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+[Illustration]
+
+The Critique of Pure Reason
+
+By Immanuel Kant
+
+Translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn
+
+Contents
+
+ Preface to the First Edition (1781)
+
+ Preface to the Second Edition (1787)
+
+ Introduction
+
+ I. Of the difference between Pure and Empirical Knowledge
+
+ II. The Human Intellect, even in an Unphilosophical State, is in
+ Possession of Certain Cognitions "à priori".
+
+ III. Philosophy stands in need of a Science which shall Determine the
+ Possibility, Principles, and Extent of Human Knowledge "à priori"
+
+ IV. Of the Difference Between Analytical and Synthetical Judgements.
+
+ V. In all Theoretical Sciences of Reason, Synthetical Judgements "à
+ priori" are contained as Principles.
+
+ VI. The Universal Problem of Pure Reason.
+
+ VII. Idea and Division of a Particular Science, under the Name of a
+ Critique of Pure Reason.
+
+ I. Transcendental Doctrine of Elements
+
+ First Part--TRANSCENDENTAL ÆSTHETIC
+
+ § 1. Introductory
+
+ SECTION I. OF SPACE
+
+ § 2. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception.
+
+ § 3. Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Space.
+
+ § 4. Conclusions from the foregoing Conceptions.
+
+ SECTION II. OF TIME
+
+ § 5. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception.
+
+ § 6. Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Time.
+
+ § 7. Conclusions from the above Conceptions.
+
+ § 8. Elucidation.
+
+ § 9. General Remarks on Transcendental Æsthetic.
+
+ § 10. Conclusion of the Transcendental Æsthetic.
+
+ Second Part--TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC
+
+ Introduction. Idea of a Transcendental Logic
+
+ I. Of Logic in General
+
+ II. Of Transcendental Logic
+
+ III. Of the Division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic
+
+ IV. Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into Transcendental
+ Analytic and Dialectic
+
+ FIRST DIVISION--TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC
+
+ BOOK I. Analytic of Conceptions. § 2
+
+ Chapter I. Of the Transcendental Clue to the Discovery of all Pure
+ Conceptions of the Understanding
+
+ Introductory § 3
+
+ Section I. Of the Logical Use of the Understanding in General. § 4
+
+ Section II. Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in
+ Judgements. § 5
+
+ Section III. Of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding, or
+ Categories. § 6
+
+ Chapter II. Of the Deduction of the Pure Conception of the
+ Understanding
+
+ Section I. Of the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction in general
+ § 9
+
+ Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. § 10
+
+ Section II Transcendental Deduction of the pure Conceptions of the
+ Understanding.
+
+ Of the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifold representations
+ given by Sense. § 11.
+
+ Of the Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception. § 12
+
+ The Principle of the Synthetical Unity of Apperception is the highest
+ Principle of all exercise of the Understanding. § 13
+
+ What Objective Unity of Self-consciousness is. § 14
+
+ The Logical Form of all Judgements consists in the Objective Unity of
+ Apperception of the Conceptions contained therein. § 15
+
+ All Sensuous Intuitions are subject to the Categories, as Conditions
+ under which alone the manifold Content of them can be united in one
+ Consciousness. § 16
+
+ Observation. § 17
+
+ In Cognition, its Application to Objects of Experience is the only
+ legitimate use of the Category. § 18
+
+ Of the Application of the Categories to Objects of the Senses in
+ general. § 20
+
+ Transcendental Deduction of the universally possible employment in
+ experience of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding. § 22
+
+ Result of this Deduction of the Conceptions of the Understanding. § 23
+
+ BOOK II. Analytic of Principles
+
+ INTRODUCTION. Of the Transcendental Faculty of judgement in General.
+
+ TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE FACULTY OF JUDGEMENT OR, ANALYTIC OF
+ PRINCIPLES.
+
+ Chapter I. Of the Schematism at of the Pure Conceptions of the
+ Understanding.
+
+ Chapter II. System of all Principles of the Pure Understanding.
+
+ Section I. Of the Supreme Principle of all Analytical Judgements.
+
+ Section II. Of the Supreme Principle of all Synthetical Judgements.
+
+ Section III. Systematic Representation of all Synthetical Principles
+ of the Pure Understanding.
+
+ Chapter III Of the Ground of the Division of all Objects into
+ Phenomena and Noumena.
+
+ APPENDIX.
+
+ SECOND DIVISION--TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC
+
+ TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. INTRODUCTION.
+
+ I. Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance.
+
+ II. Of Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusory Appearance.
+
+ TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC--BOOK I--OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF PURE REASON.
+
+ Section I--Of Ideas in General.
+
+ Section II. Of Transcendental Ideas.
+
+ Section III. System of Transcendental Ideas.
+
+ TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC--BOOK II--OF THE DIALECTICAL PROCEDURE OF PURE
+ REASON.
+
+ Chapter I. Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason.
+
+ Chapter II. The Antinomy of Pure Reason.
+
+ Section I. System of Cosmological Ideas.
+
+ Section II. Antithetic of Pure Reason.
+
+ Section III. Of the Interest of Reason in these Self-contradictions.
+
+ Section IV. Of the necessity imposed upon Pure Reason of presenting a
+ Solution of its Transcendental Problems.
+
+ Section V. Sceptical Exposition of the Cosmological Problems presented
+ in the four Transcendental Ideas.
+
+ Section VI. Transcendental Idealism as the Key to the Solution of Pure
+ Cosmological Dialectic.
+
+ Section VII. Critical Solution of the Cosmological Problem.
+
+ Section VIII. Regulative Principle of Pure Reason in relation to the
+ Cosmological Ideas.
+
+ Section IX. Of the Empirical Use of the Regulative Principle of Reason
+ with regard to the Cosmological Ideas.
+
+ I. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the
+ Composition of Phenomena in the Universe.
+
+ II. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Division
+ of a Whole given in Intuition.
+
+ III. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the
+ Deduction of Cosmical Events from their Causes.
+
+ IV. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the
+ Dependence of Phenomenal Existences.
+
+ Chapter III. The Ideal of Pure Reason.
+
+ Section I. Of the Ideal in General.
+
+ Section II. Of the Transcendental Ideal (Prototypon Trancendentale).
+
+ Section III. Of the Arguments employed by Speculative Reason in Proof
+ of the Existence of a Supreme Being.
+
+ Section IV. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the
+ Existence of God.
+
+ Section V. Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the
+ Existence of God.
+
+ Section VI. Of the Impossibility of a Physico-Theological Proof.
+
+ Section VII. Critique of all Theology based upon Speculative
+ Principles of Reason.
+
+ Appendix. Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason.
+
+ II. Transcendental Doctrine of Method
+
+ Chapter I. The Discipline of Pure Reason.
+
+ Section I. The Discipline of Pure Reason in the Sphere of Dogmatism.
+
+ Section II. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemics.
+
+ Section III. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Hypothesis.
+
+ Section IV. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Relation to Proofs.
+
+ Chapter II. The Canon of Pure Reason.
+
+ Section I. Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Reason.
+
+ Section II. Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Determining Ground
+ of the Ultimate End of Pure Reason.
+
+ Section III. Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief.
+
+ Chapter III. The Architectonic of Pure Reason.
+
+ Chapter IV. The History of Pure Reason.
+
+PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION 1781
+
+Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to
+consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by
+its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every
+faculty of the mind.
+
+It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins
+with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of
+experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same
+time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in
+obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote
+conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours
+must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to
+present themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse
+to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are
+regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion
+and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent
+errors, which, however, it is unable to discover, because the
+principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be
+tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless contests is called
+_Metaphysic_.
+
+Time was, when she was the _queen_ of all the sciences; and, if we take
+the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the
+high importance of her object-matter, this title of honour. Now, it is
+the fashion of the time to heap contempt and scorn upon her; and the
+matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba:
+
+Modo maxima rerum,
+Tot generis, natisque potens...
+Nunc trahor exul, inops.
+--Ovid, Metamorphoses. xiii
+
+At first, her government, under the administration of the _dogmatists_,
+was an absolute _despotism_. But, as the legislative continued to show
+traces of the ancient barbaric rule, her empire gradually broke up, and
+intestine wars introduced the reign of _anarchy;_ while the _sceptics_,
+like nomadic tribes, who hate a permanent habitation and settled mode
+of living, attacked from time to time those who had organized
+themselves into civil communities. But their number was, very happily,
+small; and thus they could not entirely put a stop to the exertions of
+those who persisted in raising new edifices, although on no settled or
+uniform plan. In recent times the hope dawned upon us of seeing those
+disputes settled, and the legitimacy of her claims established by a
+kind of _physiology_ of the human understanding--that of the celebrated
+Locke. But it was found that--although it was affirmed that this
+so-called queen could not refer her descent to any higher source than
+that of common experience, a circumstance which necessarily brought
+suspicion on her claims--as this _genealogy_ was incorrect, she
+persisted in the advancement of her claims to sovereignty. Thus
+metaphysics necessarily fell back into the antiquated and rotten
+constitution of _dogmatism_, and again became obnoxious to the contempt
+from which efforts had been made to save it. At present, as all
+methods, according to the general persuasion, have been tried in vain,
+there reigns nought but weariness and complete _indifferentism_--the
+mother of chaos and night in the scientific world, but at the same time
+the source of, or at least the prelude to, the re-creation and
+reinstallation of a science, when it has fallen into confusion,
+obscurity, and disuse from ill directed effort.
+
+For it is in reality vain to profess _indifference_ in regard to such
+inquiries, the object of which cannot be indifferent to humanity.
+Besides, these pretended _indifferentists_, however much they may try
+to disguise themselves by the assumption of a popular style and by
+changes on the language of the schools, unavoidably fall into
+metaphysical declarations and propositions, which they profess to
+regard with so much contempt. At the same time, this indifference,
+which has arisen in the world of science, and which relates to that
+kind of knowledge which we should wish to see destroyed the last, is a
+phenomenon that well deserves our attention and reflection. It is
+plainly not the effect of the levity, but of the matured _judgement_[1]
+of the age, which refuses to be any longer entertained with illusory
+knowledge, It is, in fact, a call to reason, again to undertake the
+most laborious of all tasks--that of self-examination, and to establish
+a tribunal, which may secure it in its well-grounded claims, while it
+pronounces against all baseless assumptions and pretensions, not in an
+arbitrary manner, but according to its own eternal and unchangeable
+laws. This tribunal is nothing less than the _Critical Investigation of
+Pure Reason_.
+
+ [1] We very often hear complaints of the shallowness of the present
+ age, and of the decay of profound science. But I do not think that
+ those which rest upon a secure foundation, such as mathematics,
+ physical science, etc., in the least deserve this reproach, but that
+ they rather maintain their ancient fame, and in the latter case,
+ indeed, far surpass it. The same would be the case with the other
+ kinds of cognition, if their principles were but firmly established.
+ In the absence of this security, indifference, doubt, and finally,
+ severe criticism are rather signs of a profound habit of thought. Our
+ age is the age of criticism, to which everything must be subjected.
+ The sacredness of religion, and the authority of legislation, are by
+ many regarded as grounds of exemption from the examination of this
+ tribunal. But, if they are exempted, they become the subjects of just
+ suspicion, and cannot lay claim to sincere respect, which reason
+ accords only to that which has stood the test of a free and public
+ examination.
+
+I do not mean by this a criticism of books and systems, but a critical
+inquiry into the faculty of reason, with reference to the cognitions to
+which it strives to attain _without the aid of experience;_ in other
+words, the solution of the question regarding the possibility or
+impossibility of metaphysics, and the determination of the origin, as
+well as of the extent and limits of this science. All this must be done
+on the basis of principles.
+
+This path--the only one now remaining--has been entered upon by me; and I
+flatter myself that I have, in this way, discovered the cause of--and
+consequently the mode of removing--all the errors which have hitherto
+set reason at variance with itself, in the sphere of non-empirical
+thought. I have not returned an evasive answer to the questions of
+reason, by alleging the inability and limitation of the faculties of
+the mind; I have, on the contrary, examined them completely in the
+light of principles, and, after having discovered the cause of the
+doubts and contradictions into which reason fell, have solved them to
+its perfect satisfaction. It is true, these questions have not been
+solved as dogmatism, in its vain fancies and desires, had expected; for
+it can only be satisfied by the exercise of magical arts, and of these
+I have no knowledge. But neither do these come within the compass of
+our mental powers; and it was the duty of philosophy to destroy the
+illusions which had their origin in misconceptions, whatever darling
+hopes and valued expectations may be ruined by its explanations. My
+chief aim in this work has been thoroughness; and I make bold to say
+that there is not a single metaphysical problem that does not find its
+solution, or at least the key to its solution, here. Pure reason is a
+perfect unity; and therefore, if the principle presented by it prove to
+be insufficient for the solution of even a single one of those
+questions to which the very nature of reason gives birth, we must
+reject it, as we could not be perfectly certain of its sufficiency in
+the case of the others.
+
+While I say this, I think I see upon the countenance of the reader
+signs of dissatisfaction mingled with contempt, when he hears
+declarations which sound so boastful and extravagant; and yet they are
+beyond comparison more moderate than those advanced by the commonest
+author of the commonest philosophical programme, in which the dogmatist
+professes to demonstrate the simple nature of the soul, or the
+necessity of a primal being. Such a dogmatist promises to extend human
+knowledge beyond the limits of possible experience; while I humbly
+confess that this is completely beyond my power. Instead of any such
+attempt, I confine myself to the examination of reason alone and its
+pure thought; and I do not need to seek far for the sum-total of its
+cognition, because it has its seat in my own mind. Besides, common
+logic presents me with a complete and systematic catalogue of all the
+simple operations of reason; and it is my task to answer the question
+how far reason can go, without the material presented and the aid
+furnished by experience.
+
+So much for the completeness and thoroughness necessary in the
+execution of the present task. The aims set before us are not
+arbitrarily proposed, but are imposed upon us by the nature of
+cognition itself.
+
+The above remarks relate to the _matter_ of our critical inquiry. As
+regards the _form_, there are two indispensable conditions, which any
+one who undertakes so difficult a task as that of a critique of pure
+reason, is bound to fulfil. These conditions are _certitude_ and
+_clearness_.
+
+As regards _certitude_, I have fully convinced myself that, in this
+sphere of thought, _opinion_ is perfectly inadmissible, and that
+everything which bears the least semblance of an hypothesis must be
+excluded, as of no value in such discussions. For it is a necessary
+condition of every cognition that is to be established upon _à priori_
+grounds that it shall be held to be absolutely necessary; much more is
+this the case with an attempt to determine all pure _à priori_
+cognition, and to furnish the standard--and consequently an example--of
+all apodeictic (philosophical) certitude. Whether I have succeeded in
+what I professed to do, it is for the reader to determine; it is the
+author's business merely to adduce grounds and reasons, without
+determining what influence these ought to have on the mind of his
+judges. But, lest anything he may have said may become the innocent
+cause of doubt in their minds, or tend to weaken the effect which his
+arguments might otherwise produce--he may be allowed to point out those
+passages which may occasion mistrust or difficulty, although these do
+not concern the main purpose of the present work. He does this solely
+with the view of removing from the mind of the reader any doubts which
+might affect his judgement of the work as a whole, and in regard to its
+ultimate aim.
+
+I know no investigations more necessary for a full insight into the
+nature of the faculty which we call _understanding_, and at the same
+time for the determination of the rules and limits of its use, than
+those undertaken in the second chapter of the "Transcendental
+Analytic," under the title of _Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of the
+Understanding;_ and they have also cost me by far the greatest
+labour--labour which, I hope, will not remain uncompensated. The view
+there taken, which goes somewhat deeply into the subject, has two
+sides. The one relates to the objects of the pure understanding, and is
+intended to demonstrate and to render comprehensible the objective
+validity of its _à priori_ conceptions; and it forms for this reason an
+essential part of the Critique. The other considers the pure
+understanding itself, its possibility and its powers of cognition--that
+is, from a subjective point of view; and, although this exposition is
+of great importance, it does not belong essentially to the main purpose
+of the work, because the grand question is what and how much can reason
+and understanding, apart from experience, cognize, and not, how is the
+_faculty of thought_ itself possible? As the latter is an inquiry into
+the cause of a given effect, and has thus in it some semblance of an
+hypothesis (although, as I shall show on another occasion, this is
+really not the fact), it would seem that, in the present instance, I
+had allowed myself to enounce a mere _opinion_, and that the reader
+must therefore be at liberty to hold a different _opinion_. But I beg
+to remind him that, if my subjective deduction does not produce in his
+mind the conviction of its certitude at which I aimed, the objective
+deduction, with which alone the present work is properly concerned, is
+in every respect satisfactory.
+
+As regards _clearness_, the reader has a right to demand, in the first
+place, _discursive_ or logical clearness, that is, on the basis of
+conceptions, and, secondly, _intuitive_ or æsthetic clearness, by means
+of intuitions, that is, by examples or other modes of illustration _in
+concreto_. I have done what I could for the first kind of
+intelligibility. This was essential to my purpose; and it thus became
+the accidental cause of my inability to do complete justice to the
+second requirement. I have been almost always at a loss, during the
+progress of this work, how to settle this question. Examples and
+illustrations always appeared to me necessary, and, in the first sketch
+of the Critique, naturally fell into their proper places. But I very
+soon became aware of the magnitude of my task, and the numerous
+problems with which I should be engaged; and, as I perceived that this
+critical investigation would, even if delivered in the driest
+_scholastic_ manner, be far from being brief, I found it unadvisable to
+enlarge it still more with examples and explanations, which are
+necessary only from a _popular_ point of view. I was induced to take
+this course from the consideration also that the present work is not
+intended for popular use, that those devoted to science do not require
+such helps, although they are always acceptable, and that they would
+have materially interfered with my present purpose. Abbé Terrasson
+remarks with great justice that, if we estimate the size of a work, not
+from the number of its pages, but from the time which we require to
+make ourselves master of it, it may be said of many a book--_that it
+would be much shorter, if it were not so short_. On the other hand, as
+regards the comprehensibility of a system of speculative cognition,
+connected under a single principle, we may say with equal justice: many
+a book would have been much clearer, if it had not been intended to be
+so very clear. For explanations and examples, and other helps to
+intelligibility, aid us in the comprehension of _parts_, but they
+distract the attention, dissipate the mental power of the reader, and
+stand in the way of his forming a clear conception of the _whole;_ as
+he cannot attain soon enough to a survey of the system, and the
+colouring and embellishments bestowed upon it prevent his observing its
+articulation or organization--which is the most important consideration
+with him, when he comes to judge of its unity and stability.
+
+The reader must naturally have a strong inducement to co-operate with
+the present author, if he has formed the intention of erecting a
+complete and solid edifice of metaphysical science, according to the
+plan now laid before him. Metaphysics, as here represented, is the only
+science which admits of completion--and with little labour, if it is
+united, in a short time; so that nothing will be left to future
+generations except the task of illustrating and applying it
+_didactically_. For this science is nothing more than the inventory of
+all that is given us by _pure reason_, systematically arranged. Nothing
+can escape our notice; for what reason produces from itself cannot lie
+concealed, but must be brought to the light by reason itself, so soon
+as we have discovered the common principle of the ideas we seek. The
+perfect unity of this kind of cognitions, which are based upon pure
+conceptions, and uninfluenced by any empirical element, or any peculiar
+intuition leading to determinate experience, renders this completeness
+not only practicable, but also necessary.
+
+Tecum habita, et nôris quam sit tibi curta supellex.
+--Persius. Satirae iv. 52.
+
+Such a system of pure speculative reason I hope to be able to publish
+under the title of _Metaphysic of Nature_[2]. The content of this work
+(which will not be half so long) will be very much richer than that of
+the present Critique, which has to discover the sources of this
+cognition and expose the conditions of its possibility, and at the same
+time to clear and level a fit foundation for the scientific edifice. In
+the present work, I look for the patient hearing and the impartiality
+of a _judge;_ in the other, for the good-will and assistance of a
+_co-labourer_. For, however complete the list of _principles_ for this
+system may be in the Critique, the correctness of the system requires
+that no _deduced_ conceptions should be absent. These cannot be
+presented _à priori_, but must be gradually discovered; and, while the
+_synthesis_ of conceptions has been fully exhausted in the Critique, it
+is necessary that, in the proposed work, the same should be the case
+with their _analysis_. But this will be rather an amusement than a
+labour.
+
+ [2] In contradistinction to the Metaphysic of Ethics. This work was
+ never published.
+
+PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION 1787
+
+Whether the treatment of that portion of our knowledge which lies
+within the province of pure reason advances with that undeviating
+certainty which characterizes the progress of _science_, we shall be at
+no loss to determine. If we find those who are engaged in metaphysical
+pursuits, unable to come to an understanding as to the method which
+they ought to follow; if we find them, after the most elaborate
+preparations, invariably brought to a stand before the goal is reached,
+and compelled to retrace their steps and strike into fresh paths, we
+may then feel quite sure that they are far from having attained to the
+certainty of scientific progress and may rather be said to be merely
+groping about in the dark. In these circumstances we shall render an
+important service to reason if we succeed in simply indicating the path
+along which it must travel, in order to arrive at any results--even if
+it should be found necessary to abandon many of those aims which,
+without reflection, have been proposed for its attainment.
+
+That _Logic_ has advanced in this sure course, even from the earliest
+times, is apparent from the fact that, since Aristotle, it has been
+unable to advance a step and, thus, to all appearance has reached its
+completion. For, if some of the moderns have thought to enlarge its
+domain by introducing _psychological_ discussions on the mental
+faculties, such as imagination and wit, _metaphysical_, discussions on
+the origin of knowledge and the different kinds of certitude, according
+to the difference of the objects (idealism, scepticism, and so on), or
+_anthropological_ discussions on prejudices, their causes and remedies:
+this attempt, on the part of these authors, only shows their ignorance
+of the peculiar nature of logical science. We do not enlarge but
+disfigure the sciences when we lose sight of their respective limits
+and allow them to run into one another. Now logic is enclosed within
+limits which admit of perfectly clear definition; it is a science which
+has for its object nothing but the exposition and proof of the _formal_
+laws of all thought, whether it be _à priori_ or empirical, whatever be
+its origin or its object, and whatever the difficulties--natural or
+accidental--which it encounters in the human mind.
+
+The early success of logic must be attributed exclusively to the
+narrowness of its field, in which abstraction may, or rather must, be
+made of all the objects of cognition with their characteristic
+distinctions, and in which the understanding has only to deal with
+itself and with its own forms. It is, obviously, a much more difficult
+task for reason to strike into the sure path of science, where it has
+to deal not simply with itself, but with objects external to itself.
+Hence, logic is properly only a _propædeutic_--forms, as it were, the
+vestibule of the sciences; and while it is necessary to enable us to
+form a correct judgement with regard to the various branches of
+knowledge, still the acquisition of real, substantive knowledge is to
+be sought only in the sciences properly so called, that is, in the
+objective sciences.
+
+Now these sciences, if they can be termed rational at all, must contain
+elements of _à priori_ cognition, and this cognition may stand in a
+twofold relation to its object. Either it may have to _determine_ the
+conception of the object--which must be supplied extraneously, or it may
+have to _establish its reality_. The former is _theoretical_, the
+latter _practical_, rational cognition. In both, the _pure_ or _à
+priori_ element must be treated first, and must be carefully
+distinguished from that which is supplied from other sources. Any other
+method can only lead to irremediable confusion.
+
+_Mathematics_ and _physics_ are the two theoretical sciences which have
+to determine their objects _à priori_. The former is purely _à priori_,
+the latter is partially so, but is also dependent on other sources of
+cognition.
+
+In the earliest times of which history affords us any record,
+_mathematics_ had already entered on the sure course of science, among
+that wonderful nation, the Greeks. Still it is not to be supposed that
+it was as easy for this science to strike into, or rather to construct
+for itself, that royal road, as it was for logic, in which reason has
+only to deal with itself. On the contrary, I believe that it must have
+remained long--chiefly among the Egyptians--in the stage of blind groping
+after its true aims and destination, and that it was revolutionized by
+the happy idea of one man, who struck out and determined for all time
+the path which this science must follow, and which admits of an
+indefinite advancement. The history of this intellectual
+revolution--much more important in its results than the discovery of the
+passage round the celebrated Cape of Good Hope--and of its author, has
+not been preserved. But Diogenes Laertius, in naming the supposed
+discoverer of some of the simplest elements of geometrical
+demonstration--elements which, according to the ordinary opinion, do not
+even require to be proved--makes it apparent that the change introduced
+by the first indication of this new path, must have seemed of the
+utmost importance to the mathematicians of that age, and it has thus
+been secured against the chance of oblivion. A new light must have
+flashed on the mind of the first man (_Thales_, or whatever may have
+been his name) who demonstrated the properties of the _isosceles_
+triangle. For he found that it was not sufficient to meditate on the
+figure, as it lay before his eyes, or the conception of it, as it
+existed in his mind, and thus endeavour to get at the knowledge of its
+properties, but that it was necessary to produce these properties, as
+it were, by a positive _à priori construction;_ and that, in order to
+arrive with certainty at _à priori_ cognition, he must not attribute to
+the object any other properties than those which necessarily followed
+from that which he had himself, in accordance with his conception,
+placed in the object.
+
+A much longer period elapsed before _Physics_ entered on the highway of
+science. For it is only about a century and a half since the wise BACON
+gave a new direction to physical studies, or rather--as others were
+already on the right track--imparted fresh vigour to the pursuit of this
+new direction. Here, too, as in the case of mathematics, we find
+evidence of a rapid intellectual revolution. In the remarks which
+follow I shall confine myself to the _empirical_ side of natural
+science.
+
+When GALILEI experimented with balls of a definite weight on the
+inclined plane, when TORRICELLI caused the air to sustain a weight
+which he had calculated beforehand to be equal to that of a definite
+column of water, or when STAHL, at a later period, converted metals
+into lime, and reconverted lime into metal, by the addition and
+subtraction of certain elements;[3] a light broke upon all natural
+philosophers. They learned that reason only perceives that which it
+produces after its own design; that it must not be content to follow,
+as it were, in the leading-strings of nature, but must proceed in
+advance with principles of judgement according to unvarying laws, and
+compel nature to reply its questions. For accidental observations, made
+according to no preconceived plan, cannot be united under a necessary
+law. But it is this that reason seeks for and requires. It is only the
+principles of reason which can give to concordant phenomena the
+validity of laws, and it is only when experiment is directed by these
+rational principles that it can have any real utility. Reason must
+approach nature with the view, indeed, of receiving information from
+it, not, however, in the character of a pupil, who listens to all that
+his master chooses to tell him, but in that of a judge, who compels the
+witnesses to reply to those questions which he himself thinks fit to
+propose. To this single idea must the revolution be ascribed, by which,
+after groping in the dark for so many centuries, natural science was at
+length conducted into the path of certain progress.
+
+ [3] I do not here follow with exactness the history of the
+ experimental method, of which, indeed, the first steps are involved in
+ some obscurity.
+
+We come now to _metaphysics_, a purely speculative science, which
+occupies a completely isolated position and is entirely independent of
+the teachings of experience. It deals with mere conceptions--not, like
+mathematics, with conceptions applied to intuition--and in it, reason is
+the pupil of itself alone. It is the oldest of the sciences, and would
+still survive, even if all the rest were swallowed up in the abyss of
+an all-destroying barbarism. But it has not yet had the good fortune to
+attain to the sure scientific method. This will be apparent; if we
+apply the tests which we proposed at the outset. We find that reason
+perpetually comes to a stand, when it attempts to gain _à priori_ the
+perception even of those laws which the most common experience
+confirms. We find it compelled to retrace its steps in innumerable
+instances, and to abandon the path on which it had entered, because
+this does not lead to the desired result. We find, too, that those who
+are engaged in metaphysical pursuits are far from being able to agree
+among themselves, but that, on the contrary, this science appears to
+furnish an arena specially adapted for the display of skill or the
+exercise of strength in mock-contests--a field in which no combatant
+ever yet succeeded in gaining an inch of ground, in which, at least, no
+victory was ever yet crowned with permanent possession.
+
+This leads us to inquire why it is that, in metaphysics, the sure path
+of science has not hitherto been found. Shall we suppose that it is
+impossible to discover it? Why then should nature have visited our
+reason with restless aspirations after it, as if it were one of our
+weightiest concerns? Nay, more, how little cause should we have to
+place confidence in our reason, if it abandons us in a matter about
+which, most of all, we desire to know the truth--and not only so, but
+even allures us to the pursuit of vain phantoms, only to betray us in
+the end? Or, if the path has only hitherto been missed, what
+indications do we possess to guide us in a renewed investigation, and
+to enable us to hope for greater success than has fallen to the lot of
+our predecessors?
+
+It appears to me that the examples of mathematics and natural
+philosophy, which, as we have seen, were brought into their present
+condition by a sudden revolution, are sufficiently remarkable to fix
+our attention on the essential circumstances of the change which has
+proved so advantageous to them, and to induce us to make the experiment
+of imitating them, so far as the analogy which, as rational sciences,
+they bear to metaphysics may permit. It has hitherto been assumed that
+our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to
+ascertain anything about these objects _à priori_, by means of
+conceptions, and thus to extend the range of our knowledge, have been
+rendered abortive by this assumption. Let us then make the experiment
+whether we may not be more successful in metaphysics, if we assume that
+the objects must conform to our cognition. This appears, at all events,
+to accord better with the _possibility_ of our gaining the end we have
+in view, that is to say, of arriving at the cognition of objects _à
+priori_, of determining something with respect to these objects, before
+they are given to us. We here propose to do just what COPERNICUS did in
+attempting to explain the celestial movements. When he found that he
+could make no progress by assuming that all the heavenly bodies
+revolved round the spectator, he reversed the process, and tried the
+experiment of assuming that the spectator revolved, while the stars
+remained at rest. We may make the same experiment with regard to the
+intuition of objects. If the intuition must conform to the nature of
+the objects, I do not see how we can know anything of them _à priori_.
+If, on the other hand, the object conforms to the nature of our faculty
+of intuition, I can then easily conceive the possibility of such an _à
+priori_ knowledge. Now as I cannot rest in the mere intuitions, but--if
+they are to become cognitions--must refer them, as _representations_, to
+something, as _object_, and must determine the latter by means of the
+former, here again there are two courses open to me. _Either_, first, I
+may assume that the conceptions, by which I effect this determination,
+conform to the object--and in this case I am reduced to the same
+perplexity as before; _or_ secondly, I may assume that the objects, or,
+which is the same thing, that _experience_, in which alone as given
+objects they are cognized, conform to my conceptions--and then I am at
+no loss how to proceed. For experience itself is a mode of cognition
+which requires understanding. Before objects, are given to me, that is,
+_à priori_, I must presuppose in myself laws of the understanding which
+are expressed in conceptions _à priori_. To these conceptions, then,
+all the objects of experience must necessarily conform. Now there are
+objects which reason _thinks_, and that necessarily, but which cannot
+be given in experience, or, at least, cannot be given _so_ as reason
+thinks them. The attempt to think these objects will hereafter furnish
+an excellent test of the new method of thought which we have adopted,
+and which is based on the principle that we only cognize in things _à
+priori_ that which we ourselves place in them.[4]
+
+ [4] This method, accordingly, which we have borrowed from the natural
+ philosopher, consists in seeking for the elements of pure reason in
+ that _which admits of confirmation or refutation by experiment_. Now
+ the propositions of pure reason, especially when they transcend the
+ limits of possible experience, do not admit of our making any
+ experiment with their _objects_, as in natural science. Hence, with
+ regard to those _conceptions_ and _principles_ which we assume _à
+ priori_, our only course will be to view them from two different
+ sides. We must regard one and the same conception, _on the one hand_,
+ in relation to experience as an object of the senses and of the
+ understanding, _on the other hand_, in relation to reason, isolated
+ and transcending the limits of experience, as an object of mere
+ thought. Now if we find that, when we regard things from this double
+ point of view, the result is in harmony with the principle of pure
+ reason, but that, when we regard them from a single point of view,
+ reason is involved in self-contradiction, then the experiment will
+ establish the correctness of this distinction.
+
+This attempt succeeds as well as we could desire, and promises to
+metaphysics, in its first part--that is, where it is occupied with
+conceptions _à priori_, of which the corresponding objects may be given
+in experience--the certain course of science. For by this new method we
+are enabled perfectly to explain the possibility of _à priori_
+cognition, and, what is more, to demonstrate satisfactorily the laws
+which lie _à priori_ at the foundation of nature, as the sum of the
+objects of experience--neither of which was possible according to the
+procedure hitherto followed. But from this deduction of the faculty of
+_à priori_ cognition in the first part of metaphysics, we derive a
+surprising result, and one which, to all appearance, militates against
+the great end of metaphysics, as treated in the second part. For we
+come to the conclusion that our faculty of cognition is unable to
+transcend the limits of possible experience; and yet this is precisely
+the most essential object of this science. The estimate of our rational
+cognition _à priori_ at which we arrive is that it has only to do with
+phenomena, and that things in themselves, while possessing a real
+existence, lie beyond its sphere. Here we are enabled to put the
+justice of this estimate to the test. For that which of necessity
+impels us to transcend the limits of experience and of all phenomena is
+the _unconditioned_, which reason absolutely requires in things as they
+are in themselves, in order to complete the series of conditions. Now,
+if it appears that when, on the one hand, we assume that our cognition
+conforms to its objects as things in themselves, _the unconditioned
+cannot be thought without contradiction_, and that when, on the other
+hand, we assume that our representation of things as they are given to
+us, does not conform to these things as they are in themselves, but
+that these objects, as phenomena, conform to our mode of
+representation, _the contradiction disappears:_ we shall then be
+convinced of the truth of that which we began by assuming for the sake
+of experiment; we may look upon it as established that the
+unconditioned does not lie in things as we know them, or as they are
+given to us, but in things as they are in themselves, beyond the range
+of our cognition.[5]
+
+ [5] This experiment of pure reason has a great similarity to that of
+ the _Chemists_, which they term the experiment of _reduction_, or,
+ more usually, the _synthetic_ process. The _analysis_ of the
+ metaphysician separates pure cognition _à priori_ into two
+ heterogeneous elements, viz., the cognition of things as phenomena,
+ and of things in themselves. _Dialectic_ combines these again into
+ harmony with the necessary rational idea of the unconditioned, and
+ finds that this harmony never results except through the above
+ distinction, which is, therefore, concluded to be just.
+
+But, after we have thus denied the power of speculative reason to make
+any progress in the sphere of the supersensible, it still remains for
+our consideration whether data do not exist in _practical_ cognition
+which may enable us to determine the transcendent conception of the
+unconditioned, to rise beyond the limits of all possible experience
+from a _practical_ point of view, and thus to satisfy the great ends of
+metaphysics. Speculative reason has thus, at least, made room for such
+an extension of our knowledge: and, if it must leave this space vacant,
+still it does not rob us of the liberty to fill it up, if we can, by
+means of practical data--nay, it even challenges us to make the
+attempt.[6]
+
+ [6] So the central laws of the movements of the heavenly bodies
+ established the truth of that which Copernicus, first, assumed only as
+ a hypothesis, and, at the same time, brought to light that invisible
+ force (Newtonian attraction) which holds the universe together. The
+ latter would have remained forever undiscovered, if Copernicus had not
+ ventured on the experiment--contrary to the senses but still just--of
+ looking for the observed movements not in the heavenly bodies, but in
+ the spectator. In this Preface I treat the new metaphysical method as
+ a hypothesis with the view of rendering apparent the first attempts at
+ such a change of method, which are always hypothetical. But in the
+ Critique itself it will be demonstrated, not hypothetically, but
+ apodeictically, from the nature of our representations of space and
+ time, and from the elementary conceptions of the understanding.
+
+This attempt to introduce a complete revolution in the procedure of
+metaphysics, after the _example_ of the geometricians and natural
+philosophers, constitutes the aim of the Critique of Pure Speculative
+Reason. It is a treatise on the method to be followed, not a system of
+the science itself. But, at the same time, it marks out and defines
+both the external boundaries and the internal structure of this
+science. For pure speculative reason has this peculiarity, that, in
+choosing the various objects of thought, it is able to define the
+limits of its own faculties, and even to give a complete enumeration of
+the possible modes of proposing problems to itself, and thus to sketch
+out the entire system of metaphysics. For, on the one hand, in
+cognition _à priori_, nothing must be attributed to the objects but
+what the thinking subject derives from itself; and, on the other hand,
+reason is, in regard to the principles of cognition, a perfectly
+distinct, independent unity, in which, as in an organized body, every
+member exists for the sake of the others, and all for the sake of each,
+so that no principle can be viewed, with safety, in one relationship,
+unless it is, at the same time, viewed in relation to the total use of
+pure reason. Hence, too, metaphysics has this singular advantage--an
+advantage which falls to the lot of no other science which has to do
+with _objects_--that, if once it is conducted into the sure path of
+science, by means of this criticism, it can then take in the whole
+sphere of its cognitions, and can thus complete its work, and leave it
+for the use of posterity, as a capital which can never receive fresh
+accessions. For metaphysics has to deal only with principles and with
+the limitations of its own employment as determined by these
+principles. To this perfection it is, therefore, bound, as the
+fundamental science, to attain, and to it the maxim may justly be
+applied:
+
+ Nil actum reputans, si quid superesset agendum.
+
+But, it will be asked, what kind of a treasure is this that we propose
+to bequeath to posterity? What is the real value of this system of
+metaphysics, purified by criticism, and thereby reduced to a permanent
+condition? A cursory view of the present work will lead to the
+supposition that its use is merely _negative_, that it only serves to
+warn us against venturing, with speculative reason, beyond the limits
+of experience. This is, in fact, its primary use. But this, at once,
+assumes a _positive_ value, when we observe that the principles with
+which speculative reason endeavours to transcend its limits lead
+inevitably, not to the _extension_, but to the _contraction_ of the use
+of reason, inasmuch as they threaten to extend the limits of
+sensibility, which is their proper sphere, over the entire realm of
+thought and, thus, to supplant the pure (practical) use of reason. So
+far, then, as this criticism is occupied in confining speculative
+reason within its proper bounds, it is only negative; but, inasmuch as
+it thereby, at the same time, removes an obstacle which impedes and
+even threatens to destroy the use of practical reason, it possesses a
+positive and very important value. In order to admit this, we have only
+to be convinced that there is an absolutely necessary use of pure
+reason--the moral use--in which it inevitably transcends the limits of
+sensibility, without the aid of speculation, requiring only to be
+insured against the effects of a speculation which would involve it in
+contradiction with itself. To deny the positive advantage of the
+service which this criticism renders us would be as absurd as to
+maintain that the system of police is productive of no positive
+benefit, since its main business is to prevent the violence which
+citizen has to apprehend from citizen, that so each may pursue his
+vocation in peace and security. That space and time are only forms of
+sensible intuition, and hence are only conditions of the existence of
+things as phenomena; that, moreover, we have no conceptions of the
+understanding, and, consequently, no elements for the cognition of
+things, except in so far as a corresponding intuition can be given to
+these conceptions; that, accordingly, we can have no cognition of an
+object, as a thing in itself, but only as an object of sensible
+intuition, that is, as phenomenon--all this is proved in the analytical
+part of the Critique; and from this the limitation of all possible
+speculative cognition to the mere objects of _experience_, follows as a
+necessary result. At the same time, it must be carefully borne in mind
+that, while we surrender the power of _cognizing_, we still reserve the
+power of _thinking_ objects, as things in themselves.[7] For,
+otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance,
+without something that appears--which would be absurd. Now let us
+suppose, for a moment, that we had not undertaken this criticism and,
+accordingly, had not drawn the necessary distinction between things as
+objects of experience and things as they are in themselves. The
+principle of causality, and, by consequence, the mechanism of nature as
+determined by causality, would then have absolute validity in relation
+to all things as efficient causes. I should then be unable to assert,
+with regard to one and the same being, e.g., the human soul, that its
+will is _free_, and yet, at the same time, subject to natural
+necessity, that is, _not free_, without falling into a palpable
+contradiction, for in both propositions I should take the soul in _the
+same signification_, as a thing in general, as a thing in itself--as,
+without previous criticism, I could not but take it. Suppose now, on
+the other hand, that we _have_ undertaken this criticism, and have
+learnt that an object may be taken in _two senses_, first, as a
+phenomenon, secondly, as a thing in itself; and that, according to the
+deduction of the conceptions of the understanding, the principle of
+causality has reference only to things in the first sense. We then see
+how it does not involve any contradiction to assert, on the one hand,
+that the will, in the phenomenal sphere--in visible action--is
+necessarily obedient to the law of nature, and, in so far, _not free;_
+and, on the other hand, that, as belonging to a thing in itself, it is
+not subject to that law, and, accordingly, is _free_. Now, it is true
+that I cannot, by means of speculative reason, and still less by
+empirical observation, _cognize_ my soul as a thing in itself and
+consequently, cannot cognize liberty as the property of a being to
+which I ascribe effects in the world of sense. For, to do so, I must
+cognize this being as existing, and yet not in time, which--since I
+cannot support my conception by any intuition--is impossible. At the
+same time, while I cannot _cognize_, I can quite well _think_ freedom,
+that is to say, my representation of it involves at least no
+contradiction, if we bear in mind the critical distinction of the two
+modes of representation (the sensible and the intellectual) and the
+consequent limitation of the conceptions of the pure understanding and
+of the principles which flow from them. Suppose now that morality
+necessarily presupposed liberty, in the strictest sense, as a property
+of our will; suppose that reason contained certain practical, original
+principles _à priori_, which were absolutely impossible without this
+presupposition; and suppose, at the same time, that speculative reason
+had proved that liberty was incapable of being thought at all. It would
+then follow that the moral presupposition must give way to the
+speculative affirmation, the opposite of which involves an obvious
+contradiction, and that _liberty_ and, with it, morality must yield to
+the _mechanism of nature;_ for the negation of morality involves no
+contradiction, except on the presupposition of liberty. Now morality
+does not require the speculative cognition of liberty; it is enough
+that I can think it, that its conception involves no contradiction,
+that it does not interfere with the mechanism of nature. But even this
+requirement we could not satisfy, if we had not learnt the twofold
+sense in which things may be taken; and it is only in this way that the
+doctrine of morality and the doctrine of nature are confined within
+their proper limits. For this result, then, we are indebted to a
+criticism which warns us of our unavoidable ignorance with regard to
+things in themselves, and establishes the necessary limitation of our
+theoretical _cognition_ to mere phenomena.
+
+ [7] In order to _cognize_ an object, I must be able to prove its
+ possibility, either from its reality as attested by experience, or _à
+ priori_, by means of reason. But I can _think_ what I please, provided
+ only I do not contradict myself; that is, provided my conception is a
+ possible thought, though I may be unable to answer for the existence
+ of a corresponding object in the sum of possibilities. But something
+ more is required before I can attribute to such a conception objective
+ validity, that is real possibility--the other possibility being merely
+ logical. We are not, however, confined to theoretical sources of
+ cognition for the means of satisfying this additional requirement, but
+ may derive them from practical sources.
+
+The positive value of the critical principles of pure reason in
+relation to the conception of _God_ and of the _simple nature_ of the
+_soul_, admits of a similar exemplification; but on this point I shall
+not dwell. I cannot even make the assumption--as the practical interests
+of morality require--of God, freedom, and immortality, if I do not
+deprive speculative reason of its pretensions to transcendent insight.
+For to arrive at these, it must make use of principles which, in fact,
+extend only to the objects of possible experience, and which cannot be
+applied to objects beyond this sphere without converting them into
+phenomena, and thus rendering the _practical extension_ of pure reason
+impossible. I must, therefore, abolish _knowledge_, to make room for
+_belief_. The dogmatism of metaphysics, that is, the presumption that
+it is possible to advance in metaphysics without previous criticism, is
+the true source of the unbelief (always dogmatic) which militates
+against morality.
+
+Thus, while it may be no very difficult task to bequeath a legacy to
+posterity, in the shape of a system of metaphysics constructed in
+accordance with the Critique of Pure Reason, still the value of such a
+bequest is not to be depreciated. It will render an important service
+to reason, by substituting the certainty of scientific method for that
+random groping after results without the guidance of principles, which
+has hitherto characterized the pursuit of metaphysical studies. It will
+render an important service to the inquiring mind of youth, by leading
+the student to apply his powers to the cultivation of genuine science,
+instead of wasting them, as at present, on speculations which can never
+lead to any result, or on the idle attempt to invent new ideas and
+opinions. But, above all, it will confer an inestimable benefit on
+morality and religion, by showing that all the objections urged against
+them may be silenced for ever by the _Socratic_ method, that is to say,
+by proving the ignorance of the objector. For, as the world has never
+been, and, no doubt, never will be without a system of metaphysics of
+one kind or another, it is the highest and weightiest concern of
+philosophy to render it powerless for harm, by closing up the sources
+of error.
+
+This important change in the field of the sciences, this loss of its
+fancied possessions, to which speculative reason must submit, does not
+prove in any way detrimental to the general interests of humanity. The
+advantages which the world has derived from the teachings of pure
+reason are not at all impaired. The loss falls, in its whole extent, on
+the _monopoly of the schools_, but does not in the slightest degree
+touch the _interests of mankind_. I appeal to the most obstinate
+dogmatist, whether the proof of the continued existence of the soul
+after death, derived from the simplicity of its substance; of the
+freedom of the will in opposition to the general mechanism of nature,
+drawn from the subtle but impotent distinction of subjective and
+objective practical necessity; or of the existence of God, deduced from
+the conception of an _ens realissimum_--the contingency of the
+changeable, and the necessity of a prime mover, has ever been able to
+pass beyond the limits of the schools, to penetrate the public mind, or
+to exercise the slightest influence on its convictions. It must be
+admitted that this has not been the case and that, owing to the
+unfitness of the common understanding for such subtle speculations, it
+can never be expected to take place. On the contrary, it is plain that
+_the hope of a future life_ arises from the feeling, which exists in
+the breast of every man, that the temporal is inadequate to meet and
+satisfy the demands of his nature. In like manner, it cannot be doubted
+that the clear exhibition of duties in opposition to all the claims of
+inclination, gives rise to the consciousness of _freedom_, and that the
+glorious order, beauty, and providential care, everywhere displayed in
+nature, give rise to the belief in a wise and great Author of the
+Universe. Such is the genesis of these general convictions of mankind,
+so far as they depend on rational grounds; and this public property not
+only remains undisturbed, but is even raised to greater importance, by
+the doctrine that the schools have no right to arrogate to themselves a
+more profound insight into a matter of general human concernment than
+that to which the great mass of men, ever held by us in the highest
+estimation, can without difficulty attain, and that the schools should,
+therefore, confine themselves to the elaboration of these universally
+comprehensible and, from a moral point of view, amply satisfactory
+proofs. The change, therefore, affects only the arrogant pretensions of
+the schools, which would gladly retain, in their own exclusive
+possession, the key to the truths which they impart to the public.
+
+ Quod mecum nescit, solus vult scire videri.
+
+At the same time it does not deprive the speculative philosopher of his
+just title to be the sole depositor of a science which benefits the
+public without its knowledge--I mean, the Critique of Pure Reason. This
+can never become popular and, indeed, has no occasion to be so; for
+finespun arguments in favour of useful truths make just as little
+impression on the public mind as the equally subtle objections brought
+against these truths. On the other hand, since both inevitably force
+themselves on every man who rises to the height of speculation, it
+becomes the manifest duty of the schools to enter upon a thorough
+investigation of the rights of speculative reason and, thus, to prevent
+the scandal which metaphysical controversies are sure, sooner or later,
+to cause even to the masses. It is only by criticism that
+metaphysicians (and, as such, theologians too) can be saved from these
+controversies and from the consequent perversion of their doctrines.
+Criticism alone can strike a blow at the root of materialism, fatalism,
+atheism, free-thinking, fanaticism, and superstition, which are
+universally injurious--as well as of idealism and scepticism, which are
+dangerous to the schools, but can scarcely pass over to the public. If
+governments think proper to interfere with the affairs of the learned,
+it would be more consistent with a wise regard for the interests of
+science, as well as for those of society, to favour a criticism of this
+kind, by which alone the labours of reason can be established on a firm
+basis, than to support the ridiculous despotism of the schools, which
+raise a loud cry of danger to the public over the destruction of
+cobwebs, of which the public has never taken any notice, and the loss
+of which, therefore, it can never feel.
+
+This critical science is not opposed to the _dogmatic procedure_ of
+reason in pure cognition; for pure cognition must always be dogmatic,
+that is, must rest on strict demonstration from sure principles _à
+priori_--but to _dogmatism_, that is, to the presumption that it is
+possible to make any progress with a pure cognition, derived from
+(philosophical) conceptions, according to the principles which reason
+has long been in the habit of employing--without first inquiring in what
+way and by what right reason has come into the possession of these
+principles. Dogmatism is thus the dogmatic procedure of pure reason
+_without previous criticism of its own powers_, and in opposing this
+procedure, we must not be supposed to lend any countenance to that
+loquacious shallowness which arrogates to itself the name of
+popularity, nor yet to scepticism, which makes short work with the
+whole science of metaphysics. On the contrary, our criticism is the
+necessary preparation for a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics
+which must perform its task entirely _à priori_, to the complete
+satisfaction of speculative reason, and must, therefore, be treated,
+not popularly, but scholastically. In carrying out the plan which the
+Critique prescribes, that is, in the future system of metaphysics, we
+must have recourse to the strict method of the celebrated WOLF, the
+greatest of all dogmatic philosophers. He was the first to point out
+the necessity of establishing fixed principles, of clearly defining our
+conceptions, and of subjecting our demonstrations to the most severe
+scrutiny, instead of rashly jumping at conclusions. The example which
+he set served to awaken that spirit of profound and thorough
+investigation which is not yet extinct in Germany. He would have been
+peculiarly well fitted to give a truly scientific character to
+metaphysical studies, had it occurred to him to prepare the field by a
+criticism of the _organum_, that is, of pure reason itself. That he
+failed to perceive the necessity of such a procedure must be ascribed
+to the dogmatic mode of thought which characterized his age, and on
+this point the philosophers of his time, as well as of all previous
+times, have nothing to reproach each other with. Those who reject at
+once the method of Wolf, and of the Critique of Pure Reason, can have
+no other aim but to shake off the fetters of _science_, to change
+labour into sport, certainty into opinion, and philosophy into
+philodoxy.
+
+In this _second edition_, I have endeavoured, as far as possible, to
+remove the difficulties and obscurity which, without fault of mine
+perhaps, have given rise to many misconceptions even among acute
+thinkers. In the propositions themselves, and in the demonstrations by
+which they are supported, as well as in the form and the entire plan of
+the work, I have found nothing to alter; which must be attributed
+partly to the long examination to which I had subjected the whole
+before offering it to the public and partly to the nature of the case.
+For pure speculative reason is an organic structure in which there is
+nothing isolated or independent, but every Single part is essential to
+all the rest; and hence, the slightest imperfection, whether defect or
+positive error, could not fail to betray itself in use. I venture,
+further, to hope, that this system will maintain the same unalterable
+character for the future. I am led to entertain this confidence, not by
+vanity, but by the evidence which the equality of the result affords,
+when we proceed, first, from the simplest elements up to the complete
+whole of pure reason and, and then, backwards from the whole to each
+part. We find that the attempt to make the slightest alteration, in any
+part, leads inevitably to contradictions, not merely in this system,
+but in human reason itself. At the same time, there is still much room
+for improvement in the _exposition_ of the doctrines contained in this
+work. In the present edition, I have endeavoured to remove
+misapprehensions of the æsthetical part, especially with regard to the
+conception of time; to clear away the obscurity which has been found in
+the deduction of the conceptions of the understanding; to supply the
+supposed want of sufficient evidence in the demonstration of the
+principles of the pure understanding; and, lastly, to obviate the
+misunderstanding of the paralogisms which immediately precede the
+Rational Psychology. Beyond this point--the end of the second main
+division of the "Transcendental Dialectic"--I have not extended my
+alterations,[8] partly from want of time, and partly because I am not
+aware that any portion of the remainder has given rise to
+misconceptions among intelligent and impartial critics, whom I do not
+here mention with that praise which is their due, but who will find
+that their suggestions have been attended to in the work itself.
+
+ [8] The only addition, properly so called--and that only in the method
+ of proof--which I have made in the present edition, consists of a new
+ refutation of psychological _Idealism_, and a strict demonstration--the
+ only one possible, as I believe--of the objective reality of external
+ intuition. However harmless idealism may be considered--although in
+ reality it is not so--in regard to the essential ends of metaphysics,
+ it must still remain a scandal to philosophy and to the general human
+ reason to be obliged to assume, as an article of mere belief, the
+ existence of things external to ourselves (from which, yet, we derive
+ the whole material of cognition for the internal sense), and not to be
+ able to oppose a satisfactory proof to any one who may call it in
+ question. As there is some obscurity of expression in the
+ demonstration as it stands in the text, I propose to alter the passage
+ in question as follows: "But this permanent cannot be an intuition in
+ me. For all the determining grounds of my existence which can be found
+ in me are representations and, as such, do themselves require a
+ permanent, distinct from them, which may determine my existence in
+ relation to their changes, that is, my existence in time, wherein they
+ change." It may, probably, be urged in opposition to this proof that,
+ after all, I am only conscious immediately of that which is in me,
+ that is, of my _representation_ of external things, and that,
+ consequently, it must always remain uncertain whether anything
+ corresponding to this representation does or does not exist externally
+ to me. But I am conscious, through internal _experience_, of my
+ _existence in time_ (consequently, also, of the determinability of the
+ former in the latter), and that is more than the simple consciousness
+ of my representation. It is, in fact, the same as the _empirical
+ consciousness of my existence_, which can only be determined in
+ relation to something, which, while connected with my existence, is
+ _external to me_. This consciousness of my existence in time is,
+ therefore, identical with the consciousness of a relation to something
+ external to me, and it is, therefore, experience, not fiction, sense,
+ not imagination, which inseparably connects the external with my
+ internal sense. For the external sense is, in itself, the relation of
+ intuition to something real, external to me; and the reality of this
+ something, as opposed to the mere imagination of it, rests solely on
+ its inseparable connection with internal experience as the condition
+ of its possibility. If with the _intellectual consciousness_ of my
+ existence, in the representation: _I am_, which accompanies all my
+ judgements, and all the operations of my understanding, I could, at
+ the same time, connect a determination of my existence by
+ _intellectual intuition_, then the consciousness of a relation to
+ something external to me would not be necessary. But the internal
+ intuition in which alone my existence can be determined, though
+ preceded by that purely intellectual consciousness, is itself sensible
+ and attached to the condition of time. Hence this determination of my
+ existence, and consequently my internal experience itself, must depend
+ on something permanent which is not in me, which can be, therefore,
+ only in something external to me, to which I must look upon myself as
+ being related. Thus the reality of the external sense is necessarily
+ connected with that of the internal, in order to the possibility of
+ experience in general; that is, I am just as certainly conscious that
+ there are things external to me related to my sense as I am that I
+ myself exist as determined in time. But in order to ascertain to what
+ given intuitions objects, external me, really correspond, in other
+ words, what intuitions belong to the external sense and not to
+ imagination, I must have recourse, in every particular case, to those
+ rules according to which experience in general (even internal
+ experience) is distinguished from imagination, and which are always
+ based on the proposition that there really is an external
+ experience.--We may add the remark that the representation of something
+ _permanent_ in existence, is not the same thing as the _permanent
+ representation;_ for a representation may be very variable and
+ changing--as all our representations, even that of matter, are--and yet
+ refer to something permanent, which must, therefore, be distinct from
+ all my representations and external to me, the existence of which is
+ necessarily included in the determination of my own existence, and
+ with it constitutes _one_ experience--an experience which would not
+ even be possible internally, if it were not also at the same time, in
+ part, external. To the question _How?_ we are no more able to reply,
+ than we are, in general, to think the stationary in time, the
+ coexistence of which with the variable, produces the conception of
+ change.
+
+In attempting to render the exposition of my views as intelligible as
+possible, I have been compelled to leave out or abridge various
+passages which were not essential to the completeness of the work, but
+which many readers might consider useful in other respects, and might
+be unwilling to miss. This trifling loss, which could not be avoided
+without swelling the book beyond due limits, may be supplied, at the
+pleasure of the reader, by a comparison with the first edition, and
+will, I hope, be more than compensated for by the greater clearness of
+the exposition as it now stands.
+
+I have observed, with pleasure and thankfulness, in the pages of
+various reviews and treatises, that the spirit of profound and thorough
+investigation is not extinct in Germany, though it may have been
+overborne and silenced for a time by the fashionable tone of a licence
+in thinking, which gives itself the airs of genius, and that the
+difficulties which beset the paths of criticism have not prevented
+energetic and acute thinkers from making themselves masters of the
+science of pure reason to which these paths conduct--a science which is
+not popular, but scholastic in its character, and which alone can hope
+for a lasting existence or possess an abiding value. To these deserving
+men, who so happily combine profundity of view with a talent for lucid
+exposition--a talent which I myself am not conscious of possessing--I
+leave the task of removing any obscurity which may still adhere to the
+statement of my doctrines. For, in this case, the danger is not that of
+being refuted, but of being misunderstood. For my own part, I must
+henceforward abstain from controversy, although I shall carefully
+attend to all suggestions, whether from friends or adversaries, which
+may be of use in the future elaboration of the system of this
+Propædeutic. As, during these labours, I have advanced pretty far in
+years this month I reach my sixty-fourth year--it will be necessary for
+me to economize time, if I am to carry out my plan of elaborating the
+metaphysics of nature as well as of morals, in confirmation of the
+correctness of the principles established in this Critique of Pure
+Reason, both speculative and practical; and I must, therefore, leave
+the task of clearing up the obscurities of the present work--inevitable,
+perhaps, at the outset--as well as, the defence of the whole, to those
+deserving men, who have made my system their own. A philosophical
+system cannot come forward armed at all points like a mathematical
+treatise, and hence it may be quite possible to take objection to
+particular passages, while the organic structure of the system,
+considered as a unity, has no danger to apprehend. But few possess the
+ability, and still fewer the inclination, to take a comprehensive view
+of a new system. By confining the view to particular passages, taking
+these out of their connection and comparing them with one another, it
+is easy to pick out apparent contradictions, especially in a work
+written with any freedom of style. These contradictions place the work
+in an unfavourable light in the eyes of those who rely on the judgement
+of others, but are easily reconciled by those who have mastered the
+idea of the whole. If a theory possesses stability in itself, the
+action and reaction which seemed at first to threaten its existence
+serve only, in the course of time, to smooth down any superficial
+roughness or inequality, and--if men of insight, impartiality, and truly
+popular gifts, turn their attention to it--to secure to it, in a short
+time, the requisite elegance also.
+
+KÖNIGSBERG, _April_ 1787.
+
+Introduction
+
+I. Of the difference between Pure and Empirical Knowledge
+
+That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt.
+For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened
+into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our
+senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse
+our powers of understanding into activity, to compare to connect, or to
+separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous
+impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience? In
+respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to
+experience, but begins with it.
+
+But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means
+follows that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is
+quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which
+we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition
+supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion),
+an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given
+by sense, till long practice has made us attentive to, and skilful in
+separating it. It is, therefore, a question which requires close
+investigation, and not to be answered at first sight, whether there
+exists a knowledge altogether independent of experience, and even of
+all sensuous impressions? Knowledge of this kind is called à priori, in
+contradistinction to empirical knowledge, which has its sources à
+posteriori, that is, in experience.
+
+But the expression, "à priori," is not as yet definite enough
+adequately to indicate the whole meaning of the question above started.
+For, in speaking of knowledge which has its sources in experience, we
+are wont to say, that this or that may be known à priori, because we do
+not derive this knowledge immediately from experience, but from a
+general rule, which, however, we have itself borrowed from experience.
+Thus, if a man undermined his house, we say, "he might know à priori
+that it would have fallen;" that is, he needed not to have waited for
+the experience that it did actually fall. But still, à priori, he could
+not know even this much. For, that bodies are heavy, and, consequently,
+that they fall when their supports are taken away, must have been known
+to him previously, by means of experience.
+
+By the term "knowledge à priori," therefore, we shall in the sequel
+understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of
+experience, but such as is absolutely so of all experience. Opposed to
+this is empirical knowledge, or that which is possible only à
+posteriori, that is, through experience. Knowledge à priori is either
+pure or impure. Pure knowledge à priori is that with which no empirical
+element is mixed up. For example, the proposition, "Every change has a
+cause," is a proposition à priori, but impure, because change is a
+conception which can only be derived from experience.
+
+II. The Human Intellect, even in an Unphilosophical State, is in
+Possession of Certain Cognitions "à priori".
+
+The question now is as to a criterion, by which we may securely
+distinguish a pure from an empirical cognition. Experience no doubt
+teaches us that this or that object is constituted in such and such a
+manner, but not that it could not possibly exist otherwise. Now, in the
+first place, if we have a proposition which contains the idea of
+necessity in its very conception, it is priori. If, moreover, it is not
+derived from any other proposition, unless from one equally involving
+the idea of necessity, it is absolutely priori. Secondly, an empirical
+judgement never exhibits strict and absolute, but only assumed and
+comparative universality (by induction); therefore, the most we can say
+is--so far as we have hitherto observed, there is no exception to this
+or that rule. If, on the other hand, a judgement carries with it strict
+and absolute universality, that is, admits of no possible exception, it
+is not derived from experience, but is valid absolutely à priori.
+
+Empirical universality is, therefore, only an arbitrary extension of
+validity, from that which may be predicated of a proposition valid in
+most cases, to that which is asserted of a proposition which holds good
+in all; as, for example, in the affirmation, "All bodies are heavy."
+When, on the contrary, strict universality characterizes a judgement,
+it necessarily indicates another peculiar source of knowledge, namely,
+a faculty of cognition à priori. Necessity and strict universality,
+therefore, are infallible tests for distinguishing pure from empirical
+knowledge, and are inseparably connected with each other. But as in the
+use of these criteria the empirical limitation is sometimes more easily
+detected than the contingency of the judgement, or the unlimited
+universality which we attach to a judgement is often a more convincing
+proof than its necessity, it may be advisable to use the criteria
+separately, each being by itself infallible.
+
+Now, that in the sphere of human cognition we have judgements which are
+necessary, and in the strictest sense universal, consequently pure à
+priori, it will be an easy matter to show. If we desire an example from
+the sciences, we need only take any proposition in mathematics. If we
+cast our eyes upon the commonest operations of the understanding, the
+proposition, "Every change must have a cause," will amply serve our
+purpose. In the latter case, indeed, the conception of a cause so
+plainly involves the conception of a necessity of connection with an
+effect, and of a strict universality of the law, that the very notion
+of a cause would entirely disappear, were we to derive it, like Hume,
+from a frequent association of what happens with that which precedes;
+and the habit thence originating of connecting representations--the
+necessity inherent in the judgement being therefore merely subjective.
+Besides, without seeking for such examples of principles existing à
+priori in cognition, we might easily show that such principles are the
+indispensable basis of the possibility of experience itself, and
+consequently prove their existence à priori. For whence could our
+experience itself acquire certainty, if all the rules on which it
+depends were themselves empirical, and consequently fortuitous? No one,
+therefore, can admit the validity of the use of such rules as first
+principles. But, for the present, we may content ourselves with having
+established the fact, that we do possess and exercise a faculty of pure
+à priori cognition; and, secondly, with having pointed out the proper
+tests of such cognition, namely, universality and necessity.
+
+Not only in judgements, however, but even in conceptions, is an à
+priori origin manifest. For example, if we take away by degrees from
+our conceptions of a body all that can be referred to mere sensuous
+experience--colour, hardness or softness, weight, even
+impenetrability--the body will then vanish; but the space which it
+occupied still remains, and this it is utterly impossible to annihilate
+in thought. Again, if we take away, in like manner, from our empirical
+conception of any object, corporeal or incorporeal, all properties
+which mere experience has taught us to connect with it, still we cannot
+think away those through which we cogitate it as substance, or adhering
+to substance, although our conception of substance is more determined
+than that of an object. Compelled, therefore, by that necessity with
+which the conception of substance forces itself upon us, we must
+confess that it has its seat in our faculty of cognition à priori.
+
+III. Philosophy stands in need of a Science which shall Determine the
+Possibility, Principles, and Extent of Human Knowledge "à priori"
+
+Of far more importance than all that has been above said, is the
+consideration that certain of our cognitions rise completely above the
+sphere of all possible experience, and by means of conceptions, to
+which there exists in the whole extent of experience no corresponding
+object, seem to extend the range of our judgements beyond its bounds.
+And just in this transcendental or supersensible sphere, where
+experience affords us neither instruction nor guidance, lie the
+investigations of reason, which, on account of their importance, we
+consider far preferable to, and as having a far more elevated aim than,
+all that the understanding can achieve within the sphere of sensuous
+phenomena. So high a value do we set upon these investigations, that
+even at the risk of error, we persist in following them out, and permit
+neither doubt nor disregard nor indifference to restrain us from the
+pursuit. These unavoidable problems of mere pure reason are God,
+freedom (of will), and immortality. The science which, with all its
+preliminaries, has for its especial object the solution of these
+problems is named metaphysics--a science which is at the very outset
+dogmatical, that is, it confidently takes upon itself the execution of
+this task without any previous investigation of the ability or
+inability of reason for such an undertaking.
+
+Now the safe ground of experience being thus abandoned, it seems
+nevertheless natural that we should hesitate to erect a building with
+the cognitions we possess, without knowing whence they come, and on the
+strength of principles, the origin of which is undiscovered. Instead of
+thus trying to build without a foundation, it is rather to be expected
+that we should long ago have put the question, how the understanding
+can arrive at these à priori cognitions, and what is the extent,
+validity, and worth which they may possess? We say, "This is natural
+enough," meaning by the word natural, that which is consistent with a
+just and reasonable way of thinking; but if we understand by the term,
+that which usually happens, nothing indeed could be more natural and
+more comprehensible than that this investigation should be left long
+unattempted. For one part of our pure knowledge, the science of
+mathematics, has been long firmly established, and thus leads us to
+form flattering expectations with regard to others, though these may be
+of quite a different nature. Besides, when we get beyond the bounds of
+experience, we are of course safe from opposition in that quarter; and
+the charm of widening the range of our knowledge is so great that,
+unless we are brought to a standstill by some evident contradiction, we
+hurry on undoubtingly in our course. This, however, may be avoided, if
+we are sufficiently cautious in the construction of our fictions, which
+are not the less fictions on that account.
+
+Mathematical science affords us a brilliant example, how far,
+independently of all experience, we may carry our à priori knowledge.
+It is true that the mathematician occupies himself with objects and
+cognitions only in so far as they can be represented by means of
+intuition. But this circumstance is easily overlooked, because the said
+intuition can itself be given à priori, and therefore is hardly to be
+distinguished from a mere pure conception. Deceived by such a proof of
+the power of reason, we can perceive no limits to the extension of our
+knowledge. The light dove cleaving in free flight the thin air, whose
+resistance it feels, might imagine that her movements would be far more
+free and rapid in airless space. Just in the same way did Plato,
+abandoning the world of sense because of the narrow limits it sets to
+the understanding, venture upon the wings of ideas beyond it, into the
+void space of pure intellect. He did not reflect that he made no real
+progress by all his efforts; for he met with no resistance which might
+serve him for a support, as it were, whereon to rest, and on which he
+might apply his powers, in order to let the intellect acquire momentum
+for its progress. It is, indeed, the common fate of human reason in
+speculation, to finish the imposing edifice of thought as rapidly as
+possible, and then for the first time to begin to examine whether the
+foundation is a solid one or no. Arrived at this point, all sorts of
+excuses are sought after, in order to console us for its want of
+stability, or rather, indeed, to enable Us to dispense altogether with
+so late and dangerous an investigation. But what frees us during the
+process of building from all apprehension or suspicion, and flatters us
+into the belief of its solidity, is this. A great part, perhaps the
+greatest part, of the business of our reason consists in the
+analysation of the conceptions which we already possess of objects. By
+this means we gain a multitude of cognitions, which although really
+nothing more than elucidations or explanations of that which (though in
+a confused manner) was already thought in our conceptions, are, at
+least in respect of their form, prized as new introspections; whilst,
+so far as regards their matter or content, we have really made no
+addition to our conceptions, but only disinvolved them. But as this
+process does furnish a real priori knowledge, which has a sure progress
+and useful results, reason, deceived by this, slips in, without being
+itself aware of it, assertions of a quite different kind; in which, to
+given conceptions it adds others, à priori indeed, but entirely foreign
+to them, without our knowing how it arrives at these, and, indeed,
+without such a question ever suggesting itself. I shall therefore at
+once proceed to examine the difference between these two modes of
+knowledge.
+
+IV. Of the Difference Between Analytical and Synthetical Judgements.
+
+In all judgements wherein the relation of a subject to the predicate is
+cogitated (I mention affirmative judgements only here; the application
+to negative will be very easy), this relation is possible in two
+different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as
+somewhat which is contained (though covertly) in the conception A; or
+the predicate B lies completely out of the conception A, although it
+stands in connection with it. In the first instance, I term the
+judgement analytical, in the second, synthetical. Analytical judgements
+(affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection of the
+predicate with the subject is cogitated through identity; those in
+which this connection is cogitated without identity, are called
+synthetical judgements. The former may be called explicative, the
+latter augmentative judgements; because the former add in the predicate
+nothing to the conception of the subject, but only analyse it into its
+constituent conceptions, which were thought already in the subject,
+although in a confused manner; the latter add to our conceptions of the
+subject a predicate which was not contained in it, and which no
+analysis could ever have discovered therein. For example, when I say,
+"All bodies are extended," this is an analytical judgement. For I need
+not go beyond the conception of body in order to find extension
+connected with it, but merely analyse the conception, that is, become
+conscious of the manifold properties which I think in that conception,
+in order to discover this predicate in it: it is therefore an
+analytical judgement. On the other hand, when I say, "All bodies are
+heavy," the predicate is something totally different from that which I
+think in the mere conception of a body. By the addition of such a
+predicate, therefore, it becomes a synthetical judgement.
+
+Judgements of experience, as such, are always synthetical. For it would
+be absurd to think of grounding an analytical judgement on experience,
+because in forming such a judgement I need not go out of the sphere of
+my conceptions, and therefore recourse to the testimony of experience
+is quite unnecessary. That "bodies are extended" is not an empirical
+judgement, but a proposition which stands firm à priori. For before
+addressing myself to experience, I already have in my conception all
+the requisite conditions for the judgement, and I have only to extract
+the predicate from the conception, according to the principle of
+contradiction, and thereby at the same time become conscious of the
+necessity of the judgement, a necessity which I could never learn from
+experience. On the other hand, though at first I do not at all include
+the predicate of weight in my conception of body in general, that
+conception still indicates an object of experience, a part of the
+totality of experience, to which I can still add other parts; and this
+I do when I recognize by observation that bodies are heavy. I can
+cognize beforehand by analysis the conception of body through the
+characteristics of extension, impenetrability, shape, etc., all which
+are cogitated in this conception. But now I extend my knowledge, and
+looking back on experience from which I had derived this conception of
+body, I find weight at all times connected with the above
+characteristics, and therefore I synthetically add to my conceptions
+this as a predicate, and say, "All bodies are heavy." Thus it is
+experience upon which rests the possibility of the synthesis of the
+predicate of weight with the conception of body, because both
+conceptions, although the one is not contained in the other, still
+belong to one another (only contingently, however), as parts of a
+whole, namely, of experience, which is itself a synthesis of
+intuitions.
+
+But to synthetical judgements à priori, such aid is entirely wanting.
+If I go out of and beyond the conception A, in order to recognize
+another B as connected with it, what foundation have I to rest on,
+whereby to render the synthesis possible? I have here no longer the
+advantage of looking out in the sphere of experience for what I want.
+Let us take, for example, the proposition, "Everything that happens has
+a cause." In the conception of "something that happens," I indeed think
+an existence which a certain time antecedes, and from this I can derive
+analytical judgements. But the conception of a cause lies quite out of
+the above conception, and indicates something entirely different from
+"that which happens," and is consequently not contained in that
+conception. How then am I able to assert concerning the general
+conception--"that which happens"--something entirely different from that
+conception, and to recognize the conception of cause although not
+contained in it, yet as belonging to it, and even necessarily? what is
+here the unknown = X, upon which the understanding rests when it
+believes it has found, out of the conception A a foreign predicate B,
+which it nevertheless considers to be connected with it? It cannot be
+experience, because the principle adduced annexes the two
+representations, cause and effect, to the representation existence, not
+only with universality, which experience cannot give, but also with the
+expression of necessity, therefore completely à priori and from pure
+conceptions. Upon such synthetical, that is augmentative propositions,
+depends the whole aim of our speculative knowledge à priori; for
+although analytical judgements are indeed highly important and
+necessary, they are so, only to arrive at that clearness of conceptions
+which is requisite for a sure and extended synthesis, and this alone is
+a real acquisition.
+
+V. In all Theoretical Sciences of Reason, Synthetical Judgements "à
+priori" are contained as Principles.
+
+1. Mathematical judgements are always synthetical. Hitherto this fact,
+though incontestably true and very important in its consequences, seems
+to have escaped the analysts of the human mind, nay, to be in complete
+opposition to all their conjectures. For as it was found that
+mathematical conclusions all proceed according to the principle of
+contradiction (which the nature of every apodeictic certainty
+requires), people became persuaded that the fundamental principles of
+the science also were recognized and admitted in the same way. But the
+notion is fallacious; for although a synthetical proposition can
+certainly be discerned by means of the principle of contradiction, this
+is possible only when another synthetical proposition precedes, from
+which the latter is deduced, but never of itself.
+
+Before all, be it observed, that proper mathematical propositions are
+always judgements à priori, and not empirical, because they carry along
+with them the conception of necessity, which cannot be given by
+experience. If this be demurred to, it matters not; I will then limit
+my assertion to pure mathematics, the very conception of which implies
+that it consists of knowledge altogether non-empirical and à priori.
+
+We might, indeed at first suppose that the proposition 7 + 5 = 12 is a
+merely analytical proposition, following (according to the principle of
+contradiction) from the conception of a sum of seven and five. But if
+we regard it more narrowly, we find that our conception of the sum of
+seven and five contains nothing more than the uniting of both sums into
+one, whereby it cannot at all be cogitated what this single number is
+which embraces both. The conception of twelve is by no means obtained
+by merely cogitating the union of seven and five; and we may analyse
+our conception of such a possible sum as long as we will, still we
+shall never discover in it the notion of twelve. We must go beyond
+these conceptions, and have recourse to an intuition which corresponds
+to one of the two--our five fingers, for example, or like Segner in his
+Arithmetic five points, and so by degrees, add the units contained in
+the five given in the intuition, to the conception of seven. For I
+first take the number 7, and, for the conception of 5 calling in the
+aid of the fingers of my hand as objects of intuition, I add the units,
+which I before took together to make up the number 5, gradually now by
+means of the material image my hand, to the number 7, and by this
+process, I at length see the number 12 arise. That 7 should be added to
+5, I have certainly cogitated in my conception of a sum = 7 + 5, but
+not that this sum was equal to 12. Arithmetical propositions are
+therefore always synthetical, of which we may become more clearly
+convinced by trying large numbers. For it will thus become quite
+evident that, turn and twist our conceptions as we may, it is
+impossible, without having recourse to intuition, to arrive at the sum
+total or product by means of the mere analysis of our conceptions. Just
+as little is any principle of pure geometry analytical. "A straight
+line between two points is the shortest," is a synthetical proposition.
+For my conception of straight contains no notion of quantity, but is
+merely qualitative. The conception of the shortest is therefore fore
+wholly an addition, and by no analysis can it be extracted from our
+conception of a straight line. Intuition must therefore here lend its
+aid, by means of which, and thus only, our synthesis is possible.
+
+Some few principles preposited by geometricians are, indeed, really
+analytical, and depend on the principle of contradiction. They serve,
+however, like identical propositions, as links in the chain of method,
+not as principles--for example, a = a, the whole is equal to itself, or
+(a+b) --> a, the whole is greater than its part. And yet even these
+principles themselves, though they derive their validity from pure
+conceptions, are only admitted in mathematics because they can be
+presented in intuition. What causes us here commonly to believe that
+the predicate of such apodeictic judgements is already contained in our
+conception, and that the judgement is therefore analytical, is merely
+the equivocal nature of the expression. We must join in thought a
+certain predicate to a given conception, and this necessity cleaves
+already to the conception. But the question is, not what we must join
+in thought to the given conception, but what we really think therein,
+though only obscurely, and then it becomes manifest that the predicate
+pertains to these conceptions, necessarily indeed, yet not as thought
+in the conception itself, but by virtue of an intuition, which must be
+added to the conception.
+
+2. The science of natural philosophy (physics) contains in itself
+synthetical judgements à priori, as principles. I shall adduce two
+propositions. For instance, the proposition, "In all changes of the
+material world, the quantity of matter remains unchanged"; or, that,
+"In all communication of motion, action and reaction must always be
+equal." In both of these, not only is the necessity, and therefore
+their origin à priori clear, but also that they are synthetical
+propositions. For in the conception of matter, I do not cogitate its
+permanency, but merely its presence in space, which it fills. I
+therefore really go out of and beyond the conception of matter, in
+order to think on to it something à priori, which I did not think in
+it. The proposition is therefore not analytical, but synthetical, and
+nevertheless conceived à priori; and so it is with regard to the other
+propositions of the pure part of natural philosophy.
+
+3. As to metaphysics, even if we look upon it merely as an attempted
+science, yet, from the nature of human reason, an indispensable one, we
+find that it must contain synthetical propositions à priori. It is not
+merely the duty of metaphysics to dissect, and thereby analytically to
+illustrate the conceptions which we form à priori of things; but we
+seek to widen the range of our à priori knowledge. For this purpose, we
+must avail ourselves of such principles as add something to the
+original conception--something not identical with, nor contained in it,
+and by means of synthetical judgements à priori, leave far behind us
+the limits of experience; for example, in the proposition, "the world
+must have a beginning," and such like. Thus metaphysics, according to
+the proper aim of the science, consists merely of synthetical
+propositions à priori.
+
+VI. The Universal Problem of Pure Reason.
+
+It is extremely advantageous to be able to bring a number of
+investigations under the formula of a single problem. For in this
+manner, we not only facilitate our own labour, inasmuch as we define it
+clearly to ourselves, but also render it more easy for others to decide
+whether we have done justice to our undertaking. The proper problem of
+pure reason, then, is contained in the question: "How are synthetical
+judgements à priori possible?"
+
+That metaphysical science has hitherto remained in so vacillating a
+state of uncertainty and contradiction, is only to be attributed to the
+fact that this great problem, and perhaps even the difference between
+analytical and synthetical judgements, did not sooner suggest itself to
+philosophers. Upon the solution of this problem, or upon sufficient
+proof of the impossibility of synthetical knowledge à priori, depends
+the existence or downfall of the science of metaphysics. Among
+philosophers, David Hume came the nearest of all to this problem; yet
+it never acquired in his mind sufficient precision, nor did he regard
+the question in its universality. On the contrary, he stopped short at
+the synthetical proposition of the connection of an effect with its
+cause (principium causalitatis), insisting that such proposition à
+priori was impossible. According to his conclusions, then, all that we
+term metaphysical science is a mere delusion, arising from the fancied
+insight of reason into that which is in truth borrowed from experience,
+and to which habit has given the appearance of necessity. Against this
+assertion, destructive to all pure philosophy, he would have been
+guarded, had he had our problem before his eyes in its universality.
+For he would then have perceived that, according to his own argument,
+there likewise could not be any pure mathematical science, which
+assuredly cannot exist without synthetical propositions à priori--an
+absurdity from which his good understanding must have saved him.
+
+In the solution of the above problem is at the same time comprehended
+the possibility of the use of pure reason in the foundation and
+construction of all sciences which contain theoretical knowledge à
+priori of objects, that is to say, the answer to the following
+questions:
+
+How is pure mathematical science possible?
+
+How is pure natural science possible?
+
+Respecting these sciences, as they do certainly exist, it may with
+propriety be asked, how they are possible?--for that they must be
+possible is shown by the fact of their really existing.[9] But as to
+metaphysics, the miserable progress it has hitherto made, and the fact
+that of no one system yet brought forward, far as regards its true aim,
+can it be said that this science really exists, leaves any one at
+liberty to doubt with reason the very possibility of its existence.
+
+ [9] As to the existence of pure natural science, or physics, perhaps
+ many may still express doubts. But we have only to look at the
+ different propositions which are commonly treated of at the
+ commencement of proper (empirical) physical science--those, for
+ example, relating to the permanence of the same quantity of matter,
+ the vis inertiae, the equality of action and reaction, etc.--to be soon
+ convinced that they form a science of pure physics (physica pura, or
+ rationalis), which well deserves to be separately exposed as a special
+ science, in its whole extent, whether that be great or confined.
+
+Yet, in a certain sense, this kind of knowledge must unquestionably be
+looked upon as given; in other words, metaphysics must be considered as
+really existing, if not as a science, nevertheless as a natural
+disposition of the human mind (metaphysica naturalis). For human
+reason, without any instigations imputable to the mere vanity of great
+knowledge, unceasingly progresses, urged on by its own feeling of need,
+towards such questions as cannot be answered by any empirical
+application of reason, or principles derived therefrom; and so there
+has ever really existed in every man some system of metaphysics. It
+will always exist, so soon as reason awakes to the exercise of its
+power of speculation. And now the question arises: "How is metaphysics,
+as a natural disposition, possible?" In other words, how, from the
+nature of universal human reason, do those questions arise which pure
+reason proposes to itself, and which it is impelled by its own feeling
+of need to answer as well as it can?
+
+But as in all the attempts hitherto made to answer the questions which
+reason is prompted by its very nature to propose to itself, for
+example, whether the world had a beginning, or has existed from
+eternity, it has always met with unavoidable contradictions, we must
+not rest satisfied with the mere natural disposition of the mind to
+metaphysics, that is, with the existence of the faculty of pure reason,
+whence, indeed, some sort of metaphysical system always arises; but it
+must be possible to arrive at certainty in regard to the question
+whether we know or do not know the things of which metaphysics treats.
+We must be able to arrive at a decision on the subjects of its
+questions, or on the ability or inability of reason to form any
+judgement respecting them; and therefore either to extend with
+confidence the bounds of our pure reason, or to set strictly defined
+and safe limits to its action. This last question, which arises out of
+the above universal problem, would properly run thus: "How is
+metaphysics possible as a science?"
+
+Thus, the critique of reason leads at last, naturally and necessarily,
+to science; and, on the other hand, the dogmatical use of reason
+without criticism leads to groundless assertions, against which others
+equally specious can always be set, thus ending unavoidably in
+scepticism.
+
+Besides, this science cannot be of great and formidable prolixity,
+because it has not to do with objects of reason, the variety of which
+is inexhaustible, but merely with Reason herself and her problems;
+problems which arise out of her own bosom, and are not proposed to her
+by the nature of outward things, but by her own nature. And when once
+Reason has previously become able completely to understand her own
+power in regard to objects which she meets with in experience, it will
+be easy to determine securely the extent and limits of her attempted
+application to objects beyond the confines of experience.
+
+We may and must, therefore, regard the attempts hitherto made to
+establish metaphysical science dogmatically as non-existent. For what
+of analysis, that is, mere dissection of conceptions, is contained in
+one or other, is not the aim of, but only a preparation for metaphysics
+proper, which has for its object the extension, by means of synthesis,
+of our à priori knowledge. And for this purpose, mere analysis is of
+course useless, because it only shows what is contained in these
+conceptions, but not how we arrive, à priori, at them; and this it is
+her duty to show, in order to be able afterwards to determine their
+valid use in regard to all objects of experience, to all knowledge in
+general. But little self-denial, indeed, is needed to give up these
+pretensions, seeing the undeniable, and in the dogmatic mode of
+procedure, inevitable contradictions of Reason with herself, have long
+since ruined the reputation of every system of metaphysics that has
+appeared up to this time. It will require more firmness to remain
+undeterred by difficulty from within, and opposition from without, from
+endeavouring, by a method quite opposed to all those hitherto followed,
+to further the growth and fruitfulness of a science indispensable to
+human reason--a science from which every branch it has borne may be cut
+away, but whose roots remain indestructible.
+
+VII. Idea and Division of a Particular Science, under the Name of a
+Critique of Pure Reason.
+
+From all that has been said, there results the idea of a particular
+science, which may be called the Critique of Pure Reason. For reason is
+the faculty which furnishes us with the principles of knowledge à
+priori. Hence, pure reason is the faculty which contains the principles
+of cognizing anything absolutely à priori. An organon of pure reason
+would be a compendium of those principles according to which alone all
+pure cognitions à priori can be obtained. The completely extended
+application of such an organon would afford us a system of pure reason.
+As this, however, is demanding a great deal, and it is yet doubtful
+whether any extension of our knowledge be here possible, or, if so, in
+what cases; we can regard a science of the mere criticism of pure
+reason, its sources and limits, as the propædeutic to a system of pure
+reason. Such a science must not be called a doctrine, but only a
+critique of pure reason; and its use, in regard to speculation, would
+be only negative, not to enlarge the bounds of, but to purify, our
+reason, and to shield it against error--which alone is no little gain. I
+apply the term transcendental to all knowledge which is not so much
+occupied with objects as with the mode of our cognition of these
+objects, so far as this mode of cognition is possible à priori. A
+system of such conceptions would be called transcendental philosophy.
+But this, again, is still beyond the bounds of our present essay. For
+as such a science must contain a complete exposition not only of our
+synthetical à priori, but of our analytical à priori knowledge, it is
+of too wide a range for our present purpose, because we do not require
+to carry our analysis any farther than is necessary to understand, in
+their full extent, the principles of synthesis à priori, with which
+alone we have to do. This investigation, which we cannot properly call
+a doctrine, but only a transcendental critique, because it aims not at
+the enlargement, but at the correction and guidance, of our knowledge,
+and is to serve as a touchstone of the worth or worthlessness of all
+knowledge à priori, is the sole object of our present essay. Such a
+critique is consequently, as far as possible, a preparation for an
+organon; and if this new organon should be found to fail, at least for
+a canon of pure reason, according to which the complete system of the
+philosophy of pure reason, whether it extend or limit the bounds of
+that reason, might one day be set forth both analytically and
+synthetically. For that this is possible, nay, that such a system is
+not of so great extent as to preclude the hope of its ever being
+completed, is evident. For we have not here to do with the nature of
+outward objects, which is infinite, but solely with the mind, which
+judges of the nature of objects, and, again, with the mind only in
+respect of its cognition à priori. And the object of our
+investigations, as it is not to be sought without, but, altogether
+within, ourselves, cannot remain concealed, and in all probability is
+limited enough to be completely surveyed and fairly estimated,
+according to its worth or worthlessness. Still less let the reader here
+expect a critique of books and systems of pure reason; our present
+object is exclusively a critique of the faculty of pure reason itself.
+Only when we make this critique our foundation, do we possess a pure
+touchstone for estimating the philosophical value of ancient and modern
+writings on this subject; and without this criterion, the incompetent
+historian or judge decides upon and corrects the groundless assertions
+of others with his own, which have themselves just as little
+foundation.
+
+Transcendental philosophy is the idea of a science, for which the
+Critique of Pure Reason must sketch the whole plan architectonically,
+that is, from principles, with a full guarantee for the validity and
+stability of all the parts which enter into the building. It is the
+system of all the principles of pure reason. If this Critique itself
+does not assume the title of transcendental philosophy, it is only
+because, to be a complete system, it ought to contain a full analysis
+of all human knowledge à priori. Our critique must, indeed, lay before
+us a complete enumeration of all the radical conceptions which
+constitute the said pure knowledge. But from the complete analysis of
+these conceptions themselves, as also from a complete investigation of
+those derived from them, it abstains with reason; partly because it
+would be deviating from the end in view to occupy itself with this
+analysis, since this process is not attended with the difficulty and
+insecurity to be found in the synthesis, to which our critique is
+entirely devoted, and partly because it would be inconsistent with the
+unity of our plan to burden this essay with the vindication of the
+completeness of such an analysis and deduction, with which, after all,
+we have at present nothing to do. This completeness of the analysis of
+these radical conceptions, as well as of the deduction from the
+conceptions à priori which may be given by the analysis, we can,
+however, easily attain, provided only that we are in possession of all
+these radical conceptions, which are to serve as principles of the
+synthesis, and that in respect of this main purpose nothing is wanting.
