in _God_. But if it Be from an _other
+Cause_, it may again be asked of that _Cause_ whether it be _of it self_,
+or from an _other_; Till at length We arrive at the _Last Cause_ of All,
+Which will Be _God_. For 'tis evident, that this _Enquiry_ will not admit
+of _Progressus in Infinitum_, especially when at Present I treat not
+only of that Cause which at _first made_ Me; But chiefly of that which
+_conserves_ me in this _Instant_ time.
+
+Neither can it be supposed that many _partial Causes_ have _concurred_
+to the making Me, and that I received the _Idea_ of one of _Gods
+perfections_ from _One_ of them, and from an _other_ of them the _Idea_
+of an _other_; and that therefore all these Perfections are to be
+found _scattered_ in the World, but not all of them _Joyn'd_ in any
+one which may Be _God_. For on the contrary, _Unity_, _Simplicity_,
+or the _inseparability_ of All Gods Attributes is one of the _chief
+Perfections_ which I conceive in Him; and certainly the _Idea_ of the
+_Unity_ of the _Divine Perfections_ could not be _created_ in me by any
+other _cause_, then by _That_, from whence I have received the _Ideas_ of
+his other _perfections_; For 'tis Impossible to make me conceive these
+_perfections_, _conjunct_ and _inseparable_, unless he should also make
+me know what _perfections_ these _are_.
+
+Lastly as touching my _having_ my _Being_ from my _Parents_. Tho whatever
+Thoughts I have heretofore harbour'd of Them were _True_, yet certainly
+they _contribute_ nothing to my _conservation_, neither proceed I from
+them as _I am_ a _Thing_ that _Thinks_, for they have onely _predisposed_
+that _material Thing_, wherein _I_, that is, _my mind_ (_which_ only
+at present I take for _my self_) _Inhabits_. Wherefore I cannot _now_
+Question that I am sprung from them. But I must of necessity conclude
+that because _I am_, and because I have an _Idea_ of a _Being most
+perfect_, that is, of _God_, it evidently follows that _there is a God_.
+
+* Now it only remains for me to examine, how I have received this _Idea_
+of _God_. For I have neither received it by _means_ of _my Senses_,
+neither comes it to me _without_ my _Forethought_, as the _Ideas_ of
+_sensible_ things use to do, when such things _Work_ on the Organs of my
+_Sense_, or at least _seem_ so to work; Neither is this _Idea_ framed
+by _my self_, for I can neither _detract from_, nor _add_ any thing
+_thereto_. Wherefore I have only to conclude that it is _Innate_, even as
+the _Idea_ of me _my self_ is _Natural_ to my self.
+
+And truly 'tis not to be Admired that _God_ in Creating me should
+_Imprint_ this _Idea_ in me, that it may there remain as a _stamp
+impressed_ by the _Workman God_ on _me_ his _Work_, neither is it
+requisite that this _stamp_ should be a Thing _different_ from the _Work_
+it self, but 'tis very Credible (from hence only that _God Created_ me)
+that I am made as it were according to his _likeness_ and _Image_, and
+that the same _likeness_, in which the _Idea_ of God is contain'd, is
+_perceived_ by Me with the _same faculty_, with which I _perceive my
+Self_; That is to say, whilst _I reflect_ upon my self, _I_ do not only
+_perceive_ that I am an _Imperfect_ thing, having my _dependance_ upon
+some other thing, and that I am a Thing that Desires _more_ and _better_
+things _Indefinitely_; But also at the same time I understand, that _He_
+on whom I _depend_ contains in him all those _wish'd for things_ (not
+only _Indefinitely_ and _Potentially_, but) _Really_, _Indefinitely_;
+and that therefore he is _God_. The whole stress of which * Argument
+lies thus, because I know it Impossible for Me to Be of the same Nature
+I am, _Viz._ Having the _Idea_ of a _God_ in me, unless really there
+were a _God_, a _God_ (I say) that very _same God_, whose _Idea I_ have
+in my _Mind_ (that is, Having all those _perfections_, which I cannot
+_comprehend_, but can as it were _think upon them_) and who is not
+_subject_ to any _Defects_.
+
+By which 'tis evident that _God_ is no _Deceiver_; for 'tis manifest by
+the _Light_ of _Nature_, that all _fraud_ and _deceit_ depends on some
+_defect_. But before I prosecute this any farther, or pry into other
+_Truthes_ which may be deduced from this, I am willing here to stop, and
+dwell upon the Contemplation of this _God_, to Consider with my self
+His _Divine Attributes_, to behold, admire, and adore the Loveliness of
+this _Immense light_, as much as possibly I am able to accomplish with my
+_dark_ Understanding. For as by _Faith_ we _believe_ that the greatest
+_happiness_ of the _next Life_ consists alone in the _Contemplation_ of
+the _Divine Majesty_, so we _find_ by _Experience_ that now we receive
+from thence the greatest _pleasure_, whereof we are capable in _this
+Life_; Tho it be much more _Imperfect_ then that in the _Next_.
+
+MEDITAT. IV.
+
+_Of Truth and Falshood._
+
+Of late it has been so common with me to withdraw _my Mind_ from my
+_sences_, and I have so throughly consider'd how few things there are
+appertaining to _Bodies_ that are _truly_ perceived, and that there are
+more Things touching _Mans mind_, and yet more concerning _God_, which
+are _well known_; that now without any difficulty _I_ can turn my
+Thoughts from things _sensible_, to those which are only _Intelligible_,
+and _Abstracted_ from _Matter_. And truely _I_ have a much more _distinct
+Idea_ of a _Mans mind_ (as it is a _Thinking Thing_, having no _Corporeal
+Dimensions_ of _Length_, _Breadth_, and _Thickness_, nor having any other
+_Corporeal Quality_) then the _Idea_ of any _Corporeal Thing_ can be. And
+when I reflect upon my self, and consider how that I _doubt_, that is,
+am an _imperfect dependent Being_, I from hence Collect such a _clear_
+and _distinct Idea_ of an _Independent perfect Being_, which is _God_,
+and from hence only that _I have such an Idea_, that is, because _I_ that
+have this _Idea_ do _my self Exist_; I do so _clearly_ conclude that
+_God also Exists_, and that on him my _Being depends_ each Minute; That
+I am Confident nothing can be known more _Evidently_ and _Certainly_ by
+_Humane Understanding_.
+
+And now _I_ seem to perceive a _Method_ by which, (from this
+Contemplation of the _true God_, in whom the Treasures of _Knowledge_ and
+_Wisdome_ are Hidden) _I_ may attain the _Knowledge_ of other Things.
+
+And first, _I_ know 'tis impossible that this _God_ should _deceive_
+me; For in all _cheating_ and _deceipt_ there is something of
+_imperfection_; and tho to be _able_ to _deceive_ may seem to be an
+Argument of _ingenuity_ and _power_, yet without doubt to _have_ the
+_Will_ of _deceiving_ is a sign of _Malice_ and _Weakness_, and therefore
+is not _Incident_ to _God_.
+
+I have also found in my self a _Judicative faculty_, which certainly (as
+all other things I possess) I have received from _God_; and seeing he
+will not _deceive_ me, he has surely given me such a _Judgement_, that
+I can _never Err_, whilst I make a _Right Use_ of it. Of which truth I
+can make no doubt, unless it seems, that From hence it will follow, That
+therefore _I can never Err_; for if whatever I have, I have from _God_,
+and if he gave me no _Faculty_ of _Erring_, I may seem not to be _able to
+Err_. And truly so it is whilst I think upon _God_, and wholly convert
+my self to the _consideration_ of him, I find no occasion of _Error_ or
+_Deceit_; but yet when I return to the _Contemplation_ of _my self_, I
+find my self liable to _Innumerable Errors_. Enquiring into the _cause_
+of which, I find in my self an _Idea_, not only a _real_ and _positive
+one_ of a _God_, that is, of a _Being infinitely perfect_, but also
+(as I may so speak) a _Negative Idea_ of _Nothing_; that is to say, I
+am so constituted between God and Nothing or between a perfect _Being_
+and _No-being_, that as I am _Created_ by the _Highest Being_, I have
+nothing in Me by which I may be _deceived_ or drawn into _Error_; but as
+I pertake in a manner of _Nothing_, or of a _No-Being_, that is, as I my
+self am _not_ the _Highest Being_, and as I _want_ many _perfections_,
+'tis no Wonder that I should be _Deceived_.
+
+By which I understand that _Error_ * (as it is _Error_) is not any _real
+Being_ dependant on _God_, but it is only a _Defect_; And that therefore
+to make me _Err_ there is not requisite a _faculty_ of _Erring_ given
+me by _God_, but only it so happens that I _Err_ meerly because the
+_Judicative faculty_, which he has given me, is not _Infinite_.
+
+But yet this Account is not fully _satisfactory_; for _Error_ is not
+only a meer _Negation_, but 'tis a _Privation_, or a _want_ of a certain
+_Knowledge_, which _ought_ (as it were) to be in me. And when I consider
+the _Nature_ of _God_, it seems impossible that he should give me any
+_faculty_ which is not _perfect_ in its _kind_, or which should _want_
+any of its _due perfections_; for if by how much the more _skilful_ the
+_Workman_ is, by so much the _Perfecter Works_ proceed from him. What can
+be made by the _Great Maker_ of all things which is not _fully perfect_?
+For I cannot Doubt but _God_ may _Create_ me so that I may _never_ be
+_deceived_, neither can I doubt but that he _Wills_ whatever is _Best_;
+Is it therefore _better_ for me to be _deceived_, or not to be _deceived?_
+
+These things when I Consider more heedfully, it comes into my Mind,
+First, that 'tis no cause of Admiration that _God_ should do Things
+whereof I can give no account, nor must I therefore doubt his _Being_,
+because there are many things done by him, and I not comprehend _Why_
+or _How_ they are done; for seeing I now know that my _Nature_ is very
+_Weak_ and _Finite_, and that the _Nature_ of _God_ is _Immense_,
+_Incomprehensible_, _Infinite_; from hence I must fully, understand, that
+he can do numberless things, the _Causes_ whereof lie _hidden_ to Me.
+Upon which account only I esteem all those Causes which are Drawn from
+the End (viz. _Final Causes_) as of no use in _Natural Philosophy_, for I
+cannot without Rashness Think my self _able_ to Discover _Gods_ Designes.
+
+I perceive this also, that whenever we endeavour to know whether the
+_Works_ of _God_ are _perfect_, we must not Respect any _one kind_ of
+Creature _singly_, but the _Whole Universe_ of _Beings_; for perhaps what
+(if considered _alone_) may Deservedly seem _Imperfect_, yet (as it is a
+_part_ of the _World_) is most _perfect_; and tho since I have _doubted_
+of all things, I have discover'd nothing _certainly_ to _Exist_, but _my
+self_, and _God_, yet since I have Consider'd the _Omnipotency_ of _God_,
+I cannot deny, but that many other things _are made_ (or at least, _may
+be made_) by him, so that I my self _may be_ a _part_ of this _Universe_.
+
+Furthermore, coming nigher to my self, and enquiring what these _Errors_
+of mine, are (which are the Only Arguments of my _Imperfection_) * I
+find them to _depend_ on _two concurring Causes_, on my _faculty_ of
+_Knowing_, and on my _faculty_ of _Choosing_ or _Freedome_ of my _Will_,
+that is to say, from my _Understanding_, and my _Will together_. For
+by my _Understanding alone_ I only perceive _Ideas_, whereon I make
+_Judgments_, wherein (_precisely_ so taken) there can be no _Error,
+properly_ so called; for tho perhaps there may be numberless things,
+whose _Ideas_ I have _not_ in Me, yet I am not _properly_ to be said
+_Deprived_ of them, but only _negatively wanting_ them; and I cannot
+prove that _God ought_ to have given me a _greater faculty_ of _Knowing_.
+And tho I understand him to be a _skilful Workman_, yet I cannot Think,
+that he _ought_ to have put all those _perfections_ in _each_ Work of his
+_singly_, with which he might have _endowed some_ of them.
+
+Neither can I complain that _God_ has not given me a _Will_, or _Freedom_
+of _Choise_, _large_ and _perfect_ enough; for I have experienced that
+'tis _Circumscribed_ by _no Bounds_.
+
+And 'tis worth our taking notice, that I have no other thing in me so
+_perfect_ and so _Great_, but I Understand that there may be _Perfecter_
+and _Greater_, for if (for Example) I consider the _Faculty_ of
+_Understanding_, I presently perceive that in me 'tis very _small_ and
+_Finite_, and also at the same time I form to my self an _Idea_ of an
+other _Understanding_ not only _much Greater_, but the _Greatest_ and
+_Infinite_, which I perceive to belong to _God_. In the same manner if I
+enquire into _memory_ or _imagination_ or any other faculties, I find
+them in my self _Weak_ and _Circumscribed_, but in _God_ I Understand
+them to be _Infinite_, there is therefore only my _Will_ or _Freedome_
+of _Choice_, which I find to be _so Great_, that I cannot frame to my
+self an _Idea_ of _One Greater_, so that 'tis by this _chiefly_ by which
+I Understand my self to Bear the _likeness_ and _Image_ of _God_. For
+tho the _Will_ in _God_ be without comparison _Greater_ then Mine, both
+as to the _Knowledge_ and _Power_ which are _Joyn'd_ therewith, which
+make it more _strong_ and _Effective_, and also as to the _Object_
+thereof, for _God_ can apply himself to _more_ things then I can. Yet
+being taken _Formally_ and _Precisely Gods Will_ seems _no greater_ then
+Mine. For the _Freedome_ of _Will_ consists only in this, that we can
+_Do_, or _not Do_ such a Thing (that is, _affirm_ or _deny_, _prosecute_
+or _avoid_) or rather in this Only, that we are _so carried_ to a Thing
+which is _proposed_ by Our _Intellect_ to _Affirm_ or _Deny_, _Prosecute_
+or _Shun_, that we are _sensible_, that we are _not Determin'd_ to the
+_Choice_ or _Aversion_ thereof, by any _outward Force_.
+
+Neither is it Requisite to make one _Free_ that he should have an
+_Inclination_ to _both_ sides. For on the contrary, by how much the more
+_strongly_ I am inclined to _one_ side (whether it be that I _evidently
+perceive_ therein Good or Evil, or Whether it be that _God has so
+disposed_ my _Inward Thoughts_) By so much the _more Free_ am I in my
+_Choice_.
+
+Neither truly do _Gods Grace_ or _Natural Knowledge_ take away from
+my _Liberty_, but rather _encrease_ and _strengthen_ it. For that
+_indifference_ which I find in my self, when no Reason inclines me _more_
+to _one side_, then to _the other_, is the _meanest_ sort of _Liberty_,
+and is so far from being a sign of _perfection_, that it only argues a
+_defect_ or _negation_ of _Knowledge_; for if I should always _Clearly
+see_ what were _True_ and _Good_ I should never _deliberate_ in my
+_Judgement_ or _Choice_, and Consequently, tho I were _perfectly Free_,
+yet I should never be _Indifferent_.
+
+From all which, I perceive that neither the _Power_ of _Willing
+precisely_ so taken, which I have from _God_, is the _Cause_ of my
+_Errors_, it being most _full_ and _perfect_ in its kind; Neither also
+the _Power_ of _Understanding_, for whatever I _Understand_ (since 'tis
+from God that I _Understand_ it) I _understand aright_, nor can I be
+therein _Deceived_.
+
+From _Whence_ therefore proceed all my _Errors_? To which, I answer,
+that they proceed from _hence_ only, that seeing the _Will_ expatiates
+it self _farther_ then the _Understanding_, I keep it not within the
+_same bounds_ with my _Understanding_, but often extend it to those
+things which I _Understand not_, to which things it being _Indifferent_,
+it easily Declines from what is _True_ and _Good_; and consequently
+I am _Deceived_ and _Commit sin_. * Thus, for example, when lately I
+felt my self to enquire, Whether any thing doth _Exist_, and found
+that from my setting _my self_ to Examine such a thing, it evidently
+follows that I _my self Exist_, I could not but _Judge_, what I so
+_clearly Understood_, to be _true_, not that I was _forced_ thereto by
+any _outward impulse_, but because a _strong Propension_ in my _Will_
+did follow this _Great Light_ in my _Understanding_, so that I believed
+it so much the more _freely_ and _willingly_, by how much the less
+_indifferent_ I was thereto. But now I understand, not only, that I
+_Exist_ as I am a _Thing_ that _Thinks_, but I also meet with a certain
+_Idea_ of a _Corporeal Nature_, and it so happens that I _doubt_,
+whether that _Thinking Nature_ that is in me be _Different_ from that
+_Corporeal Nature_, or Whether they are _both the same_: but in this
+_I_ suppose that _I_ have found no Argument to _incline_ me _either
+ways_, and therefore _I_ am _Indifferent_ to _affirm_ or _deny either_,
+or to _Judge nothing_ of _either_; But this _indifferency_ extends it
+self not only to those things of which I am _clearly ignorant_, but
+generally to all those things which are _not_ so very _evidently known_
+to me at the Time when my _Will Deliberates_ of them; for tho never so
+probable _Guesses incline_ me to _one_ side, yet the Knowing that they
+are only _Conjectures_, and not indubitable _reasons_, is enough to Draw
+my _Assent_ to the _Contrary_ Part. Which Lately _I_ have sufficiently
+experienced, when _I_ supposed all those things (which formerly _I_
+assented to as most _True_) as very _False_, for this _Reason_ only that
+_I_ found my self _able_ to doubt of them in some manner.
+
+If I abstain from _passing_ my _Judgment_, when I do _not clearly_ and
+_distinctly_ enough perceive what is _Truth_, 'tis evident that I do
+_well_, and that I am _not deceived_: But if I _affirm_ or _deny_, then
+'tis that I _abuse_ the _freedome_ of my _will_, and if I turn my self
+to that part which is _false_, I am _deceived_; but if I _embrace_ the
+_contrary_ Part, 'tis but _by chance_ that I light on the _Truth_, yet
+I shall not therefore be Blameless, for 'tis Manifest by the _light_
+of _Nature_ that the _Perception_ of the _Understanding ought_ to
+preceed the _Determination_ of the _Will_. And 'tis in this _abuse_ of
+_Free-Will_ that That _Privation_ consists, which Constitutes _Error_;
+I say there is a _Privation_ in the _Action_ as it proceeds from Me,
+but not in the _Faculty_ which I have received from _God_; nor in the
+_Action_ as it _depends_ on _him_.
+
+Neither have I any Reason to Complain that God has not given me a _larger
+Intellective Faculty_, or more _Natural Light_, for 'tis a necessary
+Incident to a _finite Understanding_ that it should not Understand _All_
+things, and 'tis Incident to a _Created Understanding_ to be _Finite_:
+and I have more Reason to thank him for what he has _bestowed_ upon me
+(tho he _owed_ me nothing) then to think my self _Robbed_ by him of those
+things which he _never gave me_.
+
+Nor have I Reason to Complain that he has given me a _Will_ larger then
+my _Understanding_: for seeing the _Will_ Consists in _one_ thing only,
+and as it were in an _Indivisible_ (viz. to _Will_, or _not to Will_) it
+seems contrary to its nature that it should be _less_ then 'tis; and
+certainly by how much the _Greater_ it is, so much the more _Thankful_ I
+ought to be to _him_; that Gave it me.
+
+Neither can I Complain that God _concurrs_ with me in the Production of
+those _Voluntary Actions_ or _Judgements_ in which I am _deceived_: for
+those _Acts_ as they _depend_ on _God_ are altogether _True_ and _Good_;
+and I am in some measure _more perfect_ in that I can _so Act_, then if
+I could _not_: for that _Privation_, in which the _Ratio Formalis_ of
+_Falshood_ and _Sin_ consists, wants not the _Concourse_ of _God_; For
+it is _not A Thing_, and having respect to him as its _Cause_, ought
+not to be called _Privation_, but _Negation_; for certainly 'tis no
+_Imperfection_ in _God_, that he has given me a _freedome_ of _Assenting_
+or _not Assenting_ to some things, the _clear_ and _distinct_ Knowledge
+whereof he has not _Imparted_ to my _Understanding_; but certainly 'tis
+an _Imperfection_ in me, that I _abuse_ this _liberty_, and _pass_ my
+_Judgement_ on those things which I do _not Rightly_ Understand.
+
+Yet I see that 'tis Possible with _God_ to effect that (tho I should
+remain _Free_, and of a _Finite Knowledge_) I should _never Err_, that
+is, if he had endowed my _Understanding_ with a _clear_ and _distinct_
+Knowledge of all things whereof I should ever have an _Occasion_ of
+_deliberating_; or if he had only so firmly fix'd in my Mind, that I
+should never forget, this, _That I must never Judge of a thing which I
+do not clearly and distinctly Understand_; Either of which things had
+_God_ done, I easily perceive that _I_ (as consider'd in my self) should
+be _more perfect_ then now I am, yet nevertheless I cannot deny but that
+there _may be a greater perfection_ in the _whole Universe_ of Things,
+for that some of its parts are Obnoxious to _Errors_, and some not, then
+if they were all _alike_. And I have no Reason to Complain, that it has
+pleased God, that I should _Act_ on the _Stage_ of this _World_ a _Part_
+not the _chief_ and _most perfect_ of all; Or that I should not be able
+to abstain from _Error_ in the _first way_ above specifi'd, which depends
+upon the _Evident Knowledge_ of those things whereof _I deliberate_; Yet
+that I may abstain from _Error_ by the _other means_ abovemention'd,
+which depends only on this, _That I Judge not of any Thing, the truth
+whereof is not Evident._ For tho I have experienced in my self this
+_Infirmity_, that I cannot _always_ be intent upon _one_ and the _same_
+Knowledge, yet _I_ may by a _continued_ and _often repeated_ Meditation
+bring this to pass, that as often as _I_ have use of this Rule _I_ may
+Remember it, by which means I may Get (as it were) an _habit_ of _not
+erring_.
+
+In which thing seeing, the _greatest_ and _chief perfection_ of
+_Man_ consists, _I_ repute my self to have gain'd much by this days
+_Meditation_, for that therein _I_ have discover'd the _Cause_ of
+_Error_, _and Falshood_; which certainly can be no other then what _I_
+have now Declared; for whenever in Passing my Judgement, _I_ bridle
+my _Will_ so that it extend it self _only_ to those things which I
+_clearly_ and _distinctly_ perceive, it is impossible that I can _Err_.
+For doubtless All _clear_ and _distinct_ Perception is _something_, and
+therefore cannot _proceed_ from _Nothing_, but must necessarily have
+_God_ for its _Author_ (_God_, I say, Who is _infinitely Perfect_, and
+who _cannot Deceive_) and therefore it Must be _True_.
+
+Nor have I this Day learnt only what I must _beware off_ that I be not
+_deceived_, but also what I must _Do_ to Discover _Truth_, for _That_ I
+shall certainly find, if I fully Apply my self to those things _only_,
+which I _perfectly_ understand; and if I distinguish between those and
+what I apprehend but _confusedly_ and _obscurely_; Both which hereafter I
+shall endeavour.
+
+MEDITAT. V.
+
+_~Of the Essence~ of Things ~Material~. And herein Again of ~God~. And
+that he does ~Exist~._
+
+There are yet remaining many Things concerning _Gods Attributes_, and
+many things concerning the _nature_ of _my self_ or of my _Mind_, which
+ought to be searched into: but these perhaps I shall set upon at some
+other Opportunity. And at Present nothing seems to me more requisite
+(feeling I have discover'd what I must _avoid_, and what I must _Do_ for
+the _Attaining_ of _Truth_) then that I imploy my Endeavours to free my
+self from those doubts into which I have lately fallen, and that I try
+whether I can have any certainty of Material Things.
+
+But before I enquire whether there be any such things _Really Existent
+without_ Me, I ought to consider the _Ideas_ of those things, as they are
+in my Thoughts and try which of them are _Distinct_, which _confused_.
+
+In which search I find that I _distinctly imagine Quantity_, that which
+Philosophers commonly call _continued_, that is to say, the _Extension_
+of that _Quantity_ or thing _continued_ into _Length_, _Breadth_, and
+_Thickness_, I can _count_ in it divers Parts, to which parts I can
+assign _Bigness_, _Figure_, _Position_, and _Local Motion_, to which
+_Local Motion_ I can assign _Duration_. Neither are only these _Generals_
+plainly discover'd and known by Me, but also by attentive Consideration,
+I perceive Innumerable _particulars_ concerning the _Shapes_, _Number_,
+and _Motion_ of These Bodies; The _Truth_ whereof is so _evident_, and
+_agreeable_ to my _Nature_, that when I first discover'd them, I seemed
+not so much to have _Learnt_ any thing that is _new_, as to have only
+_remembred_ what I have known _before_, or only to have thought on those
+things which were in me _before_, tho this be the first time that I have
+examin'd them so _diligently_.
+
+One thing there is worthy my Consideration, which is, that I find in my
+self innumerable _Ideas_ of certain things, which tho perhaps they _exist
+no where without_ Me, yet they cannot Be said to be _Nothing_; and tho
+they are _Thought_ upon by me at my _will_ and _pleasure_, yet they are
+not _made_ by _Me_, but have their own _True_ and _Immutable Natures_.
+As when, for example, * I _Imagine_ a _Triangle_, tho perhaps such a
+_Figure Exists no where_ out of my _Thoughts_, nor ever _will Exist_,
+yet the _Nature_ thereof is _determinate_, and its _Essence_ or Form is
+_Immutable_ and _Eternal_, which is neither _made_ by me, nor _depends_
+on my mind, as appears for that many _properties_ may be _demonstrated_
+of this Triangle, _viz._ That its three Angles are equal to two right
+ones, that to its Greatest Angle the Greatest side is subtended, and such
+like, which I now _clearly_ know whether _I will or not_, tho before _I_
+never thought on them, when I _imagine_ a Triangle, and consequently they
+could not be invented by Me. And 'tis nothing to the purpose for me to
+say, that perhaps this _Idea_ of a Triangle came to me by the Organs of
+_sense_, because I have sometimes seen bodies of a _Triangular Shape_;
+for I can think of Innumerable other _Figures_, which I cannot suspect
+to have come in through my _senses_, and yet I can _Demonstrate_ various
+_properties_ of them, as well as of a _Triangle_, which certainly are all
+_true_, seeing I know them _clearly_, and therefore they are _something_,
+and not a meer _Nothing_, for 'tis Evident that _what is true is
+something_.
+
+And now I have sufficiently Demonstrated, that _what I clearly perceive,
+is True_; And tho I had _not demonstrated_ it, yet such is the _Nature_
+of my _Mind_, that I could not but give my _Assent_ to what I _so_
+perceive, at least, as long as I _so_ perceive it; and I remember
+(heretofore when I most of all relied on _sensible Objects_) that I held
+those _Truths_ for the most _certain_ which I _evidently_ perceived,
+such as are concerning _Figures_, _Numbers_, with other parts of
+_Arithmetick_, and _Geometry_, as also whatever relates to _pure_ and
+_abstracted Mathematicks_.
+
+Now therefore, if from this alone, _That I can frame the Idea of a Thing
+in my Mind_, it follows, _That whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive
+belonging to a thing_, does _Really belong to it_; Cannot I from hence
+draw an Argument to Prove the _Existence_ of a _God_? Certainly I find
+the _Idea_ of a _God_, or _infinitely perfect Being_, as _naturally_ in
+me, as the _Idea_ of any _Figure_, or _Number_; and I as _clearly_ and
+_distinctly_ understand that it appertains to his _Nature Always to Be_,
+as I know that what I can _demonstrate_ of a _Mathematical Figure_ or
+_Number_ belongs to the _Nature_ of that _Figure_ or _Number_: so that,
+tho all things which I have _Meditated_ upon these three or four days
+were not _true_, yet I may well be as _certain_ of the _Existence_ of a
+_God_, as I have hitherto been of _Mathematical Truths_.
+
+_Doubt._ Yet this Argument at first sight appears not so _evident_, but
+looks rather like a _sophism_; for seeing I am used in all other things
+to _Distinguish Existence_ from _Essence_, I can easily perswade my self
+that the _Existence_ of _God_ may be _distinguish'd_ from his _Essence_,
+so that I may _Imagine God_ not to _Exist_.
+
+_Solution._ But considering it more strictly, 'tis manifest, that the
+_Existence_ of _God_ can no more be _seperated_ from his _Essence_,
+then the _Equality_ of the _Three Angles_ to _two right ones_ can be
+_seperated_ from the _Essence_ of a _Triangle_, or then the _Idea_ of a
+_Mountain_ can be _without_ the _Idea_ of a _valley_; so that 'tis no
+less a _Repugnancy_ to think of a _God_ (that is, _A Being infinitely
+perfect_) who wants _Existence_ (that is, who wants a _Perfection_) then
+to think of a _Mountain_, to which there is _no Valley adjoyning_.
+
+_Doubt._ But what if I cannot imagine _God_ but as _Existing_, or a
+_Mountain without a Vally_? yet supposing me to think of a _Mountain with
+a Vally_, it does not from thence follow, that there _Is a Mountain_
+in the World; so supposing me to think of a _God_ as _Existing_, yet
+does it not follow that _God Really Exists_. For my _Thought imposes_
+no _necessity_ on Things, and as I may imagine a _Winged Horse_, tho no
+_Horse_ has _Wings_, so I may imagine an _existing God_, tho no _God
+exist_.
+
+_Solution._ 'Tis true the _Sophism_ seems to lie in this, yet tho I
+cannot conceive a _Mountain_ but with a _Vally_, it does not from hence
+follow, that a _Mountain_ or _Vally_ do _Exist_, but this will follow,
+that whether a _Mountain_ or a _Vally do_ or _do not Exist_, yet they
+cannot be _seperated_: so from hence that I cannot think of _God_ but
+as _Existing_, it follows that _Existence_ is _Inseperable_ from _God_,
+and therefore that he _Really Exists_; Not because my _Thought_ does
+all this, or _Imposes_ any _necessity_ on any Thing, but contrarily,
+because the _necessity_ of the thing it self (_viz._ of _Gods Existence_)
+_Determines_ me to _think_ thus; for 'tis not in my Power to think a
+_God_ without _Existence_ (that is, _A Being absolutely perfect_ without
+the _Cheif Perfection_) as it is in my Power to imagine a Horse either
+_with_ or _without Wings_.