+
+To the Critique of Pure Reason, therefore, belongs all that constitutes
+transcendental philosophy; and it is the complete idea of
+transcendental philosophy, but still not the science itself; because it
+only proceeds so far with the analysis as is necessary to the power of
+judging completely of our synthetical knowledge à priori.
+
+The principal thing we must attend to, in the division of the parts of
+a science like this, is that no conceptions must enter it which contain
+aught empirical; in other words, that the knowledge à priori must be
+completely pure. Hence, although the highest principles and fundamental
+conceptions of morality are certainly cognitions à priori, yet they do
+not belong to transcendental philosophy; because, though they certainly
+do not lay the conceptions of pain, pleasure, desires, inclinations,
+etc. (which are all of empirical origin), at the foundation of its
+precepts, yet still into the conception of duty--as an obstacle to be
+overcome, or as an incitement which should not be made into a
+motive--these empirical conceptions must necessarily enter, in the
+construction of a system of pure morality. Transcendental philosophy is
+consequently a philosophy of the pure and merely speculative reason.
+For all that is practical, so far as it contains motives, relates to
+feelings, and these belong to empirical sources of cognition.
+
+If we wish to divide this science from the universal point of view of a
+science in general, it ought to comprehend, first, a Doctrine of the
+Elements, and, secondly, a Doctrine of the Method of pure reason. Each
+of these main divisions will have its subdivisions, the separate
+reasons for which we cannot here particularize. Only so much seems
+necessary, by way of introduction of premonition, that there are two
+sources of human knowledge (which probably spring from a common, but to
+us unknown root), namely, sense and understanding. By the former,
+objects are given to us; by the latter, thought. So far as the faculty
+of sense may contain representations à priori, which form the
+conditions under which objects are given, in so far it belongs to
+transcendental philosophy. The transcendental doctrine of sense must
+form the first part of our science of elements, because the conditions
+under which alone the objects of human knowledge are given must precede
+those under which they are thought.
+
+I. TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS.
+
+FIRST PART. TRANSCENDENTAL ÆSTHETIC.
+
+§ I. Introductory.
+
+In whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may relate to
+objects, it is at least quite clear that the only manner in which it
+immediately relates to them is by means of an intuition. To this as the
+indispensable groundwork, all thought points. But an intuition can take
+place only in so far as the object is given to us. This, again, is only
+possible, to man at least, on condition that the object affect the mind
+in a certain manner. The capacity for receiving representations
+(receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by objects,
+objects, is called sensibility. By means of sensibility, therefore,
+objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions; by
+the understanding they are thought, and from it arise conceptions. But
+an thought must directly, or indirectly, by means of certain signs,
+relate ultimately to intuitions; consequently, with us, to sensibility,
+because in no other way can an object be given to us.
+
+The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as
+we are affected by the said object, is sensation. That sort of
+intuition which relates to an object by means of sensation is called an
+empirical intuition. The undetermined object of an empirical intuition
+is called phenomenon. That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the
+sensation, I term its matter; but that which effects that the content
+of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations, I call its
+form. But that in which our sensations are merely arranged, and by
+which they are susceptible of assuming a certain form, cannot be itself
+sensation. It is, then, the matter of all phenomena that is given to us
+à posteriori; the form must lie ready à priori for them in the mind,
+and consequently can be regarded separately from all sensation.
+
+I call all representations pure, in the transcendental meaning of the
+word, wherein nothing is met with that belongs to sensation. And
+accordingly we find existing in the mind à priori, the pure form of
+sensuous intuitions in general, in which all the manifold content of
+the phenomenal world is arranged and viewed under certain relations.
+This pure form of sensibility I shall call pure intuition. Thus, if I
+take away from our representation of a body all that the understanding
+thinks as belonging to it, as substance, force, divisibility, etc., and
+also whatever belongs to sensation, as impenetrability, hardness,
+colour, etc.; yet there is still something left us from this empirical
+intuition, namely, extension and shape. These belong to pure intuition,
+which exists à priori in the mind, as a mere form of sensibility, and
+without any real object of the senses or any sensation.
+
+The science of all the principles of sensibility à priori, I call
+transcendental æsthetic.[10] There must, then, be such a science
+forming the first part of the transcendental doctrine of elements, in
+contradistinction to that part which contains the principles of pure
+thought, and which is called transcendental logic.
+
+ [10] The Germans are the only people who at present use this word to
+ indicate what others call the critique of taste. At the foundation of
+ this term lies the disappointed hope, which the eminent analyst,
+ Baumgarten, conceived, of subjecting the criticism of the beautiful to
+ principles of reason, and so of elevating its rules into a science.
+ But his endeavours were vain. For the said rules or criteria are, in
+ respect to their chief sources, merely empirical, consequently never
+ can serve as determinate laws à priori, by which our judgement in
+ matters of taste is to be directed. It is rather our judgement which
+ forms the proper test as to the correctness of the principles. On this
+ account it is advisable to give up the use of the term as designating
+ the critique of taste, and to apply it solely to that doctrine, which
+ is true science--the science of the laws of sensibility--and thus come
+ nearer to the language and the sense of the ancients in their
+ well-known division of the objects of cognition into aiotheta kai
+ noeta, or to share it with speculative philosophy, and employ it
+ partly in a transcendental, partly in a psychological signification.
+
+In the science of transcendental æsthetic accordingly, we shall first
+isolate sensibility or the sensuous faculty, by separating from it all
+that is annexed to its perceptions by the conceptions of understanding,
+so that nothing be left but empirical intuition. In the next place we
+shall take away from this intuition all that belongs to sensation, so
+that nothing may remain but pure intuition, and the mere form of
+phenomena, which is all that the sensibility can afford à priori. From
+this investigation it will be found that there are two pure forms of
+sensuous intuition, as principles of knowledge à priori, namely, space
+and time. To the consideration of these we shall now proceed.
+
+SECTION I. Of Space.
+
+§ 2. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception.
+
+By means of the external sense (a property of the mind), we represent
+to ourselves objects as without us, and these all in space. Herein
+alone are their shape, dimensions, and relations to each other
+determined or determinable. The internal sense, by means of which the
+mind contemplates itself or its internal state, gives, indeed, no
+intuition of the soul as an object; yet there is nevertheless a
+determinate form, under which alone the contemplation of our internal
+state is possible, so that all which relates to the inward
+determinations of the mind is represented in relations of time. Of time
+we cannot have any external intuition, any more than we can have an
+internal intuition of space. What then are time and space? Are they
+real existences? Or, are they merely relations or determinations of
+things, such, however, as would equally belong to these things in
+themselves, though they should never become objects of intuition; or,
+are they such as belong only to the form of intuition, and consequently
+to the subjective constitution of the mind, without which these
+predicates of time and space could not be attached to any object? In
+order to become informed on these points, we shall first give an
+exposition of the conception of space. By exposition, I mean the clear,
+though not detailed, representation of that which belongs to a
+conception; and an exposition is metaphysical when it contains that
+which represents the conception as given à priori.
+
+1. Space is not a conception which has been derived from outward
+experiences. For, in order that certain sensations may relate to
+something without me (that is, to something which occupies a different
+part of space from that in which I am); in like manner, in order that I
+may represent them not merely as without, of, and near to each other,
+but also in separate places, the representation of space must already
+exist as a foundation. Consequently, the representation of space cannot
+be borrowed from the relations of external phenomena through
+experience; but, on the contrary, this external experience is itself
+only possible through the said antecedent representation.
+
+2. Space then is a necessary representation à priori, which serves for
+the foundation of all external intuitions. We never can imagine or make
+a representation to ourselves of the non-existence of space, though we
+may easily enough think that no objects are found in it. It must,
+therefore, be considered as the condition of the possibility of
+phenomena, and by no means as a determination dependent on them, and is
+a representation à priori, which necessarily supplies the basis for
+external phenomena.
+
+3. Space is no discursive, or as we say, general conception of the
+relations of things, but a pure intuition. For, in the first place, we
+can only represent to ourselves one space, and, when we talk of divers
+spaces, we mean only parts of one and the same space. Moreover, these
+parts cannot antecede this one all-embracing space, as the component
+parts from which the aggregate can be made up, but can be cogitated
+only as existing in it. Space is essentially one, and multiplicity in
+it, consequently the general notion of spaces, of this or that space,
+depends solely upon limitations. Hence it follows that an à priori
+intuition (which is not empirical) lies at the root of all our
+conceptions of space. Thus, moreover, the principles of geometry--for
+example, that "in a triangle, two sides together are greater than the
+third," are never deduced from general conceptions of line and
+triangle, but from intuition, and this à priori, with apodeictic
+certainty.
+
+4. Space is represented as an infinite given quantity. Now every
+conception must indeed be considered as a representation which is
+contained in an infinite multitude of different possible
+representations, which, therefore, comprises these under itself; but no
+conception, as such, can be so conceived, as if it contained within
+itself an infinite multitude of representations. Nevertheless, space is
+so conceived of, for all parts of space are equally capable of being
+produced to infinity. Consequently, the original representation of
+space is an intuition à priori, and not a conception.
+
+§ 3. Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Space.
+
+By a transcendental exposition, I mean the explanation of a conception,
+as a principle, whence can be discerned the possibility of other
+synthetical à priori cognitions. For this purpose, it is requisite,
+firstly, that such cognitions do really flow from the given conception;
+and, secondly, that the said cognitions are only possible under the
+presupposition of a given mode of explaining this conception.
+
+Geometry is a science which determines the properties of space
+synthetically, and yet à priori. What, then, must be our representation
+of space, in order that such a cognition of it may be possible? It must
+be originally intuition, for from a mere conception, no propositions
+can be deduced which go out beyond the conception, and yet this happens
+in geometry. (Introd. V.) But this intuition must be found in the mind
+à priori, that is, before any perception of objects, consequently must
+be pure, not empirical, intuition. For geometrical principles are
+always apodeictic, that is, united with the consciousness of their
+necessity, as: "Space has only three dimensions." But propositions of
+this kind cannot be empirical judgements, nor conclusions from them.
+(Introd. II.) Now, how can an external intuition anterior to objects
+themselves, and in which our conception of objects can be determined à
+priori, exist in the human mind? Obviously not otherwise than in so far
+as it has its seat in the subject only, as the formal capacity of the
+subject's being affected by objects, and thereby of obtaining immediate
+representation, that is, intuition; consequently, only as the form of
+the external sense in general.
+
+Thus it is only by means of our explanation that the possibility of
+geometry, as a synthetical science à priori, becomes comprehensible.
+Every mode of explanation which does not show us this possibility,
+although in appearance it may be similar to ours, can with the utmost
+certainty be distinguished from it by these marks.
+
+§ 4. Conclusions from the foregoing Conceptions.
+
+(a) Space does not represent any property of objects as things in
+themselves, nor does it represent them in their relations to each
+other; in other words, space does not represent to us any determination
+of objects such as attaches to the objects themselves, and would
+remain, even though all subjective conditions of the intuition were
+abstracted. For neither absolute nor relative determinations of objects
+can be intuited prior to the existence of the things to which they
+belong, and therefore not à priori.
+
+(b) Space is nothing else than the form of all phenomena of the
+external sense, that is, the subjective condition of the sensibility,
+under which alone external intuition is possible. Now, because the
+receptivity or capacity of the subject to be affected by objects
+necessarily antecedes all intuitions of these objects, it is easily
+understood how the form of all phenomena can be given in the mind
+previous to all actual perceptions, therefore à priori, and how it, as
+a pure intuition, in which all objects must be determined, can contain
+principles of the relations of these objects prior to all experience.
+
+It is therefore from the human point of view only that we can speak of
+space, extended objects, etc. If we depart from the subjective
+condition, under which alone we can obtain external intuition, or, in
+other words, by means of which we are affected by objects, the
+representation of space has no meaning whatsoever. This predicate is
+only applicable to things in so far as they appear to us, that is, are
+objects of sensibility. The constant form of this receptivity, which we
+call sensibility, is a necessary condition of all relations in which
+objects can be intuited as existing without us, and when abstraction of
+these objects is made, is a pure intuition, to which we give the name
+of space. It is clear that we cannot make the special conditions of
+sensibility into conditions of the possibility of things, but only of
+the possibility of their existence as far as they are phenomena. And so
+we may correctly say that space contains all which can appear to us
+externally, but not all things considered as things in themselves, be
+they intuited or not, or by whatsoever subject one will. As to the
+intuitions of other thinking beings, we cannot judge whether they are
+or are not bound by the same conditions which limit our own intuition,
+and which for us are universally valid. If we join the limitation of a
+judgement to the conception of the subject, then the judgement will
+possess unconditioned validity. For example, the proposition, "All
+objects are beside each other in space," is valid only under the
+limitation that these things are taken as objects of our sensuous
+intuition. But if I join the condition to the conception and say, "All
+things, as external phenomena, are beside each other in space," then
+the rule is valid universally, and without any limitation. Our
+expositions, consequently, teach the reality (i.e., the objective
+validity) of space in regard of all which can be presented to us
+externally as object, and at the same time also the ideality of space
+in regard to objects when they are considered by means of reason as
+things in themselves, that is, without reference to the constitution of
+our sensibility. We maintain, therefore, the empirical reality of space
+in regard to all possible external experience, although we must admit
+its transcendental ideality; in other words, that it is nothing, so
+soon as we withdraw the condition upon which the possibility of all
+experience depends and look upon space as something that belongs to
+things in themselves.
+
+But, with the exception of space, there is no representation,
+subjective and referring to something external to us, which could be
+called objective à priori. For there are no other subjective
+representations from which we can deduce synthetical propositions à
+priori, as we can from the intuition of space. (See § 3.) Therefore, to
+speak accurately, no ideality whatever belongs to these, although they
+agree in this respect with the representation of space, that they
+belong merely to the subjective nature of the mode of sensuous
+perception; such a mode, for example, as that of sight, of hearing, and
+of feeling, by means of the sensations of colour, sound, and heat, but
+which, because they are only sensations and not intuitions, do not of
+themselves give us the cognition of any object, least of all, an à
+priori cognition. My purpose, in the above remark, is merely this: to
+guard any one against illustrating the asserted ideality of space by
+examples quite insufficient, for example, by colour, taste, etc.; for
+these must be contemplated not as properties of things, but only as
+changes in the subject, changes which may be different in different
+men. For, in such a case, that which is originally a mere phenomenon, a
+rose, for example, is taken by the empirical understanding for a thing
+in itself, though to every different eye, in respect of its colour, it
+may appear different. On the contrary, the transcendental conception of
+phenomena in space is a critical admonition, that, in general, nothing
+which is intuited in space is a thing in itself, and that space is not
+a form which belongs as a property to things; but that objects are
+quite unknown to us in themselves, and what we call outward objects,
+are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility, whose
+form is space, but whose real correlate, the thing in itself, is not
+known by means of these representations, nor ever can be, but
+respecting which, in experience, no inquiry is ever made.
+
+SECTION II. Of Time.
+
+§ 5. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception.
+
+1. Time is not an empirical conception. For neither coexistence nor
+succession would be perceived by us, if the representation of time did
+not exist as a foundation à priori. Without this presupposition we
+could not represent to ourselves that things exist together at one and
+the same time, or at different times, that is, contemporaneously, or in
+succession.
+
+2. Time is a necessary representation, lying at the foundation of all
+our intuitions. With regard to phenomena in general, we cannot think
+away time from them, and represent them to ourselves as out of and
+unconnected with time, but we can quite well represent to ourselves
+time void of phenomena. Time is therefore given à priori. In it alone
+is all reality of phenomena possible. These may all be annihilated in
+thought, but time itself, as the universal condition of their
+possibility, cannot be so annulled.
+
+3. On this necessity à priori is also founded the possibility of
+apodeictic principles of the relations of time, or axioms of time in
+general, such as: "Time has only one dimension," "Different times are
+not coexistent but successive" (as different spaces are not successive
+but coexistent). These principles cannot be derived from experience,
+for it would give neither strict universality, nor apodeictic
+certainty. We should only be able to say, "so common experience teaches
+us," but not "it must be so." They are valid as rules, through which,
+in general, experience is possible; and they instruct us respecting
+experience, and not by means of it.
+
+4. Time is not a discursive, or as it is called, general conception,
+but a pure form of the sensuous intuition. Different times are merely
+parts of one and the same time. But the representation which can only
+be given by a single object is an intuition. Besides, the proposition
+that different times cannot be coexistent could not be derived from a
+general conception. For this proposition is synthetical, and therefore
+cannot spring out of conceptions alone. It is therefore contained
+immediately in the intuition and representation of time.
+
+5. The infinity of time signifies nothing more than that every
+determined quantity of time is possible only through limitations of one
+time lying at the foundation. Consequently, the original
+representation, time, must be given as unlimited. But as the
+determinate representation of the parts of time and of every quantity
+of an object can only be obtained by limitation, the complete
+representation of time must not be furnished by means of conceptions,
+for these contain only partial representations. Conceptions, on the
+contrary, must have immediate intuition for their basis.
+
+§ 6 Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Time.
+
+I may here refer to what is said above (§ 5, 3), where, for or sake of
+brevity, I have placed under the head of metaphysical exposition, that
+which is properly transcendental. Here I shall add that the conception
+of change, and with it the conception of motion, as change of place, is
+possible only through and in the representation of time; that if this
+representation were not an intuition (internal) à priori, no
+conception, of whatever kind, could render comprehensible the
+possibility of change, in other words, of a conjunction of
+contradictorily opposed predicates in one and the same object, for
+example, the presence of a thing in a place and the non-presence of the
+same thing in the same place. It is only in time that it is possible to
+meet with two contradictorily opposed determinations in one thing, that
+is, after each other. Thus our conception of time explains the
+possibility of so much synthetical knowledge à priori, as is exhibited
+in the general doctrine of motion, which is not a little fruitful.
+
+§ 7. Conclusions from the above Conceptions.
+
+(a) Time is not something which subsists of itself, or which inheres in
+things as an objective determination, and therefore remains, when
+abstraction is made of the subjective conditions of the intuition of
+things. For in the former case, it would be something real, yet without
+presenting to any power of perception any real object. In the latter
+case, as an order or determination inherent in things themselves, it
+could not be antecedent to things, as their condition, nor discerned or
+intuited by means of synthetical propositions à priori. But all this is
+quite possible when we regard time as merely the subjective condition
+under which all our intuitions take place. For in that case, this form
+of the inward intuition can be represented prior to the objects, and
+consequently à priori.
+
+(b) Time is nothing else than the form of the internal sense, that is,
+of the intuitions of self and of our internal state. For time cannot be
+any determination of outward phenomena. It has to do neither with shape
+nor position; on the contrary, it determines the relation of
+representations in our internal state. And precisely because this
+internal intuition presents to us no shape or form, we endeavour to
+supply this want by analogies, and represent the course of time by a
+line progressing to infinity, the content of which constitutes a series
+which is only of one dimension; and we conclude from the properties of
+this line as to all the properties of time, with this single exception,
+that the parts of the line are coexistent, whilst those of time are
+successive. From this it is clear also that the representation of time
+is itself an intuition, because all its relations can be expressed in
+an external intuition.
+
+(c) Time is the formal condition à priori of all phenomena whatsoever.
+Space, as the pure form of external intuition, is limited as a
+condition à priori to external phenomena alone. On the other hand,
+because all representations, whether they have or have not external
+things for their objects, still in themselves, as determinations of the
+mind, belong to our internal state; and because this internal state is
+subject to the formal condition of the internal intuition, that is, to
+time--time is a condition à priori of all phenomena whatsoever--the
+immediate condition of all internal, and thereby the mediate condition
+of all external phenomena. If I can say à priori, "All outward
+phenomena are in space, and determined à priori according to the
+relations of space," I can also, from the principle of the internal
+sense, affirm universally, "All phenomena in general, that is, all
+objects of the senses, are in time and stand necessarily in relations
+of time."
+
+If we abstract our internal intuition of ourselves and all external
+intuitions, possible only by virtue of this internal intuition and
+presented to us by our faculty of representation, and consequently take
+objects as they are in themselves, then time is nothing. It is only of
+objective validity in regard to phenomena, because these are things
+which we regard as objects of our senses. It no longer objective we,
+make abstraction of the sensuousness of our intuition, in other words,
+of that mode of representation which is peculiar to us, and speak of
+things in general. Time is therefore merely a subjective condition of
+our (human) intuition (which is always sensuous, that is, so far as we
+are affected by objects), and in itself, independently of the mind or
+subject, is nothing. Nevertheless, in respect of all phenomena,
+consequently of all things which come within the sphere of our
+experience, it is necessarily objective. We cannot say, "All things are
+in time," because in this conception of things in general, we abstract
+and make no mention of any sort of intuition of things. But this is the
+proper condition under which time belongs to our representation of
+objects. If we add the condition to the conception, and say, "All
+things, as phenomena, that is, objects of sensuous intuition, are in
+time," then the proposition has its sound objective validity and
+universality à priori.
+
+What we have now set forth teaches, therefore, the empirical reality of
+time; that is, its objective validity in reference to all objects which
+can ever be presented to our senses. And as our intuition is always
+sensuous, no object ever can be presented to us in experience, which
+does not come under the conditions of time. On the other hand, we deny
+to time all claim to absolute reality; that is, we deny that it,
+without having regard to the form of our sensuous intuition, absolutely
+inheres in things as a condition or property. Such properties as belong
+to objects as things in themselves never can be presented to us through
+the medium of the senses. Herein consists, therefore, the
+transcendental ideality of time, according to which, if we abstract the
+subjective conditions of sensuous intuition, it is nothing, and cannot
+be reckoned as subsisting or inhering in objects as things in
+themselves, independently of its relation to our intuition. This
+ideality, like that of space, is not to be proved or illustrated by
+fallacious analogies with sensations, for this reason--that in such
+arguments or illustrations, we make the presupposition that the
+phenomenon, in which such and such predicates inhere, has objective
+reality, while in this case we can only find such an objective reality
+as is itself empirical, that is, regards the object as a mere
+phenomenon. In reference to this subject, see the remark in Section I
+(§ 4)
+
+§ 8. Elucidation.
+
+Against this theory, which grants empirical reality to time, but denies
+to it absolute and transcendental reality, I have heard from
+intelligent men an objection so unanimously urged that I conclude that
+it must naturally present itself to every reader to whom these
+considerations are novel. It runs thus: "Changes are real" (this the
+continual change in our own representations demonstrates, even though
+the existence of all external phenomena, together with their changes,
+is denied). Now, changes are only possible in time, and therefore time
+must be something real. But there is no difficulty in answering this. I
+grant the whole argument. Time, no doubt, is something real, that is,
+it is the real form of our internal intuition. It therefore has
+subjective reality, in reference to our internal experience, that is, I
+have really the representation of time and of my determinations
+therein. Time, therefore, is not to be regarded as an object, but as
+the mode of representation of myself as an object. But if I could
+intuite myself, or be intuited by another being, without this condition
+of sensibility, then those very determinations which we now represent
+to ourselves as changes, would present to us a knowledge in which the
+representation of time, and consequently of change, would not appear.
+The empirical reality of time, therefore, remains, as the condition of
+all our experience. But absolute reality, according to what has been
+said above, cannot be granted it. Time is nothing but the form of our
+internal intuition.[11] If we take away from it the special condition
+of our sensibility, the conception of time also vanishes; and it
+inheres not in the objects themselves, but solely in the subject (or
+mind) which intuites them.
+
+ [11] I can indeed say "my representations follow one another, or are
+ successive"; but this means only that we are conscious of them as in a
+ succession, that is, according to the form of the internal sense.
+ Time, therefore, is not a thing in itself, nor is it any objective
+ determination pertaining to, or inherent in things.
+
+But the reason why this objection is so unanimously brought against our
+doctrine of time, and that too by disputants who cannot start any
+intelligible arguments against the doctrine of the ideality of space,
+is this--they have no hope of demonstrating apodeictically the absolute
+reality of space, because the doctrine of idealism is against them,
+according to which the reality of external objects is not capable of
+any strict proof. On the other hand, the reality of the object of our
+internal sense (that is, myself and my internal state) is clear
+immediately through consciousness. The former--external objects in
+space--might be a mere delusion, but the latter--the object of my
+internal perception--is undeniably real. They do not, however, reflect
+that both, without question of their reality as representations, belong
+only to the genus phenomenon, which has always two aspects, the one,
+the object considered as a thing in itself, without regard to the mode
+of intuiting it, and the nature of which remains for this very reason
+problematical, the other, the form of our intuition of the object,
+which must be sought not in the object as a thing in itself, but in the
+subject to which it appears--which form of intuition nevertheless
+belongs really and necessarily to the phenomenal object.
+
+Time and space are, therefore, two sources of knowledge, from which, à
+priori, various synthetical cognitions can be drawn. Of this we find a
+striking example in the cognitions of space and its relations, which
+form the foundation of pure mathematics. They are the two pure forms of
+all intuitions, and thereby make synthetical propositions à priori
+possible. But these sources of knowledge being merely conditions of our
+sensibility, do therefore, and as such, strictly determine their own
+range and purpose, in that they do not and cannot present objects as
+things in themselves, but are applicable to them solely in so far as
+they are considered as sensuous phenomena. The sphere of phenomena is
+the only sphere of their validity, and if we venture out of this, no
+further objective use can be made of them. For the rest, this formal
+reality of time and space leaves the validity of our empirical
+knowledge unshaken; for our certainty in that respect is equally firm,
+whether these forms necessarily inhere in the things themselves, or
+only in our intuitions of them. On the other hand, those who maintain
+the absolute reality of time and space, whether as essentially
+subsisting, or only inhering, as modifications, in things, must find
+themselves at utter variance with the principles of experience itself.
+For, if they decide for the first view, and make space and time into
+substances, this being the side taken by mathematical natural
+philosophers, they must admit two self-subsisting nonentities, infinite
+and eternal, which exist (yet without there being anything real) for
+the purpose of containing in themselves everything that is real. If
+they adopt the second view of inherence, which is preferred by some
+metaphysical natural philosophers, and regard space and time as
+relations (contiguity in space or succession in time), abstracted from
+experience, though represented confusedly in this state of separation,
+they find themselves in that case necessitated to deny the validity of
+mathematical doctrines à priori in reference to real things (for
+example, in space)--at all events their apodeictic certainty. For such
+certainty cannot be found in an à posteriori proposition; and the
+conceptions à priori of space and time are, according to this opinion,
+mere creations of the imagination, having their source really in
+experience, inasmuch as, out of relations abstracted from experience,
+imagination has made up something which contains, indeed, general
+statements of these relations, yet of which no application can be made
+without the restrictions attached thereto by nature. The former of
+these parties gains this advantage, that they keep the sphere of
+phenomena free for mathematical science. On the other hand, these very
+conditions (space and time) embarrass them greatly, when the
+understanding endeavours to pass the limits of that sphere. The latter
+has, indeed, this advantage, that the representations of space and time
+do not come in their way when they wish to judge of objects, not as
+phenomena, but merely in their relation to the understanding. Devoid,
+however, of a true and objectively valid à priori intuition, they can
+neither furnish any basis for the possibility of mathematical
+cognitions à priori, nor bring the propositions of experience into
+necessary accordance with those of mathematics. In our theory of the
+true nature of these two original forms of the sensibility, both
+difficulties are surmounted.
+
+In conclusion, that transcendental æsthetic cannot contain any more
+than these two elements--space and time, is sufficiently obvious from
+the fact that all other conceptions appertaining to sensibility, even
+that of motion, which unites in itself both elements, presuppose
+something empirical. Motion, for example, presupposes the perception of
+something movable. But space considered in itself contains nothing
+movable, consequently motion must be something which is found in space
+only through experience--in other words, an empirical datum. In like
+manner, transcendental æsthetic cannot number the conception of change
+among its data à priori; for time itself does not change, but only
+something which is in time. To acquire the conception of change,
+therefore, the perception of some existing object and of the succession
+of its determinations, in one word, experience, is necessary.
+
+§ 9. General Remarks on Transcendental Æsthetic.
+
+I. In order to prevent any misunderstanding, it will be requisite, in
+the first place, to recapitulate, as clearly as possible, what our
+opinion is with respect to the fundamental nature of our sensuous
+cognition in general. We have intended, then, to say that all our
+intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena; that the
+things which we intuite, are not in themselves the same as our
+representations of them in intuition, nor are their relations in
+themselves so constituted as they appear to us; and that if we take
+away the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of our
+senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects in
+space and time, but even space and time themselves disappear; and that
+these, as phenomena, cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. What
+may be the nature of objects considered as things in themselves and
+without reference to the receptivity of our sensibility is quite
+unknown to us. We know nothing more than our mode of perceiving them,
+which is peculiar to us, and which, though not of necessity pertaining
+to every animated being, is so to the whole human race. With this alone
+we have to do. Space and time are the pure forms thereof; sensation the
+matter. The former alone can we cognize à priori, that is, antecedent
+to all actual perception; and for this reason such cognition is called
+pure intuition. The latter is that in our cognition which is called
+cognition à posteriori, that is, empirical intuition. The former
+appertain absolutely and necessarily to our sensibility, of whatsoever
+kind our sensations may be; the latter may be of very diversified
+character. Supposing that we should carry our empirical intuition even
+to the very highest degree of clearness, we should not thereby advance
+one step nearer to a knowledge of the constitution of objects as things
+in themselves. For we could only, at best, arrive at a complete
+cognition of our own mode of intuition, that is of our sensibility, and
+this always under the conditions originally attaching to the subject,
+namely, the conditions of space and time; while the question: "What are
+objects considered as things in themselves?" remains unanswerable even
+after the most thorough examination of the phenomenal world.
+
+To say, then, that all our sensibility is nothing but the confused
+representation of things containing exclusively that which belongs to
+them as things in themselves, and this under an accumulation of
+characteristic marks and partial representations which we cannot
+distinguish in consciousness, is a falsification of the conception of
+sensibility and phenomenization, which renders our whole doctrine
+thereof empty and useless. The difference between a confused and a
+clear representation is merely logical and has nothing to do with
+content. No doubt the conception of right, as employed by a sound
+understanding, contains all that the most subtle investigation could
+unfold from it, although, in the ordinary practical use of the word, we
+are not conscious of the manifold representations comprised in the
+conception. But we cannot for this reason assert that the ordinary
+conception is a sensuous one, containing a mere phenomenon, for right
+cannot appear as a phenomenon; but the conception of it lies in the
+understanding, and represents a property (the moral property) of
+actions, which belongs to them in themselves. On the other hand, the
+representation in intuition of a body contains nothing which could
+belong to an object considered as a thing in itself, but merely the
+phenomenon or appearance of something, and the mode in which we are
+affected by that appearance; and this receptivity of our faculty of
+cognition is called sensibility, and remains toto caelo different from
+the cognition of an object in itself, even though we should examine the
+content of the phenomenon to the very bottom.
+
+It must be admitted that the Leibnitz-Wolfian philosophy has assigned
+an entirely erroneous point of view to all investigations into the
+nature and origin of our cognitions, inasmuch as it regards the
+distinction between the sensuous and the intellectual as merely
+logical, whereas it is plainly transcendental, and concerns not merely
+the clearness or obscurity, but the content and origin of both. For the
+faculty of sensibility not only does not present us with an indistinct
+and confused cognition of objects as things in themselves, but, in
+fact, gives us no knowledge of these at all. On the contrary, so soon
+as we abstract in thought our own subjective nature, the object
+represented, with the properties ascribed to it by sensuous intuition,
+entirely disappears, because it was only this subjective nature that
+determined the form of the object as a phenomenon.
+
+In phenomena, we commonly, indeed, distinguish that which essentially
+belongs to the intuition of them, and is valid for the sensuous faculty
+of every human being, from that which belongs to the same intuition
+accidentally, as valid not for the sensuous faculty in general, but for
+a particular state or organization of this or that sense. Accordingly,
+we are accustomed to say that the former is a cognition which
+represents the object itself, whilst the latter presents only a
+particular appearance or phenomenon thereof. This distinction, however,
+is only empirical. If we stop here (as is usual), and do not regard the
+empirical intuition as itself a mere phenomenon (as we ought to do), in
+which nothing that can appertain to a thing in itself is to be found,
+our transcendental distinction is lost, and we believe that we cognize
+objects as things in themselves, although in the whole range of the
+sensuous world, investigate the nature of its objects as profoundly as
+we may, we have to do with nothing but phenomena. Thus, we call the
+rainbow a mere appearance of phenomenon in a sunny shower, and the
+rain, the reality or thing in itself; and this is right enough, if we
+understand the latter conception in a merely physical sense, that is,
+as that which in universal experience, and under whatever conditions of
+sensuous perception, is known in intuition to be so and so determined,
+and not otherwise. But if we consider this empirical datum generally,
+and inquire, without reference to its accordance with all our senses,
+whether there can be discovered in it aught which represents an object
+as a thing in itself (the raindrops of course are not such, for they
+are, as phenomena, empirical objects), the question of the relation of
+the representation to the object is transcendental; and not only are
+the raindrops mere phenomena, but even their circular form, nay, the
+space itself through which they fall, is nothing in itself, but both
+are mere modifications or fundamental dispositions of our sensuous
+intuition, whilst the transcendental object remains for us utterly
+unknown.
+
+The second important concern of our æsthetic is that it does not obtain
+favour merely as a plausible hypothesis, but possess as undoubted a
+character of certainty as can be demanded of any theory which is to
+serve for an organon. In order fully to convince the reader of this
+certainty, we shall select a case which will serve to make its validity
+apparent, and also to illustrate what has been said in § 3.
+
+Suppose, then, that space and time are in themselves objective, and
+conditions of the--possibility of objects as things in themselves. In
+the first place, it is evident that both present us, with very many
+apodeictic and synthetic propositions à priori, but especially
+space--and for this reason we shall prefer it for investigation at
+present. As the propositions of geometry are cognized synthetically à
+priori, and with apodeictic certainty, I inquire: Whence do you obtain
+propositions of this kind, and on what basis does the understanding
+rest, in order to arrive at such absolutely necessary and universally
+valid truths?
+
+There is no other way than through intuitions or conceptions, as such;
+and these are given either à priori or à posteriori. The latter,
+namely, empirical conceptions, together with the empirical intuition on
+which they are founded, cannot afford any synthetical proposition,
+except such as is itself also empirical, that is, a proposition of
+experience. But an empirical proposition cannot possess the qualities
+of necessity and absolute universality, which, nevertheless, are the
+characteristics of all geometrical propositions. As to the first and
+only means to arrive at such cognitions, namely, through mere
+conceptions or intuitions à priori, it is quite clear that from mere
+conceptions no synthetical cognitions, but only analytical ones, can be
+obtained. Take, for example, the proposition: "Two straight lines
+cannot enclose a space, and with these alone no figure is possible,"
+and try to deduce it from the conception of a straight line and the
+number two; or take the proposition: "It is possible to construct a
+figure with three straight lines," and endeavour, in like manner, to
+deduce it from the mere conception of a straight line and the number
+three. All your endeavours are in vain, and you find yourself forced to
+have recourse to intuition, as, in fact, geometry always does. You
+therefore give yourself an object in intuition. But of what kind is
+this intuition? Is it a pure à priori, or is it an empirical intuition?
+If the latter, then neither an universally valid, much less an
+apodeictic proposition can arise from it, for experience never can give
+us any such proposition. You must, therefore, give yourself an object à
+priori in intuition, and upon that ground your synthetical proposition.
+Now if there did not exist within you a faculty of intuition à priori;
+if this subjective condition were not in respect to its form also the
+universal condition à priori under which alone the object of this
+external intuition is itself possible; if the object (that is, the
+triangle) were something in itself, without relation to you the
+subject; how could you affirm that that which lies necessarily in your
+subjective conditions in order to construct a triangle, must also
+necessarily belong to the triangle in itself? For to your conceptions
+of three lines, you could not add anything new (that is, the figure);
+which, therefore, must necessarily be found in the object, because the
+object is given before your cognition, and not by means of it. If,
+therefore, space (and time also) were not a mere form of your
+intuition, which contains conditions à priori, under which alone things
+can become external objects for you, and without which subjective
+conditions the objects are in themselves nothing, you could not
+construct any synthetical proposition whatsoever regarding external
+objects. It is therefore not merely possible or probable, but
+indubitably certain, that space and time, as the necessary conditions
+of all our external and internal experience, are merely subjective
+conditions of all our intuitions, in relation to which all objects are
+therefore mere phenomena, and not things in themselves, presented to us
+in this particular manner. And for this reason, in respect to the form
+of phenomena, much may be said à priori, whilst of the thing in itself,
+which may lie at the foundation of these phenomena, it is impossible to
+say anything.
+
+II. In confirmation of this theory of the ideality of the external as
+well as internal sense, consequently of all objects of sense, as mere
+phenomena, we may especially remark that all in our cognition that
+belongs to intuition contains nothing more than mere relations. (The
+feelings of pain and pleasure, and the will, which are not cognitions,
+are excepted.) The relations, to wit, of place in an intuition
+(extension), change of place (motion), and laws according to which this
+change is determined (moving forces). That, however, which is present
+in this or that place, or any operation going on, or result taking
+place in the things themselves, with the exception of change of place,
+is not given to us by intuition. Now by means of mere relations, a
+thing cannot be known in itself; and it may therefore be fairly
+concluded, that, as through the external sense nothing but mere
+representations of relations are given us, the said external sense in
+its representation can contain only the relation of the object to the
+subject, but not the essential nature of the object as a thing in
+itself.
+
+The same is the case with the internal intuition, not only because, in
+the internal intuition, the representation of the external senses
+constitutes the material with which the mind is occupied; but because
+time, in which we place, and which itself antecedes the consciousness
+of, these representations in experience, and which, as the formal
+condition of the mode according to which objects are placed in the
+mind, lies at the foundation of them, contains relations of the
+successive, the coexistent, and of that which always must be coexistent
+with succession, the permanent. Now that which, as representation, can
+antecede every exercise of thought (of an object), is intuition; and
+when it contains nothing but relations, it is the form of the
+intuition, which, as it presents us with no representation, except in
+so far as something is placed in the mind, can be nothing else than the
+mode in which the mind is affected by its own activity, to wit--its
+presenting to itself representations, consequently the mode in which
+the mind is affected by itself; that is, it can be nothing but an
+internal sense in respect to its form. Everything that is represented
+through the medium of sense is so far phenomenal; consequently, we must
+either refuse altogether to admit an internal sense, or the subject,
+which is the object of that sense, could only be represented by it as
+phenomenon, and not as it would judge of itself, if its intuition were
+pure spontaneous activity, that is, were intellectual. The difficulty
+here lies wholly in the question: How can the subject have an internal
+intuition of itself? But this difficulty is common to every theory. The
+consciousness of self (apperception) is the simple representation of
+the "ego"; and if by means of that representation alone, all the
+manifold representations in the subject were spontaneously given, then
+our internal intuition would be intellectual. This consciousness in man
+requires an internal perception of the manifold representations which
+are previously given in the subject; and the manner in which these
+representations are given in the mind without spontaneity, must, on
+account of this difference (the want of spontaneity), be called
+sensibility. If the faculty of self-consciousness is to apprehend what
+lies in the mind, it must all act that and can in this way alone
+produce an intuition of self. But the form of this intuition, which
+lies in the original constitution of the mind, determines, in the
+representation of time, the manner in which the manifold
+representations are to combine themselves in the mind; since the
+subject intuites itself, not as it would represent itself immediately
+and spontaneously, but according to the manner in which the mind is
+internally affected, consequently, as it appears, and not as it is.
+
+III. When we say that the intuition of external objects, and also the
+self-intuition of the subject, represent both, objects and subject, in
+space and time, as they affect our senses, that is, as they appear--this
+is by no means equivalent to asserting that these objects are mere
+illusory appearances. For when we speak of things as phenomena, the
+objects, nay, even the properties which we ascribe to them, are looked
+upon as really given; only that, in so far as this or that property
+depends upon the mode of intuition of the subject, in the relation of
+the given object to the subject, the object as phenomenon is to be
+distinguished from the object as a thing in itself. Thus I do not say
+that bodies seem or appear to be external to me, or that my soul seems
+merely to be given in my self-consciousness, although I maintain that
+the properties of space and time, in conformity to which I set both, as
+the condition of their existence, abide in my mode of intuition, and
+not in the objects in themselves. It would be my own fault, if out of
+that which I should reckon as phenomenon, I made mere illusory
+appearance.[12] But this will not happen, because of our principle of
+the ideality of all sensuous intuitions. On the contrary, if we ascribe
+objective reality to these forms of representation, it becomes
+impossible to avoid changing everything into mere appearance. For if we
+regard space and time as properties, which must be found in objects as
+things in themselves, as sine quibus non of the possibility of their
+existence, and reflect on the absurdities in which we then find
+ourselves involved, inasmuch as we are compelled to admit the existence
+of two infinite things, which are nevertheless not substances, nor
+anything really inhering in substances, nay, to admit that they are the
+necessary conditions of the existence of all things, and moreover, that
+they must continue to exist, although all existing things were
+annihilated--we cannot blame the good Berkeley for degrading bodies to
+mere illusory appearances. Nay, even our own existence, which would in
+this case depend upon the self-existent reality of such a mere
+nonentity as time, would necessarily be changed with it into mere
+appearance--an absurdity which no one has as yet been guilty of.
+
+ [12] The predicates of the phenomenon can be affixed to the object
+ itself in relation to our sensuous faculty; for example, the red
+ colour or the perfume to the rose. But (illusory) appearance never can
+ be attributed as a predicate to an object, for this very reason, that
+ it attributes to this object in itself that which belongs to it only
+ in relation to our sensuous faculty, or to the subject in general,
+ e.g., the two handles which were formerly ascribed to Saturn. That
+ which is never to be found in the object itself, but always in the
+ relation of the object to the subject, and which moreover is
+ inseparable from our representation of the object, we denominate
+ phenomenon. Thus the predicates of space and time are rightly
+ attributed to objects of the senses as such, and in this there is no
+ illusion. On the contrary, if I ascribe redness of the rose as a thing
+ in itself, or to Saturn his handles, or extension to all external
+ objects, considered as things in themselves, without regarding the
+ determinate relation of these objects to the subject, and without
+ limiting my judgement to that relation--then, and then only, arises
+ illusion.
+
+IV. In natural theology, where we think of an object--God--which never
+can be an object of intuition to us, and even to himself can never be
+an object of sensuous intuition, we carefully avoid attributing to his
+intuition the conditions of space and time--and intuition all his
+cognition must be, and not thought, which always includes limitation.
+But with what right can we do this if we make them forms of objects as
+things in themselves, and such, moreover, as would continue to exist as
+à priori conditions of the existence of things, even though the things
+themselves were annihilated? For as conditions of all existence in
+general, space and time must be conditions of the existence of the
+Supreme Being also. But if we do not thus make them objective forms of
+all things, there is no other way left than to make them subjective
+forms of our mode of intuition--external and internal; which is called
+sensuous, because it is not primitive, that is, is not such as gives in
+itself the existence of the object of the intuition (a mode of
+intuition which, so far as we can judge, can belong only to the
+Creator), but is dependent on the existence of the object, is possible,
+therefore, only on condition that the representative faculty of the
+subject is affected by the object.
+
+It is, moreover, not necessary that we should limit the mode of
+intuition in space and time to the sensuous faculty of man. It may well
+be that all finite thinking beings must necessarily in this respect
+agree with man (though as to this we cannot decide), but sensibility
+does not on account of this universality cease to be sensibility, for
+this very reason, that it is a deduced (intuitus derivativus), and not
+an original (intuitus originarius), consequently not an intellectual
+intuition, and this intuition, as such, for reasons above mentioned,
+seems to belong solely to the Supreme Being, but never to a being
+dependent, quoad its existence, as well as its intuition (which its
+existence determines and limits relatively to given objects). This
+latter remark, however, must be taken only as an illustration, and not
+as any proof of the truth of our æsthetical theory.
+
+§ 10. Conclusion of the Transcendental Æsthetic.
+
+We have now completely before us one part of the solution of the grand
+general problem of transcendental philosophy, namely, the question:
+"How are synthetical propositions à priori possible?" That is to say,
+we have shown that we are in possession of pure à priori intuitions,
+namely, space and time, in which we find, when in a judgement à priori
+we pass out beyond the given conception, something which is not
+discoverable in that conception, but is certainly found à priori in the
+intuition which corresponds to the conception, and can be united
+synthetically with it. But the judgements which these pure intuitions
+enable us to make, never reach farther than to objects of the senses,
+and are valid only for objects of possible experience.
+
+Second Part--TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC
+
+INTRODUCTION. Idea of a Transcendental Logic.
+
+I. Of Logic in General.
+
+Our knowledge springs from two main sources in the mind, first of which
+is the faculty or power of receiving representations (receptivity for
+impressions); the second is the power of cognizing by means of these
+representations (spontaneity in the production of conceptions). Through
+the first an object is given to us; through the second, it is, in
+relation to the representation (which is a mere determination of the
+mind), thought. Intuition and conceptions constitute, therefore, the
+elements of all our knowledge, so that neither conceptions without an
+intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without
+conceptions, can afford us a cognition. Both are either pure or
+empirical. They are empirical, when sensation (which presupposes the
+actual presence of the object) is contained in them; and pure, when no
+sensation is mixed with the representation. Sensations we may call the
+matter of sensuous cognition. Pure intuition consequently contains
+merely the form under which something is intuited, and pure conception
+only the form of the thought of an object. Only pure intuitions and
+pure conceptions are possible à priori; the empirical only à
+posteriori.
+
+We apply the term sensibility to the receptivity of the mind for
+impressions, in so far as it is in some way affected; and, on the other
+hand, we call the faculty of spontaneously producing representations,
+or the spontaneity of cognition, understanding. Our nature is so
+constituted that intuition with us never can be other than sensuous,
+that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects.
+On the other hand, the faculty of thinking the object of sensuous
+intuition is the understanding. Neither of these faculties has a
+preference over the other. Without the sensuous faculty no object would
+be given to us, and without the understanding no object would be
+thought. Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without
+conceptions, blind. Hence it is as necessary for the mind to make its
+conceptions sensuous (that is, to join to them the object in
+intuition), as to make its intuitions intelligible (that is, to bring
+them under conceptions). Neither of these faculties can exchange its
+proper function. Understanding cannot intuite, and the sensuous faculty
+cannot think. In no other way than from the united operation of both,
+can knowledge arise. But no one ought, on this account, to overlook the
+difference of the elements contributed by each; we have rather great
+reason carefully to separate and distinguish them. We therefore
+distinguish the science of the laws of sensibility, that is, æsthetic,
+from the science of the laws of the understanding, that is, logic.
+
+Now, logic in its turn may be considered as twofold--namely, as logic of
+the general, or of the particular use of the understanding. The first
+contains the absolutely necessary laws of thought, without which no use
+whatsoever of the understanding is possible, and gives laws therefore
+to the understanding, without regard to the difference of objects on
+which it may be employed. The logic of the particular use of the
+understanding contains the laws of correct thinking upon a particular
+class of objects. The former may be called elemental logic--the latter,
+the organon of this or that particular science. The latter is for the
+most part employed in the schools, as a propædeutic to the sciences,
+although, indeed, according to the course of human reason, it is the
+last thing we arrive at, when the science has been already matured, and
+needs only the finishing touches towards its correction and completion;
+for our knowledge of the objects of our attempted science must be
+tolerably extensive and complete before we can indicate the laws by
+which a science of these objects can be established.
+
+General logic is again either pure or applied. In the former, we
+abstract all the empirical conditions under which the understanding is
+exercised; for example, the influence of the senses, the play of the
+fantasy or imagination, the laws of the memory, the force of habit, of
+inclination, etc., consequently also, the sources of prejudice--in a
+word, we abstract all causes from which particular cognitions arise,
+because these causes regard the understanding under certain
+circumstances of its application, and, to the knowledge of them
+experience is required. Pure general logic has to do, therefore, merely
+with pure à priori principles, and is a canon of understanding and
+reason, but only in respect of the formal part of their use, be the
+content what it may, empirical or transcendental. General logic is
+called applied, when it is directed to the laws of the use of the
+understanding, under the subjective empirical conditions which
+psychology teaches us. It has therefore empirical principles, although,
+at the same time, it is in so far general, that it applies to the
+exercise of the understanding, without regard to the difference of
+objects. On this account, moreover, it is neither a canon of the
+understanding in general, nor an organon of a particular science, but
+merely a cathartic of the human understanding.
+
+In general logic, therefore, that part which constitutes pure logic
+must be carefully distinguished from that which constitutes applied
+(though still general) logic. The former alone is properly science,
+although short and dry, as the methodical exposition of an elemental
+doctrine of the understanding ought to be. In this, therefore,
+logicians must always bear in mind two rules:
+
+1. As general logic, it makes abstraction of all content of the
+cognition of the understanding, and of the difference of objects, and
+has to do with nothing but the mere form of thought.
+
+2. As pure logic, it has no empirical principles, and consequently
+draws nothing (contrary to the common persuasion) from psychology,
+which therefore has no influence on the canon of the understanding. It
+is a demonstrated doctrine, and everything in it must be certain
+completely à priori.
+
+What I called applied logic (contrary to the common acceptation of this
+term, according to which it should contain certain exercises for the
+scholar, for which pure logic gives the rules), is a representation of
+the understanding, and of the rules of its necessary employment in
+concreto, that is to say, under the accidental conditions of the
+subject, which may either hinder or promote this employment, and which
+are all given only empirically. Thus applied logic treats of attention,
+its impediments and consequences, of the origin of error, of the state
+of doubt, hesitation, conviction, etc., and to it is related pure
+general logic in the same way that pure morality, which contains only
+the necessary moral laws of a free will, is related to practical
+ethics, which considers these laws under all the impediments of
+feelings, inclinations, and passions to which men are more or less
+subjected, and which never can furnish us with a true and demonstrated
+science, because it, as well as applied logic, requires empirical and
+psychological principles.
+
+II. Of Transcendental Logic.
+
+General logic, as we have seen, makes abstraction of all content of
+cognition, that is, of all relation of cognition to its object, and
+regards only the logical form in the relation of cognitions to each
+other, that is, the form of thought in general. But as we have both
+pure and empirical intuitions (as transcendental æsthetic proves), in
+like manner a distinction might be drawn between pure and empirical
+thought (of objects). In this case, there would exist a kind of logic,
+in which we should not make abstraction of all content of cognition;
+for or logic which should comprise merely the laws of pure thought (of
+an object), would of course exclude all those cognitions which were of
+empirical content. This kind of logic would also examine the origin of
+our cognitions of objects, so far as that origin cannot be ascribed to
+the objects themselves; while, on the contrary, general logic has
+nothing to do with the origin of our cognitions, but contemplates our
+representations, be they given primitively à priori in ourselves, or be
+they only of empirical origin, solely according to the laws which the
+understanding observes in employing them in the process of thought, in
+relation to each other. Consequently, general logic treats of the form
+of the understanding only, which can be applied to representations,
+from whatever source they may have arisen.
+
+And here I shall make a remark, which the reader must bear well in mind
+in the course of the following considerations, to wit, that not every
+cognition à priori, but only those through which we cognize that and
+how certain representations (intuitions or conceptions) are applied or
+are possible only à priori; that is to say, the à priori possibility of
+cognition and the à priori use of it are transcendental. Therefore
+neither is space, nor any à priori geometrical determination of space,
+a transcendental Representation, but only the knowledge that such a
+representation is not of empirical origin, and the possibility of its
+relating to objects of experience, although itself à priori, can be
+called transcendental. So also, the application of space to objects in
+general would be transcendental; but if it be limited to objects of
+sense it is empirical. Thus, the distinction of the transcendental and
+empirical belongs only to the critique of cognitions, and does not
+concern the relation of these to their object.
+
+Accordingly, in the expectation that there may perhaps be conceptions
+which relate à priori to objects, not as pure or sensuous intuitions,
+but merely as acts of pure thought (which are therefore conceptions,
+but neither of empirical nor æsthetical origin)--in this expectation, I
+say, we form to ourselves, by anticipation, the idea of a science of
+pure understanding and rational cognition, by means of which we may
+cogitate objects entirely à priori. A science of this kind, which
+should determine the origin, the extent, and the objective validity of
+such cognitions, must be called transcendental logic, because it has
+not, like general logic, to do with the laws of understanding and
+reason in relation to empirical as well as pure rational cognitions
+without distinction, but concerns itself with these only in an à priori
+relation to objects.
+
+III. Of the Division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic.
+
+The old question with which people sought to push logicians into a
+corner, so that they must either have recourse to pitiful sophisms or
+confess their ignorance, and consequently the vanity of their whole
+art, is this: "What is truth?" The definition of the word truth, to
+wit, "the accordance of the cognition with its object," is presupposed
+in the question; but we desire to be told, in the answer to it, what is
+the universal and secure criterion of the truth of every cognition.
+
+To know what questions we may reasonably propose is in itself a strong
+evidence of sagacity and intelligence. For if a question be in itself
+absurd and unsusceptible of a rational answer, it is attended with the
+danger--not to mention the shame that falls upon the person who proposes
+it--of seducing the unguarded listener into making absurd answers, and
+we are presented with the ridiculous spectacle of one (as the ancients
+said) "milking the he-goat, and the other holding a sieve."
+
+If truth consists in the accordance of a cognition with its object,
+this object must be, ipso facto, distinguished from all others; for a
+cognition is false if it does not accord with the object to which it
+relates, although it contains something which may be affirmed of other
+objects. Now an universal criterion of truth would be that which is
+valid for all cognitions, without distinction of their objects. But it
+is evident that since, in the case of such a criterion, we make
+abstraction of all the content of a cognition (that is, of all relation
+to its object), and truth relates precisely to this content, it must be
+utterly absurd to ask for a mark of the truth of this content of
+cognition; and that, accordingly, a sufficient, and at the same time
+universal, test of truth cannot possibly be found. As we have already
+termed the content of a cognition its matter, we shall say: "Of the
+truth of our cognitions in respect of their matter, no universal test
+can be demanded, because such a demand is self-contradictory."
+
+On the other hand, with regard to our cognition in respect of its mere
+form (excluding all content), it is equally manifest that logic, in so
+far as it exhibits the universal and necessary laws of the
+understanding, must in these very laws present us with criteria of
+truth. Whatever contradicts these rules is false, because thereby the
+understanding is made to contradict its own universal laws of thought;
+that is, to contradict itself. These criteria, however, apply solely to
+the form of truth, that is, of thought in general, and in so far they
+are perfectly accurate, yet not sufficient. For although a cognition
+may be perfectly accurate as to logical form, that is, not
+self-contradictory, it is notwithstanding quite possible that it may
+not stand in agreement with its object. Consequently, the merely
+logical criterion of truth, namely, the accordance of a cognition with
+the universal and formal laws of understanding and reason, is nothing
+more than the conditio sine qua non, or negative condition of all
+truth. Farther than this logic cannot go, and the error which depends
+not on the form, but on the content of the cognition, it has no test to
+discover.
+
+General logic, then, resolves the whole formal business of
+understanding and reason into its elements, and exhibits them as
+principles of all logical judging of our cognitions. This part of logic
+may, therefore, be called analytic, and is at least the negative test
+of truth, because all cognitions must first of an be estimated and
+tried according to these laws before we proceed to investigate them in
+respect of their content, in order to discover whether they contain
+positive truth in regard to their object. Because, however, the mere
+form of a cognition, accurately as it may accord with logical laws, is
+insufficient to supply us with material (objective) truth, no one, by
+means of logic alone, can venture to predicate anything of or decide
+concerning objects, unless he has obtained, independently of logic,
+well-grounded information about them, in order afterwards to examine,
+according to logical laws, into the use and connection, in a cohering
+whole, of that information, or, what is still better, merely to test it
+by them. Notwithstanding, there lies so seductive a charm in the
+possession of a specious art like this--an art which gives to all our
+cognitions the form of the understanding, although with respect to the
+content thereof we may be sadly deficient--that general logic, which is
+merely a canon of judgement, has been employed as an organon for the
+actual production, or rather for the semblance of production, of
+objective assertions, and has thus been grossly misapplied. Now general
+logic, in its assumed character of organon, is called dialectic.
+
+Different as are the significations in which the ancients used this
+term for a science or an art, we may safely infer, from their actual
+employment of it, that with them it was nothing else than a logic of
+illusion--a sophistical art for giving ignorance, nay, even intentional
+sophistries, the colouring of truth, in which the thoroughness of
+procedure which logic requires was imitated, and their topic employed
+to cloak the empty pretensions. Now it may be taken as a safe and
+useful warning, that general logic, considered as an organon, must
+always be a logic of illusion, that is, be dialectical, for, as it
+teaches us nothing whatever respecting the content of our cognitions,
+but merely the formal conditions of their accordance with the
+understanding, which do not relate to and are quite indifferent in
+respect of objects, any attempt to employ it as an instrument (organon)
+in order to extend and enlarge the range of our knowledge must end in
+mere prating; any one being able to maintain or oppose, with some
+appearance of truth, any single assertion whatever.
+
+Such instruction is quite unbecoming the dignity of philosophy. For
+these reasons we have chosen to denominate this part of logic
+dialectic, in the sense of a critique of dialectical illusion, and we
+wish the term to be so understood in this place.
+
+IV. Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into Transcendental
+Analytic and Dialectic.
+
+In transcendental logic we isolate the understanding (as in
+transcendental æsthetic the sensibility) and select from our cognition
+merely that part of thought which has its origin in the understanding
+alone. The exercise of this pure cognition, however, depends upon this
+as its condition, that objects to which it may be applied be given to
+us in intuition, for without intuition the whole of our cognition is
+without objects, and is therefore quite void. That part of
+transcendental logic, then, which treats of the elements of pure
+cognition of the understanding, and of the principles without which no
+object at all can be thought, is transcendental analytic, and at the
+same time a logic of truth. For no cognition can contradict it, without
+losing at the same time all content, that is, losing all reference to
+an object, and therefore all truth. But because we are very easily
+seduced into employing these pure cognitions and principles of the
+understanding by themselves, and that even beyond the boundaries of
+experience, which yet is the only source whence we can obtain matter
+(objects) on which those pure conceptions may be employed--understanding
+runs the risk of making, by means of empty sophisms, a material and
+objective use of the mere formal principles of the pure understanding,
+and of passing judgements on objects without distinction--objects which
+are not given to us, nay, perhaps cannot be given to us in any way.
+Now, as it ought properly to be only a canon for judging of the
+empirical use of the understanding, this kind of logic is misused when
+we seek to employ it as an organon of the universal and unlimited
+exercise of the understanding, and attempt with the pure understanding
+alone to judge synthetically, affirm, and determine respecting objects
+in general. In this case the exercise of the pure understanding becomes
+dialectical. The second part of our transcendental logic must therefore
+be a critique of dialectical illusion, and this critique we shall term
+transcendental dialectic--not meaning it as an art of producing
+dogmatically such illusion (an art which is unfortunately too current
+among the practitioners of metaphysical juggling), but as a critique of
+understanding and reason in regard to their hyperphysical use. This
+critique will expose the groundless nature of the pretensions of these
+two faculties, and invalidate their claims to the discovery and
+enlargement of our cognitions merely by means of transcendental
+principles, and show that the proper employment of these faculties is
+to test the judgements made by the pure understanding, and to guard it
+from sophistical delusion.
+
+FIRST DIVISION. TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC. § 1
+
+Transcendental analytic is the dissection of the whole of our à priori
+knowledge into the elements of the pure cognition of the understanding.
+In order to effect our purpose, it is necessary: (1) That the
+conceptions be pure and not empirical; (2) That they belong not to
+intuition and sensibility, but to thought and understanding; (3) That
+they be elementary conceptions, and as such, quite different from
+deduced or compound conceptions; (4) That our table of these elementary
+conceptions be complete, and fill up the whole sphere of the pure
+understanding. Now this completeness of a science cannot be accepted
+with confidence on the guarantee of a mere estimate of its existence in
+an aggregate formed only by means of repeated experiments and attempts.
+The completeness which we require is possible only by means of an idea
+of the totality of the à priori cognition of the understanding, and
+through the thereby determined division of the conceptions which form
+the said whole; consequently, only by means of their connection in a
+system. Pure understanding distinguishes itself not merely from
+everything empirical, but also completely from all sensibility. It is a
+unity self-subsistent, self-sufficient, and not to be enlarged by any
+additions from without. Hence the sum of its cognition constitutes a
+system to be determined by and comprised under an idea; and the
+completeness and articulation of this system can at the same time serve
+as a test of the correctness and genuineness of all the parts of
+cognition that belong to it. The whole of this part of transcendental
+logic consists of two books, of which the one contains the conceptions,
+and the other the principles of pure understanding.
+
+BOOK I. Analytic of Conceptions. § 2
+
+By the term Analytic of Conceptions, I do not understand the analysis
+of these, or the usual process in philosophical investigations of
+dissecting the conceptions which present themselves, according to their
+content, and so making them clear; but I mean the hitherto little
+attempted dissection of the faculty of understanding itself, in order
+to investigate the possibility of conceptions à priori, by looking for
+them in the understanding alone, as their birthplace, and analysing the
+pure use of this faculty. For this is the proper duty of a
+transcendental philosophy; what remains is the logical treatment of the
+conceptions in philosophy in general. We shall therefore follow up the
+pure conceptions even to their germs and beginnings in the human
+understanding, in which they lie, until they are developed on occasions
+presented by experience, and, freed by the same understanding from the
+empirical conditions attaching to them, are set forth in their
+unalloyed purity.
+
+Chapter I. Of the Transcendental Clue to the Discovery of all Pure
+Conceptions of the Understanding
+
+Introductory § 3
+
+When we call into play a faculty of cognition, different conceptions
+manifest themselves according to the different circumstances, and make
+known this faculty, and assemble themselves into a more or less
+extensive collection, according to the time or penetration that has
+been applied to the consideration of them. Where this process,
+conducted as it is mechanically, so to speak, will end, cannot be
+determined with certainty. Besides, the conceptions which we discover
+in this haphazard manner present themselves by no means in order and
+systematic unity, but are at last coupled together only according to
+resemblances to each other, and arranged in series, according to the
+quantity of their content, from the simpler to the more complex--series
+which are anything but systematic, though not altogether without a
+certain kind of method in their construction.
+
+Transcendental philosophy has the advantage, and moreover the duty, of
+searching for its conceptions according to a principle; because these
+conceptions spring pure and unmixed out of the understanding as an
+absolute unity, and therefore must be connected with each other
+according to one conception or idea. A connection of this kind,
+however, furnishes us with a ready prepared rule, by which its proper
+place may be assigned to every pure conception of the understanding,
+and the completeness of the system of all be determined à priori--both
+which would otherwise have been dependent on mere choice or chance.
+
+Section I. Of the Logical Use of the Understanding in General § 4
+
+The understanding was defined above only negatively, as a non-sensuous
+faculty of cognition. Now, independently of sensibility, we cannot
+possibly have any intuition; consequently, the understanding is no
+faculty of intuition. But besides intuition there is no other mode of
+cognition, except through conceptions; consequently, the cognition of
+every, at least of every human, understanding is a cognition through
+conceptions--not intuitive, but discursive. All intuitions, as sensuous,
+depend on affections; conceptions, therefore, upon functions. By the
+word function I understand the unity of the act of arranging diverse
+representations under one common representation. Conceptions, then, are
+based on the spontaneity of thought, as sensuous intuitions are on the
+receptivity of impressions. Now, the understanding cannot make any
+other use of these conceptions than to judge by means of them. As no
+representation, except an intuition, relates immediately to its object,
+a conception never relates immediately to an object, but only to some
+other representation thereof, be that an intuition or itself a
+conception. A judgement, therefore, is the mediate cognition of an
+object, consequently the representation of a representation of it. In
+every judgement there is a conception which applies to, and is valid
+for many other conceptions, and which among these comprehends also a
+given representation, this last being immediately connected with an
+object. For example, in the judgement--"All bodies are divisible," our
+conception of divisible applies to various other conceptions; among
+these, however, it is here particularly applied to the conception of
+body, and this conception of body relates to certain phenomena which
+occur to us. These objects, therefore, are mediately represented by the
+conception of divisibility. All judgements, accordingly, are functions
+of unity in our representations, inasmuch as, instead of an immediate,
+a higher representation, which comprises this and various others, is
+used for our cognition of the object, and thereby many possible
+cognitions are collected into one. But we can reduce all acts of the
+understanding to judgements, so that understanding may be represented
+as the faculty of judging. For it is, according to what has been said
+above, a faculty of thought. Now thought is cognition by means of
+conceptions. But conceptions, as predicates of possible judgements,
+relate to some representation of a yet undetermined object. Thus the
+conception of body indicates something--for example, metal--which can be
+cognized by means of that conception. It is therefore a conception, for
+the reason alone that other representations are contained under it, by
+means of which it can relate to objects. It is therefore the predicate
+to a possible judgement; for example: "Every metal is a body." All the
+functions of the understanding therefore can be discovered, when we can
+completely exhibit the functions of unity in judgements. And that this
+may be effected very easily, the following section will show.
+
+Section II. Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in Judgements
+§ 5
+
+If we abstract all the content of a judgement, and consider only the
+intellectual form thereof, we find that the function of thought in a
+judgement can be brought under four heads, of which each contains three
+momenta. These may be conveniently represented in the following table:
+
+                                    1
+                         _Quantity of judgements_
+                                Universal
+                                Particular
+                                Singular
+
+                      2                           3
+                    _Quality                   Relation_
+                  Affirmative                Categorical
+                  Negative                   Hypothetical
+                  Infinite                   Disjunctive
+
+                                    4
+                                 _Modality_
+                               Problematical
+                               Assertorical
+                               Apodeictical
+
+As this division appears to differ in some, though not essential
+points, from the usual technique of logicians, the following
+observations, for the prevention of otherwise possible
+misunderstanding, will not be without their use.
+
+1. Logicians say, with justice, that in the use of judgements in
+syllogisms, singular judgements may be treated like universal ones.
+For, precisely because a singular judgement has no extent at all, its
+predicate cannot refer to a part of that which is contained in the
+conception of the subject and be excluded from the rest. The predicate
+is valid for the whole conception just as if it were a general
+conception, and had extent, to the whole of which the predicate
+applied. On the other hand, let us compare a singular with a general
+judgement, merely as a cognition, in regard to quantity. The singular
+judgement relates to the general one, as unity to infinity, and is
+therefore in itself essentially different. Thus, if we estimate a
+singular judgement (_judicium singulare_) not merely according to its
+intrinsic validity as a judgement, but also as a cognition generally,
+according to its quantity in comparison with that of other cognitions,
+it is then entirely different from a general judgement (_judicium
+commune_), and in a complete table of the momenta of thought deserves a
+separate place--though, indeed, this would not be necessary in a logic
+limited merely to the consideration of the use of judgements in
+reference to each other.
+
+2. In like manner, in transcendental logic, infinite must be
+distinguished from affirmative judgements, although in general logic
+they are rightly enough classed under affirmative. General logic
+abstracts all content of the predicate (though it be negative), and
+only considers whether the said predicate be affirmed or denied of the
+subject. But transcendental logic considers also the worth or content
+of this logical affirmation--an affirmation by means of a merely
+negative predicate, and inquires how much the sum total of our
+cognition gains by this affirmation. For example, if I say of the soul,
+"It is not mortal"--by this negative judgement I should at least ward
+off error. Now, by the proposition, "The soul is not mortal," I have,
+in respect of the logical form, really affirmed, inasmuch as I thereby
+place the soul in the unlimited sphere of immortal beings. Now, because
+of the whole sphere of possible existences, the mortal occupies one
+part, and the immortal the other, neither more nor less is affirmed by
+the proposition than that the soul is one among the infinite multitude
+of things which remain over, when I take away the whole mortal part.
+But by this proceeding we accomplish only this much, that the infinite
+sphere of all possible existences is in so far limited that the mortal
+is excluded from it, and the soul is placed in the remaining part of
+the extent of this sphere. But this part remains, notwithstanding this
+exception, infinite, and more and more parts may be taken away from the
+whole sphere, without in the slightest degree thereby augmenting or
+affirmatively determining our conception of the soul. These judgements,
+therefore, infinite in respect of their logical extent, are, in respect
+of the content of their cognition, merely limitative; and are
+consequently entitled to a place in our transcendental table of all the
+momenta of thought in judgements, because the function of the
+understanding exercised by them may perhaps be of importance in the
+field of its pure à priori cognition.
+
+3. All relations of thought in judgements are those (a) of the
+predicate to the subject; (b) of the principle to its consequence; (c)
+of the divided cognition and all the members of the division to each
+other. In the first of these three classes, we consider only two
+conceptions; in the second, two judgements; in the third, several
+judgements in relation to each other. The hypothetical proposition, "If
+perfect justice exists, the obstinately wicked are punished," contains
+properly the relation to each other of two propositions, namely,
+"Perfect justice exists," and "The obstinately wicked are punished."
+Whether these propositions are in themselves true is a question not
+here decided. Nothing is cogitated by means of this judgement except a
+certain consequence. Finally, the disjunctive judgement contains a
+relation of two or more propositions to each other--a relation not of
+consequence, but of logical opposition, in so far as the sphere of the
+one proposition excludes that of the other. But it contains at the same
+time a relation of community, in so far as all the propositions taken
+together fill up the sphere of the cognition. The disjunctive judgement
+contains, therefore, the relation of the parts of the whole sphere of a
+cognition, since the sphere of each part is a complemental part of the
+sphere of the other, each contributing to form the sum total of the
+divided cognition. Take, for example, the proposition, "The world
+exists either through blind chance, or through internal necessity, or
+through an external cause." Each of these propositions embraces a part
+of the sphere of our possible cognition as to the existence of a world;
+all of them taken together, the whole sphere. To take the cognition out
+of one of these spheres, is equivalent to placing it in one of the
+others; and, on the other hand, to place it in one sphere is equivalent
+to taking it out of the rest. There is, therefore, in a disjunctive
+judgement a certain community of cognitions, which consists in this,
+that they mutually exclude each other, yet thereby determine, as a
+whole, the true cognition, inasmuch as, taken together, they make up
+the complete content of a particular given cognition. And this is all
+that I find necessary, for the sake of what follows, to remark in this
+place.
+
+4. The modality of judgements is a quite peculiar function, with this
+distinguishing characteristic, that it contributes nothing to the
+content of a judgement (for besides quantity, quality, and relation,
+there is nothing more that constitutes the content of a judgement), but
+concerns itself only with the value of the copula in relation to
+thought in general. Problematical judgements are those in which the
+affirmation or negation is accepted as merely possible (ad libitum). In
+the assertorical, we regard the proposition as real (true); in the
+apodeictical, we look on it as necessary.[13] Thus the two judgements
+(antecedens et consequens), the relation of which constitutes a
+hypothetical judgement, likewise those (the members of the division) in
+whose reciprocity the disjunctive consists, are only problematical. In
+the example above given the proposition, "There exists perfect
+justice," is not stated assertorically, but as an ad libitum judgement,
+which someone may choose to adopt, and the consequence alone is
+assertorical. Hence such judgements may be obviously false, and yet,
+taken problematically, be conditions of our cognition of the truth.
+Thus the proposition, "The world exists only by blind chance," is in
+the disjunctive judgement of problematical import only: that is to say,
+one may accept it for the moment, and it helps us (like the indication
+of the wrong road among all the roads that one can take) to find out
+the true proposition. The problematical proposition is, therefore, that
+which expresses only logical possibility (which is not objective); that
+is, it expresses a free choice to admit the validity of such a
+proposition--a merely arbitrary reception of it into the understanding.
+The assertorical speaks of logical reality or truth; as, for example,
+in a hypothetical syllogism, the antecedens presents itself in a
+problematical form in the major, in an assertorical form in the minor,
+and it shows that the proposition is in harmony with the laws of the
+understanding. The apodeictical proposition cogitates the assertorical
+as determined by these very laws of the understanding, consequently as
+affirming à priori, and in this manner it expresses logical necessity.
+Now because all is here gradually incorporated with the
+understanding--inasmuch as in the first place we judge problematically;
+then accept assertorically our judgement as true; lastly, affirm it as
+inseparably united with the understanding, that is, as necessary and
+apodeictical--we may safely reckon these three functions of modality as
+so many momenta of thought.
+
+ [13] Just as if thought were in the first instance a function of the
+ understanding; in the second, of judgement; in the third, of reason. A
+ remark which will be explained in the sequel.
+
+Section III. Of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding, or
+Categories § 6
+
+General logic, as has been repeatedly said, makes abstraction of all
+content of cognition, and expects to receive representations from some
+other quarter, in order, by means of analysis, to convert them into
+conceptions. On the contrary, transcendental logic has lying before it
+the manifold content of à priori sensibility, which transcendental
+æsthetic presents to it in order to give matter to the pure conceptions
+of the understanding, without which transcendental logic would have no
+content, and be therefore utterly void. Now space and time contain an
+infinite diversity of determinations of pure à priori intuition, but
+are nevertheless the condition of the mind's receptivity, under which
+alone it can obtain representations of objects, and which,
+consequently, must always affect the conception of these objects. But
+the spontaneity of thought requires that this diversity be examined
+after a certain manner, received into the mind, and connected, in order
+afterwards to form a cognition out of it. This Process I call
+synthesis.
+
+By the word synthesis, in its most general signification, I understand
+the process of joining different representations to each other and of
+comprehending their diversity in one cognition. This synthesis is pure
+when the diversity is not given empirically but à priori (as that in
+space and time). Our representations must be given previously to any
+analysis of them; and no conceptions can arise, quoad their content,
+analytically. But the synthesis of a diversity (be it given à priori or
+empirically) is the first requisite for the production of a cognition,
+which in its beginning, indeed, may be crude and confused, and
+therefore in need of analysis--still, synthesis is that by which alone
+the elements of our cognitions are collected and united into a certain
+content, consequently it is the first thing on which we must fix our
+attention, if we wish to investigate the origin of our knowledge.
+
+Synthesis, generally speaking, is, as we shall afterwards see, the mere
+operation of the imagination--a blind but indispensable function of the
+soul, without which we should have no cognition whatever, but of the
+working of which we are seldom even conscious. But to reduce this
+synthesis to conceptions is a function of the understanding, by means
+of which we attain to cognition, in the proper meaning of the term.
+
+Pure synthesis, represented generally, gives us the pure conception of
+the understanding. But by this pure synthesis, I mean that which rests
+upon a basis of à priori synthetical unity. Thus, our numeration (and
+this is more observable in large numbers) is a synthesis according to
+conceptions, because it takes place according to a common basis of
+unity (for example, the decade). By means of this conception,
+therefore, the unity in the synthesis of the manifold becomes
+necessary.
+
+By means of analysis different representations are brought under one
+conception--an operation of which general logic treats. On the other
+hand, the duty of transcendental logic is to reduce to conceptions, not
+representations, but the pure synthesis of representations. The first
+thing which must be given to us for the sake of the à priori cognition
+of all objects, is the diversity of the pure intuition; the synthesis
+of this diversity by means of the imagination is the second; but this
+gives, as yet, no cognition. The conceptions which give unity to this
+pure synthesis, and which consist solely in the representation of this
+necessary synthetical unity, furnish the third requisite for the
+cognition of an object, and these conceptions are given by the
+understanding.
+
+The same function which gives unity to the different representation in
+a judgement, gives also unity to the mere synthesis of different
+representations in an intuition; and this unity we call the pure
+conception of the understanding. Thus, the same understanding, and by
+the same operations, whereby in conceptions, by means of analytical
+unity, it produced the logical form of a judgement, introduces, by
+means of the synthetical unity of the manifold in intuition, a
+transcendental content into its representations, on which account they
+are called pure conceptions of the understanding, and they apply à
+priori to objects, a result not within the power of general logic.
+
+In this manner, there arise exactly so many pure conceptions of the
+understanding, applying à priori to objects of intuition in general, as
+there are logical functions in all possible judgements. For there is no
+other function or faculty existing in the understanding besides those
+enumerated in that table. These conceptions we shall, with Aristotle,
+call categories, our purpose being originally identical with his,
+notwithstanding the great difference in the execution.
+
+                     TABLE OF THE CATEGORIES
+
+                    1                         2
+
+              _Of Quantity                Of Quality_
+              Unity                      Reality
+              Plurality                  Negation
+              Totality                   Limitation
+
+                           3
+                      _Of Relation_
+   Of Inherence and Subsistence (substantia et accidens)
+   Of Causality and Dependence (cause and effect)
+   Of Community (reciprocity between the agent and patient)
+
+                           4
+                     _Of Modality_
+              Possibility—Impossibility
+              Existence—Non-existence
+              Necessity—Contingence
+
+This, then, is a catalogue of all the originally pure conceptions of
+the synthesis which the understanding contains à priori, and these
+conceptions alone entitle it to be called a pure understanding;
+inasmuch as only by them it can render the manifold of intuition
+conceivable, in other words, think an object of intuition. This
+division is made systematically from a common principle, namely the
+faculty of judgement (which is just the same as the power of thought),
+and has not arisen rhapsodically from a search at haphazard after pure
+conceptions, respecting the full number of which we never could be
+certain, inasmuch as we employ induction alone in our search, without
+considering that in this way we can never understand wherefore
+precisely these conceptions, and none others, abide in the pure
+understanding. It was a design worthy of an acute thinker like
+Aristotle, to search for these fundamental conceptions. Destitute,
+however, of any guiding principle, he picked them up just as they
+occurred to him, and at first hunted out ten, which he called
+categories (predicaments). Afterwards be believed that he had
+discovered five others, which were added under the name of post
+predicaments. But his catalogue still remained defective. Besides,
+there are to be found among them some of the modes of pure sensibility
+(quando, ubi, situs, also prius, simul), and likewise an empirical
+conception (motus)--which can by no means belong to this genealogical
+register of the pure understanding. Moreover, there are deduced
+conceptions (actio, passio) enumerated among the original conceptions,
+and, of the latter, some are entirely wanting.
+
+With regard to these, it is to be remarked, that the categories, as the
+true primitive conceptions of the pure understanding, have also their
+pure deduced conceptions, which, in a complete system of transcendental
+philosophy, must by no means be passed over; though in a merely
+critical essay we must be contented with the simple mention of the
+fact.
+
+Let it be allowed me to call these pure, but deduced conceptions of the
+understanding, the predicables of the pure understanding, in
+contradistinction to predicaments. If we are in possession of the
+original and primitive, the deduced and subsidiary conceptions can
+easily be added, and the genealogical tree of the understanding
+completely delineated. As my present aim is not to set forth a complete
+system, but merely the principles of one, I reserve this task for
+another time. It may be easily executed by any one who will refer to
+the ontological manuals, and subordinate to the category of causality,
+for example, the predicables of force, action, passion; to that of
+community, those of presence and resistance; to the categories of
+modality, those of origination, extinction, change; and so with the
+rest. The categories combined with the modes of pure sensibility, or
+with one another, afford a great number of deduced à priori
+conceptions; a complete enumeration of which would be a useful and not
+unpleasant, but in this place a perfectly dispensable, occupation.
+
+I purposely omit the definitions of the categories in this treatise. I
+shall analyse these conceptions only so far as is necessary for the
+doctrine of method, which is to form a part of this critique. In a
+system of pure reason, definitions of them would be with justice
+demanded of me, but to give them here would only bide from our view the
+main aim of our investigation, at the same time raising doubts and
+objections, the consideration of which, without injustice to our main
+purpose, may be very well postponed till another opportunity.
+Meanwhile, it ought to be sufficiently clear, from the little we have
+already said on this subject, that the formation of a complete
+vocabulary of pure conceptions, accompanied by all the requisite
+explanations, is not only a possible, but an easy undertaking. The
+compartments already exist; it is only necessary to fill them up; and a
+systematic topic like the present, indicates with perfect precision the
+proper place to which each conception belongs, while it readily points
+out any that have not yet been filled up.
+
+§ 7
+
+Our table of the categories suggests considerations of some importance,
+which may perhaps have significant results in regard to the scientific
+form of all rational cognitions. For, that this table is useful in the
+theoretical part of philosophy, nay, indispensable for the sketching of
+the complete plan of a science, so far as that science rests upon
+conceptions à priori, and for dividing it mathematically, according to
+fixed principles, is most manifest from the fact that it contains all
+the elementary conceptions of the understanding, nay, even the form of
+a system of these in the understanding itself, and consequently
+indicates all the momenta, and also the internal arrangement of a
+projected speculative science, as I have elsewhere shown.[14] Here
+follow some of these observations.
+
+ [14] In the "Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science."
+
+I. This table, which contains four classes of conceptions of the
+understanding, may, in the first instance, be divided into two classes,
+the first of which relates to objects of intuition--pure as well as
+empirical; the second, to the existence of these objects, either in
+relation to one another, or to the understanding.
+
+The former of these classes of categories I would entitle the
+mathematical, and the latter the dynamical categories. The former, as
+we see, has no correlates; these are only to be found in the second
+class. This difference must have a ground in the nature of the human
+understanding.
+
+II. The number of the categories in each class is always the same,
+namely, three--a fact which also demands some consideration, because in
+all other cases division à priori through conceptions is necessarily
+dichotomy. It is to be added, that the third category in each triad
+always arises from the combination of the second with the first.
+
+Thus totality is nothing else but plurality contemplated as unity;
+limitation is merely reality conjoined with negation; community is the
+causality of a substance, reciprocally determining, and determined by
+other substances; and finally, necessity is nothing but existence,
+which is given through the possibility itself. Let it not be supposed,
+however, that the third category is merely a deduced, and not a
+primitive conception of the pure understanding. For the conjunction of
+the first and second, in order to produce the third conception,
+requires a particular function of the understanding, which is by no
+means identical with those which are exercised in the first and second.
+Thus, the conception of a number (which belongs to the category of
+totality) is not always possible, where the conceptions of multitude
+and unity exist (for example, in the representation of the infinite).
+Or, if I conjoin the conception of a cause with that of a substance, it
+does not follow that the conception of influence, that is, how one
+substance can be the cause of something in another substance, will be
+understood from that. Thus it is evident that a particular act of the
+understanding is here necessary; and so in the other instances.
+
+III. With respect to one category, namely, that of community, which is
+found in the third class, it is not so easy as with the others to
+detect its accordance with the form of the disjunctive judgement which
+corresponds to it in the table of the logical functions.
+
+In order to assure ourselves of this accordance, we must observe that
+in every disjunctive judgement, the sphere of the judgement (that is,
+the complex of all that is contained in it) is represented as a whole
+divided into parts; and, since one part cannot be contained in the
+other, they are cogitated as co-ordinated with, not subordinated to
+each other, so that they do not determine each other unilaterally, as
+in a linear series, but reciprocally, as in an aggregate--(if one member
+of the division is posited, all the rest are excluded; and conversely).
+
+Now a like connection is cogitated in a whole of things; for one thing
+is not subordinated, as effect, to another as cause of its existence,
+but, on the contrary, is co-ordinated contemporaneously and
+reciprocally, as a cause in relation to the determination of the others
+(for example, in a body--the parts of which mutually attract and repel
+each other). And this is an entirely different kind of connection from
+that which we find in the mere relation of the cause to the effect (the
+principle to the consequence), for in such a connection the consequence
+does not in its turn determine the principle, and therefore does not
+constitute, with the latter, a whole--just as the Creator does not with
+the world make up a whole. The process of understanding by which it
+represents to itself the sphere of a divided conception, is employed
+also when we think of a thing as divisible; and in the same manner as
+the members of the division in the former exclude one another, and yet
+are connected in one sphere, so the understanding represents to itself
+the parts of the latter, as having--each of them--an existence (as
+substances), independently of the others, and yet as united in one
+whole.
+
+§ 8
+
+In the transcendental philosophy of the ancients there exists one more
+leading division, which contains pure conceptions of the understanding,
+and which, although not numbered among the categories, ought, according
+to them, as conceptions à priori, to be valid of objects. But in this
+case they would augment the number of the categories; which cannot be.
+These are set forth in the proposition, so renowned among the
+schoolmen--'_Quodlibet ens est UNUM, VERUM, BONUM_.' Now, though the
+inferences from this principle were mere tautological propositions, and
+though it is allowed only by courtesy to retain a place in modern
+metaphysics, yet a thought which maintained itself for such a length of
+time, however empty it seems to be, deserves an investigation of its
+origin, and justifies the conjecture that it must be grounded in some
+law of the understanding, which, as is often the case, has only been
+erroneously interpreted. These pretended transcendental predicates are,
+in fact, nothing but logical requisites and criteria of all cognition
+of objects, and they employ, as the basis for this cognition, the
+categories of quantity, namely, unity, plurality, and totality. But
+these, which must be taken as material conditions, that is, as
+belonging to the possibility of things themselves, they employed merely
+in a formal signification, as belonging to the logical requisites of
+all cognition, and yet most unguardedly changed these criteria of
+thought into properties of objects, as things in themselves. Now, in
+every cognition of an object, there is unity of conception, which may
+be called qualitative unity, so far as by this term we understand only
+the unity in our connection of the manifold; for example, unity of the
+theme in a play, an oration, or a story. Secondly, there is truth in
+respect of the deductions from it. The more true deductions we have
+from a given conception, the more criteria of its objective reality.
+This we might call the qualitative plurality of characteristic marks,
+which belong to a conception as to a common foundation, but are not
+cogitated as a quantity in it. Thirdly, there is perfection--which
+consists in this, that the plurality falls back upon the unity of the
+conception, and accords completely with that conception and with no
+other. This we may denominate qualitative completeness. Hence it is
+evident that these logical criteria of the possibility of cognition are
+merely the three categories of quantity modified and transformed to
+suit an unauthorized manner of applying them. That is to say, the three
+categories, in which the unity in the production of the quantum must be
+homogeneous throughout, are transformed solely with a view to the
+connection of heterogeneous parts of cognition in one act of
+consciousness, by means of the quality of the cognition, which is the
+principle of that connection. Thus the criterion of the possibility of
+a conception (not of its object) is the definition of it, in which the
+unity of the conception, the truth of all that may be immediately
+deduced from it, and finally, the completeness of what has been thus
+deduced, constitute the requisites for the reproduction of the whole
+conception. Thus also, the criterion or test of an hypothesis is the
+intelligibility of the received principle of explanation, or its unity
+(without help from any subsidiary hypothesis)--the truth of our
+deductions from it (consistency with each other and with
+experience)--and lastly, the completeness of the principle of the
+explanation of these deductions, which refer to neither more nor less
+than what was admitted in the hypothesis, restoring analytically and à
+posteriori, what was cogitated synthetically and à priori. By the
+conceptions, therefore, of unity, truth, and perfection, we have made
+no addition to the transcendental table of the categories, which is
+complete without them. We have, on the contrary, merely employed the
+three categories of quantity, setting aside their application to
+objects of experience, as general logical laws of the consistency of
+cognition with itself.
+
+Chapter II. Of the Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of the
+Understanding
+
+Section I. Of the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction in general §
+9
+
+Teachers of jurisprudence, when speaking of rights and claims,
+distinguish in a cause the question of right (quid juris) from the
+question of fact (quid facti), and while they demand proof of both,
+they give to the proof of the former, which goes to establish right or
+claim in law, the name of deduction. Now we make use of a great number
+of empirical conceptions, without opposition from any one; and consider
+ourselves, even without any attempt at deduction, justified in
+attaching to them a sense, and a supposititious signification, because
+we have always experience at hand to demonstrate their objective
+reality. There exist also, however, usurped conceptions, such as
+fortune, fate, which circulate with almost universal indulgence, and
+yet are occasionally challenged by the question, "quid juris?" In such
+cases, we have great difficulty in discovering any deduction for these
+terms, inasmuch as we cannot produce any manifest ground of right,
+either from experience or from reason, on which the claim to employ
+them can be founded.