+
+_Doubt._ And here it cannot be said, that I am forced to suppose _God
+Existing_, after I have supposed him _endowed_ with all _Perfections_,
+seeing _Existence_ is one of them; but that my _First Position_ (_viz._
+His _Absolute Perfection_) is not _necessary_. Thus, for example, 'tis
+not _necessary_ for me to think all _Quadrilateral Figures_ inscribed in
+a _Circle_; But supposing that I think _so_, I am then _necessitated_ to
+Confess a _Rhombe Inscribed_ therein, and yet this is evidently _False_.
+
+_Solution._ For tho I am not forced at any time to think of a _God_; yet
+as often as I cast my Thoughts on a _First_ and _Cheif Being_, and as
+it were bring forth out of the Treasury of my Mind an _Idea_ thereof,
+I must of necessity attribute thereto all Manner of _Perfections_, tho
+I do not at that time _count_ them over, or _Remark_ each single One;
+which _necessity_ is sufficient to make me hereafter (when I come to
+consider _Existence_ to be a _Perfection_) conclude _Rightly, That the
+First and Chief Being does Exist_. Thus, for example, I am not obliged at
+any time to imagine a _Triangle_, yet whenever I please to Consider of a
+_Right-lined Figure_ having only _three Angles_, I am then _necessitated_
+to allow it all those _Requisites_ from which I may argue rightly, _That
+the Three Angles thereof are not Greater then Two Right Ones_, Tho
+upon the first consideration this came not into my Thought. But when I
+enquire what Figures may be _inscribed_ within a _Circle_, I am not at
+all _necessitated_ to think that all _Quadrilateral Figures_ are of that
+sort; neither can I possibly imagine this, whilst I admit of nothing,
+but what I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ Understand: and therefore there
+is a great Difference between these _False suppositions_, and _True
+natural Ideas_, the _first_ and _Chief_; whereof is that of a _God_;
+For by many wayes I understand _That_ not to be a _Fiction depending_
+on my _Thought_, but an _Image_ of a _True_ and _Immutable Nature_;
+As first, because I can think of no other thing but _God_ to Whose
+_Essence Existence_ belongs. Next because I cannot Imagine _Two_ or _More
+Gods_, and supposing that he is _now_ only One, I may plainly perceive
+it _necessary_ for _Him_ to _Have been from Eternity_, and _will Be to
+Eternity_; And Lastly because I perceive many Other Things in _God_,
+Which I cannot _Change_, and from which I cannot _Detract_.
+
+But whatever way of Argumentation I use, it comes All at last to this one
+Thing, That I am fully perswaded of the _Truth_ of those things only,
+which appear to me _clearly_ and _distinctly_. And tho some of those
+things, which I so perceive, are obvious to _every_ Man, and some are
+only discover'd by Those that search more _nighly_, and enquire more
+_carefully_, yet when such _truths_ are discover'd, they are esteem'd
+no less _certain_ than the Others. For Example, Tho it do not so easily
+appear, that in a Rightangled Triangle, the square of the Base is equal
+to the squares of the sides, as it appears, that the Base is suspended
+under its Largest Angle, yet the _first Proposition_ is _no less
+certainly_ believed when once 'tis perceived, then this _Last_.
+
+Thus in Reference to _God_; certainly, unless I am overrun with
+_Prejudice_, or have my thoughts begirt on all sides with _sensible
+Objects_, I should acknowledge nothing _before_ or _easier_ then him;
+For what is more _self-evident_ then that there is a _Chief Being_, or
+then that a _God_ (to whose _essence alone Existence_ appertains) does
+_Exist_? And tho serious Consideration is required to perceive thus
+much, yet _Now_, I am not only equally _certain_ of it, as of what seems
+most _certain_, but I perceive also that the _Truth_ of other Things so
+_depends_ on it, that without it nothing can ever be _perfectly known_.
+
+For tho my _nature_ be _such_, that during the time of my _Clear_ and
+_Distinct_ Perception, I cannot but believe it _true_; yet my _Nature_
+is _such_ also, that I cannot fix the _Intention_ of my _Mind_ upon one
+and the same thing alwayes, so as to perceive it _clearly_, and the
+Remembrance of what _Judgement_ I have formerly made is often stirred
+up, when I cease attending to those reasons for which I passed such a
+Judgment, other Reasons may then be produced, which (if I did not _know
+God_) may easily _move_ me in my _Opinion_; and by this means I shall
+never attain to the _true_ and _certain Knowledge_ of any Thing, but
+_Wandring_ and _Unstable opinions_. So, for example, when I consider the
+Nature of a Triangle, it plainly appears to me (as understanding the
+Principles of Geometry) that its three Angles are equal to two right
+ones; And this I must of necessity think _True_ as long as I attend to
+the _Demonstration_ thereof; but as soon as ever I withdraw my Mind from
+the _Consideration_ of its _Proof_ (altho I remember that I have once
+_Clearly_ perceived it) yet perhaps I may _doubt_ of Its _Truth_, being
+as yet _Ignorant_ of a _God_; For I may perswade my self, that I am so
+framed by _Nature_, as to be _deceived_ in those things which I imagine
+my self to perceive most _evidently_, Especially when I recollect, that
+heretofore I have often accounted many things _True_ and _Certain_, which
+afterward upon other Reasons I have Judged as False. But when I perceive
+that there is a _God_; because at the same time I also Understand
+that all things _Depend_ on Him, and that he is not a _Deceiver_; and
+when from hence I Collect that all those Things which I _clearly_ and
+_distinctly_ perceive are _necessarily True_; tho I have no further
+Respects to those Reasons which induced me to believe it _True_, yet if
+I do but remember, that I have _once clearly_ and _distinctly_ perceived
+it, no Argument can be brought on the contrary, that shall make me
+_doubt_, but that I have _true_ and _certain_ Knowledge thereof; and not
+onely of that, but of all other _Truths_ also which I remember that I
+have _once Demonstrated_, such as are _Geometrical Propositions_ and the
+like.
+
+What now can be _Objected_ against me? shall I say, that I am so made by
+_Nature_, as to be often _deceived_? No; For I now Know that I cannot be
+_deceived_ in those Things, which I _clearly_ Understand. Shall I say,
+that at other times I have esteem'd many Things _True_ and _Certain_,
+which afterwards I found to be _falsities_? No; for I perceived none
+of those things _clearly_ and _distinctly_, but being Ignorant of this
+_Rule_ of _Truth_, I took them up for Reasons, which Reasons I afterward
+found to be _Weak_. What then can be said? Shall, I say, (as lately I
+objected) that Perhaps I am _asleep_, and that what I now think of is
+no more _True_, then the _Dreams_ of People _asleep_? But this it self
+_moves_ not my Opinion; for certainly tho I were _asleep_, if any thing
+appear'd _evident_ to my Understanding, 'twould be _True_.
+
+And Thus I Plainly see, that the _Certainty_ and _Truth_ of all _Science_
+Depends on the _Knowledge_ of the _True God_, so that before I had _Known
+Him_, I did _Know nothing_; But now many things both of _God_ himself,
+and of other _Intellectual Things_, as also of _Corporeal nature_, which
+is the _Object_ of _Mathematicks_, may be _Plainly Known_ and _Certain_
+to me.
+
+MEDITAT. VI.
+
+_~Of Corporeal Beings~, and Their ~Existence~: As Also of the Real
+Difference, Between ~Mind~ and ~Body~._
+
+It now remains that I examine whether any _Corporeal Beings_ do _Exist_;
+And already I know that (as they are the _Object_ of _Pure Mathematicks_)
+they _May_ (at least) _Exist_, for I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ perceive
+them; and doubtless _God_ is _able_ to _make_, whatever I am _able_ to
+_perceive_, and I never Judged any thing to be _beyond_ his _Power_, but
+what was _Repugnant_ to a _distinct perception_. Moreover, such _Material
+Beings seem_ to _Exist_ from the _faculty_ of _Imagination_, which I
+find my self make use of, when I am conversant about them: for if I
+attentively Consider what _Imagination_ is, 'twill appear to be only _a
+certain Application of our Cognoscitive or knowing Faculty to a Body or
+Object that is before it_; and if it be _before it_, It must _Exist_.
+
+But that this may be made more _Plain_, I must first examine the
+_difference_ between _Imagination_, and _pure Intellection_, or
+_Understanding_. So, for example, when I _Imagine_ a Triangle, I do not
+only _Understand_ that it is a _figure comprehended_ by _three Lines_,
+but I also _behold_ with the _eye_ of my _mind_ those _three lines_ as
+it were _before Me_, and this is that which I call _imagination_. But
+if I convert my Thoughts to a _Chiliogone_, or _Figure consisting_ of a
+_Thousand Angles_, I know as well that this Is a _figure comprehended_ by
+a _Thousand sides_, as I know that a _Triangle_ is a _Figure Consisting_
+of _three sides_; but I do not in the same Manner _Imagine_, or _behold_
+as _present_ those _thousand sides_, as I do the _three sides_ of a
+_Triangle_. And tho at the time when I so think of a _Chiliogone_, I may
+_confusedly_ represent to my self some _Figure_ (because whenever I Think
+of a _Corporeal Object_, I am used to _Imagine_ some _Shape_ or other)
+yet 'tis evident that this _Representation_ is not a _Chiliogone_,
+because 'tis in nothing _different_ from what I should Represent to my
+self if I thought of a _Milion-angled figure_, or any other Figure of
+_More sides_; Neither does such a _Confused Representation_ help me in
+the least to know those _Properties_, by which a _Chiliogone_ differs
+from other _Polygones_ or _Manyangled Figures_. But if a Question be
+put concerning a _Pentagone_, I know I may _Understand its Shape_, as
+I _Understand_ the _Shape_, of a _Chiliogone_, without the help of
+_Imagination_, but I can also _imagine_ it, by applying the _Eye_ of my
+_Mind_ to its _Five sides_, and to the _Area_ or _space_ contained by
+Them; And herein I manifestly perceive that there is required a _peculiar
+sort_ of _Operation_ in the _Mind_ to _imagine_ a Thing, which I require
+not to _Understand_ a Thing; which _New Operation_ of the _Mind_ plainly
+shews the _difference_ between _imagination_ and _pure Intellection_.
+
+Besides this, I Consider that this _Power_ of _Imagination_ which is in
+me (as it differs from the _Power_ of _Understanding_) does not appertain
+to the _Essence_ of _Me_, that is, of _my mind_, for tho I _wanted_ it,
+yet certainly I should be the _same He, that_ now _I am_: from whence it
+seems to follow, that it depends on something _different_ from _my self_;
+and I easily perceive that if any _Body_ whatever did _Exist_, to which
+my _Mind_ were so _conjoyn'd_, that it may Apply it self when it pleased
+to _Consider_, or (as it were) _Look_ into _this Body_; From hence, I
+say, I perceive _It may so be_, that by this very _Body_ I may _Imagine
+Corporeal Beings_: So that this _Manner_ of _Thinking_ differs from _pure
+Intellection_ only in this, that the _Mind_, when it _Understands_, does
+as it were turn _it self_, to _it self_, or _Reflect_ on it self, and
+_beholds_ some or other of those _Ideas_ which are in it self; But when
+it _Imagines_, it _Converts_ it self upon _Body_, and therein _beholds_
+something Conformable to that _Idea_, which it hath _understood_, or
+_perceived_ by _Sense_.
+
+But 'tis to be remembred, that I said, I easily conceive Imagination
+_May be_ so performed, supposing _Body_ to _Exist_. And because no
+so convenient manner of Explaining it offers it self, from thence
+I _probably_ guess, that _Body_ does _Exist_. But this I only say
+_probably_, for tho I should accurately search into all the Arguments
+drawn from the _distinct Idea_ of _Body_, which I find in my
+_Imagination_, yet I find none of them, from whence I may _necessarily_
+conclude, _that Body does Exist_.
+
+But I have been accustomed to _Imagine_ many other things besides that
+_Corporeal Nature_ which is the _Object_ of _pure Mathematicks_; such
+as are, _Colours_, _Sounds_, _Tasts_, _Pain_, &c. but none of these so
+_distinctly_. And because I perceive these better by _Sense_, from Which
+by the Help of the _Memory_ they come to the _Imagination_, that I may
+with the Greater advantage treat of them, I ought at the same time to
+Consider _Sence_, and to try whether from what I perceive by that way of
+_Thought_, which I call _Sense_, I can deduce any certain Argument for
+the _Existence_ of _Corporeal Beings_.
+
+And first I will here reflect with my self, what those things were,
+which being perceived by _Sence_ I have heretofore thought _True_, and
+the _Reasons_ why I _so thought_: I will then enquire into the _Reasons_
+for which I afterwards _doubted_ those things. And last of all I will
+consider what I _ought_ to _think_ of those Things at _Present_.
+
+[Sidenote: _The Reasons why I Trusted my Senses._]
+
+First therefore I have always thought that I have had an _Head_,
+_Hands_, _Feet_, and other _Members_, of which _This Body_ (which I have
+look'd upon as a _Part_ of _Me_, or Perhaps as my _Whole self_) Consists;
+And I have also thought that this _Body_ of _Mine_ is Conversant or
+engaged among many _Other Bodies_, by which it is Liable to be _affected_
+with what is _advantagious_ or _hurtful_; What was _Advantagious_
+I judged by a certain _sense_ of _Pleasure_, what was _Hurtful_ by
+a _sense_ of _Pain_. Furthermore, besides _Pleasure_ and _Pain_, I
+perceived in my self _Hunger_, _Thirst_, and other such like _Appetites_,
+as also certain _Corporeal Propensions_ to _Mirth_, _Sadness_, _Anger_,
+and other like _Passions_.
+
+As to What hapned to me from _Bodies without_, Besides the _Extension_,
+_Figure_, and _Motion_ of those _Bodies_, I also perceived in them
+_Hardness_, _Heat_, and other _tactile Qualities_, as also _Light_,
+_Colours_, _Smells_, _Tasts_, _Sounds_, &c. and by the _Variation_ of
+these I _distinguish'd_ the _Heaven_, _Earth_, and _Seas_, and all other
+_Bodies_ from each other.
+
+Neither was it wholly without Reason (upon the account of these _Ideas_
+of _Qualities_, which offer'd themselves to my Thoughts, and which alone
+I _properly_ and _Immediately perceived_) that I thought my self to
+Perceive some Things _Different_ from my _Thought, viz._ The _Bodies_ or
+_Objects_ from whence these _Ideas_ might _Proceed_; for I often found
+these _Ideas_ come upon me without my _Consent_ or _Will_; so that I can
+neither perceive an _Object_ (_tho I had a mind to it_) unless it were
+_before_ the Organs of my _Sense_; Neither can I _Hinder_ my self from
+perceiving it, when it is _Present_.
+
+And seeing that those _Ideas_ which I take in by sense are much more
+_Lively_, _Apparent_ and in their kind more _distinct_, than any of those
+which _I knowingly_ and _Willingly_ frame by Meditation, or stir up in
+my _Memory_; it seems to me that they cannot proceed from _my self_.
+There remains therefore no other way for them to come upon me, but from
+some other Things _Without_ Me. Of Which Things seeing _I_ have no other
+Knowledge but from these _Ideas_, _I_ cannot Think but that these _Ideas_
+are _like_ the Things.
+
+Moreover, Because _I_ remember that _I_ first made use of my _senses_
+before my _Reason_; and because _I_ did perceive that those _Ideas_
+which _I_ my self did frame were not so _Manifest_ as those which _I_
+received by my _senses_, but very often _made up of their parts_, _I_ was
+easily perswaded to think that _I_ had no _Idea_ in my _Understanding_,
+which I had not _First_ in my _sense_.
+
+Neither was it without Reason that _I_ Judged, _That Body_ (which by a
+_peculiar right I_ call my _Own_) to be _more nighly_ appertaining to
+_Me_ then any _other Body_. For from It, as from other _Bodies_, _I_
+can never be _seperated_, _I_ was _sensible_ of all _Appetites_ and
+_Affections in It_ and _for It_, and lastly _I_ perceived _pleasure_ and
+_Pain_ in its Parts, and not in any other Without it. But why from the
+_sense_ of Pain a certain _Grief_, and from the _sense_ of _pleasure_ a
+certain _Joy_ of the _Mind_ should arise, or Why that _Gnawing_ of the
+_stomach_, Which _I_ call _Hunger_, should put me in mind of _Eating_, or
+the _driness_ of my _Throat_ of _Drinking_, _I_ can give no other Reason
+but _that I am taught so by Nature_. For to my thinking there is no
+_Affinity_ or _Likeness_ between that _Gnawing_ of the _Stomach_, and the
+desire of _Eating_, or between the _sense_ of _Pain_, and the _sorrowful
+thought_ from thence arising. But in this as in all other _judgments_
+that I made of _sensible objects_, I seem'd to be taught by _Nature_, for
+I first perswaded my self that things were _so_ or _so_, before ever I
+enquired into a Reason that may prove it.
+
+[Sidenote: _The Reasons why I doubted my senses._]
+
+[Sidenote: _Medit. I._]
+
+But afterwards I discover'd many experiments, wherein my _senses_ so
+grosly deceived me, that I would never trust them again; for Towers
+which seem'd _Round_ a far off, nigh at hand appear'd _square_, and
+_large_ Statues on their tops seem'd _small_ to those that stood on the
+ground; and in numberless other things, I perceived the _judgements_
+of my _outward senses_ were _deceived_: and not of my _outward_ only,
+but of my _inward senses_ also; for what is more _intimate_ or _inward_
+than _Pain_? And yet I have heard from those, whose Arm or Leg was cut
+off, that they have felt _pain_ in that part which they _wanted_, and
+therefore I am not _absolutely certain_ that any part of me is affected
+with _pain_, tho I _feel pain_ therein. To these I have lately added
+two very _general Reasons_ of _doubt_; The first was, that while I was
+_awake_, I could not believe my self to perceive any thing, which I could
+not think my self sometimes to perceive, tho I were _a sleep_; And seeing
+I cannot believe, that what I seem to perceive in my _sleep_ proceeds
+from _outward Objects_, what greater Reason have I to think so of what I
+perceive whilst I am _awake_? The other Cause of Doubt was, that seeing
+I know not the _Author_ of my _Being_ (or at least I then _supposed_ my
+self not to know him) what reason is there but that I may be so ordered
+by _Nature_ as to be _deceived_ even in those things which appear'd to me
+most _true_. And as to the _Reasons_, which induced me to give _credit_
+to _sensible_ Things, 'twas easie to return an answer thereto, for
+finding by experience, that I was impelled by _Nature_ to many Things,
+which _Reason_ disswaded me from, I thought I should not far trust what I
+was taught by _Nature_. And tho the perceptions of my _senses_ depended
+not on my _Will_, I thought _I_ should not therefore conclude, that they
+proceeded from _Objects different_ from my self; for perhaps there may
+be some other _Faculty_ in me (tho as yet _unknown_ to me) which might
+frame those _perceptions_.
+
+[Sidenote: _How far the senses are now to be trusted._]
+
+But now that I begin better to know _my self_ and the Author of my
+_Original_, I do not think, that all things, which I seem to have from my
+_senses_ are _rashly_ to be _admitted_, neither are all things so _had_,
+to be _doubted_. And first because I know that whatever I _clearly_
+and _distinctly_ perceive, _may be_ so made by _God_ as I perceive
+them; the _Power_ of _understanding clearly_ and _distinctly_ one Thing
+_without_ the other is sufficient to make Me _certain_ that One Thing is
+_different_ from the Other; because it _may_ at least be placed apart by
+_God_, and that it may be esteem'd _different_, it matters not by what
+_Power_ it _may_ be so _sever'd_. And therefore from the knowledge I
+have, that _I my self exist_, and because at the same time I understand
+that nothing else appertains to my _Nature_ or _Essence_, but that I am a
+_thinking Being_, I rightly conclude, that my _Essence_ consists in this
+alone, that I am a _thinking Thing_. And tho _perhaps_ (or, as I shall
+shew presently, 'tis _certain_) I have a _Body_ which is very _nighly_
+conjoyned to me, yet because on this side I have a clear and _distinct
+Idea_ of my self, as I am only a _thinking Thing, not extended_; and on
+the other side because I have a _distinct Idea_ of my _Body_, as it is
+onely an _extended_ thing, _not thinking_, 'tis from hence _certain_,
+that I _am really distinct from my Body_, and that I can _exist without_
+it.
+
+Moreover I find in my self some _Faculties_ endow'd with _certain_
+peculiar waies of _thinking_, such as the _Faculty_ of _Imagination_,
+the _Faculty_ of _Perception_ or _sense_; without which _I_ can conceive
+my _whole self clearly_ and _distinctly_, but (changing the phrase) _I_
+cannot _conceive_ those _Faculties_ without _conceiving My self_, that
+is, an _understanding substance_ in which they are; for none of them
+in their _formal Conception_ includes _understanding_; from whence I
+perceive they are as _different_ from _me_, as the _modus_ or _manner_ of
+a Thing is _different_ from the _Thing it self_.
+
+I acknowledge also, that I have several other _Faculties_, such as
+_changing_ of _place_, _putting on various shapes_, &c. Which can
+no more be understood without a _substance_ in which they are, then
+the foremention'd _Faculties_, and consequently they can no more be
+understood to _Exist_ without that _substance_: But yet 'tis Manifest,
+that this sort of _Faculties_, to the End they may exist, ought to be
+in a _Corporeal_, _Extended_, and not in an _Understanding substance_,
+because _Extension_, and not _Intellection_ or _Understanding_ is
+included in the _Clear_ and _Distinct conception_ of them.
+
+But there is also in me a certain _Passive Faculty_ of _sense_, or of
+_Receiving_ and _Knowing_ the _Ideas_ of _sensible Things_; of which
+_Faculty_ I can make no use, unless there were in my self, or in
+something else, a certain _Active Faculty_ of _Producing_ and _Effecting_
+those _Ideas_. But this cannot be in my self, for it Pre-supposes no
+_Understanding_, and those _Ideas_ are Produced in me, tho I help not,
+and often against my _Will_. There remains therefore no Place for this
+_Active Faculty_, but that it should be in some _substance different_
+from me. In which because all the _Reallity_, which is contain'd
+_Objectively_ in the _Ideas_ Produced by that _Faculty_, ought to be
+contain'd _Formally_ or _Eminently_ (as I have Formerly taken notice)
+this _substance_ must be either _a Body_ (in which what is in the
+_Ideas Objectively_ is contain'd _Formally_) or it Must Be _God_, or
+some _Creature_ more _excellent_ then a _Body_ (In which what is in the
+_Ideas Objectively_ is contain'd _Eminently_). But seeing that _God_ is
+not a _Deceivour_, 'tis altogether Manifest, that _he_ does not Place
+these _Ideas_ in me either _Immediately_ from himself, or _Mediately_
+from any other Creature, wherein their _Objective Reallity_ is not *
+contain'd _Formally_, but only _Eminently_. And seeing _God_ has given
+me no _Faculty_ to discern Whether these Ideas proceed from _Corporeal_
+or _Incorporeal Beings_, but rather a _strong Inclination_ to believe
+that they are sent from _Corporeal Beings_, there is no Reason Why God
+should not be counted a _Deceiver_, if these _Ideas_ came from any Where,
+but from _Corporeal Things_. Therefore we must conclude that there are
+_Corporeal Beings_. Which perhaps are not all the same as I comprehend
+them by _my sense_ (for Perception by sense is in many Things very
+_Obscure_ and _Confused_) but those things at least, which I _clearly_
+and _distinctly_ Understand, that is to say, all those things which are
+comprehended under the _Object_ of _Pure Mathematicks_; those things I
+say at least are _True_.
+
+As to What Remains, They are either some _Particulars_, as that the
+Sun is of such a _Bigness_ or _Shape_, _&c._ or they are Things less
+_Clearly_ Understood, as _Light_, _Sound_, _Pain_, &c. And tho these and
+such like Things may be very _Doubtful_ and _Uncertain_, yet because
+_God_ is not a _Deceiver_, and because that (Therefore) none of my
+Opinions can be _false_ unless God has Given me some _Faculty_ or other
+to _Correct_ my _Error_, hence 'tis that I am incouraged with the Hopes
+of attaining _Truth_ even in these very Things.
+
+And certainly it cannot be doubted but whatever _I_ am taught by _Nature_
+has something therein of _Truth_. By _Nature_ in General I understand
+either _God_ himself, or the _Coordination_ of Creatures Made by God.
+By my _Own Nature_ in _Particular_ I understand the _Complexion_ or
+_Association_ of all those things which are given me by God.
+
+Now there is nothing that this _my Nature_ teaches me more _expresly_
+then that I have a _Body_, Which is not _Well_ when I _feel Pain_, that
+this _Body_ wants _Meat_ or _Drink_ When I am _Hungry_ or _Dry_, _&c._
+And therefore I ought not to Doubt but that these things are _True_. And
+by this _sense_ of _Pain_, _Hunger_, _Thirst_, &c. My _Nature_ tells me
+that _I_ am not in my _Body_, as a _Mariner_ is in his _Ship_, but that I
+am most _nighly conjoyn'd_ thereto, and as it were _Blended therewith_;
+so that _I_ with _It_ make up _one_ thing; For Otherwise, when the _Body_
+were hurt, _I_, who am only a _Thinking Thing_, should not therefore
+_feel_ Pain, but should only _perceive_ the Hurt with the _Eye_ of my
+_Understanding_ (as a _Mariner perceives_ by his _sight_ whatever is
+broken in his Ship) and when the _Body_ wants either Meat or Drink, I
+should only _Understand_ this want, but should not have the _Confused
+sense_ of _Hunger_ or _Thirst_; I call them _Confused_, for certainly
+the _Sense_ of _Thirst_, _Hunger_, _Pain_, &c. are only _Confused Modes_
+or _Manners_ of _Thought_ arising from the _Union_ and (as it were)
+_mixture_ of the _Mind_ and _Body_.
+
+I am taught also by _Nature_, that there are many other _Bodies Without_
+and _About_ my _Body_, some whereof are to be _desired_, others are to
+be _Avoided_. And because that I Perceive very Different _Colours_,
+_Sounds_, _Smells_, _Tasts_, _Heat_, _Hardness_, and the Like, from
+thence I Rightly conclude that there are _Correspondent Differences_ in
+_Bodies_, from which these _different perceptions_ of _sense_ proceed,
+tho perhaps not _Alike_. And because that some of these _perceptions_
+are _Pleasant_, others _Unpleasant_, 'tis evidently _certain_, that my
+_Body_, or rather my _Whole self_ (as _I_ am compounded of a _Mind_ and
+_Body_) am liable to be _Affected_ by these _Bodies_ which encompass me
+about.
+
+There are many Other Things Also which _Nature_ seems to teach Me, but
+_Really_ I am not taught by It, but have gotten them by an _ill use_ of
+Passing my Judgement _Inconsiderately_, and from hence it is that these
+things happen often to be _false_; as that all _space_ is _Empty_, in
+which I find _nothing_ that _works_ upon my _Senses_; That in a _hot
+Body_ there is something _like_ the _Idea_ of _Heat_ which is in me; That
+in a _White_ or _Green_ Body there is the same _Whiteness_ or _Greenness_
+which I _perceive_; And the same _Taste_ in a _bitter_ or _sweet_ Thing,
+_&c._ That _Stars_, _Castles_, and Other _Remote_ Bodies are of the same
+_Bigness_ and _Shape_, as they are _Represented_ to my _senses_: and
+such like. But that I may not admit of any Thing in this very matter,
+which I cannot _Distinctly_ perceive, it behoves me here to determine
+more _Accurately_ What I mean when I say, _That I am taught a Thing by
+Nature_.
+
+Here I take _Nature_ more _strictly_, then for the _Complication_ of all
+those Things which are Given me by _God_; For in this _Complication_
+there are many things contain'd which relate to the _Mind alone_, as,
+That I perceive What is _done_ cannot be _not Done_, and all Other things
+which are known by the _Light_ of _Nature_, but of these I speak not at
+present. There are also many Other Things which belong _only_ to the
+_Body_, as, That it _tends Downwards_ and such like, of these also I
+treat not at Present. But I speak of those Things only which _God_ hath
+bestowed upon me as I am _Compounded_ of a _Mind_ and _Body together_,
+and not _differently Consider'd_. 'Tis _Nature_ therefore thus taken that
+teaches me to _avoid troublesome Objects_, and _seek_ after _pleasing
+Ones_; but it appears not that this _Nature_ teaches us to conclude any
+thing of these Perceptions of our _senses_, before that we make by our
+_Understanding_ a diligent examination of _outward Objects_; for to
+Enquire into the _Truth_ of Things belongs not to the _Whole Compositum_
+of a Man as he Consists of _Mind_ and _Body_, but to the _Mind alone_.
+
+So that tho a _star affect_ my eye no _more_ then a _small spark_ of
+Fire, yet there is in my Eye no _Real_ or _Positive Inclination_ to
+_believe_ One no bigger then the Other, but thus I have been used to
+Judge from my Childhood without any Reason: and tho coming nigh the Fire
+I feel Heat, and Coming too nigh I feel Pain, yet there is no Reason to
+perswade me, That in the Fire there is any thing _like_ either that Heat
+or that Pain, but only that there is something therein, Whatever it be,
+that excites in us those _sensations_ of Heat or Pain: and so tho in some
+space there may be nothing that Works on my _senses_, it does not from
+thence follow, that there is no _Body_ there; for I see that in these
+and many other things I am used to overturn the Order of Nature, because
+I use these _perceptions_ of _sense_ (which properly are given me by
+Nature to make known to the mind what is _advantagious_ or _hurtful_ to
+the _Compositum_, whereof the _mind_ is part, and _so far_ only they are
+_Clear_ and _Distinct_ enough) as _certain Rules_ immediately to discover
+the _Essence_ of _External Bodies_, of Which they make known nothing but
+very _Obscurely_ and _Confusedly_.
+
+[Sidenote: Medit. 4.]