+
+Among the many conceptions, which make up the very variegated web of
+human cognition, some are destined for pure use à priori, independent
+of all experience; and their title to be so employed always requires a
+deduction, inasmuch as, to justify such use of them, proofs from
+experience are not sufficient; but it is necessary to know how these
+conceptions can apply to objects without being derived from experience.
+I term, therefore, an examination of the manner in which conceptions
+can apply à priori to objects, the transcendental deduction of
+conceptions, and I distinguish it from the empirical deduction, which
+indicates the mode in which conception is obtained through experience
+and reflection thereon; consequently, does not concern itself with the
+right, but only with the fact of our obtaining conceptions in such and
+such a manner. We have already seen that we are in possession of two
+perfectly different kinds of conceptions, which nevertheless agree with
+each other in this, that they both apply to objects completely à
+priori. These are the conceptions of space and time as forms of
+sensibility, and the categories as pure conceptions of the
+understanding. To attempt an empirical deduction of either of these
+classes would be labour in vain, because the distinguishing
+characteristic of their nature consists in this, that they apply to
+their objects, without having borrowed anything from experience towards
+the representation of them. Consequently, if a deduction of these
+conceptions is necessary, it must always be transcendental.
+
+Meanwhile, with respect to these conceptions, as with respect to all
+our cognition, we certainly may discover in experience, if not the
+principle of their possibility, yet the occasioning causes of their
+production. It will be found that the impressions of sense give the
+first occasion for bringing into action the whole faculty of cognition,
+and for the production of experience, which contains two very
+dissimilar elements, namely, a matter for cognition, given by the
+senses, and a certain form for the arrangement of this matter, arising
+out of the inner fountain of pure intuition and thought; and these, on
+occasion given by sensuous impressions, are called into exercise and
+produce conceptions. Such an investigation into the first efforts of
+our faculty of cognition to mount from particular perceptions to
+general conceptions is undoubtedly of great utility; and we have to
+thank the celebrated Locke for having first opened the way for this
+inquiry. But a deduction of the pure à priori conceptions of course
+never can be made in this way, seeing that, in regard to their future
+employment, which must be entirely independent of experience, they must
+have a far different certificate of birth to show from that of a
+descent from experience. This attempted physiological derivation, which
+cannot properly be called deduction, because it relates merely to a
+quaestio facti, I shall entitle an explanation of the possession of a
+pure cognition. It is therefore manifest that there can only be a
+transcendental deduction of these conceptions and by no means an
+empirical one; also, that all attempts at an empirical deduction, in
+regard to pure à priori conceptions, are vain, and can only be made by
+one who does not understand the altogether peculiar nature of these
+cognitions.
+
+But although it is admitted that the only possible deduction of pure à
+priori cognition is a transcendental deduction, it is not, for that
+reason, perfectly manifest that such a deduction is absolutely
+necessary. We have already traced to their sources the conceptions of
+space and time, by means of a transcendental deduction, and we have
+explained and determined their objective validity à priori. Geometry,
+nevertheless, advances steadily and securely in the province of pure à
+priori cognitions, without needing to ask from philosophy any
+certificate as to the pure and legitimate origin of its fundamental
+conception of space. But the use of the conception in this science
+extends only to the external world of sense, the pure form of the
+intuition of which is space; and in this world, therefore, all
+geometrical cognition, because it is founded upon à priori intuition,
+possesses immediate evidence, and the objects of this cognition are
+given à priori (as regards their form) in intuition by and through the
+cognition itself. With the pure conceptions of understanding, on the
+contrary, commences the absolute necessity of seeking a transcendental
+deduction, not only of these conceptions themselves, but likewise of
+space, because, inasmuch as they make affirmations concerning objects
+not by means of the predicates of intuition and sensibility, but of
+pure thought à priori, they apply to objects without any of the
+conditions of sensibility. Besides, not being founded on experience,
+they are not presented with any object in à priori intuition upon
+which, antecedently to experience, they might base their synthesis.
+Hence results, not only doubt as to the objective validity and proper
+limits of their use, but that even our conception of space is rendered
+equivocal; inasmuch as we are very ready with the aid of the
+categories, to carry the use of this conception beyond the conditions
+of sensuous intuition--and, for this reason, we have already found a
+transcendental deduction of it needful. The reader, then, must be quite
+convinced of the absolute necessity of a transcendental deduction,
+before taking a single step in the field of pure reason; because
+otherwise he goes to work blindly, and after he has wondered about in
+all directions, returns to the state of utter ignorance from which he
+started. He ought, moreover, clearly to recognize beforehand the
+unavoidable difficulties in his undertaking, so that he may not
+afterwards complain of the obscurity in which the subject itself is
+deeply involved, or become too soon impatient of the obstacles in his
+path; because we have a choice of only two things--either at once to
+give up all pretensions to knowledge beyond the limits of possible
+experience, or to bring this critical investigation to completion.
+
+We have been able, with very little trouble, to make it comprehensible
+how the conceptions of space and time, although à priori cognitions,
+must necessarily apply to external objects, and render a synthetical
+cognition of these possible, independently of all experience. For
+inasmuch as only by means of such pure form of sensibility an object
+can appear to us, that is, be an object of empirical intuition, space
+and time are pure intuitions, which contain à priori the condition of
+the possibility of objects as phenomena, and an à priori synthesis in
+these intuitions possesses objective validity.
+
+On the other hand, the categories of the understanding do not represent
+the conditions under which objects are given to us in intuition;
+objects can consequently appear to us without necessarily connecting
+themselves with these, and consequently without any necessity binding
+on the understanding to contain à priori the conditions of these
+objects. Thus we find ourselves involved in a difficulty which did not
+present itself in the sphere of sensibility, that is to say, we cannot
+discover how the subjective conditions of thought can have objective
+validity, in other words, can become conditions of the possibility of
+all cognition of objects; for phenomena may certainly be given to us in
+intuition without any help from the functions of the understanding. Let
+us take, for example, the conception of cause, which indicates a
+peculiar kind of synthesis, namely, that with something, A, something
+entirely different, B, is connected according to a law. It is not à
+priori manifest why phenomena should contain anything of this kind (we
+are of course debarred from appealing for proof to experience, for the
+objective validity of this conception must be demonstrated à priori),
+and it hence remains doubtful à priori, whether such a conception be
+not quite void and without any corresponding object among phenomena.
+For that objects of sensuous intuition must correspond to the formal
+conditions of sensibility existing à priori in the mind is quite
+evident, from the fact that without these they could not be objects for
+us; but that they must also correspond to the conditions which
+understanding requires for the synthetical unity of thought is an
+assertion, the grounds for which are not so easily to be discovered.
+For phenomena might be so constituted as not to correspond to the
+conditions of the unity of thought; and all things might lie in such
+confusion that, for example, nothing could be met with in the sphere of
+phenomena to suggest a law of synthesis, and so correspond to the
+conception of cause and effect; so that this conception would be quite
+void, null, and without significance. Phenomena would nevertheless
+continue to present objects to our intuition; for mere intuition does
+not in any respect stand in need of the functions of thought.
+
+If we thought to free ourselves from the labour of these investigations
+by saying: "Experience is constantly offering us examples of the
+relation of cause and effect in phenomena, and presents us with
+abundant opportunity of abstracting the conception of cause, and so at
+the same time of corroborating the objective validity of this
+conception"; we should in this case be overlooking the fact, that the
+conception of cause cannot arise in this way at all; that, on the
+contrary, it must either have an à priori basis in the understanding,
+or be rejected as a mere chimera. For this conception demands that
+something, A, should be of such a nature that something else, B, should
+follow from it necessarily, and according to an absolutely universal
+law. We may certainly collect from phenomena a law, according to which
+this or that usually happens, but the element of necessity is not to be
+found in it. Hence it is evident that to the synthesis of cause and
+effect belongs a dignity, which is utterly wanting in any empirical
+synthesis; for it is no mere mechanical synthesis, by means of
+addition, but a dynamical one; that is to say, the effect is not to be
+cogitated as merely annexed to the cause, but as posited by and through
+the cause, and resulting from it. The strict universality of this law
+never can be a characteristic of empirical laws, which obtain through
+induction only a comparative universality, that is, an extended range
+of practical application. But the pure conceptions of the understanding
+would entirely lose all their peculiar character, if we treated them
+merely as the productions of experience.
+
+Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories § 10
+
+There are only two possible ways in which synthetical representation
+and its objects can coincide with and relate necessarily to each other,
+and, as it were, meet together. Either the object alone makes the
+representation possible, or the representation alone makes the object
+possible. In the former case, the relation between them is only
+empirical, and an à priori representation is impossible. And this is
+the case with phenomena, as regards that in them which is referable to
+mere sensation. In the latter case--although representation alone (for
+of its causality, by means of the will, we do not here speak) does not
+produce the object as to its existence, it must nevertheless be à
+priori determinative in regard to the object, if it is only by means of
+the representation that we can cognize anything as an object. Now there
+are only two conditions of the possibility of a cognition of objects;
+firstly, intuition, by means of which the object, though only as
+phenomenon, is given; secondly, conception, by means of which the
+object which corresponds to this intuition is thought. But it is
+evident from what has been said on æsthetic that the first condition,
+under which alone objects can be intuited, must in fact exist, as a
+formal basis for them, à priori in the mind. With this formal condition
+of sensibility, therefore, all phenomena necessarily correspond,
+because it is only through it that they can be phenomena at all; that
+is, can be empirically intuited and given. Now the question is whether
+there do not exist, à priori in the mind, conceptions of understanding
+also, as conditions under which alone something, if not intuited, is
+yet thought as object. If this question be answered in the affirmative,
+it follows that all empirical cognition of objects is necessarily
+conformable to such conceptions, since, if they are not presupposed, it
+is impossible that anything can be an object of experience. Now all
+experience contains, besides the intuition of the senses through which
+an object is given, a conception also of an object that is given in
+intuition. Accordingly, conceptions of objects in general must lie as à
+priori conditions at the foundation of all empirical cognition; and
+consequently, the objective validity of the categories, as à priori
+conceptions, will rest upon this, that experience (as far as regards
+the form of thought) is possible only by their means. For in that case
+they apply necessarily and à priori to objects of experience, because
+only through them can an object of experience be thought.
+
+The whole aim of the transcendental deduction of all à priori
+conceptions is to show that these conceptions are à priori conditions
+of the possibility of all experience. Conceptions which afford us the
+objective foundation of the possibility of experience are for that very
+reason necessary. But the analysis of the experiences in which they are
+met with is not deduction, but only an illustration of them, because
+from experience they could never derive the attribute of necessity.
+Without their original applicability and relation to all possible
+experience, in which all objects of cognition present themselves, the
+relation of the categories to objects, of whatever nature, would be
+quite incomprehensible.
+
+The celebrated Locke, for want of due reflection on these points, and
+because he met with pure conceptions of the understanding in
+experience, sought also to deduce them from experience, and yet
+proceeded so inconsequently as to attempt, with their aid, to arrive it
+cognitions which lie far beyond the limits of all experience. David
+Hume perceived that, to render this possible, it was necessary that the
+conceptions should have an à priori origin. But as he could not explain
+how it was possible that conceptions which are not connected with each
+other in the understanding must nevertheless be thought as necessarily
+connected in the object--and it never occurred to him that the
+understanding itself might, perhaps, by means of these conceptions, be
+the author of the experience in which its objects were presented to
+it--he was forced to drive these conceptions from experience, that is,
+from a subjective necessity arising from repeated association of
+experiences erroneously considered to be objective--in one word, from
+habit. But he proceeded with perfect consequence and declared it to be
+impossible, with such conceptions and the principles arising from them,
+to overstep the limits of experience. The empirical derivation,
+however, which both of these philosophers attributed to these
+conceptions, cannot possibly be reconciled with the fact that we do
+possess scientific à priori cognitions, namely, those of pure
+mathematics and general physics.
+
+The former of these two celebrated men opened a wide door to
+extravagance--(for if reason has once undoubted right on its side, it
+will not allow itself to be confined to set limits, by vague
+recommendations of moderation); the latter gave himself up entirely to
+scepticism--a natural consequence, after having discovered, as he
+thought, that the faculty of cognition was not trustworthy. We now
+intend to make a trial whether it be not possible safely to conduct
+reason between these two rocks, to assign her determinate limits, and
+yet leave open for her the entire sphere of her legitimate activity.
+
+I shall merely premise an explanation of what the categories are. They
+are conceptions of an object in general, by means of which its
+intuition is contemplated as determined in relation to one of the
+logical functions of judgement. The following will make this plain. The
+function of the categorical judgement is that of the relation of
+subject to predicate; for example, in the proposition: "All bodies are
+divisible." But in regard to the merely logical use of the
+understanding, it still remains undetermined to which Of these two
+conceptions belongs the function Of subject and to which that of
+predicate. For we could also say: "Some divisible is a body." But the
+category of substance, when the conception of a body is brought under
+it, determines that; and its empirical intuition in experience must be
+contemplated always as subject and never as mere predicate. And so with
+all the other categories.
+
+Section II Transcendental Deduction of the pure Conceptions of the
+Understanding
+
+Of the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifold representations
+given by Sense § 11.
+
+The manifold content in our representations can be given in an
+intuition which is merely sensuous--in other words, is nothing but
+susceptibility; and the form of this intuition can exist à priori in
+our faculty of representation, without being anything else but the mode
+in which the subject is affected. But the conjunction (conjunctio) of a
+manifold in intuition never can be given us by the senses; it cannot
+therefore be contained in the pure form of sensuous intuition, for it
+is a spontaneous act of the faculty of representation. And as we must,
+to distinguish it from sensibility, entitle this faculty understanding;
+so all conjunction whether conscious or unconscious, be it of the
+manifold in intuition, sensuous or non-sensuous, or of several
+conceptions--is an act of the understanding. To this act we shall give
+the general appellation of synthesis, thereby to indicate, at the same
+time, that we cannot represent anything as conjoined in the object
+without having previously conjoined it ourselves. Of all mental
+notions, that of conjunction is the only one which cannot be given
+through objects, but can be originated only by the subject itself,
+because it is an act of its purely spontaneous activity. The reader
+will easily enough perceive that the possibility of conjunction must be
+grounded in the very nature of this act, and that it must be equally
+valid for all conjunction, and that analysis, which appears to be its
+contrary, must, nevertheless, always presuppose it; for where the
+understanding has not previously conjoined, it cannot dissect or
+analyse, because only as conjoined by it, must that which is to be
+analysed have been given to our faculty of representation.
+
+But the conception of conjunction includes, besides the conception of
+the manifold and of the synthesis of it, that of the unity of it also.
+Conjunction is the representation of the synthetical unity of the
+manifold.[15] This idea of unity, therefore, cannot arise out of that
+of conjunction; much rather does that idea, by combining itself with
+the representation of the manifold, render the conception of
+conjunction possible. This unity, which à priori precedes all
+conceptions of conjunction, is not the category of unity (§ 6); for all
+the categories are based upon logical functions of judgement, and in
+these functions we already have conjunction, and consequently unity of
+given conceptions. It is therefore evident that the category of unity
+presupposes conjunction. We must therefore look still higher for this
+unity (as qualitative, § 8), in that, namely, which contains the ground
+of the unity of diverse conceptions in judgements, the ground,
+consequently, of the possibility of the existence of the understanding,
+even in regard to its logical use.
+
+ [15] Whether the representations are in themselves identical, and
+ consequently whether one can be thought analytically by means of and
+ through the other, is a question which we need not at present
+ consider. Our Consciousness of the one, when we speak of the manifold,
+ is always distinguishable from our consciousness of the other; and it
+ is only respecting the synthesis of this (possible) consciousness that
+ we here treat.
+
+Of the Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception § 12
+
+The "I think" must accompany all my representations, for otherwise
+something would be represented in me which could not be thought; in
+other words, the representation would either be impossible, or at least
+be, in relation to me, nothing. That representation which can be given
+previously to all thought is called intuition. All the diversity or
+manifold content of intuition, has, therefore, a necessary relation to
+the "I think," in the subject in which this diversity is found. But
+this representation, "I think," is an act of spontaneity; that is to
+say, it cannot be regarded as belonging to mere sensibility. I call it
+pure apperception, in order to distinguish it from empirical; or
+primitive apperception, because it is self-consciousness which, whilst
+it gives birth to the representation "I think," must necessarily be
+capable of accompanying all our representations. It is in all acts of
+consciousness one and the same, and unaccompanied by it, no
+representation can exist for me. The unity of this apperception I call
+the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate
+the possibility of à priori cognition arising from it. For the manifold
+representations which are given in an intuition would not all of them
+be my representations, if they did not all belong to one
+self-consciousness, that is, as my representations (even although I am
+not conscious of them as such), they must conform to the condition
+under which alone they can exist together in a common
+self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not all without
+exception belong to me. From this primitive conjunction follow many
+important results.
+
+For example, this universal identity of the apperception of the
+manifold given in intuition contains a synthesis of representations and
+is possible only by means of the consciousness of this synthesis. For
+the empirical consciousness which accompanies different representations
+is in itself fragmentary and disunited, and without relation to the
+identity of the subject. This relation, then, does not exist because I
+accompany every representation with consciousness, but because I join
+one representation to another, and am conscious of the synthesis of
+them. Consequently, only because I can connect a variety of given
+representations in one consciousness, is it possible that I can
+represent to myself the identity of consciousness in these
+representations; in other words, the analytical unity of apperception
+is possible only under the presupposition of a synthetical unity.[16]
+The thought, "These representations given in intuition belong all of
+them to me," is accordingly just the same as, "I unite them in one
+self-consciousness, or can at least so unite them"; and although this
+thought is not itself the consciousness of the synthesis of
+representations, it presupposes the possibility of it; that is to say,
+for the reason alone that I can comprehend the variety of my
+representations in one consciousness, do I call them my
+representations, for otherwise I must have as many-coloured and various
+a self as are the representations of which I am conscious. Synthetical
+unity of the manifold in intuitions, as given à priori, is therefore
+the foundation of the identity of apperception itself, which antecedes
+à priori all determinate thought. But the conjunction of
+representations into a conception is not to be found in objects
+themselves, nor can it be, as it were, borrowed from them and taken up
+into the understanding by perception, but it is on the contrary an
+operation of the understanding itself, which is nothing more than the
+faculty of conjoining à priori and of bringing the variety of given
+representations under the unity of apperception. This principle is the
+highest in all human cognition.
+
+ [16] All general conceptions--as such--depend, for their existence, on
+ the analytical unity of consciousness. For example, when I think of
+ red in general, I thereby think to myself a property which (as a
+ characteristic mark) can be discovered somewhere, or can be united
+ with other representations; consequently, it is only by means of a
+ forethought possible synthetical unity that I can think to myself the
+ analytical. A representation which is cogitated as common to different
+ representations, is regarded as belonging to such as, besides this
+ common representation, contain something different; consequently it
+ must be previously thought in synthetical unity with other although
+ only possible representations, before I can think in it the analytical
+ unity of consciousness which makes it a conceptas communis. And thus
+ the synthetical unity of apperception is the highest point with which
+ we must connect every operation of the understanding, even the whole
+ of logic, and after it our transcendental philosophy; indeed, this
+ faculty is the understanding itself.
+
+This fundamental principle of the necessary unity of apperception is
+indeed an identical, and therefore analytical, proposition; but it
+nevertheless explains the necessity for a synthesis of the manifold
+given in an intuition, without which the identity of self-consciousness
+would be incogitable. For the ego, as a simple representation, presents
+us with no manifold content; only in intuition, which is quite
+different from the representation ego, can it be given us, and by means
+of conjunction it is cogitated in one self-consciousness. An
+understanding, in which all the manifold should be given by means of
+consciousness itself, would be intuitive; our understanding can only
+think and must look for its intuition to sense. I am, therefore,
+conscious of my identical self, in relation to all the variety of
+representations given to me in an intuition, because I call all of them
+my representations. In other words, I am conscious myself of a
+necessary à priori synthesis of my representations, which is called the
+original synthetical unity of apperception, under which rank all the
+representations presented to me, but that only by means of a synthesis.
+
+The Principle of the Synthetical Unity of Apperception is the highest
+Principle of all exercise of the Understanding § 13
+
+The supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in relation
+to sensibility was, according to our transcendental æsthetic, that all
+the manifold in intuition be subject to the formal conditions of space
+and time. The supreme principle of the possibility of it in relation to
+the understanding is that all the manifold in it be subject to
+conditions of the originally synthetical unity or apperception.[17] To
+the former of these two principles are subject all the various
+representations of intuition, in so far as they are given to us; to the
+latter, in so far as they must be capable of conjunction in one
+consciousness; for without this nothing can be thought or cognized,
+because the given representations would not have in common the act Of
+the apperception "I think" and therefore could not be connected in one
+self-consciousness.
+
+ [17] Space and time, and all portions thereof, are intuitions;
+ consequently are, with a manifold for their content, single
+ representations. (See the Transcendental Æsthetic.) Consequently, they
+ are not pure conceptions, by means of which the same consciousness is
+ found in a great number of representations; but, on the contrary, they
+ are many representations contained in one, the consciousness of which
+ is, so to speak, compounded. The unity of consciousness is
+ nevertheless synthetical and, therefore, primitive. From this peculiar
+ character of consciousness follow many important consequences. (See §
+ 21.)
+
+Understanding is, to speak generally, the faculty Of cognitions. These
+consist in the determined relation of given representation to an
+object. But an object is that, in the conception of which the manifold
+in a given intuition is united. Now all union of representations
+requires unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently,
+it is the unity of consciousness alone that constitutes the possibility
+of representations relating to an object, and therefore of their
+objective validity, and of their becoming cognitions, and consequently,
+the possibility of the existence of the understanding itself.
+
+The first pure cognition of understanding, then, upon which is founded
+all its other exercise, and which is at the same time perfectly
+independent of all conditions of mere sensuous intuition, is the
+principle of the original synthetical unity of apperception. Thus the
+mere form of external sensuous intuition, namely, space, affords us,
+per se, no cognition; it merely contributes the manifold in à priori
+intuition to a possible cognition. But, in order to cognize something
+in space (for example, a line), I must draw it, and thus produce
+synthetically a determined conjunction of the given manifold, so that
+the unity of this act is at the same time the unity of consciousness
+(in the conception of a line), and by this means alone is an object (a
+determinate space) cognized. The synthetical unity of consciousness is,
+therefore, an objective condition of all cognition, which I do not
+merely require in order to cognize an object, but to which every
+intuition must necessarily be subject, in order to become an object for
+me; because in any other way, and without this synthesis, the manifold
+in intuition could not be united in one consciousness.
+
+This proposition is, as already said, itself analytical, although it
+constitutes the synthetical unity, the condition of all thought; for it
+states nothing more than that all my representations in any given
+intuition must be subject to the condition which alone enables me to
+connect them, as my representation with the identical self, and so to
+unite them synthetically in one apperception, by means of the general
+expression, "I think."
+
+But this principle is not to be regarded as a principle for every
+possible understanding, but only for the understanding by means of
+whose pure apperception in the thought I am, no manifold content is
+given. The understanding or mind which contained the manifold in
+intuition, in and through the act itself of its own self-consciousness,
+in other words, an understanding by and in the representation of which
+the objects of the representation should at the same time exist, would
+not require a special act of synthesis of the manifold as the condition
+of the unity of its consciousness, an act of which the human
+understanding, which thinks only and cannot intuite, has absolute need.
+But this principle is the first principle of all the operations of our
+understanding, so that we cannot form the least conception of any other
+possible understanding, either of one such as should be itself
+intuition, or possess a sensuous intuition, but with forms different
+from those of space and time.
+
+What Objective Unity of Self-consciousness is § 14
+
+It is by means of the transcendental unity of apperception that all the
+manifold, given in an intuition is united into a conception of the
+object. On this account it is called objective, and must be
+distinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness, which is a
+determination of the internal sense, by means of which the said
+manifold in intuition is given empirically to be so united. Whether I
+can be empirically conscious of the manifold as coexistent or as
+successive, depends upon circumstances, or empirical conditions. Hence
+the empirical unity of consciousness by means of association of
+representations, itself relates to a phenomenal world and is wholly
+contingent. On the contrary, the pure form of intuition in time, merely
+as an intuition, which contains a given manifold, is subject to the
+original unity of consciousness, and that solely by means of the
+necessary relation of the manifold in intuition to the "I think,"
+consequently by means of the pure synthesis of the understanding, which
+lies à priori at the foundation of all empirical synthesis. The
+transcendental unity of apperception is alone objectively valid; the
+empirical which we do not consider in this essay, and which is merely a
+unity deduced from the former under given conditions in concreto,
+possesses only subjective validity. One person connects the notion
+conveyed in a word with one thing, another with another thing; and the
+unity of consciousness in that which is empirical, is, in relation to
+that which is given by experience, not necessarily and universally
+valid.
+
+The Logical Form of all Judgements consists in the Objective Unity of
+Apperception of the Conceptions contained therein § 15
+
+I could never satisfy myself with the definition which logicians give
+of a judgement. It is, according to them, the representation of a
+relation between two conceptions. I shall not dwell here on the
+faultiness of this definition, in that it suits only for categorical
+and not for hypothetical or disjunctive judgements, these latter
+containing a relation not of conceptions but of judgements themselves--a
+blunder from which many evil results have followed.[18] It is more
+important for our present purpose to observe, that this definition does
+not determine in what the said relation consists.
+
+ [18] The tedious doctrine of the four syllogistic figures concerns
+ only categorical syllogisms; and although it is nothing more than
+ an artifice by surreptitiously introducing immediate conclusions
+ (consequentiae immediatae) among the premises of a pure syllogism,
+ to give rise to an appearance of more modes of drawing a conclusion
+ than that in the first figure, the artifice would not have had much
+ success, had not its authors succeeded in bringing categorical
+ judgements into exclusive respect, as those to which all others must
+ be referred--a doctrine, however, which, according to § 5, is utterly
+ false.
+
+But if I investigate more closely the relation of given cognitions in
+every judgement, and distinguish it, as belonging to the understanding,
+from the relation which is produced according to laws of the
+reproductive imagination (which has only subjective validity), I find
+that judgement is nothing but the mode of bringing given cognitions
+under the objective unit of apperception. This is plain from our use of
+the term of relation is in judgements, in order to distinguish the
+objective unity of given representations from the subjective unity. For
+this term indicates the relation of these representations to the
+original apperception, and also their necessary unity, even although
+the judgement is empirical, therefore contingent, as in the judgement:
+"All bodies are heavy." I do not mean by this, that these
+representations do necessarily belong to each other in empirical
+intuition, but that by means of the necessary unity of appreciation
+they belong to each other in the synthesis of intuitions, that is to
+say, they belong to each other according to principles of the objective
+determination of all our representations, in so far as cognition can
+arise from them, these principles being all deduced from the main
+principle of the transcendental unity of apperception. In this way
+alone can there arise from this relation a judgement, that is, a
+relation which has objective validity, and is perfectly distinct from
+that relation of the very same representations which has only
+subjective validity--a relation, to wit, which is produced according to
+laws of association. According to these laws, I could only say: "When I
+hold in my hand or carry a body, I feel an impression of weight"; but I
+could not say: "It, the body, is heavy"; for this is tantamount to
+saying both these representations are conjoined in the object, that is,
+without distinction as to the condition of the subject, and do not
+merely stand together in my perception, however frequently the
+perceptive act may be repeated.
+
+All Sensuous Intuitions are subject to the Categories, as Conditions
+under which alone the manifold Content of them can be united in one
+Consciousness § 16
+
+The manifold content given in a sensuous intuition comes necessarily
+under the original synthetical unity of apperception, because thereby
+alone is the unity of intuition possible (§ 13). But that act of the
+understanding, by which the manifold content of given representations
+(whether intuitions or conceptions) is brought under one apperception,
+is the logical function of judgements (§ 15). All the manifold,
+therefore, in so far as it is given in one empirical intuition, is
+determined in relation to one of the logical functions of judgement, by
+means of which it is brought into union in one consciousness. Now the
+categories are nothing else than these functions of judgement so far as
+the manifold in a given intuition is determined in relation to them (§
+9). Consequently, the manifold in a given intuition is necessarily
+subject to the categories of the understanding.
+
+Observation § 17
+
+The manifold in an intuition, which I call mine, is represented by
+means of the synthesis of the understanding, as belonging to the
+necessary unity of self-consciousness, and this takes place by means of
+the category.[19] The category indicates accordingly that the empirical
+consciousness of a given manifold in an intuition is subject to a pure
+self-consciousness à priori, in the same manner as an empirical
+intuition is subject to a pure sensuous intuition, which is also à
+priori. In the above proposition, then, lies the beginning of a
+deduction of the pure conceptions of the understanding. Now, as the
+categories have their origin in the understanding alone, independently
+of sensibility, I must in my deduction make abstraction of the mode in
+which the manifold of an empirical intuition is given, in order to fix
+my attention exclusively on the unity which is brought by the
+understanding into the intuition by means of the category. In what
+follows (§ 22), it will be shown, from the mode in which the empirical
+intuition is given in the faculty of sensibility, that the unity which
+belongs to it is no other than that which the category (according to §
+16) imposes on the manifold in a given intuition, and thus, its à
+priori validity in regard to all objects of sense being established,
+the purpose of our deduction will be fully attained.
+
+ [19] The proof of this rests on the represented unity of intuition, by
+ means of which an object is given, and which always includes in itself
+ a synthesis of the manifold to be intuited, and also the relation of
+ this latter to unity of apperception.
+
+But there is one thing in the above demonstration of which I could not
+make abstraction, namely, that the manifold to be intuited must be
+given previously to the synthesis of the understanding, and
+independently of it. How this takes place remains here undetermined.
+For if I cogitate an understanding which was itself intuitive (as, for
+example, a divine understanding which should not represent given
+objects, but by whose representation the objects themselves should be
+given or produced), the categories would possess no significance in
+relation to such a faculty of cognition. They are merely rules for an
+understanding, whose whole power consists in thought, that is, in the
+act of submitting the synthesis of the manifold which is presented to
+it in intuition from a very different quarter, to the unity of
+apperception; a faculty, therefore, which cognizes nothing per se, but
+only connects and arranges the material of cognition, the intuition,
+namely, which must be presented to it by means of the object. But to
+show reasons for this peculiar character of our understandings, that it
+produces unity of apperception à priori only by means of categories,
+and a certain kind and number thereof, is as impossible as to explain
+why we are endowed with precisely so many functions of judgement and no
+more, or why time and space are the only forms of our intuition.
+
+In Cognition, its Application to Objects of Experience is the only
+legitimate use of the Category § 18
+
+To think an object and to cognize an object are by no means the same
+thing. In cognition there are two elements: firstly, the conception,
+whereby an object is cogitated (the category); and, secondly, the
+intuition, whereby the object is given. For supposing that to the
+conception a corresponding intuition could not be given, it would still
+be a thought as regards its form, but without any object, and no
+cognition of anything would be possible by means of it, inasmuch as, so
+far as I knew, there existed and could exist nothing to which my
+thought could be applied. Now all intuition possible to us is sensuous;
+consequently, our thought of an object by means of a pure conception of
+the understanding, can become cognition for us only in so far as this
+conception is applied to objects of the senses. Sensuous intuition is
+either pure intuition (space and time) or empirical intuition--of that
+which is immediately represented in space and time by means of
+sensation as real. Through the determination of pure intuition we
+obtain à priori cognitions of objects, as in mathematics, but only as
+regards their form as phenomena; whether there can exist things which
+must be intuited in this form is not thereby established. All
+mathematical conceptions, therefore, are not per se cognition, except
+in so far as we presuppose that there exist things which can only be
+represented conformably to the form of our pure sensuous intuition. But
+things in space and time are given only in so far as they are
+perceptions (representations accompanied with sensation), therefore
+only by empirical representation. Consequently the pure conceptions of
+the understanding, even when they are applied to intuitions à priori
+(as in mathematics), produce cognition only in so far as these (and
+therefore the conceptions of the understanding by means of them) can be
+applied to empirical intuitions. Consequently the categories do not,
+even by means of pure intuition afford us any cognition of things; they
+can only do so in so far as they can be applied to empirical intuition.
+That is to say, the categories serve only to render empirical cognition
+possible. But this is what we call experience. Consequently, in
+cognition, their application to objects of experience is the only
+legitimate use of the categories.
+
+§ 19
+
+The foregoing proposition is of the utmost importance, for it
+determines the limits of the exercise of the pure conceptions of the
+understanding in regard to objects, just as transcendental æsthetic
+determined the limits of the exercise of the pure form of our sensuous
+intuition. Space and time, as conditions of the possibility of the
+presentation of objects to us, are valid no further than for objects of
+sense, consequently, only for experience. Beyond these limits they
+represent to us nothing, for they belong only to sense, and have no
+reality apart from it. The pure conceptions of the understanding are
+free from this limitation, and extend to objects of intuition in
+general, be the intuition like or unlike to ours, provided only it be
+sensuous, and not intellectual. But this extension of conceptions
+beyond the range of our intuition is of no advantage; for they are then
+mere empty conceptions of objects, as to the possibility or
+impossibility of the existence of which they furnish us with no means
+of discovery. They are mere forms of thought, without objective
+reality, because we have no intuition to which the synthetical unity of
+apperception, which alone the categories contain, could be applied, for
+the purpose of determining an object. Our sensuous and empirical
+intuition can alone give them significance and meaning.
+
+If, then, we suppose an object of a non-sensuous intuition to be given
+we can in that case represent it by all those predicates which are
+implied in the presupposition that nothing appertaining to sensuous
+intuition belongs to it; for example, that it is not extended, or in
+space; that its duration is not time; that in it no change (the effect
+of the determinations in time) is to be met with, and so on. But it is
+no proper knowledge if I merely indicate what the intuition of the
+object is not, without being able to say what is contained in it, for I
+have not shown the possibility of an object to which my pure conception
+of understanding could be applicable, because I have not been able to
+furnish any intuition corresponding to it, but am only able to say that
+our intuition is not valid for it. But the most important point is
+this, that to a something of this kind not one category can be found
+applicable. Take, for example, the conception of substance, that is,
+something that can exist as subject, but never as mere predicate; in
+regard to this conception I am quite ignorant whether there can really
+be anything to correspond to such a determination of thought, if
+empirical intuition did not afford me the occasion for its application.
+But of this more in the sequel.
+
+Of the Application of the Categories to Objects of the Senses in
+general § 20
+
+The pure conceptions of the understanding apply to objects of intuition
+in general, through the understanding alone, whether the intuition be
+our own or some other, provided only it be sensuous, but are, for this
+very reason, mere forms of thought, by means of which alone no
+determined object can be cognized. The synthesis or conjunction of the
+manifold in these conceptions relates, we have said, only to the unity
+of apperception, and is for this reason the ground of the possibility
+of à priori cognition, in so far as this cognition is dependent on the
+understanding. This synthesis is, therefore, not merely transcendental,
+but also purely intellectual. But because a certain form of sensuous
+intuition exists in the mind à priori which rests on the receptivity of
+the representative faculty (sensibility), the understanding, as a
+spontaneity, is able to determine the internal sense by means of the
+diversity of given representations, conformably to the synthetical
+unity of apperception, and thus to cogitate the synthetical unity of
+the apperception of the manifold of sensuous intuition à priori, as the
+condition to which must necessarily be submitted all objects of human
+intuition. And in this manner the categories as mere forms of thought
+receive objective reality, that is, application to objects which are
+given to us in intuition, but that only as phenomena, for it is only of
+phenomena that we are capable of à priori intuition.
+
+This synthesis of the manifold of sensuous intuition, which is possible
+and necessary à priori, may be called figurative (synthesis speciosa),
+in contradistinction to that which is cogitated in the mere category in
+regard to the manifold of an intuition in general, and is called
+connection or conjunction of the understanding (synthesis
+intellectualis). Both are transcendental, not merely because they
+themselves precede à priori all experience, but also because they form
+the basis for the possibility of other cognition à priori.
+
+But the figurative synthesis, when it has relation only to the
+originally synthetical unity of apperception, that is to the
+transcendental unity cogitated in the categories, must, to be
+distinguished from the purely intellectual conjunction, be entitled the
+transcendental synthesis of imagination. Imagination is the faculty of
+representing an object even without its presence in intuition. Now, as
+all our intuition is sensuous, imagination, by reason of the subjective
+condition under which alone it can give a corresponding intuition to
+the conceptions of the understanding, belongs to sensibility. But in so
+far as the synthesis of the imagination is an act of spontaneity, which
+is determinative, and not, like sense, merely determinable, and which
+is consequently able to determine sense à priori, according to its
+form, conformably to the unity of apperception, in so far is the
+imagination a faculty of determining sensibility à priori, and its
+synthesis of intuitions according to the categories must be the
+transcendental synthesis of the imagination. It is an operation of the
+understanding on sensibility, and the first application of the
+understanding to objects of possible intuition, and at the same time
+the basis for the exercise of the other functions of that faculty. As
+figurative, it is distinguished from the merely intellectual synthesis,
+which is produced by the understanding alone, without the aid of
+imagination. Now, in so far as imagination is spontaneity, I sometimes
+call it also the productive imagination, and distinguish it from the
+reproductive, the synthesis of which is subject entirely to empirical
+laws, those of association, namely, and which, therefore, contributes
+nothing to the explanation of the possibility of à priori cognition,
+and for this reason belongs not to transcendental philosophy, but to
+psychology.
+
+We have now arrived at the proper place for explaining the paradox
+which must have struck every one in our exposition of the internal
+sense (§ 6), namely--how this sense represents us to our own
+consciousness, only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in
+ourselves, because, to wit, we intuite ourselves only as we are
+inwardly affected. Now this appears to be contradictory, inasmuch as we
+thus stand in a passive relation to ourselves; and therefore in the
+systems of psychology, the internal sense is commonly held to be one
+with the faculty of apperception, while we, on the contrary, carefully
+distinguish them.
+
+That which determines the internal sense is the understanding, and its
+original power of conjoining the manifold of intuition, that is, of
+bringing this under an apperception (upon which rests the possibility
+of the understanding itself). Now, as the human understanding is not in
+itself a faculty of intuition, and is unable to exercise such a power,
+in order to conjoin, as it were, the manifold of its own intuition, the
+synthesis of understanding is, considered per se, nothing but the unity
+of action, of which, as such, it is self-conscious, even apart from
+sensibility, by which, moreover, it is able to determine our internal
+sense in respect of the manifold which may be presented to it according
+to the form of sensuous intuition. Thus, under the name of a
+transcendental synthesis of imagination, the understanding exercises an
+activity upon the passive subject, whose faculty it is; and so we are
+right in saying that the internal sense is affected thereby.
+Apperception and its synthetical unity are by no means one and the same
+with the internal sense. The former, as the source of all our
+synthetical conjunction, applies, under the name of the categories, to
+the manifold of intuition in general, prior to all sensuous intuition
+of objects. The internal sense, on the contrary, contains merely the
+form of intuition, but without any synthetical conjunction of the
+manifold therein, and consequently does not contain any determined
+intuition, which is possible only through consciousness of the
+determination of the manifold by the transcendental act of the
+imagination (synthetical influence of the understanding on the internal
+sense), which I have named figurative synthesis.
+
+This we can indeed always perceive in ourselves. We cannot cogitate a
+geometrical line without drawing it in thought, nor a circle without
+describing it, nor represent the three dimensions of space without
+drawing three lines from the same point perpendicular to one another.
+We cannot even cogitate time, unless, in drawing a straight line (which
+is to serve as the external figurative representation of time), we fix
+our attention on the act of the synthesis of the manifold, whereby we
+determine successively the internal sense, and thus attend also to the
+succession of this determination. Motion as an act of the subject (not
+as a determination of an object),[20] consequently the synthesis of the
+manifold in space, if we make abstraction of space and attend merely to
+the act by which we determine the internal sense according to its form,
+is that which produces the conception of succession. The understanding,
+therefore, does by no means find in the internal sense any such
+synthesis of the manifold, but produces it, in that it affects this
+sense. At the same time, how "I who think" is distinct from the "i"
+which intuites itself (other modes of intuition being cogitable as at
+least possible), and yet one and the same with this latter as the same
+subject; how, therefore, I am able to say: "I, as an intelligence and
+thinking subject, cognize myself as an object thought, so far as I am,
+moreover, given to myself in intuition--only, like other phenomena, not
+as I am in myself, and as considered by the understanding, but merely
+as I appear"--is a question that has in it neither more nor less
+difficulty than the question--"How can I be an object to myself?" or
+this--"How I can be an object of my own intuition and internal
+perceptions?" But that such must be the fact, if we admit that space is
+merely a pure form of the phenomena of external sense, can be clearly
+proved by the consideration that we cannot represent time, which is not
+an object of external intuition, in any other way than under the image
+of a line, which we draw in thought, a mode of representation without
+which we could not cognize the unity of its dimension, and also that we
+are necessitated to take our determination of periods of time, or of
+points of time, for all our internal perceptions from the changes which
+we perceive in outward things. It follows that we must arrange the
+determinations of the internal sense, as phenomena in time, exactly in
+the same manner as we arrange those of the external senses in space.
+And consequently, if we grant, respecting this latter, that by means of
+them we know objects only in so far as we are affected externally, we
+must also confess, with regard to the internal sense, that by means of
+it we intuite ourselves only as we are internally affected by
+ourselves; in other words, as regards internal intuition, we cognize
+our own subject only as phenomenon, and not as it is in itself.[21]
+
+ [20] Motion of an object in space does not belong to a pure science,
+ consequently not to geometry; because, that a thing is movable cannot
+ be known à priori, but only from experience. But motion, considered as
+ the description of a space, is a pure act of the successive synthesis
+ of the manifold in external intuition by means of productive
+ imagination, and belongs not only to geometry, but even to
+ transcendental philosophy.
+
+ [21] I do not see why so much difficulty should be found in admitting
+ that our internal sense is affected by ourselves. Every act of
+ attention exemplifies it. In such an act the understanding determines
+ the internal sense by the synthetical conjunction which it cogitates,
+ conformably to the internal intuition which corresponds to the
+ manifold in the synthesis of the understanding. How much the mind is
+ usually affected thereby every one will be able to perceive in
+ himself.
+
+§ 21
+
+On the other hand, in the transcendental synthesis of the manifold
+content of representations, consequently in the synthetical unity of
+apperception, I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor
+as I am in myself, but only that "I am." This representation is a
+thought, not an intuition. Now, as in order to cognize ourselves, in
+addition to the act of thinking, which subjects the manifold of every
+possible intuition to the unity of apperception, there is necessary a
+determinate mode of intuition, whereby this manifold is given; although
+my own existence is certainly not mere phenomenon (much less mere
+illusion), the determination of my existence[22] Can only take place
+conformably to the form of the internal sense, according to the
+particular mode in which the manifold which I conjoin is given in
+internal intuition, and I have therefore no knowledge of myself as I
+am, but merely as I appear to myself. The consciousness of self is thus
+very far from a knowledge of self, in which I do not use the
+categories, whereby I cogitate an object, by means of the conjunction
+of the manifold in one apperception. In the same way as I require, for
+the sake of the cognition of an object distinct from myself, not only
+the thought of an object in general (in the category), but also an
+intuition by which to determine that general conception, in the same
+way do I require, in order to the cognition of myself, not only the
+consciousness of myself or the thought that I think myself, but in
+addition an intuition of the manifold in myself, by which to determine
+this thought. It is true that I exist as an intelligence which is
+conscious only of its faculty of conjunction or synthesis, but
+subjected in relation to the manifold which this intelligence has to
+conjoin to a limitative conjunction called the internal sense. My
+intelligence (that is, I) can render that conjunction or synthesis
+perceptible only according to the relations of time, which are quite
+beyond the proper sphere of the conceptions of the understanding and
+consequently cognize itself in respect to an intuition (which cannot
+possibly be intellectual, nor given by the understanding), only as it
+appears to itself, and not as it would cognize itself, if its intuition
+were intellectual.
+
+ [22] The "I think" expresses the act of determining my own existence.
+ My existence is thus already given by the act of consciousness; but
+ the mode in which I must determine my existence, that is, the mode in
+ which I must place the manifold belonging to my existence, is not
+ thereby given. For this purpose intuition of self is required, and
+ this intuition possesses a form given à priori, namely, time, which is
+ sensuous, and belongs to our receptivity of the determinable. Now, as
+ I do not possess another intuition of self which gives the determining
+ in me (of the spontaneity of which I am conscious), prior to the act
+ of determination, in the same manner as time gives the determinable,
+ it is clear that I am unable to determine my own existence as that of
+ a spontaneous being, but I am only able to represent to myself the
+ spontaneity of my thought, that is, of my determination, and my
+ existence remains ever determinable in a purely sensuous manner, that
+ is to say, like the existence of a phenomenon. But it is because of
+ this spontaneity that I call myself an intelligence.
+
+Transcendental Deduction of the universally possible employment in
+experience of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding § 22
+
+In the metaphysical deduction, the à priori origin of categories was
+proved by their complete accordance with the general logical of
+thought; in the transcendental deduction was exhibited the possibility
+of the categories as à priori cognitions of objects of an intuition in
+general (§ 16 and 17).At present we are about to explain the
+possibility of cognizing, à priori, by means of the categories, all
+objects which can possibly be presented to our senses, not, indeed,
+according to the form of their intuition, but according to the laws of
+their conjunction or synthesis, and thus, as it were, of prescribing
+laws to nature and even of rendering nature possible. For if the
+categories were inadequate to this task, it would not be evident to us
+why everything that is presented to our senses must be subject to those
+laws which have an à priori origin in the understanding itself.
+
+I premise that by the term synthesis of apprehension I understand the
+combination of the manifold in an empirical intuition, whereby
+perception, that is, empirical consciousness of the intuition (as
+phenomenon), is possible.
+
+We have à priori forms of the external and internal sensuous intuition
+in the representations of space and time, and to these must the
+synthesis of apprehension of the manifold in a phenomenon be always
+comformable, because the synthesis itself can only take place according
+to these forms. But space and time are not merely forms of sensuous
+intuition, but intuitions themselves (which contain a manifold), and
+therefore contain à priori the determination of the unity of this
+manifold.[23] (See the Transcendent Æsthetic.) Therefore is unity of
+the synthesis of the manifold without or within us, consequently also a
+conjunction to which all that is to be represented as determined in
+space or time must correspond, given à priori along with (not in) these
+intuitions, as the condition of the synthesis of all apprehension of
+them. But this synthetical unity can be no other than that of the
+conjunction of the manifold of a given intuition in general, in a
+primitive act of consciousness, according to the categories, but
+applied to our sensuous intuition. Consequently all synthesis, whereby
+alone is even perception possible, is subject to the categories. And,
+as experience is cognition by means of conjoined perceptions, the
+categories are conditions of the possibility of experience and are
+therefore valid à priori for all objects of experience.
+
+ [23] Space represented as an object (as geometry really requires it to
+ be) contains more than the mere form of the intuition; namely, a
+ combination of the manifold given according to the form of sensibility
+ into a representation that can be intuited; so that the form of the
+ intuition gives us merely the manifold, but the formal intuition gives
+ unity of representation. In the æsthetic, I regarded this unity as
+ belonging entirely to sensibility, for the purpose of indicating that
+ it antecedes all conceptions, although it presupposes a synthesis
+ which does not belong to sense, through which alone, however, all our
+ conceptions of space and time are possible. For as by means of this
+ unity alone (the understanding determining the sensibility) space and
+ time are given as intuitions, it follows that the unity of this
+ intuition à priori belongs to space and time, and not to the
+ conception of the understanding (§ 20).
+
+When, then, for example, I make the empirical intuition of a house by
+apprehension of the manifold contained therein into a perception, the
+necessary unity of space and of my external sensuous intuition lies at
+the foundation of this act, and I, as it were, draw the form of the
+house conformably to this synthetical unity of the manifold in space.
+But this very synthetical unity remains, even when I abstract the form
+of space, and has its seat in the understanding, and is in fact the
+category of the synthesis of the homogeneous in an intuition; that is
+to say, the category of quantity, to which the aforesaid synthesis of
+apprehension, that is, the perception, must be completely
+conformable.[24]
+
+ [24] In this manner it is proved, that the synthesis of apprehension,
+ which is empirical, must necessarily be conformable to the synthesis
+ of apperception, which is intellectual, and contained à priori in the
+ category. It is one and the same spontaneity which at one time, under
+ the name of imagination, at another under that of understanding,
+ produces conjunction in the manifold of intuition.
+
+To take another example, when I perceive the freezing of water, I
+apprehend two states (fluidity and solidity), which, as such, stand
+toward each other mutually in a relation of time. But in the time,
+which I place as an internal intuition, at the foundation of this
+phenomenon, I represent to myself synthetical unity of the manifold,
+without which the aforesaid relation could not be given in an intuition
+as determined (in regard to the succession of time). Now this
+synthetical unity, as the à priori condition under which I conjoin the
+manifold of an intuition, is, if I make abstraction of the permanent
+form of my internal intuition (that is to say, of time), the category
+of cause, by means of which, when applied to my sensibility, I
+determine everything that occurs according to relations of time.
+Consequently apprehension in such an event, and the event itself, as
+far as regards the possibility of its perception, stands under the
+conception of the relation of cause and effect: and so in all other
+cases.
+
+Categories are conceptions which prescribe laws à priori to phenomena,
+consequently to nature as the complex of all phenomena (natura
+materialiter spectata). And now the question arises--inasmuch as these
+categories are not derived from nature, and do not regulate themselves
+according to her as their model (for in that case they would be
+empirical)--how it is conceivable that nature must regulate herself
+according to them, in other words, how the categories can determine à
+priori the synthesis of the manifold of nature, and yet not derive
+their origin from her. The following is the solution of this enigma.
+
+It is not in the least more difficult to conceive how the laws of the
+phenomena of nature must harmonize with the understanding and with its
+à priori form--that is, its faculty of conjoining the manifold--than it
+is to understand how the phenomena themselves must correspond with the
+à priori form of our sensuous intuition. For laws do not exist in the
+phenomena any more than the phenomena exist as things in themselves.
+Laws do not exist except by relation to the subject in which the
+phenomena inhere, in so far as it possesses understanding, just as
+phenomena have no existence except by relation to the same existing
+subject in so far as it has senses. To things as things in themselves,
+conformability to law must necessarily belong independently of an
+understanding to cognize them. But phenomena are only representations
+of things which are utterly unknown in respect to what they are in
+themselves. But as mere representations, they stand under no law of
+conjunction except that which the conjoining faculty prescribes. Now
+that which conjoins the manifold of sensuous intuition is imagination,
+a mental act to which understanding contributes unity of intellectual
+synthesis, and sensibility, manifoldness of apprehension. Now as all
+possible perception depends on the synthesis of apprehension, and this
+empirical synthesis itself on the transcendental, consequently on the
+categories, it is evident that all possible perceptions, and therefore
+everything that can attain to empirical consciousness, that is, all
+phenomena of nature, must, as regards their conjunction, be subject to
+the categories. And nature (considered merely as nature in general) is
+dependent on them, as the original ground of her necessary
+conformability to law (as natura formaliter spectata). But the pure
+faculty (of the understanding) of prescribing laws à priori to
+phenomena by means of mere categories, is not competent to enounce
+other or more laws than those on which a nature in general, as a
+conformability to law of phenomena of space and time, depends.
+Particular laws, inasmuch as they concern empirically determined
+phenomena, cannot be entirely deduced from pure laws, although they all
+stand under them. Experience must be superadded in order to know these
+particular laws; but in regard to experience in general, and everything
+that can be cognized as an object thereof, these à priori laws are our
+only rule and guide.
+
+Result of this Deduction of the Conceptions of the Understanding § 23
+
+We cannot think any object except by means of the categories; we cannot
+cognize any thought except by means of intuitions corresponding to
+these conceptions. Now all our intuitions are sensuous, and our
+cognition, in so far as the object of it is given, is empirical. But
+empirical cognition is experience; consequently no à priori cognition
+is possible for us, except of objects of possible experience.[25]
+
+ [25] Lest my readers should stumble at this assertion, and the
+ conclusions that may be too rashly drawn from it, I must remind them
+ that the categories in the act of thought are by no means limited by
+ the conditions of our sensuous intuition, but have an unbounded sphere
+ of action. It is only the cognition of the object of thought, the
+ determining of the object, which requires intuition. In the absence of
+ intuition, our thought of an object may still have true and useful
+ consequences in regard to the exercise of reason by the subject. But
+ as this exercise of reason is not always directed on the determination
+ of the object, in other words, on cognition thereof, but also on the
+ determination of the subject and its volition, I do not intend to
+ treat of it in this place.
+
+But this cognition, which is limited to objects of experience, is not
+for that reason derived entirely, from, experience, but--and this is
+asserted of the pure intuitions and the pure conceptions of the
+understanding--there are, unquestionably, elements of cognition, which
+exist in the mind à priori. Now there are only two ways in which a
+necessary harmony of experience with the conceptions of its objects can
+be cogitated. Either experience makes these conceptions possible, or
+the conceptions make experience possible. The former of these
+statements will not hold good with respect to the categories (nor in
+regard to pure sensuous intuition), for they are à priori conceptions,
+and therefore independent of experience. The assertion of an empirical
+origin would attribute to them a sort of generatio aequivoca.
+Consequently, nothing remains but to adopt the second alternative
+(which presents us with a system, as it were, of the epigenesis of pure
+reason), namely, that on the part of the understanding the categories
+do contain the grounds of the possibility of all experience. But with
+respect to the questions how they make experience possible, and what
+are the principles of the possibility thereof with which they present
+us in their application to phenomena, the following section on the
+transcendental exercise of the faculty of judgement will inform the
+reader.
+
+It is quite possible that someone may propose a species of
+preformation-system of pure reason--a middle way between the two--to wit,
+that the categories are neither innate and first à priori principles of
+cognition, nor derived from experience, but are merely subjective
+aptitudes for thought implanted in us contemporaneously with our
+existence, which were so ordered and disposed by our Creator, that
+their exercise perfectly harmonizes with the laws of nature which
+regulate experience. Now, not to mention that with such an hypothesis
+it is impossible to say at what point we must stop in the employment of
+predetermined aptitudes, the fact that the categories would in this
+case entirely lose that character of necessity which is essentially
+involved in the very conception of them, is a conclusive objection to
+it. The conception of cause, for example, which expresses the necessity
+of an effect under a presupposed condition, would be false, if it
+rested only upon such an arbitrary subjective necessity of uniting
+certain empirical representations according to such a rule of relation.
+I could not then say--"The effect is connected with its cause in the
+object (that is, necessarily)," but only, "I am so constituted that I
+can think this representation as so connected, and not otherwise." Now
+this is just what the sceptic wants. For in this case, all our
+knowledge, depending on the supposed objective validity of our
+judgement, is nothing but mere illusion; nor would there be wanting
+people who would deny any such subjective necessity in respect to
+themselves, though they must feel it. At all events, we could not
+dispute with any one on that which merely depends on the manner in
+which his subject is organized.
+
+Short view of the above Deduction.
+
+The foregoing deduction is an exposition of the pure conceptions of the
+understanding (and with them of all theoretical à priori cognition), as
+principles of the possibility of experience, but of experience as the
+determination of all phenomena in space and time in general--of
+experience, finally, from the principle of the original synthetical
+unity of apperception, as the form of the understanding in relation to
+time and space as original forms of sensibility.
+
+I consider the division by paragraphs to be necessary only up to this
+point, because we had to treat of the elementary conceptions. As we now
+proceed to the exposition of the employment of these, I shall not
+designate the chapters in this manner any further.
+
+BOOK II. Analytic of Principles
+
+General logic is constructed upon a plan which coincides exactly with
+the division of the higher faculties of cognition. These are,
+understanding, judgement, and reason. This science, accordingly, treats
+in its analytic of conceptions, judgements, and conclusions in exact
+correspondence with the functions and order of those mental powers
+which we include generally under the generic denomination of
+understanding.
+
+As this merely formal logic makes abstraction of all content of
+cognition, whether pure or empirical, and occupies itself with the mere
+form of thought (discursive cognition), it must contain in its analytic
+a canon for reason. For the form of reason has its law, which, without
+taking into consideration the particular nature of the cognition about
+which it is employed, can be discovered à priori, by the simple
+analysis of the action of reason into its momenta.
+
+Transcendental logic, limited as it is to a determinate content, that
+of pure à priori cognitions, to wit, cannot imitate general logic in
+this division. For it is evident that the transcendental employment of
+reason is not objectively valid, and therefore does not belong to the
+logic of truth (that is, to analytic), but as a logic of illusion,
+occupies a particular department in the scholastic system under the
+name of transcendental dialectic.
+
+Understanding and judgement accordingly possess in transcendental logic
+a canon of objectively valid, and therefore true exercise, and are
+comprehended in the analytical department of that logic. But reason, in
+her endeavours to arrive by à priori means at some true statement
+concerning objects and to extend cognition beyond the bounds of
+possible experience, is altogether dialectic, and her illusory
+assertions cannot be constructed into a canon such as an analytic ought
+to contain.
+
+Accordingly, the analytic of principles will be merely a canon for the
+faculty of judgement, for the instruction of this faculty in its
+application to phenomena of the pure conceptions of the understanding,
+which contain the necessary condition for the establishment of à priori
+laws. On this account, although the subject of the following chapters
+is the especial principles of understanding, I shall make use of the
+term Doctrine of the faculty of judgement, in order to define more
+particularly my present purpose.
+
+INTRODUCTION. Of the Transcendental Faculty of judgement in General
+
+If understanding in general be defined as the faculty of laws or rules,
+the faculty of judgement may be termed the faculty of subsumption under
+these rules; that is, of distinguishing whether this or that does or
+does not stand under a given rule (casus datae legis). General logic
+contains no directions or precepts for the faculty of judgement, nor
+can it contain any such. For as it makes abstraction of all content of
+cognition, no duty is left for it, except that of exposing analytically
+the mere form of cognition in conceptions, judgements, and conclusions,
+and of thereby establishing formal rules for all exercise of the
+understanding. Now if this logic wished to give some general direction
+how we should subsume under these rules, that is, how we should
+distinguish whether this or that did or did not stand under them, this
+again could not be done otherwise than by means of a rule. But this
+rule, precisely because it is a rule, requires for itself direction
+from the faculty of judgement. Thus, it is evident that the
+understanding is capable of being instructed by rules, but that the
+judgement is a peculiar talent, which does not, and cannot require
+tuition, but only exercise. This faculty is therefore the specific
+quality of the so-called mother wit, the want of which no scholastic
+discipline can compensate.
+
+For although education may furnish, and, as it were, engraft upon a
+limited understanding rules borrowed from other minds, yet the power of
+employing these rules correctly must belong to the pupil himself; and
+no rule which we can prescribe to him with this purpose is, in the
+absence or deficiency of this gift of nature, secure from misuse.[26] A
+physician therefore, a judge or a statesman, may have in his head many
+admirable pathological, juridical, or political rules, in a degree that
+may enable him to be a profound teacher in his particular science, and
+yet in the application of these rules he may very possibly
+blunder--either because he is wanting in natural judgement (though not
+in understanding) and, whilst he can comprehend the general in
+abstracto, cannot distinguish whether a particular case in concreto
+ought to rank under the former; or because his faculty of judgement has
+not been sufficiently exercised by examples and real practice. Indeed,
+the grand and only use of examples, is to sharpen the judgement. For as
+regards the correctness and precision of the insight of the
+understanding, examples are commonly injurious rather than otherwise,
+because, as casus in terminis they seldom adequately fulfil the
+conditions of the rule. Besides, they often weaken the power of our
+understanding to apprehend rules or laws in their universality,
+independently of particular circumstances of experience; and hence,
+accustom us to employ them more as formulae than as principles.
+Examples are thus the go-cart of the judgement, which he who is
+naturally deficient in that faculty cannot afford to dispense with.
+
+ [26] Deficiency in judgement is properly that which is called
+ stupidity; and for such a failing we know no remedy. A dull or
+ narrow-minded person, to whom nothing is wanting but a proper degree
+ of understanding, may be improved by tuition, even so far as to
+ deserve the epithet of learned. But as such persons frequently labour
+ under a deficiency in the faculty of judgement, it is not uncommon to
+ find men extremely learned who in the application of their science
+ betray a lamentable degree this irremediable want.
+
+But although general logic cannot give directions to the faculty of
+judgement, the case is very different as regards transcendental logic,
+insomuch that it appears to be the especial duty of the latter to
+secure and direct, by means of determinate rules, the faculty of
+judgement in the employment of the pure understanding. For, as a
+doctrine, that is, as an endeavour to enlarge the sphere of the
+understanding in regard to pure à priori cognitions, philosophy is
+worse than useless, since from all the attempts hitherto made, little
+or no ground has been gained. But, as a critique, in order to guard
+against the mistakes of the faculty of judgement (lapsus judicii) in
+the employment of the few pure conceptions of the understanding which
+we possess, although its use is in this case purely negative,
+philosophy is called upon to apply all its acuteness and penetration.
+
+But transcendental philosophy has this peculiarity, that besides
+indicating the rule, or rather the general condition for rules, which
+is given in the pure conception of the understanding, it can, at the
+same time, indicate à priori the case to which the rule must be
+applied. The cause of the superiority which, in this respect,
+transcendental philosophy possesses above all other sciences except
+mathematics, lies in this: it treats of conceptions which must relate à
+priori to their objects, whose objective validity consequently cannot
+be demonstrated à posteriori, and is, at the same time, under the
+obligation of presenting in general but sufficient tests, the
+conditions under which objects can be given in harmony with those
+conceptions; otherwise they would be mere logical forms, without
+content, and not pure conceptions of the understanding.
+
+Our transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgement will contain
+two chapters. The first will treat of the sensuous condition under
+which alone pure conceptions of the understanding can be employed--that
+is, of the schematism of the pure understanding. The second will treat
+of those synthetical judgements which are derived à priori from pure
+conceptions of the understanding under those conditions, and which lie
+à priori at the foundation of all other cognitions, that is to say, it
+will treat of the principles of the pure understanding.
+
+TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE FACULTY OF JUDGEMENT OR, ANALYTIC OF
+PRINCIPLES
+
+Chapter I. Of the Schematism at of the Pure Conceptions of the
+Understanding
+
+In all subsumptions of an object under a conception, the representation
+of the object must be homogeneous with the conception; in other words,
+the conception must contain that which is represented in the object to
+be subsumed under it. For this is the meaning of the expression: "An
+object is contained under a conception." Thus the empirical conception
+of a plate is homogeneous with the pure geometrical conception of a
+circle, inasmuch as the roundness which is cogitated in the former is
+intuited in the latter.
+
+But pure conceptions of the understanding, when compared with empirical
+intuitions, or even with sensuous intuitions in general, are quite
+heterogeneous, and never can be discovered in any intuition. How then
+is the subsumption of the latter under the former, and consequently the
+application of the categories to phenomena, possible?--For it is
+impossible to say, for example: "Causality can be intuited through the
+senses and is contained in the phenomenon."--This natural and important
+question forms the real cause of the necessity of a transcendental
+doctrine of the faculty of judgement, with the purpose, to wit, of
+showing how pure conceptions of the understanding can be applied to
+phenomena. In all other sciences, where the conceptions by which the
+object is thought in the general are not so different and heterogeneous
+from those which represent the object in concreto--as it is given, it is
+quite unnecessary to institute any special inquiries concerning the
+application of the former to the latter.
+
+Now it is quite clear that there must be some third thing, which on the
+one side is homogeneous with the category, and with the phenomenon on
+the other, and so makes the application of the former to the latter
+possible. This mediating representation must be pure (without any
+empirical content), and yet must on the one side be intellectual, on
+the other sensuous. Such a representation is the transcendental schema.
+
+The conception of the understanding contains pure synthetical unity of
+the manifold in general. Time, as the formal condition of the manifold
+of the internal sense, consequently of the conjunction of all
+representations, contains à priori a manifold in the pure intuition.
+Now a transcendental determination of time is so far homogeneous with
+the category, which constitutes the unity thereof, that it is universal
+and rests upon a rule à priori. On the other hand, it is so far
+homogeneous with the phenomenon, inasmuch as time is contained in every
+empirical representation of the manifold. Thus an application of the
+category to phenomena becomes possible, by means of the transcendental
+determination of time, which, as the schema of the conceptions of the
+understanding, mediates the subsumption of the latter under the former.
+
+After what has been proved in our deduction of the categories, no one,
+it is to be hoped, can hesitate as to the proper decision of the
+question, whether the employment of these pure conceptions of the
+understanding ought to be merely empirical or also transcendental; in
+other words, whether the categories, as conditions of a possible
+experience, relate à priori solely to phenomena, or whether, as
+conditions of the possibility of things in general, their application
+can be extended to objects as things in themselves. For we have there
+seen that conceptions are quite impossible, and utterly without
+signification, unless either to them, or at least to the elements of
+which they consist, an object be given; and that, consequently, they
+cannot possibly apply to objects as things in themselves without regard
+to the question whether and how these may be given to us; and, further,
+that the only manner in which objects can be given to us is by means of
+the modification of our sensibility; and, finally, that pure à priori
+conceptions, in addition to the function of the understanding in the
+category, must contain à priori formal conditions of sensibility (of
+the internal sense, namely), which again contain the general condition
+under which alone the category can be applied to any object. This
+formal and pure condition of sensibility, to which the conception of
+the understanding is restricted in its employment, we shall name the
+schema of the conception of the understanding, and the procedure of the
+understanding with these schemata we shall call the schematism of the
+pure understanding.
+
+The schema is, in itself, always a mere product of the imagination.
+But, as the synthesis of imagination has for its aim no single
+intuition, but merely unity in the determination of sensibility, the
+schema is clearly distinguishable from the image. Thus, if I place five
+points one after another.... this is an image of the number five. On
+the other hand, if I only think a number in general, which may be
+either five or a hundred, this thought is rather the representation of
+a method of representing in an image a sum (e.g., a thousand) in
+conformity with a conception, than the image itself, an image which I
+should find some little difficulty in reviewing, and comparing with the
+conception. Now this representation of a general procedure of the
+imagination to present its image to a conception, I call the schema of
+this conception.
+
+In truth, it is not images of objects, but schemata, which lie at the
+foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions. No image could ever be
+adequate to our conception of a triangle in general. For the
+generalness of the conception it never could attain to, as this
+includes under itself all triangles, whether right-angled,
+acute-angled, etc., whilst the image would always be limited to a
+single part of this sphere. The schema of the triangle can exist
+nowhere else than in thought, and it indicates a rule of the synthesis
+of the imagination in regard to pure figures in space. Still less is an
+object of experience, or an image of the object, ever to the empirical
+conception. On the contrary, the conception always relates immediately
+to the schema of the imagination, as a rule for the determination of
+our intuition, in conformity with a certain general conception. The
+conception of a dog indicates a rule, according to which my imagination
+can delineate the figure of a four-footed animal in general, without
+being limited to any particular individual form which experience
+presents to me, or indeed to any possible image that I can represent to
+myself in concreto. This schematism of our understanding in regard to
+phenomena and their mere form, is an art, hidden in the depths of the
+human soul, whose true modes of action we shall only with difficulty
+discover and unveil. Thus much only can we say: "The image is a product
+of the empirical faculty of the productive imagination--the schema of
+sensuous conceptions (of figures in space, for example) is a product,
+and, as it were, a monogram of the pure imagination à priori, whereby
+and according to which images first become possible, which, however,
+can be connected with the conception only mediately by means of the
+schema which they indicate, and are in themselves never fully adequate
+to it." On the other hand, the schema of a pure conception of the
+understanding is something that cannot be reduced into any image--it is
+nothing else than the pure synthesis expressed by the category,
+conformably, to a rule of unity according to conceptions. It is a
+transcendental product of the imagination, a product which concerns the
+determination of the internal sense, according to conditions of its
+form (time) in respect to all representations, in so far as these
+representations must be conjoined à priori in one conception,
+conformably to the unity of apperception.
+
+Without entering upon a dry and tedious analysis of the essential
+requisites of transcendental schemata of the pure conceptions of the
+understanding, we shall rather proceed at once to give an explanation
+of them according to the order of the categories, and in connection
+therewith.
+
+For the external sense the pure image of all quantities (quantorum) is
+space; the pure image of all objects of sense in general, is time. But
+the pure schema of quantity (quantitatis) as a conception of the
+understanding, is number, a representation which comprehends the
+successive addition of one to one (homogeneous quantities). Thus,
+number is nothing else than the unity of the synthesis of the manifold
+in a homogeneous intuition, by means of my generating time itself in my
+apprehension of the intuition.
+
+Reality, in the pure conception of the understanding, is that which
+corresponds to a sensation in general; that, consequently, the
+conception of which indicates a being (in time). Negation is that the
+conception of which represents a not-being (in time). The opposition of
+these two consists therefore in the difference of one and the same
+time, as a time filled or a time empty. Now as time is only the form of
+intuition, consequently of objects as phenomena, that which in objects
+corresponds to sensation is the transcendental matter of all objects as
+things in themselves (Sachheit, reality). Now every sensation has a
+degree or quantity by which it can fill time, that is to say, the
+internal sense in respect of the representation of an object, more or
+less, until it vanishes into nothing (= 0 = negatio). Thus there is a
+relation and connection between reality and negation, or rather a
+transition from the former to the latter, which makes every reality
+representable to us as a quantum; and the schema of a reality as the
+quantity of something in so far as it fills time, is exactly this
+continuous and uniform generation of the reality in time, as we descend
+in time from the sensation which has a certain degree, down to the
+vanishing thereof, or gradually ascend from negation to the quantity
+thereof.
+
+The schema of substance is the permanence of the real in time; that is,
+the representation of it as a substratum of the empirical determination
+of time; a substratum which therefore remains, whilst all else changes.
+(Time passes not, but in it passes the existence of the changeable. To
+time, therefore, which is itself unchangeable and permanent,
+corresponds that which in the phenomenon is unchangeable in existence,
+that is, substance, and it is only by it that the succession and
+coexistence of phenomena can be determined in regard to time.)
+
+The schema of cause and of the causality of a thing is the real which,
+when posited, is always followed by something else. It consists,
+therefore, in the succession of the manifold, in so far as that
+succession is subjected to a rule.
+
+The schema of community (reciprocity of action and reaction), or the
+reciprocal causality of substances in respect of their accidents, is
+the coexistence of the determinations of the one with those of the
+other, according to a general rule.
+
+The schema of possibility is the accordance of the synthesis of
+different representations with the conditions of time in general (as,
+for example, opposites cannot exist together at the same time in the
+same thing, but only after each other), and is therefore the
+determination of the representation of a thing at any time.
+
+The schema of reality is existence in a determined time.
+
+The schema of necessity is the existence of an object in all time.
+
+It is clear, from all this, that the schema of the category of quantity
+contains and represents the generation (synthesis) of time itself, in
+the successive apprehension of an object; the schema of quality the
+synthesis of sensation with the representation of time, or the filling
+up of time; the schema of relation the relation of perceptions to each
+other in all time (that is, according to a rule of the determination of
+time): and finally, the schema of modality and its categories, time
+itself, as the correlative of the determination of an object--whether it
+does belong to time, and how. The schemata, therefore, are nothing but
+à priori determinations of time according to rules, and these, in
+regard to all possible objects, following the arrangement of the
+categories, relate to the series in time, the content in time, the
+order in time, and finally, to the complex or totality in time.
+
+Hence it is apparent that the schematism of the understanding, by means
+of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, amounts to nothing
+else than the unity of the manifold of intuition in the internal sense,
+and thus indirectly to the unity of apperception, as a function
+corresponding to the internal sense (a receptivity). Thus, the schemata
+of the pure conceptions of the understanding are the true and only
+conditions whereby our understanding receives an application to
+objects, and consequently significance. Finally, therefore, the
+categories are only capable of empirical use, inasmuch as they serve
+merely to subject phenomena to the universal rules of synthesis, by
+means of an à priori necessary unity (on account of the necessary union
+of all consciousness in one original apperception); and so to render
+them susceptible of a complete connection in one experience. But within
+this whole of possible experience lie all our cognitions, and in the
+universal relation to this experience consists transcendental truth,
+which antecedes all empirical truth, and renders the latter possible.
+
+It is, however, evident at first sight, that although the schemata of
+sensibility are the sole agents in realizing the categories, they do,
+nevertheless, also restrict them, that is, they limit the categories by
+conditions which lie beyond the sphere of understanding--namely, in
+sensibility. Hence the schema is properly only the phenomenon, or the
+sensuous conception of an object in harmony with the category. (Numerus
+est quantitas phaenomenon--sensatio realitas phaenomenon; constans et
+perdurabile rerum substantia phaenomenon--aeternitas, necessitas,
+phaenomena, etc.) Now, if we remove a restrictive condition, we thereby
+amplify, it appears, the formerly limited conception. In this way, the
+categories in their pure signification, free from all conditions of
+sensibility, ought to be valid of things as they are, and not, as the
+schemata represent them, merely as they appear; and consequently the
+categories must have a significance far more extended, and wholly
+independent of all schemata. In truth, there does always remain to the
+pure conceptions of the understanding, after abstracting every sensuous
+condition, a value and significance, which is, however, merely logical.
+But in this case, no object is given them, and therefore they have no
+meaning sufficient to afford us a conception of an object. The notion
+of substance, for example, if we leave out the sensuous determination
+of permanence, would mean nothing more than a something which can be
+cogitated as subject, without the possibility of becoming a predicate
+to anything else. Of this representation I can make nothing, inasmuch
+as it does not indicate to me what determinations the thing possesses
+which must thus be valid as premier subject. Consequently, the
+categories, without schemata are merely functions of the understanding
+for the production of conceptions, but do not represent any object.
+This significance they derive from sensibility, which at the same time
+realizes the understanding and restricts it.
+
+Chapter II. System of all Principles of the Pure Understanding
+
+In the foregoing chapter we have merely considered the general
+conditions under which alone the transcendental faculty of judgement is
+justified in using the pure conceptions of the understanding for
+synthetical judgements. Our duty at present is to exhibit in systematic
+connection those judgements which the understanding really produces à
+priori. For this purpose, our table of the categories will certainly
+afford us the natural and safe guidance. For it is precisely the
+categories whose application to possible experience must constitute all
+pure à priori cognition of the understanding; and the relation of which
+to sensibility will, on that very account, present us with a complete
+and systematic catalogue of all the transcendental principles of the
+use of the understanding.
+
+Principles à priori are so called, not merely because they contain in
+themselves the grounds of other judgements, but also because they
+themselves are not grounded in higher and more general cognitions. This
+peculiarity, however, does not raise them altogether above the need of
+a proof. For although there could be found no higher cognition, and
+therefore no objective proof, and although such a principle rather
+serves as the foundation for all cognition of the object, this by no
+means hinders us from drawing a proof from the subjective sources of
+the possibility of the cognition of an object. Such a proof is
+necessary, moreover, because without it the principle might be liable
+to the imputation of being a mere gratuitous assertion.
+
+In the second place, we shall limit our investigations to those
+principles which relate to the categories. For as to the principles of
+transcendental æsthetic, according to which space and time are the
+conditions of the possibility of things as phenomena, as also the
+restriction of these principles, namely, that they cannot be applied to
+objects as things in themselves--these, of course, do not fall within
+the scope of our present inquiry. In like manner, the principles of
+mathematical science form no part of this system, because they are all
+drawn from intuition, and not from the pure conception of the
+understanding. The possibility of these principles, however, will
+necessarily be considered here, inasmuch as they are synthetical
+judgements à priori, not indeed for the purpose of proving their
+accuracy and apodeictic certainty, which is unnecessary, but merely to
+render conceivable and deduce the possibility of such evident à priori
+cognitions.
+
+But we shall have also to speak of the principle of analytical
+judgements, in opposition to synthetical judgements, which is the
+proper subject of our inquiries, because this very opposition will free
+the theory of the latter from all ambiguity, and place it clearly
+before our eyes in its true nature.
+
+SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE PURE UNDERSTANDING
+
+Section I. Of the Supreme Principle of all Analytical Judgements
+
+Whatever may be the content of our cognition, and in whatever manner
+our cognition may be related to its object, the universal, although
+only negative conditions of all our judgements is that they do not
+contradict themselves; otherwise these judgements are in themselves
+(even without respect to the object) nothing. But although there may
+exist no contradiction in our judgement, it may nevertheless connect
+conceptions in such a manner that they do not correspond to the object,
+or without any grounds either à priori or à posteriori for arriving at
+such a judgement, and thus, without being self-contradictory, a
+judgement may nevertheless be either false or groundless.
+
+Now, the proposition: "No subject can have a predicate that contradicts
+it," is called the principle of contradiction, and is a universal but
+purely negative criterion of all truth. But it belongs to logic alone,
+because it is valid of cognitions, merely as cognitions and without
+respect to their content, and declares that the contradiction entirely
+nullifies them. We can also, however, make a positive use of this
+principle, that is, not merely to banish falsehood and error (in so far
+as it rests upon contradiction), but also for the cognition of truth.
+For if the judgement is analytical, be it affirmative or negative, its
+truth must always be recognizable by means of the principle of
+contradiction. For the contrary of that which lies and is cogitated as
+conception in the cognition of the object will be always properly
+negatived, but the conception itself must always be affirmed of the
+object, inasmuch as the contrary thereof would be in contradiction to
+the object.
+
+We must therefore hold the principle of contradiction to be the
+universal and fully sufficient Principle of all analytical cognition.
+But as a sufficient criterion of truth, it has no further utility or
+authority. For the fact that no cognition can be at variance with this
+principle without nullifying itself, constitutes this principle the
+sine qua non, but not the determining ground of the truth of our
+cognition. As our business at present is properly with the synthetical
+part of our knowledge only, we shall always be on our guard not to
+transgress this inviolable principle; but at the same time not to
+expect from it any direct assistance in the establishment of the truth
+of any synthetical proposition.
+
+There exists, however, a formula of this celebrated principle--a
+principle merely formal and entirely without content--which contains a
+synthesis that has been inadvertently and quite unnecessarily mixed up
+with it. It is this: "It is impossible for a thing to be and not to be
+at the same time." Not to mention the superfluousness of the addition
+of the word impossible to indicate the apodeictic certainty, which
+ought to be self-evident from the proposition itself, the proposition
+is affected by the condition of time, and as it were says: "A thing =
+A, which is something = B, cannot at the same time be non-B." But both,
+B as well as non-B, may quite well exist in succession. For example, a
+man who is young cannot at the same time be old; but the same man can
+very well be at one time young, and at another not young, that is, old.
+Now the principle of contradiction as a merely logical proposition must
+not by any means limit its application merely to relations of time, and
+consequently a formula like the preceding is quite foreign to its true
+purpose. The misunderstanding arises in this way. We first of all
+separate a predicate of a thing from the conception of the thing, and
+afterwards connect with this predicate its opposite, and hence do not
+establish any contradiction with the subject, but only with its
+predicate, which has been conjoined with the subject synthetically--a
+contradiction, moreover, which obtains only when the first and second
+predicate are affirmed in the same time. If I say: "A man who is
+ignorant is not learned," the condition "at the same time" must be
+added, for he who is at one time ignorant, may at another be learned.
+But if I say: "No ignorant man is a learned man," the proposition is
+analytical, because the characteristic ignorance is now a constituent
+part of the conception of the subject; and in this case the negative
+proposition is evident immediately from the proposition of
+contradiction, without the necessity of adding the condition "the same
+time." This is the reason why I have altered the formula of this
+principle--an alteration which shows very clearly the nature of an
+analytical proposition.
+
+Section II. Of the Supreme Principle of all Synthetical Judgements
+
+The explanation of the possibility of synthetical judgements is a task
+with which general logic has nothing to do; indeed she needs not even
+be acquainted with its name. But in transcendental logic it is the most
+important matter to be dealt with--indeed the only one, if the question
+is of the possibility of synthetical judgements à priori, the
+conditions and extent of their validity. For when this question is
+fully decided, it can reach its aim with perfect ease, the
+determination, to wit, of the extent and limits of the pure
+understanding.
+
+In an analytical judgement I do not go beyond the given conception, in
+order to arrive at some decision respecting it. If the judgement is
+affirmative, I predicate of the conception only that which was already
+cogitated in it; if negative, I merely exclude from the conception its
+contrary. But in synthetical judgements, I must go beyond the given
+conception, in order to cogitate, in relation with it, something quite
+different from that which was cogitated in it, a relation which is
+consequently never one either of identity or contradiction, and by
+means of which the truth or error of the judgement cannot be discerned
+merely from the judgement itself.
+
+Granted, then, that we must go out beyond a given conception, in order
+to compare it synthetically with another, a third thing is necessary,
+in which alone the synthesis of two conceptions can originate. Now what
+is this tertium quid that is to be the medium of all synthetical
+judgements? It is only a complex in which all our representations are
+contained, the internal sense to wit, and its form à priori, time.
+
+The synthesis of our representations rests upon the imagination; their
+synthetical unity (which is requisite to a judgement), upon the unity
+of apperception. In this, therefore, is to be sought the possibility of
+synthetical judgements, and as all three contain the sources of à
+priori representations, the possibility of pure synthetical judgements
+also; nay, they are necessary upon these grounds, if we are to possess
+a knowledge of objects, which rests solely upon the synthesis of
+representations.
+
+If a cognition is to have objective reality, that is, to relate to an
+object, and possess sense and meaning in respect to it, it is necessary
+that the object be given in some way or another. Without this, our
+conceptions are empty, and we may indeed have thought by means of them,
+but by such thinking we have not, in fact, cognized anything, we have
+merely played with representation. To give an object, if this
+expression be understood in the sense of "to present" the object, not
+mediately but immediately in intuition, means nothing else than to
+apply the representation of it to experience, be that experience real
+or only possible. Space and time themselves, pure as these conceptions
+are from all that is empirical, and certain as it is that they are
+represented fully à priori in the mind, would be completely without
+objective validity, and without sense and significance, if their
+necessary use in the objects of experience were not shown. Nay, the
+representation of them is a mere schema, that always relates to the
+reproductive imagination, which calls up the objects of experience,
+without which they have no meaning. And so it is with all conceptions
+without distinction.
+
+The possibility of experience is, then, that which gives objective
+reality to all our à priori cognitions. Now experience depends upon the
+synthetical unity of phenomena, that is, upon a synthesis according to
+conceptions of the object of phenomena in general, a synthesis without
+which experience never could become knowledge, but would be merely a
+rhapsody of perceptions, never fitting together into any connected
+text, according to rules of a thoroughly united (possible)
+consciousness, and therefore never subjected to the transcendental and
+necessary unity of apperception. Experience has therefore for a
+foundation, à priori principles of its form, that is to say, general
+rules of unity in the synthesis of phenomena, the objective reality of
+which rules, as necessary conditions even of the possibility of
+experience can which rules, as necessary conditions--even of the
+possibility of experience--can always be shown in experience. But apart
+from this relation, à priori synthetical propositions are absolutely
+impossible, because they have no third term, that is, no pure object,
+in which the synthetical unity can exhibit the objective reality of its
+conceptions.
+
+Although, then, respecting space, or the forms which productive
+imagination describes therein, we do cognize much à priori in
+synthetical judgements, and are really in no need of experience for
+this purpose, such knowledge would nevertheless amount to nothing but a
+busy trifling with a mere chimera, were not space to be considered as
+the condition of the phenomena which constitute the material of
+external experience. Hence those pure synthetical judgements do relate,
+though but mediately, to possible experience, or rather to the
+possibility of experience, and upon that alone is founded the objective
+validity of their synthesis.
+
+While then, on the one hand, experience, as empirical synthesis, is the
+only possible mode of cognition which gives reality to all other
+synthesis; on the other hand, this latter synthesis, as cognition à
+priori, possesses truth, that is, accordance with its object, only in
+so far as it contains nothing more than what is necessary to the
+synthetical unity of experience.
+
+Accordingly, the supreme principle of all synthetical judgements is:
+"Every object is subject to the necessary conditions of the synthetical
+unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience."
+
+À priori synthetical judgements are possible when we apply the formal
+conditions of the à priori intuition, the synthesis of the imagination,
+and the necessary unity of that synthesis in a transcendental
+apperception, to a possible cognition of experience, and say: "The
+conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same
+time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, and
+have, for that reason, objective validity in an à priori synthetical
+judgement."
+
+Section III. Systematic Representation of all Synthetical Principles of
+the Pure Understanding
+
+That principles exist at all is to be ascribed solely to the pure
+understanding, which is not only the faculty of rules in regard to that
+which happens, but is even the source of principles according to which
+everything that can be presented to us as an object is necessarily
+subject to rules, because without such rules we never could attain to
+cognition of an object. Even the laws of nature, if they are
+contemplated as principles of the empirical use of the understanding,
+possess also a characteristic of necessity, and we may therefore at
+least expect them to be determined upon grounds which are valid à
+priori and antecedent to all experience. But all laws of nature,
+without distinction, are subject to higher principles of the
+understanding, inasmuch as the former are merely applications of the
+latter to particular cases of experience. These higher principles alone
+therefore give the conception, which contains the necessary condition,
+and, as it were, the exponent of a rule; experience, on the other hand,
+gives the case which comes under the rule.
+
+There is no danger of our mistaking merely empirical principles for
+principles of the pure understanding, or conversely; for the character
+of necessity, according to conceptions which distinguish the latter,
+and the absence of this in every empirical proposition, how extensively
+valid soever it may be, is a perfect safeguard against confounding
+them. There are, however, pure principles à priori, which nevertheless
+I should not ascribe to the pure understanding--for this reason, that
+they are not derived from pure conceptions, but (although by the
+mediation of the understanding) from pure intuitions. But understanding
+is the faculty of conceptions. Such principles mathematical science
+possesses, but their application to experience, consequently their
+objective validity, nay the possibility of such à priori synthetical
+cognitions (the deduction thereof) rests entirely upon the pure
+understanding.
+
+On this account, I shall not reckon among my principles those of
+mathematics; though I shall include those upon the possibility and
+objective validity à priori, of principles of the mathematical science,
+which, consequently, are to be looked upon as the principle of these,
+and which proceed from conceptions to intuition, and not from intuition
+to conceptions.
+
+In the application of the pure conceptions of the understanding to
+possible experience, the employment of their synthesis is either
+mathematical or dynamical, for it is directed partly on the intuition
+alone, partly on the existence of a phenomenon. But the à priori
+conditions of intuition are in relation to a possible experience
+absolutely necessary, those of the existence of objects of a possible
+empirical intuition are in themselves contingent. Hence the principles
+of the mathematical use of the categories will possess a character of
+absolute necessity, that is, will be apodeictic; those, on the other
+hand, of the dynamical use, the character of an à priori necessity
+indeed, but only under the condition of empirical thought in an
+experience, therefore only mediately and indirectly. Consequently they
+will not possess that immediate evidence which is peculiar to the
+former, although their application to experience does not, for that
+reason, lose its truth and certitude. But of this point we shall be
+better able to judge at the conclusion of this system of principles.
+
+The table of the categories is naturally our guide to the table of
+principles, because these are nothing else than rules for the objective
+employment of the former. Accordingly, all principles of the pure
+understanding are:
+
+                                1
+                              Axioms
+                           of Intuition
+
+               2                                    3
+          Anticipations                          Analogies
+          of Perception                        of Experience
+                                4
+                          Postulates of
+                        Empirical Thought
+                           in general
+
+These appellations I have chosen advisedly, in order that we might not
+lose sight of the distinctions in respect of the evidence and the
+employment of these principles. It will, however, soon appear that--a
+fact which concerns both the evidence of these principles, and the à
+priori determination of phenomena--according to the categories of
+quantity and quality (if we attend merely to the form of these), the
+principles of these categories are distinguishable from those of the
+two others, in as much as the former are possessed of an intuitive, but
+the latter of a merely discursive, though in both instances a complete,
+certitude. I shall therefore call the former mathematical, and the
+latter dynamical principles.[27] It must be observed, however, that by
+these terms I mean just as little in the one case the principles of
+mathematics as those of general (physical) dynamics in the other. I
+have here in view merely the principles of the pure understanding, in
+their application to the internal sense (without distinction of the
+representations given therein), by means of which the sciences of
+mathematics and dynamics become possible. Accordingly, I have named
+these principles rather with reference to their application than their
+content; and I shall now proceed to consider them in the order in which
+they stand in the table.