+
+I have * formerly shewn how my _Judgement_ happens to be false
+notwithstanding _Gods Goodness_. But now there arises a new _Difficulty_
+concerning those very things which _Nature_ tells me I am to _prosecute_
+or _avoid_, concerning my _Internal senses_, Wherein I find many
+_Errors_, as when a Man being deceived by the Pleasant Taste of some sort
+of Meat, devours therein some hidden Poyson. But in this very Instance
+it cannot be said, that the Man is impelled by Nature to desire the
+_Poyson_, for of that he is wholly Ignorant; but he is said to Desire
+the _Meat_ only as being of a grateful Taste; and from hence nothing can
+be concluded but, That _Mans-Nature_ is not _All-knowing_; which is no
+Wonder seeing Man is a _Finite Being_, and therefore nothing but _Finite
+Perfections_ belong to him.
+
+But We often err even in those things to Which we are _Impelled_ by
+_Nature_, as when sick men desire that _Meat_ or _Drink_, which will
+certainly prove Hurtful to them. To this it may perhaps be reply'd, That
+they _Err_ in this because their _Nature_ is _Corrupt_. But this Answers
+not the Difficulty, For a sick man is no less _Gods Creature_ then a Man
+in Health, and therefore 'tis as Absurd to Imagine a _Deceitful Nature_
+imposed by _God_ on the One as on the Other; And as a Clock that is made
+up of Wheels and Weights does no less strictly observe the _Laws_ of its
+_Nature_, when it is _ill_ contrived, and tells the hours _falsly_, as
+when it answers the Desire of the Artificer in all performances; so if
+I consider the body of a Man as a meer _Machine_ or _Movement_, made up
+and compounded of _Bones_, _Nerves_, _Muscles_, _Veins_, _Blood_, and
+_Skin_; so that, tho there were no _mind_ in It, yet It would perform all
+those Motions which now are in it (those only excepted which Proceed from
+the _Will_, and consequently from the _Mind_) I do easily acknowledge,
+that it would be as _natural_ for him (if for example sake he were sick
+of a _Dropsie_) to suffer that _Driness_ of his _Throat_ which uses to
+bring into his mind the _sense_ of _Thirst_, & that thereby his Nerves
+and other Parts would be so disposed as to take Drink, by Which his
+disease would be encreased; As (supposing him to be troubled with no
+such Distemper) by the like Driness of Throat he would be disposed to
+Drink, when 'tis Requisite. And tho, if I respect the Intended use of a
+Clock I may say that it _Errs_ from its _Nature_, when it tells the Hours
+_wrong_, and so considering the _Movement_ of a _Mans Body_ as contrived
+for such _Motions_ as are used to be performed thereby, I may think That
+also to _Err_ from its _Nature_, if its _Throat_ is _Dry_, when it has
+no want of Drink for its _Preservation_. Yet I Plainly discover, that
+this last _Acceptation_ of _Nature_ differs much from that whereof we
+have been speaking all this While, for this is only a _Denomination
+extrinsick_ to the Things whereof 'tis spoken, and _depending_ on my
+_Thought_, while it _Compares_ a _sick_ man, and a _disorderly_ Clock
+with the _Idea_ of an _healthy_ man and a _Rectified_ Clock. But by
+_Nature_ in its former _Acceptation_ I Understand something that is
+_Really_ in the _Things_ themselves, which therefore has something of
+_Truth_ in it.
+
+But tho Respecting only a _Body sick_ of a Dropsie it be an _Extrinsick
+Denomination_ to say, that its _Nature_ is _Corrupt_, because it has
+a _Dry Throat_, and stands in _no need_ of Drink; yet respecting the
+_Whole Compound_ or _Mind joyn'd_ to such a _Body_, 'tis not a _meer
+Denomination_, but a _real Error_ of _Nature_ for it to _thirst_ when
+_drink_ is _hurtful_ to it. It remains therefore here to be inquired, how
+the _Goodness_ of _God_ suffers _Nature so taken_ to be _deceivable_.
+
+First therefore I understand that a _chief difference_ between my _Mind_
+and _Body_ consists in this, That my _Body_ is of its _Nature divisible_,
+but my _Mind indivisible_; for while I consider my _Mind_ or _my self_,
+as I am only a _thinking Thing_, I can distinguish _no parts_ in Me,
+but I perceive my self to be but _one entire_ Thing; and tho the _whole
+Mind_ seems to be _united_ to the _whole Body_, yet a Foot, an Arm, or
+any other part of the Body being cut off, I do not therefore conceive
+any _part_ of my _Mind_ taken away; Neither can its _Faculties_ of
+_desiring_, _perceiving_, _understanding_, &c. be called its _Parts_, for
+'tis one and the _same_, _mind_, that _desires_, that _perceives_, that
+_understands_; Contrarily, I cannot think of any _Corporeal_ or _extended
+Being_, which I cannot easily _divide_ into _Parts_ by my thought, and by
+this I understand it to be _divisible_. And this alone (if I had known it
+from no other Argument) is sufficient to inform me, that my _mind_ is
+_really distinct_ from my _Body_.
+
+Nextly I find, that my _mind_ is not _immediately affected_ by all parts
+of my _body_, but only by the _Brain_, and perhaps only by one small part
+of it, That, to wit, wherein the _common sense_ is said to reside; Which
+part, as often as it is disposed in the _same manner_, will represent to
+the _mind_ the _same thing_, tho at the same time the other parts of the
+_body_ may be _differently_ order'd. And this is proved by numberless
+Experiments, which need not here be related.
+
+Moreover I discover that the _nature_ of my _body_ is such, that no part
+of it can be _moved_ by an other _remote_ part thereof, but it may also
+be _moved_ in the _same manner_ by some of the _interjacent_ parts, tho
+the more _remote_ part lay still and acted not; As for example in the
+Rope,
+
+                                 A⸺B⸺C⸺D
+
+if its end D. were drawn, the end A. would be moved no otherwise, than
+if one of the intermediate parts B. or C. were drawn, and the end D.
+rest quiet. So when I feel _pain_ in my _Foot_, the consideration of
+Physicks instructs me, that this is performed by the help of _Nerves_
+dispersed through the Foot, which from thence being _continued_ like
+Ropes to the very Brain, whilst they are _drawn_ in the Foot, they also
+_draw_ the inward parts of the Brain to which they reach, and therein
+excite a certain _motion_, which is ordain'd by _Nature_ to affect the
+_mind_ with a _sense_ of _Pain_, as being in the _Foot_. But because
+these Nerves must pass through the _Shin_, the _Thighs_, the _Loins_, the
+_Back_, the _Neck_, before they can reach the _Brain_ from the _Foot_, it
+may so happen, that tho _that part_ of them, which is in the Foot were
+not touch'd, but only some of their _intermediate parts_, yet the same
+_motion_, would be caused in the _Brain_, as when the _Foot_ it self is
+_ill affected_, from whence 'twill necessarily follow, that the _mind_
+should _perceive_ the same _Pain_. And thus may we think of any other
+_Sense_.
+
+I understand lastly, that seeing each single motion perform'd in that
+part of the _Brain_, which _immediately affects_ the _mind_, excites
+therein only one sort of _sense_, nothing could be contrived more
+conveniently in this case, than that, of all those _Senses_ which it
+can cause, it should cause that which _cheifly_, and most _frequently_
+conduces to the _conservation_ of an _healthful Man_; And experience
+witnesses, that to this very _end_ all our _senses_ are given us by
+_Nature_; and therefore nothing can be found therein, which does not
+abundantly testifie the _Power_ and _Goodness_ of _God_. Thus for
+Example, when the Nerves of the Feet are violently and more than
+ordinarily moved, that motion of them being propagated through the
+_Medulla Spinalis_ of the Back to the inward parts of the Brain, there it
+signifies to the mind, that something or other is to be felt, and what is
+this but Pain, as if it were in the Foot, by which the Mind is excited
+to use its indeavours for removing the Cause, as being hurtful to the
+Foot. But the _Nature_ of _Man_ might have been so _order'd_ by _God_,
+that That same motion in the Brain should represent to the mind any other
+thing, _viz._ either it self as 'tis in the Brain, or it self as it is
+in the Foot, or in any of the other forementioned intermediate parts, or
+lastly any other thing whatsoever; but none of these would have so much
+conduced to the _Conservation_ of the _Body_. In the like manner when we
+want drink, from thence arises a certain _dryness_ in the _Throat_, which
+moves the Nerves thereof, and by their means the inward parts of the
+Brain, and this motion _affects_ the _mind_ with the _sense_ of _thirst_;
+because that in this case nothing is more requisite for us to know, then
+that we _want drink_ for the _Preservation_ of our _Health_. So of the
+Rest.
+
+From all which 'tis manifest, that (notwithstanding the _infinite
+Goodness_ of God) 'tis impossible but the _Nature_ of _Man_ as he
+consists of a _mind_ and _body_ should be _deceivable_. For if any cause
+should excite (not in the Foot but) in the Brain it self, or in any
+other part through which the Nerves are continued from the Foot to the
+Brain, that _self same_ motion, which uses to arise from the Foot being
+troubled, the _Pain_ would be felt _as in the Foot_, and the _sense_
+would be _naturally_ deceived; for 'tis consonant to Reason (seeing that
+That same motion of the Brain alwayes represents to the mind that same
+sense, and it oftner proceeds from a cause _hurtful_ to the _Foot_, than
+from any other) I say 'tis reasonable, that it should make known to the
+_mind_ the Pain of the _Foot_, rather than of any other _part_. And so
+if a _dryness_ of _Throat_ arises (not as 'tis used from the _necessity_
+of _drink_ for the _conservation_ of the _Body_, but) from an _unusual
+Cause_, as it happens in a _Dropsie_, 'tis far better that it should
+_then deceive us_; then that it should _alwayes deceive_ us when the
+_Body_ is in _Health_, and so of the Rest.
+
+And this consideration helps me very much, not only to _understand_ the
+_Errors_ to which my _Nature_ is subject, but also to _correct_ and
+_avoid_ them. For seeing I know that all my _Senses_ do oftener inform
+me _falsly_ than _truely_ in those things which conduce to the _Bodies
+advantage_; and seeing I can use (almost alwayes) more of them than one
+to _Examine_ the same thing, as also I can use _memory_, which joyns
+present and past things together, and my _understanding_ also, which
+hath already discovered to me all the _causes_ of my _Errors_, I ought
+no longer to fear, that what my _Senses_ daily represent to me should be
+false. But especially those _extravagant Doubts_ of my First Meditation
+are to be turn'd off as ridiculous; and perticularly the _chief_ of
+them, _viz_. That * of not _distinguishing Sleep_ from _Waking_, for now
+I plainly discover a great _difference_, between them, for my _Dreams_
+are never _conjoyned_ by my _memory_ with the other _actions_ of _my
+life_, as whatever happens to me _awake_ is; and certainly if (while
+I were awake) any person should suddenly appear to me, and presently
+disappear (as in _Dreams_) so that I could not tell _from whence_ he
+came or _where_ he went, I should rather esteem it a _Spectre_ or
+_Apparition feign'd_ in my Brain, then a _true Man_; but when such
+things occur, as I distinctly know from _whence_, _where_, and _when_
+they come, and I _conjoyn_ the _perception_ of them by my _memory_ with
+the other _Accidents_ of my _life_, I am _certain_ they are represented
+to me _waking_ and not _asleep_, neither ought I in the least to doubt
+of their _Truth_, if after I have called up all my _senses_, _memory_,
+and _understanding_ to their _Examination_ I find nothing in any of
+them, that clashes with other truths; For _God_ not being a _Deceiver_,
+it follows, that In such things I am not _deceived_. But because the
+_urgency_ of _Action_ in the common _occurrences_ of _Affairs_ will not
+alwayes allow time for such an _accurate examination_, I must confess
+that _Mans life_ is _subject_ to many _Errors_ about _perticulars_, so
+that the _infirmity_ of our _Nature_ must be _acknowledged_ by Us.
+
+_FINIS._
+
+ADVERTISEMENT CONCERNING THE OBJECTIONS.
+
+Among seven Parcels of Objections made by Divers Learned Persons against
+these Meditations, I have made choise of the Third in the Latine Copy,
+as being Penn'd by _Thomas Hobbs_ of _Malmesbury_, a Man famously known
+to the World abroad, but especially to his own the English Nation; and
+therefore 'tis likely that what comes from Him may be more acceptable to
+his Countrymen, then what proceeds from a Stranger; and as the strength
+of a Fortification is never better known then by a Forcible Resistance,
+so fares it with these _Meditations_ which stand unshaken by the
+Violent Opposition of so Potent an Enemy. And yet it must be Confess'd
+that the Force of these Objections and Cogency of the Arguments cannot
+be well apprehended by those who are not versed in other Pieces of Mr.
+_Hobbs_'s Philosophy, especially His Book _De Corpore_ and _De Homine_,
+The former whereof I am sure is Translated into English, and therefore
+not Impertinently refer'd to Here in a Discourse to English Readers. And
+this is the Reason that makes the Great _Des-Cartes_ pass over many of
+these Objections so slightly, Who certainly would have Undermined the
+whole Fabrick of the _Hobbian Philosophy_ had he but known upon What
+Foundations it was Built.
+
+OBJECTIONS
+
+Made against the Foregoing
+
+MEDITATIONS,
+
+BY THE FAMOUS
+
+_THOMAS HOBBS_
+
+Of MALMESBURY,
+
+WITH
+
+_DES-CARTES'S_
+
+ANSWERS.
+
+OBJECT. I.
+
+_Against the First Meditation: Of things Doubtful._
+
+'Tis evident enough from What has been said in this Meditation, that
+there is no _sign_ by Which we may Distinguish our _Dreams_ from _True
+Sense_ and _Waking_, and therefore that those _Phantasmes_ which we
+have waking and from our Senses are not accidents inhering in Outward
+Objects, neither do they Prove that such outward Objects do Exist; and
+therefore if we trust our Senses without any other Ground, we may well
+doubt whether any Thing _Be_ or _Not_. We therefore acknowledge the Truth
+of this Meditation. But Because _Plato_ and other Antient Philosophers
+argued for the same _incertainty_ in sensible Things, and because 'tis
+commonly Observed by the Vulgar that 'tis hard to Distinguish Sleep from
+Waking, I would not have the most excellent Author of such new Thoughts
+put forth so antique Notions.
+
+ANSWER.
+
+Those Reasons of Doubt which by this Philosopher are admitted as _true_,
+were proposed by Me only as _Probable_, and I made use of them not that
+I may vend them as _new_, but partly that I may prepare the Minds of my
+Readers for the Consideration of Intellectual Things, wherein they seem'd
+to me very necessary; And partly that thereby I may shew how firm those
+Truths are, which hereafter I lay down, seeing they cannot be Weaken'd by
+these Metaphysical Doubts: So, that I never designed to gain any Honor by
+repeating them, but I think I could no more omit them, then a Writer in
+Physick can pass over the Description of a Disease, Whose Cure he intends
+to Teach.
+
+OBJECT. II.
+
+_Against the Second Meditation: Of the Nature of Mans Mind._
+
+I _am a Thinking Thing_. 'Tis True; for because I _think_ or have a
+_Phantasme_ (whether I am _awake_ or _asleep_) it follows that _I am
+Thinking_, for _I Think_ and _I am Thinking_ signifie the same Thing.
+Because _I Think_, it follows That _I am_, for whatever _Thinks_ cannot
+be _Nothing_. But when he Adds, _That is_, _a Mind_, _a Soul_, _an
+Understanding_, _Reason_, I question his Argumentation; for it does not
+seem a Right Consequence to say, _I am a Thinking Thing_, therefore _I am
+a Thought_, neither, _I am an Understanding Thing_, therefore _I am the
+Understanding_. For in the same manner I may Conclude, _I am a Walking
+Thing_, therefore _I am the Walking it self_.
+
+Wherefore _D.Cartes_ Concludes that an _Understanding Thing_ and
+_Intellection_ (which is the _Act_ of an Understanding Thing) are the
+same; or at least that an _Understanding Thing_ and the _Intellect_
+(which is the _Power_ of an Understanding Thing) are the same; And yet
+all Philosophers distinguish the _subject_ from its _Faculties_ and
+_Acts_, that is, from its _Properties_ and _Essence_, for the _Thing it
+self_ is one thing, and its _Essence_ is an other. It may be therefore
+that a _Thinking Thing_ is the _Subject_ of a _Mind_, _Reason_, or
+_Understanding_, and therefor it may be a _Corporeal Thing_, the Contrary
+Whereof is here _Assumed_ and not _Proved_; and yet this _Inference_ is
+the _Foundation_ of that Conclusion which _D.Cartes_ would Establish.
+
+[Sidenote: * _Places noted with this Asterick are the Passages of the
+foregoing Meditations here Objected against._]
+
+In the same Meditation, on, * _I know that I am, I ask, What I am Whom I
+Thus Know, Certainly the Knowledge of Me precisely so taken depends not
+on those Things of whose Existence I am yet Ignorant_.
+
+'Tis Certain the Knowledge of this Proposition _I am_, depends on this,
+_I think_ as he hath rightly inform'd us; but from whence have we the
+knowledge of this Proposition, _I think_? certainly from hence only,
+that we cannot conceive any _Act_ without its _subject_, as _dancing_
+without a _Dancer_, _knowledge_, without a _Knower_, _thought_ without a
+_thinker_.
+
+And from hence it seems to follow, that a _thinking Thing_ is a
+_Corporeal Thing_; for the _Subjects_ of all _Acts_ are understood only
+in a _Corporeal way_, or after the manner of _matter_, as he himself
+shews hereafter by the example of a piece of Wax, which changing its
+_colour_, _consistence_, _shape_, and other _Acts_ is yet known to
+continue the _same thing_, that is, the _same matter subject_ to so many
+_changes_. But I cannot conclude from another _thought_ that _I now
+think_; for tho a Man may _think_ that he _hath thought_ (which consists
+only in _memory_) yet 'tis altogether impossible for him to _think_ that
+he _now thinks_, or to _know_, that _he knows_, for the question may be
+put _infinitely_, how do you _know_ that you _know_, that you _know_,
+that you _know_? &c.
+
+Wherefore seeing the Knowledge of this Proposition _I am_, depends on
+the knowledge of this _I think_, and the knowledge of this is from hence
+only, that we cannot separate _thought_ from _thinking matter_, it seems
+rather to follow, that a _thinking thing_ is _material_, than that 'tis
+_immaterial_.
+
+ANSWER.
+
+When I said, _That is a Mind_, _a Soul_, _an Understanding_, _Reason_,
+&c. I did not mean by these _names_ the _Faculties_ only, but the
+_things_ indow'd with those _Faculties_; and so 'tis alwayes understood
+by the two first names (_mind_ and _soul_) and very often so understood
+by the two last Names (_understanding_ and _Reason_) and this I have
+explain'd so often, and in so many places of these Meditations, that
+there is not the least occasion of questioning my meaning.
+
+Neither is there any parity between _Walking_ and _Thought_, for
+_walking_ is used only for the _Act_ it self, but _thought_ is sometimes
+used for the _Act_, sometimes for the _Faculty_, and sometimes for the
+_thing_ it self, wherein the _Faculty_ resides.
+
+Neither do I say, that the _understanding thing_ and _intellection_ are
+the same, or that the _understanding thing_ and the _intellect_ are the
+same, if the _intellect_ be taken for the _Faculty_, but only when 'tis
+taken for the _thing it self that understands_. Yet I willingly confess,
+that I have (as much as in me lay) made use of _abstracted words_ to
+signifie that _thing_ or _substance_, which I would have devested of all
+those things that belong not to it. Whereas contrarily this Philosopher
+uses the most _concrete Words_ to signifie this _thinking thing_, such
+as _subject_, _matter_, _Body_, &c. that he may not suffer it to be
+separated from _Body_.
+
+Neither am I concern'd that His manner of joyning many things together
+may seem to some fitter for the discovery of Truth, than mine, wherein I
+separate as much as possibly each particular. But let us omit words and
+speak of things.
+
+_It may be_ (sayes he) _that a Thinking thing is a corporeal thing,
+the contrary whereof is here assumed and not proved._ But herein he is
+mistaken, for I never _assumed_ the _contrary_, neither have I used it as
+a _Foundation_, for the rest of _my Superstructure_, but left it wholly
+_undetermin'd_ till the _sixth Meditation_, and in that 'tis proved.
+
+Then he tells us rightly, _that we cannot conceive any Act without its
+subject_, as _thought_ without a _thinking thing_, for what _thinks_
+cannot be _nothing_; but then he subjoyns without any Reason, and against
+the usual manner of speaking, and contrary to all Logick, _that hence it
+seem to follow, that a thinking thing is a corporeal Being_. Truly the
+_subjects_ of all _Acts_ are understood under the notion of _substance_,
+or if you please under the notion of _matter_ (that is to say of
+_metaphysical matter_) but not therefore under the notion of _Bodies_.
+
+But Logicians and Commonly all Men are used to say, that there are some
+_Spiritual_, some _Corporeal_ substances. And by the Instance of Wax I
+only proved that _Colour_, _Consistence_, _Shape_, &c. appertain not to
+the _Ratio Formalis_ of the Wax; For in that Place I treated neither of
+the _Ratio Formalis_ of the _Mind_, neither of _Body_.
+
+Neither is it pertinent to the business, that the Philosopher asserts,
+_That one Thought cannot be the subject of an other thought_, for Who
+besides Himself ever Imagin'd This? But that I may explain the matter in
+a few words, 'Tis certain that _Thought_ cannot be without a _Thinking
+Thing_, neither any _Act_ or any _Accident_ without a _substance_ wherein
+it resides. But seeing that we know not a _substance immediately by it
+self_, but by this alone, that 'tis the _subject_ of several _Acts_, it
+is very consonant to the commands of Reason and Custome, that we should
+call by _different names_ those _substances_, which we perceive are the
+_subjects_ of very _different Acts_ or _Accidents_, and that afterwards
+we should examine, whether those _different names_ signifie _different_
+or _one_ and the _same_ thing. Now there are some _Acts_ which we call
+_corporeal_, as _magnitude_, _figure_, _motion_, and what ever else
+cannot be thought on without _local extension_, and the _substance_
+wherein these reside we call _Body_; neither can it be imagin'd that
+'tis one _substance_ which is the _subject_ of _Figure_, and another
+_substance_ which is the _subject_ of _local motion_, &c. Because all
+these _Acts_ agree under one common notion of _Extension_. Besides
+there are other _Acts_, which we call _cogitative_ or _thinking_, as
+_understanding_, _will_, _imagination_, _sense_, &c. All which agree
+under the common notion of _thought_, _perception_, or _Conscience_;
+And the _substance_ wherein they are, we say, is a _thinking thing_,
+or _mind_, or call it by whatever other name we please, so we do not
+confound it with _corporeal substance_, because _cogitative Acts_ have
+no affinity with _corporeal Acts_, and _thought_, which is the common
+_Ratio_ of _those_ is wholly different from _Extension_, which is the
+common _Ratio_ of _These_. But after we have formed two _distinct
+conceptions_ of these two _substances_, from what is said in the sixth
+Meditation, 'tis easie to know, whether they be _one_ and the _same_ or
+_different_.
+
+OBJECT. III.
+
+* _Which of them is it, that is distinct from my thought? which of them
+is it that can be separated from me?_
+
+Some perhaps will answer this Question thus, I my self, who _think_ am
+distinct from my _thought_, and my _thought_ is _different_ from me
+(tho' not _seperated_) as _dancing_ is _distinguished_ from the _Dancer_
+(as before is noted.) But if _Des-Cartes_ will prove, that _he_ who
+_understands_ is the same with his _understanding_, we shall fall into
+the Scholastick expressions, the _understanding understands_, the _sight
+sees_, the _Will wills_, and then by an exact analogy, the Walking (or
+at least the _Faculty_ of walking) shall walk. All which are obscure,
+improper, and unworthy that perspicuity which is usual with the noble
+_Des-Cartes_.
+
+ANSWER.
+
+I do not deny, that _I_ who _think_ am _distinct_ from my _thought_,
+as a _thing_ is _distinguish'd_ from its _modus_ or _manner_; But when
+I ask, _which of them is it that is distinct from my thought_? this I
+understand of those various _modes_ of _thought_ there mention'd, and
+not of _substance_; and when I subjoyn, _which of them is it that can be
+separated from me_? I only signifie that all those _modes_ or _manners_
+of _thinking_ reside in me, neither do I herein perceive what occasion of
+_doubt_ or _obscurity_ can be imagined.
+
+OBJECT. IV.
+
+* _It remains therefore for me to Confess that I cannot Imagine what this
+Wax is, but that I conceive in my mind What it is._
+
+There is a great Difference between _Imagination_ (that is) having
+an _Idea_ of a Thing, and the _Conception of the Mind_ (that is) a
+_Concluding_ from _Reasoning_ that a thing _Is_ or _Exists_. But
+_Des-Cartes_ has not Declared to us in what they Differ. Besides,
+the Ancient Aristotelians have clearly deliver'd as a Doctrine, that
+_substance_ is not _perceived_ by _sense_ but is _Collected_ by
+_Ratiocination_.
+
+But what shall we now say, if perhaps _Ratiocination_ be nothing Else but
+a _Copulation_ or _Concatenation_ of _Names_ or _Appellations_ by this
+Word _Is_? From whence 'twill follow that we _Collect_ by _Reasoning_
+nothing _of_ or _concerning_ the _Nature_ of _Things_, but of the _names_
+of _Things_, that is to say, we only discover whether or no we _joyn_ the
+_Names_ of _Things_ according to the _Agreements_ which at Pleasure we
+have made concerning their _significations_; if it be so (as so it may
+be) _Ratiocination_ will depend on _Words_, _Words_ on _Imagination_,
+and perhaps _Imagination_ as _also Sense_ on the _Motion_ of _Corporeal
+Parts_; and so the _Mind_ shall be nothing but _Motions_ in some Parts of
+an _Organical Body_.
+
+ANSWER.
+
+I have here Explain'd the Difference between _Imagination_, and the Meer
+_Conception_ of the _Mind_, by reckoning up in my Example of the Wax,
+what it is therein which we _Imagine_, and what it is that we _conceive_
+in our _Mind_ only: but besides this, I have explained in an other Place
+How we _understand_ one way, and _Imagine_ an other way One and the same
+Thing, suppose a Pentagone or Five sided Figure.
+
+There is in _Ratiocination_ a _Conjunction_ not of _Words_, but of
+_Things signified_ by _Words_; And I much admire that the _Contrary_
+could Possibly enter any Mans Thoughts; For Who ever doubted but that
+a _Frenchman_ and a _German_ may argue about the _same Things_, tho
+they use very _Differing Words_? and does not the Philosopher Disprove
+himself when he speaks of the _Agreements which at pleasure we have made
+about the significations of Words_? for if he grants that _something_ is
+_Signified_ by _Words_, Why will he not admit that our Ratiocinations are
+rather about this _something_, then about _Words_ only? and by the same
+Right that he concludes the _Mind_ to be a _Motion_, he may Conclude Also
+that the Earth is Heaven, or What else he Pleases.
+
+OBJECT. V.
+
+_Against the Third Meditation of God._
+
+* _Some of These (viz. ~Humane Thoughts~) are as it were the Images of
+Things, and to these alone belongs properly the Name of an Idea, as when
+I Think on a Man, a Chimera, Heaven, an Angel, or God._
+
+When I Think on a _Man_ I perceive an _Idea_ made up of _Figure_ and
+_Colour_, whereof I may _doubt_ whether it be the _Likeness_ of a _Man_
+or not; and so when I think on _Heaven_. But when I think on a Chimera, I
+perceive an _Image_ or _Idea_, of which I may _doubt_ whether it be the
+_Likeness_ of any _Animal_ not only at present Existing, but possible to
+Exist, or that ever will Exist hereafter or not.
+
+But thinking on an _Angel_, there is offer'd to my Mind sometimes the
+_Image_ of a _Flame_, sometimes the _Image_ of a _Pretty Little Boy_
+with _Wings_, which I am certain has no _Likeness_ to an _Angel_, and
+therefore that it is not the _Idea_ of an _Angel_; But beleiving that
+there are some Creatures, Who do (as it were) wait upon God, and are
+Invisible, and Immaterial, upon the _Thing Believed_ or _supposed_ we
+Impose the _Name_ of _Angel_; Whereas the _Idea_, under which I Imagine
+an Angel, is compounded of the Ideas of sensible Things.
+
+In the like manner at the Venerable Name of _God_, we have _no Image_ or
+_Idea_ of God, and therefore we are forbidden to _Worship God_ under any
+_Image_, least we should seem to _Conceive_ Him that is inconceivable.
+
+Whereby it appears that we have no _Idea_ of _God_; but like one _born
+blind_, who being brought to the _Fire_, and perceiving himself to be
+_Warmed_, knows there is _something_ by which he is _warmed_ and Hearing
+it called _Fire_, he Concludes that _Fire Exists_, but yet knows not of
+what _shape_ or _Colour_ the Fire is, neither has he any _Image_ or
+_Idea_ thereof in his _Mind_.
+
+So Man knowing that there must be some _Cause_ of his _Imaginations_
+or _Ideas_, as also an other _cause before That_, and so _onwards_, he
+is brought at last to an _End_, or to a _supposal_ of some _Eternal
+Cause_, Which because it never _began_ to _Be_ cannot have any other
+_Cause before it_, and thence he Concludes that 'tis _necessary_ that
+some _Eternal Thing Exist_: and yet he has no _Idea_ which He can call
+the _Idea_ of this _Eternal Thing_, but he names this _Thing_, which he
+believes and acknowledges by the Name _God_.
+
+But now _Des-Cartes_ proceeds from this Position, _That we have an Idea
+of God in our Mind_, to prove this Theoreme, _That God (that if an
+Almighty, Wise, Creatour of the World) Exists_, whereas he ought to have
+explain'd this _Idea_ of _God_ better, and he should have thence deduced
+not only his _Existence_, but also the _Creation_ of the World.
+
+ANSWER.