+
+ [27] All combination (conjunctio) is either composition (compositio)
+ or connection (nexus). The former is the synthesis of a manifold, the
+ parts of which do not necessarily belong to each other. For example,
+ the two triangles into which a square is divided by a diagonal, do not
+ necessarily belong to each other, and of this kind is the synthesis of
+ the homogeneous in everything that can be mathematically considered.
+ This synthesis can be divided into those of aggregation and coalition,
+ the former of which is applied to extensive, the latter to intensive
+ quantities. The second sort of combination (nexus) is the synthesis of
+ a manifold, in so far as its parts do belong necessarily to each
+ other; for example, the accident to a substance, or the effect to the
+ cause. Consequently it is a synthesis of that which though
+ heterogeneous, is represented as connected à priori. This
+ combination--not an arbitrary one--I entitle dynamical because it
+ concerns the connection of the existence of the manifold. This, again,
+ may be divided into the physical synthesis, of the phenomena divided
+ among each other, and the metaphysical synthesis, or the connection of
+ phenomena à priori in the faculty of cognition.
+
+1. AXIOMS OF INTUITION.
+
+The principle of these is: All Intuitions are Extensive Quantities.
+
+PROOF.
+
+All phenomena contain, as regards their form, an intuition in space and
+time, which lies à priori at the foundation of all without exception.
+Phenomena, therefore, cannot be apprehended, that is, received into
+empirical consciousness otherwise than through the synthesis of a
+manifold, through which the representations of a determinate space or
+time are generated; that is to say, through the composition of the
+homogeneous and the consciousness of the synthetical unity of this
+manifold (homogeneous). Now the consciousness of a homogeneous manifold
+in intuition, in so far as thereby the representation of an object is
+rendered possible, is the conception of a quantity (quanti).
+Consequently, even the perception of an object as phenomenon is
+possible only through the same synthetical unity of the manifold of the
+given sensuous intuition, through which the unity of the composition of
+the homogeneous manifold in the conception of a quantity is cogitated;
+that is to say, all phenomena are quantities, and extensive quantities,
+because as intuitions in space or time they must be represented by
+means of the same synthesis through which space and time themselves are
+determined.
+
+An extensive quantity I call that wherein the representation of the
+parts renders possible (and therefore necessarily antecedes) the
+representation of the whole. I cannot represent to myself any line,
+however small, without drawing it in thought, that is, without
+generating from a point all its parts one after another, and in this
+way alone producing this intuition. Precisely the same is the case with
+every, even the smallest, portion of time. I cogitate therein only the
+successive progress from one moment to another, and hence, by means of
+the different portions of time and the addition of them, a determinate
+quantity of time is produced. As the pure intuition in all phenomena is
+either time or space, so is every phenomenon in its character of
+intuition an extensive quantity, inasmuch as it can only be cognized in
+our apprehension by successive synthesis (from part to part). All
+phenomena are, accordingly, to be considered as aggregates, that is, as
+a collection of previously given parts; which is not the case with
+every sort of quantities, but only with those which are represented and
+apprehended by us as extensive.
+
+On this successive synthesis of the productive imagination, in the
+generation of figures, is founded the mathematics of extension, or
+geometry, with its axioms, which express the conditions of sensuous
+intuition à priori, under which alone the schema of a pure conception
+of external intuition can exist; for example, "be tween two points only
+one straight line is possible," "two straight lines cannot enclose a
+space," etc. These are the axioms which properly relate only to
+quantities (quanta) as such.
+
+But, as regards the quantity of a thing (quantitas), that is to say,
+the answer to the question: "How large is this or that object?"
+although, in respect to this question, we have various propositions
+synthetical and immediately certain (indemonstrabilia); we have, in the
+proper sense of the term, no axioms. For example, the propositions: "If
+equals be added to equals, the wholes are equal"; "If equals be taken
+from equals, the remainders are equal"; are analytical, because I am
+immediately conscious of the identity of the production of the one
+quantity with the production of the other; whereas axioms must be à
+priori synthetical propositions. On the other hand, the self-evident
+propositions as to the relation of numbers, are certainly synthetical
+but not universal, like those of geometry, and for this reason cannot
+be called axioms, but numerical formulae. That 7 + 5 = 12 is not an
+analytical proposition. For neither in the representation of seven, nor
+of five, nor of the composition of the two numbers, do I cogitate the
+number twelve. (Whether I cogitate the number in the addition of both,
+is not at present the question; for in the case of an analytical
+proposition, the only point is whether I really cogitate the predicate
+in the representation of the subject.) But although the proposition is
+synthetical, it is nevertheless only a singular proposition. In so far
+as regard is here had merely to the synthesis of the homogeneous (the
+units), it cannot take place except in one manner, although our use of
+these numbers is afterwards general. If I say: "A triangle can be
+constructed with three lines, any two of which taken together are
+greater than the third," I exercise merely the pure function of the
+productive imagination, which may draw the lines longer or shorter and
+construct the angles at its pleasure. On the contrary, the number seven
+is possible only in one manner, and so is likewise the number twelve,
+which results from the synthesis of seven and five. Such propositions,
+then, cannot be termed axioms (for in that case we should have an
+infinity of these), but numerical formulae.
+
+This transcendental principle of the mathematics of phenomena greatly
+enlarges our à priori cognition. For it is by this principle alone that
+pure mathematics is rendered applicable in all its precision to objects
+of experience, and without it the validity of this application would
+not be so self-evident; on the contrary, contradictions and confusions
+have often arisen on this very point. Phenomena are not things in
+themselves. Empirical intuition is possible only through pure intuition
+(of space and time); consequently, what geometry affirms of the latter,
+is indisputably valid of the former. All evasions, such as the
+statement that objects of sense do not conform to the rules of
+construction in space (for example, to the rule of the infinite
+divisibility of lines or angles), must fall to the ground. For, if
+these objections hold good, we deny to space, and with it to all
+mathematics, objective validity, and no longer know wherefore, and how
+far, mathematics can be applied to phenomena. The synthesis of spaces
+and times as the essential form of all intuition, is that which renders
+possible the apprehension of a phenomenon, and therefore every external
+experience, consequently all cognition of the objects of experience;
+and whatever mathematics in its pure use proves of the former, must
+necessarily hold good of the latter. All objections are but the
+chicaneries of an ill-instructed reason, which erroneously thinks to
+liberate the objects of sense from the formal conditions of our
+sensibility, and represents these, although mere phenomena, as things
+in themselves, presented as such to our understanding. But in this
+case, no à priori synthetical cognition of them could be possible,
+consequently not through pure conceptions of space and the science
+which determines these conceptions, that is to say, geometry, would
+itself be impossible.
+
+2. ANTICIPATIONS OF PERCEPTION.
+
+The principle of these is: In all phenomena the Real, that which is an
+object of sensation, has Intensive Quantity, that is, has a Degree.
+
+PROOF.
+
+Perception is empirical consciousness, that is to say, a consciousness
+which contains an element of sensation. Phenomena as objects of
+perception are not pure, that is, merely formal intuitions, like space
+and time, for they cannot be perceived in themselves.[28] They contain,
+then, over and above the intuition, the materials for an object
+(through which is represented something existing in space or time),
+that is to say, they contain the real of sensation, as a representation
+merely subjective, which gives us merely the consciousness that the
+subject is affected, and which we refer to some external object. Now, a
+gradual transition from empirical consciousness to pure consciousness
+is possible, inasmuch as the real in this consciousness entirely
+vanishes, and there remains a merely formal consciousness (à priori) of
+the manifold in time and space; consequently there is possible a
+synthesis also of the production of the quantity of a sensation from
+its commencement, that is, from the pure intuition = 0 onwards up to a
+certain quantity of the sensation. Now as sensation in itself is not an
+objective representation, and in it is to be found neither the
+intuition of space nor of time, it cannot possess any extensive
+quantity, and yet there does belong to it a quantity (and that by means
+of its apprehension, in which empirical consciousness can within a
+certain time rise from nothing = 0 up to its given amount),
+consequently an intensive quantity. And thus we must ascribe intensive
+quantity, that is, a degree of influence on sense to all objects of
+perception, in so far as this perception contains sensation.
+
+ [28] They can be perceived only as phenomena, and some part of them
+ must always belong to the non-ego; whereas pure intuitions are
+ entirely the products of the mind itself, and as such are cognized _in
+ themselves.--Tr_
+
+All cognition, by means of which I am enabled to cognize and determine
+à priori what belongs to empirical cognition, may be called an
+anticipation; and without doubt this is the sense in which Epicurus
+employed his expression prholepsis. But as there is in phenomena
+something which is never cognized à priori, which on this account
+constitutes the proper difference between pure and empirical cognition,
+that is to say, sensation (as the matter of perception), it follows,
+that sensation is just that element in cognition which cannot be at all
+anticipated. On the other hand, we might very well term the pure
+determinations in space and time, as well in regard to figure as to
+quantity, anticipations of phenomena, because they represent à priori
+that which may always be given à posteriori in experience. But suppose
+that in every sensation, as sensation in general, without any
+particular sensation being thought of, there existed something which
+could be cognized à priori, this would deserve to be called
+anticipation in a special sense--special, because it may seem surprising
+to forestall experience, in that which concerns the matter of
+experience, and which we can only derive from itself. Yet such really
+is the case here.
+
+Apprehension[29], by means of sensation alone, fills only one moment,
+that is, if I do not take into consideration a succession of many
+sensations. As that in the phenomenon, the apprehension of which is not
+a successive synthesis advancing from parts to an entire
+representation, sensation has therefore no extensive quantity; the want
+of sensation in a moment of time would represent it as empty,
+consequently = 0. That which in the empirical intuition corresponds to
+sensation is reality (realitas phaenomenon); that which corresponds to
+the absence of it, negation = 0. Now every sensation is capable of a
+diminution, so that it can decrease, and thus gradually disappear.
+Therefore, between reality in a phenomenon and negation, there exists a
+continuous concatenation of many possible intermediate sensations, the
+difference of which from each other is always smaller than that between
+the given sensation and zero, or complete negation. That is to say, the
+real in a phenomenon has always a quantity, which however is not
+discoverable in apprehension, inasmuch as apprehension take place by
+means of mere sensation in one instant, and not by the successive
+synthesis of many sensations, and therefore does not progress from
+parts to the whole. Consequently, it has a quantity, but not an
+extensive quantity.
+
+ [29] Apprehension is the Kantian word for preception, in the largest
+ sense in which we employ that term. It is the genus which includes
+ under i, as species, perception proper and sensation proper--Tr
+
+Now that quantity which is apprehended only as unity, and in which
+plurality can be represented only by approximation to negation = 0, I
+term intensive quantity. Consequently, reality in a phenomenon has
+intensive quantity, that is, a degree. If we consider this reality as
+cause (be it of sensation or of another reality in the phenomenon, for
+example, a change), we call the degree of reality in its character of
+cause a momentum, for example, the momentum of weight; and for this
+reason, that the degree only indicates that quantity the apprehension
+of which is not successive, but instantaneous. This, however, I touch
+upon only in passing, for with causality I have at present nothing to
+do.
+
+Accordingly, every sensation, consequently every reality in phenomena,
+however small it may be, has a degree, that is, an intensive quantity,
+which may always be lessened, and between reality and negation there
+exists a continuous connection of possible realities, and possible
+smaller perceptions. Every colour--for example, red--has a degree, which,
+be it ever so small, is never the smallest, and so is it always with
+heat, the momentum of weight, etc.
+
+This property of quantities, according to which no part of them is the
+smallest possible (no part simple), is called their continuity. Space
+and time are quanta continua, because no part of them can be given,
+without enclosing it within boundaries (points and moments),
+consequently, this given part is itself a space or a time. Space,
+therefore, consists only of spaces, and time of times. Points and
+moments are only boundaries, that is, the mere places or positions of
+their limitation. But places always presuppose intuitions which are to
+limit or determine them; and we cannot conceive either space or time
+composed of constituent parts which are given before space or time.
+Such quantities may also be called flowing, because synthesis (of the
+productive imagination) in the production of these quantities is a
+progression in time, the continuity of which we are accustomed to
+indicate by the expression flowing.
+
+All phenomena, then, are continuous quantities, in respect both to
+intuition and mere perception (sensation, and with it reality). In the
+former case they are extensive quantities; in the latter, intensive.
+When the synthesis of the manifold of a phenomenon is interrupted,
+there results merely an aggregate of several phenomena, and not
+properly a phenomenon as a quantity, which is not produced by the mere
+continuation of the productive synthesis of a certain kind, but by the
+repetition of a synthesis always ceasing. For example, if I call
+thirteen dollars a sum or quantity of money, I employ the term quite
+correctly, inasmuch as I understand by thirteen dollars the value of a
+mark in standard silver, which is, to be sure, a continuous quantity,
+in which no part is the smallest, but every part might constitute a
+piece of money, which would contain material for still smaller pieces.
+If, however, by the words thirteen dollars I understand so many coins
+(be their value in silver what it may), it would be quite erroneous to
+use the expression a quantity of dollars; on the contrary, I must call
+them aggregate, that is, a number of coins. And as in every number we
+must have unity as the foundation, so a phenomenon taken as unity is a
+quantity, and as such always a continuous quantity (quantum continuum).
+
+Now, seeing all phenomena, whether considered as extensive or
+intensive, are continuous quantities, the proposition: "All change
+(transition of a thing from one state into another) is continuous,"
+might be proved here easily, and with mathematical evidence, were it
+not that the causality of a change lies, entirely beyond the bounds of
+a transcendental philosophy, and presupposes empirical principles. For
+of the possibility of a cause which changes the condition of things,
+that is, which determines them to the contrary to a certain given
+state, the understanding gives us à priori no knowledge; not merely
+because it has no insight into the possibility of it (for such insight
+is absent in several à priori cognitions), but because the notion of
+change concerns only certain determinations of phenomena, which
+experience alone can acquaint us with, while their cause lies in the
+unchangeable. But seeing that we have nothing which we could here
+employ but the pure fundamental conceptions of all possible experience,
+among which of course nothing empirical can be admitted, we dare not,
+without injuring the unity of our system, anticipate general physical
+science, which is built upon certain fundamental experiences.
+
+Nevertheless, we are in no want of proofs of the great influence which
+the principle above developed exercises in the anticipation of
+perceptions, and even in supplying the want of them, so far as to
+shield us against the false conclusions which otherwise we might rashly
+draw.
+
+If all reality in perception has a degree, between which and negation
+there is an endless sequence of ever smaller degrees, and if,
+nevertheless, every sense must have a determinate degree of receptivity
+for sensations; no perception, and consequently no experience is
+possible, which can prove, either immediately or mediately, an entire
+absence of all reality in a phenomenon; in other words, it is
+impossible ever to draw from experience a proof of the existence of
+empty space or of empty time. For in the first place, an entire absence
+of reality in a sensuous intuition cannot of course be an object of
+perception; secondly, such absence cannot be deduced from the
+contemplation of any single phenomenon, and the difference of the
+degrees in its reality; nor ought it ever to be admitted in explanation
+of any phenomenon. For if even the complete intuition of a determinate
+space or time is thoroughly real, that is, if no part thereof is empty,
+yet because every reality has its degree, which, with the extensive
+quantity of the phenomenon unchanged, can diminish through endless
+gradations down to nothing (the void), there must be infinitely
+graduated degrees, with which space or time is filled, and the
+intensive quantity in different phenomena may be smaller or greater,
+although the extensive quantity of the intuition remains equal and
+unaltered.
+
+We shall give an example of this. Almost all natural philosophers,
+remarking a great difference in the quantity of the matter of different
+kinds in bodies with the same volume (partly on account of the momentum
+of gravity or weight, partly on account of the momentum of resistance
+to other bodies in motion), conclude unanimously that this volume
+(extensive quantity of the phenomenon) must be void in all bodies,
+although in different proportion. But who would suspect that these for
+the most part mathematical and mechanical inquirers into nature should
+ground this conclusion solely on a metaphysical hypothesis--a sort of
+hypothesis which they profess to disparage and avoid? Yet this they do,
+in assuming that the real in space (I must not here call it
+impenetrability or weight, because these are empirical conceptions) is
+always identical, and can only be distinguished according to its
+extensive quantity, that is, multiplicity. Now to this presupposition,
+for which they can have no ground in experience, and which consequently
+is merely metaphysical, I oppose a transcendental demonstration, which
+it is true will not explain the difference in the filling up of spaces,
+but which nevertheless completely does away with the supposed necessity
+of the above-mentioned presupposition that we cannot explain the said
+difference otherwise than by the hypothesis of empty spaces. This
+demonstration, moreover, has the merit of setting the understanding at
+liberty to conceive this distinction in a different manner, if the
+explanation of the fact requires any such hypothesis. For we perceive
+that although two equal spaces may be completely filled by matters
+altogether different, so that in neither of them is there left a single
+point wherein matter is not present, nevertheless, every reality has
+its degree (of resistance or of weight), which, without diminution of
+the extensive quantity, can become less and less ad infinitum, before
+it passes into nothingness and disappears. Thus an expansion which
+fills a space--for example, caloric, or any other reality in the
+phenomenal world--can decrease in its degrees to infinity, yet without
+leaving the smallest part of the space empty; on the contrary, filling
+it with those lesser degrees as completely as another phenomenon could
+with greater. My intention here is by no means to maintain that this is
+really the case with the difference of matters, in regard to their
+specific gravity; I wish only to prove, from a principle of the pure
+understanding, that the nature of our perceptions makes such a mode of
+explanation possible, and that it is erroneous to regard the real in a
+phenomenon as equal quoad its degree, and different only quoad its
+aggregation and extensive quantity, and this, too, on the pretended
+authority of an à priori principle of the understanding.
+
+Nevertheless, this principle of the anticipation of perception must
+somewhat startle an inquirer whom initiation into transcendental
+philosophy has rendered cautious. We must naturally entertain some
+doubt whether or not the understanding can enounce any such synthetical
+proposition as that respecting the degree of all reality in phenomena,
+and consequently the possibility of the internal difference of
+sensation itself--abstraction being made of its empirical quality. Thus
+it is a question not unworthy of solution: "How the understanding can
+pronounce synthetically and à priori respecting phenomena, and thus
+anticipate these, even in that which is peculiarly and merely
+empirical, that, namely, which concerns sensation itself?"
+
+The quality of sensation is in all cases merely empirical, and cannot
+be represented à priori (for example, colours, taste, etc.). But the
+real--that which corresponds to sensation--in opposition to negation = 0,
+only represents something the conception of which in itself contains a
+being (ein seyn), and signifies nothing but the synthesis in an
+empirical consciousness. That is to say, the empirical consciousness in
+the internal sense can be raised from 0 to every higher degree, so that
+the very same extensive quantity of intuition, an illuminated surface,
+for example, excites as great a sensation as an aggregate of many other
+surfaces less illuminated. We can therefore make complete abstraction
+of the extensive quantity of a phenomenon, and represent to ourselves
+in the mere sensation in a certain momentum, a synthesis of homogeneous
+ascension from 0 up to the given empirical consciousness, All
+sensations therefore as such are given only à posteriori, but this
+property thereof, namely, that they have a degree, can be known à
+priori. It is worthy of remark, that in respect to quantities in
+general, we can cognize à priori only a single quality, namely,
+continuity; but in respect to all quality (the real in phenomena), we
+cannot cognize à priori anything more than the intensive quantity
+thereof, namely, that they have a degree. All else is left to
+experience.
+
+3. ANALOGIES OF EXPERIENCE.
+
+The principle of these is: Experience is possible only through the
+representation of a necessary connection of Perceptions.
+
+PROOF.
+
+Experience is an empirical cognition; that is to say, a cognition which
+determines an object by means of perceptions. It is therefore a
+synthesis of perceptions, a synthesis which is not itself contained in
+perception, but which contains the synthetical unity of the manifold of
+perception in a consciousness; and this unity constitutes the essential
+of our cognition of objects of the senses, that is, of experience (not
+merely of intuition or sensation). Now in experience our perceptions
+come together contingently, so that no character of necessity in their
+connection appears, or can appear from the perceptions themselves,
+because apprehension is only a placing together of the manifold of
+empirical intuition, and no representation of a necessity in the
+connected existence of the phenomena which apprehension brings
+together, is to be discovered therein. But as experience is a cognition
+of objects by means of perceptions, it follows that the relation of the
+existence of the existence of the manifold must be represented in
+experience not as it is put together in time, but as it is objectively
+in time. And as time itself cannot be perceived, the determination of
+the existence of objects in time can only take place by means of their
+connection in time in general, consequently only by means of à priori
+connecting conceptions. Now as these conceptions always possess the
+character of necessity, experience is possible only by means of a
+representation of the necessary connection of perception.
+
+The three modi of time are permanence, succession, and coexistence.
+Accordingly, there are three rules of all relations of time in
+phenomena, according to which the existence of every phenomenon is
+determined in respect of the unity of all time, and these antecede all
+experience and render it possible.
+
+The general principle of all three analogies rests on the necessary
+unity of apperception in relation to all possible empirical
+consciousness (perception) at every time, consequently, as this unity
+lies à priori at the foundation of all mental operations, the principle
+rests on the synthetical unity of all phenomena according to their
+relation in time. For the original apperception relates to our internal
+sense (the complex of all representations), and indeed relates à priori
+to its form, that is to say, the relation of the manifold empirical
+consciousness in time. Now this manifold must be combined in original
+apperception according to relations of time--a necessity imposed by the
+à priori transcendental unity of apperception, to which is subjected
+all that can belong to my (i.e., my own) cognition, and therefore all
+that can become an object for me. This synthetical and à priori
+determined unity in relation of perceptions in time is therefore the
+rule: "All empirical determinations of time must be subject to rules of
+the general determination of time"; and the analogies of experience, of
+which we are now about to treat, must be rules of this nature.
+
+These principles have this peculiarity, that they do not concern
+phenomena, and the synthesis of the empirical intuition thereof, but
+merely the existence of phenomena and their relation to each other in
+regard to this existence. Now the mode in which we apprehend a thing in
+a phenomenon can be determined à priori in such a manner that the rule
+of its synthesis can give, that is to say, can produce this à priori
+intuition in every empirical example. But the existence of phenomena
+cannot be known à priori, and although we could arrive by this path at
+a conclusion of the fact of some existence, we could not cognize that
+existence determinately, that is to say, we should be incapable of
+anticipating in what respect the empirical intuition of it would be
+distinguishable from that of others.
+
+The two principles above mentioned, which I called mathematical, in
+consideration of the fact of their authorizing the application of
+mathematic phenomena, relate to these phenomena only in regard to their
+possibility, and instruct us how phenomena, as far as regards their
+intuition or the real in their perception, can be generated according
+to the rules of a mathematical synthesis. Consequently, numerical
+quantities, and with them the determination of a phenomenon as a
+quantity, can be employed in the one case as well as in the other.
+Thus, for example, out of 200,000 illuminations by the moon, I might
+compose and give à priori, that is construct, the degree of our
+sensations of the sun-light.[30] We may therefore entitle these two
+principles constitutive.
+
+ [30] Kant's meaning is: The two principles enunciated under the heads
+ of "Axioms of Intuition," and "Anticipations of Perception," authorize
+ the application to phenomena of determinations of size and number,
+ that is of mathematic. For example, I may compute the light of the
+ sun, and say that its quantity is a certain number of times greater
+ than that of the moon. In the same way, heat is measured by the
+ comparison of its different effects on water, &c., and on mercury in a
+ thermometer.--Tr
+
+The case is very different with those principles whose province it is
+to subject the existence of phenomena to rules à priori. For as
+existence does not admit of being constructed, it is clear that they
+must only concern the relations of existence and be merely regulative
+principles. In this case, therefore, neither axioms nor anticipations
+are to be thought of. Thus, if a perception is given us, in a certain
+relation of time to other (although undetermined) perceptions, we
+cannot then say à priori, what and how great (in quantity) the other
+perception necessarily connected with the former is, but only how it is
+connected, quoad its existence, in this given modus of time. Analogies
+in philosophy mean something very different from that which they
+represent in mathematics. In the latter they are formulae, which
+enounce the equality of two relations of quantity, and are always
+constitutive, so that if two terms of the proportion are given, the
+third is also given, that is, can be constructed by the aid of these
+formulae. But in philosophy, analogy is not the equality of two
+quantitative but of two qualitative relations. In this case, from three
+given terms, I can give à priori and cognize the relation to a fourth
+member, but not this fourth term itself, although I certainly possess a
+rule to guide me in the search for this fourth term in experience, and
+a mark to assist me in discovering it. An analogy of experience is
+therefore only a rule according to which unity of experience must arise
+out of perceptions in respect to objects (phenomena) not as a
+constitutive, but merely as a regulative principle. The same holds good
+also of the postulates of empirical thought in general, which relate to
+the synthesis of mere intuition (which concerns the form of phenomena),
+the synthesis of perception (which concerns the matter of phenomena),
+and the synthesis of experience (which concerns the relation of these
+perceptions). For they are only regulative principles, and clearly
+distinguishable from the mathematical, which are constitutive, not
+indeed in regard to the certainty which both possess à priori, but in
+the mode of evidence thereof, consequently also in the manner of
+demonstration.
+
+But what has been observed of all synthetical propositions, and must be
+particularly remarked in this place, is this, that these analogies
+possess significance and validity, not as principles of the
+transcendental, but only as principles of the empirical use of the
+understanding, and their truth can therefore be proved only as such,
+and that consequently the phenomena must not be subjoined directly
+under the categories, but only under their schemata. For if the objects
+to which those principles must be applied were things in themselves, it
+would be quite impossible to cognize aught concerning them
+synthetically à priori. But they are nothing but phenomena; a complete
+knowledge of which--a knowledge to which all principles à priori must at
+last relate--is the only possible experience. It follows that these
+principles can have nothing else for their aim than the conditions of
+the empirical cognition in the unity of synthesis of phenomena. But
+this synthesis is cogitated only in the schema of the pure conception
+of the understanding, of whose unity, as that of a synthesis in
+general, the category contains the function unrestricted by any
+sensuous condition. These principles will therefore authorize us to
+connect phenomena according to an analogy, with the logical and
+universal unity of conceptions, and consequently to employ the
+categories in the principles themselves; but in the application of them
+to experience, we shall use only their schemata, as the key to their
+proper application, instead of the categories, or rather the latter as
+restricting conditions, under the title of "formulae" of the former.
+
+A. FIRST ANALOGY.
+
+Principle of the Permanence of Substance.
+
+In all changes of phenomena, substance is permanent, and the quantum
+thereof in nature is neither increased nor diminished.
+
+PROOF.
+
+All phenomena exist in time, wherein alone as substratum, that is, as
+the permanent form of the internal intuition, coexistence and
+succession can be represented. Consequently time, in which all changes
+of phenomena must be cogitated, remains and changes not, because it is
+that in which succession and coexistence can be represented only as
+determinations thereof. Now, time in itself cannot be an object of
+perception. It follows that in objects of perception, that is, in
+phenomena, there must be found a substratum which represents time in
+general, and in which all change or coexistence can be perceived by
+means of the relation of phenomena to it. But the substratum of all
+reality, that is, of all that pertains to the existence of things, is
+substance; all that pertains to existence can be cogitated only as a
+determination of substance. Consequently, the permanent, in relation to
+which alone can all relations of time in phenomena be determined, is
+substance in the world of phenomena, that is, the real in phenomena,
+that which, as the substratum of all change, remains ever the same.
+Accordingly, as this cannot change in existence, its quantity in nature
+can neither be increased nor diminished.
+
+Our apprehension of the manifold in a phenomenon is always successive,
+is Consequently always changing. By it alone we could, therefore, never
+determine whether this manifold, as an object of experience, is
+coexistent or successive, unless it had for a foundation something
+fixed and permanent, of the existence of which all succession and
+coexistence are nothing but so many modes (modi of time). Only in the
+permanent, then, are relations of time possible (for simultaneity and
+succession are the only relations in time); that is to say, the
+permanent is the substratum of our empirical representation of time
+itself, in which alone all determination of time is possible.
+Permanence is, in fact, just another expression for time, as the
+abiding correlate of all existence of phenomena, and of all change, and
+of all coexistence. For change does not affect time itself, but only
+the phenomena in time (just as coexistence cannot be regarded as a
+modus of time itself, seeing that in time no parts are coexistent, but
+all successive). If we were to attribute succession to time itself, we
+should be obliged to cogitate another time, in which this succession
+would be possible. It is only by means of the permanent that existence
+in different parts of the successive series of time receives a
+quantity, which we entitle duration. For in mere succession, existence
+is perpetually vanishing and recommencing, and therefore never has even
+the least quantity. Without the permanent, then, no relation in time is
+possible. Now, time in itself is not an object of perception;
+consequently the permanent in phenomena must be regarded as the
+substratum of all determination of time, and consequently also as the
+condition of the possibility of all synthetical unity of perceptions,
+that is, of experience; and all existence and all change in time can
+only be regarded as a mode in the existence of that which abides
+unchangeably. Therefore, in all phenomena, the permanent is the object
+in itself, that is, the substance (phenomenon); but all that changes or
+can change belongs only to the mode of the existence of this substance
+or substances, consequently to its determinations.
+
+I find that in all ages not only the philosopher, but even the common
+understanding, has preposited this permanence as a substratum of all
+change in phenomena; indeed, I am compelled to believe that they will
+always accept this as an indubitable fact. Only the philosopher
+expresses himself in a more precise and definite manner, when he says:
+"In all changes in the world, the substance remains, and the accidents
+alone are changeable." But of this decidedly synthetical proposition, I
+nowhere meet with even an attempt at proof; nay, it very rarely has the
+good fortune to stand, as it deserves to do, at the head of the pure
+and entirely à priori laws of nature. In truth, the statement that
+substance is permanent, is tautological. For this very permanence is
+the ground on which we apply the category of substance to the
+phenomenon; and we should have been obliged to prove that in all
+phenomena there is something permanent, of the existence of which the
+changeable is nothing but a determination. But because a proof of this
+nature cannot be dogmatical, that is, cannot be drawn from conceptions,
+inasmuch as it concerns a synthetical proposition à priori, and as
+philosophers never reflected that such propositions are valid only in
+relation to possible experience, and therefore cannot be proved except
+by means of a deduction of the possibility of experience, it is no
+wonder that while it has served as the foundation of all experience
+(for we feel the need of it in empirical cognition), it has never been
+supported by proof.
+
+A philosopher was asked: "What is the weight of smoke?" He answered:
+"Subtract from the weight of the burnt wood the weight of the remaining
+ashes, and you will have the weight of the smoke." Thus he presumed it
+to be incontrovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) does
+not perish, but that only the form of it undergoes a change. In like
+manner was the saying: "From nothing comes nothing," only another
+inference from the principle or permanence, or rather of the
+ever-abiding existence of the true subject in phenomena. For if that in
+the phenomenon which we call substance is to be the proper substratum
+of all determination of time, it follows that all existence in past as
+well as in future time, must be determinable by means of it alone.
+Hence we are entitled to apply the term substance to a phenomenon, only
+because we suppose its existence in all time, a notion which the word
+permanence does not fully express, as it seems rather to be referable
+to future time. However, the internal necessity perpetually to be, is
+inseparably connected with the necessity always to have been, and so
+the expression may stand as it is. "Gigni de nihilo nihil; in nihilum
+nil posse reverti,"[31] are two propositions which the ancients never
+parted, and which people nowadays sometimes mistakenly disjoin, because
+they imagine that the propositions apply to objects as things in
+themselves, and that the former might be inimical to the dependence
+(even in respect of its substance also) of the world upon a supreme
+cause. But this apprehension is entirely needless, for the question in
+this case is only of phenomena in the sphere of experience, the unity
+of which never could be possible, if we admitted the possibility that
+new things (in respect of their substance) should arise. For in that
+case, we should lose altogether that which alone can represent the
+unity of time, to wit, the identity of the substratum, as that through
+which alone all change possesses complete and thorough unity. This
+permanence is, however, nothing but the manner in which we represent to
+ourselves the existence of things in the phenomenal world.
+
+ [31] Persius, Satirae, iii.83-84.
+
+The determinations of a substance, which are only particular modes of
+its existence, are called accidents. They are always real, because they
+concern the existence of substance (negations are only determinations,
+which express the non-existence of something in the substance). Now, if
+to this real in the substance we ascribe a particular existence (for
+example, to motion as an accident of matter), this existence is called
+inherence, in contradistinction to the existence of substance, which we
+call subsistence. But hence arise many misconceptions, and it would be
+a more accurate and just mode of expression to designate the accident
+only as the mode in which the existence of a substance is positively
+determined. Meanwhile, by reason of the conditions of the logical
+exercise of our understanding, it is impossible to avoid separating, as
+it were, that which in the existence of a substance is subject to
+change, whilst the substance remains, and regarding it in relation to
+that which is properly permanent and radical. On this account, this
+category of substance stands under the title of relation, rather
+because it is the condition thereof than because it contains in itself
+any relation.
+
+Now, upon this notion of permanence rests the proper notion of the
+conception change. Origin and extinction are not changes of that which
+originates or becomes extinct. Change is but a mode of existence, which
+follows on another mode of existence of the same object; hence all that
+changes is permanent, and only the condition thereof changes. Now since
+this mutation affects only determinations, which can have a beginning
+or an end, we may say, employing an expression which seems somewhat
+paradoxical: "Only the permanent (substance) is subject to change; the
+mutable suffers no change, but rather alternation, that is, when
+certain determinations cease, others begin."
+
+Change, when, cannot be perceived by us except in substances, and
+origin or extinction in an absolute sense, that does not concern merely
+a determination of the permanent, cannot be a possible perception, for
+it is this very notion of the permanent which renders possible the
+representation of a transition from one state into another, and from
+non-being to being, which, consequently, can be empirically cognized
+only as alternating determinations of that which is permanent. Grant
+that a thing absolutely begins to be; we must then have a point of time
+in which it was not. But how and by what can we fix and determine this
+point of time, unless by that which already exists? For a void
+time--preceding--is not an object of perception; but if we connect this
+beginning with objects which existed previously, and which continue to
+exist till the object in question in question begins to be, then the
+latter can only be a determination of the former as the permanent. The
+same holds good of the notion of extinction, for this presupposes the
+empirical representation of a time, in which a phenomenon no longer
+exists.
+
+Substances (in the world of phenomena) are the substratum of all
+determinations of time. The beginning of some, and the ceasing to be of
+other substances, would utterly do away with the only condition of the
+empirical unity of time; and in that case phenomena would relate to two
+different times, in which, side by side, existence would pass; which is
+absurd. For there is only one time in which all different times must be
+placed, not as coexistent, but as successive.
+
+Accordingly, permanence is a necessary condition under which alone
+phenomena, as things or objects, are determinable in a possible
+experience. But as regards the empirical criterion of this necessary
+permanence, and with it of the substantiality of phenomena, we shall
+find sufficient opportunity to speak in the sequel.
+
+B. SECOND ANALOGY.
+
+Principle of the Succession of Time According to the Law of Causality.
+All changes take place according to the law of the connection of Cause
+and Effect.
+
+PROOF.
+
+(That all phenomena in the succession of time are only changes, that
+is, a successive being and non-being of the determinations of
+substance, which is permanent; consequently that a being of substance
+itself which follows on the non-being thereof, or a non-being of
+substance which follows on the being thereof, in other words, that the
+origin or extinction of substance itself, is impossible--all this has
+been fully established in treating of the foregoing principle. This
+principle might have been expressed as follows: "All alteration
+(succession) of phenomena is merely change"; for the changes of
+substance are not origin or extinction, because the conception of
+change presupposes the same subject as existing with two opposite
+determinations, and consequently as permanent. After this premonition,
+we shall proceed to the proof.)
+
+I perceive that phenomena succeed one another, that is to say, a state
+of things exists at one time, the opposite of which existed in a former
+state. In this case, then, I really connect together two perceptions in
+time. Now connection is not an operation of mere sense and intuition,
+but is the product of a synthetical faculty of imagination, which
+determines the internal sense in respect of a relation of time. But
+imagination can connect these two states in two ways, so that either
+the one or the other may antecede in time; for time in itself cannot be
+an object of perception, and what in an object precedes and what
+follows cannot be empirically determined in relation to it. I am only
+conscious, then, that my imagination places one state before and the
+other after; not that the one state antecedes the other in the object.
+In other words, the objective relation of the successive phenomena
+remains quite undetermined by means of mere perception. Now in order
+that this relation may be cognized as determined, the relation between
+the two states must be so cogitated that it is thereby determined as
+necessary, which of them must be placed before and which after, and not
+conversely. But the conception which carries with it a necessity of
+synthetical unity, can be none other than a pure conception of the
+understanding which does not lie in mere perception; and in this case
+it is the conception of "the relation of cause and effect," the former
+of which determines the latter in time, as its necessary consequence,
+and not as something which might possibly antecede (or which might in
+some cases not be perceived to follow). It follows that it is only
+because we subject the sequence of phenomena, and consequently all
+change, to the law of causality, that experience itself, that is,
+empirical cognition of phenomena, becomes possible; and consequently,
+that phenomena themselves, as objects of experience, are possible only
+by virtue of this law.
+
+Our apprehension of the manifold of phenomena is always successive. The
+representations of parts succeed one another. Whether they succeed one
+another in the object also, is a second point for reflection, which was
+not contained in the former. Now we may certainly give the name of
+object to everything, even to every representation, so far as we are
+conscious thereof; but what this word may mean in the case of
+phenomena, not merely in so far as they (as representations) are
+objects, but only in so far as they indicate an object, is a question
+requiring deeper consideration. In so far as they, regarded merely as
+representations, are at the same time objects of consciousness, they
+are not to be distinguished from apprehension, that is, reception into
+the synthesis of imagination, and we must therefore say: "The manifold
+of phenomena is always produced successively in the mind." If phenomena
+were things in themselves, no man would be able to conjecture from the
+succession of our representations how this manifold is connected in the
+object; for we have to do only with our representations. How things may
+be in themselves, without regard to the representations through which
+they affect us, is utterly beyond the sphere of our cognition. Now
+although phenomena are not things in themselves, and are nevertheless
+the only thing given to us to be cognized, it is my duty to show what
+sort of connection in time belongs to the manifold in phenomena
+themselves, while the representation of this manifold in apprehension
+is always successive. For example, the apprehension of the manifold in
+the phenomenon of a house which stands before me, is successive. Now
+comes the question whether the manifold of this house is in itself
+successive--which no one will be at all willing to grant. But, so soon
+as I raise my conception of an object to the transcendental
+signification thereof, I find that the house is not a thing in itself,
+but only a phenomenon, that is, a representation, the transcendental
+object of which remains utterly unknown. What then am I to understand
+by the question: "How can the manifold be connected in the phenomenon
+itself--not considered as a thing in itself, but merely as a
+phenomenon?" Here that which lies in my successive apprehension is
+regarded as representation, whilst the phenomenon which is given me,
+notwithstanding that it is nothing more than a complex of these
+representations, is regarded as the object thereof, with which my
+conception, drawn from the representations of apprehension, must
+harmonize. It is very soon seen that, as accordance of the cognition
+with its object constitutes truth, the question now before us can only
+relate to the formal conditions of empirical truth; and that the
+phenomenon, in opposition to the representations of apprehension, can
+only be distinguished therefrom as the object of them, if it is subject
+to a rule which distinguishes it from every other apprehension, and
+which renders necessary a mode of connection of the manifold. That in
+the phenomenon which contains the condition of this necessary rule of
+apprehension, is the object.
+
+Let us now proceed to our task. That something happens, that is to say,
+that something or some state exists which before was not, cannot be
+empirically perceived, unless a phenomenon precedes, which does not
+contain in itself this state. For a reality which should follow upon a
+void time, in other words, a beginning, which no state of things
+precedes, can just as little be apprehended as the void time itself.
+Every apprehension of an event is therefore a perception which follows
+upon another perception. But as this is the case with all synthesis of
+apprehension, as I have shown above in the example of a house, my
+apprehension of an event is not yet sufficiently distinguished from
+other apprehensions. But I remark also that if in a phenomenon which
+contains an occurrence, I call the antecedent state of my perception,
+A, and the following state, B, the perception B can only follow A in
+apprehension, and the perception A cannot follow B, but only precede
+it. For example, I see a ship float down the stream of a river. My
+perception of its place lower down follows upon my perception of its
+place higher up the course of the river, and it is impossible that, in
+the apprehension of this phenomenon, the vessel should be perceived
+first below and afterwards higher up the stream. Here, therefore, the
+order in the sequence of perceptions in apprehension is determined; and
+by this order apprehension is regulated. In the former example, my
+perceptions in the apprehension of a house might begin at the roof and
+end at the foundation, or vice versa; or I might apprehend the manifold
+in this empirical intuition, by going from left to right, and from
+right to left. Accordingly, in the series of these perceptions, there
+was no determined order, which necessitated my beginning at a certain
+point, in order empirically to connect the manifold. But this rule is
+always to be met with in the perception of that which happens, and it
+makes the order of the successive perceptions in the apprehension of
+such a phenomenon necessary.
+
+I must, therefore, in the present case, deduce the subjective sequence
+of apprehension from the objective sequence of phenomena, for otherwise
+the former is quite undetermined, and one phenomenon is not
+distinguishable from another. The former alone proves nothing as to the
+connection of the manifold in an object, for it is quite arbitrary. The
+latter must consist in the order of the manifold in a phenomenon,
+according to which order the apprehension of one thing (that which
+happens) follows that of another thing (which precedes), in conformity
+with a rule. In this way alone can I be authorized to say of the
+phenomenon itself, and not merely of my own apprehension, that a
+certain order or sequence is to be found therein. That is, in other
+words, I cannot arrange my apprehension otherwise than in this order.
+
+In conformity with this rule, then, it is necessary that in that which
+antecedes an event there be found the condition of a rule, according to
+which in this event follows always and necessarily; but I cannot
+reverse this and go back from the event, and determine (by
+apprehension) that which antecedes it. For no phenomenon goes back from
+the succeeding point of time to the preceding point, although it does
+certainly relate to a preceding point of time; from a given time, on
+the other hand, there is always a necessary progression to the
+determined succeeding time. Therefore, because there certainly is
+something that follows, I must of necessity connect it with something
+else, which antecedes, and upon which it follows, in conformity with a
+rule, that is necessarily, so that the event, as conditioned, affords
+certain indication of a condition, and this condition determines the
+event.
+
+Let us suppose that nothing precedes an event, upon which this event
+must follow in conformity with a rule. All sequence of perception would
+then exist only in apprehension, that is to say, would be merely
+subjective, and it could not thereby be objectively determined what
+thing ought to precede, and what ought to follow in perception. In such
+a case, we should have nothing but a play of representations, which
+would possess no application to any object. That is to say, it would
+not be possible through perception to distinguish one phenomenon from
+another, as regards relations of time; because the succession in the
+act of apprehension would always be of the same sort, and therefore
+there would be nothing in the phenomenon to determine the succession,
+and to render a certain sequence objectively necessary. And, in this
+case, I cannot say that two states in a phenomenon follow one upon the
+other, but only that one apprehension follows upon another. But this is
+merely subjective, and does not determine an object, and consequently
+cannot be held to be cognition of an object--not even in the phenomenal
+world.
+
+Accordingly, when we know in experience that something happens, we
+always presuppose that something precedes, whereupon it follows in
+conformity with a rule. For otherwise I could not say of the object
+that it follows; because the mere succession in my apprehension, if it
+be not determined by a rule in relation to something preceding, does
+not authorize succession in the object. Only, therefore, in reference
+to a rule, according to which phenomena are determined in their
+sequence, that is, as they happen, by the preceding state, can I make
+my subjective synthesis (of apprehension) objective, and it is only
+under this presupposition that even the experience of an event is
+possible.
+
+No doubt it appears as if this were in thorough contradiction to all
+the notions which people have hitherto entertained in regard to the
+procedure of the human understanding. According to these opinions, it
+is by means of the perception and comparison of similar consequences
+following upon certain antecedent phenomena that the understanding is
+led to the discovery of a rule, according to which certain events
+always follow certain phenomena, and it is only by this process that we
+attain to the conception of cause. Upon such a basis, it is clear that
+this conception must be merely empirical, and the rule which it
+furnishes us with--"Everything that happens must have a cause"--would be
+just as contingent as experience itself. The universality and necessity
+of the rule or law would be perfectly spurious attributes of it.
+Indeed, it could not possess universal validity, inasmuch as it would
+not in this case be à priori, but founded on deduction. But the same is
+the case with this law as with other pure à priori representations
+(e.g., space and time), which we can draw in perfect clearness and
+completeness from experience, only because we had already placed them
+therein, and by that means, and by that alone, had rendered experience
+possible. Indeed, the logical clearness of this representation of a
+rule, determining the series of events, is possible only when we have
+made use thereof in experience. Nevertheless, the recognition of this
+rule, as a condition of the synthetical unity of phenomena in time, was
+the ground of experience itself and consequently preceded it à priori.
+
+It is now our duty to show by an example that we never, even in
+experience, attribute to an object the notion of succession or effect
+(of an event--that is, the happening of something that did not exist
+before), and distinguish it from the subjective succession of
+apprehension, unless when a rule lies at the foundation, which compels
+us to observe this order of perception in preference to any other, and
+that, indeed, it is this necessity which first renders possible the
+representation of a succession in the object.
+
+We have representations within us, of which also we can be conscious.
+But, however widely extended, however accurate and thoroughgoing this
+consciousness may be, these representations are still nothing more than
+representations, that is, internal determinations of the mind in this
+or that relation of time. Now how happens it that to these
+representations we should set an object, or that, in addition to their
+subjective reality, as modifications, we should still further attribute
+to them a certain unknown objective reality? It is clear that objective
+significancy cannot consist in a relation to another representation (of
+that which we desire to term object), for in that case the question
+again arises: "How does this other representation go out of itself, and
+obtain objective significancy over and above the subjective, which is
+proper to it, as a determination of a state of mind?" If we try to
+discover what sort of new property the relation to an object gives to
+our subjective representations, and what new importance they thereby
+receive, we shall find that this relation has no other effect than that
+of rendering necessary the connection of our representations in a
+certain manner, and of subjecting them to a rule; and that conversely,
+it is only because a certain order is necessary in the relations of
+time of our representations, that objective significancy is ascribed to
+them.
+
+In the synthesis of phenomena, the manifold of our representations is
+always successive. Now hereby is not represented an object, for by
+means of this succession, which is common to all apprehension, no one
+thing is distinguished from another. But so soon as I perceive or
+assume that in this succession there is a relation to a state
+antecedent, from which the representation follows in accordance with a
+rule, so soon do I represent something as an event, or as a thing that
+happens; in other words, I cognize an object to which I must assign a
+certain determinate position in time, which cannot be altered, because
+of the preceding state in the object. When, therefore, I perceive that
+something happens, there is contained in this representation, in the
+first place, the fact, that something antecedes; because, it is only in
+relation to this that the phenomenon obtains its proper relation of
+time, in other words, exists after an antecedent time, in which it did
+not exist. But it can receive its determined place in time only by the
+presupposition that something existed in the foregoing state, upon
+which it follows inevitably and always, that is, in conformity with a
+rule. From all this it is evident that, in the first place, I cannot
+reverse the order of succession, and make that which happens precede
+that upon which it follows; and that, in the second place, if the
+antecedent state be posited, a certain determinate event inevitably and
+necessarily follows. Hence it follows that there exists a certain order
+in our representations, whereby the present gives a sure indication of
+some previously existing state, as a correlate, though still
+undetermined, of the existing event which is given--a correlate which
+itself relates to the event as its consequence, conditions it, and
+connects it necessarily with itself in the series of time.
+
+If then it be admitted as a necessary law of sensibility, and
+consequently a formal condition of all perception, that the preceding
+necessarily determines the succeeding time (inasmuch as I cannot arrive
+at the succeeding except through the preceding), it must likewise be an
+indispensable law of empirical representation of the series of time
+that the phenomena of the past determine all phenomena in the
+succeeding time, and that the latter, as events, cannot take place,
+except in so far as the former determine their existence in time, that
+is to say, establish it according to a rule. For it is of course only
+in phenomena that we can empirically cognize this continuity in the
+connection of times.
+
+For all experience and for the possibility of experience, understanding
+is indispensable, and the first step which it takes in this sphere is
+not to render the representation of objects clear, but to render the
+representation of an object in general, possible. It does this by
+applying the order of time to phenomena, and their existence. In other
+words, it assigns to each phenomenon, as a consequence, a place in
+relation to preceding phenomena, determined à priori in time, without
+which it could not harmonize with time itself, which determines a place
+à priori to all its parts. This determination of place cannot be
+derived from the relation of phenomena to absolute time (for it is not
+an object of perception); but, on the contrary, phenomena must
+reciprocally determine the places in time of one another, and render
+these necessary in the order of time. In other words, whatever follows
+or happens, must follow in conformity with a universal rule upon that
+which was contained in the foregoing state. Hence arises a series of
+phenomena, which, by means of the understanding, produces and renders
+necessary exactly the same order and continuous connection in the
+series of our possible perceptions, as is found à priori in the form of
+internal intuition (time), in which all our perceptions must have
+place.
+
+That something happens, then, is a perception which belongs to a
+possible experience, which becomes real only because I look upon the
+phenomenon as determined in regard to its place in time, consequently
+as an object, which can always be found by means of a rule in the
+connected series of my perceptions. But this rule of the determination
+of a thing according to succession in time is as follows: "In what
+precedes may be found the condition, under which an event always (that
+is, necessarily) follows." From all this it is obvious that the
+principle of cause and effect is the principle of possible experience,
+that is, of objective cognition of phenomena, in regard to their
+relations in the succession of time.
+
+The proof of this fundamental proposition rests entirely on the
+following momenta of argument. To all empirical cognition belongs the
+synthesis of the manifold by the imagination, a synthesis which is
+always successive, that is, in which the representations therein always
+follow one another. But the order of succession in imagination is not
+determined, and the series of successive representations may be taken
+retrogressively as well as progressively. But if this synthesis is a
+synthesis of apprehension (of the manifold of a given phenomenon), then
+the order is determined in the object, or to speak more accurately,
+there is therein an order of successive synthesis which determines an
+object, and according to which something necessarily precedes, and when
+this is posited, something else necessarily follows. If, then, my
+perception is to contain the cognition of an event, that is, of
+something which really happens, it must be an empirical judgement,
+wherein we think that the succession is determined; that is, it
+presupposes another phenomenon, upon which this event follows
+necessarily, or in conformity with a rule. If, on the contrary, when I
+posited the antecedent, the event did not necessarily follow, I should
+be obliged to consider it merely as a subjective play of my
+imagination, and if in this I represented to myself anything as
+objective, I must look upon it as a mere dream. Thus, the relation of
+phenomena (as possible perceptions), according to which that which
+happens is, as to its existence, necessarily determined in time by
+something which antecedes, in conformity with a rule--in other words,
+the relation of cause and effect--is the condition of the objective
+validity of our empirical judgements in regard to the sequence of
+perceptions, consequently of their empirical truth, and therefore of
+experience. The principle of the relation of causality in the
+succession of phenomena is therefore valid for all objects of
+experience, because it is itself the ground of the possibility of
+experience.
+
+Here, however, a difficulty arises, which must be resolved. The
+principle of the connection of causality among phenomena is limited in
+our formula to the succession thereof, although in practice we find
+that the principle applies also when the phenomena exist together in
+the same time, and that cause and effect may be simultaneous. For
+example, there is heat in a room, which does not exist in the open air.
+I look about for the cause, and find it to be the fire, Now the fire as
+the cause is simultaneous with its effect, the heat of the room. In
+this case, then, there is no succession as regards time, between cause
+and effect, but they are simultaneous; and still the law holds good.
+The greater part of operating causes in nature are simultaneous with
+their effects, and the succession in time of the latter is produced
+only because the cause cannot achieve the total of its effect in one
+moment. But at the moment when the effect first arises, it is always
+simultaneous with the causality of its cause, because, if the cause had
+but a moment before ceased to be, the effect could not have arisen.
+Here it must be specially remembered that we must consider the order of
+time and not the lapse thereof. The relation remains, even though no
+time has elapsed. The time between the causality of the cause and its
+immediate effect may entirely vanish, and the cause and effect be thus
+simultaneous, but the relation of the one to the other remains always
+determinable according to time. If, for example, I consider a leaden
+ball, which lies upon a cushion and makes a hollow in it, as a cause,
+then it is simultaneous with the effect. But I distinguish the two
+through the relation of time of the dynamical connection of both. For
+if I lay the ball upon the cushion, then the hollow follows upon the
+before smooth surface; but supposing the cushion has, from some cause
+or another, a hollow, there does not thereupon follow a leaden ball.
+
+Thus, the law of succession of time is in all instances the only
+empirical criterion of effect in relation to the causality of the
+antecedent cause. The glass is the cause of the rising of the water
+above its horizontal surface, although the two phenomena are
+contemporaneous. For, as soon as I draw some water with the glass from
+a larger vessel, an effect follows thereupon, namely, the change of the
+horizontal state which the water had in the large vessel into a
+concave, which it assumes in the glass.
+
+This conception of causality leads us to the conception of action; that
+of action, to the conception of force; and through it, to the
+conception of substance. As I do not wish this critical essay, the sole
+purpose of which is to treat of the sources of our synthetical
+cognition à priori, to be crowded with analyses which merely explain,
+but do not enlarge the sphere of our conceptions, I reserve the
+detailed explanation of the above conceptions for a future system of
+pure reason. Such an analysis, indeed, executed with great
+particularity, may already be found in well-known works on this
+subject. But I cannot at present refrain from making a few remarks on
+the empirical criterion of a substance, in so far as it seems to be
+more evident and more easily recognized through the conception of
+action than through that of the permanence of a phenomenon.
+
+Where action (consequently activity and force) exists, substance also
+must exist, and in it alone must be sought the seat of that fruitful
+source of phenomena. Very well. But if we are called upon to explain
+what we mean by substance, and wish to avoid the vice of reasoning in a
+circle, the answer is by no means so easy. How shall we conclude
+immediately from the action to the permanence of that which acts, this
+being nevertheless an essential and peculiar criterion of substance
+(phenomenon)? But after what has been said above, the solution of this
+question becomes easy enough, although by the common mode of
+procedure--merely analysing our conceptions--it would be quite
+impossible. The conception of action indicates the relation of the
+subject of causality to the effect. Now because all effect consists in
+that which happens, therefore in the changeable, the last subject
+thereof is the permanent, as the substratum of all that changes, that
+is, substance. For according to the principle of causality, actions are
+always the first ground of all change in phenomena and, consequently,
+cannot be a property of a subject which itself changes, because if this
+were the case, other actions and another subject would be necessary to
+determine this change. From all this it results that action alone, as
+an empirical criterion, is a sufficient proof of the presence of
+substantiality, without any necessity on my part of endeavouring to
+discover the permanence of substance by a comparison. Besides, by this
+mode of induction we could not attain to the completeness which the
+magnitude and strict universality of the conception requires. For that
+the primary subject of the causality of all arising and passing away,
+all origin and extinction, cannot itself (in the sphere of phenomena)
+arise and pass away, is a sound and safe conclusion, a conclusion which
+leads us to the conception of empirical necessity and permanence in
+existence, and consequently to the conception of a substance as
+phenomenon.
+
+When something happens, the mere fact of the occurrence, without regard
+to that which occurs, is an object requiring investigation. The
+transition from the non-being of a state into the existence of it,
+supposing that this state contains no quality which previously existed
+in the phenomenon, is a fact of itself demanding inquiry. Such an
+event, as has been shown in No. A, does not concern substance (for
+substance does not thus originate), but its condition or state. It is
+therefore only change, and not origin from nothing. If this origin be
+regarded as the effect of a foreign cause, it is termed creation, which
+cannot be admitted as an event among phenomena, because the very
+possibility of it would annihilate the unity of experience. If,
+however, I regard all things not as phenomena, but as things in
+themselves and objects of understanding alone, they, although
+substances, may be considered as dependent, in respect of their
+existence, on a foreign cause. But this would require a very different
+meaning in the words, a meaning which could not apply to phenomena as
+objects of possible experience.
+
+How a thing can be changed, how it is possible that upon one state
+existing in one point of time, an opposite state should follow in
+another point of time--of this we have not the smallest conception à
+priori. There is requisite for this the knowledge of real powers, which
+can only be given empirically; for example, knowledge of moving forces,
+or, in other words, of certain successive phenomena (as movements)
+which indicate the presence of such forces. But the form of every
+change, the condition under which alone it can take place as the coming
+into existence of another state (be the content of the change, that is,
+the state which is changed, what it may), and consequently the
+succession of the states themselves can very well be considered à
+priori, in relation to the law of causality and the conditions of
+time.[32]
+
+ [32] It must be remarked that I do not speak of the change of certain
+ relations, but of the change of the state. Thus, when a body moves in
+ a uniform manner, it does not change its state (of motion); but only
+ when all motion increases or decreases.
+
+When a substance passes from one state, a, into another state, b, the
+point of time in which the latter exists is different from, and
+subsequent to that in which the former existed. In like manner, the
+second state, as reality (in the phenomenon), differs from the first,
+in which the reality of the second did not exist, as b from zero. That
+is to say, if the state, b, differs from the state, a, only in respect
+to quantity, the change is a coming into existence of b -a, which in
+the former state did not exist, and in relation to which that state is
+= O.
+
+Now the question arises how a thing passes from one state = a, into
+another state = b. Between two moments there is always a certain time,
+and between two states existing in these moments there is always a
+difference having a certain quantity (for all parts of phenomena are
+in their turn quantities). Consequently, every transition from one
+state into another, is always effected in a time contained between
+two moments, of which the first determines the state which the thing
+leaves, and the second determines the state into which the thing
+passes. Both moments, then, are limitations of the time of a change,
+consequently of the intermediate state between both, and as such they
+belong to the total of the change. Now every change has a cause, which
+evidences its causality in the whole time during which the charge takes
+place. The cause, therefore, does not produce the change all at once or
+in one moment, but in a time, so that, as the time gradually increases
+from the commencing instant, a, to its completion at b, in like manner
+also, the quantity of the reality (b - a) is generated through the
+lesser degrees which are contained between the first and last. All
+change is therefore possible only through a continuous action of the
+causality, which, in so far as it is uniform, we call a momentum. The
+change does not consist of these momenta, but is generated or produced
+by them as their effect.
+
+Such is the law of the continuity of all change, the ground of which is
+that neither time itself nor any phenomenon in time consists of parts
+which are the smallest possible, but that, notwithstanding, the state
+of a thing passes in the process of a change through all these parts,
+as elements, to its second state. There is no smallest degree of
+reality in a phenomenon, just as there is no smallest degree in the
+quantity of time; and so the new state of reality grows up out of the
+former state, through all the infinite degrees thereof, the differences
+of which one from another, taken all together, are less than the
+difference between 0 and a.
+
+It is not our business to inquire here into the utility of this
+principle in the investigation of nature. But how such a proposition,
+which appears so greatly to extend our knowledge of nature, is possible
+completely à priori, is indeed a question which deserves investigation,
+although the first view seems to demonstrate the truth and reality of
+the principle, and the question, how it is possible, may be considered
+superfluous. For there are so many groundless pretensions to the
+enlargement of our knowledge by pure reason that we must take it as a
+general rule to be mistrustful of all such, and without a thoroughgoing
+and radical deduction, to believe nothing of the sort even on the
+clearest dogmatical evidence.
+
+Every addition to our empirical knowledge, and every advance made in
+the exercise of our perception, is nothing more than an extension of
+the determination of the internal sense, that is to say, a progression
+in time, be objects themselves what they may, phenomena, or pure
+intuitions. This progression in time determines everything, and is
+itself determined by nothing else. That is to say, the parts of the
+progression exist only in time, and by means of the synthesis thereof,
+and are not given antecedently to it. For this reason, every transition
+in perception to anything which follows upon another in time, is a
+determination of time by means of the production of this perception.
+And as this determination of time is, always and in all its parts, a
+quantity, the perception produced is to be considered as a quantity
+which proceeds through all its degrees--no one of which is the smallest
+possible--from zero up to its determined degree. From this we perceive
+the possibility of cognizing à priori a law of changes--a law, however,
+which concerns their form merely. We merely anticipate our own
+apprehension, the formal condition of which, inasmuch as it is itself
+to be found in the mind antecedently to all given phenomena, must
+certainly be capable of being cognized à priori.
+
+Thus, as time contains the sensuous condition à priori of the
+possibility of a continuous progression of that which exists to that
+which follows it, the understanding, by virtue of the unity of
+apperception, contains the condition à priori of the possibility of a
+continuous determination of the position in time of all phenomena, and
+this by means of the series of causes and effects, the former of which
+necessitate the sequence of the latter, and thereby render universally
+and for all time, and by consequence, objectively, valid the empirical
+cognition of the relations of time.
+
+C. THIRD ANALOGY.
+
+Principle of Coexistence, According to the Law of Reciprocity or
+Community.
+
+All substances, in so far as they can be perceived in space at the same
+time, exist in a state of complete reciprocity of action.
+
+PROOF.
+
+Things are coexistent, when in empirical intuition the perception of
+the one can follow upon the perception of the other, and vice
+versa--which cannot occur in the succession of phenomena, as we have
+shown in the explanation of the second principle. Thus I can perceive
+the moon and then the earth, or conversely, first the earth and then
+the moon; and for the reason that my perceptions of these objects can
+reciprocally follow each other, I say, they exist contemporaneously.
+Now coexistence is the existence of the manifold in the same time. But
+time itself is not an object of perception; and therefore we cannot
+conclude from the fact that things are placed in the same time, the
+other fact, that the perception of these things can follow each other
+reciprocally. The synthesis of the imagination in apprehension would
+only present to us each of these perceptions as present in the subject
+when the other is not present, and contrariwise; but would not show
+that the objects are coexistent, that is to say, that, if the one
+exists, the other also exists in the same time, and that this is
+necessarily so, in order that the perceptions may be capable of
+following each other reciprocally. It follows that a conception of the
+understanding or category of the reciprocal sequence of the
+determinations of phenomena (existing, as they do, apart from each
+other, and yet contemporaneously), is requisite to justify us in saying
+that the reciprocal succession of perceptions has its foundation in the
+object, and to enable us to represent coexistence as objective. But
+that relation of substances in which the one contains determinations
+the ground of which is in the other substance, is the relation of
+influence. And, when this influence is reciprocal, it is the relation
+of community or reciprocity. Consequently the coexistence of substances
+in space cannot be cognized in experience otherwise than under the
+precondition of their reciprocal action. This is therefore the
+condition of the possibility of things themselves as objects of
+experience.
+
+Things are coexistent, in so far as they exist in one and the same
+time. But how can we know that they exist in one and the same time?
+Only by observing that the order in the synthesis of apprehension of
+the manifold is arbitrary and a matter of indifference, that is to say,
+that it can proceed from A, through B, C, D, to E, or contrariwise from
+E to A. For if they were successive in time (and in the order, let us
+suppose, which begins with A), it is quite impossible for the
+apprehension in perception to begin with E and go backwards to A,
+inasmuch as A belongs to past time and, therefore, cannot be an object
+of apprehension.
+
+Let us assume that in a number of substances considered as phenomena
+each is completely isolated, that is, that no one acts upon another.
+Then I say that the coexistence of these cannot be an object of
+possible perception and that the existence of one cannot, by any mode
+of empirical synthesis, lead us to the existence of another. For we
+imagine them in this case to be separated by a completely void space,
+and thus perception, which proceeds from the one to the other in time,
+would indeed determine their existence by means of a following
+perception, but would be quite unable to distinguish whether the one
+phenomenon follows objectively upon the first, or is coexistent with
+it.
+
+Besides the mere fact of existence, then, there must be something by
+means of which A determines the position of B in time and, conversely,
+B the position of A; because only under this condition can substances
+be empirically represented as existing contemporaneously. Now that
+alone determines the position of another thing in time which is the
+cause of it or of its determinations. Consequently every substance
+(inasmuch as it can have succession predicated of it only in respect of
+its determinations) must contain the causality of certain
+determinations in another substance, and at the same time the effects
+of the causality of the other in itself. That is to say, substances
+must stand (mediately or immediately) in dynamical community with each
+other, if coexistence is to be cognized in any possible experience.
+But, in regard to objects of experience, that is absolutely necessary
+without which the experience of these objects would itself be
+impossible. Consequently it is absolutely necessary that all substances
+in the world of phenomena, in so far as they are coexistent, stand in a
+relation of complete community of reciprocal action to each other.
+
+The word community has in our language[33] two meanings, and contains
+the two notions conveyed in the Latin communio and commercium. We
+employ it in this place in the latter sense--that of a dynamical
+community, without which even the community of place (communio spatii)
+could not be empirically cognized. In our experiences it is easy to
+observe that it is only the continuous influences in all parts of space
+that can conduct our senses from one object to another; that the light
+which plays between our eyes and the heavenly bodies produces a
+mediating community between them and us, and thereby evidences their
+coexistence with us; that we cannot empirically change our position
+(perceive this change), unless the existence of matter throughout the
+whole of space rendered possible the perception of the positions we
+occupy; and that this perception can prove the contemporaneous
+existence of these places only through their reciprocal influence, and
+thereby also the coexistence of even the most remote objects--although
+in this case the proof is only mediate. Without community, every
+perception (of a phenomenon in space) is separated from every other and
+isolated, and the chain of empirical representations, that is, of
+experience, must, with the appearance of a new object, begin entirely
+de novo, without the least connection with preceding representations,
+and without standing towards these even in the relation of time. My
+intention here is by no means to combat the notion of empty space; for
+it may exist where our perceptions cannot exist, inasmuch as they
+cannot reach thereto, and where, therefore, no empirical perception of
+coexistence takes place. But in this case it is not an object of
+possible experience.
+
+ [33] German
+
+The following remarks may be useful in the way of explanation. In the
+mind, all phenomena, as contents of a possible experience, must exist
+in community (communio) of apperception or consciousness, and in so far
+as it is requisite that objects be represented as coexistent and
+connected, in so far must they reciprocally determine the position in
+time of each other and thereby constitute a whole. If this subjective
+community is to rest upon an objective basis, or to be applied to
+substances as phenomena, the perception of one substance must render
+possible the perception of another, and conversely. For otherwise
+succession, which is always found in perceptions as apprehensions,
+would be predicated of external objects, and their representation of
+their coexistence be thus impossible. But this is a reciprocal
+influence, that is to say, a real community (commercium) of substances,
+without which therefore the empirical relation of coexistence would be
+a notion beyond the reach of our minds. By virtue of this commercium,
+phenomena, in so far as they are apart from, and nevertheless in
+connection with each other, constitute a compositum reale. Such
+composita are possible in many different ways. The three dynamical
+relations then, from which all others spring, are those of inherence,
+consequence, and composition.
+
+These, then, are the three analogies of experience. They are nothing
+more than principles of the determination of the existence of phenomena
+in time, according to the three modi of this determination; to wit, the
+relation to time itself as a quantity (the quantity of existence, that
+is, duration), the relation in time as a series or succession, finally,
+the relation in time as the complex of all existence (simultaneity).
+This unity of determination in regard to time is thoroughly dynamical;
+that is to say, time is not considered as that in which experience
+determines immediately to every existence its position; for this is
+impossible, inasmuch as absolute time is not an object of perception,
+by means of which phenomena can be connected with each other. On the
+contrary, the rule of the understanding, through which alone the
+existence of phenomena can receive synthetical unity as regards
+relations of time, determines for every phenomenon its position in
+time, and consequently à priori, and with validity for all and every
+time.
+
+By nature, in the empirical sense of the word, we understand the
+totality of phenomena connected, in respect of their existence,
+according to necessary rules, that is, laws. There are therefore
+certain laws (which are moreover à priori) which make nature possible;
+and all empirical laws can exist only by means of experience, and by
+virtue of those primitive laws through which experience itself becomes
+possible. The purpose of the analogies is therefore to represent to us
+the unity of nature in the connection of all phenomena under certain
+exponents, the only business of which is to express the relation of
+time (in so far as it contains all existence in itself) to the unity of
+apperception, which can exist in synthesis only according to rules. The
+combined expression of all is this: "All phenomena exist in one nature,
+and must so exist, inasmuch as without this à priori unity, no unity of
+experience, and consequently no determination of objects in experience,
+is possible."
+
+As regards the mode of proof which we have employed in treating of
+these transcendental laws of nature, and the peculiar character of
+it we must make one remark, which will at the same time be important
+as a guide in every other attempt to demonstrate the truth of
+intellectual and likewise synthetical propositions à priori. Had we
+endeavoured to prove these analogies dogmatically, that is, from
+conceptions; that is to say, had we employed this method in attempting
+to show that everything which exists, exists only in that which is
+permanent--that every thing or event presupposes the existence of
+something in a preceding state, upon which it follows in conformity
+with a rule--lastly, that in the manifold, which is coexistent, the
+states coexist in connection with each other according to a rule, all
+our labour would have been utterly in vain. For mere conceptions of
+things, analyse them as we may, cannot enable us to conclude from the
+existence of one object to the existence of another. What other course
+was left for us to pursue? This only, to demonstrate the possibility
+of experience as a cognition in which at last all objects must be
+capable of being presented to us, if the representation of them is
+to possess any objective reality. Now in this third, this mediating
+term, the essential form of which consists in the synthetical unity
+of the apperception of all phenomena, we found à priori conditions
+of the universal and necessary determination as to time of all
+existences in the world of phenomena, without which the empirical
+determination thereof as to time would itself be impossible, and we
+also discovered rules of synthetical unity à priori, by means of
+which we could anticipate experience. For want of this method, and
+from the fancy that it was possible to discover a dogmatical proof
+of the synthetical propositions which are requisite in the empirical
+employment of the understanding, has it happened that a proof of the
+principle of sufficient reason has been so often attempted, and always
+in vain. The other two analogies nobody has ever thought of, although
+they have always been silently employed by the mind,[34] because the
+guiding thread furnished by the categories was wanting, the guide which
+alone can enable us to discover every hiatus, both in the system of
+conceptions and of principles.
+
+ [34] The unity of the universe, in which all phenomena to be
+ connected, is evidently a mere consequence of the admitted principle
+ of the community of all substances which are coexistent. For were
+ substances isolated, they could not as parts constitute a whole, and
+ were their connection (reciprocal action of the manifold) not
+ necessary from the very fact of coexistence, we could not conclude
+ from the fact of the latter as a merely ideal relation to the former
+ as a real one. We have, however, shown in its place that community is
+ the proper ground of the possibility of an empirical cognition of
+ coexistence, and that we may therefore properly reason from the latter
+ to the former as its condition.
+
+4. THE POSTULATES OF EMPIRICAL THOUGHT.
+
+1. That which agrees with the formal conditions (intuition and
+conception) of experience, is possible.
+
+2. That which coheres with the material conditions of experience
+(sensation), is real.
+
+3. That whose coherence with the real is determined according to
+universal conditions of experience is (exists) necessary.
+
+Explanation.
+
+The categories of modality possess this peculiarity, that they do not
+in the least determine the object, or enlarge the conception to which
+they are annexed as predicates, but only express its relation to the
+faculty of cognition. Though my conception of a thing is in itself
+complete, I am still entitled to ask whether the object of it is merely
+possible, or whether it is also real, or, if the latter, whether it is
+also necessary. But hereby the object itself is not more definitely
+determined in thought, but the question is only in what relation it,
+including all its determinations, stands to the understanding and its
+employment in experience, to the empirical faculty of judgement, and to
+the reason of its application to experience.
+
+For this very reason, too, the categories of modality are nothing more
+than explanations of the conceptions of possibility, reality, and
+necessity, as employed in experience, and at the same time,
+restrictions of all the categories to empirical use alone, not
+authorizing the transcendental employment of them. For if they are to
+have something more than a merely logical significance, and to be
+something more than a mere analytical expression of the form of
+thought, and to have a relation to things and their possibility,
+reality, or necessity, they must concern possible experience and its
+synthetical unity, in which alone objects of cognition can be given.
+
+The postulate of the possibility of things requires also, that the
+conception of the things agree with the formal conditions of our
+experience in general. But this, that is to say, the objective form of
+experience, contains all the kinds of synthesis which are requisite for
+the cognition of objects. A conception which contains a synthesis must
+be regarded as empty and, without reference to an object, if its
+synthesis does not belong to experience--either as borrowed from it, and
+in this case it is called an empirical conception, or such as is the
+ground and à priori condition of experience (its form), and in this
+case it is a pure conception, a conception which nevertheless belongs
+to experience, inasmuch as its object can be found in this alone. For
+where shall we find the criterion or character of the possibility of an
+object which is cogitated by means of an à priori synthetical
+conception, if not in the synthesis which constitutes the form of
+empirical cognition of objects? That in such a conception no
+contradiction exists is indeed a necessary logical condition, but very
+far from being sufficient to establish the objective reality of the
+conception, that is, the possibility of such an object as is thought in
+the conception. Thus, in the conception of a figure which is contained
+within two straight lines, there is no contradiction, for the
+conceptions of two straight lines and of their junction contain no
+negation of a figure. The impossibility in such a case does not rest
+upon the conception in itself, but upon the construction of it in
+space, that is to say, upon the conditions of space and its
+determinations. But these have themselves objective reality, that is,
+they apply to possible things, because they contain à priori the form
+of experience in general.
+
+And now we shall proceed to point out the extensive utility and
+influence of this postulate of possibility. When I represent to myself
+a thing that is permanent, so that everything in it which changes
+belongs merely to its state or condition, from such a conception alone
+I never can cognize that such a thing is possible. Or, if I represent
+to myself something which is so constituted that, when it is posited,
+something else follows always and infallibly, my thought contains no
+self-contradiction; but whether such a property as causality is to be
+found in any possible thing, my thought alone affords no means of
+judging. Finally, I can represent to myself different things
+(substances) which are so constituted that the state or condition of
+one causes a change in the state of the other, and reciprocally; but
+whether such a relation is a property of things cannot be perceived
+from these conceptions, which contain a merely arbitrary synthesis.
+Only from the fact, therefore, that these conceptions express à priori
+the relations of perceptions in every experience, do we know that they
+possess objective reality, that is, transcendental truth; and that
+independent of experience, though not independent of all relation to
+form of an experience in general and its synthetical unity, in which
+alone objects can be empirically cognized.
+
+But when we fashion to ourselves new conceptions of substances, forces,
+action, and reaction, from the material presented to us by perception,
+without following the example of experience in their connection, we
+create mere chimeras, of the possibility of which we cannot discover
+any criterion, because we have not taken experience for our
+instructress, though we have borrowed the conceptions from her. Such
+fictitious conceptions derive their character of possibility not, like
+the categories, à priori, as conceptions on which all experience
+depends, but only, à posteriori, as conceptions given by means of
+experience itself, and their possibility must either be cognized à
+posteriori and empirically, or it cannot be cognized at all. A
+substance which is permanently present in space, yet without filling it
+(like that tertium quid between matter and the thinking subject which
+some have tried to introduce into metaphysics), or a peculiar
+fundamental power of the mind of intuiting the future by anticipation
+(instead of merely inferring from past and present events), or,
+finally, a power of the mind to place itself in community of thought
+with other men, however distant they may be--these are conceptions the
+possibility of which has no ground to rest upon. For they are not based
+upon experience and its known laws; and, without experience, they are a
+merely arbitrary conjunction of thoughts, which, though containing no
+internal contradiction, has no claim to objective reality, neither,
+consequently, to the possibility of such an object as is thought in
+these conceptions. As far as concerns reality, it is self-evident that
+we cannot cogitate such a possibility in concreto without the aid of
+experience; because reality is concerned only with sensation, as the
+matter of experience, and not with the form of thought, with which we
+can no doubt indulge in shaping fancies.
+
+But I pass by everything which derives its possibility from reality in
+experience, and I purpose treating here merely of the possibility of
+things by means of à priori conceptions. I maintain, then, that the
+possibility of things is not derived from such conceptions per se, but
+only when considered as formal and objective conditions of an
+experience in general.
+
+It seems, indeed, as if the possibility of a triangle could be cognized
+from the conception of it alone (which is certainly independent of
+experience); for we can certainly give to the conception a
+corresponding object completely à priori, that is to say, we can
+construct it. But as a triangle is only the form of an object, it must
+remain a mere product of the imagination, and the possibility of the
+existence of an object corresponding to it must remain doubtful, unless
+we can discover some other ground, unless we know that the figure can
+be cogitated under the conditions upon which all objects of experience
+rest. Now, the facts that space is a formal condition à priori of
+external experience, that the formative synthesis, by which we
+construct a triangle in imagination, is the very same as that we employ
+in the apprehension of a phenomenon for the purpose of making an
+empirical conception of it, are what alone connect the notion of the
+possibility of such a thing, with the conception of it. In the same
+manner, the possibility of continuous quantities, indeed of quantities
+in general, for the conceptions of them are without exception
+synthetical, is never evident from the conceptions in themselves, but
+only when they are considered as the formal conditions of the
+determination of objects in experience. And where, indeed, should we
+look for objects to correspond to our conceptions, if not in
+experience, by which alone objects are presented to us? It is, however,
+true that without antecedent experience we can cognize and characterize
+the possibility of things, relatively to the formal conditions, under
+which something is determined in experience as an object, consequently,
+completely à priori. But still this is possible only in relation to
+experience and within its limits.
+
+The postulate concerning the cognition of the reality of things
+requires perception, consequently conscious sensation, not indeed
+immediately, that is, of the object itself, whose existence is to be
+cognized, but still that the object have some connection with a real
+perception, in accordance with the analogies of experience, which
+exhibit all kinds of real connection in experience.
+
+From the mere conception of a thing it is impossible to conclude its
+existence. For, let the conception be ever so complete, and containing
+a statement of all the determinations of the thing, the existence of it
+has nothing to do with all this, but only with the question whether
+such a thing is given, so that the perception of it can in every case
+precede the conception. For the fact that the conception of it precedes
+the perception, merely indicates the possibility of its existence; it
+is perception which presents matter to the conception, that is the sole
+criterion of reality. Prior to the perception of the thing, however,
+and therefore comparatively à priori, we are able to cognize its
+existence, provided it stands in connection with some perceptions
+according to the principles of the empirical conjunction of these, that
+is, in conformity with the analogies of perception. For, in this case,
+the existence of the supposed thing is connected with our perception in
+a possible experience, and we are able, with the guidance of these
+analogies, to reason in the series of possible perceptions from a thing
+which we do really perceive to the thing we do not perceive. Thus, we
+cognize the existence of a magnetic matter penetrating all bodies from
+the perception of the attraction of the steel-filings by the magnet,
+although the constitution of our organs renders an immediate perception
+of this matter impossible for us. For, according to the laws of
+sensibility and the connected context of our perceptions, we should in
+an experience come also on an immediate empirical intuition of this
+matter, if our senses were more acute--but this obtuseness has no
+influence upon and cannot alter the form of possible experience in
+general. Our knowledge of the existence of things reaches as far as our
+perceptions, and what may be inferred from them according to empirical
+laws, extend. If we do not set out from experience, or do not proceed
+according to the laws of the empirical connection of phenomena, our
+pretensions to discover the existence of a thing which we do not
+immediately perceive are vain. Idealism, however, brings forward
+powerful objections to these rules for proving existence mediately.
+This is, therefore, the proper place for its refutation.
+
+REFUTATION OF IDEALISM.
+
+Idealism--I mean material idealism--is the theory which declares the
+existence of objects in space without us to be either () doubtful and
+indemonstrable, or (2) false and impossible. The first is the
+problematical idealism of Descartes, who admits the undoubted certainty
+of only one empirical assertion (assertio), to wit, "I am." The second
+is the dogmatical idealism of Berkeley, who maintains that space,
+together with all the objects of which it is the inseparable condition,
+is a thing which is in itself impossible, and that consequently the
+objects in space are mere products of the imagination. The dogmatical
+theory of idealism is unavoidable, if we regard space as a property of
+things in themselves; for in that case it is, with all to which it
+serves as condition, a nonentity. But the foundation for this kind of
+idealism we have already destroyed in the transcendental æsthetic.
+Problematical idealism, which makes no such assertion, but only alleges
+our incapacity to prove the existence of anything besides ourselves by
+means of immediate experience, is a theory rational and evidencing a
+thorough and philosophical mode of thinking, for it observes the rule
+not to form a decisive judgement before sufficient proof be shown. The
+desired proof must therefore demonstrate that we have experience of
+external things, and not mere fancies. For this purpose, we must prove,
+that our internal and, to Descartes, indubitable experience is itself
+possible only under the previous assumption of external experience.
+
+THEOREM.
+
+The simple but empirically determined consciousness of my own existence
+proves the existence of external objects in space.
+
+PROOF
+
+I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. All
+determination in regard to time presupposes the existence of something
+permanent in perception. But this permanent something cannot be
+something in me, for the very reason that my existence in time is
+itself determined by this permanent something. It follows that the
+perception of this permanent existence is possible only through a thing
+without me and not through the mere representation of a thing without
+me. Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible
+only through the existence of real things external to me. Now,
+consciousness in time is necessarily connected with the consciousness
+of the possibility of this determination in time. Hence it follows that
+consciousness in time is necessarily connected also with the existence
+of things without me, inasmuch as the existence of these things is the
+condition of determination in time. That is to say, the consciousness
+of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of
+the existence of other things without me.
+
+Remark I. The reader will observe, that in the foregoing proof the game
+which idealism plays is retorted upon itself, and with more justice. It
+assumed that the only immediate experience is internal and that from
+this we can only infer the existence of external things. But, as always
+happens, when we reason from given effects to determined causes,
+idealism has reasoned with too much haste and uncertainty, for it is
+quite possible that the cause of our representations may lie in
+ourselves, and that we ascribe it falsely to external things. But our
+proof shows that external experience is properly immediate,[35] that
+only by virtue of it--not, indeed, the consciousness of our own
+existence, but certainly the determination of our existence in time,
+that is, internal experience--is possible. It is true, that the
+representation "I am," which is the expression of the consciousness
+which can accompany all my thoughts, is that which immediately includes
+the existence of a subject. But in this representation we cannot find
+any knowledge of the subject, and therefore also no empirical
+knowledge, that is, experience. For experience contains, in addition to
+the thought of something existing, intuition, and in this case it must
+be internal intuition, that is, time, in relation to which the subject
+must be determined. But the existence of external things is absolutely
+requisite for this purpose, so that it follows that internal experience
+is itself possible only mediately and through external experience.
+
+ [35] The immediate consciousness of the existence of external things
+ is, in the preceding theorem, not presupposed, but proved, by the
+ possibility of this consciousness understood by us or not. The
+ question as to the possibility of it would stand thus: "Have we an
+ internal sense, but no external sense, and is our belief in external
+ perception a mere delusion?" But it is evident that, in order merely
+ to fancy to ourselves anything as external, that is, to present it to
+ the sense in intuition we must already possess an external sense, and
+ must thereby distinguish immediately the mere receptivity of an
+ external intuition from the spontaneity which characterizes every act
+ of imagination. For merely to imagine also an external sense, would
+ annihilate the faculty of intuition itself which is to be determined
+ by the imagination.
+
+Remark II. Now with this view all empirical use of our faculty of
+cognition in the determination of time is in perfect accordance. Its
+truth is supported by the fact that it is possible to perceive a
+determination of time only by means of a change in external relations
+(motion) to the permanent in space (for example, we become aware of the
+sun's motion by observing the changes of his relation to the objects of
+this earth). But this is not all. We find that we possess nothing
+permanent that can correspond and be submitted to the conception of a
+substance as intuition, except matter. This idea of permanence is not
+itself derived from external experience, but is an à priori necessary
+condition of all determination of time, consequently also of the
+internal sense in reference to our own existence, and that through the
+existence of external things. In the representation "I," the
+consciousness of myself is not an intuition, but a merely intellectual
+representation produced by the spontaneous activity of a thinking
+subject. It follows, that this "i" has not any predicate of intuition,
+which, in its character of permanence, could serve as correlate to the
+determination of time in the internal sense--in the same way as
+impenetrability is the correlate of matter as an empirical intuition.
+
+Remark III. From the fact that the existence of external things is a
+necessary condition of the possibility of a determined consciousness of
+ourselves, it does not follow that every intuitive representation of
+external things involves the existence of these things, for their
+representations may very well be the mere products of the imagination
+(in dreams as well as in madness); though, indeed, these are themselves
+created by the reproduction of previous external perceptions, which, as
+has been shown, are possible only through the reality of external
+objects. The sole aim of our remarks has, however, been to prove that
+internal experience in general is possible only through external
+experience in general. Whether this or that supposed experience be
+purely imaginary must be discovered from its particular determinations
+and by comparing these with the criteria of all real experience.
+
+Finally, as regards the third postulate, it applies to material
+necessity in existence, and not to merely formal and logical necessity
+in the connection of conceptions. Now as we cannot cognize completely à
+priori the existence of any object of sense, though we can do so
+comparatively à priori, that is, relatively to some other previously
+given existence--a cognition, however, which can only be of such an
+existence as must be contained in the complex of experience, of which
+the previously given perception is a part--the necessity of existence
+can never be cognized from conceptions, but always, on the contrary,
+from its connection with that which is an object of perception. But the
+only existence cognized, under the condition of other given phenomena,
+as necessary, is the existence of effects from given causes in
+conformity with the laws of causality. It is consequently not the
+necessity of the existence of things (as substances), but the necessity
+of the state of things that we cognize, and that not immediately, but
+by means of the existence of other states given in perception,
+according to empirical laws of causality. Hence it follows that the
+criterion of necessity is to be found only in the law of possible
+experience--that everything which happens is determined à priori in the
+phenomenon by its cause. Thus we cognize only the necessity of effects
+in nature, the causes of which are given us. Moreover, the criterion of
+necessity in existence possesses no application beyond the field of
+possible experience, and even in this it is not valid of the existence
+of things as substances, because these can never be considered as
+empirical effects, or as something that happens and has a beginning.
+Necessity, therefore, regards only the relations of phenomena according
+to the dynamical law of causality, and the possibility grounded
+thereon, of reasoning from some given existence (of a cause) à priori
+to another existence (of an effect). "Everything that happens is
+hypothetically necessary," is a principle which subjects the changes
+that take place in the world to a law, that is, to a rule of necessary
+existence, without which nature herself could not possibly exist. Hence
+the proposition, "Nothing happens by blind chance (in mundo non datur
+casus)," is an à priori law of nature. The case is the same with the
+proposition, "Necessity in nature is not blind," that is, it is
+conditioned, consequently intelligible necessity (non datur fatum).