+
+Here the Philosopher will have the Word _Idea_ be only Understood
+for the _Images_ of _Material_ Things represented in a _Corporeal_
+Phantasie, by which Position he may Easily Prove, that there can be no
+Proper _Idea_ of an _Angel_ or _God_. Whereas as I declare every Where,
+but especially in this Place, that I take the Name _Idea_ for whatever is
+immediately _perceived_ by the _Mind_, so that when I _Will_, or _Fear_,
+because at the same time I _perceive_ that I _Will_ or _Fear_, this
+very _Will_ or _Fear_ are reckon'd by me among the number of _Ideas_;
+And I have purposely made use of that Word, because It was usual with
+the Antient Philosophers to signifie the Manner of _Perceptions_ in the
+_Divine Mind_, altho neither we nor they acknowledge a Phantasie in
+_God_: and besides I had no fitter Word to express it by.
+
+And I think I have sufficiently explain'd the _Idea_ of _God_ for those
+that will attend my meaning, but I can never do it fully enough for those
+that will Understand my Words otherwise then I intend them.
+
+Lastly, what is here added concerning the _Creation_ of the World is
+wholly beside the Question in hand.
+
+OBJECT. VI.
+
+* _But there are Other (~Thoughts~) That have Superadded Forms to them,
+as when I Will, when I Fear, when I Affirm, when I Deny; I know I have
+alwayes (whenever I think) some certain thing as the Subject or Object
+of my Thought, but in this last sort of Thoughts there is something
+More which I think upon then Barely the Likeness of the Thing; and of
+these Thoughts some are called Wills and Affections, and others of them
+Judgements._
+
+When any one _Fears_ or _Wills_, he has certainly the _Image_ of the
+_Thing Fear'd_, or _Action Will'd_, but what more a _Willing_ or
+_Fearing_ Man has in his Thoughts is not explain'd; and tho _Fear_ be a
+_Thought_, yet I see not how it can be any other then the _Thought_ of
+the _Thing Fear'd_; For what is the _Fear_ of a _Lion rushing on me_, but
+the _Idea_ of a Lion Rushing on me, and the _Effect_ (which that _Idea_
+produces in the _Heart_) whereby the Man _Fearing_ is excited to that
+Animal Motion which is called Flight? but now this Motion of _Flying_
+is not _Thought_, it remains therefore that in _Fear_ there is no other
+_Thought_, but that which consists in the _likeness_ of the thing. And
+the same may be said of _Will_.
+
+Moreover _Affirmation_ and _Negation_ are not without a _voice_ and
+_words_, and hence 'tis that Brutes can neither _affirme_ or _deny_ not
+so much as in their Thought, and consequently neither can they judge.
+But yet the same thought may be in a beast as in a Man; for when we
+_affirme_ that a Man runs, we have not a _thought_ different from what
+a Dog has when he sees his Master running; _Affirmation_ therefore or
+_Negation_ superadds nothing to _meer thoughts_, unless perhaps it adds
+this thought, that the _names_ of which an _Affirmation_ consists are (to
+the Person _affirming_) the _Names_ of the _same thing_; and this is not
+to comprehend in the _thought_ more then the _likeness_ of the _thing_,
+but it is only comprehending the same _likeness twice_.
+
+ANSWER.
+
+'Tis self evident, That 'tis one thing to _see_ a Lion and at the same
+time to _fear_ him, and an other thing _only_ to _see_ him. So 'tis one
+thing to _see_ a Man Running, and an other thing to _Affirme_ within my
+self (which may be done without a voice) That I _see_ him.
+
+But in all this objection I find nothing that requires an Answer.
+
+OBJECT. VII.
+
+* _Now it remains for me to examine, how I have received this Idea of
+God, for I have neither received it by means of my senses, neither comes
+it to me without my forethought, as the Ideas of sensible things use to
+do, when those things work on the Organs of my sense, or at least seem so
+to work; Neither is this Idea framed by my self, for I can neither add
+to, nor detract from it. Wherefore I have only to conclude, that it is
+innate, even as the Idea of me my self is Natural to my self._
+
+If there be no _Idea_ of _God_, as it seems there is _not_ (and here 'tis
+not proved that there is) this whole discourse falls to the ground. And
+as to the _Idea_ of _my self_ (if I respect the _Body_) it proceeds from
+_Sight_, but (if the _Soul_) there is no _Idea_ of a _Soul_, but we
+collect by Ratiocination, that there is some inward thing in a Mans Body,
+that imparts to it _Animal Motion_, by which it _perceives_ and _moves_,
+and this (whatever it be) without any _Idea_ we call a _Soul_.
+
+ANSWER.
+
+If there be an _Idea_ of _God_ (as 'tis manifest that there is) this
+whole _Objection_ falls to the ground; and then he subjoyns, _That we
+have no Idea of the Soul, but collect it by Ratiocination_, 'Tis the same
+as if he should say, that there is no _Image_ thereof represented in the
+_Phantasie_, but yet, that there is such a Thing, as I call an _Idea_.
+
+OBJECT. VIII.
+
+* _An other Idea of the Sun as taken from the Arguments of Astronomers,
+that is consequentially collected by me from certain natural notions._
+
+At the same time we can certainly have but one _Idea_ of the Sun, whether
+it be look'd at by our eyes, or collected by _Ratiocination_ to be much
+bigger than it seems; for this last is not an _Idea_ of the Sun, but a
+proof by Arguments, that the _Idea_ of the _Sun_ would be much larger, if
+it were look'd at nigher. But at different or several times the _Ideas_
+of the Sun may be diverse, as if at one time we look at it with our bare
+eye, at an other time through a Teloscope; but Astronomical arguments do
+not make the _Idea_ of the Sun greater or less, but they rather tell us
+that the _sensible Idea_ thereof is _false_.
+
+ANSWER.
+
+Here also (as before) what he says is not the _Idea_ of the Sun, and yet
+is described, is that very thing which I call the _Idea_.
+
+OBJECT. IX.
+
+* _For without doubt those Ideas which Represent substances are something
+more, or (as I may say) have more of objective Reality in them, then
+those that represent only accidents or modes; and again, that by which
+I understand a mighty God, Eternal, Infinite, Omniscient, Omnipotent,
+Creatour of all things besides himself, has certainly in it more
+objective reality, then those by which Finite substances are exhibited._
+
+I have before often noted that there can be no _Idea_ of _God_ or
+the _Mind_: I will now superadd, That neither can there be an _Idea_
+of _Substance_. For _Substance_ (Which is only _Matter Subject_ to
+_Accidents_ and _Changes_) is _Collected_ only by _Reasoning_, but
+it is not at all _Conceived_, neither does it _represent_ to us any
+_Idea_. And if this be true, How can it be said, _That those Ideas
+which represent to us Substances have in them something More, or More
+Objective Reality, then those which represent to us Accidents_? Besides,
+Let _Des-Cartes_ again Consider what he means by ~More Reality~? Can
+_Reality_ be increas'd or diminish'd? Or does he think that One _Thing_
+can be _More A Thing_ then an other Thing? let him Consider how this can
+be Explain'd to our Understandings with that _Perspicuity_ or Clearness
+which is requisite in all _Demonstrations_, and Which He Himself is used
+to present us with upon other Occasions.
+
+ANSWER.
+
+I have often noted before, That that very Thing which is _evidenc'd_
+by _Reason_, as also whatever else is perceived by any other Means, is
+Called by Me an _Idea_. And I have sufficiently explain'd How _Reality_
+may be _Encreas'd_ or _Diminish'd_, in the same manner (to wit) as
+_Substance_ is _More_ a _Thing_, then A _Mode_; and if there be any such
+things as _Real Qualities_, or _Incomplete Substances_, these are _More
+Things_ then _Modes_, and _Less Things_ then _Complete Substances_:
+and Lastly if there be an _Infinite Independent Substance_ this is
+_More_ a _Thing_, then a _Finite, Dependent Substance_. And all this is
+self-evident.
+
+OBJECT. X.
+
+* _Wherefore There only Remains the Idea of God; Wherein I must consider
+whether there be not something Included, which cannot Possibly have its
+Original from me. By the Word, God, I mean a certain Infinite Substance,
+Independent, Omniscient, Almighty, by whom both I my self and every
+thing Else That Is (if any thing do actually exist) was Created; All
+which attributes are of such an High Nature That the more attentively
+I consider them, the Less I Conceive my self alone possible to be the
+Author of these notions; from what therefore has been said I must
+Conclude there is a God._
+
+Considering the _Attributes_ of _God_, that from thence we may gather an
+_Idea_ of _God_, and that we may enquire whether there be not something
+in that _Idea_ which cannot Possibly Proceed from our selves, I discover
+(if I am not Deceived) that what we think off at the _Venerable name_
+of _God_ proceeds neither from our selves, neither is it Necessary that
+they should have any other _Original_ then from _Outward Objects_. For
+by the Name of _God_ I understand a ~Substance~, that is, I understand
+that _God_ Exists (not by an _Idea_, but by Reasoning) ~Infinite~ (that
+is, I cannot conceive or Imagine Terms or Parts in him so Extream, but I
+can Imagine others Farther) from whence it follows, that not an _Idea_ of
+_Gods Infinity_ but of my Own bounds and Limits presents it self at the
+Word _Infinite_. ~Independent~, That is, I do not conceive any _Cause_
+from which _God_ may proceed; from whence 'tis evident that I have no
+other _Idea_ at the word _Independent_, but the memory of my own _Ideas_
+which at Different Times have _Different Beginnings_, and Consequently
+they must be _Dependent_.
+
+Wherefore, to say that God is _Independent_, is only to say That _God_ is
+in the Number of those things, the _Original_ whereof I do not Imagine:
+and so to say that _God_ is _Infinite_, is the same as if we say That He
+is in the Number of Those Things whose _Bounds_ we do not Conceive: And
+thus any _Idea_ of _God_ is Exploded, for What _Idea_ can we have without
+_Beginning_ or _Ending_?
+
+~Omniscient~ or Understanding all things, Here _I_ desire to know, by
+what _Idea_, _Des-Cartes_ understands _Gods Understanding_? ~Almighty~,
+I desire also to know by What _Idea Gods Power_ is _understood_? For
+_Power_ is in Respect of Future Things, that is, Things not Existing. For
+my Part, I understand _Power_ from the Image or Memory of past Actions,
+arguing with my self thus, He did so, therefore he was _able_ (or had
+_Power_) to do so, therefore (continuing the same) he will again have
+_Power_ to do so. But now all these are _Ideas_ that may arise from
+_external Objects_.
+
+~Creatour~ of all things, _I_ can frame an _Image_ of _Creation_ from
+what I see every day, as a Man Born, or growing from a Punctum to that
+shape and size he now bears; an other _Idea_ then this no man can have at
+the word _Creatour_; But the _Possibility_ of _Imagining_ a Creation is
+not sufficient to prove that the world _was created_. And therefore tho
+it were _Demonstrated_ that some _Infinite Independent Almighty Being_
+did _exist_, yet it will not from thence follow that a _Creatour exists_;
+unless one can think this to be a right inference, we _believe_ that
+there exists something that has created all other things, therefore the
+world _was Created_ thereby.
+
+Moreover when he says, that the _Idea_ of _God_, and of our _Soul_ is
+_Innate_ or _born in us_, I would fain know, whether the _Souls_ of those
+that _sleep soundly_ do _think_ unless they _dream_; If not, then at that
+time they have no _Ideas_, and consequently no _Idea_ is _Innate_, for
+what is _Innate_ to us is never _Absent_ from us.
+
+ANSWER.
+
+None of _Gods_ Attributes can proceed from _outward objects_ as from a
+_Pattern_, because there is nothing found in God like what is found in
+_External_, that is, _Corporeal_ things; Now 'tis manifest that whatever
+we think of in him _differing_ or _unlike_ what we find in them proceeds
+not from them, but from a cause of that very _diversity_ in our Thought.
+
+And here I desire to know, how this Philosopher deduces _Gods
+Understanding_ from _outward Things_, and yet I can easily explain
+what _Idea_ I have thereof, by saying, that by the _Idea_ of _Gods
+Understanding_ I conceive whatever is the _Form_ of any _Perception_;
+For who is there that does not perceive that he _understands_
+something or other, and consequently he must thereby have an _Idea_ of
+_understanding_, and by enlarging it _Indefinitely_ he forms the _Idea_
+of _Gods Understanding_. And so of his other Attributes.
+
+And seeing we have made use of that _Idea_ of _God_ which is in us to
+demonstrate his existence, and seeing there is contain'd in this _Idea_
+such an _Immense Power_, that we conceive it a contradiction for _God_ to
+_Exist_, and yet that any thing should _Be_ besides Him, which was not
+_Created_ by Him, it plainly follows that demonstrating His existence
+we demonstrate also that the whole world, or all things different from
+_God_, were _Created_ by God.
+
+Lastly when we assert, that some _Ideas_ are _Innate_ or _natural_ to us,
+we do not mean that they are always present with us (for so no _Idea_
+would be _Innate_) but only that we have in our selves a Faculty of
+producing them.
+
+OBJECT. XI.
+
+* _The whole stress of which Argument lyes thus; because I know it
+impossible for me to be of the same nature I am, ~viz~, having the Idea
+of a God in me, unless really there were a God, A God (I say) that very
+same God, whose Idea I have in my mind._
+
+Wherefore seeing 'tis not _demonstrated_ that we have an _Idea_ of
+_God_, and the Christian Religion commands us to believe that _God_ is
+_Inconceivable_, that is, as I suppose, that we cannot have an _Idea_ of
+Him, it follows, that the _Existence_ of _God_ is not demonstrated, much
+less _the Creation_.
+
+ANSWER.
+
+When _God_ is said to be _Inconceiveable_ 'tis understood of an _Adequate
+full conception_. But I am 'een tired with often repeating, how
+notwithstanding we may have an _Idea_ of _God_. So that here is nothing
+brought that makes any thing against my _demonstration_.
+
+OBJECT. XII.
+
+_Against the Fourth Meditation, Of Truth and Falshood._
+
+* _By Which I understand that Error (as it is Error) is not a Real Being,
+Dependent on God, but is only a Defect; and that therefore to make me Err
+there is not requisite a Faculty of Erring Given me by God._
+
+'Tis Certain that _Ignorance_ is only a _Defect_, and that there is no
+Occasion of any _Positive Faculty_ to make us _Ignorant_. But this
+position is not so clear in Relation to _Error_, for Stones and Inanimate
+Creatures cannot _Err_, for this Reason only, because they have not the
+_Faculties_ of _Reasoning_ or _Imagination_; from whence 'tis Natural
+for us to Conclude, That to _Err_ there is requisite a _Faculty_ of
+_Judging_, or at least of _Imagining_, both which _Faculties_ are
+_Positive_, and given to all _Creatures_ subject to Error, and to Them
+only.
+
+Moreover _Des-Cartes_ says thus, _I find_ (my Errors) _to Depend on two
+concurring Causes_, viz. _on my Faculty of Knowing, and on my Faculty of
+Choosing, or Freedom of my Will_. Which seems Contradictious to what he
+said before; And here also we may note, that _Freedom of Will_ is assumed
+without any Proof contrary to the Opinion of the Calvinists.
+
+ANSWER.
+
+Tho to make us _Err_ there is requisite a _Faculty_ of _Reasoning_ (or
+rather of _Judging_, that is, of _Affirming_ and _Denying_) because
+_Error_ is the _Defect_ thereof, yet it does not follow from thence that
+this _Defect_ is any thing _Real_, for neither is _Blindness_ a _Real_
+Thing, tho stones cannot be said to be _Blind_, for this Reason only,
+That they are _incapable of sight_. And I much wonder that in all these
+_Objections_ I have not found one _Right Inference_.