+Both laws subject the play of change to "a nature of things (as
+phenomena)," or, which is the same thing, to the unity of the
+understanding, and through the understanding alone can changes belong
+to an experience, as the synthetical unity of phenomena. Both belong to
+the class of dynamical principles. The former is properly a consequence
+of the principle of causality--one of the analogies of experience. The
+latter belongs to the principles of modality, which to the
+determination of causality adds the conception of necessity, which is
+itself, however, subject to a rule of the understanding. The principle
+of continuity forbids any leap in the series of phenomena regarded as
+changes (in mundo non datur saltus); and likewise, in the complex of
+all empirical intuitions in space, any break or hiatus between two
+phenomena (non datur hiatus)--for we can so express the principle, that
+experience can admit nothing which proves the existence of a vacuum, or
+which even admits it as a part of an empirical synthesis. For, as
+regards a vacuum or void, which we may cogitate as out and beyond the
+field of possible experience (the world), such a question cannot come
+before the tribunal of mere understanding, which decides only upon
+questions that concern the employment of given phenomena for the
+construction of empirical cognition. It is rather a problem for ideal
+reason, which passes beyond the sphere of a possible experience and
+aims at forming a judgement of that which surrounds and circumscribes
+it, and the proper place for the consideration of it is the
+transcendental dialectic. These four propositions, "In mundo non datur
+hiatus, non datur saltus, non datur casus, non datur fatum," as well as
+all principles of transcendental origin, we could very easily exhibit
+in their proper order, that is, in conformity with the order of the
+categories, and assign to each its proper place. But the already
+practised reader will do this for himself, or discover the clue to such
+an arrangement. But the combined result of all is simply this, to admit
+into the empirical synthesis nothing which might cause a break in or be
+foreign to the understanding and the continuous connection of all
+phenomena, that is, the unity of the conceptions of the understanding.
+For in the understanding alone is the unity of experience, in which all
+perceptions must have their assigned place, possible.
+
+Whether the field of possibility be greater than that of reality, and
+whether the field of the latter be itself greater than that of
+necessity, are interesting enough questions, and quite capable of
+synthetic solution, questions, however, which come under the
+jurisdiction of reason alone. For they are tantamount to asking whether
+all things as phenomena do without exception belong to the complex and
+connected whole of a single experience, of which every given perception
+is a part which therefore cannot be conjoined with any other
+phenomena--or, whether my perceptions can belong to more than one
+possible experience? The understanding gives to experience, according
+to the subjective and formal conditions, of sensibility as well as of
+apperception, the rules which alone make this experience possible.
+Other forms of intuition besides those of space and time, other forms
+of understanding besides the discursive forms of thought, or of
+cognition by means of conceptions, we can neither imagine nor make
+intelligible to ourselves; and even if we could, they would still not
+belong to experience, which is the only mode of cognition by which
+objects are presented to us. Whether other perceptions besides those
+which belong to the total of our possible experience, and consequently
+whether some other sphere of matter exists, the understanding has no
+power to decide, its proper occupation being with the synthesis of that
+which is given. Moreover, the poverty of the usual arguments which go
+to prove the existence of a vast sphere of possibility, of which all
+that is real (every object of experience) is but a small part, is very
+remarkable. "All real is possible"; from this follows naturally,
+according to the logical laws of conversion, the particular
+proposition: "Some possible is real." Now this seems to be equivalent
+to: "Much is possible that is not real." No doubt it does seem as if we
+ought to consider the sum of the possible to be greater than that of
+the real, from the fact that something must be added to the former to
+constitute the latter. But this notion of adding to the possible is
+absurd. For that which is not in the sum of the possible, and
+consequently requires to be added to it, is manifestly impossible. In
+addition to accordance with the formal conditions of experience, the
+understanding requires a connection with some perception; but that
+which is connected with this perception is real, even although it is
+not immediately perceived. But that another series of phenomena, in
+complete coherence with that which is given in perception, consequently
+more than one all-embracing experience is possible, is an inference
+which cannot be concluded from the data given us by experience, and
+still less without any data at all. That which is possible only under
+conditions which are themselves merely possible, is not possible in any
+respect. And yet we can find no more certain ground on which to base
+the discussion of the question whether the sphere of possibility is
+wider than that of experience.
+
+I have merely mentioned these questions, that in treating of the
+conception of the understanding, there might be no omission of anything
+that, in the common opinion, belongs to them. In reality, however, the
+notion of absolute possibility (possibility which is valid in every
+respect) is not a mere conception of the understanding, which can be
+employed empirically, but belongs to reason alone, which passes the
+bounds of all empirical use of the understanding. We have, therefore,
+contented ourselves with a merely critical remark, leaving the subject
+to be explained in the sequel.
+
+Before concluding this fourth section, and at the same time the system
+of all principles of the pure understanding, it seems proper to mention
+the reasons which induced me to term the principles of modality
+postulates. This expression I do not here use in the sense which some
+more recent philosophers, contrary to its meaning with mathematicians,
+to whom the word properly belongs, attach to it--that of a proposition,
+namely, immediately certain, requiring neither deduction nor proof. For
+if, in the case of synthetical propositions, however evident they may
+be, we accord to them without deduction, and merely on the strength of
+their own pretensions, unqualified belief, all critique of the
+understanding is entirely lost; and, as there is no want of bold
+pretensions, which the common belief (though for the philosopher this
+is no credential) does not reject, the understanding lies exposed to
+every delusion and conceit, without the power of refusing its assent to
+those assertions, which, though illegitimate, demand acceptance as
+veritable axioms. When, therefore, to the conception of a thing an à
+priori determination is synthetically added, such a proposition must
+obtain, if not a proof, at least a deduction of the legitimacy of its
+assertion.
+
+The principles of modality are, however, not objectively synthetical,
+for the predicates of possibility, reality, and necessity do not in the
+least augment the conception of that of which they are affirmed,
+inasmuch as they contribute nothing to the representation of the
+object. But as they are, nevertheless, always synthetical, they are so
+merely subjectively. That is to say, they have a reflective power, and
+apply to the conception of a thing, of which, in other respects, they
+affirm nothing, the faculty of cognition in which the conception
+originates and has its seat. So that if the conception merely agree
+with the formal conditions of experience, its object is called
+possible; if it is in connection with perception, and determined
+thereby, the object is real; if it is determined according to
+conceptions by means of the connection of perceptions, the object is
+called necessary. The principles of modality therefore predicate of a
+conception nothing more than the procedure of the faculty of cognition
+which generated it. Now a postulate in mathematics is a practical
+proposition which contains nothing but the synthesis by which we
+present an object to ourselves, and produce the conception of it, for
+example--"With a given line, to describe a circle upon a plane, from a
+given point"; and such a proposition does not admit of proof, because
+the procedure, which it requires, is exactly that by which alone it is
+possible to generate the conception of such a figure. With the same
+right, accordingly, can we postulate the principles of modality,
+because they do not augment[36] the conception of a thing but merely
+indicate the manner in which it is connected with the faculty of
+cognition.
+
+ [36] When I think the reality of a thing, I do really think more than
+ the possibility, but not in the thing; for that can never contain more
+ in reality than was contained in its complete possibility. But while
+ the notion of possibility is merely the notion of a position of thing
+ in relation to the understanding (its empirical use), reality is the
+ conjunction of the thing with perception.
+
+GENERAL REMARK ON THE SYSTEM OF PRINCIPLES.
+
+It is very remarkable that we cannot perceive the possibility of a
+thing from the category alone, but must always have an intuition, by
+which to make evident the objective reality of the pure conception of
+the understanding. Take, for example, the categories of relation. How
+(1) a thing can exist only as a subject, and not as a mere
+determination of other things, that is, can be substance; or how (2),
+because something exists, some other thing must exist, consequently how
+a thing can be a cause; or how (3), when several things exist, from the
+fact that one of these things exists, some consequence to the others
+follows, and reciprocally, and in this way a community of substances
+can be possible--are questions whose solution cannot be obtained from
+mere conceptions. The very same is the case with the other categories;
+for example, how a thing can be of the same sort with many others, that
+is, can be a quantity, and so on. So long as we have not intuition we
+cannot know whether we do really think an object by the categories, and
+where an object can anywhere be found to cohere with them, and thus the
+truth is established, that the categories are not in themselves
+cognitions, but mere forms of thought for the construction of
+cognitions from given intuitions. For the same reason is it true that
+from categories alone no synthetical proposition can be made. For
+example: "In every existence there is substance," that is, something
+that can exist only as a subject and not as mere predicate; or,
+"Everything is a quantity"--to construct propositions such as these, we
+require something to enable us to go out beyond the given conception
+and connect another with it. For the same reason the attempt to prove a
+synthetical proposition by means of mere conceptions, for example:
+"Everything that exists contingently has a cause," has never succeeded.
+We could never get further than proving that, without this relation to
+conceptions, we could not conceive the existence of the contingent,
+that is, could not à priori through the understanding cognize the
+existence of such a thing; but it does not hence follow that this is
+also the condition of the possibility of the thing itself that is said
+to be contingent. If, accordingly; we look back to our proof of the
+principle of causality, we shall find that we were able to prove it as
+valid only of objects of possible experience, and, indeed, only as
+itself the principle of the possibility of experience, Consequently of
+the cognition of an object given in empirical intuition, and not from
+mere conceptions. That, however, the proposition: "Everything that is
+contingent must have a cause," is evident to every one merely from
+conceptions, is not to be denied. But in this case the conception of
+the contingent is cogitated as involving not the category of modality
+(as that the non-existence of which can be conceived) but that of
+relation (as that which can exist only as the consequence of something
+else), and so it is really an identical proposition: "That which can
+exist only as a consequence, has a cause." In fact, when we have to
+give examples of contingent existence, we always refer to changes, and
+not merely to the possibility of conceiving the opposite.[37] But
+change is an event, which, as such, is possible only through a cause,
+and considered per se its non-existence is therefore possible, and we
+become cognizant of its contingency from the fact that it can exist
+only as the effect of a cause. Hence, if a thing is assumed to be
+contingent, it is an analytical proposition to say, it has a cause.
+
+ [37] We can easily conceive the non-existence of matter; but the
+ ancients did not thence infer its contingency. But even the
+ alternation of the existence and non-existence of a given state in a
+ thing, in which all change consists, by no means proves the
+ contingency of that state--the ground of proof being the reality of its
+ opposite. For example, a body is in a state of rest after motion, but
+ we cannot infer the contingency of the motion from the fact that the
+ former is the opposite of the latter. For this opposite is merely a
+ logical and not a real opposite to the other. If we wish to
+ demonstrate the contingency of the motion, what we ought to prove is
+ that, instead of the motion which took place in the preceding point of
+ time, it was possible for the body to have been then in rest, not,
+ that it is afterwards in rest; for in this case, both opposites are
+ perfectly consistent with each other.
+
+But it is still more remarkable that, to understand the possibility of
+things according to the categories and thus to demonstrate the
+objective reality of the latter, we require not merely intuitions, but
+external intuitions. If, for example, we take the pure conceptions of
+relation, we find that (1) for the purpose of presenting to the
+conception of substance something permanent in intuition corresponding
+thereto and thus of demonstrating the objective reality of this
+conception, we require an intuition (of matter) in space, because space
+alone is permanent and determines things as such, while time, and with
+it all that is in the internal sense, is in a state of continual flow;
+(2) in order to represent change as the intuition corresponding to the
+conception of causality, we require the representation of motion as
+change in space; in fact, it is through it alone that changes, the
+possibility of which no pure understanding can perceive, are capable of
+being intuited. Change is the connection of determinations
+contradictorily opposed to each other in the existence of one and the
+same thing. Now, how it is possible that out of a given state one quite
+opposite to it in the same thing should follow, reason without an
+example can not only not conceive, but cannot even make intelligible
+without intuition; and this intuition is the motion of a point in
+space; the existence of which in different spaces (as a consequence of
+opposite determinations) alone makes the intuition of change possible.
+For, in order to make even internal change cognitable, we require to
+represent time, as the form of the internal sense, figuratively by a
+line, and the internal change by the drawing of that line (motion), and
+consequently are obliged to employ external intuition to be able to
+represent the successive existence of ourselves in different states.
+The proper ground of this fact is that all change to be perceived as
+change presupposes something permanent in intuition, while in the
+internal sense no permanent intuition is to be found. Lastly, the
+objective possibility of the category of community cannot be conceived
+by mere reason, and consequently its objective reality cannot be
+demonstrated without an intuition, and that external in space. For how
+can we conceive the possibility of community, that is, when several
+substances exist, that some effect on the existence of the one follows
+from the existence of the other, and reciprocally, and therefore that,
+because something exists in the latter, something else must exist in
+the former, which could not be understood from its own existence alone?
+For this is the very essence of community--which is inconceivable as a
+property of things which are perfectly isolated. Hence, Leibnitz, in
+attributing to the substances of the world--as cogitated by the
+understanding alone--a community, required the mediating aid of a
+divinity; for, from their existence, such a property seemed to him with
+justice inconceivable. But we can very easily conceive the possibility
+of community (of substances as phenomena) if we represent them to
+ourselves as in space, consequently in external intuition. For external
+intuition contains in itself à priori formal external relations, as the
+conditions of the possibility of the real relations of action and
+reaction, and therefore of the possibility of community. With the same
+ease can it be demonstrated, that the possibility of things as
+quantities, and consequently the objective reality of the category of
+quantity, can be grounded only in external intuition, and that by its
+means alone is the notion of quantity appropriated by the internal
+sense. But I must avoid prolixity, and leave the task of illustrating
+this by examples to the reader's own reflection.
+
+The above remarks are of the greatest importance, not only for the
+confirmation of our previous confutation of idealism, but still more
+when the subject of self-cognition by mere internal consciousness and
+the determination of our own nature without the aid of external
+empirical intuitions is under discussion, for the indication of the
+grounds of the possibility of such a cognition.
+
+The result of the whole of this part of the analytic of principles is,
+therefore: "All principles of the pure understanding are nothing more
+than à priori principles of the possibility of experience, and to
+experience alone do all à priori synthetical propositions apply and
+relate"; indeed, their possibility itself rests entirely on this
+relation.
+
+Chapter III Of the Ground of the Division of all Objects into Phenomena
+and Noumena
+
+We have now not only traversed the region of the pure understanding and
+carefully surveyed every part of it, but we have also measured it, and
+assigned to everything therein its proper place. But this land is an
+island, and enclosed by nature herself within unchangeable limits. It
+is the land of truth (an attractive word), surrounded by a wide and
+stormy ocean, the region of illusion, where many a fog-bank, many an
+iceberg, seems to the mariner, on his voyage of discovery, a new
+country, and, while constantly deluding him with vain hopes, engages
+him in dangerous adventures, from which he never can desist, and which
+yet he never can bring to a termination. But before venturing upon this
+sea, in order to explore it in its whole extent, and to arrive at a
+certainty whether anything is to be discovered there, it will not be
+without advantage if we cast our eyes upon the chart of the land that
+we are about to leave, and to ask ourselves, firstly, whether we cannot
+rest perfectly contented with what it contains, or whether we must not
+of necessity be contented with it, if we can find nowhere else a solid
+foundation to build upon; and, secondly, by what title we possess this
+land itself, and how we hold it secure against all hostile claims?
+Although, in the course of our analytic, we have already given
+sufficient answers to these questions, yet a summary recapitulation of
+these solutions may be useful in strengthening our conviction, by
+uniting in one point the momenta of the arguments.
+
+We have seen that everything which the understanding draws from itself,
+without borrowing from experience, it nevertheless possesses only for
+the behoof and use of experience. The principles of the pure
+understanding, whether constitutive à priori (as the mathematical
+principles), or merely regulative (as the dynamical), contain nothing
+but the pure schema, as it were, of possible experience. For experience
+possesses its unity from the synthetical unity which the understanding,
+originally and from itself, imparts to the synthesis of the imagination
+in relation to apperception, and in à priori relation to and agreement
+with which phenomena, as data for a possible cognition, must stand. But
+although these rules of the understanding are not only à priori true,
+but the very source of all truth, that is, of the accordance of our
+cognition with objects, and on this ground, that they contain the basis
+of the possibility of experience, as the ensemble of all cognition, it
+seems to us not enough to propound what is true--we desire also to be
+told what we want to know. If, then, we learn nothing more by this
+critical examination than what we should have practised in the merely
+empirical use of the understanding, without any such subtle inquiry,
+the presumption is that the advantage we reap from it is not worth the
+labour bestowed upon it. It may certainly be answered that no rash
+curiosity is more prejudicial to the enlargement of our knowledge than
+that which must know beforehand the utility of this or that piece of
+information which we seek, before we have entered on the needful
+investigations, and before one could form the least conception of its
+utility, even though it were placed before our eyes. But there is one
+advantage in such transcendental inquiries which can be made
+comprehensible to the dullest and most reluctant learner--this, namely,
+that the understanding which is occupied merely with empirical
+exercise, and does not reflect on the sources of its own cognition, may
+exercise its functions very well and very successfully, but is quite
+unable to do one thing, and that of very great importance, to
+determine, namely, the bounds that limit its employment, and to know
+what lies within or without its own sphere. This purpose can be
+obtained only by such profound investigations as we have instituted.
+But if it cannot distinguish whether certain questions lie within its
+horizon or not, it can never be sure either as to its claims or
+possessions, but must lay its account with many humiliating
+corrections, when it transgresses, as it unavoidably will, the limits
+of its own territory, and loses itself in fanciful opinions and
+blinding illusions.
+
+That the understanding, therefore, cannot make of its à priori
+principles, or even of its conceptions, other than an empirical use, is
+a proposition which leads to the most important results. A
+transcendental use is made of a conception in a fundamental proposition
+or principle, when it is referred to things in general and considered
+as things in themselves; an empirical use, when it is referred merely
+to phenomena, that is, to objects of a possible experience. That the
+latter use of a conception is the only admissible one is evident from
+the reasons following. For every conception are requisite, firstly, the
+logical form of a conception (of thought) general; and, secondly, the
+possibility of presenting to this an object to which it may apply.
+Failing this latter, it has no sense, and utterly void of content,
+although it may contain the logical function for constructing a
+conception from certain data. Now, object cannot be given to a
+conception otherwise than by intuition, and, even if a pure intuition
+antecedent to the object is à priori possible, this pure intuition can
+itself obtain objective validity only from empirical intuition, of
+which it is itself but the form. All conceptions, therefore, and with
+them all principles, however high the degree of their à priori
+possibility, relate to empirical intuitions, that is, to data towards a
+possible experience. Without this they possess no objective validity,
+but are mere play of imagination or of understanding with images or
+notions. Let us take, for example, the conceptions of mathematics, and
+first in its pure intuitions. "Space has three dimensions"--"Between two
+points there can be only one straight line," etc. Although all these
+principles, and the representation of the object with which this
+science occupies itself, are generated in the mind entirely à priori,
+they would nevertheless have no significance if we were not always able
+to exhibit their significance in and by means of phenomena (empirical
+objects). Hence it is requisite that an abstract conception be made
+sensuous, that is, that an object corresponding to it in intuition be
+forthcoming, otherwise the conception remains, as we say, without
+sense, that is, without meaning. Mathematics fulfils this requirement
+by the construction of the figure, which is a phenomenon evident to the
+senses. The same science finds support and significance in number; this
+in its turn finds it in the fingers, or in counters, or in lines and
+points. The conception itself is always produced à priori, together
+with the synthetical principles or formulas from such conceptions; but
+the proper employment of them, and their application to objects, can
+exist nowhere but in experience, the possibility of which, as regards
+its form, they contain à priori.
+
+That this is also the case with all of the categories and the
+principles based upon them is evident from the fact that we cannot
+render intelligible the possibility of an object corresponding to them
+without having recourse to the conditions of sensibility, consequently,
+to the form of phenomena, to which, as their only proper objects, their
+use must therefore be confined, inasmuch as, if this condition is
+removed, all significance, that is, all relation to an object,
+disappears, and no example can be found to make it comprehensible what
+sort of things we ought to think under such conceptions.
+
+The conception of quantity cannot be explained except by saying that it
+is the determination of a thing whereby it can be cogitated how many
+times one is placed in it. But this "how many times" is based upon
+successive repetition, consequently upon time and the synthesis of the
+homogeneous therein. Reality, in contradistinction to negation, can be
+explained only by cogitating a time which is either filled therewith or
+is void. If I leave out the notion of permanence (which is existence in
+all time), there remains in the conception of substance nothing but the
+logical notion of subject, a notion of which I endeavour to realize by
+representing to myself something that can exist only as a subject. But
+not only am I perfectly ignorant of any conditions under which this
+logical prerogative can belong to a thing, I can make nothing out of
+the notion, and draw no inference from it, because no object to which
+to apply the conception is determined, and we consequently do not know
+whether it has any meaning at all. In like manner, if I leave out the
+notion of time, in which something follows upon some other thing in
+conformity with a rule, I can find nothing in the pure category, except
+that there is a something of such a sort that from it a conclusion may
+be drawn as to the existence of some other thing. But in this case it
+would not only be impossible to distinguish between a cause and an
+effect, but, as this power to draw conclusions requires conditions of
+which I am quite ignorant, the conception is not determined as to the
+mode in which it ought to apply to an object. The so-called principle:
+"Everything that is contingent has a cause," comes with a gravity and
+self-assumed authority that seems to require no support from without.
+But, I ask, what is meant by contingent? The answer is that the
+non-existence of which is possible. But I should like very well to know
+by what means this possibility of non-existence is to be cognized, if
+we do not represent to ourselves a succession in the series of
+phenomena, and in this succession an existence which follows a
+non-existence, or conversely, consequently, change. For to say, that
+the non-existence of a thing is not self-contradictory is a lame appeal
+to a logical condition, which is no doubt a necessary condition of the
+existence of the conception, but is far from being sufficient for the
+real objective possibility of non-existence. I can annihilate in
+thought every existing substance without self-contradiction, but I
+cannot infer from this their objective contingency in existence, that
+is to say, the possibility of their non-existence in itself. As regards
+the category of community, it may easily be inferred that, as the pure
+categories of substance and causality are incapable of a definition and
+explanation sufficient to determine their object without the aid of
+intuition, the category of reciprocal causality in the relation of
+substances to each other (commercium) is just as little susceptible
+thereof. Possibility, existence, and necessity nobody has ever yet been
+able to explain without being guilty of manifest tautology, when the
+definition has been drawn entirely from the pure understanding. For the
+substitution of the logical possibility of the conception--the condition
+of which is that it be not self-contradictory, for the transcendental
+possibility of things--the condition of which is that there be an object
+corresponding to the conception, is a trick which can only deceive the
+inexperienced.[38]
+
+ [38] In one word, to none of these conceptions belongs a corresponding
+ object, and consequently their real possibility cannot be
+ demonstrated, if we take away sensuous intuition--the only intuition
+ which we possess--and there then remains nothing but the logical
+ possibility, that is, the fact that the conception or thought is
+ possible--which, however, is not the question; what we want to know
+ being, whether it relates to an object and thus possesses any meaning.
+
+It follows incontestably, that the pure conceptions of the
+understanding are incapable of transcendental, and must always be of
+empirical use alone, and that the principles of the pure understanding
+relate only to the general conditions of a possible experience, to
+objects of the senses, and never to things in general, apart from the
+mode in which we intuite them.
+
+Transcendental analytic has accordingly this important result, to wit,
+that the understanding is competent effect nothing à priori, except the
+anticipation of the form of a possible experience in general, and that,
+as that which is not phenomenon cannot be an object of experience, it
+can never overstep the limits of sensibility, within which alone
+objects are presented to us. Its principles are merely principles of
+the exposition of phenomena, and the proud name of an ontology, which
+professes to present synthetical cognitions à priori of things in
+general in a systematic doctrine, must give place to the modest title
+of analytic of the pure understanding.
+
+Thought is the act of referring a given intuition to an object. If the
+mode of this intuition is unknown to us, the object is merely
+transcendental, and the conception of the understanding is employed
+only transcendentally, that is, to produce unity in the thought of a
+manifold in general. Now a pure category, in which all conditions of
+sensuous intuition--as the only intuition we possess--are abstracted,
+does not determine an object, but merely expresses the thought of an
+object in general, according to different modes. Now, to employ a
+conception, the function of judgement is required, by which an object
+is subsumed under the conception, consequently the at least formal
+condition, under which something can be given in intuition. Failing
+this condition of judgement (schema), subsumption is impossible; for
+there is in such a case nothing given, which may be subsumed under the
+conception. The merely transcendental use of the categories is
+therefore, in fact, no use at all and has no determined, or even, as
+regards its form, determinable object. Hence it follows that the pure
+category is incompetent to establish a synthetical à priori principle,
+and that the principles of the pure understanding are only of empirical
+and never of transcendental use, and that beyond the sphere of possible
+experience no synthetical à priori principles are possible.
+
+It may be advisable, therefore, to express ourselves thus. The pure
+categories, apart from the formal conditions of sensibility, have a
+merely transcendental meaning, but are nevertheless not of
+transcendental use, because this is in itself impossible, inasmuch as
+all the conditions of any employment or use of them (in judgements) are
+absent, to wit, the formal conditions of the subsumption of an object
+under these conceptions. As, therefore, in the character of pure
+categories, they must be employed empirically, and cannot be employed
+transcendentally, they are of no use at all, when separated from
+sensibility, that is, they cannot be applied to an object. They are
+merely the pure form of the employment of the understanding in respect
+of objects in general and of thought, without its being at the same
+time possible to think or to determine any object by their means. But
+there lurks at the foundation of this subject an illusion which it is
+very difficult to avoid. The categories are not based, as regards their
+origin, upon sensibility, like the forms of intuition, space, and time;
+they seem, therefore, to be capable of an application beyond the sphere
+of sensuous objects. But this is not the case. They are nothing but
+mere forms of thought, which contain only the logical faculty of
+uniting à priori in consciousness the manifold given in intuition.
+Apart, then, from the only intuition possible for us, they have still
+less meaning than the pure sensuous forms, space and time, for through
+them an object is at least given, while a mode of connection of the
+manifold, when the intuition which alone gives the manifold is wanting,
+has no meaning at all. At the same time, when we designate certain
+objects as phenomena or sensuous existences, thus distinguishing our
+mode of intuiting them from their own nature as things in themselves,
+it is evident that by this very distinction we as it were place the
+latter, considered in this their own nature, although we do not so
+intuite them, in opposition to the former, or, on the other hand, we do
+so place other possible things, which are not objects of our senses,
+but are cogitated by the understanding alone, and call them
+intelligible existences (noumena). Now the question arises whether the
+pure conceptions of our understanding do possess significance in
+respect of these latter, and may possibly be a mode of cognizing them.
+
+But we are met at the very commencement with an ambiguity, which may
+easily occasion great misapprehension. The understanding, when it terms
+an object in a certain relation phenomenon, at the same time forms out
+of this relation a representation or notion of an object in itself, and
+hence believes that it can form also conceptions of such objects. Now
+as the understanding possesses no other fundamental conceptions besides
+the categories, it takes for granted that an object considered as a
+thing in itself must be capable of being thought by means of these pure
+conceptions, and is thereby led to hold the perfectly undetermined
+conception of an intelligible existence, a something out of the sphere
+of our sensibility, for a determinate conception of an existence which
+we can cognize in some way or other by means of the understanding.
+
+If, by the term noumenon, we understand a thing so far as it is not an
+object of our sensuous intuition, thus making abstraction of our mode
+of intuiting it, this is a noumenon in the negative sense of the word.
+But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensuous intuition, we in
+this case assume a peculiar mode of intuition, an intellectual
+intuition, to wit, which does not, however, belong to us, of the very
+possibility of which we have no notion--and this is a noumenon in the
+positive sense.
+
+The doctrine of sensibility is also the doctrine of noumena in the
+negative sense, that is, of things which the understanding is obliged
+to cogitate apart from any relation to our mode of intuition,
+consequently not as mere phenomena, but as things in themselves. But
+the understanding at the same time comprehends that it cannot employ
+its categories for the consideration of things in themselves, because
+these possess significance only in relation to the unity of intuitions
+in space and time, and that they are competent to determine this unity
+by means of general à priori connecting conceptions only on account of
+the pure ideality of space and time. Where this unity of time is not to
+be met with, as is the case with noumena, the whole use, indeed the
+whole meaning of the categories is entirely lost, for even the
+possibility of things to correspond to the categories is in this case
+incomprehensible. On this point, I need only refer the reader to what I
+have said at the commencement of the General Remark appended to the
+foregoing chapter. Now, the possibility of a thing can never be proved
+from the fact that the conception of it is not self-contradictory, but
+only by means of an intuition corresponding to the conception. If,
+therefore, we wish to apply the categories to objects which cannot be
+regarded as phenomena, we must have an intuition different from the
+sensuous, and in this case the objects would be a noumena in the
+positive sense of the word. Now, as such an intuition, that is, an
+intellectual intuition, is no part of our faculty of cognition, it is
+absolutely impossible for the categories to possess any application
+beyond the limits of experience. It may be true that there are
+intelligible existences to which our faculty of sensuous intuition has
+no relation, and cannot be applied, but our conceptions of the
+understanding, as mere forms of thought for our sensuous intuition, do
+not extend to these. What, therefore, we call noumenon must be
+understood by us as such in a negative sense.
+
+If I take away from an empirical intuition all thought (by means of the
+categories), there remains no cognition of any object; for by means of
+mere intuition nothing is cogitated, and, from the existence of such or
+such an affection of sensibility in me, it does not follow that this
+affection or representation has any relation to an object without me.
+But if I take away all intuition, there still remains the form of
+thought, that is, the mode of determining an object for the manifold of
+a possible intuition. Thus the categories do in some measure really
+extend further than sensuous intuition, inasmuch as they think objects
+in general, without regard to the mode (of sensibility) in which these
+objects are given. But they do not for this reason apply to and
+determine a wider sphere of objects, because we cannot assume that such
+can be given, without presupposing the possibility of another than the
+sensuous mode of intuition, a supposition we are not justified in
+making.
+
+I call a conception problematical which contains in itself no
+contradiction, and which is connected with other cognitions as a
+limitation of given conceptions, but whose objective reality cannot be
+cognized in any manner. The conception of a noumenon, that is, of a
+thing which must be cogitated not as an object of sense, but as a thing
+in itself (solely through the pure understanding), is not
+self-contradictory, for we are not entitled to maintain that
+sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition. Nay, further, this
+conception is necessary to restrain sensuous intuition within the
+bounds of phenomena, and thus to limit the objective validity of
+sensuous cognition; for things in themselves, which lie beyond its
+province, are called noumena for the very purpose of indicating that
+this cognition does not extend its application to all that the
+understanding thinks. But, after all, the possibility of such noumena
+is quite incomprehensible, and beyond the sphere of phenomena, all is
+for us a mere void; that is to say, we possess an understanding whose
+province does problematically extend beyond this sphere, but we do not
+possess an intuition, indeed, not even the conception of a possible
+intuition, by means of which objects beyond the region of sensibility
+could be given us, and in reference to which the understanding might be
+employed assertorically. The conception of a noumenon is therefore
+merely a limitative conception and therefore only of negative use. But
+it is not an arbitrary or fictitious notion, but is connected with the
+limitation of sensibility, without, however, being capable of
+presenting us with any positive datum beyond this sphere.
+
+The division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and of the world
+into a mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis is therefore quite
+inadmissible in a positive sense, although conceptions do certainly
+admit of such a division; for the class of noumena have no determinate
+object corresponding to them, and cannot therefore possess objective
+validity. If we abandon the senses, how can it be made conceivable that
+the categories (which are the only conceptions that could serve as
+conceptions for noumena) have any sense or meaning at all, inasmuch as
+something more than the mere unity of thought, namely, a possible
+intuition, is requisite for their application to an object? The
+conception of a noumenon, considered as merely problematical, is,
+however, not only admissible, but, as a limitative conception of
+sensibility, absolutely necessary. But, in this case, a noumenon is not
+a particular intelligible object for our understanding; on the
+contrary, the kind of understanding to which it could belong is itself
+a problem, for we cannot form the most distant conception of the
+possibility of an understanding which should cognize an object, not
+discursively by means of categories, but intuitively in a non-sensuous
+intuition. Our understanding attains in this way a sort of negative
+extension. That is to say, it is not limited by, but rather limits,
+sensibility, by giving the name of noumena to things, not considered as
+phenomena, but as things in themselves. But it at the same time
+prescribes limits to itself, for it confesses itself unable to cognize
+these by means of the categories, and hence is compelled to cogitate
+them merely as an unknown something.
+
+I find, however, in the writings of modern authors, an entirely
+different use of the expressions, mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis,
+which quite departs from the meaning of the ancients--an acceptation in
+which, indeed, there is to be found no difficulty, but which at the
+same time depends on mere verbal quibbling. According to this meaning,
+some have chosen to call the complex of phenomena, in so far as it is
+intuited, mundus sensibilis, but in so far as the connection thereof is
+cogitated according to general laws of thought, mundus intelligibilis.
+Astronomy, in so far as we mean by the word the mere observation of the
+starry heaven, may represent the former; a system of astronomy, such as
+the Copernican or Newtonian, the latter. But such twisting of words is
+a mere sophistical subterfuge, to avoid a difficult question, by
+modifying its meaning to suit our own convenience. To be sure,
+understanding and reason are employed in the cognition of phenomena;
+but the question is, whether these can be applied when the object is
+not a phenomenon and in this sense we regard it if it is cogitated as
+given to the understanding alone, and not to the senses. The question
+therefore is whether, over and above the empirical use of the
+understanding, a transcendental use is possible, which applies to the
+noumenon as an object. This question we have answered in the negative.
+
+When therefore we say, the senses represent objects as they appear, the
+understanding as they are, the latter statement must not be understood
+in a transcendental, but only in an empirical signification, that is,
+as they must be represented in the complete connection of phenomena,
+and not according to what they may be, apart from their relation to
+possible experience, consequently not as objects of the pure
+understanding. For this must ever remain unknown to us. Nay, it is also
+quite unknown to us whether any such transcendental or extraordinary
+cognition is possible under any circumstances, at least, whether it is
+possible by means of our categories. Understanding and sensibility,
+with us, can determine objects only in conjunction. If we separate
+them, we have intuitions without conceptions, or conceptions without
+intuitions; in both cases, representations, which we cannot apply to
+any determinate object.
+
+If, after all our inquiries and explanations, any one still hesitates
+to abandon the mere transcendental use of the categories, let him
+attempt to construct with them a synthetical proposition. It would, of
+course, be unnecessary for this purpose to construct an analytical
+proposition, for that does not extend the sphere of the understanding,
+but, being concerned only about what is cogitated in the conception
+itself, it leaves it quite undecided whether the conception has any
+relation to objects, or merely indicates the unity of thought--complete
+abstraction being made of the modi in which an object may be given: in
+such a proposition, it is sufficient for the understanding to know what
+lies in the conception--to what it applies is to it indifferent. The
+attempt must therefore be made with a synthetical and so-called
+transcendental principle, for example: "Everything that exists, exists
+as substance," or, "Everything that is contingent exists as an effect
+of some other thing, viz., of its cause." Now I ask, whence can the
+understanding draw these synthetical propositions, when the conceptions
+contained therein do not relate to possible experience but to things in
+themselves (noumena)? Where is to be found the third term, which is
+always requisite PURE site in a synthetical proposition, which may
+connect in the same proposition conceptions which have no logical
+(analytical) connection with each other? The proposition never will be
+demonstrated, nay, more, the possibility of any such pure assertion
+never can be shown, without making reference to the empirical use of
+the understanding, and thus, ipso facto, completely renouncing pure and
+non-sensuous judgement. Thus the conception of pure and merely
+intelligible objects is completely void of all principles of its
+application, because we cannot imagine any mode in which they might be
+given, and the problematical thought which leaves a place open for them
+serves only, like a void space, to limit the use of empirical
+principles, without containing at the same time any other object of
+cognition beyond their sphere.
+
+APPENDIX
+
+Of the Equivocal Nature or Amphiboly of the Conceptions of Reflection
+from the Confusion of the Transcendental with the Empirical use of the
+Understanding.
+
+Reflection (reflexio) is not occupied about objects themselves, for the
+purpose of directly obtaining conceptions of them, but is that state of
+the mind in which we set ourselves to discover the subjective
+conditions under which we obtain conceptions. It is the consciousness
+of the relation of given representations to the different sources or
+faculties of cognition, by which alone their relation to each other can
+be rightly determined. The first question which occurs in considering
+our representations is to what faculty of cognition do they belong? To
+the understanding or to the senses? Many judgements are admitted to be
+true from mere habit or inclination; but, because reflection neither
+precedes nor follows, it is held to be a judgement that has its origin
+in the understanding. All judgements do not require examination, that
+is, investigation into the grounds of their truth. For, when they are
+immediately certain (for example: "Between two points there can be only
+one straight line"), no better or less mediate test of their truth can
+be found than that which they themselves contain and express. But all
+judgement, nay, all comparisons require reflection, that is, a
+distinction of the faculty of cognition to which the given conceptions
+belong. The act whereby I compare my representations with the faculty
+of cognition which originates them, and whereby I distinguish whether
+they are compared with each other as belonging to the pure
+understanding or to sensuous intuition, I term transcendental
+reflection. Now, the relations in which conceptions can stand to each
+other are those of identity and difference, agreement and opposition,
+of the internal and external, finally, of the determinable and the
+determining (matter and form). The proper determination of these
+relations rests on the question, to what faculty of cognition they
+subjectively belong, whether to sensibility or understanding? For, on
+the manner in which we solve this question depends the manner in which
+we must cogitate these relations.
+
+Before constructing any objective judgement, we compare the conceptions
+that are to be placed in the judgement, and observe whether there
+exists identity (of many representations in one conception), if a
+general judgement is to be constructed, or difference, if a particular;
+whether there is agreement when affirmative; and opposition when
+negative judgements are to be constructed, and so on. For this reason
+we ought to call these conceptions, conceptions of comparison
+(conceptus comparationis). But as, when the question is not as to the
+logical form, but as to the content of conceptions, that is to say,
+whether the things themselves are identical or different, in agreement
+or opposition, and so on, the things can have a twofold relation to our
+faculty of cognition, to wit, a relation either to sensibility or to
+the understanding, and as on this relation depends their relation to
+each other, transcendental reflection, that is, the relation of given
+representations to one or the other faculty of cognition, can alone
+determine this latter relation. Thus we shall not be able to discover
+whether the things are identical or different, in agreement or
+opposition, etc., from the mere conception of the things by means of
+comparison (comparatio), but only by distinguishing the mode of
+cognition to which they belong, in other words, by means of
+transcendental reflection. We may, therefore, with justice say, that
+logical reflection is mere comparison, for in it no account is taken of
+the faculty of cognition to which the given conceptions belong, and
+they are consequently, as far as regards their origin, to be treated as
+homogeneous; while transcendental reflection (which applies to the
+objects themselves) contains the ground of the possibility of objective
+comparison of representations with each other, and is therefore very
+different from the former, because the faculties of cognition to which
+they belong are not even the same. Transcendental reflection is a duty
+which no one can neglect who wishes to establish an à priori judgement
+upon things. We shall now proceed to fulfil this duty, and thereby
+throw not a little light on the question as to the determination of the
+proper business of the understanding.
+
+1. Identity and Difference. When an object is presented to us several
+times, but always with the same internal determinations (qualitas et
+quantitas), it, if an object of pure understanding, is always the same,
+not several things, but only one thing (numerica identitas); but if a
+phenomenon, we do not concern ourselves with comparing the conception
+of the thing with the conception of some other, but, although they may
+be in this respect perfectly the same, the difference of place at the
+same time is a sufficient ground for asserting the numerical difference
+of these objects (of sense). Thus, in the case of two drops of water,
+we may make complete abstraction of all internal difference (quality
+and quantity), and, the fact that they are intuited at the same time in
+different places, is sufficient to justify us in holding them to be
+numerically different. Leibnitz regarded phenomena as things in
+themselves, consequently as intelligibilia, that is, objects of pure
+understanding (although, on account of the confused nature of their
+representations, he gave them the name of phenomena), and in this case
+his principle of the indiscernible (principium identatis
+indiscernibilium) is not to be impugned. But, as phenomena are objects
+of sensibility, and, as the understanding, in respect of them, must be
+employed empirically and not purely or transcendentally, plurality and
+numerical difference are given by space itself as the condition of
+external phenomena. For one part of space, although it may be perfectly
+similar and equal to another part, is still without it, and for this
+reason alone is different from the latter, which is added to it in
+order to make up a greater space. It follows that this must hold good
+of all things that are in the different parts of space at the same
+time, however similar and equal one may be to another.
+
+2. Agreement and Opposition. When reality is represented by the pure
+understanding (realitas noumenon), opposition between realities is
+incogitable--such a relation, that is, that when these realities are
+connected in one subject, they annihilate the effects of each other and
+may be represented in the formula 3 -3 = 0. On the other hand, the real
+in a phenomenon (realitas phaenomenon) may very well be in mutual
+opposition, and, when united in the same subject, the one may
+completely or in part annihilate the effect or consequence of the
+other; as in the case of two moving forces in the same straight line
+drawing or impelling a point in opposite directions, or in the case of
+a pleasure counterbalancing a certain amount of pain.
+
+3. The Internal and External. In an object of the pure understanding,
+only that is internal which has no relation (as regards its existence)
+to anything different from itself. On the other hand, the internal
+determinations of a substantia phaenomenon in space are nothing but
+relations, and it is itself nothing more than a complex of mere
+relations. Substance in space we are cognizant of only through forces
+operative in it, either drawing others towards itself (attraction), or
+preventing others from forcing into itself (repulsion and
+impenetrability). We know no other properties that make up the
+conception of substance phenomenal in space, and which we term matter.
+On the other hand, as an object of the pure understanding, every
+substance must have internal determination and forces. But what other
+internal attributes of such an object can I think than those which my
+internal sense presents to me? That, to wit, which in either itself
+thought, or something analogous to it. Hence Leibnitz, who looked upon
+things as noumena, after denying them everything like external
+relation, and therefore also composition or combination, declared that
+all substances, even the component parts of matter, were simple
+substances with powers of representation, in one word, monads.
+
+4. Matter and Form. These two conceptions lie at the foundation of all
+other reflection, so inseparably are they connected with every mode of
+exercising the understanding. The former denotes the determinable in
+general, the second its determination, both in a transcendental sense,
+abstraction being made of every difference in that which is given, and
+of the mode in which it is determined. Logicians formerly termed the
+universal, matter, the specific difference of this or that part of the
+universal, form. In a judgement one may call the given conceptions
+logical matter (for the judgement), the relation of these to each other
+(by means of the copula), the form of the judgement. In an object, the
+composite parts thereof (essentialia) are the matter; the mode in which
+they are connected in the object, the form. In respect to things in
+general, unlimited reality was regarded as the matter of all
+possibility, the limitation thereof (negation) as the form, by which
+one thing is distinguished from another according to transcendental
+conceptions. The understanding demands that something be given (at
+least in the conception), in order to be able to determine it in a
+certain manner. Hence, in a conception of the pure understanding, the
+matter precedes the form, and for this reason Leibnitz first assumed
+the existence of things (monads) and of an internal power of
+representation in them, in order to found upon this their external
+relation and the community their state (that is, of their
+representations). Hence, with him, space and time were possible--the
+former through the relation of substances, the latter through the
+connection of their determinations with each other, as causes and
+effects. And so would it really be, if the pure understanding were
+capable of an immediate application to objects, and if space and time
+were determinations of things in themselves. But being merely sensuous
+intuitions, in which we determine all objects solely as phenomena, the
+form of intuition (as a subjective property of sensibility) must
+antecede all matter (sensations), consequently space and time must
+antecede all phenomena and all data of experience, and rather make
+experience itself possible. But the intellectual philosopher could not
+endure that the form should precede the things themselves and determine
+their possibility; an objection perfectly correct, if we assume that we
+intuite things as they are, although with confused representation. But
+as sensuous intuition is a peculiar subjective condition, which is à
+priori at the foundation of all perception, and the form of which is
+primitive, the form must be given per se, and so far from matter (or
+the things themselves which appear) lying at the foundation of
+experience (as we must conclude, if we judge by mere conceptions), the
+very possibility of itself presupposes, on the contrary, a given formal
+intuition (space and time).
+
+REMARK ON THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF REFLECTION.
+
+Let me be allowed to term the position which we assign to a conception
+either in the sensibility or in the pure understanding, the
+transcendental place. In this manner, the appointment of the position
+which must be taken by each conception according to the difference in
+its use, and the directions for determining this place to all
+conceptions according to rules, would be a transcendental topic, a
+doctrine which would thoroughly shield us from the surreptitious
+devices of the pure understanding and the delusions which thence arise,
+as it would always distinguish to what faculty of cognition each
+conception properly belonged. Every conception, every title, under
+which many cognitions rank together, may be called a logical place.
+Upon this is based the logical topic of Aristotle, of which teachers
+and rhetoricians could avail themselves, in order, under certain titles
+of thought, to observe what would best suit the matter they had to
+treat, and thus enable themselves to quibble and talk with fluency and
+an appearance of profundity.
+
+Transcendental topic, on the contrary, contains nothing more than the
+above-mentioned four titles of all comparison and distinction, which
+differ from categories in this respect, that they do not represent the
+object according to that which constitutes its conception (quantity,
+reality), but set forth merely the comparison of representations, which
+precedes our conceptions of things. But this comparison requires a
+previous reflection, that is, a determination of the place to which the
+representations of the things which are compared belong, whether, to
+wit, they are cogitated by the pure understanding, or given by
+sensibility.
+
+Conceptions may be logically compared without the trouble of inquiring
+to what faculty their objects belong, whether as noumena, to the
+understanding, or as phenomena, to sensibility. If, however, we wish to
+employ these conceptions in respect of objects, previous transcendental
+reflection is necessary. Without this reflection I should make a very
+unsafe use of these conceptions, and construct pretended synthetical
+propositions which critical reason cannot acknowledge and which are
+based solely upon a transcendental amphiboly, that is, upon a
+substitution of an object of pure understanding for a phenomenon.
+
+For want of this doctrine of transcendental topic, and consequently
+deceived by the amphiboly of the conceptions of reflection, the
+celebrated Leibnitz constructed an intellectual system of the world, or
+rather, believed himself competent to cognize the internal nature of
+things, by comparing all objects merely with the understanding and the
+abstract formal conceptions of thought. Our table of the conceptions of
+reflection gives us the unexpected advantage of being able to exhibit
+the distinctive peculiarities of his system in all its parts, and at
+the same time of exposing the fundamental principle of this peculiar
+mode of thought, which rested upon naught but a misconception. He
+compared all things with each other merely by means of conceptions, and
+naturally found no other differences than those by which the
+understanding distinguishes its pure conceptions one from another. The
+conditions of sensuous intuition, which contain in themselves their own
+means of distinction, he did not look upon as primitive, because
+sensibility was to him but a confused mode of representation and not
+any particular source of representations. A phenomenon was for him the
+representation of the thing in itself, although distinguished from
+cognition by the understanding only in respect of the logical form--the
+former with its usual want of analysis containing, according to him, a
+certain mixture of collateral representations in its conception of a
+thing, which it is the duty of the understanding to separate and
+distinguish. In one word, Leibnitz intellectualized phenomena, just as
+Locke, in his system of noogony (if I may be allowed to make use of
+such expressions), sensualized the conceptions of the understanding,
+that is to say, declared them to be nothing more than empirical or
+abstract conceptions of reflection. Instead of seeking in the
+understanding and sensibility two different sources of representations,
+which, however, can present us with objective judgements of things only
+in conjunction, each of these great men recognized but one of these
+faculties, which, in their opinion, applied immediately to things in
+themselves, the other having no duty but that of confusing or arranging
+the representations of the former.
+
+Accordingly, the objects of sense were compared by Leibnitz as things
+in general merely in the understanding.
+
+1st. He compares them in regard to their identity or difference--as
+judged by the understanding. As, therefore, he considered merely the
+conceptions of objects, and not their position in intuition, in which
+alone objects can be given, and left quite out of sight the
+transcendental locale of these conceptions--whether, that is, their
+object ought to be classed among phenomena, or among things in
+themselves, it was to be expected that he should extend the application
+of the principle of indiscernibles, which is valid solely of
+conceptions of things in general, to objects of sense (mundus
+phaenomenon), and that he should believe that he had thereby
+contributed in no small degree to extend our knowledge of nature. In
+truth, if I cognize in all its inner determinations a drop of water as
+a thing in itself, I cannot look upon one drop as different from
+another, if the conception of the one is completely identical with that
+of the other. But if it is a phenomenon in space, it has a place not
+merely in the understanding (among conceptions), but also in sensuous
+external intuition (in space), and in this case, the physical locale is
+a matter of indifference in regard to the internal determinations of
+things, and one place, B, may contain a thing which is perfectly
+similar and equal to another in a place, A, just as well as if the two
+things were in every respect different from each other. Difference of
+place without any other conditions, makes the plurality and distinction
+of objects as phenomena, not only possible in itself, but even
+necessary. Consequently, the above so-called law is not a law of
+nature. It is merely an analytical rule for the comparison of things by
+means of mere conceptions.
+
+2nd. The principle: "Realities (as simple affirmations) never logically
+contradict each other," is a proposition perfectly true respecting the
+relation of conceptions, but, whether as regards nature, or things in
+themselves (of which we have not the slightest conception), is without
+any the least meaning. For real opposition, in which A -B is = 0,
+exists everywhere, an opposition, that is, in which one reality united
+with another in the same subject annihilates the effects of the other--a
+fact which is constantly brought before our eyes by the different
+antagonistic actions and operations in nature, which, nevertheless, as
+depending on real forces, must be called realitates phaenomena. General
+mechanics can even present us with the empirical condition of this
+opposition in an à priori rule, as it directs its attention to the
+opposition in the direction of forces--a condition of which the
+transcendental conception of reality can tell us nothing. Although M.
+Leibnitz did not announce this proposition with precisely the pomp of a
+new principle, he yet employed it for the establishment of new
+propositions, and his followers introduced it into their
+Leibnitzio-Wolfian system of philosophy. According to this principle,
+for example, all evils are but consequences of the limited nature of
+created beings, that is, negations, because these are the only opposite
+of reality. (In the mere conception of a thing in general this is
+really the case, but not in things as phenomena.) In like manner, the
+upholders of this system deem it not only possible, but natural also,
+to connect and unite all reality in one being, because they acknowledge
+no other sort of opposition than that of contradiction (by which the
+conception itself of a thing is annihilated), and find themselves
+unable to conceive an opposition of reciprocal destruction, so to
+speak, in which one real cause destroys the effect of another, and the
+conditions of whose representation we meet with only in sensibility.
+
+3rd. The Leibnitzian monadology has really no better foundation than on
+this philosopher's mode of falsely representing the difference of the
+internal and external solely in relation to the understanding.
+Substances, in general, must have something inward, which is therefore
+free from external relations, consequently from that of composition
+also. The simple--that which can be represented by a unit--is therefore
+the foundation of that which is internal in things in themselves. The
+internal state of substances cannot therefore consist in place, shape,
+contact, or motion, determinations which are all external relations,
+and we can ascribe to them no other than that whereby we internally
+determine our faculty of sense itself, that is to say, the state of
+representation. Thus, then, were constructed the monads, which were to
+form the elements of the universe, the active force of which consists
+in representation, the effects of this force being thus entirely
+confined to themselves.
+
+For the same reason, his view of the possible community of substances
+could not represent it but as a predetermined harmony, and by no means
+as a physical influence. For inasmuch as everything is occupied only
+internally, that is, with its own representations, the state of the
+representations of one substance could not stand in active and living
+connection with that of another, but some third cause operating on all
+without exception was necessary to make the different states correspond
+with one another. And this did not happen by means of assistance
+applied in each particular case (systema assistentiae), but through the
+unity of the idea of a cause occupied and connected with all
+substances, in which they necessarily receive, according to the
+Leibnitzian school, their existence and permanence, consequently also
+reciprocal correspondence, according to universal laws.
+
+4th. This philosopher's celebrated doctrine of space and time, in which
+he intellectualized these forms of sensibility, originated in the same
+delusion of transcendental reflection. If I attempt to represent by the
+mere understanding, the external relations of things, I can do so only
+by employing the conception of their reciprocal action, and if I wish
+to connect one state of the same thing with another state, I must avail
+myself of the notion of the order of cause and effect. And thus
+Leibnitz regarded space as a certain order in the community of
+substances, and time as the dynamical sequence of their states. That
+which space and time possess proper to themselves and independent of
+things, he ascribed to a necessary confusion in our conceptions of
+them, whereby that which is a mere form of dynamical relations is held
+to be a self-existent intuition, antecedent even to things themselves.
+Thus space and time were the intelligible form of the connection of
+things (substances and their states) in themselves. But things were
+intelligible substances (substantiae noumena). At the same time, he
+made these conceptions valid of phenomena, because he did not allow to
+sensibility a peculiar mode of intuition, but sought all, even the
+empirical representation of objects, in the understanding, and left to
+sense naught but the despicable task of confusing and disarranging the
+representations of the former.
+
+But even if we could frame any synthetical proposition concerning
+things in themselves by means of the pure understanding (which is
+impossible), it could not apply to phenomena, which do not represent
+things in themselves. In such a case I should be obliged in
+transcendental reflection to compare my conceptions only under the
+conditions of sensibility, and so space and time would not be
+determinations of things in themselves, but of phenomena. What things
+may be in themselves, I know not and need not know, because a thing is
+never presented to me otherwise than as a phenomenon.
+
+I must adopt the same mode of procedure with the other conceptions of
+reflection. Matter is substantia phaenomenon. That in it which is
+internal I seek to discover in all parts of space which it occupies,
+and in all the functions and operations it performs, and which are
+indeed never anything but phenomena of the external sense. I cannot
+therefore find anything that is absolutely, but only what is
+comparatively internal, and which itself consists of external
+relations. The absolutely internal in matter, and as it should be
+according to the pure understanding, is a mere chimera, for matter is
+not an object for the pure understanding. But the transcendental
+object, which is the foundation of the phenomenon which we call matter,
+is a mere nescio quid, the nature of which we could not understand,
+even though someone were found able to tell us. For we can understand
+nothing that does not bring with it something in intuition
+corresponding to the expressions employed. If, by the complaint of
+being unable to perceive the internal nature of things, it is meant
+that we do not comprehend by the pure understanding what the things
+which appear to us may be in themselves, it is a silly and unreasonable
+complaint; for those who talk thus really desire that we should be able
+to cognize, consequently to intuite, things without senses, and
+therefore wish that we possessed a faculty of cognition perfectly
+different from the human faculty, not merely in degree, but even as
+regards intuition and the mode thereof, so that thus we should not be
+men, but belong to a class of beings, the possibility of whose
+existence, much less their nature and constitution, we have no means of
+cognizing. By observation and analysis of phenomena we penetrate into
+the interior of nature, and no one can say what progress this knowledge
+may make in time. But those transcendental questions which pass beyond
+the limits of nature, we could never answer, even although all nature
+were laid open to us, because we have not the power of observing our
+own mind with any other intuition than that of our internal sense. For
+herein lies the mystery of the origin and source of our faculty of
+sensibility. Its application to an object, and the transcendental
+ground of this unity of subjective and objective, lie too deeply
+concealed for us, who cognize ourselves only through the internal
+sense, consequently as phenomena, to be able to discover in our
+existence anything but phenomena, the non-sensuous cause of which we at
+the same time earnestly desire to penetrate to.
+
+The great utility of this critique of conclusions arrived at by the
+processes of mere reflection consists in its clear demonstration of the
+nullity of all conclusions respecting objects which are compared with
+each other in the understanding alone, while it at the same time
+confirms what we particularly insisted on, namely, that, although
+phenomena are not included as things in themselves among the objects of
+the pure understanding, they are nevertheless the only things by which
+our cognition can possess objective reality, that is to say, which give
+us intuitions to correspond with our conceptions.
+
+When we reflect in a purely logical manner, we do nothing more than
+compare conceptions in our understanding, to discover whether both have
+the same content, whether they are self-contradictory or not, whether
+anything is contained in either conception, which of the two is given,
+and which is merely a mode of thinking that given. But if I apply these
+conceptions to an object in general (in the transcendental sense),
+without first determining whether it is an object of sensuous or
+intellectual intuition, certain limitations present themselves, which
+forbid us to pass beyond the conceptions and render all empirical use
+of them impossible. And thus these limitations prove that the
+representation of an object as a thing in general is not only
+insufficient, but, without sensuous determination and independently of
+empirical conditions, self-contradictory; that we must therefore make
+abstraction of all objects, as in logic, or, admitting them, must think
+them under conditions of sensuous intuition; that, consequently, the
+intelligible requires an altogether peculiar intuition, which we do not
+possess, and in the absence of which it is for us nothing; while, on
+the other hand phenomena cannot be objects in themselves. For, when I
+merely think things in general, the difference in their external
+relations cannot constitute a difference in the things themselves; on
+the contrary, the former presupposes the latter, and if the conception
+of one of two things is not internally different from that of the
+other, I am merely thinking the same thing in different relations.
+Further, by the addition of one affirmation (reality) to the other, the
+positive therein is really augmented, and nothing is abstracted or
+withdrawn from it; hence the real in things cannot be in contradiction
+with or opposition to itself--and so on.
+
+The true use of the conceptions of reflection in the employment of the
+understanding has, as we have shown, been so misconceived by Leibnitz,
+one of the most acute philosophers of either ancient or modern times,
+that he has been misled into the construction of a baseless system of
+intellectual cognition, which professes to determine its objects
+without the intervention of the senses. For this reason, the exposition
+of the cause of the amphiboly of these conceptions, as the origin of
+these false principles, is of great utility in determining with
+certainty the proper limits of the understanding.
+
+It is right to say whatever is affirmed or denied of the whole of a
+conception can be affirmed or denied of any part of it (dictum de omni
+et nullo); but it would be absurd so to alter this logical proposition
+as to say whatever is not contained in a general conception is likewise
+not contained in the particular conceptions which rank under it; for
+the latter are particular conceptions, for the very reason that their
+content is greater than that which is cogitated in the general
+conception. And yet the whole intellectual system of Leibnitz is based
+upon this false principle, and with it must necessarily fall to the
+ground, together with all the ambiguous principles in reference to the
+employment of the understanding which have thence originated.
+
+Leibnitz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles or
+indistinguishables is really based on the presupposition that, if in
+the conception of a thing a certain distinction is not to be found, it
+is also not to be met with in things themselves; that, consequently,
+all things are completely identical (numero eadem) which are not
+distinguishable from each other (as to quality or quantity) in our
+conceptions of them. But, as in the mere conception of anything
+abstraction has been made of many necessary conditions of intuition,
+that of which abstraction has been made is rashly held to be
+non-existent, and nothing is attributed to the thing but what is
+contained in its conception.
+
+The conception of a cubic foot of space, however I may think it,
+is in itself completely identical. But two cubic feet in space are
+nevertheless distinct from each other from the sole fact of their
+being in different places (they are numero diversa); and these places
+are conditions of intuition, wherein the object of this conception is
+given, and which do not belong to the conception, but to the faculty
+of sensibility. In like manner, there is in the conception of a thing
+no contradiction when a negative is not connected with an affirmative;
+and merely affirmative conceptions cannot, in conjunction, produce any
+negation. But in sensuous intuition, wherein reality (take for example,
+motion) is given, we find conditions (opposite directions)--of which
+abstraction has been made in the conception of motion in general--which
+render possible a contradiction or opposition (not indeed of a logical
+kind)--and which from pure positives produce zero = 0. We are therefore
+not justified in saying that all reality is in perfect agreement
+and harmony, because no contradiction is discoverable among its
+conceptions.[39] According to mere conceptions, that which is internal
+is the substratum of all relations or external determinations. When,
+therefore, I abstract all conditions of intuition, and confine myself
+solely to the conception of a thing in general, I can make abstraction
+of all external relations, and there must nevertheless remain a
+conception of that which indicates no relation, but merely internal
+determinations. Now it seems to follow that in everything (substance)
+there is something which is absolutely internal and which antecedes
+all external determinations, inasmuch as it renders them possible; and
+that therefore this substratum is something which does not contain any
+external relations and is consequently simple (for corporeal things
+are never anything but relations, at least of their parts external to
+each other); and, inasmuch as we know of no other absolutely internal
+determinations than those of the internal sense, this substratum is not
+only simple, but also, analogously with our internal sense, determined
+through representations, that is to say, all things are properly
+monads, or simple beings endowed with the power of representation. Now
+all this would be perfectly correct, if the conception of a thing were
+the only necessary condition of the presentation of objects of external
+intuition. It is, on the contrary, manifest that a permanent phenomenon
+in space (impenetrable extension) can contain mere relations, and
+nothing that is absolutely internal, and yet be the primary substratum
+of all external perception. By mere conceptions I cannot think anything
+external, without, at the same time, thinking something internal, for
+the reason that conceptions of relations presuppose given things,
+and without these are impossible. But, as an intuition there is
+something (that is, space, which, with all it contains, consists of
+purely formal, or, indeed, real relations) which is not found in the
+mere conception of a thing in general, and this presents to us the
+substratum which could not be cognized through conceptions alone, I
+cannot say: because a thing cannot be represented by mere conceptions
+without something absolutely internal, there is also, in the things
+themselves which are contained under these conceptions, and in their
+intuition nothing external to which something absolutely internal does
+not serve as the foundation. For, when we have made abstraction of
+all the conditions of intuition, there certainly remains in the mere
+conception nothing but the internal in general, through which alone
+the external is possible. But this necessity, which is grounded upon
+abstraction alone, does not obtain in the case of things themselves,
+in so far as they are given in intuition with such determinations as
+express mere relations, without having anything internal as their
+foundation; for they are not things in themselves, but only phenomena.
+What we cognize in matter is nothing but relations (what we call its
+internal determinations are but comparatively internal). But there are
+some self-subsistent and permanent, through which a determined object
+is given. That I, when abstraction is made of these relations, have
+nothing more to think, does not destroy the conception of a thing as
+phenomenon, nor the conception of an object in abstracto, but it does
+away with the possibility of an object that is determinable according
+to mere conceptions, that is, of a noumenon. It is certainly startling
+to hear that a thing consists solely of relations; but this thing is
+simply a phenomenon, and cannot be cogitated by means of the mere
+categories: it does itself consist in the mere relation of something in
+general to the senses. In the same way, we cannot cogitate relations
+of things in abstracto, if we commence with conceptions alone, in any
+other manner than that one is the cause of determinations in the other;
+for that is itself the conception of the understanding or category of
+relation. But, as in this case we make abstraction of all intuition, we
+lose altogether the mode in which the manifold determines to each of
+its parts its place, that is, the form of sensibility (space); and yet
+this mode antecedes all empirical causality.
+
+ [39] If any one wishes here to have recourse to the usual subterfuge,
+ and to say, that at least realitates noumena cannot be in opposition
+ to each other, it will be requisite for him to adduce an example of
+ this pure and non-sensuous reality, that it may be understood whether
+ the notion represents something or nothing. But an example cannot be
+ found except in experience, which never presents to us anything more
+ than phenomena; and thus the proposition means nothing more than that
+ the conception which contains only affirmatives does not contain
+ anything negative--a proposition nobody ever doubted.
+
+If by intelligible objects we understand things which can be thought
+by means of the pure categories, without the need of the schemata of
+sensibility, such objects are impossible. For the condition of the
+objective use of all our conceptions of understanding is the mode of
+our sensuous intuition, whereby objects are given; and, if we make
+abstraction of the latter, the former can have no relation to an
+object. And even if we should suppose a different kind of intuition
+from our own, still our functions of thought would have no use or
+signification in respect thereof. But if we understand by the term,
+objects of a non-sensuous intuition, in respect of which our categories
+are not valid, and of which we can accordingly have no knowledge
+(neither intuition nor conception), in this merely negative sense
+noumena must be admitted. For this is no more than saying that our
+mode of intuition is not applicable to all things, but only to objects
+of our senses, that consequently its objective validity is limited,
+and that room is therefore left for another kind of intuition, and
+thus also for things that may be objects of it. But in this sense the
+conception of a noumenon is problematical, that is to say, it is the
+notion of a thing of which we can neither say that it is possible,
+nor that it is impossible, inasmuch as we do not know of any mode of
+intuition besides the sensuous, or of any other sort of conceptions
+than the categories--a mode of intuition and a kind of conception
+neither of which is applicable to a non-sensuous object. We are on this
+account incompetent to extend the sphere of our objects of thought
+beyond the conditions of our sensibility, and to assume the existence
+of objects of pure thought, that is, of noumena, inasmuch as these
+have no true positive signification. For it must be confessed of the
+categories that they are not of themselves sufficient for the cognition
+of things in themselves and, without the data of sensibility, are
+mere subjective forms of the unity of the understanding. Thought is
+certainly not a product of the senses, and in so far is not limited
+by them, but it does not therefore follow that it may be employed
+purely and without the intervention of sensibility, for it would then
+be without reference to an object. And we cannot call a noumenon
+an object of pure thought; for the representation thereof is but
+the problematical conception of an object for a perfectly different
+intuition and a perfectly different understanding from ours, both of
+which are consequently themselves problematical. The conception of a
+noumenon is therefore not the conception of an object, but merely a
+problematical conception inseparably connected with the limitation
+of our sensibility. That is to say, this conception contains the
+answer to the question: "Are there objects quite unconnected with,
+and independent of, our intuition?"--a question to which only an
+indeterminate answer can be given. That answer is: "Inasmuch as
+sensuous intuition does not apply to all things without distinction,
+there remains room for other and different objects." The existence of
+these problematical objects is therefore not absolutely denied, in the
+absence of a determinate conception of them, but, as no category is
+valid in respect of them, neither must they be admitted as objects for
+our understanding.
+
+Understanding accordingly limits sensibility, without at the same time
+enlarging its own field. While, moreover, it forbids sensibility to
+apply its forms and modes to things in themselves and restricts it to
+the sphere of phenomena, it cogitates an object in itself, only,
+however, as a transcendental object, which is the cause of a phenomenon
+(consequently not itself a phenomenon), and which cannot be thought
+either as a quantity or as reality, or as substance (because these
+conceptions always require sensuous forms in which to determine an
+object)--an object, therefore, of which we are quite unable to say
+whether it can be met with in ourselves or out of us, whether it would
+be annihilated together with sensibility, or, if this were taken away,
+would continue to exist. If we wish to call this object a noumenon,
+because the representation of it is non-sensuous, we are at liberty to
+do so. But as we can apply to it none of the conceptions of our
+understanding, the representation is for us quite void, and is
+available only for the indication of the limits of our sensuous
+intuition, thereby leaving at the same time an empty space, which we
+are competent to fill by the aid neither of possible experience, nor of
+the pure understanding.
+
+The critique of the pure understanding, accordingly, does not permit us
+to create for ourselves a new field of objects beyond those which are
+presented to us as phenomena, and to stray into intelligible worlds;
+nay, it does not even allow us to endeavour to form so much as a
+conception of them. The specious error which leads to this--and which is
+a perfectly excusable one--lies in the fact that the employment of the
+understanding, contrary to its proper purpose and destination, is made
+transcendental, and objects, that is, possible intuitions, are made to
+regulate themselves according to conceptions, instead of the
+conceptions arranging themselves according to the intuitions, on which
+alone their own objective validity rests. Now the reason of this again
+is that apperception, and with it thought, antecedes all possible
+determinate arrangement of representations. Accordingly we think
+something in general and determine it on the one hand sensuously, but,
+on the other, distinguish the general and in abstracto represented
+object from this particular mode of intuiting it. In this case there
+remains a mode of determining the object by mere thought, which is
+really but a logical form without content, which, however, seems to us
+to be a mode of the existence of the object in itself (noumenon),
+without regard to intuition which is limited to our senses.
+
+Before ending this transcendental analytic, we must make an addition,
+which, although in itself of no particular importance, seems to be
+necessary to the completeness of the system. The highest conception,
+with which a transcendental philosophy commonly begins, is the division
+into possible and impossible. But as all division presupposes a divided
+conception, a still higher one must exist, and this is the conception
+of an object in general--problematically understood and without its
+being decided whether it is something or nothing. As the categories are
+the only conceptions which apply to objects in general, the
+distinguishing of an object, whether it is something or nothing, must
+proceed according to the order and direction of the categories.
+
+1. To the categories of quantity, that is, the conceptions of all,
+many, and one, the conception which annihilates all, that is, the
+conception of none, is opposed. And thus the object of a conception, to
+which no intuition can be found to correspond, is = nothing. That is,
+it is a conception without an object (ens rationis), like noumena,
+which cannot be considered possible in the sphere of reality, though
+they must not therefore be held to be impossible--or like certain new
+fundamental forces in matter, the existence of which is cogitable
+without contradiction, though, as examples from experience are not
+forthcoming, they must not be regarded as possible.
+
+2. Reality is something; negation is nothing, that is, a conception of
+the absence of an object, as cold, a shadow (nihil privativum).
+
+3. The mere form of intuition, without substance, is in itself no
+object, but the merely formal condition of an object (as phenomenon),
+as pure space and pure time. These are certainly something, as forms of
+intuition, but are not themselves objects which are intuited (ens
+imaginarium).
+
+4. The object of a conception which is self-contradictory, is nothing,
+because the conception is nothing--is impossible, as a figure composed
+of two straight lines (nihil negativum).
+
+The table of this division of the conception of nothing (the
+corresponding division of the conception of something does not require
+special description) must therefore be arranged as follows:
+
+                      NOTHING
+                        AS
+
+                        1
+                As Empty Conception
+                 without object,
+                  _ens rationis_
+           2                               3
+     Empty object of               Empty intuition
+      a conception,                without object,
+     _nihil privativum_            _ens imaginarium_
+                        4
+                   Empty object
+                 without conception,
+                  _nihil negativum_
+
+We see that the ens rationis is distinguished from the nihil negativum
+or pure nothing by the consideration that the former must not be
+reckoned among possibilities, because it is a mere fiction--though not
+self-contradictory, while the latter is completely opposed to all
+possibility, inasmuch as the conception annihilates itself. Both,
+however, are empty conceptions. On the other hand, the nihil privativum
+and ens imaginarium are empty data for conceptions. If light be not
+given to the senses, we cannot represent to ourselves darkness, and if
+extended objects are not perceived, we cannot represent space. Neither
+the negation, nor the mere form of intuition can, without something
+real, be an object.
+
+SECOND DIVISION--TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC
+
+TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
+INTRODUCTION.
+
+I. Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance
+
+We termed dialectic in general a logic of appearance. This does not
+signify a doctrine of probability; for probability is truth, only
+cognized upon insufficient grounds, and though the information it
+gives us is imperfect, it is not therefore deceitful. Hence it must
+not be separated from the analytical part of logic. Still less must
+phenomenon and appearance be held to be identical. For truth or
+illusory appearance does not reside in the object, in so far as it
+is intuited, but in the judgement upon the object, in so far as it
+is thought. It is, therefore, quite correct to say that the senses
+do not err, not because they always judge correctly, but because
+they do not judge at all. Hence truth and error, consequently also,
+illusory appearance as the cause of error, are only to be found in a
+judgement, that is, in the relation of an object to our understanding.
+In a cognition which completely harmonizes with the laws of the
+understanding, no error can exist. In a representation of the senses--as
+not containing any judgement--there is also no error. But no power of
+nature can of itself deviate from its own laws. Hence neither the
+understanding per se (without the influence of another cause), nor the
+senses per se, would fall into error; the former could not, because,
+if it acts only according to its own laws, the effect (the judgement)
+must necessarily accord with these laws. But in accordance with the
+laws of the understanding consists the formal element in all truth. In
+the senses there is no judgement--neither a true nor a false one. But,
+as we have no source of cognition besides these two, it follows that
+error is caused solely by the unobserved influence of the sensibility
+upon the understanding. And thus it happens that the subjective grounds
+of a judgement blend and are confounded with the objective, and cause
+them to deviate from their proper determination,[40] just as a body
+in motion would always of itself proceed in a straight line, but if
+another impetus gives to it a different direction, it will then start
+off into a curvilinear line of motion. To distinguish the peculiar
+action of the understanding from the power which mingles with it,
+it is necessary to consider an erroneous judgement as the diagonal
+between two forces, that determine the judgement in two different
+directions, which, as it were, form an angle, and to resolve this
+composite operation into the simple ones of the understanding and the
+sensibility. In pure à priori judgements this must be done by means of
+transcendental reflection, whereby, as has been already shown, each
+representation has its place appointed in the corresponding faculty of
+cognition, and consequently the influence of the one faculty upon the
+other is made apparent.
+
+ [40] Sensibility, subjected to the understanding, as the object upon
+ which the understanding employs its functions, is the source of real
+ cognitions. But, in so far as it exercises an influence upon the
+ action of the understanding and determines it to judgement,
+ sensibility is itself the cause of error.
+
+It is not at present our business to treat of empirical illusory
+appearance (for example, optical illusion), which occurs in the
+empirical application of otherwise correct rules of the understanding,
+and in which the judgement is misled by the influence of imagination.
+Our purpose is to speak of transcendental illusory appearance, which
+influences principles--that are not even applied to experience, for in
+this case we should possess a sure test of their correctness--but which
+leads us, in disregard of all the warnings of criticism, completely
+beyond the empirical employment of the categories and deludes us with
+the chimera of an extension of the sphere of the pure understanding. We
+shall term those principles the application of which is confined
+entirely within the limits of possible experience, immanent; those, on
+the other hand, which transgress these limits, we shall call
+transcendent principles. But by these latter I do not understand
+principles of the transcendental use or misuse of the categories, which
+is in reality a mere fault of the judgement when not under due
+restraint from criticism, and therefore not paying sufficient attention
+to the limits of the sphere in which the pure understanding is allowed
+to exercise its functions; but real principles which exhort us to break
+down all those barriers, and to lay claim to a perfectly new field of
+cognition, which recognizes no line of demarcation. Thus transcendental
+and transcendent are not identical terms. The principles of the pure
+understanding, which we have already propounded, ought to be of
+empirical and not of transcendental use, that is, they are not
+applicable to any object beyond the sphere of experience. A principle
+which removes these limits, nay, which authorizes us to overstep them,
+is called transcendent. If our criticism can succeed in exposing the
+illusion in these pretended principles, those which are limited in
+their employment to the sphere of experience may be called, in
+opposition to the others, immanent principles of the pure
+understanding.
+
+Logical illusion, which consists merely in the imitation of the form of
+reason (the illusion in sophistical syllogisms), arises entirely from a
+want of due attention to logical rules. So soon as the attention is
+awakened to the case before us, this illusion totally disappears.
+Transcendental illusion, on the contrary, does not cease to exist, even
+after it has been exposed, and its nothingness clearly perceived by
+means of transcendental criticism. Take, for example, the illusion in
+the proposition: "The world must have a beginning in time." The cause
+of this is as follows. In our reason, subjectively considered as a
+faculty of human cognition, there exist fundamental rules and maxims of
+its exercise, which have completely the appearance of objective
+principles. Now from this cause it happens that the subjective
+necessity of a certain connection of our conceptions, is regarded as an
+objective necessity of the determination of things in themselves. This
+illusion it is impossible to avoid, just as we cannot avoid perceiving
+that the sea appears to be higher at a distance than it is near the
+shore, because we see the former by means of higher rays than the
+latter, or, which is a still stronger case, as even the astronomer
+cannot prevent himself from seeing the moon larger at its rising than
+some time afterwards, although he is not deceived by this illusion.
+
+Transcendental dialectic will therefore content itself with exposing
+the illusory appearance in transcendental judgements, and guarding us
+against it; but to make it, as in the case of logical illusion,
+entirely disappear and cease to be illusion is utterly beyond its
+power. For we have here to do with a natural and unavoidable illusion,
+which rests upon subjective principles and imposes these upon us as
+objective, while logical dialectic, in the detection of sophisms, has
+to do merely with an error in the logical consequence of the
+propositions, or with an artificially constructed illusion, in
+imitation of the natural error. There is, therefore, a natural and
+unavoidable dialectic of pure reason--not that in which the bungler,
+from want of the requisite knowledge, involves himself, nor that which
+the sophist devises for the purpose of misleading, but that which is an
+inseparable adjunct of human reason, and which, even after its
+illusions have been exposed, does not cease to deceive, and continually
+to lead reason into momentary errors, which it becomes necessary
+continually to remove.
+
+II. Of Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusory Appearance
+
+A. OF REASON IN GENERAL.
+
+All our knowledge begins with sense, proceeds thence to understanding,
+and ends with reason, beyond which nothing higher can be discovered in
+the human mind for elaborating the matter of intuition and subjecting
+it to the highest unity of thought. At this stage of our inquiry it is
+my duty to give an explanation of this, the highest faculty of
+cognition, and I confess I find myself here in some difficulty. Of
+reason, as of the understanding, there is a merely formal, that is,
+logical use, in which it makes abstraction of all content of cognition;
+but there is also a real use, inasmuch as it contains in itself the
+source of certain conceptions and principles, which it does not borrow
+either from the senses or the understanding. The former faculty has
+been long defined by logicians as the faculty of mediate conclusion in
+contradistinction to immediate conclusions (consequentiae immediatae);
+but the nature of the latter, which itself generates conceptions, is
+not to be understood from this definition. Now as a division of reason
+into a logical and a transcendental faculty presents itself here, it
+becomes necessary to seek for a higher conception of this source of
+cognition which shall comprehend both conceptions. In this we may
+expect, according to the analogy of the conceptions of the
+understanding, that the logical conception will give us the key to the
+transcendental, and that the table of the functions of the former will
+present us with the clue to the conceptions of reason.
+
+In the former part of our transcendental logic, we defined the
+understanding to be the faculty of rules; reason may be distinguished
+from understanding as the faculty of principles.
+
+The term principle is ambiguous, and commonly signifies merely a
+cognition that may be employed as a principle, although it is not in
+itself, and as regards its proper origin, entitled to the distinction.
+Every general proposition, even if derived from experience by the
+process of induction, may serve as the major in a syllogism; but it is
+not for that reason a principle. Mathematical axioms (for example,
+there can be only one straight line between two points) are general à
+priori cognitions, and are therefore rightly denominated principles,
+relatively to the cases which can be subsumed under them. But I cannot
+for this reason say that I cognize this property of a straight line
+from principles--I cognize it only in pure intuition.
+
+Cognition from principles, then, is that cognition in which I cognize
+the particular in the general by means of conceptions. Thus every
+syllogism is a form of the deduction of a cognition from a principle.
+For the major always gives a conception, through which everything that
+is subsumed under the condition thereof is cognized according to a
+principle. Now as every general cognition may serve as the major in a
+syllogism, and the understanding presents us with such general à priori
+propositions, they may be termed principles, in respect of their
+possible use.
+
+But if we consider these principles of the pure understanding in
+relation to their origin, we shall find them to be anything rather than
+cognitions from conceptions. For they would not even be possible à
+priori, if we could not rely on the assistance of pure intuition (in
+mathematics), or on that of the conditions of a possible experience.
+That everything that happens has a cause, cannot be concluded from the
+general conception of that which happens; on the contrary the principle
+of causality instructs us as to the mode of obtaining from that which
+happens a determinate empirical conception.
+
+Synthetical cognitions from conceptions the understanding cannot
+supply, and they alone are entitled to be called principles. At the
+same time, all general propositions may be termed comparative
+principles.
+
+It has been a long-cherished wish--that (who knows how late), may one
+day, be happily accomplished--that the principles of the endless variety
+of civil laws should be investigated and exposed; for in this way alone
+can we find the secret of simplifying legislation. But in this case,
+laws are nothing more than limitations of our freedom upon conditions
+under which it subsists in perfect harmony with itself; they
+consequently have for their object that which is completely our own
+work, and of which we ourselves may be the cause by means of these
+conceptions. But how objects as things in themselves--how the nature of
+things is subordinated to principles and is to be determined, according
+to conceptions, is a question which it seems well nigh impossible to
+answer. Be this, however, as it may--for on this point our investigation
+is yet to be made--it is at least manifest from what we have said that
+cognition from principles is something very different from cognition by
+means of the understanding, which may indeed precede other cognitions
+in the form of a principle, but in itself--in so far as it is
+synthetical--is neither based upon mere thought, nor contains a general
+proposition drawn from conceptions alone.
+
+The understanding may be a faculty for the production of unity of
+phenomena by virtue of rules; the reason is a faculty for the
+production of unity of rules (of the understanding) under principles.
+Reason, therefore, never applies directly to experience, or to any
+sensuous object; its object is, on the contrary, the understanding, to
+the manifold cognition of which it gives a unity à priori by means of
+conceptions--a unity which may be called rational unity, and which is of
+a nature very different from that of the unity produced by the
+understanding.
+
+The above is the general conception of the faculty of reason, in so far
+as it has been possible to make it comprehensible in the absence of
+examples. These will be given in the sequel.
+
+B. OF THE LOGICAL USE OF REASON.
+
+A distinction is commonly made between that which is immediately
+cognized and that which is inferred or concluded. That in a figure
+which is bounded by three straight lines there are three angles, is an
+immediate cognition; but that these angles are together equal to two
+right angles, is an inference or conclusion. Now, as we are constantly
+employing this mode of thought and have thus become quite accustomed to
+it, we no longer remark the above distinction, and, as in the case of
+the so-called deceptions of sense, consider as immediately perceived,
+what has really been inferred. In every reasoning or syllogism, there
+is a fundamental proposition, afterwards a second drawn from it, and
+finally the conclusion, which connects the truth in the first with the
+truth in the second--and that infallibly. If the judgement concluded is
+so contained in the first proposition that it can be deduced from it
+without the meditation of a third notion, the conclusion is called
+immediate (consequentia immediata); I prefer the term conclusion of the
+understanding. But if, in addition to the fundamental cognition, a
+second judgement is necessary for the production of the conclusion, it
+is called a conclusion of the reason. In the proposition: All men are
+mortal, are contained the propositions: Some men are mortal, Nothing
+that is not mortal is a man, and these are therefore immediate
+conclusions from the first. On the other hand, the proposition: all the
+learned are mortal, is not contained in the main proposition (for the
+conception of a learned man does not occur in it), and it can be
+deduced from the main proposition only by means of a mediating
+judgement.
+
+In every syllogism I first cogitate a rule (the major) by means of the
+understanding. In the next place I subsume a cognition under the
+condition of the rule (and this is the minor) by means of the
+judgement. And finally I determine my cognition by means of the
+predicate of the rule (this is the conclusio), consequently, I
+determine it à priori by means of the reason. The relations, therefore,
+which the major proposition, as the rule, represents between a
+cognition and its condition, constitute the different kinds of
+syllogisms. These are just threefold--analogously with all judgements,
+in so far as they differ in the mode of expressing the relation of a
+cognition in the understanding--namely, categorical, hypothetical, and
+disjunctive.
+
+When as often happens, the conclusion is a judgement which may follow
+from other given judgements, through which a perfectly different object
+is cogitated, I endeavour to discover in the understanding whether the
+assertion in this conclusion does not stand under certain conditions
+according to a general rule. If I find such a condition, and if the
+object mentioned in the conclusion can be subsumed under the given
+condition, then this conclusion follows from a rule which is also valid
+for other objects of cognition. From this we see that reason endeavours
+to subject the great variety of the cognitions of the understanding to
+the smallest possible number of principles (general conditions), and
+thus to produce in it the highest unity.
+
+C. OF THE PURE USE OF REASON.
+
+Can we isolate reason, and, if so, is it in this case a peculiar source
+of conceptions and judgements which spring from it alone, and through
+which it can be applied to objects; or is it merely a subordinate
+faculty, whose duty it is to give a certain form to given cognitions--a
+form which is called logical, and through which the cognitions of the
+understanding are subordinated to each other, and lower rules to higher
+(those, to wit, whose condition comprises in its sphere the condition
+of the others), in so far as this can be done by comparison? This is
+the question which we have at present to answer. Manifold variety of
+rules and unity of principles is a requirement of reason, for the
+purpose of bringing the understanding into complete accordance with
+itself, just as understanding subjects the manifold content of
+intuition to conceptions, and thereby introduces connection into it.
+But this principle prescribes no law to objects, and does not contain
+any ground of the possibility of cognizing or of determining them as
+such, but is merely a subjective law for the proper arrangement of the
+content of the understanding. The purpose of this law is, by a
+comparison of the conceptions of the understanding, to reduce them to
+the smallest possible number, although, at the same time, it does not
+justify us in demanding from objects themselves such a uniformity as
+might contribute to the convenience and the enlargement of the sphere
+of the understanding, or in expecting that it will itself thus receive
+from them objective validity. In one word, the question is: "does
+reason in itself, that is, does pure reason contain à priori
+synthetical principles and rules, and what are those principles?"
+
+The formal and logical procedure of reason in syllogisms gives us
+sufficient information in regard to the ground on which the
+transcendental principle of reason in its pure synthetical cognition
+will rest.
+
+1. Reason, as observed in the syllogistic process, is not applicable to
+intuitions, for the purpose of subjecting them to rules--for this is the
+province of the understanding with its categories--but to conceptions
+and judgements. If pure reason does apply to objects and the intuition
+of them, it does so not immediately, but mediately--through the
+understanding and its judgements, which have a direct relation to the
+senses and their intuition, for the purpose of determining their
+objects. The unity of reason is therefore not the unity of a possible
+experience, but is essentially different from this unity, which is that
+of the understanding. That everything which happens has a cause, is not
+a principle cognized and prescribed by reason. This principle makes the
+unity of experience possible and borrows nothing from reason, which,
+without a reference to possible experience, could never have produced
+by means of mere conceptions any such synthetical unity.
+
+2. Reason, in its logical use, endeavours to discover the general
+condition of its judgement (the conclusion), and a syllogism is itself
+nothing but a judgement by means of the subsumption of its condition
+under a general rule (the major). Now as this rule may itself be
+subjected to the same process of reason, and thus the condition of the
+condition be sought (by means of a prosyllogism) as long as the process
+can be continued, it is very manifest that the peculiar principle of
+reason in its logical use is to find for the conditioned cognition of
+the understanding the unconditioned whereby the unity of the former is
+completed.
+
+But this logical maxim cannot be a principle of pure reason, unless we
+admit that, if the conditioned is given, the whole series of conditions
+subordinated to one another--a series which is consequently itself
+unconditioned--is also given, that is, contained in the object and its
+connection.
+
+But this principle of pure reason is evidently synthetical; for,
+analytically, the conditioned certainly relates to some condition, but
+not to the unconditioned. From this principle also there must originate
+different synthetical propositions, of which the pure understanding is
+perfectly ignorant, for it has to do only with objects of a possible
+experience, the cognition and synthesis of which is always conditioned.
+The unconditioned, if it does really exist, must be especially
+considered in regard to the determinations which distinguish it from
+whatever is conditioned, and will thus afford us material for many à
+priori synthetical propositions.
+
+The principles resulting from this highest principle of pure reason
+will, however, be transcendent in relation to phenomena, that is to
+say, it will be impossible to make any adequate empirical use of this
+principle. It is therefore completely different from all principles of
+the understanding, the use made of which is entirely immanent, their
+object and purpose being merely the possibility of experience. Now our
+duty in the transcendental dialectic is as follows. To discover whether
+the principle that the series of conditions (in the synthesis of
+phenomena, or of thought in general) extends to the unconditioned is
+objectively true, or not; what consequences result therefrom affecting
+the empirical use of the understanding, or rather whether there exists
+any such objectively valid proposition of reason, and whether it is
+not, on the contrary, a merely logical precept which directs us to
+ascend perpetually to still higher conditions, to approach completeness
+in the series of them, and thus to introduce into our cognition the
+highest possible unity of reason. We must ascertain, I say, whether
+this requirement of reason has not been regarded, by a
+misunderstanding, as a transcendental principle of pure reason, which
+postulates a thorough completeness in the series of conditions in
+objects themselves. We must show, moreover, the misconceptions and
+illusions that intrude into syllogisms, the major proposition of which
+pure reason has supplied--a proposition which has perhaps more of the
+character of a petitio than of a postulatum--and that proceed from
+experience upwards to its conditions. The solution of these problems is
+our task in transcendental dialectic, which we are about to expose even
+at its source, that lies deep in human reason. We shall divide it into
+two parts, the first of which will treat of the transcendent
+conceptions of pure reason, the second of transcendent and dialectical
+syllogisms.
+
+TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC--BOOK I--OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF PURE REASON.
+
+The conceptions of pure reason--we do not here speak of the possibility
+of them--are not obtained by reflection, but by inference or conclusion.
+The conceptions of understanding are also cogitated à priori
+antecedently to experience, and render it possible; but they contain
+nothing but the unity of reflection upon phenomena, in so far as these
+must necessarily belong to a possible empirical consciousness. Through
+them alone are cognition and the determination of an object possible.
+It is from them, accordingly, that we receive material for reasoning,
+and antecedently to them we possess no à priori conceptions of objects
+from which they might be deduced, On the other hand, the sole basis of
+their objective reality consists in the necessity imposed on them, as
+containing the intellectual form of all experience, of restricting
+their application and influence to the sphere of experience.
+
+But the term, conception of reason, or rational conception, itself
+indicates that it does not confine itself within the limits of
+experience, because its object-matter is a cognition, of which every
+empirical cognition is but a part--nay, the whole of possible experience
+may be itself but a part of it--a cognition to which no actual
+experience ever fully attains, although it does always pertain to it.
+The aim of rational conceptions is the comprehension, as that of the
+conceptions of understanding is the understanding of perceptions. If
+they contain the unconditioned, they relate to that to which all
+experience is subordinate, but which is never itself an object of
+experience--that towards which reason tends in all its conclusions from
+experience, and by the standard of which it estimates the degree of
+their empirical use, but which is never itself an element in an
+empirical synthesis. If, notwithstanding, such conceptions possess
+objective validity, they may be called conceptus ratiocinati
+(conceptions legitimately concluded); in cases where they do not, they
+have been admitted on account of having the appearance of being
+correctly concluded, and may be called conceptus ratiocinantes
+(sophistical conceptions). But as this can only be sufficiently
+demonstrated in that part of our treatise which relates to the
+dialectical conclusions of reason, we shall omit any consideration of
+it in this place. As we called the pure conceptions of the
+understanding categories, we shall also distinguish those of pure
+reason by a new name and call them transcendental ideas. These terms,
+however, we must in the first place explain and justify.
+
+Section I--Of Ideas in General
+
+Despite the great wealth of words which European languages possess, the
+thinker finds himself often at a loss for an expression exactly suited
+to his conception, for want of which he is unable to make himself
+intelligible either to others or to himself. To coin new words is a
+pretension to legislation in language which is seldom successful; and,
+before recourse is taken to so desperate an expedient, it is advisable
+to examine the dead and learned languages, with the hope and the
+probability that we may there meet with some adequate expression of the
+notion we have in our minds. In this case, even if the original meaning
+of the word has become somewhat uncertain, from carelessness or want of
+caution on the part of the authors of it, it is always better to adhere
+to and confirm its proper meaning--even although it may be doubtful
+whether it was formerly used in exactly this sense--than to make our
+labour vain by want of sufficient care to render ourselves
+intelligible.
+
+For this reason, when it happens that there exists only a single word
+to express a certain conception, and this word, in its usual
+acceptation, is thoroughly adequate to the conception, the accurate
+distinction of which from related conceptions is of great importance,
+we ought not to employ the expression improvidently, or, for the sake
+of variety and elegance of style, use it as a synonym for other cognate
+words. It is our duty, on the contrary, carefully to preserve its
+peculiar signification, as otherwise it easily happens that when the
+attention of the reader is no longer particularly attracted to the
+expression, and it is lost amid the multitude of other words of very
+different import, the thought which it conveyed, and which it alone
+conveyed, is lost with it.
+
+Plato employed the expression idea in a way that plainly showed he
+meant by it something which is never derived from the senses, but which
+far transcends even the conceptions of the understanding (with which
+Aristotle occupied himself), inasmuch as in experience nothing
+perfectly corresponding to them could be found. Ideas are, according to
+him, archetypes of things themselves, and not merely keys to possible
+experiences, like the categories. In his view they flow from the
+highest reason, by which they have been imparted to human reason,
+which, however, exists no longer in its original state, but is obliged
+with great labour to recall by reminiscence--which is called
+philosophy--the old but now sadly obscured ideas. I will not here enter
+upon any literary investigation of the sense which this sublime
+philosopher attached to this expression. I shall content myself with
+remarking that it is nothing unusual, in common conversation as well as
+in written works, by comparing the thoughts which an author has
+delivered upon a subject, to understand him better than he understood
+himself inasmuch as he may not have sufficiently determined his
+conception, and thus have sometimes spoken, nay even thought, in
+opposition to his own opinions.
+
+Plato perceived very clearly that our faculty of cognition has the
+feeling of a much higher vocation than that of merely spelling out
+phenomena according to synthetical unity, for the purpose of being able
+to read them as experience, and that our reason naturally raises itself
+to cognitions far too elevated to admit of the possibility of an object
+given by experience corresponding to them--cognitions which are
+nevertheless real, and are not mere phantoms of the brain.
+
+This philosopher found his ideas especially in all that is
+practical,[41] that is, which rests upon freedom, which in its turn
+ranks under cognitions that are the peculiar product of reason. He who
+would derive from experience the conceptions of virtue, who would make
+(as many have really done) that, which at best can but serve as an
+imperfectly illustrative example, a model for or the formation of a
+perfectly adequate idea on the subject, would in fact transform virtue
+into a nonentity changeable according to time and circumstance and
+utterly incapable of being employed as a rule. On the contrary, every
+one is conscious that, when any one is held up to him as a model of
+virtue, he compares this so-called model with the true original which
+he possesses in his own mind and values him according to this standard.
+But this standard is the idea of virtue, in relation to which all
+possible objects of experience are indeed serviceable as
+examples--proofs of the practicability in a certain degree of that which
+the conception of virtue demands--but certainly not as archetypes. That
+the actions of man will never be in perfect accordance with all the
+requirements of the pure ideas of reason, does not prove the thought to
+be chimerical. For only through this idea are all judgements as to
+moral merit or demerit possible; it consequently lies at the foundation
+of every approach to moral perfection, however far removed from it the
+obstacles in human nature--indeterminable as to degree--may keep us.
+
+ [41] He certainly extended the application of his conception to
+ speculative cognitions also, provided they were given pure and
+ completely à priori, nay, even to mathematics, although this science
+ cannot possess an object otherwhere than in Possible experience. I
+ cannot follow him in this, and as little can I follow him in his
+ mystical deduction of these ideas, or in his hypostatization of them;
+ although, in truth, the elevated and exaggerated language which he
+ employed in describing them is quite capable of an interpretation more
+ subdued and more in accordance with fact and the nature of things.
+
+The Platonic Republic has become proverbial as an example--and a
+striking one--of imaginary perfection, such as can exist only in the
+brain of the idle thinker; and Brucker ridicules the philosopher for
+maintaining that a prince can never govern well, unless he is
+participant in the ideas. But we should do better to follow up this
+thought and, where this admirable thinker leaves us without assistance,
+employ new efforts to place it in clearer light, rather than carelessly
+fling it aside as useless, under the very miserable and pernicious
+pretext of impracticability. A constitution of the greatest possible
+human freedom according to laws, by which the liberty of every
+individual can consist with the liberty of every other (not of the
+greatest possible happiness, for this follows necessarily from the
+former), is, to say the least, a necessary idea, which must be placed
+at the foundation not only of the first plan of the constitution of a
+state, but of all its laws. And, in this, it not necessary at the
+outset to take account of the obstacles which lie in our way--obstacles
+which perhaps do not necessarily arise from the character of human
+nature, but rather from the previous neglect of true ideas in
+legislation. For there is nothing more pernicious and more unworthy of
+a philosopher, than the vulgar appeal to a so-called adverse
+experience, which indeed would not have existed, if those institutions
+had been established at the proper time and in accordance with ideas;
+while, instead of this, conceptions, crude for the very reason that
+they have been drawn from experience, have marred and frustrated all
+our better views and intentions. The more legislation and government
+are in harmony with this idea, the more rare do punishments become and
+thus it is quite reasonable to maintain, as Plato did, that in a
+perfect state no punishments at all would be necessary. Now although a
+perfect state may never exist, the idea is not on that account the less
+just, which holds up this maximum as the archetype or standard of a
+constitution, in order to bring legislative government always nearer
+and nearer to the greatest possible perfection. For at what precise
+degree human nature must stop in its progress, and how wide must be the
+chasm which must necessarily exist between the idea and its
+realization, are problems which no one can or ought to determine--and
+for this reason, that it is the destination of freedom to overstep all
+assigned limits between itself and the idea.
+
+But not only in that wherein human reason is a real causal agent and
+where ideas are operative causes (of actions and their objects), that
+is to say, in the region of ethics, but also in regard to nature
+herself, Plato saw clear proofs of an origin from ideas. A plant, and
+animal, the regular order of nature--probably also the disposition of
+the whole universe--give manifest evidence that they are possible only
+by means of and according to ideas; that, indeed, no one creature,
+under the individual conditions of its existence, perfectly harmonizes
+with the idea of the most perfect of its kind--just as little as man
+with the idea of humanity, which nevertheless he bears in his soul as
+the archetypal standard of his actions; that, notwithstanding, these
+ideas are in the highest sense individually, unchangeably, and
+completely determined, and are the original causes of things; and that
+the totality of connected objects in the universe is alone fully
+adequate to that idea. Setting aside the exaggerations of expression in
+the writings of this philosopher, the mental power exhibited in this
+ascent from the ectypal mode of regarding the physical world to the
+architectonic connection thereof according to ends, that is, ideas, is
+an effort which deserves imitation and claims respect. But as regards
+the principles of ethics, of legislation, and of religion, spheres in
+which ideas alone render experience possible, although they never
+attain to full expression therein, he has vindicated for himself a
+position of peculiar merit, which is not appreciated only because it is
+judged by the very empirical rules, the validity of which as principles
+is destroyed by ideas. For as regards nature, experience presents us
+with rules and is the source of truth, but in relation to ethical laws
+experience is the parent of illusion, and it is in the highest degree
+reprehensible to limit or to deduce the laws which dictate what I ought
+to do, from what is done.
+
+We must, however, omit the consideration of these important subjects,
+the development of which is in reality the peculiar duty and dignity of
+philosophy, and confine ourselves for the present to the more humble
+but not less useful task of preparing a firm foundation for those
+majestic edifices of moral science. For this foundation has been
+hitherto insecure from the many subterranean passages which reason in
+its confident but vain search for treasures has made in all directions.
+Our present duty is to make ourselves perfectly acquainted with the
+transcendental use made of pure reason, its principles and ideas, that
+we may be able properly to determine and value its influence and real
+worth. But before bringing these introductory remarks to a close, I beg
+those who really have philosophy at heart--and their number is but
+small--if they shall find themselves convinced by the considerations
+following as well as by those above, to exert themselves to preserve to
+the expression idea its original signification, and to take care that
+it be not lost among those other expressions by which all sorts of
+representations are loosely designated--that the interests of science
+may not thereby suffer. We are in no want of words to denominate
+adequately every mode of representation, without the necessity of
+encroaching upon terms which are proper to others. The following is a
+graduated list of them. The genus is representation in general
+(representatio). Under it stands representation with consciousness
+(perceptio). A perception which relates solely to the subject as a
+modification of its state, is a sensation (sensatio), an objective
+perception is a cognition (cognitio). A cognition is either an
+intuition or a conception (intuitus vel conceptus). The former has an
+immediate relation to the object and is singular and individual; the
+latter has but a mediate relation, by means of a characteristic mark
+which may be common to several things. A conception is either empirical
+or pure. A pure conception, in so far as it has its origin in the
+understanding alone, and is not the conception of a pure sensuous
+image, is called notio. A conception formed from notions, which
+transcends the possibility of experience, is an idea, or a conception
+of reason. To one who has accustomed himself to these distinctions, it
+must be quite intolerable to hear the representation of the colour red
+called an idea. It ought not even to be called a notion or conception
+of understanding.
+
+Section II. Of Transcendental Ideas
+
+Transcendental analytic showed us how the mere logical form of our
+cognition can contain the origin of pure conceptions à priori,
+conceptions which represent objects antecedently to all experience, or
+rather, indicate the synthetical unity which alone renders possible an
+empirical cognition of objects. The form of judgements--converted into a
+conception of the synthesis of intuitions--produced the categories which
+direct the employment of the understanding in experience. This
+consideration warrants us to expect that the form of syllogisms, when
+applied to synthetical unity of intuitions, following the rule of the
+categories, will contain the origin of particular à priori conceptions,
+which we may call pure conceptions of reason or transcendental ideas,
+and which will determine the use of the understanding in the totality
+of experience according to principles.
+
+The function of reason in arguments consists in the universality of a
+cognition according to conceptions, and the syllogism itself is a
+judgement which is determined à priori in the whole extent of its
+condition. The proposition: "Caius is mortal," is one which may be
+obtained from experience by the aid of the understanding alone; but my
+wish is to find a conception which contains the condition under which
+the predicate of this judgement is given--in this case, the conception
+of man--and after subsuming under this condition, taken in its whole
+extent (all men are mortal), I determine according to it the cognition
+of the object thought, and say: "Caius is mortal."
+
+Hence, in the conclusion of a syllogism we restrict a predicate to a
+certain object, after having thought it in the major in its whole
+extent under a certain condition. This complete quantity of the extent
+in relation to such a condition is called universality (universalitas).
+To this corresponds totality (universitas) of conditions in the
+synthesis of intuitions. The transcendental conception of reason is
+therefore nothing else than the conception of the totality of the
+conditions of a given conditioned. Now as the unconditioned alone
+renders possible totality of conditions, and, conversely, the totality
+of conditions is itself always unconditioned; a pure rational
+conception in general can be defined and explained by means of the
+conception of the unconditioned, in so far as it contains a basis for
+the synthesis of the conditioned.
+
+To the number of modes of relation which the understanding cogitates by
+means of the categories, the number of pure rational conceptions will
+correspond. We must therefore seek for, first, an unconditioned of the
+categorical synthesis in a subject; secondly, of the hypothetical
+synthesis of the members of a series; thirdly, of the disjunctive
+synthesis of parts in a system.
+
+There are exactly the same number of modes of syllogisms, each of which
+proceeds through prosyllogisms to the unconditioned--one to the subject
+which cannot be employed as predicate, another to the presupposition
+which supposes nothing higher than itself, and the third to an
+aggregate of the members of the complete division of a conception.
+Hence the pure rational conceptions of totality in the synthesis of
+conditions have a necessary foundation in the nature of human reason--at
+least as modes of elevating the unity of the understanding to the
+unconditioned. They may have no valid application, corresponding to
+their transcendental employment, in concreto, and be thus of no greater
+utility than to direct the understanding how, while extending them as
+widely as possible, to maintain its exercise and application in perfect
+consistence and harmony.
+
+But, while speaking here of the totality of conditions and of the
+unconditioned as the common title of all conceptions of reason, we
+again light upon an expression which we find it impossible to dispense
+with, and which nevertheless, owing to the ambiguity attaching to it
+from long abuse, we cannot employ with safety. The word absolute is one
+of the few words which, in its original signification, was perfectly
+adequate to the conception it was intended to convey--a conception which
+no other word in the same language exactly suits, and the loss--or,
+which is the same thing, the incautious and loose employment--of which
+must be followed by the loss of the conception itself. And, as it is a
+conception which occupies much of the attention of reason, its loss
+would be greatly to the detriment of all transcendental philosophy. The
+word absolute is at present frequently used to denote that something
+can be predicated of a thing considered in itself and intrinsically. In
+this sense absolutely possible would signify that which is possible in
+itself (interne)--which is, in fact, the least that one can predicate of
+an object. On the other hand, it is sometimes employed to indicate that
+a thing is valid in all respects--for example, absolute sovereignty.
+Absolutely possible would in this sense signify that which is possible
+in all relations and in every respect; and this is the most that can be
+predicated of the possibility of a thing. Now these significations do
+in truth frequently coincide. Thus, for example, that which is
+intrinsically impossible, is also impossible in all relations, that is,
+absolutely impossible. But in most cases they differ from each other
+toto caelo, and I can by no means conclude that, because a thing is in
+itself possible, it is also possible in all relations, and therefore
+absolutely. Nay, more, I shall in the sequel show that absolute
+necessity does not by any means depend on internal necessity, and that,
+therefore, it must not be considered as synonymous with it. Of an
+opposite which is intrinsically impossible, we may affirm that it is in
+all respects impossible, and that, consequently, the thing itself, of
+which this is the opposite, is absolutely necessary; but I cannot
+reason conversely and say, the opposite of that which is absolutely
+necessary is intrinsically impossible, that is, that the absolute
+necessity of things is an internal necessity. For this internal
+necessity is in certain cases a mere empty word with which the least
+conception cannot be connected, while the conception of the necessity
+of a thing in all relations possesses very peculiar determinations. Now
+as the loss of a conception of great utility in speculative science
+cannot be a matter of indifference to the philosopher, I trust that the
+proper determination and careful preservation of the expression on
+which the conception depends will likewise be not indifferent to him.
+
+In this enlarged signification, then, shall I employ the word absolute,
+in opposition to that which is valid only in some particular respect;
+for the latter is restricted by conditions, the former is valid without
+any restriction whatever.
+
+Now the transcendental conception of reason has for its object nothing
+else than absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions and does not
+rest satisfied till it has attained to the absolutely, that is, in all
+respects and relations, unconditioned. For pure reason leaves to the
+understanding everything that immediately relates to the object of
+intuition or rather to their synthesis in imagination. The former
+restricts itself to the absolute totality in the employment of the
+conceptions of the understanding and aims at carrying out the
+synthetical unity which is cogitated in the category, even to the
+unconditioned. This unity may hence be called the rational unity of
+phenomena, as the other, which the category expresses, may be termed
+the unity of the understanding. Reason, therefore, has an immediate
+relation to the use of the understanding, not indeed in so far as the
+latter contains the ground of possible experience (for the conception
+of the absolute totality of conditions is not a conception that can be
+employed in experience, because no experience is unconditioned), but
+solely for the purpose of directing it to a certain unity, of which the
+understanding has no conception, and the aim of which is to collect
+into an absolute whole all acts of the understanding. Hence the
+objective employment of the pure conceptions of reason is always
+transcendent, while that of the pure conceptions of the understanding
+must, according to their nature, be always immanent, inasmuch as they
+are limited to possible experience.
+
+I understand by idea a necessary conception of reason, to which no
+corresponding object can be discovered in the world of sense.
+Accordingly, the pure conceptions of reason at present under
+consideration are transcendental ideas. They are conceptions of pure
+reason, for they regard all empirical cognition as determined by means
+of an absolute totality of conditions. They are not mere fictions, but
+natural and necessary products of reason, and have hence a necessary
+relation to the whole sphere of the exercise of the understanding. And,
+finally, they are transcendent, and overstep the limits of all
+experiences, in which, consequently, no object can ever be presented
+that would be perfectly adequate to a transcendental idea. When we use
+the word idea, we say, as regards its object (an object of the pure
+understanding), a great deal, but as regards its subject (that is, in
+respect of its reality under conditions of experience), exceedingly
+little, because the idea, as the conception of a maximum, can never be
+completely and adequately presented in concreto. Now, as in the merely
+speculative employment of reason the latter is properly the sole aim,
+and as in this case the approximation to a conception, which is never
+attained in practice, is the same thing as if the conception were
+non-existent--it is commonly said of the conception of this kind, "it is
+only an idea." So we might very well say, "the absolute totality of all
+phenomena is only an idea," for, as we never can present an adequate
+representation of it, it remains for us a problem incapable of
+solution. On the other hand, as in the practical use of the
+understanding we have only to do with action and practice according to
+rules, an idea of pure reason can always be given really in concreto,
+although only partially, nay, it is the indispensable condition of all
+practical employment of reason. The practice or execution of the idea
+is always limited and defective, but nevertheless within indeterminable
+boundaries, consequently always under the influence of the conception
+of an absolute perfection. And thus the practical idea is always in the
+highest degree fruitful, and in relation to real actions indispensably
+necessary. In the idea, pure reason possesses even causality and the
+power of producing that which its conception contains. Hence we cannot
+say of wisdom, in a disparaging way, "it is only an idea." For, for the
+very reason that it is the idea of the necessary unity of all possible
+aims, it must be for all practical exertions and endeavours the
+primitive condition and rule--a rule which, if not constitutive, is at
+least limitative.
+
+Now, although we must say of the transcendental conceptions of reason,
+"they are only ideas," we must not, on this account, look upon them as
+superfluous and nugatory. For, although no object can be determined by
+them, they can be of great utility, unobserved and at the basis of the
+edifice of the understanding, as the canon for its extended and
+self-consistent exercise--a canon which, indeed, does not enable it to
+cognize more in an object than it would cognize by the help of its own
+conceptions, but which guides it more securely in its cognition. Not to
+mention that they perhaps render possible a transition from our
+conceptions of nature and the non-ego to the practical conceptions, and
+thus produce for even ethical ideas keeping, so to speak, and
+connection with the speculative cognitions of reason. The explication
+of all this must be looked for in the sequel.
+
+But setting aside, in conformity with our original purpose, the
+consideration of the practical ideas, we proceed to contemplate reason
+in its speculative use alone, nay, in a still more restricted sphere,
+to wit, in the transcendental use; and here must strike into the same
+path which we followed in our deduction of the categories. That is to
+say, we shall consider the logical form of the cognition of reason,
+that we may see whether reason may not be thereby a source of
+conceptions which enables us to regard objects in themselves as
+determined synthetically à priori, in relation to one or other of the
+functions of reason.
+
+Reason, considered as the faculty of a certain logical form of
+cognition, is the faculty of conclusion, that is, of mediate
+judgement--by means of the subsumption of the condition of a possible
+judgement under the condition of a given judgement. The given judgement
+is the general rule (major). The subsumption of the condition of
+another possible judgement under the condition of the rule is the
+minor. The actual judgement, which enounces the assertion of the rule
+in the subsumed case, is the conclusion (conclusio). The rule
+predicates something generally under a certain condition. The condition
+of the rule is satisfied in some particular case. It follows that what
+was valid in general under that condition must also be considered as
+valid in the particular case which satisfies this condition. It is very
+plain that reason attains to a cognition, by means of acts of the
+understanding which constitute a series of conditions. When I arrive at
+the proposition, "All bodies are changeable," by beginning with the
+more remote cognition (in which the conception of body does not appear,
+but which nevertheless contains the condition of that conception), "All
+compound is changeable," by proceeding from this to a less remote
+cognition, which stands under the condition of the former, "Bodies are
+compound," and hence to a third, which at length connects for me the
+remote cognition (changeable) with the one before me, "Consequently,
+bodies are changeable"--I have arrived at a cognition (conclusion)
+through a series of conditions (premisses). Now every series, whose
+exponent (of the categorical or hypothetical judgement) is given, can
+be continued; consequently the same procedure of reason conducts us to
+the ratiocinatio polysyllogistica, which is a series of syllogisms,
+that can be continued either on the side of the conditions (per
+prosyllogismos) or of the conditioned (per episyllogismos) to an
+indefinite extent.
+
+But we very soon perceive that the chain or series of prosyllogisms,
+that is, of deduced cognitions on the side of the grounds or conditions
+of a given cognition, in other words, the ascending series of
+syllogisms must have a very different relation to the faculty of reason
+from that of the descending series, that is, the progressive procedure
+of reason on the side of the conditioned by means of episyllogisms.
+For, as in the former case the cognition (conclusio) is given only as
+conditioned, reason can attain to this cognition only under the
+presupposition that all the members of the series on the side of the
+conditions are given (totality in the series of premisses), because
+only under this supposition is the judgement we may be considering
+possible à priori; while on the side of the conditioned or the
+inferences, only an incomplete and becoming, and not a presupposed or
+given series, consequently only a potential progression, is cogitated.
+Hence, when a cognition is contemplated as conditioned, reason is
+compelled to consider the series of conditions in an ascending line as
+completed and given in their totality. But if the very same condition
+is considered at the same time as the condition of other cognitions,
+which together constitute a series of inferences or consequences in a
+descending line, reason may preserve a perfect indifference, as to how
+far this progression may extend _a parte posteriori_, and whether the
+totality of this series is possible, because it stands in no need of
+such a series for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion before it,
+inasmuch as this conclusion is sufficiently guaranteed and determined
+on grounds a parte priori. It may be the case, that upon the side of
+the conditions the series of premisses has a first or highest
+condition, or it may not possess this, and so be a parte priori
+unlimited; but it must, nevertheless, contain totality of conditions,
+even admitting that we never could succeed in completely apprehending
+it; and the whole series must be unconditionally true, if the
+conditioned, which is considered as an inference resulting from it, is
+to be held as true. This is a requirement of reason, which announces
+its cognition as determined à priori and as necessary, either in
+itself--and in this case it needs no grounds to rest upon--or, if it is
+deduced, as a member of a series of grounds, which is itself
+unconditionally true.
+
+Section III. System of Transcendental Ideas
+
+We are not at present engaged with a logical dialectic, which makes
+complete abstraction of the content of cognition and aims only at
+unveiling the illusory appearance in the form of syllogisms. Our
+subject is transcendental dialectic, which must contain, completely à
+priori, the origin of certain cognitions drawn from pure reason, and
+the origin of certain deduced conceptions, the object of which cannot
+be given empirically and which therefore lie beyond the sphere of the
+faculty of understanding. We have observed, from the natural relation
+which the transcendental use of our cognition, in syllogisms as well as
+in judgements, must have to the logical, that there are three kinds of
+dialectical arguments, corresponding to the three modes of conclusion,
+by which reason attains to cognitions on principles; and that in all it
+is the business of reason to ascend from the conditioned synthesis,
+beyond which the understanding never proceeds, to the unconditioned
+which the understanding never can reach.
+
+Now the most general relations which can exist in our representations
+are: 1st, the relation to the subject; 2nd, the relation to objects,
+either as phenomena, or as objects of thought in general. If we connect
+this subdivision with the main division, all the relations of our
+representations, of which we can form either a conception or an idea,
+are threefold: 1. The relation to the subject; 2. The relation to the
+manifold of the object as a phenomenon; 3. The relation to all things
+in general.
+
+Now all pure conceptions have to do in general with the synthetical
+unity of representations; conceptions of pure reason (transcendental
+ideas), on the other hand, with the unconditional synthetical unity of
+all conditions. It follows that all transcendental ideas arrange
+themselves in three classes, the first of which contains the absolute
+(unconditioned) unity of the thinking subject, the second the absolute
+unity of the series of the conditions of a phenomenon, the third the
+absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general.
+
+The thinking subject is the object-matter of Psychology; the sum total
+of all phenomena (the world) is the object-matter of Cosmology; and the
+thing which contains the highest condition of the possibility of all
+that is cogitable (the being of all beings) is the object-matter of all
+Theology. Thus pure reason presents us with the idea of a
+transcendental doctrine of the soul (psychologia rationalis), of a
+transcendental science of the world (cosmologia rationalis), and
+finally of a transcendental doctrine of God (theologia
+transcendentalis). Understanding cannot originate even the outline of
+any of these sciences, even when connected with the highest logical use
+of reason, that is, all cogitable syllogisms--for the purpose of
+proceeding from one object (phenomenon) to all others, even to the
+utmost limits of the empirical synthesis. They are, on the contrary,
+pure and genuine products, or problems, of pure reason.
+
+What modi of the pure conceptions of reason these transcendental ideas
+are will be fully exposed in the following chapter. They follow the
+guiding thread of the categories. For pure reason never relates
+immediately to objects, but to the conceptions of these contained in
+the understanding. In like manner, it will be made manifest in the
+detailed explanation of these ideas--how reason, merely through the
+synthetical use of the same function which it employs in a categorical
+syllogism, necessarily attains to the conception of the absolute unity
+of the thinking subject--how the logical procedure in hypothetical ideas
+necessarily produces the idea of the absolutely unconditioned in a
+series of given conditions, and finally--how the mere form of the
+disjunctive syllogism involves the highest conception of a being of all
+beings: a thought which at first sight seems in the highest degree
+paradoxical.
+
+An objective deduction, such as we were able to present in the case of
+the categories, is impossible as regards these transcendental ideas.
+For they have, in truth, no relation to any object, in experience, for
+the very reason that they are only ideas. But a subjective deduction of
+them from the nature of our reason is possible, and has been given in
+the present chapter.
+
+It is easy to perceive that the sole aim of pure reason is the absolute
+totality of the synthesis on the side of the conditions, and that it
+does not concern itself with the absolute completeness on the Part of
+the conditioned. For of the former alone does she stand in need, in
+order to preposit the whole series of conditions, and thus present them
+to the understanding à priori. But if we once have a completely (and
+unconditionally) given condition, there is no further necessity, in
+proceeding with the series, for a conception of reason; for the
+understanding takes of itself every step downward, from the condition
+to the conditioned. Thus the transcendental ideas are available only
+for ascending in the series of conditions, till we reach the
+unconditioned, that is, principles. As regards descending to the
+conditioned, on the other hand, we find that there is a widely
+extensive logical use which reason makes of the laws of the
+understanding, but that a transcendental use thereof is impossible; and
+that when we form an idea of the absolute totality of such a synthesis,
+for example, of the whole series of all future changes in the world,
+this idea is a mere ens rationis, an arbitrary fiction of thought, and
+not a necessary presupposition of reason. For the possibility of the
+conditioned presupposes the totality of its conditions, but not of its
+consequences. Consequently, this conception is not a transcendental
+idea--and it is with these alone that we are at present occupied.
+
+Finally, it is obvious that there exists among the transcendental ideas
+a certain connection and unity, and that pure reason, by means of them,
+collects all its cognitions into one system. From the cognition of self
+to the cognition of the world, and through these to the supreme being,
+the progression is so natural, that it seems to resemble the logical
+march of reason from the premisses to the conclusion.[42] Now whether
+there lies unobserved at the foundation of these ideas an analogy of
+the same kind as exists between the logical and transcendental
+procedure of reason, is another of those questions, the answer to which
+we must not expect till we arrive at a more advanced stage in our
+inquiries. In this cursory and preliminary view, we have, meanwhile,
+reached our aim. For we have dispelled the ambiguity which attached to
+the transcendental conceptions of reason, from their being commonly
+mixed up with other conceptions in the systems of philosophers, and not
+properly distinguished from the conceptions of the understanding; we
+have exposed their origin and, thereby, at the same time their
+determinate number, and presented them in a systematic connection, and
+have thus marked out and enclosed a definite sphere for pure reason.
+
+ [42] The science of Metaphysics has for the proper object of its
+ inquiries only three grand ideas: GOD, FREEDOM, and IMMORTALITY, and
+ it aims at showing, that the second conception, conjoined with the
+ first, must lead to the third, as a necessary conclusion. All the
+ other subjects with which it occupies itself, are merely means for the
+ attainment and realization of these ideas. It does not require these
+ ideas for the construction of a science of nature, but, on the
+ contrary, for the purpose of passing beyond the sphere of nature. A
+ complete insight into and comprehension of them would render Theology,
+ Ethics, and, through the conjunction of both, Religion, solely
+ dependent on the speculative faculty of reason. In a systematic
+ representation of these ideas the above-mentioned arrangement--the
+ synthetical one--would be the most suitable; but in the investigation
+ which must necessarily precede it, the analytical, which reverses this
+ arrangement, would be better adapted to our purpose, as in it we
+ should proceed from that which experience immediately presents to
+ us--psychology, to cosmology, and thence to theology.
+
+TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC--BOOK II--OF THE DIALECTICAL PROCEDURE OF PURE
+REASON
+
+It may be said that the object of a merely transcendental idea is
+something of which we have no conception, although the idea may be a
+necessary product of reason according to its original laws. For, in
+fact, a conception of an object that is adequate to the idea given by
+reason, is impossible. For such an object must be capable of being
+presented and intuited in a Possible experience. But we should express
+our meaning better, and with less risk of being misunderstood, if we
+said that we can have no knowledge of an object, which perfectly
+corresponds to an idea, although we may possess a problematical
+conception thereof.
+
+Now the transcendental (subjective) reality at least of the pure
+conceptions of reason rests upon the fact that we are led to such ideas
+by a necessary procedure of reason. There must therefore be syllogisms
+which contain no empirical premisses, and by means of which we conclude
+from something that we do know, to something of which we do not even
+possess a conception, to which we, nevertheless, by an unavoidable
+illusion, ascribe objective reality. Such arguments are, as regards
+their result, rather to be termed sophisms than syllogisms, although
+indeed, as regards their origin, they are very well entitled to the
+latter name, inasmuch as they are not fictions or accidental products
+of reason, but are necessitated by its very nature. They are sophisms,
+not of men, but of pure reason herself, from which the Wisest cannot
+free himself. After long labour he may be able to guard against the
+error, but he can never be thoroughly rid of the illusion which
+continually mocks and misleads him.
+
+Of these dialectical arguments there are three kinds, corresponding
+to the number of the ideas which their conclusions present. In the
+argument or syllogism of the first class, I conclude, from the
+transcendental conception of the subject which contains no manifold,
+the absolute unity of the subject itself, of which I cannot in this
+manner attain to a conception. This dialectical argument I shall
+call the transcendental paralogism. The second class of sophistical
+arguments is occupied with the transcendental conception of the
+absolute totality of the series of conditions for a given phenomenon,
+and I conclude, from the fact that I have always a self-contradictory
+conception of the unconditioned synthetical unity of the series upon
+one side, the truth of the opposite unity, of which I have nevertheless
+no conception. The condition of reason in these dialectical arguments,
+I shall term the antinomy of pure reason. Finally, according to the
+third kind of sophistical argument, I conclude, from the totality of
+the conditions of thinking objects in general, in so far as they can
+be given, the absolute synthetical unity of all conditions of the
+possibility of things in general; that is, from things which I do not
+know in their mere transcendental conception, I conclude a being of all
+beings which I know still less by means of a transcendental conception,
+and of whose unconditioned necessity I can form no conception whatever.
+This dialectical argument I shall call the ideal of pure reason.
+
+Chapter I. Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason
+
+The logical paralogism consists in the falsity of an argument in
+respect of its form, be the content what it may. But a transcendental
+paralogism has a transcendental foundation, and concludes falsely,
+while the form is correct and unexceptionable. In this manner the
+paralogism has its foundation in the nature of human reason, and is the
+parent of an unavoidable, though not insoluble, mental illusion.
+
+We now come to a conception which was not inserted in the general list
+of transcendental conceptions, and yet must be reckoned with them, but
+at the same time without in the least altering, or indicating a
+deficiency in that table. This is the conception, or, if the term is
+preferred, the judgement, "I think." But it is readily perceived that
+this thought is as it were the vehicle of all conceptions in general,
+and consequently of transcendental conceptions also, and that it is
+therefore regarded as a transcendental conception, although it can have
+no peculiar claim to be so ranked, inasmuch as its only use is to
+indicate that all thought is accompanied by consciousness. At the same
+time, pure as this conception is from empirical content (impressions of
+the senses), it enables us to distinguish two different kinds of
+objects. "I," as thinking, am an object of the internal sense, and am
+called soul. That which is an object of the external senses is called
+body. Thus the expression, "I," as a thinking being, designates the
+object-matter of psychology, which may be called "the rational doctrine
+of the soul," inasmuch as in this science I desire to know nothing of
+the soul but what, independently of all experience (which determines me
+in concreto), may be concluded from this conception "I," in so far as
+it appears in all thought.
+
+Now, the rational doctrine of the soul is really an undertaking of this
+kind. For if the smallest empirical element of thought, if any
+particular perception of my internal state, were to be introduced among
+the grounds of cognition of this science, it would not be a rational,
+but an empirical doctrine of the soul. We have thus before us a
+pretended science, raised upon the single proposition, "I think," whose
+foundation or want of foundation we may very properly, and agreeably
+with the nature of a transcendental philosophy, here examine. It ought
+not to be objected that in this proposition, which expresses the
+perception of one's self, an internal experience is asserted, and that
+consequently the rational doctrine of the soul which is founded upon
+it, is not pure, but partly founded upon an empirical principle. For
+this internal perception is nothing more than the mere apperception, "I
+think," which in fact renders all transcendental conceptions possible,
+in which we say, "I think substance, cause, etc." For internal
+experience in general and its possibility, or perception in general,
+and its relation to other perceptions, unless some particular
+distinction or determination thereof is empirically given, cannot be
+regarded as empirical cognition, but as cognition of the empirical, and
+belongs to the investigation of the possibility of every experience,
+which is certainly transcendental. The smallest object of experience
+(for example, only pleasure or pain), that should be included in the
+general representation of self-consciousness, would immediately change
+the rational into an empirical psychology.
+
+"I think" is therefore the only text of rational psychology, from which
+it must develop its whole system. It is manifest that this thought,
+when applied to an object (myself), can contain nothing but
+transcendental predicates thereof; because the least empirical
+predicate would destroy the purity of the science and its independence
+of all experience.
+
+But we shall have to follow here the guidance of the categories--only,
+as in the present case a thing, "I," as thinking being, is at first
+given, we shall--not indeed change the order of the categories as it
+stands in the table--but begin at the category of substance, by which at
+the a thing in itself is represented and proceeds backwards through the
+series. The topic of the rational doctrine of the soul, from which
+everything else it may contain must be deduced, is accordingly as
+follows:
+
+            1                          2
+  The Soul is SUBSTANCE       As regards its quality
+                                it is SIMPLE
+
+                      3
+          As regards the different
+          times in which it exists,
+          it is numerically identical,
+          that is UNITY, not Plurality.
+
+                       4
+  It is in relation to possible objects in space[43]
+
+ [43] The reader, who may not so easily perceive the psychological
+ sense of these expressions, taken here in their transcendental
+ abstraction, and cannot guess why the latter attribute of the soul
+ belongs to the category of existence, will find the expressions
+ sufficiently explained and justified in the sequel. I have, moreover,
+ to apologize for the Latin terms which have been employed, instead of
+ their German synonyms, contrary to the rules of correct writing. But I
+ judged it better to sacrifice elegance to perspicuity.
+
+From these elements originate all the conceptions of pure psychology,
+by combination alone, without the aid of any other principle. This
+substance, merely as an object of the internal sense, gives the
+conception of Immateriality; as simple substance, that of
+Incorruptibility; its identity, as intellectual substance, gives the
+conception of Personality; all these three together, Spirituality. Its
+relation to objects in space gives us the conception of connection
+(commercium) with bodies. Thus it represents thinking substance as the
+principle of life in matter, that is, as a soul (anima), and as the
+ground of Animality; and this, limited and determined by the conception
+of spirituality, gives us that of Immortality.
+
+Now to these conceptions relate four paralogisms of a transcendental
+psychology, which is falsely held to be a science of pure reason,
+touching the nature of our thinking being. We can, however, lay at the
+foundation of this science nothing but the simple and in itself
+perfectly contentless representation "i" which cannot even be called a
+conception, but merely a consciousness which accompanies all
+conceptions. By this "I," or "He," or "It," who or which thinks,
+nothing more is represented than a transcendental subject of thought =
+x, which is cognized only by means of the thoughts that are its
+predicates, and of which, apart from these, we cannot form the least
+conception. Hence in a perpetual circle, inasmuch as we must always
+employ it, in order to frame any judgement respecting it. And this
+inconvenience we find it impossible to rid ourselves of, because
+consciousness in itself is not so much a representation distinguishing
+a particular object, as a form of representation in general, in so far
+as it may be termed cognition; for in and by cognition alone do I think
+anything.
+
+It must, however, appear extraordinary at first sight that the
+condition under which I think, and which is consequently a property of
+my subject, should be held to be likewise valid for every existence
+which thinks, and that we can presume to base upon a seemingly
+empirical proposition a judgement which is apodeictic and universal, to
+wit, that everything which thinks is constituted as the voice of my
+consciousness declares it to be, that is, as a self-conscious being.
+The cause of this belief is to be found in the fact that we necessarily
+attribute to things à priori all the properties which constitute
+conditions under which alone we can cogitate them. Now I cannot obtain
+the least representation of a thinking being by means of external
+experience, but solely through self-consciousness. Such objects are
+consequently nothing more than the transference of this consciousness
+of mine to other things which can only thus be represented as thinking
+beings. The proposition, "I think," is, in the present case, understood
+in a problematical sense, not in so far as it contains a perception of
+an existence (like the Cartesian "Cogito, ergo sum"), but in regard to
+its mere possibility--for the purpose of discovering what properties may
+be inferred from so simple a proposition and predicated of the subject
+of it.
+
+If at the foundation of our pure rational cognition of thinking beings
+there lay more than the mere Cogito--if we could likewise call in aid
+observations on the play of our thoughts, and the thence derived
+natural laws of the thinking self, there would arise an empirical
+psychology which would be a kind of physiology of the internal sense
+and might possibly be capable of explaining the phenomena of that
+sense. But it could never be available for discovering those properties
+which do not belong to possible experience (such as the quality of
+simplicity), nor could it make any apodeictic enunciation on the nature
+of thinking beings: it would therefore not be a rational psychology.
+
+Now, as the proposition "I think" (in the problematical sense) contains
+the form of every judgement in general and is the constant
+accompaniment of all the categories, it is manifest that conclusions
+are drawn from it only by a transcendental employment of the
+understanding. This use of the understanding excludes all empirical
+elements; and we cannot, as has been shown above, have any favourable
+conception beforehand of its procedure. We shall therefore follow with
+a critical eye this proposition through all the predicaments of pure
+psychology; but we shall, for brevity's sake, allow this examination to
+proceed in an uninterrupted connection.
+
+Before entering on this task, however, the following general remark may
+help to quicken our attention to this mode of argument. It is not
+merely through my thinking that I cognize an object, but only through
+my determining a given intuition in relation to the unity of
+consciousness in which all thinking consists. It follows that I cognize
+myself, not through my being conscious of myself as thinking, but only
+when I am conscious of the intuition of myself as determined in
+relation to the function of thought. All the modi of self-consciousness
+in thought are hence not conceptions of objects (conceptions of the
+understanding--categories); they are mere logical functions, which do
+not present to thought an object to be cognized, and cannot therefore
+present my Self as an object. Not the consciousness of the determining,
+but only that of the determinable self, that is, of my internal
+intuition (in so far as the manifold contained in it can be connected
+conformably with the general condition of the unity of apperception in
+thought), is the object.
+
+1. In all judgements I am the determining subject of that relation
+which constitutes a judgement. But that the I which thinks, must be
+considered as in thought always a subject, and as a thing which cannot
+be a predicate to thought, is an apodeictic and identical proposition.
+But this proposition does not signify that I, as an object, am, for
+myself, a self-subsistent being or substance. This latter statement--an
+ambitious one--requires to be supported by data which are not to be
+discovered in thought; and are perhaps (in so far as I consider the
+thinking self merely as such) not to be discovered in the thinking self
+at all.
+
+2. That the I or Ego of apperception, and consequently in all thought,
+is singular or simple, and cannot be resolved into a plurality of
+subjects, and therefore indicates a logically simple subject--this is
+self-evident from the very conception of an Ego, and is consequently an
+analytical proposition. But this is not tantamount to declaring that
+the thinking Ego is a simple substance--for this would be a synthetical
+proposition. The conception of substance always relates to intuitions,
+which with me cannot be other than sensuous, and which consequently lie
+completely out of the sphere of the understanding and its thought: but
+to this sphere belongs the affirmation that the Ego is simple in
+thought. It would indeed be surprising, if the conception of
+"substance," which in other cases requires so much labour to
+distinguish from the other elements presented by intuition--so much
+trouble, too, to discover whether it can be simple (as in the case of
+the parts of matter)--should be presented immediately to me, as if by
+revelation, in the poorest mental representation of all.
+
+3. The proposition of the identity of my Self amidst all the manifold
+representations of which I am conscious, is likewise a proposition
+lying in the conceptions themselves, and is consequently analytical.
+But this identity of the subject, of which I am conscious in all its
+representations, does not relate to or concern the intuition of the
+subject, by which it is given as an object. This proposition cannot
+therefore enounce the identity of the person, by which is understood
+the consciousness of the identity of its own substance as a thinking
+being in all change and variation of circumstances. To prove this, we
+should require not a mere analysis of the proposition, but synthetical
+judgements based upon a given intuition.
+
+4. I distinguish my own existence, as that of a thinking being, from
+that of other things external to me--among which my body also is
+reckoned. This is also an analytical proposition, for other things are
+exactly those which I think as different or distinguished from myself.
+But whether this consciousness of myself is possible without things
+external to me; and whether therefore I can exist merely as a thinking
+being (without being man)--cannot be known or inferred from this
+proposition.
+
+Thus we have gained nothing as regards the cognition of myself as
+object, by the analysis of the consciousness of my Self in thought. The
+logical exposition of thought in general is mistaken for a metaphysical
+determination of the object.
+
+Our Critique would be an investigation utterly superfluous, if there
+existed a possibility of proving à priori, that all thinking beings are
+in themselves simple substances, as such, therefore, possess the
+inseparable attribute of personality, and are conscious of their
+existence apart from and unconnected with matter. For we should thus
+have taken a step beyond the world of sense, and have penetrated into
+the sphere of noumena; and in this case the right could not be denied
+us of extending our knowledge in this sphere, of establishing
+ourselves, and, under a favouring star, appropriating to ourselves
+possessions in it. For the proposition: "Every thinking being, as such,
+is simple substance," is an à priori synthetical proposition; because
+in the first place it goes beyond the conception which is the subject
+of it, and adds to the mere notion of a thinking being the mode of its
+existence, and in the second place annexes a predicate (that of
+simplicity) to the latter conception--a predicate which it could not
+have discovered in the sphere of experience. It would follow that à
+priori synthetical propositions are possible and legitimate, not only,
+as we have maintained, in relation to objects of possible experience,
+and as principles of the possibility of this experience itself, but are
+applicable to things in themselves--an inference which makes an end of
+the whole of this Critique, and obliges us to fall back on the old mode
+of metaphysical procedure. But indeed the danger is not so great, if we
+look a little closer into the question.
+
+There lurks in the procedure of rational Psychology a paralogism, which
+is represented in the following syllogism:
+
+That which cannot be cogitated otherwise than as subject, does not
+exist otherwise than as subject, and is therefore substance.
+
+A thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be cogitated
+otherwise than as subject.
+
+Therefore it exists also as such, that is, as substance.
+
+In the major we speak of a being that can be cogitated generally and in
+every relation, consequently as it may be given in intuition. But in
+the minor we speak of the same being only in so far as it regards
+itself as subject, relatively to thought and the unity of
+consciousness, but not in relation to intuition, by which it is
+presented as an object to thought. Thus the conclusion is here arrived
+at by a Sophisma figurae dictionis.[44]
+
+ [44] Thought is taken in the two premisses in two totally different
+ senses. In the major it is considered as relating and applying to
+ objects in general, consequently to objects of intuition also. In the
+ minor, we understand it as relating merely to self-consciousness. In
+ this sense, we do not cogitate an object, but merely the relation to
+ the self-consciousness of the subject, as the form of thought. In the
+ former premiss we speak of things which cannot be cogitated otherwise
+ than as subjects. In the second, we do not speak of things, but of
+ thought (all objects being abstracted), in which the Ego is always the
+ subject of consciousness. Hence the conclusion cannot be, "I cannot
+ exist otherwise than as subject"; but only "I can, in cogitating my
+ existence, employ my Ego only as the subject of the judgement." But
+ this is an identical proposition, and throws no light on the mode of
+ my existence.
+
+That this famous argument is a mere paralogism, will be plain to any
+one who will consider the general remark which precedes our exposition
+of the principles of the pure understanding, and the section on
+noumena. For it was there proved that the conception of a thing, which
+can exist per se--only as a subject and never as a predicate, possesses
+no objective reality; that is to say, we can never know whether there
+exists any object to correspond to the conception; consequently, the
+conception is nothing more than a conception, and from it we derive no
+proper knowledge. If this conception is to indicate by the term
+substance, an object that can be given, if it is to become a cognition,
+we must have at the foundation of the cognition a permanent intuition,
+as the indispensable condition of its objective reality. For through
+intuition alone can an object be given. But in internal intuition there
+is nothing permanent, for the Ego is but the consciousness of my
+thought. If then, we appeal merely to thought, we cannot discover the
+necessary condition of the application of the conception of
+substance--that is, of a subject existing per se--to the subject as a
+thinking being. And thus the conception of the simple nature of
+substance, which is connected with the objective reality of this
+conception, is shown to be also invalid, and to be, in fact, nothing
+more than the logical qualitative unity of self-consciousness in
+thought; whilst we remain perfectly ignorant whether the subject is
+composite or not.
+
+Refutation of the Argument of Mendelssohn for the Substantiality or
+Permanence of the Soul.
+
+This acute philosopher easily perceived the insufficiency of the common
+argument which attempts to prove that the soul--it being granted that it
+is a simple being--cannot perish by dissolution or decomposition; he saw
+it is not impossible for it to cease to be by extinction, or
+disappearance. He endeavoured to prove in his Phaedo, that the soul
+cannot be annihilated, by showing that a simple being cannot cease to
+exist. Inasmuch as, he said, a simple existence cannot diminish, nor
+gradually lose portions of its being, and thus be by degrees reduced to
+nothing (for it possesses no parts, and therefore no multiplicity),
+between the moment in which it is, and the moment in which it is not,
+no time can be discovered--which is impossible. But this philosopher did
+not consider that, granting the soul to possess this simple nature,
+which contains no parts external to each other and consequently no
+extensive quantity, we cannot refuse to it any less than to any other
+being, intensive quantity, that is, a degree of reality in regard to
+all its faculties, nay, to all that constitutes its existence. But this
+degree of reality can become less and less through an infinite series
+of smaller degrees. It follows, therefore, that this supposed
+substance--this thing, the permanence of which is not assured in any
+other way, may, if not by decomposition, by gradual loss (remissio) of
+its powers (consequently by elanguescence, if I may employ this
+expression), be changed into nothing. For consciousness itself has
+always a degree, which may be lessened.[45] Consequently the faculty of
+being conscious may be diminished; and so with all other faculties. The
+permanence of the soul, therefore, as an object of the internal sense,
+remains undemonstrated, nay, even indemonstrable. Its permanence in
+life is evident, per se, inasmuch as the thinking being (as man) is to
+itself, at the same time, an object of the external senses. But this
+does not authorize the rational psychologist to affirm, from mere
+conceptions, its permanence beyond life.[46]
+
+ [45] Clearness is not, as logicians maintain, the consciousness of a
+ representation. For a certain degree of consciousness, which may not,
+ however, be sufficient for recollection, is to be met with in many dim
+ representations. For without any consciousness at all, we should not
+ be able to recognize any difference in the obscure representations we
+ connect; as we really can do with many conceptions, such as those of
+ right and justice, and those of the musician, who strikes at once
+ several notes in improvising a piece of music. But a representation is
+ clear, in which our consciousness is sufficient for the consciousness
+ of the difference of this representation from others. If we are only
+ conscious that there is a difference, but are not conscious of the
+ difference--that is, what the difference is--the representation must be
+ termed obscure. There is, consequently, an infinite series of degrees
+ of consciousness down to its entire disappearance.
+
+ [46] There are some who think they have done enough to establish a new
+ possibility in the mode of the existence of souls, when they have
+ shown that there is no contradiction in their hypotheses on this
+ subject. Such are those who affirm the possibility of thought--of which
+ they have no other knowledge than what they derive from its use in
+ connecting empirical intuitions presented in this our human life--after
+ this life has ceased. But it is very easy to embarrass them by the
+ introduction of counter-possibilities, which rest upon quite as good a
+ foundation. Such, for example, is the possibility of the division of a
+ simple substance into several substances; and conversely, of the
+ coalition of several into one simple substance. For, although
+ divisibility presupposes composition, it does not necessarily require
+ a composition of substances, but only of the degrees (of the several
+ faculties) of one and the same substance. Now we can cogitate all the
+ powers and faculties of the soul--even that of consciousness--as
+ diminished by one half, the substance still remaining. In the same way
+ we can represent to ourselves without contradiction, this obliterated
+ half as preserved, not in the soul, but without it; and we can believe
+ that, as in this case every thing that is real in the soul, and has a
+ degree--consequently its entire existence--has been halved, a particular
+ substance would arise out of the soul. For the multiplicity, which has
+ been divided, formerly existed, but not as a multiplicity of
+ substances, but of every reality as the quantum of existence in it;
+ and the unity of substance was merely a mode of existence, which by
+ this division alone has been transformed into a plurality of
+ subsistence. In the same manner several simple substances might
+ coalesce into one, without anything being lost except the plurality of
+ subsistence, inasmuch as the one substance would contain the degree of
+ reality of all the former substances. Perhaps, indeed, the simple
+ substances, which appear under the form of matter, might (not indeed
+ by a mechanical or chemical influence upon each other, but by an
+ unknown influence, of which the former would be but the phenomenal
+ appearance), by means of such a dynamical division of the
+ parent-souls, as intensive quantities, produce other souls, while the
+ former repaired the loss thus sustained with new matter of the same
+ sort. I am far from allowing any value to such chimeras; and the
+ principles of our analytic have clearly proved that no other than an
+ empirical use of the categories--that of substance, for example--is
+ possible. But if the rationalist is bold enough to construct, on the
+ mere authority of the faculty of thought--without any intuition,
+ whereby an object is given--a self-subsistent being, merely because the
+ unity of apperception in thought cannot allow him to believe it a
+ composite being, instead of declaring, as he ought to do, that he is
+ unable to explain the possibility of a thinking nature; what ought to
+ hinder the materialist, with as complete an independence of
+ experience, to employ the principle of the rationalist in a directly
+ opposite manner--still preserving the formal unity required by his
+ opponent?
+
+If, now, we take the above propositions--as they must be accepted as
+valid for all thinking beings in the system of rational psychology--in
+synthetical connection, and proceed, from the category of relation,
+with the proposition: "All thinking beings are, as such, substances,"
+backwards through the series, till the circle is completed; we come at
+last to their existence, of which, in this system of rational
+psychology, substances are held to be conscious, independently of
+external things; nay, it is asserted that, in relation to the
+permanence which is a necessary characteristic of substance, they can
+of themselves determine external things. It follows that idealism--at
+least problematical idealism, is perfectly unavoidable in this
+rationalistic system. And, if the existence of outward things is not
+held to be requisite to the determination of the existence of a
+substance in time, the existence of these outward things at all, is a
+gratuitous assumption which remains without the possibility of a proof.
+
+But if we proceed analytically--the "I think" as a proposition
+containing in itself an existence as given, consequently modality being
+the principle--and dissect this proposition, in order to ascertain its
+content, and discover whether and how this Ego determines its existence
+in time and space without the aid of anything external; the
+propositions of rationalistic psychology would not begin with the
+conception of a thinking being, but with a reality, and the properties
+of a thinking being in general would be deduced from the mode in which
+this reality is cogitated, after everything empirical had been
+abstracted; as is shown in the following table:
+
+                        1
+                      I think,
+
+            2                             3
+        as Subject,              as simple Subject,
+
+                        4
+               as identical Subject,
+           in every state of my thought.
+
+Now, inasmuch as it is not determined in this second proposition,
+whether I can exist and be cogitated only as subject, and not also as a
+predicate of another being, the conception of a subject is here taken
+in a merely logical sense; and it remains undetermined, whether
+substance is to be cogitated under the conception or not. But in the
+third proposition, the absolute unity of apperception--the simple Ego in
+the representation to which all connection and separation, which
+constitute thought, relate, is of itself important; even although it
+presents us with no information about the constitution or subsistence
+of the subject. Apperception is something real, and the simplicity of
+its nature is given in the very fact of its possibility. Now in space
+there is nothing real that is at the same time simple; for points,
+which are the only simple things in space, are merely limits, but not
+constituent parts of space. From this follows the impossibility of a
+definition on the basis of materialism of the constitution of my Ego as
+a merely thinking subject. But, because my existence is considered in
+the first proposition as given, for it does not mean, "Every thinking
+being exists" (for this would be predicating of them absolute
+necessity), but only, "I exist thinking"; the proposition is quite
+empirical, and contains the determinability of my existence merely in
+relation to my representations in time. But as I require for this
+purpose something that is permanent, such as is not given in internal
+intuition; the mode of my existence, whether as substance or as
+accident, cannot be determined by means of this simple
+self-consciousness. Thus, if materialism is inadequate to explain the
+mode in which I exist, spiritualism is likewise as insufficient; and
+the conclusion is that we are utterly unable to attain to any knowledge
+of the constitution of the soul, in so far as relates to the
+possibility of its existence apart from external objects.
+
+And, indeed, how should it be possible, merely by the aid of the unity
+of consciousness--which we cognize only for the reason that it is
+indispensable to the possibility of experience--to pass the bounds of
+experience (our existence in this life); and to extend our cognition to
+the nature of all thinking beings by means of the empirical--but in
+relation to every sort of intuition, perfectly
+undetermined--proposition, "I think"?
+
+There does not then exist any rational psychology as a doctrine
+furnishing any addition to our knowledge of ourselves. It is nothing
+more than a discipline, which sets impassable limits to speculative
+reason in this region of thought, to prevent it, on the one hand, from
+throwing itself into the arms of a soulless materialism, and, on the
+other, from losing itself in the mazes of a baseless spiritualism. It
+teaches us to consider this refusal of our reason to give any
+satisfactory answer to questions which reach beyond the limits of this
+our human life, as a hint to abandon fruitless speculation; and to
+direct, to a practical use, our knowledge of ourselves--which, although
+applicable only to objects of experience, receives its principles from
+a higher source, and regulates its procedure as if our destiny reached
+far beyond the boundaries of experience and life.
+
+From all this it is evident that rational psychology has its origin in
+a mere misunderstanding. The unity of consciousness, which lies at the
+basis of the categories, is considered to be an intuition of the
+subject as an object; and the category of substance is applied to the
+intuition. But this unity is nothing more than the unity in thought, by
+which no object is given; to which therefore the category of
+substance--which always presupposes a given intuition--cannot be applied.
+Consequently, the subject cannot be cognized. The subject of the
+categories cannot, therefore, for the very reason that it cogitates
+these, frame any conception of itself as an object of the categories;
+for, to cogitate these, it must lay at the foundation its own pure
+self-consciousness--the very thing that it wishes to explain and
+describe. In like manner, the subject, in which the representation of
+time has its basis, cannot determine, for this very reason, its own
+existence in time. Now, if the latter is impossible, the former, as an
+attempt to determine itself by means of the categories as a thinking
+being in general, is no less so.[47]
+
+ [47] The "I think" is, as has been already stated, an empirical
+ proposition, and contains the proposition, "I exist." But I cannot
+ say, "Everything, which thinks, exists"; for in this case the property
+ of thought would constitute all beings possessing it, necessary
+ beings. Hence my existence cannot be considered as an inference from
+ the proposition, "I think," as Descartes maintained--because in this
+ case the major premiss, "Everything, which thinks, exists," must
+ precede--but the two propositions are identical. The proposition, "I
+ think," expresses an undetermined empirical intuition, that perception
+ (proving consequently that sensation, which must belong to
+ sensibility, lies at the foundation of this proposition); but it
+ precedes experience, whose province it is to determine an object of
+ perception by means of the categories in relation to time; and
+ existence in this proposition is not a category, as it does not apply
+ to an undetermined given object, but only to one of which we have a
+ conception, and about which we wish to know whether it does or does
+ not exist, out of, and apart from this conception. An undetermined
+ perception signifies here merely something real that has been given,
+ only, however, to thought in general--but not as a phenomenon, nor as a
+ thing in itself (noumenon), but only as something that really exists,
+ and is designated as such in the proposition, "I think." For it must
+ be remarked that, when I call the proposition, "I think," an empirical
+ proposition, I do not thereby mean that the Ego in the proposition is
+ an empirical representation; on the contrary, it is purely
+ intellectual, because it belongs to thought in general. But without
+ some empirical representation, which presents to the mind material for
+ thought, the mental act, "I think," would not take place; and the
+ empirical is only the condition of the application or employment of
+ the pure intellectual faculty.
+
+Thus, then, appears the vanity of the hope of establishing a cognition
+which is to extend its rule beyond the limits of experience--a cognition
+which is one of the highest interests of humanity; and thus is proved
+the futility of the attempt of speculative philosophy in this region of
+thought. But, in this interest of thought, the severity of criticism
+has rendered to reason a not unimportant service, by the demonstration
+of the impossibility of making any dogmatical affirmation concerning an
+object of experience beyond the boundaries of experience. She has thus
+fortified reason against all affirmations of the contrary. Now, this
+can be accomplished in only two ways. Either our proposition must be
+proved apodeictically; or, if this is unsuccessful, the sources of this
+inability must be sought for, and, if these are discovered to exist in
+the natural and necessary limitation of our reason, our opponents must
+submit to the same law of renunciation and refrain from advancing
+claims to dogmatic assertion.
+
+But the right, say rather the necessity to admit a future life, upon
+principles of the practical conjoined with the speculative use of
+reason, has lost nothing by this renunciation; for the merely
+speculative proof has never had any influence upon the common reason of
+men. It stands upon the point of a hair, so that even the schools have
+been able to preserve it from falling only by incessantly discussing it
+and spinning it like a top; and even in their eyes it has never been
+able to present any safe foundation for the erection of a theory. The
+proofs which have been current among men, preserve their value
+undiminished; nay, rather gain in clearness and unsophisticated power,
+by the rejection of the dogmatical assumptions of speculative reason.
+For reason is thus confined within her own peculiar province--the
+arrangement of ends or aims, which is at the same time the arrangement
+of nature; and, as a practical faculty, without limiting itself to the
+latter, it is justified in extending the former, and with it our own
+existence, beyond the boundaries of experience and life. If we turn our
+attention to the analogy of the nature of living beings in this world,
+in the consideration of which reason is obliged to accept as a
+principle that no organ, no faculty, no appetite is useless, and that
+nothing is superfluous, nothing disproportionate to its use, nothing
+unsuited to its end; but that, on the contrary, everything is perfectly
+conformed to its destination in life--we shall find that man, who alone
+is the final end and aim of this order, is still the only animal that
+seems to be excepted from it. For his natural gifts--not merely as
+regards the talents and motives that may incite him to employ them, but
+especially the moral law in him--stretch so far beyond all mere earthly
+utility and advantage, that he feels himself bound to prize the mere
+consciousness of probity, apart from all advantageous consequences--even
+the shadowy gift of posthumous fame--above everything; and he is
+conscious of an inward call to constitute himself, by his conduct in
+this world--without regard to mere sublunary interests--the citizen of a
+better. This mighty, irresistible proof--accompanied by an
+ever-increasing knowledge of the conformability to a purpose in
+everything we see around us, by the conviction of the boundless
+immensity of creation, by the consciousness of a certain
+illimitableness in the possible extension of our knowledge, and by a
+desire commensurate therewith--remains to humanity, even after the
+theoretical cognition of ourselves has failed to establish the
+necessity of an existence after death.
+
+Conclusion of the Solution of the Psychological Paralogism.
+
+The dialectical illusion in rational psychology arises from our
+confounding an idea of reason (of a pure intelligence) with the
+conception--in every respect undetermined--of a thinking being in
+general. I cogitate myself in behalf of a possible experience, at the
+same time making abstraction of all actual experience; and infer
+therefrom that I can be conscious of myself apart from experience and
+its empirical conditions. I consequently confound the possible
+abstraction of my empirically determined existence with the supposed
+consciousness of a possible separate existence of my thinking self; and
+I believe that I cognize what is substantial in myself as a
+transcendental subject, when I have nothing more in thought than the
+unity of consciousness, which lies at the basis of all determination of
+cognition.
+
+The task of explaining the community of the soul with the body does not
+properly belong to the psychology of which we are here speaking;
+because it proposes to prove the personality of the soul apart from
+this communion (after death), and is therefore transcendent in the
+proper sense of the word, although occupying itself with an object of
+experience--only in so far, however, as it ceases to be an object of
+experience. But a sufficient answer may be found to the question in our
+system. The difficulty which lies in the execution of this task
+consists, as is well known, in the presupposed heterogeneity of the
+object of the internal sense (the soul) and the objects of the external
+senses; inasmuch as the formal condition of the intuition of the one is
+time, and of that of the other space also. But if we consider that both
+kinds of objects do not differ internally, but only in so far as the
+one appears externally to the other--consequently, that what lies at the
+basis of phenomena, as a thing in itself, may not be heterogeneous;
+this difficulty disappears. There then remains no other difficulty than
+is to be found in the question--how a community of substances is
+possible; a question which lies out of the region of psychology, and
+which the reader, after what in our analytic has been said of primitive
+forces and faculties, will easily judge to be also beyond the region of
+human cognition.
+
+GENERAL REMARK
+
+On the Transition from Rational Psychology to Cosmology.
+
+The proposition, "I think," or, "I exist thinking," is an empirical
+proposition. But such a proposition must be based on empirical
+intuition, and the object cogitated as a phenomenon; and thus our
+theory appears to maintain that the soul, even in thought, is merely a
+phenomenon; and in this way our consciousness itself, in fact, abuts
+upon nothing.
+
+Thought, per se, is merely the purely spontaneous logical function
+which operates to connect the manifold of a possible intuition; and it
+does not represent the subject of consciousness as a phenomenon--for
+this reason alone, that it pays no attention to the question whether
+the mode of intuiting it is sensuous or intellectual. I therefore do
+not represent myself in thought either as I am, or as I appear to
+myself; I merely cogitate myself as an object in general, of the mode
+of intuiting which I make abstraction. When I represent myself as the
+subject of thought, or as the ground of thought, these modes of
+representation are not related to the categories of substance or of
+cause; for these are functions of thought applicable only to our
+sensuous intuition. The application of these categories to the Ego
+would, however, be necessary, if I wished to make myself an object of
+knowledge. But I wish to be conscious of myself only as thinking; in
+what mode my Self is given in intuition, I do not consider, and it may
+be that I, who think, am a phenomenon--although not in so far as I am a
+thinking being; but in the consciousness of myself in mere thought I am
+a being, though this consciousness does not present to me any property
+of this being as material for thought.
+
+But the proposition, "I think," in so far as it declares, "I exist
+thinking," is not the mere representation of a logical function. It
+determines the subject (which is in this case an object also) in
+relation to existence; and it cannot be given without the aid of the
+internal sense, whose intuition presents to us an object, not as a
+thing in itself, but always as a phenomenon. In this proposition there
+is therefore something more to be found than the mere spontaneity of
+thought; there is also the receptivity of intuition, that is, my
+thought of myself applied to the empirical intuition of myself. Now, in
+this intuition the thinking self must seek the conditions of the
+employment of its logical functions as categories of substance, cause,
+and so forth; not merely for the purpose of distinguishing itself as an
+object in itself by means of the representation "I," but also for the
+purpose of determining the mode of its existence, that is, of cognizing
+itself as noumenon. But this is impossible, for the internal empirical
+intuition is sensuous, and presents us with nothing but phenomenal
+data, which do not assist the object of pure consciousness in its
+attempt to cognize itself as a separate existence, but are useful only
+as contributions to experience.
+
+But, let it be granted that we could discover, not in experience, but
+in certain firmly-established à priori laws of the use of pure
+reason--laws relating to our existence, authority to consider ourselves
+as legislating à priori in relation to our own existence and as
+determining this existence; we should, on this supposition, find
+ourselves possessed of a spontaneity, by which our actual existence
+would be determinable, without the aid of the conditions of empirical
+intuition. We should also become aware that in the consciousness of our
+existence there was an à priori content, which would serve to determine
+our own existence--an existence only sensuously determinable--relatively,
+however, to a certain internal faculty in relation to an intelligible
+world.
+
+But this would not give the least help to the attempts of rational
+psychology. For this wonderful faculty, which the consciousness of the
+moral law in me reveals, would present me with a principle of the
+determination of my own existence which is purely intellectual--but by
+what predicates? By none other than those which are given in sensuous
+intuition. Thus I should find myself in the same position in rational
+psychology which I formerly occupied, that is to say, I should find
+myself still in need of sensuous intuitions, in order to give
+significance to my conceptions of substance and cause, by means of
+which alone I can possess a knowledge of myself: but these intuitions
+can never raise me above the sphere of experience. I should be
+justified, however, in applying these conceptions, in regard to their
+practical use, which is always directed to objects of experience--in
+conformity with their analogical significance when employed
+theoretically--to freedom and its subject. At the same time, I should
+understand by them merely the logical functions of subject and
+predicate, of principle and consequence, in conformity with which all
+actions are so determined, that they are capable of being explained
+along with the laws of nature, conformably to the categories of
+substance and cause, although they originate from a very different
+principle. We have made these observations for the purpose of guarding
+against misunderstanding, to which the doctrine of our intuition of
+self as a phenomenon is exposed. We shall have occasion to perceive
+their utility in the sequel.
+
+Chapter II. The Antinomy of Pure Reason
+
+We showed in the introduction to this part of our work, that all
+transcendental illusion of pure reason arose from dialectical
+arguments, the schema of which logic gives us in its three formal
+species of syllogisms--just as the categories find their logical schema
+in the four functions of all judgements. The first kind of these
+sophistical arguments related to the unconditioned unity of the
+subjective conditions of all representations in general (of the subject
+or soul), in correspondence with the categorical syllogisms, the major
+of which, as the principle, enounces the relation of a predicate to a
+subject. The second kind of dialectical argument will therefore be
+concerned, following the analogy with hypothetical syllogisms, with the
+unconditioned unity of the objective conditions in the phenomenon; and,
+in this way, the theme of the third kind to be treated of in the
+following chapter will be the unconditioned unity of the objective
+conditions of the possibility of objects in general.
+
+But it is worthy of remark that the transcendental paralogism produced
+in the mind only a one-third illusion, in regard to the idea of the
+subject of our thought; and the conceptions of reason gave no ground to
+maintain the contrary proposition. The advantage is completely on the
+side of Pneumatism; although this theory itself passes into naught, in
+the crucible of pure reason.
+
+Very different is the case when we apply reason to the objective
+synthesis of phenomena. Here, certainly, reason establishes, with much
+plausibility, its principle of unconditioned unity; but it very soon
+falls into such contradictions that it is compelled, in relation to
+cosmology, to renounce its pretensions.
+
+For here a new phenomenon of human reason meets us--a perfectly natural
+antithetic, which does not require to be sought for by subtle
+sophistry, but into which reason of itself unavoidably falls. It is
+thereby preserved, to be sure, from the slumber of a fancied
+conviction--which a merely one-sided illusion produces; but it is at the
+same time compelled, either, on the one hand, to abandon itself to a
+despairing scepticism, or, on the other, to assume a dogmatical
+confidence and obstinate persistence in certain assertions, without
+granting a fair hearing to the other side of the question. Either is
+the death of a sound philosophy, although the former might perhaps
+deserve the title of the euthanasia of pure reason.
+
+Before entering this region of discord and confusion, which the
+conflict of the laws of pure reason (antinomy) produces, we shall
+present the reader with some considerations, in explanation and
+justification of the method we intend to follow in our treatment of
+this subject. I term all transcendental ideas, in so far as they relate
+to the absolute totality in the synthesis of phenomena, cosmical
+conceptions; partly on account of this unconditioned totality, on which
+the conception of the world-whole is based--a conception, which is
+itself an idea--partly because they relate solely to the synthesis of
+phenomena--the empirical synthesis; while, on the other hand, the
+absolute totality in the synthesis of the conditions of all possible
+things gives rise to an ideal of pure reason, which is quite distinct
+from the cosmical conception, although it stands in relation with it.
+Hence, as the paralogisms of pure reason laid the foundation for a
+dialectical psychology, the antinomy of pure reason will present us
+with the transcendental principles of a pretended pure (rational)
+cosmology--not, however, to declare it valid and to appropriate it,
+but--as the very term of a conflict of reason sufficiently indicates, to
+present it as an idea which cannot be reconciled with phenomena and
+experience.
+
+Section I. System of Cosmological Ideas
+
+That we may be able to enumerate with systematic precision these ideas
+according to a principle, we must remark, in the first place, that it
+is from the understanding alone that pure and transcendental
+conceptions take their origin; that the reason does not properly give
+birth to any conception, but only frees the conception of the
+understanding from the unavoidable limitation of a possible experience,
+and thus endeavours to raise it above the empirical, though it must
+still be in connection with it. This happens from the fact that, for a
+given conditioned, reason demands absolute totality on the side of the
+conditions (to which the understanding submits all phenomena), and thus
+makes of the category a transcendental idea. This it does that it may
+be able to give absolute completeness to the empirical synthesis, by
+continuing it to the unconditioned (which is not to be found in
+experience, but only in the idea). Reason requires this according to
+the principle: If the conditioned is given the whole of the conditions,
+and consequently the absolutely unconditioned, is also given, whereby
+alone the former was possible. First, then, the transcendental ideas
+are properly nothing but categories elevated to the unconditioned; and
+they may be arranged in a table according to the titles of the latter.
+But, secondly, all the categories are not available for this purpose,
+but only those in which the synthesis constitutes a series--of
+conditions subordinated to, not co-ordinated with, each other. Absolute
+totality is required of reason only in so far as concerns the ascending
+series of the conditions of a conditioned; not, consequently, when the
+question relates to the descending series of consequences, or to the
+aggregate of the co-ordinated conditions of these consequences. For, in
+relation to a given conditioned, conditions are presupposed and
+considered to be given along with it. On the other hand, as the
+consequences do not render possible their conditions, but rather
+presuppose them--in the consideration of the procession of consequences
+(or in the descent from the given condition to the conditioned), we may
+be quite unconcerned whether the series ceases or not; and their
+totality is not a necessary demand of reason.
+
+Thus we cogitate--and necessarily--a given time completely elapsed up to
+a given moment, although that time is not determinable by us. But as
+regards time future, which is not the condition of arriving at the
+present, in order to conceive it; it is quite indifferent whether we
+consider future time as ceasing at some point, or as prolonging itself
+to infinity. Take, for example, the series m, n, o, in which n is given
+as conditioned in relation to m, but at the same time as the condition
+of o, and let the series proceed upwards from the conditioned n to m
+(l, k, i, etc.), and also downwards from the condition n to the
+conditioned o (p, q, r, etc.)--I must presuppose the former series, to
+be able to consider n as given, and n is according to reason (the
+totality of conditions) possible only by means of that series. But its
+possibility does not rest on the following series o, p, q, r, which for
+this reason cannot be regarded as given, but only as capable of being
+given (dabilis).
+
+I shall term the synthesis of the series on the side of the
+conditions--from that nearest to the given phenomenon up to the more
+remote--regressive; that which proceeds on the side of the conditioned,
+from the immediate consequence to the more remote, I shall call the
+progressive synthesis. The former proceeds in antecedentia, the latter
+in consequentia. The cosmological ideas are therefore occupied with the
+totality of the regressive synthesis, and proceed in antecedentia, not
+in consequentia. When the latter takes place, it is an arbitrary and
+not a necessary problem of pure reason; for we require, for the
+complete understanding of what is given in a phenomenon, not the
+consequences which succeed, but the grounds or principles which
+precede.
+
+In order to construct the table of ideas in correspondence with the
+table of categories, we take first the two primitive quanta of all our
+intuitions, time and space. Time is in itself a series (and the formal
+condition of all series), and hence, in relation to a given present, we
+must distinguish à priori in it the antecedentia as conditions (time
+past) from the consequentia (time future). Consequently, the
+transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the series of the
+conditions of a given conditioned, relates merely to all past time.
+According to the idea of reason, the whole past time, as the condition
+of the given moment, is necessarily cogitated as given. But, as regards
+space, there exists in it no distinction between progressus and
+regressus; for it is an aggregate and not a series--its parts existing
+together at the same time. I can consider a given point of time in
+relation to past time only as conditioned, because this given moment
+comes into existence only through the past time rather through the
+passing of the preceding time. But as the parts of space are not
+subordinated, but co-ordinated to each other, one part cannot be the
+condition of the possibility of the other; and space is not in itself,
+like time, a series. But the synthesis of the manifold parts of
+space--(the syntheses whereby we apprehend space)--is nevertheless
+successive; it takes place, therefore, in time, and contains a series.
+And as in this series of aggregated spaces (for example, the feet in a
+rood), beginning with a given portion of space, those which continue to
+be annexed form the condition of the limits of the former--the
+measurement of a space must also be regarded as a synthesis of the
+series of the conditions of a given conditioned. It differs, however,
+in this respect from that of time, that the side of the conditioned is
+not in itself distinguishable from the side of the condition; and,
+consequently, regressus and progressus in space seem to be identical.
+But, inasmuch as one part of space is not given, but only limited, by
+and through another, we must also consider every limited space as
+conditioned, in so far as it presupposes some other space as the
+condition of its limitation, and so on. As regards limitation,
+therefore, our procedure in space is also a regressus, and the
+transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the synthesis in a
+series of conditions applies to space also; and I am entitled to demand
+the absolute totality of the phenomenal synthesis in space as well as
+in time. Whether my demand can be satisfied is a question to be
+answered in the sequel.
+
+Secondly, the real in space--that is, matter--is conditioned. Its
+internal conditions are its parts, and the parts of parts its remote
+conditions; so that in this case we find a regressive synthesis, the
+absolute totality of which is a demand of reason. But this cannot be
+obtained otherwise than by a complete division of parts, whereby the
+real in matter becomes either nothing or that which is not matter, that
+is to say, the simple. Consequently we find here also a series of
+conditions and a progress to the unconditioned.
+
+Thirdly, as regards the categories of a real relation between
+phenomena, the category of substance and its accidents is not suitable
+for the formation of a transcendental idea; that is to say, reason has
+no ground, in regard to it, to proceed regressively with conditions.
+For accidents (in so far as they inhere in a substance) are
+co-ordinated with each other, and do not constitute a series. And, in
+relation to substance, they are not properly subordinated to it, but
+are the mode of existence of the substance itself. The conception of
+the substantial might nevertheless seem to be an idea of the
+transcendental reason. But, as this signifies nothing more than the
+conception of an object in general, which subsists in so far as we
+cogitate in it merely a transcendental subject without any predicates;
+and as the question here is of an unconditioned in the series of
+phenomena--it is clear that the substantial can form no member thereof.
+The same holds good of substances in community, which are mere
+aggregates and do not form a series. For they are not subordinated to
+each other as conditions of the possibility of each other; which,
+however, may be affirmed of spaces, the limits of which are never
+determined in themselves, but always by some other space. It is,
+therefore, only in the category of causality that we can find a series
+of causes to a given effect, and in which we ascend from the latter, as
+the conditioned, to the former as the conditions, and thus answer the
+question of reason.
+
+Fourthly, the conceptions of the possible, the actual, and the
+necessary do not conduct us to any series--excepting only in so far as
+the contingent in existence must always be regarded as conditioned, and
+as indicating, according to a law of the understanding, a condition,
+under which it is necessary to rise to a higher, till in the totality
+of the series, reason arrives at unconditioned necessity.
+
+There are, accordingly, only four cosmological ideas, corresponding
+with the four titles of the categories. For we can select only such as
+necessarily furnish us with a series in the synthesis of the manifold.
+
+                      1
+            The absolute Completeness
+                    of the
+                 COMPOSITION
+     of the given totality of all phenomena.
+
+                      2
+            The absolute Completeness
+                    of the
+                   DIVISION
+     of given totality in a phenomenon.
+
+                       3
+            The absolute Completeness
+                     of the
+                   ORIGINATION
+                  of a phenomenon.
+
+                       4
+            The absolute Completeness
+         of the DEPENDENCE of the EXISTENCE
+        of what is changeable in a phenomenon.
+
+We must here remark, in the first place, that the idea of absolute
+totality relates to nothing but the exposition of phenomena, and
+therefore not to the pure conception of a totality of things. Phenomena
+are here, therefore, regarded as given, and reason requires the
+absolute completeness of the conditions of their possibility, in so far
+as these conditions constitute a series--consequently an absolutely
+(that is, in every respect) complete synthesis, whereby a phenomenon
+can be explained according to the laws of the understanding.
+
+Secondly, it is properly the unconditioned alone that reason seeks in
+this serially and regressively conducted synthesis of conditions. It
+wishes, to speak in another way, to attain to completeness in the
+series of premisses, so as to render it unnecessary to presuppose
+others. This unconditioned is always contained in the absolute totality
+of the series, when we endeavour to form a representation of it in
+thought. But this absolutely complete synthesis is itself but an idea;
+for it is impossible, at least before hand, to know whether any such
+synthesis is possible in the case of phenomena. When we represent all
+existence in thought by means of pure conceptions of the understanding,
+without any conditions of sensuous intuition, we may say with justice
+that for a given conditioned the whole series of conditions
+subordinated to each other is also given; for the former is only given
+through the latter. But we find in the case of phenomena a particular
+limitation of the mode in which conditions are given, that is, through
+the successive synthesis of the manifold of intuition, which must be
+complete in the regress. Now whether this completeness is sensuously
+possible, is a problem. But the idea of it lies in the reason--be it
+possible or impossible to connect with the idea adequate empirical
+conceptions. Therefore, as in the absolute totality of the regressive
+synthesis of the manifold in a phenomenon (following the guidance of
+the categories, which represent it as a series of conditions to a given
+conditioned) the unconditioned is necessarily contained--it being still
+left unascertained whether and how this totality exists; reason sets
+out from the idea of totality, although its proper and final aim is the
+unconditioned--of the whole series, or of a part thereof.
+
+This unconditioned may be cogitated--either as existing only in the
+entire series, all the members of which therefore would be without
+exception conditioned and only the totality absolutely
+unconditioned--and in this case the regressus is called infinite; or the
+absolutely unconditioned is only a part of the series, to which the
+other members are subordinated, but which Is not itself submitted to
+any other condition.[48] In the former case the series is a parte
+priori unlimited (without beginning), that is, infinite, and
+nevertheless completely given. But the regress in it is never
+completed, and can only be called potentially infinite. In the second
+case there exists a first in the series. This first is called, in
+relation to past time, the beginning of the world; in relation to
+space, the limit of the world; in relation to the parts of a given
+limited whole, the simple; in relation to causes, absolute spontaneity
+(liberty); and in relation to the existence of changeable things,
+absolute physical necessity.
+
+ [48] The absolute totality of the series of conditions to a given
+ conditioned is always unconditioned; because beyond it there exist no
+ other conditions, on which it might depend. But the absolute totality
+ of such a series is only an idea, or rather a problematical
+ conception, the possibility of which must be investigated--particularly
+ in relation to the mode in which the unconditioned, as the
+ transcendental idea which is the real subject of inquiry, may be
+ contained therein.
+
+We possess two expressions, world and nature, which are generally
+interchanged. The first denotes the mathematical total of all phenomena
+and the totality of their synthesis--in its progress by means of
+composition, as well as by division. And the world is termed
+nature,[49] when it is regarded as a dynamical whole--when our attention
+is not directed to the aggregation in space and time, for the purpose
+of cogitating it as a quantity, but to the unity in the existence of
+phenomena. In this case the condition of that which happens is called a
+cause; the unconditioned causality of the cause in a phenomenon is
+termed liberty; the conditioned cause is called in a more limited sense
+a natural cause. The conditioned in existence is termed contingent, and
+the unconditioned necessary. The unconditioned necessity of phenomena
+may be called natural necessity.
+
+ [49] Nature, understood adjective (formaliter), signifies the complex
+ of the determinations of a thing, connected according to an internal
+ principle of causality. On the other hand, we understand by nature,
+ substantive (materialiter), the sum total of phenomena, in so far as
+ they, by virtue of an internal principle of causality, are connected
+ with each other throughout. In the former sense we speak of the nature
+ of liquid matter, of fire, etc., and employ the word only adjective;
+ while, if speaking of the objects of nature, we have in our minds the
+ idea of a subsisting whole.
+
+The ideas which we are at present engaged in discussing I have called
+cosmological ideas; partly because by the term world is understood the
+entire content of all phenomena, and our ideas are directed solely to
+the unconditioned among phenomena; partly also, because world, in the
+transcendental sense, signifies the absolute totality of the content of
+existing things, and we are directing our attention only to the
+completeness of the synthesis--although, properly, only in regression.
+In regard to the fact that these ideas are all transcendent, and,
+although they do not transcend phenomena as regards their mode, but are
+concerned solely with the world of sense (and not with noumena),
+nevertheless carry their synthesis to a degree far above all possible
+experience--it still seems to me that we can, with perfect propriety,
+designate them cosmical conceptions. As regards the distinction between
+the mathematically and the dynamically unconditioned which is the aim
+of the regression of the synthesis, I should call the two former, in a
+more limited signification, cosmical conceptions, the remaining two
+transcendent physical conceptions. This distinction does not at present
+seem to be of particular importance, but we shall afterwards find it to
+be of some value.
+
+Section II. Antithetic of Pure Reason
+
+Thetic is the term applied to every collection of dogmatical
+propositions. By antithetic I do not understand dogmatical assertions
+of the opposite, but the self-contradiction of seemingly dogmatical
+cognitions (thesis cum antithesis), in none of which we can discover
+any decided superiority. Antithetic is not, therefore, occupied with
+one-sided statements, but is engaged in considering the contradictory
+nature of the general cognitions of reason and its causes.
+Transcendental antithetic is an investigation into the antinomy of pure
+reason, its causes and result. If we employ our reason not merely in
+the application of the principles of the understanding to objects of
+experience, but venture with it beyond these boundaries, there arise
+certain sophistical propositions or theorems. These assertions have the
+following peculiarities: They can find neither confirmation nor
+confutation in experience; and each is in itself not only
+self-consistent, but possesses conditions of its necessity in the very
+nature of reason--only that, unluckily, there exist just as valid and
+necessary grounds for maintaining the contrary proposition.
+
+The questions which naturally arise in the consideration of this
+dialectic of pure reason, are therefore: 1st. In what propositions is
+pure reason unavoidably subject to an antinomy? 2nd. What are the
+causes of this antinomy? 3rd. Whether and in what way can reason free
+itself from this self-contradiction?
+
+A dialectical proposition or theorem of pure reason must, according to
+what has been said, be distinguishable from all sophistical
+propositions, by the fact that it is not an answer to an arbitrary
+question, which may be raised at the mere pleasure of any person, but
+to one which human reason must necessarily encounter in its progress.
+In the second place, a dialectical proposition, with its opposite, does
+not carry the appearance of a merely artificial illusion, which
+disappears as soon as it is investigated, but a natural and unavoidable
+illusion, which, even when we are no longer deceived by it, continues
+to mock us and, although rendered harmless, can never be completely
+removed.
+
+This dialectical doctrine will not relate to the unity of understanding
+in empirical conceptions, but to the unity of reason in pure ideas. The
+conditions of this doctrine are--inasmuch as it must, as a synthesis
+according to rules, be conformable to the understanding, and at the
+same time as the absolute unity of the synthesis, to the reason--that,
+if it is adequate to the unity of reason, it is too great for the
+understanding, if according with the understanding, it is too small for
+the reason. Hence arises a mutual opposition, which cannot be avoided,
+do what we will.
+
+These sophistical assertions of dialectic open, as it were, a
+battle-field, where that side obtains the victory which has been
+permitted to make the attack, and he is compelled to yield who has been
+unfortunately obliged to stand on the defensive. And hence, champions
+of ability, whether on the right or on the wrong side, are certain to
+carry away the crown of victory, if they only take care to have the
+right to make the last attack, and are not obliged to sustain another
+onset from their opponent. We can easily believe that this arena has
+been often trampled by the feet of combatants, that many victories have
+been obtained on both sides, but that the last victory, decisive of the
+affair between the contending parties, was won by him who fought for
+the right, only if his adversary was forbidden to continue the tourney.
+As impartial umpires, we must lay aside entirely the consideration
+whether the combatants are fighting for the right or for the wrong
+side, for the true or for the false, and allow the combat to be first
+decided. Perhaps, after they have wearied more than injured each other,
+they will discover the nothingness of their cause of quarrel and part
+good friends.
+
+This method of watching, or rather of originating, a conflict of
+assertions, not for the purpose of finally deciding in favour of either
+side, but to discover whether the object of the struggle is not a mere
+illusion, which each strives in vain to reach, but which would be no
+gain even when reached--this procedure, I say, may be termed the
+sceptical method. It is thoroughly distinct from scepticism--the
+principle of a technical and scientific ignorance, which undermines the
+foundations of all knowledge, in order, if possible, to destroy our
+belief and confidence therein. For the sceptical method aims at
+certainty, by endeavouring to discover in a conflict of this kind,
+conducted honestly and intelligently on both sides, the point of
+misunderstanding; just as wise legislators derive, from the
+embarrassment of judges in lawsuits, information in regard to the
+defective and ill-defined parts of their statutes. The antinomy which
+reveals itself in the application of laws, is for our limited wisdom
+the best criterion of legislation. For the attention of reason, which
+in abstract speculation does not easily become conscious of its errors,
+is thus roused to the momenta in the determination of its principles.