+
+I have not here assumed any thing concerning the _Freedom_ of _Mans
+Will_, unless what all Men do Experience in themselves, and is most
+evident by the Light of Nature. Neither see I any Reason, Why he should
+say that this is Contradictious to any former Position.
+
+Perhaps there may be Many, who respecting _Gods predisposal_ of Things
+cannot Comprehend, How their _Freedom_ of _Will_ Consists there-with,
+but yet there is no Man who, respecting himself only, does not find by
+Experience, That 'tis one and the same Thing to be _Willing_, and to be
+_Free_. But 'tis no Place to Enquire what the Opinion of others may be in
+this Matter.
+
+OBJECT. XIII.
+
+* _As for Example, When lately I set my self to examine Whether any
+Thing Do Exist, and found, that from my setting my self to examine such a
+Thing, it evidently follows, That I my self Exist, I could not but Judge,
+what I so clearly understood, to be true, not that I was forced thereto
+by any outward Impulse, but because a strong Propension in my Will did
+follow this Great Light in my Understanding, so that I believed it so
+much the more Freely and Willingly, by how much the Less indifferent I
+was thereunto._
+
+This expression, _Great Light in the Understanding_, is _Metaphorical_,
+and therefore not to be used in Argumentation; And every one, that
+Doubts not of his Opinion, Pretends such a _Light_, and has no less a
+_Propension_ in his _Will_ to Affirm what he doubts not, than He that
+_really_ and _truely_ knows a Thing. Wherefore this _Light_ may be the
+cause of _Defending_ and _Holding_ an Opinion _Obstinately_, but never of
+_knowing_ an Opinion _Truly_.
+
+Moreover not only the _Knowledge_ of _Truth_, but _Belief_ or _Giving
+Assent_, are not the _Acts_ of the _Will_; for Whatever is _proved_ by
+_strong Arguments_, or _Credibly_ told, we Believe whether we will or no.
+
+'Tis true, To _Affirm_ or _Deny_ Propositions, to _Defend_ or _Oppose_
+Propositions, are the _Acts_ of the _Will_; but it does not from thence
+Follow that the _Internal Assent_ depends on the _Will_. Wherefore the
+following Conclusion (_so that in the abuse of our Freedom of Will that
+Privation consists which Constitutes Error_) is not fully Demonstrated.
+
+ANSWER.
+
+'Tis not much _matter_, Whether this expression, _Great Light_, be
+_Argumentative_ or not, so it be explicative, as really it is, For all
+men know, that by _light in the understanding_ is meant _clearness_ of
+_knowledge_, which every one has not, that _thinks_ he has; and this
+hinders not but this _light_ in the _Understanding_ may be very different
+from an _obstinate Opinion_ taken up without _clear perception_.
+
+But when 'tis here said, _That we assent to things clearly perceived
+whether we will or no_, 'tis the same, as if it were said, _that willing
+or nilling, we desire Good clearly known_; whereas the word _Nilling_,
+finds no room in such Expressions, for it implies, that we will and nill
+the same thing.
+
+OBJECT XIV.
+
+_Against the Fifth Meditation. Of the Essence of material things._
+
+* _As when for Example, I imagine a Triangle, tho perhaps such a Figure
+exists no where out of my thoughts, nor ever will exist, yet the Nature
+thereof is determinate, and its Essence or Form is immutable and eternal,
+which is neither made by me nor depends on my mind, as appears from this,
+that many propositions may be demonstrated of this Triangle._
+
+If a Triangle be _no where_, I understand not how it can have _any
+Nature_, for what is _no where_, is not, and therefore has not a _Being_,
+or any _Nature_.
+
+A Triangle in the _Mind_ arises from a Triangle _seen_, or from one made
+up of what has been _seen_, but when once we have given the name of a
+_Triangle_ to a thing (from which we think the _Idea_ of a _Triangle_
+arises) tho the Triangle it self perish, yet the _name_ continues; In
+the like manner, when we have once conceived in our thought, _That all
+the Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones_, and when we have
+given this other name (viz. _Having its three Angles equal to two right
+ones_) to a Triangle, tho afterwards there were no such thing in the
+World, yet the _Name_ would still continue, and this Proposition, _A
+Triangle is a Figure having three Angles equal to two right Ones_, would
+be _eternally true_. But the Nature of a Triangle will not be eternal if
+all Triangles were destroy'd.
+
+This Proposition likewise, _A Man is an Animal_, will be _true_ to
+_Eternity_, because the Word _Animal_ will eternally signifie what the
+Word _Man_ signifies; but certainly if _Mankind_ perish, _Humane Nature_
+will be no longer.
+
+From whence 'tis Manifest, That _Essence_ as 'tis distinguish'd from
+_Existence_ is nothing more than the _Copulation_ of _Names_ by this word
+_Is_, and therefore _Essence_ without _Existence_ is meerly a _Fiction_
+of our own; and as the _Image_ of a _Man_ in the _Mind_ is to a _Man_, so
+it seems _Essence_ is to _Existence_. Or as this Proposition _Socrates
+is a Man_, is to this, _Socrates Is or Exists_, so is the _Essence_ of
+_Socrates_ to his Existence. Now this Proposition, _Socrates is a Man_,
+when _Socrates_ does not exist, signifies only the Connection of the
+Names, and the word _Is_ carries under it the _Image_ of the _unity_ of
+the thing, which is called by these _Two Names_.
+
+ANSWER.
+
+The Difference between _Essence_ and _Existence_ is known to all Men. And
+what is here said of _Eternal Names_ instead of _Eternal Truth_, has been
+long ago sufficiently rejected.
+
+OBJECT. XV.
+
+_Against the Sixth Meditation. Of the Existence of Material Beings._
+
+* _And seeing God has given me no Faculty to know whether these Ideas
+proceed from Bodies or not, but rather a strong inclination to believe,
+that these Ideas are sent from Bodies, I see no reason, why God should
+not be counted a Deceiver, if these Ideas came from any where, but from
+Corporeal Beings, and therefore we must conclude that Corporeal Beings
+exist._
+
+'Tis a received opinion, that Physicians who deceive their Patients for
+their Healths sake, and Fathers, who deceive their Children for their
+Good, are guilty thereby of no Crimes, for the _fault_ of _Deceit_ does
+not consist in the _falsity_ of _Words_; but in the _Injury_ done to the
+Person deceived.
+
+Let _D. Cartes_ therefore consider whether this Proposition, _God can
+upon no account deceive us_, Universally taken be _true_; For if it be
+not _true_ so universally taken, that Conclusion, _Therefore Corporeal
+Beings exist_, will not follow.
+
+ANSWER.
+
+'Tis not requisite for the establishment of my Conclusion, _That we
+cannot be deceived on any account_ (for I willingly granted, that we
+may be _often_ deceived) but that we cannot be deceived, when that our
+_Error_ argues that in _God_ there is such a _Will_ to _Cheat_ us as
+would be _contradictious_ to his _Nature_. And here again we have a
+_wrong inference_ in this _Objection_.
+
+The Last Objection.
+
+* _For now I plainly discover a great difference between them (~that is
+sleep and waking~) for my Dreams are never conjoyn'd by my Memory, with
+the other Actions of my Life._
+
+I desire to Know, whether it be certain, that a Man _dreaming_, that the
+_doubts_ whether he _dream or not_, may not _Dream_, that he joyns his
+_Dream_ to the _Ideas_ of things past long since; if he may, than those
+_Actions_ of his past life, may be thought as _true_ if he were awake.
+
+Moreover because (as _D. Cartes_ affirms) the _Certainty_ and _truth_ of
+all _knowledge_ depends only on the _knowledge_ of the _True God_, either
+an Atheist cannot from the _Memory_ of his past life conclude that he
+is _awake_, or else 'tis possible for a man to know that he is _awake_
+without the _Knowledge_ of the _True God_.
+
+ANSWER.
+
+A Man that _dreams_ cannot _really_ connect his _dreams_ with the _Ideas_
+of past things, tho, I confess, he may _dream_ that he so connects them;
+for whoever deny'd That a man when he is _a sleep_ may be _Deceived_? But
+when he awakens he may easily discover his Error.
+
+An Atheist from the memory of his past life may collect that he is awake,
+but he cannot know, that this _Sign_ is sufficient to make him _certain_,
+that he is not _deceived_, unless he know that he is _created_ by a _God_
+that will not _deceive_ him.
+
+FINIS.
+
+_A Catalogue of some Books sold by ~Benjamin Took~ at the Ship in St.
+~Pauls~ Church-yard._
+
+_Herodoti Halicarnassei Historiarum libri novem ejusdem narratio de
+vita Homeri, Gr. Lat. & H. Stephani Apologia pro Herodoto accesserunt
+huic Edition Chronologia Historia, & Tabula Geographica Herodotææ,
+necnon variantes Lectiones & notæ ex pluribus M. S. S. Cod. & Antiquis
+scriptoribus collectæ._ fol.
+
+_Francisci Suarez. Doct. Theol. Grau. Tractatus de Legibus ac Deo
+Legislatore in decem libros distributus._ fol.
+
+_Thorndicius de Ratione ac Jure finiendi Controversias Ecclesiæ._ fol.
+
+The Holy Court in five Tomes, written in French by _N. Causin_,
+translated by Sir _T. H._ the fourth Edition. _fol._
+
+The Works of the most Reverend _John Bramhal_, D. D. late L. Archbishop
+of _Armagh_, some of which never before printed, with the life of the
+Author, _&c._ _fol._
+
+The History and Vindication of the Irish Remonstrance against all
+Calumnies and Censures in several Treatises. _folio._
+
+A Collection of all the Statutes now in use in the Kingdom of _Ireland_,
+with Notes in the Margin. And likewise the Acts of Settlement and
+Explanation, with the rest of the Acts, made in the Reign of his Majesty
+that now is, to the dissolution of the Parliament, _Aug. 7. 1666_.
+
+Several Chyrurgical Treatises by _Rich. Wiseman_, Serjeant Chyrurgion.
+_folio._
+
+The Primitive Origination of Mankind considered and examined, according
+to the light of Nature, written by Sir _M. Hale_, Kt. late Lord Chief
+Justice of the Kings Bench. _folio._
+
+_Sir Rich. Baker_'s Chronicle of the Kings of _England_ from the Romans
+Government to this time.
+
+Thirty five Sermons by the Right Reverend _R. Sanderson_ late Lord Bishop
+of _Lincoln_.
+
+_Le Beau Pledeur_, a Book of Entries containing Declarations,
+Informations, and other select and approved Pleadings; with special
+Verdicts and Demurrers in most actions real, personal, and mixt, which
+have been argued and adjudged in the Courts of _Westminster_, with
+faithfull references to the most authentick Law Books, by Sir _Humphry
+Winch_, Kt. sometimes one of the Justices of the Court of Common Pleas,
+_fol._
+
+_Etymologicon Linguæ Anglicanæ; seu explicatio vocum Anglicarum
+Etymologica ex propriis fontibus. Omnia Alphabetico ordine in quinque
+distinctas Classes digesta. Authore Step. Skinner, M.D._ folio.
+
+A large Dictionary in three Parts by _Tho. Holyoake_ D.D. _folio._
+
+_Horæ Hebraicæ & Talmudicæ impensæ in Evangelium S. Johannis._ p. I.
+Lightfoot. quarto.
+
+Doctor _Browns_ Travels in _Hungaria_, _Servia_, _Bulgaria_, _Macedonia_,
+&c. As also through a great part of _Germany_, with Observations on the
+Mines, Baths, and mineral Waters in those Parts, illustrated with the
+Figures of some habits and remarkable places. _quarto._
+
+A Representation of the State of Christianity in _England_, and of its
+Decay and Danger from Sectaries as well as Papists.
+
+The Controversial Letters, or the grand Controversie, concerning the
+pretended authority of Popes and true Soveraign of Kings, in 16 Letters.
+_quarto._
+
+A True Widow, a Comedy written by _T. Shadwel_. _quarto._
+
+A Vindication of the sincerity of the Protestant Religion in the point of
+Obedience to Sovereigns, opposed to the Doctrine of Rebellion authorised
+and practised by the Pope and the Jesuites, by _Peter Du Moulin_.
+_quarto._
+
+_Phocæna_, or the Anatomy of a Porpess dissected at _Gresham_ Colledge,
+with a Preliminary discourse concerning Anatomy, and a Natural History of
+Animals. _quar._
+
+_Dodwells_ separation of Churches from Episcopal Government, as practised
+by the present Nonconformists proved Schismatical from such principles
+as are least controverted, and do withal most popularly explain the
+sinfulness and mischief of Schism. _quarto._
+
+--Two Letters of Advice. 1. For the susception of Holy Orders. 2. For
+Studies Theological, especially such as are rational; at the end of the
+former is inserted a Catalogue of the Christian Writers, and genuine
+works of the first three Centuries. _octavo._
+
+--Some Considerations of present Concernment; how far Romanists may be
+trusted by Princes of another Perswasion. _octavo._
+
+--Two short Discourses against the Romanists 1. An Account of the
+fundamental Principle of Popery. 2. An Answer to six Queries. _twelves._
+
+Navigation and Commerce their Original and Progress, containing a
+succinct account of Traffick in general, by _John Evelin_, Esq; _octavo._
+
+Of Gifts and Offices in the publick Worship of God, in three parts,
+endeavouring an impartial account, what was in the inspired Age of the
+Church, what succeeded in the more ordinary State; what reasonably may
+be allowed in Prayer, singing, and preaching, by _Edw. Wetenhal_, D.D.
+_octavo._
+
+The Catechism of the Church of _England_ with marginal Notes, very
+plainly setting forth its meaning, and proving the same out of the
+Scriptures, for the use of Schools by _Edw. Wetenhal_, D.D.
+
+Poems and Songs by _Tho. Flatman_. _octa._
+
+Poems by _N. Tate_. _octavo._
+
+The Degrees of Consanguinity affinity described and delineated, by
+_Robert Dixon_, D.D. in _octavo_.
+
+The French Gardiner instructing how to cultivate all sorts of Fruit Trees
+and Herbs for the Garden, together with instructions to dry and conserve
+them, written in French, and Englished by _Jo. Evelin_, Esq; in _octavo_.
+
+_Ataxiæ Obstaculum_; being an Answer to several Queries dispersed in
+several parts of _Glocestershire_ in _octavo_.
+
+_S. Gardinerus S. T. P. de Trinitate contra Sandium_, in octavo.
+
+_Deus Nobiscum._ A Narrative of a great Deliverance at Sea, by _W.
+Johnson_, D.D. _Phædri Augusti Cæsaris Liberti Fabularum Esopiarum Libri
+V. in usum scholarum Anglæ._ octavo.
+
+A Short View of the chief points in Controversie between the Reformed
+Churches, and the Church of _Rome_, by Dr. _Peter Du Moulin_. in _octavo_.
+
+The Country Parsons advice to his Parishioners in two Parts. 1.
+Containing a plain and serious Exhortation to a Religious Life. 2.
+General Directions how to live accordingly. in _octavo_.
+
+FINIS.
\ No newline at end of file