+
+But this sceptical method is essentially peculiar to transcendental
+philosophy, and can perhaps be dispensed with in every other field of
+investigation. In mathematics its use would be absurd; because in it no
+false assertions can long remain hidden, inasmuch as its demonstrations
+must always proceed under the guidance of pure intuition, and by means
+of an always evident synthesis. In experimental philosophy, doubt and
+delay may be very useful; but no misunderstanding is possible, which
+cannot be easily removed; and in experience means of solving the
+difficulty and putting an end to the dissension must at last be found,
+whether sooner or later. Moral philosophy can always exhibit its
+principles, with their practical consequences, in concreto--at least in
+possible experiences, and thus escape the mistakes and ambiguities of
+abstraction. But transcendental propositions, which lay claim to
+insight beyond the region of possible experience, cannot, on the one
+hand, exhibit their abstract synthesis in any à priori intuition, nor,
+on the other, expose a lurking error by the help of experience.
+Transcendental reason, therefore, presents us with no other criterion
+than that of an attempt to reconcile such assertions, and for this
+purpose to permit a free and unrestrained conflict between them. And
+this we now proceed to arrange.[50]
+
+ [50] The antinomies stand in the order of the four transcendental
+ ideas above detailed.
+
+FIRST CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS. THESIS.
+
+The world has a beginning in time, and is also limited in regard to
+space.
+
+PROOF.
+
+Granted that the world has no beginning in time; up to every given
+moment of time, an eternity must have elapsed, and therewith passed
+away an infinite series of successive conditions or states of things in
+the world. Now the infinity of a series consists in the fact that it
+never can be completed by means of a successive synthesis. It follows
+that an infinite series already elapsed is impossible and that,
+consequently, a beginning of the world is a necessary condition of its
+existence. And this was the first thing to be proved.
+
+As regards the second, let us take the opposite for granted. In this
+case, the world must be an infinite given total of coexistent things.
+Now we cannot cogitate the dimensions of a quantity, which is not given
+within certain limits of an intuition,[51] in any other way than by
+means of the synthesis of its parts, and the total of such a quantity
+only by means of a completed synthesis, or the repeated addition of
+unity to itself. Accordingly, to cogitate the world, which fills all
+spaces, as a whole, the successive synthesis of the parts of an
+infinite world must be looked upon as completed, that is to say, an
+infinite time must be regarded as having elapsed in the enumeration of
+all co-existing things; which is impossible. For this reason an
+infinite aggregate of actual things cannot be considered as a given
+whole, consequently, not as a contemporaneously given whole. The world
+is consequently, as regards extension in space, not infinite, but
+enclosed in limits. And this was the second thing to be proved.
+
+ [51] We may consider an undetermined quantity as a whole, when it is
+ enclosed within limits, although we cannot construct or ascertain its
+ totality by measurement, that is, by the successive synthesis of its
+ parts. For its limits of themselves determine its completeness as a
+ whole.
+
+ANTITHESIS.
+
+The world has no beginning, and no limits in space, but is, in relation
+both to time and space, infinite.
+
+PROOF.
+
+For let it be granted that it has a beginning. A beginning is an
+existence which is preceded by a time in which the thing does not
+exist. On the above supposition, it follows that there must have been a
+time in which the world did not exist, that is, a void time. But in a
+void time the origination of a thing is impossible; because no part of
+any such time contains a distinctive condition of being, in preference
+to that of non-being (whether the supposed thing originate of itself,
+or by means of some other cause). Consequently, many series of things
+may have a beginning in the world, but the world itself cannot have a
+beginning, and is, therefore, in relation to past time, infinite.
+
+As regards the second statement, let us first take the opposite for
+granted--that the world is finite and limited in space; it follows that
+it must exist in a void space, which is not limited. We should
+therefore meet not only with a relation of things in space, but also a
+relation of things to space. Now, as the world is an absolute whole,
+out of and beyond which no object of intuition, and consequently no
+correlate to which can be discovered, this relation of the world to a
+void space is merely a relation to no object. But such a relation, and
+consequently the limitation of the world by void space, is nothing.
+Consequently, the world, as regards space, is not limited, that is, it
+is infinite in regard to extension.[52]
+
+ [52] Space is merely the form of external intuition (formal
+ intuition), and not a real object which can be externally perceived.
+ Space, prior to all things which determine it (fill or limit it), or,
+ rather, which present an empirical intuition conformable to it, is,
+ under the title of absolute space, nothing but the mere possibility of
+ external phenomena, in so far as they either exist in themselves, or
+ can annex themselves to given intuitions. Empirical intuition is
+ therefore not a composition of phenomena and space (of perception and
+ empty intuition). The one is not the correlate of the other in a
+ synthesis, but they are vitally connected in the same empirical
+ intuition, as matter and form. If we wish to set one of these two
+ apart from the other--space from phenomena--there arise all sorts of
+ empty determinations of external intuition, which are very far from
+ being possible perceptions. For example, motion or rest of the world
+ in an infinite empty space, or a determination of the mutual relation
+ of both, cannot possibly be perceived, and is therefore merely the
+ predicate of a notional entity.
+
+OBSERVATIONS ON THE FIRST ANTINOMY. ON THE THESIS.
+
+In bringing forward these conflicting arguments, I have not been on the
+search for sophisms, for the purpose of availing myself of special
+pleading, which takes advantage of the carelessness of the opposite
+party, appeals to a misunderstood statute, and erects its unrighteous
+claims upon an unfair interpretation. Both proofs originate fairly from
+the nature of the case, and the advantage presented by the mistakes of
+the dogmatists of both parties has been completely set aside.
+
+The thesis might also have been unfairly demonstrated, by the
+introduction of an erroneous conception of the infinity of a given
+quantity. A quantity is infinite, if a greater than itself cannot
+possibly exist. The quantity is measured by the number of given
+units--which are taken as a standard--contained in it. Now no number can
+be the greatest, because one or more units can always be added. It
+follows that an infinite given quantity, consequently an infinite world
+(both as regards time and extension) is impossible. It is, therefore,
+limited in both respects. In this manner I might have conducted my
+proof; but the conception given in it does not agree with the true
+conception of an infinite whole. In this there is no representation of
+its quantity, it is not said how large it is; consequently its
+conception is not the conception of a maximum. We cogitate in it merely
+its relation to an arbitrarily assumed unit, in relation to which it is
+greater than any number. Now, just as the unit which is taken is
+greater or smaller, the infinite will be greater or smaller; but the
+infinity, which consists merely in the relation to this given unit,
+must remain always the same, although the absolute quantity of the
+whole is not thereby cognized.
+
+The true (transcendental) conception of infinity is: that the
+successive synthesis of unity in the measurement of a given quantum can
+never be completed.[53] Hence it follows, without possibility of
+mistake, that an eternity of actual successive states up to a given
+(the present) moment cannot have elapsed, and that the world must
+therefore have a beginning.
+
+ [53] The quantum in this sense contains a congeries of given units,
+ which is greater than any number--and this is the mathematical
+ conception of the infinite.
+
+In regard to the second part of the thesis, the difficulty as to an
+infinite and yet elapsed series disappears; for the manifold of a world
+infinite in extension is contemporaneously given. But, in order to
+cogitate the total of this manifold, as we cannot have the aid of
+limits constituting by themselves this total in intuition, we are
+obliged to give some account of our conception, which in this case
+cannot proceed from the whole to the determined quantity of the parts,
+but must demonstrate the possibility of a whole by means of a
+successive synthesis of the parts. But as this synthesis must
+constitute a series that cannot be completed, it is impossible for us
+to cogitate prior to it, and consequently not by means of it, a
+totality. For the conception of totality itself is in the present case
+the representation of a completed synthesis of the parts; and this
+completion, and consequently its conception, is impossible.
+
+ON THE ANTITHESIS.
+
+The proof in favour of the infinity of the cosmical succession and the
+cosmical content is based upon the consideration that, in the opposite
+case, a void time and a void space must constitute the limits of the
+world. Now I am not unaware, that there are some ways of escaping this
+conclusion. It may, for example, be alleged, that a limit to the world,
+as regards both space and time, is quite possible, without at the same
+time holding the existence of an absolute time before the beginning of
+the world, or an absolute space extending beyond the actual world--which
+is impossible. I am quite well satisfied with the latter part of this
+opinion of the philosophers of the Leibnitzian school. Space is merely
+the form of external intuition, but not a real object which can itself
+be externally intuited; it is not a correlate of phenomena, it is the
+form of phenomena itself. Space, therefore, cannot be regarded as
+absolutely and in itself something determinative of the existence of
+things, because it is not itself an object, but only the form of
+possible objects. Consequently, things, as phenomena, determine space;
+that is to say, they render it possible that, of all the possible
+predicates of space (size and relation), certain may belong to reality.
+But we cannot affirm the converse, that space, as something
+self-subsistent, can determine real things in regard to size or shape,
+for it is in itself not a real thing. Space (filled or void)[54] may
+therefore be limited by phenomena, but phenomena cannot be limited by
+an empty space without them. This is true of time also. All this being
+granted, it is nevertheless indisputable, that we must assume these two
+nonentities, void space without and void time before the world, if we
+assume the existence of cosmical limits, relatively to space or time.
+
+ [54] It is evident that what is meant here is, that empty space, in so
+ far as it is limited by phenomena--space, that is, within the
+ world--does not at least contradict transcendental principles, and may
+ therefore, as regards them, be admitted, although its possibility
+ cannot on that account be affirmed.
+
+For, as regards the subterfuge adopted by those who endeavour to evade
+the consequence--that, if the world is limited as to space and time, the
+infinite void must determine the existence of actual things in regard
+to their dimensions--it arises solely from the fact that instead of a
+sensuous world, an intelligible world--of which nothing is known--is
+cogitated; instead of a real beginning (an existence, which is preceded
+by a period in which nothing exists), an existence which presupposes no
+other condition than that of time; and, instead of limits of extension,
+boundaries of the universe. But the question relates to the mundus
+phaenomenon, and its quantity; and in this case we cannot make
+abstraction of the conditions of sensibility, without doing away with
+the essential reality of this world itself. The world of sense, if it
+is limited, must necessarily lie in the infinite void. If this, and
+with it space as the à priori condition of the possibility of
+phenomena, is left out of view, the whole world of sense disappears. In
+our problem is this alone considered as given. The mundus
+intelligibilis is nothing but the general conception of a world, in
+which abstraction has been made of all conditions of intuition, and in
+relation to which no synthetical proposition--either affirmative or
+negative--is possible.
+
+SECOND CONFLICT OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS. THESIS.
+
+Every composite substance in the world consists of simple parts; and
+there exists nothing that is not either itself simple, or composed of
+simple parts.
+
+PROOF.
+
+For, grant that composite substances do not consist of simple parts; in
+this case, if all combination or composition were annihilated in
+thought, no composite part, and (as, by the supposition, there do not
+exist simple parts) no simple part would exist. Consequently, no
+substance; consequently, nothing would exist. Either, then, it is
+impossible to annihilate composition in thought; or, after such
+annihilation, there must remain something that subsists without
+composition, that is, something that is simple. But in the former case
+the composite could not itself consist of substances, because with
+substances composition is merely a contingent relation, apart from
+which they must still exist as self-subsistent beings. Now, as this
+case contradicts the supposition, the second must contain the
+truth--that the substantial composite in the world consists of simple
+parts.
+
+It follows, as an immediate inference, that the things in the world are
+all, without exception, simple beings--that composition is merely an
+external condition pertaining to them--and that, although we never can
+separate and isolate the elementary substances from the state of
+composition, reason must cogitate these as the primary subjects of all
+composition, and consequently, as prior thereto--and as simple
+substances.
+
+ANTITHESIS.
+
+No composite thing in the world consists of simple parts; and there
+does not exist in the world any simple substance.
+
+PROOF.
+
+Let it be supposed that a composite thing (as substance) consists of
+simple parts. Inasmuch as all external relation, consequently all
+composition of substances, is possible only in space; the space,
+occupied by that which is composite, must consist of the same number of
+parts as is contained in the composite. But space does not consist of
+simple parts, but of spaces. Therefore, every part of the composite
+must occupy a space. But the absolutely primary parts of what is
+composite are simple. It follows that what is simple occupies a space.
+Now, as everything real that occupies a space, contains a manifold the
+parts of which are external to each other, and is consequently
+composite--and a real composite, not of accidents (for these cannot
+exist external to each other apart from substance), but of
+substances--it follows that the simple must be a substantial composite,
+which is self-contradictory.
+
+The second proposition of the antithesis--that there exists in the world
+nothing that is simple--is here equivalent to the following: The
+existence of the absolutely simple cannot be demonstrated from any
+experience or perception either external or internal; and the
+absolutely simple is a mere idea, the objective reality of which cannot
+be demonstrated in any possible experience; it is consequently, in the
+exposition of phenomena, without application and object. For, let us
+take for granted that an object may be found in experience for this
+transcendental idea; the empirical intuition of such an object must
+then be recognized to contain absolutely no manifold with its parts
+external to each other, and connected into unity. Now, as we cannot
+reason from the non-consciousness of such a manifold to the
+impossibility of its existence in the intuition of an object, and as
+the proof of this impossibility is necessary for the establishment and
+proof of absolute simplicity; it follows that this simplicity cannot be
+inferred from any perception whatever. As, therefore, an absolutely
+simple object cannot be given in any experience, and the world of sense
+must be considered as the sum total of all possible experiences:
+nothing simple exists in the world.
+
+This second proposition in the antithesis has a more extended aim than
+the first. The first merely banishes the simple from the intuition of
+the composite; while the second drives it entirely out of nature. Hence
+we were unable to demonstrate it from the conception of a given object
+of external intuition (of the composite), but we were obliged to prove
+it from the relation of a given object to a possible experience in
+general.
+
+OBSERVATIONS ON THE SECOND ANTINOMY. THESIS.
+
+When I speak of a whole, which necessarily consists of simple parts, I
+understand thereby only a substantial whole, as the true composite;
+that is to say, I understand that contingent unity of the manifold
+which is given as perfectly isolated (at least in thought), placed in
+reciprocal connection, and thus constituted a unity. Space ought not to
+be called a compositum but a totum, for its parts are possible in the
+whole, and not the whole by means of the parts. It might perhaps be
+called a compositum ideale, but not a compositum reale. But this is of
+no importance. As space is not a composite of substances (and not even
+of real accidents), if I abstract all composition therein--nothing, not
+even a point, remains; for a point is possible only as the limit of a
+space--consequently of a composite. Space and time, therefore, do not
+consist of simple parts. That which belongs only to the condition or
+state of a substance, even although it possesses a quantity (motion or
+change, for example), likewise does not consist of simple parts. That
+is to say, a certain degree of change does not originate from the
+addition of many simple changes. Our inference of the simple from the
+composite is valid only of self-subsisting things. But the accidents of
+a state are not self-subsistent. The proof, then, for the necessity of
+the simple, as the component part of all that is substantial and
+composite, may prove a failure, and the whole case of this thesis be
+lost, if we carry the proposition too far, and wish to make it valid of
+everything that is composite without distinction--as indeed has really
+now and then happened. Besides, I am here speaking only of the simple,
+in so far as it is necessarily given in the composite--the latter being
+capable of solution into the former as its component parts. The proper
+signification of the word monas (as employed by Leibnitz) ought to
+relate to the simple, given immediately as simple substance (for
+example, in consciousness), and not as an element of the composite. As
+an element, the term atomus would be more appropriate. And as I wish to
+prove the existence of simple substances, only in relation to, and as
+the elements of, the composite, I might term the antithesis of the
+second Antinomy, transcendental Atomistic. But as this word has long
+been employed to designate a particular theory of corporeal phenomena
+(moleculae), and thus presupposes a basis of empirical conceptions, I
+prefer calling it the dialectical principle of Monadology.
+
+ANTITHESIS.
+
+Against the assertion of the infinite subdivisibility of matter whose
+ground of proof is purely mathematical, objections have been alleged by
+the Monadists. These objections lay themselves open, at first sight, to
+suspicion, from the fact that they do not recognize the clearest
+mathematical proofs as propositions relating to the constitution of
+space, in so far as it is really the formal condition of the
+possibility of all matter, but regard them merely as inferences from
+abstract but arbitrary conceptions, which cannot have any application
+to real things. Just as if it were possible to imagine another mode of
+intuition than that given in the primitive intuition of space; and just
+as if its à priori determinations did not apply to everything, the
+existence of which is possible, from the fact alone of its filling
+space. If we listen to them, we shall find ourselves required to
+cogitate, in addition to the mathematical point, which is simple--not,
+however, a part, but a mere limit of space--physical points, which are
+indeed likewise simple, but possess the peculiar property, as parts of
+space, of filling it merely by their aggregation. I shall not repeat
+here the common and clear refutations of this absurdity, which are to
+be found everywhere in numbers: every one knows that it is impossible
+to undermine the evidence of mathematics by mere discursive
+conceptions; I shall only remark that, if in this case philosophy
+endeavours to gain an advantage over mathematics by sophistical
+artifices, it is because it forgets that the discussion relates solely
+to Phenomena and their conditions. It is not sufficient to find the
+conception of the simple for the pure conception of the composite, but
+we must discover for the intuition of the composite (matter), the
+intuition of the simple. Now this, according to the laws of
+sensibility, and consequently in the case of objects of sense, is
+utterly impossible. In the case of a whole composed of substances,
+which is cogitated solely by the pure understanding, it may be
+necessary to be in possession of the simple before composition is
+possible. But this does not hold good of the Totum substantiale
+phaenomenon, which, as an empirical intuition in space, possesses the
+necessary property of containing no simple part, for the very reason
+that no part of space is simple. Meanwhile, the Monadists have been
+subtle enough to escape from this difficulty, by presupposing intuition
+and the dynamical relation of substances as the condition of the
+possibility of space, instead of regarding space as the condition of
+the possibility of the objects of external intuition, that is, of
+bodies. Now we have a conception of bodies only as phenomena, and, as
+such, they necessarily presuppose space as the condition of all
+external phenomena. The evasion is therefore in vain; as, indeed, we
+have sufficiently shown in our Æsthetic. If bodies were things in
+themselves, the proof of the Monadists would be unexceptionable.
+
+The second dialectical assertion possesses the peculiarity of having
+opposed to it a dogmatical proposition, which, among all such
+sophistical statements, is the only one that undertakes to prove in the
+case of an object of experience, that which is properly a
+transcendental idea--the absolute simplicity of substance. The
+proposition is that the object of the internal sense, the thinking Ego,
+is an absolute simple substance. Without at present entering upon this
+subject--as it has been considered at length in a former chapter--I shall
+merely remark that, if something is cogitated merely as an object,
+without the addition of any synthetical determination of its
+intuition--as happens in the case of the bare representation, _I_--it is
+certain that no manifold and no composition can be perceived in such a
+representation. As, moreover, the predicates whereby I cogitate this
+object are merely intuitions of the internal sense, there cannot be
+discovered in them anything to prove the existence of a manifold whose
+parts are external to each other, and, consequently, nothing to prove
+the existence of real composition. Consciousness, therefore, is so
+constituted that, inasmuch as the thinking subject is at the same time
+its own object, it cannot divide itself--although it can divide its
+inhering determinations. For every object in relation to itself is
+absolute unity. Nevertheless, if the subject is regarded externally, as
+an object of intuition, it must, in its character of phenomenon,
+possess the property of composition. And it must always be regarded in
+this manner, if we wish to know whether there is or is not contained in
+it a manifold whose parts are external to each other.
+
+THIRD CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS. THESIS.
+
+Causality according to the laws of nature, is not the only causality
+operating to originate the phenomena of the world. A causality of
+freedom is also necessary to account fully for these phenomena.
+
+PROOF.
+
+Let it be supposed, that there is no other kind of causality than that
+according to the laws of nature. Consequently, everything that happens
+presupposes a previous condition, which it follows with absolute
+certainty, in conformity with a rule. But this previous condition must
+itself be something that has happened (that has arisen in time, as it
+did not exist before), for, if it has always been in existence, its
+consequence or effect would not thus originate for the first time, but
+would likewise have always existed. The causality, therefore, of a
+cause, whereby something happens, is itself a thing that has happened.
+Now this again presupposes, in conformity with the law of nature, a
+previous condition and its causality, and this another anterior to the
+former, and so on. If, then, everything happens solely in accordance
+with the laws of nature, there cannot be any real first beginning of
+things, but only a subaltern or comparative beginning. There cannot,
+therefore, be a completeness of series on the side of the causes which
+originate the one from the other. But the law of nature is that nothing
+can happen without a sufficient à priori determined cause. The
+proposition therefore--if all causality is possible only in accordance
+with the laws of nature--is, when stated in this unlimited and general
+manner, self-contradictory. It follows that this cannot be the only
+kind of causality.
+
+From what has been said, it follows that a causality must be admitted,
+by means of which something happens, without its cause being determined
+according to necessary laws by some other cause preceding. That is to
+say, there must exist an absolute spontaneity of cause, which of itself
+originates a series of phenomena which proceeds according to natural
+laws--consequently transcendental freedom, without which even in the
+course of nature the succession of phenomena on the side of causes is
+never complete.
+
+ANTITHESIS.
+
+There is no such thing as freedom, but everything in the world happens
+solely according to the laws of nature.
+
+PROOF.
+
+Granted, that there does exist freedom in the transcendental sense, as
+a peculiar kind of causality, operating to produce events in the
+world--a faculty, that is to say, of originating a state, and
+consequently a series of consequences from that state. In this case,
+not only the series originated by this spontaneity, but the
+determination of this spontaneity itself to the production of the
+series, that is to say, the causality itself must have an absolute
+commencement, such that nothing can precede to determine this action
+according to unvarying laws. But every beginning of action presupposes
+in the acting cause a state of inaction; and a dynamically primal
+beginning of action presupposes a state, which has no connection--as
+regards causality--with the preceding state of the cause--which does not,
+that is, in any wise result from it. Transcendental freedom is
+therefore opposed to the natural law of cause and effect, and such a
+conjunction of successive states in effective causes is destructive of
+the possibility of unity in experience and for that reason not to be
+found in experience--is consequently a mere fiction of thought.
+
+We have, therefore, nothing but nature to which we must look for
+connection and order in cosmical events. Freedom--independence of the
+laws of nature--is certainly a deliverance from restraint, but it is
+also a relinquishing of the guidance of law and rule. For it cannot be
+alleged that, instead of the laws of nature, laws of freedom may be
+introduced into the causality of the course of nature. For, if freedom
+were determined according to laws, it would be no longer freedom, but
+merely nature. Nature, therefore, and transcendental freedom are
+distinguishable as conformity to law and lawlessness. The former
+imposes upon understanding the difficulty of seeking the origin of
+events ever higher and higher in the series of causes, inasmuch as
+causality is always conditioned thereby; while it compensates this
+labour by the guarantee of a unity complete and in conformity with law.
+The latter, on the contrary, holds out to the understanding the promise
+of a point of rest in the chain of causes, by conducting it to an
+unconditioned causality, which professes to have the power of
+spontaneous origination, but which, in its own utter blindness,
+deprives it of the guidance of rules, by which alone a completely
+connected experience is possible.
+
+OBSERVATIONS ON THE THIRD ANTINOMY. ON THE THESIS.
+
+The transcendental idea of freedom is far from constituting the entire
+content of the psychological conception so termed, which is for the
+most part empirical. It merely presents us with the conception of
+spontaneity of action, as the proper ground for imputing freedom to the
+cause of a certain class of objects. It is, however, the true
+stumbling-stone to philosophy, which meets with unconquerable
+difficulties in the way of its admitting this kind of unconditioned
+causality. That element in the question of the freedom of the will,
+which has for so long a time placed speculative reason in such
+perplexity, is properly only transcendental, and concerns the question,
+whether there must be held to exist a faculty of spontaneous
+origination of a series of successive things or states. How such a
+faculty is possible is not a necessary inquiry; for in the case of
+natural causality itself, we are obliged to content ourselves with the
+à priori knowledge that such a causality must be presupposed, although
+we are quite incapable of comprehending how the being of one thing is
+possible through the being of another, but must for this information
+look entirely to experience. Now we have demonstrated this necessity of
+a free first beginning of a series of phenomena, only in so far as it
+is required for the comprehension of an origin of the world, all
+following states being regarded as a succession according to laws of
+nature alone. But, as there has thus been proved the existence of a
+faculty which can of itself originate a series in time--although we are
+unable to explain how it can exist--we feel ourselves authorized to
+admit, even in the midst of the natural course of events, a beginning,
+as regards causality, of different successions of phenomena, and at the
+same time to attribute to all substances a faculty of free action. But
+we ought in this case not to allow ourselves to fall into a common
+misunderstanding, and to suppose that, because a successive series in
+the world can only have a comparatively first beginning--another state
+or condition of things always preceding--an absolutely first beginning
+of a series in the course of nature is impossible. For we are not
+speaking here of an absolutely first beginning in relation to time, but
+as regards causality alone. When, for example, I, completely of my own
+free will, and independently of the necessarily determinative influence
+of natural causes, rise from my chair, there commences with this event,
+including its material consequences in infinitum, an absolutely new
+series; although, in relation to time, this event is merely the
+continuation of a preceding series. For this resolution and act of mine
+do not form part of the succession of effects in nature, and are not
+mere continuations of it; on the contrary, the determining causes of
+nature cease to operate in reference to this event, which certainly
+succeeds the acts of nature, but does not proceed from them. For these
+reasons, the action of a free agent must be termed, in regard to
+causality, if not in relation to time, an absolutely primal beginning
+of a series of phenomena.
+
+The justification of this need of reason to rest upon a free act as the
+first beginning of the series of natural causes is evident from the
+fact, that all philosophers of antiquity (with the exception of the
+Epicurean school) felt themselves obliged, when constructing a theory
+of the motions of the universe, to accept a prime mover, that is, a
+freely acting cause, which spontaneously and prior to all other causes
+evolved this series of states. They always felt the need of going
+beyond mere nature, for the purpose of making a first beginning
+comprehensible.
+
+ON THE ANTITHESIS.
+
+The assertor of the all-sufficiency of nature in regard to causality
+(transcendental Physiocracy), in opposition to the doctrine of freedom,
+would defend his view of the question somewhat in the following manner.
+He would say, in answer to the sophistical arguments of the opposite
+party: If you do not accept a mathematical first, in relation to time,
+you have no need to seek a dynamical first, in regard to causality. Who
+compelled you to imagine an absolutely primal condition of the world,
+and therewith an absolute beginning of the gradually progressing
+successions of phenomena--and, as some foundation for this fancy of
+yours, to set bounds to unlimited nature? Inasmuch as the substances in
+the world have always existed--at least the unity of experience renders
+such a supposition quite necessary--there is no difficulty in believing
+also, that the changes in the conditions of these substances have
+always existed; and, consequently, that a first beginning, mathematical
+or dynamical, is by no means required. The possibility of such an
+infinite derivation, without any initial member from which all the
+others result, is certainly quite incomprehensible. But, if you are
+rash enough to deny the enigmatical secrets of nature for this reason,
+you will find yourselves obliged to deny also the existence of many
+fundamental properties of natural objects (such as fundamental forces),
+which you can just as little comprehend; and even the possibility of so
+simple a conception as that of change must present to you insuperable
+difficulties. For if experience did not teach you that it was real, you
+never could conceive à priori the possibility of this ceaseless
+sequence of being and non-being.
+
+But if the existence of a transcendental faculty of freedom is
+granted--a faculty of originating changes in the world--this faculty must
+at least exist out of and apart from the world; although it is
+certainly a bold assumption, that, over and above the complete content
+of all possible intuitions, there still exists an object which cannot
+be presented in any possible perception. But, to attribute to
+substances in the world itself such a faculty, is quite inadmissible;
+for, in this case; the connection of phenomena reciprocally determining
+and determined according to general laws, which is termed nature, and
+along with it the criteria of empirical truth, which enable us to
+distinguish experience from mere visionary dreaming, would almost
+entirely disappear. In proximity with such a lawless faculty of
+freedom, a system of nature is hardly cogitable; for the laws of the
+latter would be continually subject to the intrusive influences of the
+former, and the course of phenomena, which would otherwise proceed
+regularly and uniformly, would become thereby confused and
+disconnected.
+
+FOURTH CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS. THESIS.
+
+There exists either in, or in connection with the world--either as a
+part of it, or as the cause of it--an absolutely necessary being.
+
+PROOF.
+
+The world of sense, as the sum total of all phenomena, contains a
+series of changes. For, without such a series, the mental
+representation of the series of time itself, as the condition of the
+possibility of the sensuous world, could not be presented to us.[55]
+But every change stands under its condition, which precedes it in time
+and renders it necessary. Now the existence of a given condition
+presupposes a complete series of conditions up to the absolutely
+unconditioned, which alone is absolutely necessary. It follows that
+something that is absolutely necessary must exist, if change exists as
+its consequence. But this necessary thing itself belongs to the
+sensuous world. For suppose it to exist out of and apart from it, the
+series of cosmical changes would receive from it a beginning, and yet
+this necessary cause would not itself belong to the world of sense. But
+this is impossible. For, as the beginning of a series in time is
+determined only by that which precedes it in time, the supreme
+condition of the beginning of a series of changes must exist in the
+time in which this series itself did not exist; for a beginning
+supposes a time preceding, in which the thing that begins to be was not
+in existence. The causality of the necessary cause of changes, and
+consequently the cause itself, must for these reasons belong to
+time--and to phenomena, time being possible only as the form of
+phenomena. Consequently, it cannot be cogitated as separated from the
+world of sense--the sum total of all phenomena. There is, therefore,
+contained in the world, something that is absolutely necessary--whether
+it be the whole cosmical series itself, or only a part of it.
+
+ [55] Objectively, time, as the formal condition of the possibility of
+ change, precedes all changes; but subjectively, and in consciousness,
+ the representation of time, like every other, is given solely by
+ occasion of perception.
+
+ANTITHESIS.
+
+An absolutely necessary being does not exist, either in the world, or
+out of it--as its cause.
+
+PROOF.
+
+Grant that either the world itself is necessary, or that there is
+contained in it a necessary existence. Two cases are possible. First,
+there must either be in the series of cosmical changes a beginning,
+which is unconditionally necessary, and therefore uncaused--which is at
+variance with the dynamical law of the determination of all phenomena
+in time; or, secondly, the series itself is without beginning, and,
+although contingent and conditioned in all its parts, is nevertheless
+absolutely necessary and unconditioned as a whole--which is
+self-contradictory. For the existence of an aggregate cannot be
+necessary, if no single part of it possesses necessary existence.
+
+Grant, on the other hand, that an absolutely necessary cause exists out
+of and apart from the world. This cause, as the highest member in the
+series of the causes of cosmical changes, must originate or begin[56]
+the existence of the latter and their series. In this case it must also
+begin to act, and its causality would therefore belong to time, and
+consequently to the sum total of phenomena, that is, to the world. It
+follows that the cause cannot be out of the world; which is
+contradictory to the hypothesis. Therefore, neither in the world, nor
+out of it (but in causal connection with it), does there exist any
+absolutely necessary being.
+
+ [56] The word begin is taken in two senses. The first is active--the
+ cause being regarded as beginning a series of conditions as its effect
+ (infit). The second is passive--the causality in the cause itself
+ beginning to operate (fit). I reason here from the first to the
+ second.
+
+OBSERVATIONS ON THE FOURTH ANTINOMY. ON THE THESIS.
+
+To demonstrate the existence of a necessary being, I cannot be
+permitted in this place to employ any other than the cosmological
+argument, which ascends from the conditioned in phenomena to the
+unconditioned in conception--the unconditioned being considered the
+necessary condition of the absolute totality of the series. The proof,
+from the mere idea of a supreme being, belongs to another principle of
+reason and requires separate discussion.
+
+The pure cosmological proof demonstrates the existence of a necessary
+being, but at the same time leaves it quite unsettled, whether this
+being is the world itself, or quite distinct from it. To establish the
+truth of the latter view, principles are requisite, which are not
+cosmological and do not proceed in the series of phenomena. We should
+require to introduce into our proof conceptions of contingent
+beings--regarded merely as objects of the understanding, and also a
+principle which enables us to connect these, by means of mere
+conceptions, with a necessary being. But the proper place for all such
+arguments is a transcendent philosophy, which has unhappily not yet
+been established.
+
+But, if we begin our proof cosmologically, by laying at the foundation
+of it the series of phenomena, and the regress in it according to
+empirical laws of causality, we are not at liberty to break off from
+this mode of demonstration and to pass over to something which is not
+itself a member of the series. The condition must be taken in exactly
+the same signification as the relation of the conditioned to its
+condition in the series has been taken, for the series must conduct us
+in an unbroken regress to this supreme condition. But if this relation
+is sensuous, and belongs to the possible empirical employment of
+understanding, the supreme condition or cause must close the regressive
+series according to the laws of sensibility and consequently, must
+belong to the series of time. It follows that this necessary existence
+must be regarded as the highest member of the cosmical series.
+
+Certain philosophers have, nevertheless, allowed themselves the liberty
+of making such a saltus (metabasis eis allo gonos). From the changes in
+the world they have concluded their empirical contingency, that is,
+their dependence on empirically-determined causes, and they thus
+admitted an ascending series of empirical conditions: and in this they
+are quite right. But as they could not find in this series any primal
+beginning or any highest member, they passed suddenly from the
+empirical conception of contingency to the pure category, which
+presents us with a series--not sensuous, but intellectual--whose
+completeness does certainly rest upon the existence of an absolutely
+necessary cause. Nay, more, this intellectual series is not tied to any
+sensuous conditions; and is therefore free from the condition of time,
+which requires it spontaneously to begin its causality in time. But
+such a procedure is perfectly inadmissible, as will be made plain from
+what follows.
+
+In the pure sense of the categories, that is contingent the
+contradictory opposite of which is possible. Now we cannot reason from
+empirical contingency to intellectual. The opposite of that which is
+changed--the opposite of its state--is actual at another time, and is
+therefore possible. Consequently, it is not the contradictory opposite
+of the former state. To be that, it is necessary that, in the same time
+in which the preceding state existed, its opposite could have existed
+in its place; but such a cognition is not given us in the mere
+phenomenon of change. A body that was in motion = A, comes into a state
+of rest = non-A. Now it cannot be concluded from the fact that a state
+opposite to the state A follows it, that the contradictory opposite of
+A is possible; and that A is therefore contingent. To prove this, we
+should require to know that the state of rest could have existed in the
+very same time in which the motion took place. Now we know nothing more
+than that the state of rest was actual in the time that followed the
+state of motion; consequently, that it was also possible. But motion at
+one time, and rest at another time, are not contradictorily opposed to
+each other. It follows from what has been said that the succession of
+opposite determinations, that is, change, does not demonstrate the fact
+of contingency as represented in the conceptions of the pure
+understanding; and that it cannot, therefore, conduct us to the fact of
+the existence of a necessary being. Change proves merely empirical
+contingency, that is to say, that the new state could not have existed
+without a cause, which belongs to the preceding time. This cause--even
+although it is regarded as absolutely necessary--must be presented to us
+in time, and must belong to the series of phenomena.
+
+ON THE ANTITHESIS.
+
+The difficulties which meet us, in our attempt to rise through the
+series of phenomena to the existence of an absolutely necessary supreme
+cause, must not originate from our inability to establish the truth of
+our mere conceptions of the necessary existence of a thing. That is to
+say, our objections not be ontological, but must be directed against
+the causal connection with a series of phenomena of a condition which
+is itself unconditioned. In one word, they must be cosmological and
+relate to empirical laws. We must show that the regress in the series
+of causes (in the world of sense) cannot conclude with an empirically
+unconditioned condition, and that the cosmological argument from the
+contingency of the cosmical state--a contingency alleged to arise from
+change--does not justify us in accepting a first cause, that is, a prime
+originator of the cosmical series.
+
+The reader will observe in this antinomy a very remarkable contrast.
+The very same grounds of proof which established in the thesis the
+existence of a supreme being, demonstrated in the antithesis--and with
+equal strictness--the non-existence of such a being. We found, first,
+that a necessary being exists, because the whole time past contains the
+series of all conditions, and with it, therefore, the unconditioned
+(the necessary); secondly, that there does not exist any necessary
+being, for the same reason, that the whole time past contains the
+series of all conditions--which are themselves, therefore, in the
+aggregate, conditioned. The cause of this seeming incongruity is as
+follows. We attend, in the first argument, solely to the absolute
+totality of the series of conditions, the one of which determines the
+other in time, and thus arrive at a necessary unconditioned. In the
+second, we consider, on the contrary, the contingency of everything
+that is determined in the series of time--for every event is preceded by
+a time, in which the condition itself must be determined as
+conditioned--and thus everything that is unconditioned or absolutely
+necessary disappears. In both, the mode of proof is quite in accordance
+with the common procedure of human reason, which often falls into
+discord with itself, from considering an object from two different
+points of view. Herr von Mairan regarded the controversy between two
+celebrated astronomers, which arose from a similar difficulty as to the
+choice of a proper standpoint, as a phenomenon of sufficient importance
+to warrant a separate treatise on the subject. The one concluded: the
+moon revolves on its own axis, because it constantly presents the same
+side to the earth; the other declared that the moon does not revolve on
+its own axis, for the same reason. Both conclusions were perfectly
+correct, according to the point of view from which the motions of the
+moon were considered.
+
+Section III. Of the Interest of Reason in these Self-contradictions
+
+We have thus completely before us the dialectical procedure of the
+cosmological ideas. No possible experience can present us with an
+object adequate to them in extent. Nay, more, reason itself cannot
+cogitate them as according with the general laws of experience. And yet
+they are not arbitrary fictions of thought. On the contrary, reason, in
+its uninterrupted progress in the empirical synthesis, is necessarily
+conducted to them, when it endeavours to free from all conditions and
+to comprehend in its unconditioned totality that which can only be
+determined conditionally in accordance with the laws of experience.
+These dialectical propositions are so many attempts to solve four
+natural and unavoidable problems of reason. There are neither more, nor
+can there be less, than this number, because there are no other series
+of synthetical hypotheses, limiting à priori the empirical synthesis.
+
+The brilliant claims of reason striving to extend its dominion beyond
+the limits of experience, have been represented above only in dry
+formulae, which contain merely the grounds of its pretensions. They
+have, besides, in conformity with the character of a transcendental
+philosophy, been freed from every empirical element; although the full
+splendour of the promises they hold out, and the anticipations they
+excite, manifests itself only when in connection with empirical
+cognitions. In the application of them, however, and in the advancing
+enlargement of the employment of reason, while struggling to rise from
+the region of experience and to soar to those sublime ideas, philosophy
+discovers a value and a dignity, which, if it could but make good its
+assertions, would raise it far above all other departments of human
+knowledge--professing, as it does, to present a sure foundation for our
+highest hopes and the ultimate aims of all the exertions of reason. The
+questions: whether the world has a beginning and a limit to its
+extension in space; whether there exists anywhere, or perhaps, in my
+own thinking Self, an indivisible and indestructible unity--or whether
+nothing but what is divisible and transitory exists; whether I am a
+free agent, or, like other beings, am bound in the chains of nature and
+fate; whether, finally, there is a supreme cause of the world, or all
+our thought and speculation must end with nature and the order of
+external things--are questions for the solution of which the
+mathematician would willingly exchange his whole science; for in it
+there is no satisfaction for the highest aspirations and most ardent
+desires of humanity. Nay, it may even be said that the true value of
+mathematics--that pride of human reason--consists in this: that she
+guides reason to the knowledge of nature--in her greater as well as in
+her less manifestations--in her beautiful order and regularity--guides
+her, moreover, to an insight into the wonderful unity of the moving
+forces in the operations of nature, far beyond the expectations of a
+philosophy building only on experience; and that she thus encourages
+philosophy to extend the province of reason beyond all experience, and
+at the same time provides it with the most excellent materials for
+supporting its investigations, in so far as their nature admits, by
+adequate and accordant intuitions.
+
+Unfortunately for speculation--but perhaps fortunately for the practical
+interests of humanity--reason, in the midst of her highest
+anticipations, finds herself hemmed in by a press of opposite and
+contradictory conclusions, from which neither her honour nor her safety
+will permit her to draw back. Nor can she regard these conflicting
+trains of reasoning with indifference as mere passages at arms, still
+less can she command peace; for in the subject of the conflict she has
+a deep interest. There is no other course left open to her than to
+reflect with herself upon the origin of this disunion in reason--whether
+it may not arise from a mere misunderstanding. After such an inquiry,
+arrogant claims would have to be given up on both sides; but the
+sovereignty of reason over understanding and sense would be based upon
+a sure foundation.
+
+We shall at present defer this radical inquiry and, in the meantime,
+consider for a little what side in the controversy we should most
+willingly take, if we were obliged to become partisans at all. As, in
+this case, we leave out of sight altogether the logical criterion of
+truth, and merely consult our own interest in reference to the
+question, these considerations, although inadequate to settle the
+question of right in either party, will enable us to comprehend how
+those who have taken part in the struggle, adopt the one view rather
+than the other--no special insight into the subject, however, having
+influenced their choice. They will, at the same time, explain to us
+many other things by the way--for example, the fiery zeal on the one
+side and the cold maintenance of their cause on the other; why the one
+party has met with the warmest approbations, and the other has always
+been repulsed by irreconcilable prejudices.
+
+There is one thing, however, that determines the proper point of view,
+from which alone this preliminary inquiry can be instituted and carried
+on with the proper completeness--and that is the comparison of the
+principles from which both sides, thesis and antithesis, proceed. My
+readers would remark in the propositions of the antithesis a complete
+uniformity in the mode of thought and a perfect unity of principle. Its
+principle was that of pure empiricism, not only in the explication of
+the phenomena in the world, but also in the solution of the
+transcendental ideas, even of that of the universe itself. The
+affirmations of the thesis, on the contrary, were based, in addition to
+the empirical mode of explanation employed in the series of phenomena,
+on intellectual propositions; and its principles were in so far not
+simple. I shall term the thesis, in view of its essential
+characteristic, the dogmatism of pure reason.
+
+On the side of Dogmatism, or of the thesis, therefore, in the
+determination of the cosmological ideas, we find:
+
+1. A practical interest, which must be very dear to every
+right-thinking man. That the word has a beginning--that the nature of my
+thinking self is simple, and therefore indestructible--that I am a free
+agent, and raised above the compulsion of nature and her laws--and,
+finally, that the entire order of things, which form the world, is
+dependent upon a Supreme Being, from whom the whole receives unity and
+connection--these are so many foundation-stones of morality and
+religion. The antithesis deprives us of all these supports--or, at
+least, seems so to deprive us.
+
+2. A speculative interest of reason manifests itself on this side. For,
+if we take the transcendental ideas and employ them in the manner which
+the thesis directs, we can exhibit completely à priori the entire chain
+of conditions, and understand the derivation of the
+conditioned--beginning from the unconditioned. This the antithesis does
+not do; and for this reason does not meet with so welcome a reception.
+For it can give no answer to our question respecting the conditions of
+its synthesis--except such as must be supplemented by another question,
+and so on to infinity. According to it, we must rise from a given
+beginning to one still higher; every part conducts us to a still
+smaller one; every event is preceded by another event which is its
+cause; and the conditions of existence rest always upon other and still
+higher conditions, and find neither end nor basis in some
+self-subsistent thing as the primal being.
+
+3. This side has also the advantage of popularity; and this constitutes
+no small part of its claim to favour. The common understanding does not
+find the least difficulty in the idea of the unconditioned beginning of
+all synthesis--accustomed, as it is, rather to follow our consequences
+than to seek for a proper basis for cognition. In the conception of an
+absolute first, moreover--the possibility of which it does not inquire
+into--it is highly gratified to find a firmly-established point of
+departure for its attempts at theory; while in the restless and
+continuous ascent from the conditioned to the condition, always with
+one foot in the air, it can find no satisfaction.
+
+On the side of the antithesis, or Empiricism, in the determination of
+the cosmological ideas:
+
+1. We cannot discover any such practical interest arising from pure
+principles of reason as morality and religion present. On the contrary,
+pure empiricism seems to empty them of all their power and influence.
+If there does not exist a Supreme Being distinct from the world--if the
+world is without beginning, consequently without a Creator--if our wills
+are not free, and the soul is divisible and subject to corruption just
+like matter--the ideas and principles of morality lose all validity and
+fall with the transcendental ideas which constituted their theoretical
+support.
+
+2. But empiricism, in compensation, holds out to reason, in its
+speculative interests, certain important advantages, far exceeding any
+that the dogmatist can promise us. For, when employed by the
+empiricist, understanding is always upon its proper ground of
+investigation--the field of possible experience, the laws of which it
+can explore, and thus extend its cognition securely and with clear
+intelligence without being stopped by limits in any direction. Here can
+it and ought it to find and present to intuition its proper object--not
+only in itself, but in all its relations; or, if it employ conceptions,
+upon this ground it can always present the corresponding images in
+clear and unmistakable intuitions. It is quite unnecessary for it to
+renounce the guidance of nature, to attach itself to ideas, the objects
+of which it cannot know; because, as mere intellectual entities, they
+cannot be presented in any intuition. On the contrary, it is not even
+permitted to abandon its proper occupation, under the pretence that it
+has been brought to a conclusion (for it never can be), and to pass
+into the region of idealizing reason and transcendent conceptions,
+which it is not required to observe and explore the laws of nature, but
+merely to think and to imagine--secure from being contradicted by facts,
+because they have not been called as witnesses, but passed by, or
+perhaps subordinated to the so-called higher interests and
+considerations of pure reason.
+
+Hence the empiricist will never allow himself to accept any epoch of
+nature for the first--the absolutely primal state; he will not believe
+that there can be limits to his outlook into her wide domains, nor pass
+from the objects of nature, which he can satisfactorily explain by
+means of observation and mathematical thought--which he can determine
+synthetically in intuition, to those which neither sense nor
+imagination can ever present in concreto; he will not concede the
+existence of a faculty in nature, operating independently of the laws
+of nature--a concession which would introduce uncertainty into the
+procedure of the understanding, which is guided by necessary laws to
+the observation of phenomena; nor, finally, will he permit himself to
+seek a cause beyond nature, inasmuch as we know nothing but it, and
+from it alone receive an objective basis for all our conceptions and
+instruction in the unvarying laws of things.
+
+In truth, if the empirical philosopher had no other purpose in the
+establishment of his antithesis than to check the presumption of a
+reason which mistakes its true destination, which boasts of its insight
+and its knowledge, just where all insight and knowledge cease to exist,
+and regards that which is valid only in relation to a practical
+interest, as an advancement of the speculative interests of the mind
+(in order, when it is convenient for itself, to break the thread of our
+physical investigations, and, under pretence of extending our
+cognition, connect them with transcendental ideas, by means of which we
+really know only that we know nothing)--if, I say, the empiricist rested
+satisfied with this benefit, the principle advanced by him would be a
+maxim recommending moderation in the pretensions of reason and modesty
+in its affirmations, and at the same time would direct us to the right
+mode of extending the province of the understanding, by the help of the
+only true teacher, experience. In obedience to this advice,
+intellectual hypotheses and faith would not be called in aid of our
+practical interests; nor should we introduce them under the pompous
+titles of science and insight. For speculative cognition cannot find an
+objective basis any other where than in experience; and, when we
+overstep its limits our synthesis, which requires ever new cognitions
+independent of experience, has no substratum of intuition upon which to
+build.
+
+But if--as often happens--empiricism, in relation to ideas, becomes
+itself dogmatic and boldly denies that which is above the sphere of its
+phenomenal cognition, it falls itself into the error of intemperance--an
+error which is here all the more reprehensible, as thereby the
+practical interest of reason receives an irreparable injury.
+
+And this constitutes the opposition between Epicureanism[57] and
+Platonism.
+
+ [57] It is, however, still a matter of doubt whether Epicurus ever
+ propounded these principles as directions for the objective employment
+ of the understanding. If, indeed, they were nothing more than maxims
+ for the speculative exercise of reason, he gives evidence therein a
+ more genuine philosophic spirit than any of the philosophers of
+ antiquity. That, in the explanation of phenomena, we must proceed as
+ if the field of inquiry had neither limits in space nor commencement
+ in time; that we must be satisfied with the teaching of experience in
+ reference to the material of which the world is posed; that we must
+ not look for any other mode of the origination of events than that
+ which is determined by the unalterable laws of nature; and finally,
+ that we not employ the hypothesis of a cause distinct from the world
+ to account for a phenomenon or for the world itself--are principles for
+ the extension of speculative philosophy, and the discovery of the true
+ sources of the principles of morals, which, however little conformed
+ to in the present day, are undoubtedly correct. At the same time, any
+ one desirous of ignoring, in mere speculation, these dogmatical
+ propositions, need not for that reason be accused of denying them.
+
+Both Epicurus and Plato assert more in their systems than they know.
+The former encourages and advances science--although to the prejudice of
+the practical; the latter presents us with excellent principles for the
+investigation of the practical, but, in relation to everything
+regarding which we can attain to speculative cognition, permits reason
+to append idealistic explanations of natural phenomena, to the great
+injury of physical investigation.
+
+3. In regard to the third motive for the preliminary choice of a party
+in this war of assertions, it seems very extraordinary that empiricism
+should be utterly unpopular. We should be inclined to believe that the
+common understanding would receive it with pleasure--promising as it
+does to satisfy it without passing the bounds of experience and its
+connected order; while transcendental dogmatism obliges it to rise to
+conceptions which far surpass the intelligence and ability of the most
+practised thinkers. But in this, in truth, is to be found its real
+motive. For the common understanding thus finds itself in a situation
+where not even the most learned can have the advantage of it. If it
+understands little or nothing about these transcendental conceptions,
+no one can boast of understanding any more; and although it may not
+express itself in so scholastically correct a manner as others, it can
+busy itself with reasoning and arguments without end, wandering among
+mere ideas, about which one can always be very eloquent, because we
+know nothing about them; while, in the observation and investigation of
+nature, it would be forced to remain dumb and to confess its utter
+ignorance. Thus indolence and vanity form of themselves strong
+recommendations of these principles. Besides, although it is a hard
+thing for a philosopher to assume a principle, of which he can give to
+himself no reasonable account, and still more to employ conceptions,
+the objective reality of which cannot be established, nothing is more
+usual with the common understanding. It wants something which will
+allow it to go to work with confidence. The difficulty of even
+comprehending a supposition does not disquiet it, because--not knowing
+what comprehending means--it never even thinks of the supposition it may
+be adopting as a principle; and regards as known that with which it has
+become familiar from constant use. And, at last, all speculative
+interests disappear before the practical interests which it holds dear;
+and it fancies that it understands and knows what its necessities and
+hopes incite it to assume or to believe. Thus the empiricism of
+transcendentally idealizing reason is robbed of all popularity; and,
+however prejudicial it may be to the highest practical principles,
+there is no fear that it will ever pass the limits of the schools, or
+acquire any favour or influence in society or with the multitude.
+
+Human reason is by nature architectonic. That is to say, it regards all
+cognitions as parts of a possible system, and hence accepts only such
+principles as at least do not incapacitate a cognition to which we may
+have attained from being placed along with others in a general system.
+But the propositions of the antithesis are of a character which renders
+the completion of an edifice of cognitions impossible. According to
+these, beyond one state or epoch of the world there is always to be
+found one more ancient; in every part always other parts themselves
+divisible; preceding every event another, the origin of which must
+itself be sought still higher; and everything in existence is
+conditioned, and still not dependent on an unconditioned and primal
+existence. As, therefore, the antithesis will not concede the existence
+of a first beginning which might be available as a foundation, a
+complete edifice of cognition, in the presence of such hypothesis, is
+utterly impossible. Thus the architectonic interest of reason, which
+requires a unity--not empirical, but à priori and rational--forms a
+natural recommendation for the assertions of the thesis in our
+antinomy.
+
+But if any one could free himself entirely from all considerations of
+interest, and weigh without partiality the assertions of reason,
+attending only to their content, irrespective of the consequences which
+follow from them; such a person, on the supposition that he knew no
+other way out of the confusion than to settle the truth of one or other
+of the conflicting doctrines, would live in a state of continual
+hesitation. Today, he would feel convinced that the human will is free;
+to-morrow, considering the indissoluble chain of nature, he would look
+on freedom as a mere illusion and declare nature to be all-in-all. But,
+if he were called to action, the play of the merely speculative reason
+would disappear like the shapes of a dream, and practical interest
+would dictate his choice of principles. But, as it well befits a
+reflective and inquiring being to devote certain periods of time to the
+examination of its own reason--to divest itself of all partiality, and
+frankly to communicate its observations for the judgement and opinion
+of others; so no one can be blamed for, much less prevented from,
+placing both parties on their trial, with permission to end themselves,
+free from intimidation, before intimidation, before a sworn jury of
+equal condition with themselves--the condition of weak and fallible men.
+
+Section IV. Of the necessity imposed upon Pure Reason of presenting a
+Solution of its Transcendental Problems
+
+To avow an ability to solve all problems and to answer all questions
+would be a profession certain to convict any philosopher of extravagant
+boasting and self-conceit, and at once to destroy the confidence that
+might otherwise have been reposed in him. There are, however, sciences
+so constituted that every question arising within their sphere must
+necessarily be capable of receiving an answer from the knowledge
+already possessed, for the answer must be received from the same
+sources whence the question arose. In such sciences it is not allowable
+to excuse ourselves on the plea of necessary and unavoidable ignorance;
+a solution is absolutely requisite. The rule of right and wrong must
+help us to the knowledge of what is right or wrong in all possible
+cases; otherwise, the idea of obligation or duty would be utterly null,
+for we cannot have any obligation to that which we cannot know. On the
+other hand, in our investigations of the phenomena of nature, much must
+remain uncertain, and many questions continue insoluble; because what
+we know of nature is far from being sufficient to explain all the
+phenomena that are presented to our observation. Now the question is:
+Whether there is in transcendental philosophy any question, relating to
+an object presented to pure reason, which is unanswerable by this
+reason; and whether we must regard the subject of the question as quite
+uncertain, so far as our knowledge extends, and must give it a place
+among those subjects, of which we have just so much conception as is
+sufficient to enable us to raise a question--faculty or materials
+failing us, however, when we attempt an answer.
+
+Now I maintain that, among all speculative cognition, the peculiarity
+of transcendental philosophy is that there is no question, relating to
+an object presented to pure reason, which is insoluble by this reason;
+and that the profession of unavoidable ignorance--the problem being
+alleged to be beyond the reach of our faculties--cannot free us from the
+obligation to present a complete and satisfactory answer. For the very
+conception which enables us to raise the question must give us the
+power of answering it; inasmuch as the object, as in the case of right
+and wrong, is not to be discovered out of the conception.
+
+But, in transcendental philosophy, it is only the cosmological
+questions to which we can demand a satisfactory answer in relation to
+the constitution of their object; and the philosopher is not permitted
+to avail himself of the pretext of necessary ignorance and impenetrable
+obscurity. These questions relate solely to the cosmological ideas. For
+the object must be given in experience, and the question relates to the
+adequateness of the object to an idea. If the object is transcendental
+and therefore itself unknown; if the question, for example, is whether
+the object--the something, the phenomenon of which (internal--in
+ourselves) is thought--that is to say, the soul, is in itself a simple
+being; or whether there is a cause of all things, which is absolutely
+necessary--in such cases we are seeking for our idea an object, of which
+we may confess that it is unknown to us, though we must not on that
+account assert that it is impossible.[58] The cosmological ideas alone
+posses the peculiarity that we can presuppose the object of them and
+the empirical synthesis requisite for the conception of that object to
+be given; and the question, which arises from these ideas, relates
+merely to the progress of this synthesis, in so far as it must contain
+absolute totality--which, however, is not empirical, as it cannot be
+given in any experience. Now, as the question here is solely in regard
+to a thing as the object of a possible experience and not as a thing in
+itself, the answer to the transcendental cosmological question need not
+be sought out of the idea, for the question does not regard an object
+in itself. The question in relation to a possible experience is not,
+"What can be given in an experience in concreto" but "what is contained
+in the idea, to which the empirical synthesis must approximate." The
+question must therefore be capable of solution from the idea alone. For
+the idea is a creation of reason itself, which therefore cannot
+disclaim the obligation to answer or refer us to the unknown object.
+
+ [58] The question, "What is the constitution of a transcendental
+ object?" is unanswerable--we are unable to say what it is; but we can
+ perceive that the question itself is nothing; because it does not
+ relate to any object that can be presented to us. For this reason, we
+ must consider all the questions raised in transcendental psychology as
+ answerable and as really answered; for they relate to the
+ transcendental subject of all internal phenomena, which is not itself
+ phenomenon and consequently not given as an object, in which,
+ moreover, none of the categories--and it is to them that the question
+ is properly directed--find any conditions of its application. Here,
+ therefore, is a case where no answer is the only proper answer. For a
+ question regarding the constitution of a something which cannot be
+ cogitated by any determined predicate, being completely beyond the
+ sphere of objects and experience, is perfectly null and void.
+
+It is not so extraordinary, as it at first sight appears, that a
+science should demand and expect satisfactory answers to all the
+questions that may arise within its own sphere (questiones domesticae),
+although, up to a certain time, these answers may not have been
+discovered. There are, in addition to transcendental philosophy, only
+two pure sciences of reason; the one with a speculative, the other with
+a practical content--pure mathematics and pure ethics. Has any one ever
+heard it alleged that, from our complete and necessary ignorance of the
+conditions, it is uncertain what exact relation the diameter of a
+circle bears to the circle in rational or irrational numbers? By the
+former the sum cannot be given exactly, by the latter only
+approximately; and therefore we decide that the impossibility of a
+solution of the question is evident. Lambert presented us with a
+demonstration of this. In the general principles of morals there can be
+nothing uncertain, for the propositions are either utterly without
+meaning, or must originate solely in our rational conceptions. On the
+other hand, there must be in physical science an infinite number of
+conjectures, which can never become certainties; because the phenomena
+of nature are not given as objects dependent on our conceptions. The
+key to the solution of such questions cannot, therefore, be found in
+our conceptions, or in pure thought, but must lie without us and for
+that reason is in many cases not to be discovered; and consequently a
+satisfactory explanation cannot be expected. The questions of
+transcendental analytic, which relate to the deduction of our pure
+cognition, are not to be regarded as of the same kind as those
+mentioned above; for we are not at present treating of the certainty of
+judgements in relation to the origin of our conceptions, but only of
+that certainty in relation to objects.
+
+We cannot, therefore, escape the responsibility of at least a critical
+solution of the questions of reason, by complaints of the limited
+nature of our faculties, and the seemingly humble confession that it is
+beyond the power of our reason to decide, whether the world has existed
+from all eternity or had a beginning--whether it is infinitely extended,
+or enclosed within certain limits--whether anything in the world is
+simple, or whether everything must be capable of infinite
+divisibility--whether freedom can originate phenomena, or whether
+everything is absolutely dependent on the laws and order of nature--and,
+finally, whether there exists a being that is completely unconditioned
+and necessary, or whether the existence of everything is conditioned
+and consequently dependent on something external to itself, and
+therefore in its own nature contingent. For all these questions relate
+to an object, which can be given nowhere else than in thought. This
+object is the absolutely unconditioned totality of the synthesis of
+phenomena. If the conceptions in our minds do not assist us to some
+certain result in regard to these problems, we must not defend
+ourselves on the plea that the object itself remains hidden from and
+unknown to us. For no such thing or object can be given--it is not to be
+found out of the idea in our minds. We must seek the cause of our
+failure in our idea itself, which is an insoluble problem and in regard
+to which we obstinately assume that there exists a real object
+corresponding and adequate to it. A clear explanation of the dialectic
+which lies in our conception, will very soon enable us to come to a
+satisfactory decision in regard to such a question.
+
+The pretext that we are unable to arrive at certainty in regard to
+these problems may be met with this question, which requires at least a
+plain answer: "From what source do the ideas originate, the solution of
+which involves you in such difficulties? Are you seeking for an
+explanation of certain phenomena; and do you expect these ideas to give
+you the principles or the rules of this explanation?" Let it be
+granted, that all nature was laid open before you; that nothing was hid
+from your senses and your consciousness. Still, you could not cognize
+in concreto the object of your ideas in any experience. For what is
+demanded is not only this full and complete intuition, but also a
+complete synthesis and the consciousness of its absolute totality; and
+this is not possible by means of any empirical cognition. It follows
+that your question--your idea--is by no means necessary for the
+explanation of any phenomenon; and the idea cannot have been in any
+sense given by the object itself. For such an object can never be
+presented to us, because it cannot be given by any possible experience.
+Whatever perceptions you may attain to, you are still surrounded by
+conditions--in space, or in time--and you cannot discover anything
+unconditioned; nor can you decide whether this unconditioned is to be
+placed in an absolute beginning of the synthesis, or in an absolute
+totality of the series without beginning. A whole, in the empirical
+signification of the term, is always merely comparative. The absolute
+whole of quantity (the universe), of division, of derivation, of the
+condition of existence, with the question--whether it is to be produced
+by finite or infinite synthesis, no possible experience can instruct us
+concerning. You will not, for example, be able to explain the phenomena
+of a body in the least degree better, whether you believe it to consist
+of simple, or of composite parts; for a simple phenomenon--and just as
+little an infinite series of composition--can never be presented to your
+perception. Phenomena require and admit of explanation, only in so far
+as the conditions of that explanation are given in perception; but the
+sum total of that which is given in phenomena, considered as an
+absolute whole, is itself a perception--and we cannot therefore seek for
+explanations of this whole beyond itself, in other perceptions. The
+explanation of this whole is the proper object of the transcendental
+problems of pure reason.
+
+Although, therefore, the solution of these problems is unattainable
+through experience, we must not permit ourselves to say that it is
+uncertain how the object of our inquiries is constituted. For the
+object is in our own mind and cannot be discovered in experience; and
+we have only to take care that our thoughts are consistent with each
+other, and to avoid falling into the amphiboly of regarding our idea as
+a representation of an object empirically given, and therefore to be
+cognized according to the laws of experience. A dogmatical solution is
+therefore not only unsatisfactory but impossible. The critical
+solution, which may be a perfectly certain one, does not consider the
+question objectively, but proceeds by inquiring into the basis of the
+cognition upon which the question rests.
+
+Section V. Sceptical Exposition of the Cosmological Problems presented
+in the four Transcendental Ideas
+
+We should be quite willing to desist from the demand of a dogmatical
+answer to our questions, if we understood beforehand that, be the
+answer what it may, it would only serve to increase our ignorance, to
+throw us from one incomprehensibility into another, from one obscurity
+into another still greater, and perhaps lead us into irreconcilable
+contradictions. If a dogmatical affirmative or negative answer is
+demanded, is it at all prudent to set aside the probable grounds of a
+solution which lie before us and to take into consideration what
+advantage we shall gain, if the answer is to favour the one side or the
+other? If it happens that in both cases the answer is mere nonsense, we
+have in this an irresistible summons to institute a critical
+investigation of the question, for the purpose of discovering whether
+it is based on a groundless presupposition and relates to an idea, the
+falsity of which would be more easily exposed in its application and
+consequences than in the mere representation of its content. This is
+the great utility of the sceptical mode of treating the questions
+addressed by pure reason to itself. By this method we easily rid
+ourselves of the confusions of dogmatism, and establish in its place a
+temperate criticism, which, as a genuine cathartic, will successfully
+remove the presumptuous notions of philosophy and their consequence--the
+vain pretension to universal science.
+
+If, then, I could understand the nature of a cosmological idea and
+perceive, before I entered on the discussion of the subject at all,
+that, whatever side of the question regarding the unconditioned of the
+regressive synthesis of phenomena it favoured--it must either be too
+great or too small for every conception of the understanding--I would be
+able to comprehend how the idea, which relates to an object of
+experience--an experience which must be adequate to and in accordance
+with a possible conception of the understanding--must be completely void
+and without significance, inasmuch as its object is inadequate,
+consider it as we may. And this is actually the case with all
+cosmological conceptions, which, for the reason above mentioned,
+involve reason, so long as it remains attached to them, in an
+unavoidable antinomy. For suppose:
+
+First, that the world has no beginning--in this case it is too large for
+our conception; for this conception, which consists in a successive
+regress, cannot overtake the whole eternity that has elapsed. Grant
+that it has a beginning, it is then too small for the conception of the
+understanding. For, as a beginning presupposes a time preceding, it
+cannot be unconditioned; and the law of the empirical employment of the
+understanding imposes the necessity of looking for a higher condition
+of time; and the world is, therefore, evidently too small for this law.
+
+The same is the case with the double answer to the question regarding
+the extent, in space, of the world. For, if it is infinite and
+unlimited, it must be too large for every possible empirical
+conception. If it is finite and limited, we have a right to ask: "What
+determines these limits?" Void space is not a self-subsistent correlate
+of things, and cannot be a final condition--and still less an empirical
+condition, forming a part of a possible experience. For how can we have
+any experience or perception of an absolute void? But the absolute
+totality of the empirical synthesis requires that the unconditioned be
+an empirical conception. Consequently, a finite world is too small for
+our conception.
+
+Secondly, if every phenomenon (matter) in space consists of an infinite
+number of parts, the regress of the division is always too great for
+our conception; and if the division of space must cease with some
+member of the division (the simple), it is too small for the idea of
+the unconditioned. For the member at which we have discontinued our
+division still admits a regress to many more parts contained in the
+object.
+
+Thirdly, suppose that every event in the world happens in accordance
+with the laws of nature; the causality of a cause must itself be an
+event and necessitates a regress to a still higher cause, and
+consequently the unceasing prolongation of the series of conditions a
+parte priori. Operative nature is therefore too large for every
+conception we can form in the synthesis of cosmical events.
+
+If we admit the existence of spontaneously produced events, that is, of
+free agency, we are driven, in our search for sufficient reasons, on an
+unavoidable law of nature and are compelled to appeal to the empirical
+law of causality, and we find that any such totality of connection in
+our synthesis is too small for our necessary empirical conception.
+
+Fourthly, if we assume the existence of an absolutely necessary
+being--whether it be the world or something in the world, or the cause
+of the world--we must place it in a time at an infinite distance from
+any given moment; for, otherwise, it must be dependent on some other
+and higher existence. Such an existence is, in this case, too large for
+our empirical conception, and unattainable by the continued regress of
+any synthesis.
+
+But if we believe that everything in the world--be it condition or
+conditioned--is contingent; every given existence is too small for our
+conception. For in this case we are compelled to seek for some other
+existence upon which the former depends.
+
+We have said that in all these cases the cosmological idea is either
+too great or too small for the empirical regress in a synthesis, and
+consequently for every possible conception of the understanding. Why
+did we not express ourselves in a manner exactly the reverse of this
+and, instead of accusing the cosmological idea of over stepping or of
+falling short of its true aim, possible experience, say that, in the
+first case, the empirical conception is always too small for the idea,
+and in the second too great, and thus attach the blame of these
+contradictions to the empirical regress? The reason is this. Possible
+experience can alone give reality to our conceptions; without it a
+conception is merely an idea, without truth or relation to an object.
+Hence a possible empirical conception must be the standard by which we
+are to judge whether an idea is anything more than an idea and fiction
+of thought, or whether it relates to an object in the world. If we say
+of a thing that in relation to some other thing it is too large or too
+small, the former is considered as existing for the sake of the latter,
+and requiring to be adapted to it. Among the trivial subjects of
+discussion in the old schools of dialectics was this question: "If a
+ball cannot pass through a hole, shall we say that the ball is too
+large or the hole too small?" In this case it is indifferent what
+expression we employ; for we do not know which exists for the sake of
+the other. On the other hand, we cannot say: "The man is too long for
+his coat"; but: "The coat is too short for the man."
+
+We are thus led to the well-founded suspicion that the cosmological
+ideas, and all the conflicting sophistical assertions connected with
+them, are based upon a false and fictitious conception of the mode in
+which the object of these ideas is presented to us; and this suspicion
+will probably direct us how to expose the illusion that has so long led
+us astray from the truth.
+
+Section VI. Transcendental Idealism as the Key to the Solution of Pure
+Cosmological Dialectic
+
+In the transcendental æsthetic we proved that everything intuited in
+space and time, all objects of a possible experience, are nothing but
+phenomena, that is, mere representations; and that these, as presented
+to us--as extended bodies, or as series of changes--have no
+self-subsistent existence apart from human thought. This doctrine I
+call Transcendental Idealism.[59] The realist in the transcendental
+sense regards these modifications of our sensibility, these mere
+representations, as things subsisting in themselves.
+
+ [59] I have elsewhere termed this theory formal idealism, to
+ distinguish it from material idealism, which doubts or denies the
+ existence of external things. To avoid ambiguity, it seems advisable
+ in many cases to employ this term instead of that mentioned in the
+ text.
+
+It would be unjust to accuse us of holding the long-decried theory of
+empirical idealism, which, while admitting the reality of space,
+denies, or at least doubts, the existence of bodies extended in it, and
+thus leaves us without a sufficient criterion of reality and illusion.
+The supporters of this theory find no difficulty in admitting the
+reality of the phenomena of the internal sense in time; nay, they go
+the length of maintaining that this internal experience is of itself a
+sufficient proof of the real existence of its object as a thing in
+itself.
+
+Transcendental idealism allows that the objects of external
+intuition--as intuited in space, and all changes in time--as represented
+by the internal sense, are real. For, as space is the form of that
+intuition which we call external, and, without objects in space, no
+empirical representation could be given us, we can and ought to regard
+extended bodies in it as real. The case is the same with
+representations in time. But time and space, with all phenomena
+therein, are not in themselves things. They are nothing but
+representations and cannot exist out of and apart from the mind. Nay,
+the sensuous internal intuition of the mind (as the object of
+consciousness), the determination of which is represented by the
+succession of different states in time, is not the real, proper self,
+as it exists in itself--not the transcendental subject--but only a
+phenomenon, which is presented to the sensibility of this, to us,
+unknown being. This internal phenomenon cannot be admitted to be a
+self-subsisting thing; for its condition is time, and time cannot be
+the condition of a thing in itself. But the empirical truth of
+phenomena in space and time is guaranteed beyond the possibility of
+doubt, and sufficiently distinguished from the illusion of dreams or
+fancy--although both have a proper and thorough connection in an
+experience according to empirical laws. The objects of experience then
+are not things in themselves, but are given only in experience, and
+have no existence apart from and independently of experience. That
+there may be inhabitants in the moon, although no one has ever observed
+them, must certainly be admitted; but this assertion means only, that
+we may in the possible progress of experience discover them at some
+future time. For that which stands in connection with a perception
+according to the laws of the progress of experience is real. They are
+therefore really existent, if they stand in empirical connection with
+my actual or real consciousness, although they are not in themselves
+real, that is, apart from the progress of experience.
+
+There is nothing actually given--we can be conscious of nothing as real,
+except a perception and the empirical progression from it to other
+possible perceptions. For phenomena, as mere representations, are real
+only in perception; and perception is, in fact, nothing but the reality
+of an empirical representation, that is, a phenomenon. To call a
+phenomenon a real thing prior to perception means either that we must
+meet with this phenomenon in the progress of experience, or it means
+nothing at all. For I can say only of a thing in itself that it exists
+without relation to the senses and experience. But we are speaking here
+merely of phenomena in space and time, both of which are determinations
+of sensibility, and not of things in themselves. It follows that
+phenomena are not things in themselves, but are mere representations,
+which if not given in us--in perception--are non-existent.
+
+The faculty of sensuous intuition is properly a receptivity--a capacity
+of being affected in a certain manner by representations, the relation
+of which to each other is a pure intuition of space and time--the pure
+forms of sensibility. These representations, in so far as they are
+connected and determinable in this relation (in space and time)
+according to laws of the unity of experience, are called objects. The
+non-sensuous cause of these representations is completely unknown to us
+and hence cannot be intuited as an object. For such an object could not
+be represented either in space or in time; and without these conditions
+intuition or representation is impossible. We may, at the same time,
+term the non-sensuous cause of phenomena the transcendental object--but
+merely as a mental correlate to sensibility, considered as a
+receptivity. To this transcendental object we may attribute the whole
+connection and extent of our possible perceptions, and say that it is
+given and exists in itself prior to all experience. But the phenomena,
+corresponding to it, are not given as things in themselves, but in
+experience alone. For they are mere representations, receiving from
+perceptions alone significance and relation to a real object, under the
+condition that this or that perception--indicating an object--is in
+complete connection with all others in accordance with the rules of the
+unity of experience. Thus we can say: "The things that really existed
+in past time are given in the transcendental object of experience." But
+these are to me real objects, only in so far as I can represent to my
+own mind, that a regressive series of possible perceptions--following
+the indications of history, or the footsteps of cause and effect--in
+accordance with empirical laws--that, in one word, the course of the
+world conducts us to an elapsed series of time as the condition of the
+present time. This series in past time is represented as real, not in
+itself, but only in connection with a possible experience. Thus, when I
+say that certain events occurred in past time, I merely assert the
+possibility of prolonging the chain of experience, from the present
+perception, upwards to the conditions that determine it according to
+time.
+
+If I represent to myself all objects existing in all space and time, I
+do not thereby place these in space and time prior to all experience;
+on the contrary, such a representation is nothing more than the notion
+of a possible experience, in its absolute completeness. In experience
+alone are those objects, which are nothing but representations, given.
+But, when I say they existed prior to my experience, this means only
+that I must begin with the perception present to me and follow the
+track indicated until I discover them in some part or region of
+experience. The cause of the empirical condition of this
+progression--and consequently at what member therein I must stop, and at
+what point in the regress I am to find this member--is transcendental,
+and hence necessarily incognizable. But with this we have not to do;
+our concern is only with the law of progression in experience, in which
+objects, that is, phenomena, are given. It is a matter of indifference,
+whether I say, "I may in the progress of experience discover stars, at
+a hundred times greater distance than the most distant of those now
+visible," or, "Stars at this distance may be met in space, although no
+one has, or ever will discover them." For, if they are given as things
+in themselves, without any relation to possible experience, they are
+for me non-existent, consequently, are not objects, for they are not
+contained in the regressive series of experience. But, if these
+phenomena must be employed in the construction or support of the
+cosmological idea of an absolute whole, and when we are discussing a
+question that oversteps the limits of possible experience, the proper
+distinction of the different theories of the reality of sensuous
+objects is of great importance, in order to avoid the illusion which
+must necessarily arise from the misinterpretation of our empirical
+conceptions.
+
+Section VII. Critical Solution of the Cosmological Problem
+
+The antinomy of pure reason is based upon the following dialectical
+argument: "If that which is conditioned is given, the whole series of
+its conditions is also given; but sensuous objects are given as
+conditioned; consequently..." This syllogism, the major of which seems
+so natural and evident, introduces as many cosmological ideas as there
+are different kinds of conditions in the synthesis of phenomena, in so
+far as these conditions constitute a series. These ideas require
+absolute totality in the series, and thus place reason in inextricable
+embarrassment. Before proceeding to expose the fallacy in this
+dialectical argument, it will be necessary to have a correct
+understanding of certain conceptions that appear in it.
+
+In the first place, the following proposition is evident, and
+indubitably certain: "If the conditioned is given, a regress in the
+series of all its conditions is thereby imperatively required." For the
+very conception of a conditioned is a conception of something related
+to a condition, and, if this condition is itself conditioned, to
+another condition--and so on through all the members of the series. This
+proposition is, therefore, analytical and has nothing to fear from
+transcendental criticism. It is a logical postulate of reason: to
+pursue, as far as possible, the connection of a conception with its
+conditions.
+
+If, in the second place, both the conditioned and the condition are
+things in themselves, and if the former is given, not only is the
+regress to the latter requisite, but the latter is really given with
+the former. Now, as this is true of all the members of the series, the
+entire series of conditions, and with them the unconditioned, is at the
+same time given in the very fact of the conditioned, the existence of
+which is possible only in and through that series, being given. In this
+case, the synthesis of the conditioned with its condition, is a
+synthesis of the understanding merely, which represents things as they
+are, without regarding whether and how we can cognize them. But if I
+have to do with phenomena, which, in their character of mere
+representations, are not given, if I do not attain to a cognition of
+them (in other words, to themselves, for they are nothing more than
+empirical cognitions), I am not entitled to say: "If the conditioned is
+given, all its conditions (as phenomena) are also given." I cannot,
+therefore, from the fact of a conditioned being given, infer the
+absolute totality of the series of its conditions. For phenomena are
+nothing but an empirical synthesis in apprehension or perception, and
+are therefore given only in it. Now, in speaking of phenomena it does
+not follow that, if the conditioned is given, the synthesis which
+constitutes its empirical condition is also thereby given and
+presupposed; such a synthesis can be established only by an actual
+regress in the series of conditions. But we are entitled to say in this
+case that a regress to the conditions of a conditioned, in other words,
+that a continuous empirical synthesis is enjoined; that, if the
+conditions are not given, they are at least required; and that we are
+certain to discover the conditions in this regress.
+
+We can now see that the major, in the above cosmological syllogism,
+takes the conditioned in the transcendental signification which it has
+in the pure category, while the minor speaks of it in the empirical
+signification which it has in the category as applied to phenomena.
+There is, therefore, a dialectical fallacy in the syllogism--a sophisma
+figurae dictionis. But this fallacy is not a consciously devised one,
+but a perfectly natural illusion of the common reason of man. For, when
+a thing is given as conditioned, we presuppose in the major its
+conditions and their series, unperceived, as it were, and unseen;
+because this is nothing more than the logical requirement of complete
+and satisfactory premisses for a given conclusion. In this case, time
+is altogether left out in the connection of the conditioned with the
+condition; they are supposed to be given in themselves, and
+contemporaneously. It is, moreover, just as natural to regard phenomena
+(in the minor) as things in themselves and as objects presented to the
+pure understanding, as in the major, in which complete abstraction was
+made of all conditions of intuition. But it is under these conditions
+alone that objects are given. Now we overlooked a remarkable
+distinction between the conceptions. The synthesis of the conditioned
+with its condition, and the complete series of the latter (in the
+major) are not limited by time, and do not contain the conception of
+succession. On the contrary, the empirical synthesis and the series of
+conditions in the phenomenal world--subsumed in the minor--are
+necessarily successive and given in time alone. It follows that I
+cannot presuppose in the minor, as I did in the major, the absolute
+totality of the synthesis and of the series therein represented; for in
+the major all the members of the series are given as things in
+themselves--without any limitations or conditions of time, while in the
+minor they are possible only in and through a successive regress, which
+cannot exist, except it be actually carried into execution in the world
+of phenomena.
+
+After this proof of the viciousness of the argument commonly employed
+in maintaining cosmological assertions, both parties may now be justly
+dismissed, as advancing claims without grounds or title. But the
+process has not been ended by convincing them that one or both were in
+the wrong and had maintained an assertion which was without valid
+grounds of proof. Nothing seems to be clearer than that, if one
+maintains: "The world has a beginning," and another: "The world has no
+beginning," one of the two must be right. But it is likewise clear
+that, if the evidence on both sides is equal, it is impossible to
+discover on what side the truth lies; and the controversy continues,
+although the parties have been recommended to peace before the tribunal
+of reason. There remains, then, no other means of settling the question
+than to convince the parties, who refute each other with such
+conclusiveness and ability, that they are disputing about nothing, and
+that a transcendental illusion has been mocking them with visions of
+reality where there is none. The mode of adjusting a dispute which
+cannot be decided upon its own merits, we shall now proceed to lay
+before our readers.
+
+Zeno of Elea, a subtle dialectician, was severely reprimanded by Plato
+as a sophist, who, merely from the base motive of exhibiting his skill
+in discussion, maintained and subverted the same proposition by
+arguments as powerful and convincing on the one side as on the other.
+He maintained, for example, that God (who was probably nothing more, in
+his view, than the world) is neither finite nor infinite, neither in
+motion nor in rest, neither similar nor dissimilar to any other thing.
+It seemed to those philosophers who criticized his mode of discussion
+that his purpose was to deny completely both of two self-contradictory
+propositions--which is absurd. But I cannot believe that there is any
+justice in this accusation. The first of these propositions I shall
+presently consider in a more detailed manner. With regard to the
+others, if by the word of God he understood merely the Universe, his
+meaning must have been--that it cannot be permanently present in one
+place--that is, at rest--nor be capable of changing its place--that is, of
+moving--because all places are in the universe, and the universe itself
+is, therefore, in no place. Again, if the universe contains in itself
+everything that exists, it cannot be similar or dissimilar to any other
+thing, because there is, in fact, no other thing with which it can be
+compared. If two opposite judgements presuppose a contingent
+impossible, or arbitrary condition, both--in spite of their opposition
+(which is, however, not properly or really a contradiction)--fall away;
+because the condition, which ensured the validity of both, has itself
+disappeared.
+
+If we say: "Everybody has either a good or a bad smell," we have
+omitted a third possible judgement--it has no smell at all; and thus
+both conflicting statements may be false. If we say: "It is either
+good-smelling or not good-smelling (vel suaveolens vel
+non-suaveolens)," both judgements are contradictorily opposed; and the
+contradictory opposite of the former judgement--some bodies are not
+good-smelling--embraces also those bodies which have no smell at all. In
+the preceding pair of opposed judgements (per disparata), the
+contingent condition of the conception of body (smell) attached to both
+conflicting statements, instead of having been omitted in the latter,
+which is consequently not the contradictory opposite of the former.
+
+If, accordingly, we say: "The world is either infinite in extension, or
+it is not infinite (non est infinitus)"; and if the former proposition
+is false, its contradictory opposite--the world is not infinite--must be
+true. And thus I should deny the existence of an infinite, without,
+however affirming the existence of a finite world. But if we construct
+our proposition thus: "The world is either infinite or finite
+(non-infinite)," both statements may be false. For, in this case, we
+consider the world as per se determined in regard to quantity, and
+while, in the one judgement, we deny its infinite and consequently,
+perhaps, its independent existence; in the other, we append to the
+world, regarded as a thing in itself, a certain determination--that of
+finitude; and the latter may be false as well as the former, if the
+world is not given as a thing in itself, and thus neither as finite nor
+as infinite in quantity. This kind of opposition I may be allowed to
+term dialectical; that of contradictories may be called analytical
+opposition. Thus then, of two dialectically opposed judgements both may
+be false, from the fact, that the one is not a mere contradictory of
+the other, but actually enounces more than is requisite for a full and
+complete contradiction.
+
+When we regard the two propositions--"The world is infinite in
+quantity," and, "The world is finite in quantity," as contradictory
+opposites, we are assuming that the world--the complete series of
+phenomena--is a thing in itself. For it remains as a permanent quantity,
+whether I deny the infinite or the finite regress in the series of its
+phenomena. But if we dismiss this assumption--this transcendental
+illusion--and deny that it is a thing in itself, the contradictory
+opposition is metamorphosed into a merely dialectical one; and the
+world, as not existing in itself--independently of the regressive series
+of my representations--exists in like manner neither as a whole which is
+infinite nor as a whole which is finite in itself. The universe exists
+for me only in the empirical regress of the series of phenomena and not
+per se. If, then, it is always conditioned, it is never completely or
+as a whole; and it is, therefore, not an unconditioned whole and does
+not exist as such, either with an infinite, or with a finite quantity.
+
+What we have here said of the first cosmological idea--that of the
+absolute totality of quantity in phenomena--applies also to the others.
+The series of conditions is discoverable only in the regressive
+synthesis itself, and not in the phenomenon considered as a thing in
+itself--given prior to all regress. Hence I am compelled to say: "The
+aggregate of parts in a given phenomenon is in itself neither finite
+nor infinite; and these parts are given only in the regressive
+synthesis of decomposition--a synthesis which is never given in absolute
+completeness, either as finite, or as infinite." The same is the case
+with the series of subordinated causes, or of the conditioned up to the
+unconditioned and necessary existence, which can never be regarded as
+in itself, and in its totality, either as finite or as infinite;
+because, as a series of subordinate representations, it subsists only
+in the dynamical regress and cannot be regarded as existing previously
+to this regress, or as a self-subsistent series of things.
+
+Thus the antinomy of pure reason in its cosmological ideas disappears.
+For the above demonstration has established the fact that it is merely
+the product of a dialectical and illusory opposition, which arises from
+the application of the idea of absolute totality--admissible only as a
+condition of things in themselves--to phenomena, which exist only in our
+representations, and--when constituting a series--in a successive
+regress. This antinomy of reason may, however, be really profitable to
+our speculative interests, not in the way of contributing any
+dogmatical addition, but as presenting to us another material support
+in our critical investigations. For it furnishes us with an indirect
+proof of the transcendental ideality of phenomena, if our minds were
+not completely satisfied with the direct proof set forth in the
+Trancendental Æsthetic. The proof would proceed in the following
+dilemma. If the world is a whole existing in itself, it must be either
+finite or infinite. But it is neither finite nor infinite--as has been
+shown, on the one side, by the thesis, on the other, by the antithesis.
+Therefore the world--the content of all phenomena--is not a whole
+existing in itself. It follows that phenomena are nothing, apart from
+our representations. And this is what we mean by transcendental
+ideality.
+
+This remark is of some importance. It enables us to see that the proofs
+of the fourfold antinomy are not mere sophistries--are not fallacious,
+but grounded on the nature of reason, and valid--under the supposition
+that phenomena are things in themselves. The opposition of the
+judgements which follow makes it evident that a fallacy lay in the
+initial supposition, and thus helps us to discover the true
+constitution of objects of sense. This transcendental dialectic does
+not favour scepticism, although it presents us with a triumphant
+demonstration of the advantages of the sceptical method, the great
+utility of which is apparent in the antinomy, where the arguments of
+reason were allowed to confront each other in undiminished force. And
+although the result of these conflicts of reason is not what we
+expected--although we have obtained no positive dogmatical addition to
+metaphysical science--we have still reaped a great advantage in the
+correction of our judgements on these subjects of thought.
+
+Section VIII. Regulative Principle of Pure Reason in relation to the
+Cosmological Ideas
+
+The cosmological principle of totality could not give us any certain
+knowledge in regard to the maximum in the series of conditions in the
+world of sense, considered as a thing in itself. The actual regress in
+the series is the only means of approaching this maximum. This
+principle of pure reason, therefore, may still be considered as
+valid--not as an axiom enabling us to cogitate totality in the object as
+actual, but as a problem for the understanding, which requires it to
+institute and to continue, in conformity with the idea of totality in
+the mind, the regress in the series of the conditions of a given
+conditioned. For in the world of sense, that is, in space and time,
+every condition which we discover in our investigation of phenomena is
+itself conditioned; because sensuous objects are not things in
+themselves (in which case an absolutely unconditioned might be reached
+in the progress of cognition), but are merely empirical representations
+the conditions of which must always be found in intuition. The
+principle of reason is therefore properly a mere rule--prescribing a
+regress in the series of conditions for given phenomena, and
+prohibiting any pause or rest on an absolutely unconditioned. It is,
+therefore, not a principle of the possibility of experience or of the
+empirical cognition of sensuous objects--consequently not a principle of
+the understanding; for every experience is confined within certain
+proper limits determined by the given intuition. Still less is it a
+constitutive principle of reason authorizing us to extend our
+conception of the sensuous world beyond all possible experience. It is
+merely a principle for the enlargement and extension of experience as
+far as is possible for human faculties. It forbids us to consider any
+empirical limits as absolute. It is, hence, a principle of reason,
+which, as a rule, dictates how we ought to proceed in our empirical
+regress, but is unable to anticipate or indicate prior to the empirical
+regress what is given in the object itself. I have termed it for this
+reason a regulative principle of reason; while the principle of the
+absolute totality of the series of conditions, as existing in itself
+and given in the object, is a constitutive cosmological principle. This
+distinction will at once demonstrate the falsehood of the constitutive
+principle, and prevent us from attributing (by a transcendental
+subreptio) objective reality to an idea, which is valid only as a rule.
+
+In order to understand the proper meaning of this rule of pure reason,
+we must notice first that it cannot tell us what the object is, but
+only how the empirical regress is to be proceeded with in order to
+attain to the complete conception of the object. If it gave us any
+information in respect to the former statement, it would be a
+constitutive principle--a principle impossible from the nature of pure
+reason. It will not therefore enable us to establish any such
+conclusions as: "The series of conditions for a given conditioned is in
+itself finite," or, "It is infinite." For, in this case, we should be
+cogitating in the mere idea of absolute totality, an object which is
+not and cannot be given in experience; inasmuch as we should be
+attributing a reality objective and independent of the empirical
+synthesis, to a series of phenomena. This idea of reason cannot then be
+regarded as valid--except as a rule for the regressive synthesis in the
+series of conditions, according to which we must proceed from the
+conditioned, through all intermediate and subordinate conditions, up to
+the unconditioned; although this goal is unattained and unattainable.
+For the absolutely unconditioned cannot be discovered in the sphere of
+experience.
+
+We now proceed to determine clearly our notion of a synthesis which can
+never be complete. There are two terms commonly employed for this
+purpose. These terms are regarded as expressions of different and
+distinguishable notions, although the ground of the distinction has
+never been clearly exposed. The term employed by the mathematicians is
+progressus in infinitum. The philosophers prefer the expression
+progressus in indefinitum. Without detaining the reader with an
+examination of the reasons for such a distinction, or with remarks on
+the right or wrong use of the terms, I shall endeavour clearly to
+determine these conceptions, so far as is necessary for the purpose in
+this Critique.
+
+We may, with propriety, say of a straight line, that it may be produced
+to infinity. In this case the distinction between a progressus in
+infinitum and a progressus in indefinitum is a mere piece of subtlety.
+For, although when we say, "Produce a straight line," it is more
+correct to say in indefinitum than in infinitum; because the former
+means, "Produce it as far as you please," the second, "You must not
+cease to produce it"; the expression in infinitum is, when we are
+speaking of the power to do it, perfectly correct, for we can always
+make it longer if we please--on to infinity. And this remark holds good
+in all cases, when we speak of a progressus, that is, an advancement
+from the condition to the conditioned; this possible advancement always
+proceeds to infinity. We may proceed from a given pair in the
+descending line of generation from father to son, and cogitate a
+never-ending line of descendants from it. For in such a case reason
+does not demand absolute totality in the series, because it does not
+presuppose it as a condition and as given (datum), but merely as
+conditioned, and as capable of being given (dabile).
+
+Very different is the case with the problem: "How far the regress,
+which ascends from the given conditioned to the conditions, must
+extend"; whether I can say: "It is a regress in infinitum," or only "in
+indefinitum"; and whether, for example, setting out from the human
+beings at present alive in the world, I may ascend in the series of
+their ancestors, in infinitum--or whether all that can be said is, that
+so far as I have proceeded, I have discovered no empirical ground for
+considering the series limited, so that I am justified, and indeed,
+compelled to search for ancestors still further back, although I am not
+obliged by the idea of reason to presuppose them.
+
+My answer to this question is: "If the series is given in empirical
+intuition as a whole, the regress in the series of its internal
+conditions proceeds in infinitum; but, if only one member of the series
+is given, from which the regress is to proceed to absolute totality,
+the regress is possible only in indefinitum." For example, the division
+of a portion of matter given within certain limits--of a body, that
+is--proceeds in infinitum. For, as the condition of this whole is its
+part, and the condition of the part a part of the part, and so on, and
+as in this regress of decomposition an unconditioned indivisible member
+of the series of conditions is not to be found; there are no reasons or
+grounds in experience for stopping in the division, but, on the
+contrary, the more remote members of the division are actually and
+empirically given prior to this division. That is to say, the division
+proceeds to infinity. On the other hand, the series of ancestors of any
+given human being is not given, in its absolute totality, in any
+experience, and yet the regress proceeds from every genealogical member
+of this series to one still higher, and does not meet with any
+empirical limit presenting an absolutely unconditioned member of the
+series. But as the members of such a series are not contained in the
+empirical intuition of the whole, prior to the regress, this regress
+does not proceed to infinity, but only in indefinitum, that is, we are
+called upon to discover other and higher members, which are themselves
+always conditioned.
+
+In neither case--the regressus in infinitum, nor the regressus
+in indefinitum, is the series of conditions to be considered as
+actually infinite in the object itself. This might be true of things
+in themselves, but it cannot be asserted of phenomena, which, as
+conditions of each other, are only given in the empirical regress
+itself. Hence, the question no longer is, "What is the quantity of
+this series of conditions in itself--is it finite or infinite?" for
+it is nothing in itself; but, "How is the empirical regress to be
+commenced, and how far ought we to proceed with it?" And here a signal
+distinction in the application of this rule becomes apparent. If the
+whole is given empirically, it is possible to recede in the series of
+its internal conditions to infinity. But if the whole is not given, and
+can only be given by and through the empirical regress, I can only say:
+"It is possible to infinity, to proceed to still higher conditions in
+the series." In the first case, I am justified in asserting that more
+members are empirically given in the object than I attain to in the
+regress (of decomposition). In the second case, I am justified only
+in saying, that I can always proceed further in the regress, because
+no member of the series is given as absolutely conditioned, and thus
+a higher member is possible, and an inquiry with regard to it is
+necessary. In the one case it is necessary to find other members of the
+series, in the other it is necessary to inquire for others, inasmuch as
+experience presents no absolute limitation of the regress. For, either
+you do not possess a perception which absolutely limits your empirical
+regress, and in this case the regress cannot be regarded as complete;
+or, you do possess such a limitative perception, in which case it is
+not a part of your series (for that which limits must be distinct from
+that which is limited by it), and it is incumbent on you to continue
+your regress up to this condition, and so on.
+
+These remarks will be placed in their proper light by their application
+in the following section.
+
+Section IX. Of the Empirical Use of the Regulative Principle of Reason
+with regard to the Cosmological Ideas
+
+We have shown that no transcendental use can be made either of the
+conceptions of reason or of understanding. We have shown, likewise,
+that the demand of absolute totality in the series of conditions in the
+world of sense arises from a transcendental employment of reason,
+resting on the opinion that phenomena are to be regarded as things in
+themselves. It follows that we are not required to answer the question
+respecting the absolute quantity of a series--whether it is in itself
+limited or unlimited. We are only called upon to determine how far we
+must proceed in the empirical regress from condition to condition, in
+order to discover, in conformity with the rule of reason, a full and
+correct answer to the questions proposed by reason itself.
+
+This principle of reason is hence valid only as a rule for the
+extension of a possible experience--its invalidity as a principle
+constitutive of phenomena in themselves having been sufficiently
+demonstrated. And thus, too, the antinomial conflict of reason with
+itself is completely put an end to; inasmuch as we have not only
+presented a critical solution of the fallacy lurking in the opposite
+statements of reason, but have shown the true meaning of the ideas
+which gave rise to these statements. The dialectical principle of
+reason has, therefore, been changed into a doctrinal principle. But in
+fact, if this principle, in the subjective signification which we have
+shown to be its only true sense, may be guaranteed as a principle of
+the unceasing extension of the employment of our understanding, its
+influence and value are just as great as if it were an axiom for the à
+priori determination of objects. For such an axiom could not exert a
+stronger influence on the extension and rectification of our knowledge,
+otherwise than by procuring for the principles of the understanding the
+most widely expanded employment in the field of experience.
+
+I. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Composition
+of Phenomena in the Universe
+
+Here, as well as in the case of the other cosmological problems, the
+ground of the regulative principle of reason is the proposition that in
+our empirical regress no experience of an absolute limit, and
+consequently no experience of a condition, which is itself absolutely
+unconditioned, is discoverable. And the truth of this proposition
+itself rests upon the consideration that such an experience must
+represent to us phenomena as limited by nothing or the mere void, on
+which our continued regress by means of perception must abut--which is
+impossible.
+
+Now this proposition, which declares that every condition attained in
+the empirical regress must itself be considered empirically
+conditioned, contains the rule in terminis, which requires me, to
+whatever extent I may have proceeded in the ascending series, always to
+look for some higher member in the series--whether this member is to
+become known to me through experience, or not.
+
+Nothing further is necessary, then, for the solution of the first
+cosmological problem, than to decide, whether, in the regress to the
+unconditioned quantity of the universe (as regards space and time),
+this never limited ascent ought to be called a regressus in infinitum
+or indefinitum.
+
+The general representation which we form in our minds of the series of
+all past states or conditions of the world, or of all the things which
+at present exist in it, is itself nothing more than a possible
+empirical regress, which is cogitated--although in an undetermined
+manner--in the mind, and which gives rise to the conception of a series
+of conditions for a given object.[60] Now I have a conception of the
+universe, but not an intuition--that is, not an intuition of it as a
+whole. Thus I cannot infer the magnitude of the regress from the
+quantity or magnitude of the world, and determine the former by means
+of the latter; on the contrary, I must first of all form a conception
+of the quantity or magnitude of the world from the magnitude of the
+empirical regress. But of this regress I know nothing more than that I
+ought to proceed from every given member of the series of conditions to
+one still higher. But the quantity of the universe is not thereby
+determined, and we cannot affirm that this regress proceeds in
+infinitum. Such an affirmation would anticipate the members of the
+series which have not yet been reached, and represent the number of
+them as beyond the grasp of any empirical synthesis; it would
+consequently determine the cosmical quantity prior to the regress
+(although only in a negative manner)--which is impossible. For the world
+is not given in its totality in any intuition: consequently, its
+quantity cannot be given prior to the regress. It follows that we are
+unable to make any declaration respecting the cosmical quantity in
+itself--not even that the regress in it is a regress in infinitum; we
+must only endeavour to attain to a conception of the quantity of the
+universe, in conformity with the rule which determines the empirical
+regress in it. But this rule merely requires us never to admit an
+absolute limit to our series--how far soever we may have proceeded in
+it, but always, on the contrary, to subordinate every phenomenon to
+some other as its condition, and consequently to proceed to this higher
+phenomenon. Such a regress is, therefore, the regressus in indefinitum,
+which, as not determining a quantity in the object, is clearly
+distinguishable from the regressus in infinitum.
+
+ [60] The cosmical series can neither be greater nor smaller than the
+ possible empirical regress, upon which its conception is based. And as
+ this regress cannot be a determinate infinite regress, still less a
+ determinate finite (absolutely limited), it is evident that we cannot
+ regard the world as either finite or infinite, because the regress,
+ which gives us the representation of the world, is neither finite nor
+ infinite.
+
+It follows from what we have said that we are not justified in
+declaring the world to be infinite in space, or as regards past time.
+For this conception of an infinite given quantity is empirical; but we
+cannot apply the conception of an infinite quantity to the world as an
+object of the senses. I cannot say, "The regress from a given
+perception to everything limited either in space or time, proceeds in
+infinitum," for this presupposes an infinite cosmical quantity; neither
+can I say, "It is finite," for an absolute limit is likewise impossible
+in experience. It follows that I am not entitled to make any assertion
+at all respecting the whole object of experience--the world of sense; I
+must limit my declarations to the rule according to which experience or
+empirical knowledge is to be attained.
+
+To the question, therefore, respecting the cosmical quantity, the first
+and negative answer is: "The world has no beginning in time, and no
+absolute limit in space."
+
+For, in the contrary case, it would be limited by a void time on the
+one hand, and by a void space on the other. Now, since the world, as a
+phenomenon, cannot be thus limited in itself for a phenomenon is not a
+thing in itself; it must be possible for us to have a perception of
+this limitation by a void time and a void space. But such a
+perception--such an experience is impossible; because it has no content.
+Consequently, an absolute cosmical limit is empirically, and therefore
+absolutely, impossible.[61]
+
+ [61] The reader will remark that the proof presented above is very
+ different from the dogmatical demonstration given in the antithesis of
+ the first antinomy. In that demonstration, it was taken for granted
+ that the world is a thing in itself--given in its totality prior to all
+ regress, and a determined position in space and time was denied to
+ it--if it was not considered as occupying all time and all space. Hence
+ our conclusion differed from that given above; for we inferred in the
+ antithesis the actual infinity of the world.
+
+From this follows the affirmative answer: "The regress in the series of
+phenomena--as a determination of the cosmical quantity, proceeds in
+indefinitum." This is equivalent to saying: "The world of sense has no
+absolute quantity, but the empirical regress (through which alone the
+world of sense is presented to us on the side of its conditions) rests
+upon a rule, which requires it to proceed from every member of the
+series, as conditioned, to one still more remote (whether through
+personal experience, or by means of history, or the chain of cause and
+effect), and not to cease at any point in this extension of the
+possible empirical employment of the understanding." And this is the
+proper and only use which reason can make of its principles.
+
+The above rule does not prescribe an unceasing regress in one kind of
+phenomena. It does not, for example, forbid us, in our ascent from an
+individual human being through the line of his ancestors, to expect
+that we shall discover at some point of the regress a primeval pair, or
+to admit, in the series of heavenly bodies, a sun at the farthest
+possible distance from some centre. All that it demands is a perpetual
+progress from phenomena to phenomena, even although an actual
+perception is not presented by them (as in the case of our perceptions
+being so weak as that we are unable to become conscious of them), since
+they, nevertheless, belong to possible experience.
+
+Every beginning is in time, and all limits to extension are in space.
+But space and time are in the world of sense. Consequently phenomena in
+the world are conditionally limited, but the world itself is not
+limited, either conditionally or unconditionally.
+
+For this reason, and because neither the world nor the cosmical series
+of conditions to a given conditioned can be completely given, our
+conception of the cosmical quantity is given only in and through the
+regress and not prior to it--in a collective intuition. But the regress
+itself is really nothing more than the determining of the cosmical
+quantity, and cannot therefore give us any determined conception of
+it--still less a conception of a quantity which is, in relation to a
+certain standard, infinite. The regress does not, therefore, proceed to
+infinity (an infinity given), but only to an indefinite extent, for or
+the of presenting to us a quantity--realized only in and through the
+regress itself.
+
+II. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Division
+of a Whole given in Intuition
+
+When I divide a whole which is given in intuition, I proceed from a
+conditioned to its conditions. The division of the parts of the whole
+(subdivisio or decompositio) is a regress in the series of these
+conditions. The absolute totality of this series would be actually
+attained and given to the mind, if the regress could arrive at simple
+parts. But if all the parts in a continuous decomposition are
+themselves divisible, the division, that is to say, the regress,
+proceeds from the conditioned to its conditions in infinitum; because
+the conditions (the parts) are themselves contained in the conditioned,
+and, as the latter is given in a limited intuition, the former are all
+given along with it. This regress cannot, therefore, be called a
+regressus in indefinitum, as happened in the case of the preceding
+cosmological idea, the regress in which proceeded from the conditioned
+to the conditions not given contemporaneously and along with it, but
+discoverable only through the empirical regress. We are not, however,
+entitled to affirm of a whole of this kind, which is divisible in
+infinitum, that it consists of an infinite number of parts. For,
+although all the parts are contained in the intuition of the whole, the
+whole division is not contained therein. The division is contained only
+in the progressing decomposition--in the regress itself, which is the
+condition of the possibility and actuality of the series. Now, as this
+regress is infinite, all the members (parts) to which it attains must
+be contained in the given whole as an aggregate. But the complete
+series of division is not contained therein. For this series, being
+infinite in succession and always incomplete, cannot represent an
+infinite number of members, and still less a composition of these
+members into a whole.
+
+To apply this remark to space. Every limited part of space presented to
+intuition is a whole, the parts of which are always spaces--to whatever
+extent subdivided. Every limited space is hence divisible to infinity.
+
+Let us again apply the remark to an external phenomenon enclosed in
+limits, that is, a body. The divisibility of a body rests upon the
+divisibility of space, which is the condition of the possibility of the
+body as an extended whole. A body is consequently divisible to
+infinity, though it does not, for that reason, consist of an infinite
+number of parts.
+
+It certainly seems that, as a body must be cogitated as substance in
+space, the law of divisibility would not be applicable to it as
+substance. For we may and ought to grant, in the case of space, that
+division or decomposition, to any extent, never can utterly annihilate
+composition (that is to say, the smallest part of space must still
+consist of spaces); otherwise space would entirely cease to exist--which
+is impossible. But, the assertion on the other hand that when all
+composition in matter is annihilated in thought, nothing remains, does
+not seem to harmonize with the conception of substance, which must be
+properly the subject of all composition and must remain, even after the
+conjunction of its attributes in space--which constituted a body--is
+annihilated in thought. But this is not the case with substance in the
+phenomenal world, which is not a thing in itself cogitated by the pure
+category. Phenomenal substance is not an absolute subject; it is merely
+a permanent sensuous image, and nothing more than an intuition, in
+which the unconditioned is not to be found.
+
+But, although this rule of progress to infinity is legitimate and
+applicable to the subdivision of a phenomenon, as a mere occupation or
+filling of space, it is not applicable to a whole consisting of a
+number of distinct parts and constituting a quantum discretum--that is
+to say, an organized body. It cannot be admitted that every part in an
+organized whole is itself organized, and that, in analysing it to
+infinity, we must always meet with organized parts; although we may
+allow that the parts of the matter which we decompose in infinitum, may
+be organized. For the infinity of the division of a phenomenon in space
+rests altogether on the fact that the divisibility of a phenomenon is
+given only in and through this infinity, that is, an undetermined
+number of parts is given, while the parts themselves are given and
+determined only in and through the subdivision; in a word, the infinity
+of the division necessarily presupposes that the whole is not already
+divided in se. Hence our division determines a number of parts in the
+whole--a number which extends just as far as the actual regress in the
+division; while, on the other hand, the very notion of a body organized
+to infinity represents the whole as already and in itself divided. We
+expect, therefore, to find in it a determinate, but at the same time,
+infinite, number of parts--which is self-contradictory. For we should
+thus have a whole containing a series of members which could not be
+completed in any regress--which is infinite, and at the same time
+complete in an organized composite. Infinite divisibility is applicable
+only to a quantum continuum, and is based entirely on the infinite
+divisibility of space, But in a quantum discretum the multitude of
+parts or units is always determined, and hence always equal to some
+number. To what extent a body may be organized, experience alone can
+inform us; and although, so far as our experience of this or that body
+has extended, we may not have discovered any inorganic part, such parts
+must exist in possible experience. But how far the transcendental
+division of a phenomenon must extend, we cannot know from experience--it
+is a question which experience cannot answer; it is answered only by
+the principle of reason which forbids us to consider the empirical
+regress, in the analysis of extended body, as ever absolutely complete.
+
+Concluding Remark on the Solution of the Transcendental Mathematical
+Ideas--and Introductory to the Solution of the Dynamical Ideas.
+
+We presented the antinomy of pure reason in a tabular form, and we
+endeavoured to show the ground of this self-contradiction on the part
+of reason, and the only means of bringing it to a conclusion--namely, by
+declaring both contradictory statements to be false. We represented in
+these antinomies the conditions of phenomena as belonging to the
+conditioned according to relations of space and time--which is the usual
+supposition of the common understanding. In this respect, all
+dialectical representations of totality, in the series of conditions to
+a given conditioned, were perfectly homogeneous. The condition was
+always a member of the series along with the conditioned, and thus the
+homogeneity of the whole series was assured. In this case the regress
+could never be cogitated as complete; or, if this was the case, a
+member really conditioned was falsely regarded as a primal member,
+consequently as unconditioned. In such an antinomy, therefore, we did
+not consider the object, that is, the conditioned, but the series of
+conditions belonging to the object, and the magnitude of that series.
+And thus arose the difficulty--a difficulty not to be settled by any
+decision regarding the claims of the two parties, but simply by cutting
+the knot--by declaring the series proposed by reason to be either too
+long or too short for the understanding, which could in neither case
+make its conceptions adequate with the ideas.
+
+But we have overlooked, up to this point, an essential difference
+existing between the conceptions of the understanding which reason
+endeavours to raise to the rank of ideas--two of these indicating a
+mathematical, and two a dynamical synthesis of phenomena. Hitherto, it
+was necessary to signalize this distinction; for, just as in our
+general representation of all transcendental ideas, we considered them
+under phenomenal conditions, so, in the two mathematical ideas, our
+discussion is concerned solely with an object in the world of
+phenomena. But as we are now about to proceed to the consideration of
+the dynamical conceptions of the understanding, and their adequateness
+with ideas, we must not lose sight of this distinction. We shall find
+that it opens up to us an entirely new view of the conflict in which
+reason is involved. For, while in the first two antinomies, both
+parties were dismissed, on the ground of having advanced statements
+based upon false hypothesis; in the present case the hope appears of
+discovering a hypothesis which may be consistent with the demands of
+reason, and, the judge completing the statement of the grounds of
+claim, which both parties had left in an unsatisfactory state, the
+question may be settled on its own merits, not by dismissing the
+claimants, but by a comparison of the arguments on both sides. If we
+consider merely their extension, and whether they are adequate with
+ideas, the series of conditions may be regarded as all homogeneous. But
+the conception of the understanding which lies at the basis of these
+ideas, contains either a synthesis of the homogeneous (presupposed in
+every quantity--in its composition as well as in its division) or of the
+heterogeneous, which is the case in the dynamical synthesis of cause
+and effect, as well as of the necessary and the contingent.
+
+Thus it happens that in the mathematical series of phenomena no other
+than a sensuous condition is admissible--a condition which is itself a
+member of the series; while the dynamical series of sensuous conditions
+admits a heterogeneous condition, which is not a member of the series,
+but, as purely intelligible, lies out of and beyond it. And thus reason
+is satisfied, and an unconditioned placed at the head of the series of
+phenomena, without introducing confusion into or discontinuing it,
+contrary to the principles of the understanding.
+
+Now, from the fact that the dynamical ideas admit a condition of
+phenomena which does not form a part of the series of phenomena, arises
+a result which we should not have expected from an antinomy. In former
+cases, the result was that both contradictory dialectical statements
+were declared to be false. In the present case, we find the conditioned
+in the dynamical series connected with an empirically unconditioned,
+but non-sensuous condition; and thus satisfaction is done to the
+understanding on the one hand and to the reason on the other.[62]
+While, moreover, the dialectical arguments for unconditioned totality
+in mere phenomena fall to the ground, both propositions of reason may
+be shown to be true in their proper signification. This could not
+happen in the case of the cosmological ideas which demanded a
+mathematically unconditioned unity; for no condition could be placed at
+the head of the series of phenomena, except one which was itself a
+phenomenon and consequently a member of the series.
+
+ [62] For the understanding cannot admit among phenomena a condition
+ which is itself empirically unconditioned. But if it is possible to
+ cogitate an intelligible condition--one which is not a member of the
+ series of phenomena--for a conditioned phenomenon, without breaking the
+ series of empirical conditions, such a condition may be admissible as
+ empirically unconditioned, and the empirical regress continue regular,
+ unceasing, and intact.
+
+III. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Deduction
+of Cosmical Events from their Causes
+
+There are only two modes of causality cogitable--the causality of nature
+or of freedom. The first is the conjunction of a particular state with
+another preceding it in the world of sense, the former following the
+latter by virtue of a law. Now, as the causality of phenomena is
+subject to conditions of time, and the preceding state, if it had
+always existed, could not have produced an effect which would make its
+first appearance at a particular time, the causality of a cause must
+itself be an effect--must itself have begun to be, and therefore,
+according to the principle of the understanding, itself requires a
+cause.
+
+We must understand, on the contrary, by the term freedom, in the
+cosmological sense, a faculty of the spontaneous origination of a
+state; the causality of which, therefore, is not subordinated to
+another cause determining it in time. Freedom is in this sense a pure
+transcendental idea, which, in the first place, contains no empirical
+element; the object of which, in the second place, cannot be given or
+determined in any experience, because it is a universal law of the very
+possibility of experience, that everything which happens must have a
+cause, that consequently the causality of a cause, being itself
+something that has happened, must also have a cause. In this view of
+the case, the whole field of experience, how far soever it may extend,
+contains nothing that is not subject to the laws of nature. But, as we
+cannot by this means attain to an absolute totality of conditions in
+reference to the series of causes and effects, reason creates the idea
+of a spontaneity, which can begin to act of itself, and without any
+external cause determining it to action, according to the natural law
+of causality.
+
+It is especially remarkable that the practical conception of freedom is
+based upon the transcendental idea, and that the question of the
+possibility of the former is difficult only as it involves the
+consideration of the truth of the latter. Freedom, in the practical
+sense, is the independence of the will of coercion by sensuous
+impulses. A will is sensuous, in so far as it is pathologically
+affected (by sensuous impulses); it is termed animal (arbitrium
+brutum), when it is pathologically necessitated. The human will is
+certainly an arbitrium sensitivum, not brutum, but liberum; because
+sensuousness does not necessitate its action, a faculty existing in man
+of self-determination, independently of all sensuous coercion.
+
+It is plain that, if all causality in the world of sense were
+natural--and natural only--every event would be determined by another
+according to necessary laws, and that, consequently, phenomena, in so
+far as they determine the will, must necessitate every action as a
+natural effect from themselves; and thus all practical freedom would
+fall to the ground with the transcendental idea. For the latter
+presupposes that although a certain thing has not happened, it ought to
+have happened, and that, consequently, its phenomenal cause was not so
+powerful and determinative as to exclude the causality of our will--a
+causality capable of producing effects independently of and even in
+opposition to the power of natural causes, and capable, consequently,
+of spontaneously originating a series of events.
+
+Here, too, we find it to be the case, as we generally found in the
+self-contradictions and perplexities of a reason which strives to pass
+the bounds of possible experience, that the problem is properly not
+physiological, but transcendental. The question of the possibility of
+freedom does indeed concern psychology; but, as it rests upon
+dialectical arguments of pure reason, its solution must engage the
+attention of transcendental philosophy. Before attempting this
+solution, a task which transcendental philosophy cannot decline, it
+will be advisable to make a remark with regard to its procedure in the
+settlement of the question.
+
+If phenomena were things in themselves, and time and space forms of the
+existence of things, condition and conditioned would always be members
+of the same series; and thus would arise in the present case the
+antinomy common to all transcendental ideas--that their series is either
+too great or too small for the understanding. The dynamical ideas,
+which we are about to discuss in this and the following section,
+possess the peculiarity of relating to an object, not considered as a
+quantity, but as an existence; and thus, in the discussion of the
+present question, we may make abstraction of the quantity of the series
+of conditions, and consider merely the dynamical relation of the
+condition to the conditioned. The question, then, suggests itself,
+whether freedom is possible; and, if it is, whether it can consist with
+the universality of the natural law of causality; and, consequently,
+whether we enounce a proper disjunctive proposition when we say: "Every
+effect must have its origin either in nature or in freedom," or whether
+both cannot exist together in the same event in different relations.
+The principle of an unbroken connection between all events in the
+phenomenal world, in accordance with the unchangeable laws of nature,
+is a well-established principle of transcendental analytic which admits
+of no exception. The question, therefore, is: "Whether an effect,
+determined according to the laws of nature, can at the same time be
+produced by a free agent, or whether freedom and nature mutually
+exclude each other?" And here, the common but fallacious hypothesis of
+the absolute reality of phenomena manifests its injurious influence in
+embarrassing the procedure of reason. For if phenomena are things in
+themselves, freedom is impossible. In this case, nature is the complete
+and all-sufficient cause of every event; and condition and conditioned,
+cause and effect are contained in the same series, and necessitated by
+the same law. If, on the contrary, phenomena are held to be, as they
+are in fact, nothing more than mere representations, connected with
+each other in accordance with empirical laws, they must have a ground
+which is not phenomenal. But the causality of such an intelligible
+cause is not determined or determinable by phenomena; although its
+effects, as phenomena, must be determined by other phenomenal
+existences. This cause and its causality exist therefore out of and
+apart from the series of phenomena; while its effects do exist and are
+discoverable in the series of empirical conditions. Such an effect may
+therefore be considered to be free in relation to its intelligible
+cause, and necessary in relation to the phenomena from which it is a
+necessary consequence--a distinction which, stated in this perfectly
+general and abstract manner, must appear in the highest degree subtle
+and obscure. The sequel will explain. It is sufficient, at present, to
+remark that, as the complete and unbroken connection of phenomena is an
+unalterable law of nature, freedom is impossible--on the supposition
+that phenomena are absolutely real. Hence those philosophers who adhere
+to the common opinion on this subject can never succeed in reconciling
+the ideas of nature and freedom.
+
+_Possibility of Freedom in Harmony with the Universal Law of Natural
+Necessity._
+
+That element in a sensuous object which is not itself sensuous, I may
+be allowed to term intelligible. If, accordingly, an object which must
+be regarded as a sensuous phenomenon possesses a faculty which is not
+an object of sensuous intuition, but by means of which it is capable of
+being the cause of phenomena, the causality of an object or existence
+of this kind may be regarded from two different points of view. It may
+be considered to be intelligible, as regards its action--the action of a
+thing which is a thing in itself, and sensuous, as regards its
+effects--the effects of a phenomenon belonging to the sensuous world. We
+should accordingly, have to form both an empirical and an intellectual
+conception of the causality of such a faculty or power--both, however,
+having reference to the same effect. This twofold manner of cogitating
+a power residing in a sensuous object does not run counter to any of
+the conceptions which we ought to form of the world of phenomena or of
+a possible experience. Phenomena--not being things in themselves--must
+have a transcendental object as a foundation, which determines them as
+mere representations; and there seems to be no reason why we should not
+ascribe to this transcendental object, in addition to the property of
+self-phenomenization, a causality whose effects are to be met with in
+the world of phenomena, although it is not itself a phenomenon. But
+every effective cause must possess a character, that is to say, a law
+of its causality, without which it would cease to be a cause. In the
+above case, then, every sensuous object would possess an empirical
+character, which guaranteed that its actions, as phenomena, stand in
+complete and harmonious connection, conformably to unvarying natural
+laws, with all other phenomena, and can be deduced from these, as
+conditions, and that they do thus, in connection with these, constitute
+a series in the order of nature. This sensuous object must, in the
+second place, possess an intelligible character, which guarantees it to
+be the cause of those actions, as phenomena, although it is not itself
+a phenomenon nor subordinate to the conditions of the world of sense.
+The former may be termed the character of the thing as a phenomenon,
+the latter the character of the thing as a thing in itself.
+
+Now this active subject would, in its character of intelligible
+subject, be subordinate to no conditions of time, for time is only a
+condition of phenomena, and not of things in themselves. No action
+would begin or cease to be in this subject; it would consequently be
+free from the law of all determination of time--the law of change,
+namely, that everything which happens must have a cause in the
+phenomena of a preceding state. In one word, the causality of the
+subject, in so far as it is intelligible, would not form part of the
+series of empirical conditions which determine and necessitate an event
+in the world of sense. Again, this intelligible character of a thing
+cannot be immediately cognized, because we can perceive nothing but
+phenomena, but it must be capable of being cogitated in harmony with
+the empirical character; for we always find ourselves compelled to
+place, in thought, a transcendental object at the basis of phenomena
+although we can never know what this object is in itself.
+
+In virtue of its empirical character, this subject would at the same
+time be subordinate to all the empirical laws of causality, and, as a
+phenomenon and member of the sensuous world, its effects would have to
+be accounted for by a reference to preceding phenomena. Eternal
+phenomena must be capable of influencing it; and its actions, in
+accordance with natural laws, must explain to us how its empirical
+character, that is, the law of its causality, is to be cognized in and
+by means of experience. In a word, all requisites for a complete and
+necessary determination of these actions must be presented to us by
+experience.
+
+In virtue of its intelligible character, on the other hand (although we
+possess only a general conception of this character), the subject must
+be regarded as free from all sensuous influences, and from all
+phenomenal determination. Moreover, as nothing happens in this
+subject--for it is a noumenon, and there does not consequently exist in
+it any change, demanding the dynamical determination of time, and for
+the same reason no connection with phenomena as causes--this active
+existence must in its actions be free from and independent of natural
+necessity, for this necessity exists only in the world of phenomena. It
+would be quite correct to say that it originates or begins its effects
+in the world of sense from itself, although the action productive of
+these effects does not begin in itself. We should not be in this case
+affirming that these sensuous effects began to exist of themselves,
+because they are always determined by prior empirical conditions--by
+virtue of the empirical character, which is the phenomenon of the
+intelligible character--and are possible only as constituting a
+continuation of the series of natural causes. And thus nature and
+freedom, each in the complete and absolute signification of these
+terms, can exist, without contradiction or disagreement, in the same
+action.
+
+_Exposition of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom in Harmony with the
+Universal Law of Natural Necessity._
+
+I have thought it advisable to lay before the reader at first merely a
+sketch of the solution of this transcendental problem, in order to
+enable him to form with greater ease a clear conception of the course
+which reason must adopt in the solution. I shall now proceed to exhibit
+the several momenta of this solution, and to consider them in their
+order.
+
+The natural law that everything which happens must have a cause, that
+the causality of this cause, that is, the action of the cause (which
+cannot always have existed, but must be itself an event, for it
+precedes in time some effect which it has originated), must have itself
+a phenomenal cause, by which it is determined and, and, consequently,
+all events are empirically determined in an order of nature--this law, I
+say, which lies at the foundation of the possibility of experience, and
+of a connected system of phenomena or nature is a law of the
+understanding, from which no departure, and to which no exception, can
+be admitted. For to except even a single phenomenon from its operation
+is to exclude it from the sphere of possible experience and thus to
+admit it to be a mere fiction of thought or phantom of the brain.
+
+Thus we are obliged to acknowledge the existence of a chain of causes,
+in which, however, absolute totality cannot be found. But we need not
+detain ourselves with this question, for it has already been
+sufficiently answered in our discussion of the antinomies into which
+reason falls, when it attempts to reach the unconditioned in the series
+of phenomena. If we permit ourselves to be deceived by the illusion of
+transcendental idealism, we shall find that neither nature nor freedom
+exists. Now the question is: "Whether, admitting the existence of
+natural necessity in the world of phenomena, it is possible to consider
+an effect as at the same time an effect of nature and an effect of
+freedom--or, whether these two modes of causality are contradictory and
+incompatible?"
+
+No phenomenal cause can absolutely and of itself begin a series. Every
+action, in so far as it is productive of an event, is itself an event
+or occurrence, and presupposes another preceding state, in which its
+cause existed. Thus everything that happens is but a continuation of a
+series, and an absolute beginning is impossible in the sensuous world.
+The actions of natural causes are, accordingly, themselves effects, and
+presuppose causes preceding them in time. A primal action which forms
+an absolute beginning, is beyond the causal power of phenomena.
+
+Now, is it absolutely necessary that, granting that all effects are
+phenomena, the causality of the cause of these effects must also be a
+phenomenon and belong to the empirical world? Is it not rather possible
+that, although every effect in the phenomenal world must be connected
+with an empirical cause, according to the universal law of nature, this
+empirical causality may be itself the effect of a non-empirical and
+intelligible causality--its connection with natural causes remaining
+nevertheless intact? Such a causality would be considered, in reference
+to phenomena, as the primal action of a cause, which is in so far,
+therefore, not phenomenal, but, by reason of this faculty or power,
+intelligible; although it must, at the same time, as a link in the
+chain of nature, be regarded as belonging to the sensuous world.
+
+A belief in the reciprocal causality of phenomena is necessary, if we
+are required to look for and to present the natural conditions of
+natural events, that is to say, their causes. This being admitted as
+unexceptionably valid, the requirements of the understanding, which
+recognizes nothing but nature in the region of phenomena, are
+satisfied, and our physical explanations of physical phenomena may
+proceed in their regular course, without hindrance and without
+opposition. But it is no stumbling-block in the way, even assuming the
+idea to be a pure fiction, to admit that there are some natural causes
+in the possession of a faculty which is not empirical, but
+intelligible, inasmuch as it is not determined to action by empirical
+conditions, but purely and solely upon grounds brought forward by the
+understanding--this action being still, when the cause is phenomenized,
+in perfect accordance with the laws of empirical causality. Thus the
+acting subject, as a causal phenomenon, would continue to preserve a
+complete connection with nature and natural conditions; and the
+phenomenon only of the subject (with all its phenomenal causality)
+would contain certain conditions, which, if we ascend from the
+empirical to the transcendental object, must necessarily be regarded as
+intelligible. For, if we attend, in our inquiries with regard to causes
+in the world of phenomena, to the directions of nature alone, we need
+not trouble ourselves about the relation in which the transcendental
+subject, which is completely unknown to us, stands to these phenomena
+and their connection in nature. The intelligible ground of phenomena in
+this subject does not concern empirical questions. It has to do only
+with pure thought; and, although the effects of this thought and action
+of the pure understanding are discoverable in phenomena, these
+phenomena must nevertheless be capable of a full and complete
+explanation, upon purely physical grounds and in accordance with
+natural laws. And in this case we attend solely to their empirical and
+omit all consideration of their intelligible character (which is the
+transcendental cause of the former) as completely unknown, except in so
+far as it is exhibited by the latter as its empirical symbol. Now let
+us apply this to experience. Man is a phenomenon of the sensuous world
+and, at the same time, therefore, a natural cause, the causality of
+which must be regulated by empirical laws. As such, he must possess an
+empirical character, like all other natural phenomena. We remark this
+empirical character in his actions, which reveal the presence of
+certain powers and faculties. If we consider inanimate or merely animal
+nature, we can discover no reason for ascribing to ourselves any other
+than a faculty which is determined in a purely sensuous manner. But
+man, to whom nature reveals herself only through sense, cognizes
+himself not only by his senses, but also through pure apperception; and
+this in actions and internal determinations, which he cannot regard as
+sensuous impressions. He is thus to himself, on the one hand, a
+phenomenon, but on the other hand, in respect of certain faculties, a
+purely intelligible object--intelligible, because its action cannot be
+ascribed to sensuous receptivity. These faculties are understanding and
+reason. The latter, especially, is in a peculiar manner distinct from
+all empirically-conditioned faculties, for it employs ideas alone in
+the consideration of its objects, and by means of these determines the
+understanding, which then proceeds to make an empirical use of its own
+conceptions, which, like the ideas of reason, are pure and
+non-empirical.
+
+That reason possesses the faculty of causality, or that at least we are
+compelled so to represent it, is evident from the imperatives, which in
+the sphere of the practical we impose on many of our executive powers.
+The words I ought express a species of necessity, and imply a
+connection with grounds which nature does not and cannot present to the
+mind of man. Understanding knows nothing in nature but that which is,
+or has been, or will be. It would be absurd to say that anything in
+nature ought to be other than it is in the relations of time in which
+it stands; indeed, the ought, when we consider merely the course of
+nature, has neither application nor meaning. The question, "What ought
+to happen in the sphere of nature?" is just as absurd as the question,
+"What ought to be the properties of a circle?" All that we are entitled
+to ask is, "What takes place in nature?" or, in the latter case, "What
+are the properties of a circle?"
+
+But the idea of an ought or of duty indicates a possible action, the
+ground of which is a pure conception; while the ground of a merely
+natural action is, on the contrary, always a phenomenon. This action
+must certainly be possible under physical conditions, if it is
+prescribed by the moral imperative ought; but these physical or natural
+conditions do not concern the determination of the will itself, they
+relate to its effects alone, and the consequences of the effect in the
+world of phenomena. Whatever number of motives nature may present to my
+will, whatever sensuous impulses--the moral ought it is beyond their
+power to produce. They may produce a volition, which, so far from being
+necessary, is always conditioned--a volition to which the ought
+enunciated by reason, sets an aim and a standard, gives permission or
+prohibition. Be the object what it may, purely sensuous--as pleasure, or
+presented by pure reason--as good, reason will not yield to grounds
+which have an empirical origin. Reason will not follow the order of
+things presented by experience, but, with perfect spontaneity,
+rearranges them according to ideas, with which it compels empirical
+conditions to agree. It declares, in the name of these ideas, certain
+actions to be necessary which nevertheless have not taken place and
+which perhaps never will take place; and yet presupposes that it
+possesses the faculty of causality in relation to these actions. For,
+in the absence of this supposition, it could not expect its ideas to
+produce certain effects in the world of experience.
+
+Now, let us stop here and admit it to be at least possible that reason
+does stand in a really causal relation to phenomena. In this case it
+must--pure reason as it is--exhibit an empirical character. For every
+cause supposes a rule, according to which certain phenomena follow as
+effects from the cause, and every rule requires uniformity in these
+effects; and this is the proper ground of the conception of a cause--as
+a faculty or power. Now this conception (of a cause) may be termed the
+empirical character of reason; and this character is a permanent one,
+while the effects produced appear, in conformity with the various
+conditions which accompany and partly limit them, in various forms.
+
+Thus the volition of every man has an empirical character, which is
+nothing more than the causality of his reason, in so far as its effects
+in the phenomenal world manifest the presence of a rule, according to
+which we are enabled to examine, in their several kinds and degrees,
+the actions of this causality and the rational grounds for these
+actions, and in this way to decide upon the subjective principles of
+the volition. Now we learn what this empirical character is only from
+phenomenal effects, and from the rule of these which is presented by
+experience; and for this reason all the actions of man in the world of
+phenomena are determined by his empirical character, and the
+co-operative causes of nature. If, then, we could investigate all the
+phenomena of human volition to their lowest foundation in the mind,
+there would be no action which we could not anticipate with certainty,
+and recognize to be absolutely necessary from its preceding conditions.
+So far as relates to this empirical character, therefore, there can be
+no freedom; and it is only in the light of this character that we can
+consider the human will, when we confine ourselves to simple
+observation and, as is the case in anthropology, institute a
+physiological investigation of the motive causes of human actions.
+
+But when we consider the same actions in relation to reason--not for the
+purpose of explaining their origin, that is, in relation to speculative
+reason, but to practical reason, as the producing cause of these
+actions--we shall discover a rule and an order very different from those
+of nature and experience. For the declaration of this mental faculty
+may be that what has and could not but take place in the course of
+nature, ought not to have taken place. Sometimes, too, we discover, or
+believe that we discover, that the ideas of reason did actually stand
+in a causal relation to certain actions of man; and that these actions
+have taken place because they were determined, not by empirical causes,
+but by the act of the will upon grounds of reason.
+
+Now, granting that reason stands in a causal relation to phenomena; can
+an action of reason be called free, when we know that, sensuously, in
+its empirical character, it is completely determined and absolutely
+necessary? But this empirical character is itself determined by the
+intelligible character. The latter we cannot cognize; we can only
+indicate it by means of phenomena, which enable us to have an immediate
+cognition only of the empirical character.[63] An action, then, in so
+far as it is to be ascribed to an intelligible cause, does not result
+from it in accordance with empirical laws. That is to say, not the
+conditions of pure reason, but only their effects in the internal
+sense, precede the act. Pure reason, as a purely intelligible faculty,
+is not subject to the conditions of time. The causality of reason in
+its intelligible character does not begin to be; it does not make its
+appearance at a certain time, for the purpose of producing an effect.
+If this were not the case, the causality of reason would be subservient
+to the natural law of phenomena, which determines them according to
+time, and as a series of causes and effects in time; it would
+consequently cease to be freedom and become a part of nature. We are
+therefore justified in saying: "If reason stands in a causal relation
+to phenomena, it is a faculty which originates the sensuous condition
+of an empirical series of effects." For the condition, which resides in
+the reason, is non-sensuous, and therefore cannot be originated, or
+begin to be. And thus we find--what we could not discover in any
+empirical series--a condition of a successive series of events itself
+empirically unconditioned. For, in the present case, the condition
+stands out of and beyond the series of phenomena--it is intelligible,
+and it consequently cannot be subjected to any sensuous condition, or
+to any time-determination by a preceding cause.
+
+ [63] The real morality of actions--their merit or demerit, and even
+ that of our own conduct, is completely unknown to us. Our estimates
+ can relate only to their empirical character. How much is the result
+ of the action of free will, how much is to be ascribed to nature and
+ to blameless error, or to a happy constitution of temperament (merito
+ fortunae), no one can discover, nor, for this reason, determine with
+ perfect justice.
+
+But, in another respect, the same cause belongs also to the series of
+phenomena. Man is himself a phenomenon. His will has an empirical
+character, which is the empirical cause of all his actions. There is no
+condition--determining man and his volition in conformity with this
+character--which does not itself form part of the series of effects in
+nature, and is subject to their law--the law according to which an
+empirically undetermined cause of an event in time cannot exist. For
+this reason no given action can have an absolute and spontaneous
+origination, all actions being phenomena, and belonging to the world of
+experience. But it cannot be said of reason, that the state in which it
+determines the will is always preceded by some other state determining
+it. For reason is not a phenomenon, and therefore not subject to
+sensuous conditions; and, consequently, even in relation to its
+causality, the sequence or conditions of time do not influence reason,
+nor can the dynamical law of nature, which determines the sequence of
+time according to certain rules, be applied to it.
+
+Reason is consequently the permanent condition of all actions of the
+human will. Each of these is determined in the empirical character of
+the man, even before it has taken place. The intelligible character, of
+which the former is but the sensuous schema, knows no before or after;
+and every action, irrespective of the time-relation in which it stands
+with other phenomena, is the immediate effect of the intelligible
+character of pure reason, which, consequently, enjoys freedom of
+action, and is not dynamically determined either by internal or
+external preceding conditions. This freedom must not be described, in a
+merely negative manner, as independence of empirical conditions, for in
+this case the faculty of reason would cease to be a cause of phenomena;
+but it must be regarded, positively, as a faculty which can
+spontaneously originate a series of events. At the same time, it must
+not be supposed that any beginning can take place in reason; on the
+contrary, reason, as the unconditioned condition of all action of the
+will, admits of no time-conditions, although its effect does really
+begin in a series of phenomena--a beginning which is not, however,
+absolutely primal.
+
+I shall illustrate this regulative principle of reason by an example,
+from its employment in the world of experience; proved it cannot be by
+any amount of experience, or by any number of facts, for such arguments
+cannot establish the truth of transcendental propositions. Let us take
+a voluntary action--for example, a falsehood--by means of which a man has
+introduced a certain degree of confusion into the social life of
+humanity, which is judged according to the motives from which it
+originated, and the blame of which and of the evil consequences arising
+from it, is imputed to the offender. We at first proceed to examine the
+empirical character of the offence, and for this purpose we endeavour
+to penetrate to the sources of that character, such as a defective
+education, bad company, a shameless and wicked disposition, frivolity,
+and want of reflection--not forgetting also the occasioning causes which
+prevailed at the moment of the transgression. In this the procedure is
+exactly the same as that pursued in the investigation of the series of
+causes which determine a given physical effect. Now, although we
+believe the action to have been determined by all these circumstances,
+we do not the less blame the offender. We do not blame him for his
+unhappy disposition, nor for the circumstances which influenced him,
+nay, not even for his former course of life; for we presuppose that all
+these considerations may be set aside, that the series of preceding
+conditions may be regarded as having never existed, and that the action
+may be considered as completely unconditioned in relation to any state
+preceding, just as if the agent commenced with it an entirely new
+series of effects. Our blame of the offender is grounded upon a law of
+reason, which requires us to regard this faculty as a cause, which
+could have and ought to have otherwise determined the behaviour of the
+culprit, independently of all empirical conditions. This causality of
+reason we do not regard as a co-operating agency, but as complete in
+itself. It matters not whether the sensuous impulses favoured or
+opposed the action of this causality, the offence is estimated
+according to its intelligible character--the offender is decidedly
+worthy of blame, the moment he utters a falsehood. It follows that we
+regard reason, in spite of the empirical conditions of the act, as
+completely free, and therefore, as in the present case,
+culpable.
+
+The above judgement is complete evidence that we are accustomed to
+think that reason is not affected by sensuous conditions, that in it no
+change takes place--although its phenomena, in other words, the mode in
+which it appears in its effects, are subject to change--that in it no
+preceding state determines the following, and, consequently, that it
+does not form a member of the series of sensuous conditions which
+necessitate phenomena according to natural laws. Reason is present and
+the same in all human actions and at all times; but it does not itself
+exist in time, and therefore does not enter upon any state in which it
+did not formerly exist. It is, relatively to new states or conditions,
+determining, but not determinable. Hence we cannot ask: "Why did not
+reason determine itself in a different manner?" The question ought to
+be thus stated: "Why did not reason employ its power of causality to
+determine certain phenomena in a different manner?" But this is a
+question which admits of no answer. For a different intelligible
+character would have exhibited a different empirical character; and,
+when we say that, in spite of the course which his whole former life
+has taken, the offender could have refrained from uttering the
+falsehood, this means merely that the act was subject to the power and
+authority--permissive or prohibitive--of reason. Now, reason is not
+subject in its causality to any conditions of phenomena or of time; and
+a difference in time may produce a difference in the relation of
+phenomena to each other--for these are not things and therefore not
+causes in themselves--but it cannot produce any difference in the
+relation in which the action stands to the faculty of reason.
+
+Thus, then, in our investigation into free actions and the causal power
+which produced them, we arrive at an intelligible cause, beyond which,
+however, we cannot go; although we can recognize that it is free, that
+is, independent of all sensuous conditions, and that, in this way, it
+may be the sensuously unconditioned condition of phenomena. But for
+what reason the intelligible character generates such and such
+phenomena and exhibits such and such an empirical character under
+certain circumstances, it is beyond the power of our reason to decide.
+The question is as much above the power and the sphere of reason as the
+following would be: "Why does the transcendental object of our external
+sensuous intuition allow of no other form than that of intuition in
+space?" But the problem, which we were called upon to solve, does not
+require us to entertain any such questions. The problem was merely
+this--whether freedom and natural necessity can exist without opposition
+in the same action. To this question we have given a sufficient answer;
+for we have shown that, as the former stands in a relation to a
+different kind of condition from those of the latter, the law of the
+one does not affect the law of the other and that, consequently, both
+can exist together in independence of and without interference with
+each other.
+
+The reader must be careful to remark that my intention in the above
+remarks has not been to prove the actual existence of freedom, as a
+faculty in which resides the cause of certain sensuous phenomena. For,
+not to mention that such an argument would not have a transcendental
+character, nor have been limited to the discussion of pure
+conceptions--all attempts at inferring from experience what cannot be
+cogitated in accordance with its laws, must ever be unsuccessful. Nay,
+more, I have not even aimed at demonstrating the possibility of
+freedom; for this too would have been a vain endeavour, inasmuch as it
+is beyond the power of the mind to cognize the possibility of a reality
+or of a causal power by the aid of mere à priori conceptions. Freedom
+has been considered in the foregoing remarks only as a transcendental
+idea, by means of which reason aims at originating a series of
+conditions in the world of phenomena with the help of that which is
+sensuously unconditioned, involving itself, however, in an antinomy
+with the laws which itself prescribes for the conduct of the
+understanding. That this antinomy is based upon a mere illusion, and
+that nature and freedom are at least not opposed--this was the only
+thing in our power to prove, and the question which it was our task to
+solve.
+
+IV. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Dependence
+of Phenomenal Existences
+
+In the preceding remarks, we considered the changes in the world of
+sense as constituting a dynamical series, in which each member is
+subordinated to another--as its cause. Our present purpose is to avail
+ourselves of this series of states or conditions as a guide to an
+existence which may be the highest condition of all changeable
+phenomena, that is, to a necessary being. Our endeavour to reach, not
+the unconditioned causality, but the unconditioned existence, of
+substance. The series before us is therefore a series of conceptions,
+and not of intuitions (in which the one intuition is the condition of
+the other).
+
+But it is evident that, as all phenomena are subject to change and
+conditioned in their existence, the series of dependent existences
+cannot embrace an unconditioned member, the existence of which would be
+absolutely necessary. It follows that, if phenomena were things in
+themselves, and--as an immediate consequence from this
+supposition--condition and conditioned belonged to the same series of
+phenomena, the existence of a necessary being, as the condition of the
+existence of sensuous phenomena, would be perfectly impossible.
+
+An important distinction, however, exists between the dynamical and the
+mathematical regress. The latter is engaged solely with the combination
+of parts into a whole, or with the division of a whole into its parts;
+and therefore are the conditions of its series parts of the series, and
+to be consequently regarded as homogeneous, and for this reason, as
+consisting, without exception, of phenomena. If the former regress, on
+the contrary, the aim of which is not to establish the possibility of
+an unconditioned whole consisting of given parts, or of an
+unconditioned part of a given whole, but to demonstrate the possibility
+of the deduction of a certain state from its cause, or of the
+contingent existence of substance from that which exists necessarily,
+it is not requisite that the condition should form part of an empirical
+series along with the conditioned.
+
+In the case of the apparent antinomy with which we are at present
+dealing, there exists a way of escape from the difficulty; for it is
+not impossible that both of the contradictory statements may be true in
+different relations. All sensuous phenomena may be contingent, and
+consequently possess only an empirically conditioned existence, and yet
+there may also exist a non-empirical condition of the whole series, or,
+in other words, a necessary being. For this necessary being, as an
+intelligible condition, would not form a member--not even the highest
+member--of the series; the whole world of sense would be left in its
+empirically determined existence uninterfered with and uninfluenced.
+This would also form a ground of distinction between the modes of
+solution employed for the third and fourth antinomies. For, while in
+the consideration of freedom in the former antinomy, the thing
+itself--the cause (substantia phaenomenon)--was regarded as belonging to
+the series of conditions, and only its causality to the intelligible
+world--we are obliged in the present case to cogitate this necessary
+being as purely intelligible and as existing entirely apart from the
+world of sense (as an ens extramundanum); for otherwise it would be
+subject to the phenomenal law of contingency and dependence.
+
+In relation to the present problem, therefore, the regulative principle
+of reason is that everything in the sensuous world possesses an
+empirically conditioned existence--that no property of the sensuous
+world possesses unconditioned necessity--that we are bound to expect,
+and, so far as is possible, to seek for the empirical condition of
+every member in the series of conditions--and that there is no
+sufficient reason to justify us in deducing any existence from a
+condition which lies out of and beyond the empirical series, or in
+regarding any existence as independent and self-subsistent; although
+this should not prevent us from recognizing the possibility of the
+whole series being based upon a being which is intelligible, and for
+this reason free from all empirical conditions.
+
+But it has been far from my intention, in these remarks, to prove the
+existence of this unconditioned and necessary being, or even to
+evidence the possibility of a purely intelligible condition of the
+existence of all sensuous phenomena. As bounds were set to reason, to
+prevent it from leaving the guiding thread of empirical conditions and
+losing itself in transcendent theories which are incapable of concrete
+presentation; so it was my purpose, on the other hand, to set bounds to
+the law of the purely empirical understanding, and to protest against
+any attempts on its part at deciding on the possibility of things, or
+declaring the existence of the intelligible to be impossible, merely on
+the ground that it is not available for the explanation and exposition
+of phenomena. It has been shown, at the same time, that the contingency
+of all the phenomena of nature and their empirical conditions is quite
+consistent with the arbitrary hypothesis of a necessary, although
+purely intelligible condition, that no real contradiction exists
+between them and that, consequently, both may be true. The existence of
+such an absolutely necessary being may be impossible; but this can
+never be demonstrated from the universal contingency and dependence of
+sensuous phenomena, nor from the principle which forbids us to
+discontinue the series at some member of it, or to seek for its cause
+in some sphere of existence beyond the world of nature. Reason goes its
+way in the empirical world, and follows, too, its peculiar path in the
+sphere of the transcendental.
+
+The sensuous world contains nothing but phenomena, which are mere
+representations, and always sensuously conditioned; things in
+themselves are not, and cannot be, objects to us. It is not to be
+wondered at, therefore, that we are not justified in leaping from some
+member of an empirical series beyond the world of sense, as if
+empirical representations were things in themselves, existing apart
+from their transcendental ground in the human mind, and the cause of
+whose existence may be sought out of the empirical series. This would
+certainly be the case with contingent things; but it cannot be with
+mere representations of things, the contingency of which is itself
+merely a phenomenon and can relate to no other regress than that which
+determines phenomena, that is, the empirical. But to cogitate an
+intelligible ground of phenomena, as free, moreover, from the
+contingency of the latter, conflicts neither with the unlimited nature
+of the empirical regress, nor with the complete contingency of
+phenomena. And the demonstration of this was the only thing necessary
+for the solution of this apparent antinomy. For if the condition of
+every conditioned--as regards its existence--is sensuous, and for this
+reason a part of the same series, it must be itself conditioned, as was
+shown in the antithesis of the fourth antinomy. The embarrassments into
+which a reason, which postulates the unconditioned, necessarily falls,
+must, therefore, continue to exist; or the unconditioned must be placed
+in the sphere of the intelligible. In this way, its necessity does not
+require, nor does it even permit, the presence of an empirical
+condition: and it is, consequently, unconditionally necessary.
+
+The empirical employment of reason is not affected by the assumption of
+a purely intelligible being; it continues its operations on the
+principle of the contingency of all phenomena, proceeding from
+empirical conditions to still higher and higher conditions, themselves
+empirical. Just as little does this regulative principle exclude the
+assumption of an intelligible cause, when the question regards merely
+the pure employment of reason--in relation to ends or aims. For, in this
+case, an intelligible cause signifies merely the transcendental and to
+us unknown ground of the possibility of sensuous phenomena, and its
+existence, necessary and independent of all sensuous conditions, is not
+inconsistent with the contingency of phenomena, or with the unlimited
+possibility of regress which exists in the series of empirical
+conditions.
+
+Concluding Remarks on the Antinomy of Pure Reason.
+
+So long as the object of our rational conceptions is the totality of
+conditions in the world of phenomena, and the satisfaction, from this
+source, of the requirements of reason, so long are our ideas
+transcendental and cosmological. But when we set the
+unconditioned--which is the aim of all our inquiries--in a sphere which
+lies out of the world of sense and possible experience, our ideas
+become transcendent. They are then not merely serviceable towards the
+completion of the exercise of reason (which remains an idea, never
+executed, but always to be pursued); they detach themselves completely
+from experience and construct for themselves objects, the material of
+which has not been presented by experience, and the objective reality
+of which is not based upon the completion of the empirical series, but
+upon pure à priori conceptions. The intelligible object of these
+transcendent ideas may be conceded, as a transcendental object. But we
+cannot cogitate it as a thing determinable by certain distinct
+predicates relating to its internal nature, for it has no connection
+with empirical conceptions; nor are we justified in affirming the
+existence of any such object. It is, consequently, a mere product of
+the mind alone. Of all the cosmological ideas, however, it is that
+occasioning the fourth antinomy which compels us to venture upon this
+step. For the existence of phenomena, always conditioned and never
+self-subsistent, requires us to look for an object different from
+phenomena--an intelligible object, with which all contingency must
+cease. But, as we have allowed ourselves to assume the existence of a
+self-subsistent reality out of the field of experience, and are
+therefore obliged to regard phenomena as merely a contingent mode of
+representing intelligible objects employed by beings which are
+themselves intelligences--no other course remains for us than to follow
+analogy and employ the same mode in forming some conception of
+intelligible things, of which we have not the least knowledge, which
+nature taught us to use in the formation of empirical conceptions.
+Experience made us acquainted with the contingent. But we are at
+present engaged in the discussion of things which are not objects of
+experience; and must, therefore, deduce our knowledge of them from that
+which is necessary absolutely and in itself, that is, from pure
+conceptions. Hence the first step which we take out of the world of
+sense obliges us to begin our system of new cognition with the
+investigation of a necessary being, and to deduce from our conceptions
+of it all our conceptions of intelligible things. This we propose to
+attempt in the following chapter.
+
+Chapter III. The Ideal of Pure Reason
+
+Section I. Of the Ideal in General
+
+We have seen that pure conceptions do not present objects to the mind,
+except under sensuous conditions; because the conditions of objective
+reality do not exist in these conceptions, which contain, in fact,
+nothing but the mere form of thought. They may, however, when applied
+to phenomena, be presented in concreto; for it is phenomena that
+present to them the materials for the formation of empirical
+conceptions, which are nothing more than concrete forms of the
+conceptions of the understanding. But ideas are still further removed
+from objective reality than categories; for no phenomenon can ever
+present them to the human mind in concreto. They contain a certain
+perfection, attainable by no possible empirical cognition; and they
+give to reason a systematic unity, to which the unity of experience
+attempts to approximate, but can never completely attain.
+
+But still further removed than the idea from objective reality is the
+Ideal, by which term I understand the idea, not in concreto, but in
+individuo--as an individual thing, determinable or determined by the
+idea alone. The idea of humanity in its complete perfection supposes
+not only the advancement of all the powers and faculties, which
+constitute our conception of human nature, to a complete attainment of
+their final aims, but also everything which is requisite for the
+complete determination of the idea; for of all contradictory
+predicates, only one can conform with the idea of the perfect man. What
+I have termed an ideal was in Plato's philosophy an idea of the divine
+mind--an individual object present to its pure intuition, the most
+perfect of every kind of possible beings, and the archetype of all
+phenomenal existences.
+
+Without rising to these speculative heights, we are bound to confess
+that human reason contains not only ideas, but ideals, which possess,
+not, like those of Plato, creative, but certainly practical power--as
+regulative principles, and form the basis of the perfectibility of
+certain actions. Moral conceptions are not perfectly pure conceptions
+of reason, because an empirical element--of pleasure or pain--lies at the
+foundation of them. In relation, however, to the principle, whereby
+reason sets bounds to a freedom which is in itself without law, and
+consequently when we attend merely to their form, they may be
+considered as pure conceptions of reason. Virtue and wisdom in their
+perfect purity are ideas. But the wise man of the Stoics is an ideal,
+that is to say, a human being existing only in thought and in complete
+conformity with the idea of wisdom. As the idea provides a rule, so the
+ideal serves as an archetype for the perfect and complete determination
+of the copy. Thus the conduct of this wise and divine man serves us as
+a standard of action, with which we may compare and judge ourselves,
+which may help us to reform ourselves, although the perfection it
+demands can never be attained by us. Although we cannot concede
+objective reality to these ideals, they are not to be considered as
+chimeras; on the contrary, they provide reason with a standard, which
+enables it to estimate, by comparison, the degree of incompleteness in
+the objects presented to it. But to aim at realizing the ideal in an
+example in the world of experience--to describe, for instance, the
+character of the perfectly wise man in a romance--is impracticable. Nay
+more, there is something absurd in the attempt; and the result must be
+little edifying, as the natural limitations, which are continually
+breaking in upon the perfection and completeness of the idea, destroy
+the illusion in the story and throw an air of suspicion even on what is
+good in the idea, which hence appears fictitious and unreal.
+
+Such is the constitution of the ideal of reason, which is always based
+upon determinate conceptions, and serves as a rule and a model for
+limitation or of criticism. Very different is the nature of the ideals
+of the imagination. Of these it is impossible to present an
+intelligible conception; they are a kind of monogram, drawn according
+to no determinate rule, and forming rather a vague picture--the
+production of many diverse experiences--than a determinate image. Such
+are the ideals which painters and physiognomists profess to have in
+their minds, and which can serve neither as a model for production nor
+as a standard for appreciation. They may be termed, though improperly,
+sensuous ideals, as they are declared to be models of certain possible
+empirical intuitions. They cannot, however, furnish rules or standards
+for explanation or examination.
+
+In its ideals, reason aims at complete and perfect determination
+according to à priori rules; and hence it cogitates an object, which
+must be completely determinable in conformity with principles, although
+all empirical conditions are absent, and the conception of the object
+is on this account transcendent.
+
+Section II. Of the Transcendental Ideal (Prototypon Trancendentale)
+
+Every conception is, in relation to that which is not contained in it,
+undetermined and subject to the principle of determinability. This
+principle is that, of every two contradictorily opposed predicates,
+only one can belong to a conception. It is a purely logical principle,
+itself based upon the principle of contradiction; inasmuch as it makes
+complete abstraction of the content and attends merely to the logical
+form of the cognition.
+
+But again, everything, as regards its possibility, is also subject to
+the principle of complete determination, according to which one of all
+the possible contradictory predicates of things must belong to it. This
+principle is not based merely upon that of contradiction; for, in
+addition to the relation between two contradictory predicates, it
+regards everything as standing in a relation to the sum of
+possibilities, as the sum total of all predicates of things, and, while
+presupposing this sum as an à priori condition, presents to the mind
+everything as receiving the possibility of its individual existence
+from the relation it bears to, and the share it possesses in, the
+aforesaid sum of possibilities.[64] The principle of complete
+determination relates the content and not to the logical form. It is
+the principle of the synthesis of all the predicates which are required
+to constitute the complete conception of a thing, and not a mere
+principle analytical representation, which enounces that one of two
+contradictory predicates must belong to a conception. It contains,
+moreover, a transcendental presupposition--that, namely, of the material
+for all possibility, which must contain à priori the data for this or
+that particular possibility.
+
+ [64] Thus this principle declares everything to possess a relation to
+ a common correlate--the sum-total of possibility, which, if discovered
+ to exist in the idea of one individual thing, would establish the
+ affinity of all possible things, from the identity of the ground of
+ their complete determination. The determinability of every conception
+ is subordinate to the universality (Allgemeinheit, universalitas) of
+ the principle of excluded middle; the determination of a thing to the
+ totality (Allheit, universitas) of all possible predicates.
+
+The proposition, everything which exists is completely determined,
+means not only that one of every pair of given contradictory
+attributes, but that one of all possible attributes, is always
+predicable of the thing; in it the predicates are not merely compared
+logically with each other, but the thing itself is transcendentally
+compared with the sum-total of all possible predicates. The proposition
+is equivalent to saying: "To attain to a complete knowledge of a thing,
+it is necessary to possess a knowledge of everything that is possible,
+and to determine it thereby in a positive or negative manner." The
+conception of complete determination is consequently a conception which
+cannot be presented in its totality in concreto, and is therefore based
+upon an idea, which has its seat in the reason--the faculty which
+prescribes to the understanding the laws of its harmonious and perfect
+exercise.
+
+Now, although this idea of the sum-total of all possibility, in so far
+as it forms the condition of the complete determination of everything,
+is itself undetermined in relation to the predicates which may
+constitute this sum-total, and we cogitate in it merely the sum-total
+of all possible predicates--we nevertheless find, upon closer
+examination, that this idea, as a primitive conception of the mind,
+excludes a large number of predicates--those deduced and those
+irreconcilable with others, and that it is evolved as a conception
+completely determined à priori. Thus it becomes the conception of an
+individual object, which is completely determined by and through the
+mere idea, and must consequently be termed an ideal of pure reason.
+
+When we consider all possible predicates, not merely logically, but
+transcendentally, that is to say, with reference to the content which
+may be cogitated as existing in them à priori, we shall find that some
+indicate a being, others merely a non-being. The logical negation
+expressed in the word not does not properly belong to a conception, but
+only to the relation of one conception to another in a judgement, and
+is consequently quite insufficient to present to the mind the content
+of a conception. The expression not mortal does not indicate that a
+non-being is cogitated in the object; it does not concern the content
+at all. A transcendental negation, on the contrary, indicates non-being
+in itself, and is opposed to transcendental affirmation, the conception
+of which of itself expresses a being. Hence this affirmation indicates
+a reality, because in and through it objects are considered to be
+something--to be things; while the opposite negation, on the other hand,
+indicates a mere want, or privation, or absence, and, where such
+negations alone are attached to a representation, the non-existence of
+anything corresponding to the representation.
+
+Now a negation cannot be cogitated as determined, without cogitating at
+the same time the opposite affirmation. The man born blind has not the
+least notion of darkness, because he has none of light; the vagabond
+knows nothing of poverty, because he has never known what it is to be
+in comfort;[65] the ignorant man has no conception of his ignorance,
+because he has no conception of knowledge. All conceptions of negatives
+are accordingly derived or deduced conceptions; and realities contain
+the data, and, so to speak, the material or transcendental content of
+the possibility and complete determination of all things.
+
+ [65] The investigations and calculations of astronomers have taught us
+ much that is wonderful; but the most important lesson we have received
+ from them is the discovery of the abyss of our ignorance in relation
+ to the universe--an ignorance the magnitude of which reason, without
+ the information thus derived, could never have conceived. This
+ discovery of our deficiencies must produce a great change in the
+ determination of the aims of human reason.
+
+If, therefore, a transcendental substratum lies at the foundation of
+the complete determination of things--a substratum which is to form the
+fund from which all possible predicates of things are to be supplied,
+this substratum cannot be anything else than the idea of a sum-total of
+reality (omnitudo realitatis). In this view, negations are nothing but
+limitations--a term which could not, with propriety, be applied to them,
+if the unlimited (the all) did not form the true basis of our
+conception.
+
+This conception of a sum-total of reality is the conception of a thing
+in itself, regarded as completely determined; and the conception of an
+ens realissimum is the conception of an individual being, inasmuch as
+it is determined by that predicate of all possible contradictory
+predicates, which indicates and belongs to being. It is, therefore, a
+transcendental ideal which forms the basis of the complete
+determination of everything that exists, and is the highest material
+condition of its possibility--a condition on which must rest the
+cogitation of all objects with respect to their content. Nay, more,
+this ideal is the only proper ideal of which the human mind is capable;
+because in this case alone a general conception of a thing is
+completely determined by and through itself, and cognized as the
+representation of an individuum.
+
+The logical determination of a conception is based upon a disjunctive
+syllogism, the major of which contains the logical division of the
+extent of a general conception, the minor limits this extent to a
+certain part, while the conclusion determines the conception by this
+part. The general conception of a reality cannot be divided à priori,
+because, without the aid of experience, we cannot know any determinate
+kinds of reality, standing under the former as the genus. The
+transcendental principle of the complete determination of all things is
+therefore merely the representation of the sum-total of all reality; it
+is not a conception which is the genus of all predicates under itself,
+but one which comprehends them all within itself. The complete
+determination of a thing is consequently based upon the limitation of
+this total of reality, so much being predicated of the thing, while all
+that remains over is excluded--a procedure which is in exact agreement
+with that of the disjunctive syllogism and the determination of the
+objects in the conclusion by one of the members of the division. It
+follows that reason, in laying the transcendental ideal at the
+foundation of its determination of all possible things, takes a course
+in exact analogy with that which it pursues in disjunctive syllogisms--a
+proposition which formed the basis of the systematic division of all
+transcendental ideas, according to which they are produced in complete
+parallelism with the three modes of syllogistic reasoning employed by
+the human mind.
+
+It is self-evident that reason, in cogitating the necessary complete
+determination of things, does not presuppose the existence of a being
+corresponding to its ideal, but merely the idea of the ideal--for the
+purpose of deducing from the unconditional totality of complete
+determination, The ideal is therefore the prototype of all things,
+which, as defective copies (ectypa), receive from it the material of
+their possibility, and approximate to it more or less, though it is
+impossible that they can ever attain to its perfection.
+
+The possibility of things must therefore be regarded as derived--except
+that of the thing which contains in itself all reality, which must be
+considered to be primitive and original. For all negations--and they are
+the only predicates by means of which all other things can be
+distinguished from the ens realissimum--are mere limitations of a
+greater and a higher--nay, the highest reality; and they consequently
+presuppose this reality, and are, as regards their content, derived
+from it. The manifold nature of things is only an infinitely various
+mode of limiting the conception of the highest reality, which is their
+common substratum; just as all figures are possible only as different
+modes of limiting infinite space. The object of the ideal of reason--an
+object existing only in reason itself--is also termed the primal being
+(ens originarium); as having no existence superior to him, the supreme
+being (ens summum); and as being the condition of all other beings,
+which rank under it, the being of all beings (ens entium). But none of
+these terms indicate the objective relation of an actually existing
+object to other things, but merely that of an idea to conceptions; and
+all our investigations into this subject still leave us in perfect
+uncertainty with regard to the existence of this being.
+
+A primal being cannot be said to consist of many other beings with an
+existence which is derivative, for the latter presuppose the former,
+and therefore cannot be constitutive parts of it. It follows that the
+ideal of the primal being must be cogitated as simple.
+
+The deduction of the possibility of all other things from this primal
+being cannot, strictly speaking, be considered as a limitation, or as a
+kind of division of its reality; for this would be regarding the primal
+being as a mere aggregate--which has been shown to be impossible,
+although it was so represented in our first rough sketch. The highest
+reality must be regarded rather as the ground than as the sum-total of
+the possibility of all things, and the manifold nature of things be
+based, not upon the limitation of the primal being itself, but upon the
+complete series of effects which flow from it. And thus all our powers
+of sense, as well as all phenomenal reality, may be with propriety
+regarded as belonging to this series of effects, while they could not
+have formed parts of the idea, considered as an aggregate. Pursuing
+this track, and hypostatizing this idea, we shall find ourselves
+authorized to determine our notion of the Supreme Being by means of the
+mere conception of a highest reality, as one, simple, all-sufficient,
+eternal, and so on--in one word, to determine it in its unconditioned
+completeness by the aid of every possible predicate. The conception of
+such a being is the conception of God in its transcendental sense, and
+thus the ideal of pure reason is the object-matter of a transcendental
+theology.
+
+But, by such an employment of the transcendental idea, we should be
+over stepping the limits of its validity and purpose. For reason placed
+it, as the conception of all reality, at the basis of the complete
+determination of things, without requiring that this conception be
+regarded as the conception of an objective existence. Such an existence
+would be purely fictitious, and the hypostatizing of the content of the
+idea into an ideal, as an individual being, is a step perfectly
+unauthorized. Nay, more, we are not even called upon to assume the
+possibility of such an hypothesis, as none of the deductions drawn from
+such an ideal would affect the complete determination of things in
+general--for the sake of which alone is the idea necessary.
+
+It is not sufficient to circumscribe the procedure and the dialectic of
+reason; we must also endeavour to discover the sources of this
+dialectic, that we may have it in our power to give a rational
+explanation of this illusion, as a phenomenon of the human mind. For
+the ideal, of which we are at present speaking, is based, not upon an
+arbitrary, but upon a natural, idea. The question hence arises: How
+happens it that reason regards the possibility of all things as deduced
+from a single possibility, that, to wit, of the highest reality, and
+presupposes this as existing in an individual and primal being?
+
+The answer is ready; it is at once presented by the procedure of
+transcendental analytic. The possibility of sensuous objects is a
+relation of these objects to thought, in which something (the empirical
+form) may be cogitated à priori; while that which constitutes the
+matter--the reality of the phenomenon (that element which corresponds to
+sensation)--must be given from without, as otherwise it could not even
+be cogitated by, nor could its possibility be presentable to the mind.
+Now, a sensuous object is completely determined, when it has been
+compared with all phenomenal predicates, and represented by means of
+these either positively or negatively. But, as that which constitutes
+the thing itself--the real in a phenomenon, must be given, and that, in
+which the real of all phenomena is given, is experience, one, sole, and
+all-embracing--the material of the possibility of all sensuous objects
+must be presupposed as given in a whole, and it is upon the limitation
+of this whole that the possibility of all empirical objects, their
+distinction from each other and their complete determination, are
+based. Now, no other objects are presented to us besides sensuous
+objects, and these can be given only in connection with a possible
+experience; it follows that a thing is not an object to us, unless it
+presupposes the whole or sum-total of empirical reality as the
+condition of its possibility. Now, a natural illusion leads us to
+consider this principle, which is valid only of sensuous objects, as
+valid with regard to things in general. And thus we are induced to hold
+the empirical principle of our conceptions of the possibility of
+things, as phenomena, by leaving out this limitative condition, to be a
+transcendental principle of the possibility of things in general.
+
+We proceed afterwards to hypostatize this idea of the sum-total of all
+reality, by changing the distributive unity of the empirical exercise
+of the understanding into the collective unity of an empirical whole--a
+dialectical illusion, and by cogitating this whole or sum of experience
+as an individual thing, containing in itself all empirical reality.
+This individual thing or being is then, by means of the above-mentioned
+transcendental subreption, substituted for our notion of a thing which
+stands at the head of the possibility of all things, the real
+conditions of whose complete determination it presents.[66]
+
+ [66] This ideal of the ens realissimum--although merely a mental
+ representation--is first objectivized, that is, has an objective
+ existence attributed to it, then hypostatized, and finally, by the
+ natural progress of reason to the completion of unity, personified, as
+ we shall show presently. For the regulative unity of experience is not
+ based upon phenomena themselves, but upon the connection of the
+ variety of phenomena by the understanding in a consciousness, and thus
+ the unity of the supreme reality and the complete determinability of
+ all things, seem to reside in a supreme understanding, and,
+ consequently, in a conscious intelligence.
+
+Section III. Of the Arguments employed by Speculative Reason in Proof
+of the Existence of a Supreme Being
+
+Notwithstanding the pressing necessity which reason feels, to form some
+presupposition that shall serve the understanding as a proper basis for
+the complete determination of its conceptions, the idealistic and
+factitious nature of such a presupposition is too evident to allow
+reason for a moment to persuade itself into a belief of the objective
+existence of a mere creation of its own thought. But there are other
+considerations which compel reason to seek out some resting place in
+the regress from the conditioned to the unconditioned, which is not
+given as an actual existence from the mere conception of it, although
+it alone can give completeness to the series of conditions. And this is
+the natural course of every human reason, even of the most uneducated,
+although the path at first entered it does not always continue to
+follow. It does not begin from conceptions, but from common experience,
+and requires a basis in actual existence. But this basis is insecure,
+unless it rests upon the immovable rock of the absolutely necessary.
+And this foundation is itself unworthy of trust, if it leave under and
+above it empty space, if it do not fill all, and leave no room for a
+why or a wherefore, if it be not, in one word, infinite in its reality.
+
+If we admit the existence of some one thing, whatever it may be, we
+must also admit that there is something which exists necessarily. For
+what is contingent exists only under the condition of some other thing,
+which is its cause; and from this we must go on to conclude the
+existence of a cause which is not contingent, and which consequently
+exists necessarily and unconditionally. Such is the argument by which
+reason justifies its advances towards a primal being.
+
+Now reason looks round for the conception of a being that may be
+admitted, without inconsistency, to be worthy of the attribute of
+absolute necessity, not for the purpose of inferring à priori, from the
+conception of such a being, its objective existence (for if reason
+allowed itself to take this course, it would not require a basis in
+given and actual existence, but merely the support of pure
+conceptions), but for the purpose of discovering, among all our
+conceptions of possible things, that conception which possesses no
+element inconsistent with the idea of absolute necessity. For that
+there must be some absolutely necessary existence, it regards as a
+truth already established. Now, if it can remove every existence
+incapable of supporting the attribute of absolute necessity, excepting
+one--this must be the absolutely necessary being, whether its necessity
+is comprehensible by us, that is, deducible from the conception of it
+alone, or not.
+
+Now that, the conception of which contains a therefore to every
+wherefore, which is not defective in any respect whatever, which is
+all-sufficient as a condition, seems to be the being of which we can
+justly predicate absolute necessity--for this reason, that, possessing
+the conditions of all that is possible, it does not and cannot itself
+require any condition. And thus it satisfies, in one respect at least,
+the requirements of the conception of absolute necessity. In this view,
+it is superior to all other conceptions, which, as deficient and
+incomplete, do not possess the characteristic of independence of all
+higher conditions. It is true that we cannot infer from this that what
+does not contain in itself the supreme and complete condition--the
+condition of all other things--must possess only a conditioned
+existence; but as little can we assert the contrary, for this supposed
+being does not possess the only characteristic which can enable reason
+to cognize by means of an à priori conception the unconditioned and
+necessary nature of its existence.
+
+The conception of an ens realissimum is that which best agrees with the
+conception of an unconditioned and necessary being. The former
+conception does not satisfy all the requirements of the latter; but we
+have no choice, we are obliged to adhere to it, for we find that we
+cannot do without the existence of a necessary being; and even although
+we admit it, we find it out of our power to discover in the whole
+sphere of possibility any being that can advance well-grounded claims
+to such a distinction.
+
+The following is, therefore, the natural course of human reason. It
+begins by persuading itself of the existence of some necessary being.
+In this being it recognizes the characteristics of unconditioned
+existence. It then seeks the conception of that which is independent of
+all conditions, and finds it in that which is itself the sufficient
+condition of all other things--in other words, in that which contains
+all reality. But the unlimited all is an absolute unity, and is
+conceived by the mind as a being one and supreme; and thus reason
+concludes that the Supreme Being, as the primal basis of all things,
+possesses an existence which is absolutely necessary.
+
+This conception must be regarded as in some degree satisfactory, if we
+admit the existence of a necessary being, and consider that there
+exists a necessity for a definite and final answer to these questions.
+In such a case, we cannot make a better choice, or rather we have no
+choice at all, but feel ourselves obliged to declare in favour of the
+absolute unity of complete reality, as the highest source of the
+possibility of things. But if there exists no motive for coming to a
+definite conclusion, and we may leave the question unanswered till we
+have fully weighed both sides--in other words, when we are merely called
+upon to decide how much we happen to know about the question, and how
+much we merely flatter ourselves that we know--the above conclusion does
+not appear to be so great advantage, but, on the contrary, seems
+defective in the grounds upon which it is supported.
+
+For, admitting the truth of all that has been said, that, namely, the
+inference from a given existence (my own, for example) to the existence
+of an unconditioned and necessary being is valid and unassailable;
+that, in the second place, we must consider a being which contains all
+reality, and consequently all the conditions of other things, to be
+absolutely unconditioned; and admitting too, that we have thus
+discovered the conception of a thing to which may be attributed,
+without inconsistency, absolute necessity--it does not follow from all
+this that the conception of a limited being, in which the supreme
+reality does not reside, is therefore incompatible with the idea of
+absolute necessity. For, although I do not discover the element of the
+unconditioned in the conception of such a being--an element which is
+manifestly existent in the sum-total of all conditions--I am not
+entitled to conclude that its existence is therefore conditioned; just
+as I am not entitled to affirm, in a hypothetical syllogism, that where
+a certain condition does not exist (in the present, completeness, as
+far as pure conceptions are concerned), the conditioned does not exist
+either. On the contrary, we are free to consider all limited beings as
+likewise unconditionally necessary, although we are unable to infer
+this from the general conception which we have of them. Thus conducted,
+this argument is incapable of giving us the least notion of the
+properties of a necessary being, and must be in every respect without
+result.
+
+This argument continues, however, to possess a weight and an authority,
+which, in spite of its objective insufficiency, it has never been
+divested of. For, granting that certain responsibilities lie upon us,
+which, as based on the ideas of reason, deserve to be respected and
+submitted to, although they are incapable of a real or practical
+application to our nature, or, in other words, would be
+responsibilities without motives, except upon the supposition of a
+Supreme Being to give effect and influence to the practical laws: in
+such a case we should be bound to obey our conceptions, which, although
+objectively insufficient, do, according to the standard of reason,
+preponderate over and are superior to any claims that may be advanced
+from any other quarter. The equilibrium of doubt would in this case be
+destroyed by a practical addition; indeed, Reason would be compelled to
+condemn herself, if she refused to comply with the demands of the
+judgement, no superior to which we know--however defective her
+understanding of the grounds of these demands might be.
+
+This argument, although in fact transcendental, inasmuch as it rests
+upon the intrinsic insufficiency of the contingent, is so simple and
+natural, that the commonest understanding can appreciate its value. We
+see things around us change, arise, and pass away; they, or their
+condition, must therefore have a cause. The same demand must again be
+made of the cause itself--as a datum of experience. Now it is natural
+that we should place the highest causality just where we place supreme
+causality, in that being, which contains the conditions of all possible
+effects, and the conception of which is so simple as that of an
+all-embracing reality. This highest cause, then, we regard as
+absolutely necessary, because we find it absolutely necessary to rise
+to it, and do not discover any reason for proceeding beyond it. Thus,
+among all nations, through the darkest polytheism glimmer some faint
+sparks of monotheism, to which these idolaters have been led, not from
+reflection and profound thought, but by the study and natural progress
+of the common understanding.
+
+There are only three modes of proving the existence of a Deity, on the
+grounds of speculative reason.
+
+All the paths conducting to this end begin either from determinate
+experience and the peculiar constitution of the world of sense, and
+rise, according to the laws of causality, from it to the highest cause
+existing apart from the world--or from a purely indeterminate
+experience, that is, some empirical existence--or abstraction is made of
+all experience, and the existence of a supreme cause is concluded from
+à priori conceptions alone. The first is the physico-theological
+argument, the second the cosmological, the third the ontological. More
+there are not, and more there cannot be.
+
+I shall show it is as unsuccessful on the one path--the empirical--as on
+the other--the transcendental, and that it stretches its wings in vain,
+to soar beyond the world of sense by the mere might of speculative
+thought. As regards the order in which we must discuss those arguments,
+it will be exactly the reverse of that in which reason, in the progress
+of its development, attains to them--the order in which they are placed
+above. For it will be made manifest to the reader that, although
+experience presents the occasion and the starting-point, it is the
+transcendental idea of reason which guides it in its pilgrimage and is
+the goal of all its struggles. I shall therefore begin with an
+examination of the transcendental argument, and afterwards inquire what
+additional strength has accrued to this mode of proof from the addition
+of the empirical element.
+
+Section IV. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the
+Existence of God
+
+It is evident from what has been said that the conception of an
+absolutely necessary being is a mere idea, the objective reality of
+which is far from being established by the mere fact that it is a need
+of reason. On the contrary, this idea serves merely to indicate a
+certain unattainable perfection, and rather limits the operations than,
+by the presentation of new objects, extends the sphere of the
+understanding. But a strange anomaly meets us at the very threshold;
+for the inference from a given existence in general to an absolutely
+necessary existence seems to be correct and unavoidable, while the
+conditions of the understanding refuse to aid us in forming any
+conception of such a being.
+
+Philosophers have always talked of an absolutely necessary being, and
+have nevertheless declined to take the trouble of conceiving
+whether--and how--a being of this nature is even cogitable, not to
+mention that its existence is actually demonstrable. A verbal
+definition of the conception is certainly easy enough: it is something
+the non-existence of which is impossible. But does this definition
+throw any light upon the conditions which render it impossible to
+cogitate the non-existence of a thing--conditions which we wish to
+ascertain, that we may discover whether we think anything in the
+conception of such a being or not? For the mere fact that I throw away,
+by means of the word unconditioned, all the conditions which the
+understanding habitually requires in order to regard anything as
+necessary, is very far from making clear whether by means of the
+conception of the unconditionally necessary I think of something, or
+really of nothing at all.
+
+Nay, more, this chance-conception, now become so current, many have
+endeavoured to explain by examples which seemed to render any inquiries
+regarding its intelligibility quite needless. Every geometrical
+proposition--a triangle has three angles--it was said, is absolutely
+necessary; and thus people talked of an object which lay out of the
+sphere of our understanding as if it were perfectly plain what the
+conception of such a being meant.
+
+All the examples adduced have been drawn, without exception, from
+judgements, and not from things. But the unconditioned necessity of a
+judgement does not form the absolute necessity of a thing. On the
+contrary, the absolute necessity of a judgement is only a conditioned
+necessity of a thing, or of the predicate in a judgement. The
+proposition above-mentioned does not enounce that three angles
+necessarily exist, but, upon condition that a triangle exists, three
+angles must necessarily exist--in it. And thus this logical necessity
+has been the source of the greatest delusions. Having formed an à
+priori conception of a thing, the content of which was made to embrace
+existence, we believed ourselves safe in concluding that, because
+existence belongs necessarily to the object of the conception (that is,
+under the condition of my positing this thing as given), the existence
+of the thing is also posited necessarily, and that it is therefore
+absolutely necessary--merely because its existence has been cogitated in
+the conception.
+
+If, in an identical judgement, I annihilate the predicate in thought,
+and retain the subject, a contradiction is the result; and hence I say,
+the former belongs necessarily to the latter. But if I suppress both
+subject and predicate in thought, no contradiction arises; for there is
+nothing at all, and therefore no means of forming a contradiction. To
+suppose the existence of a triangle and not that of its three angles,
+is self-contradictory; but to suppose the non-existence of both
+triangle and angles is perfectly admissible. And so is it with the
+conception of an absolutely necessary being. Annihilate its existence
+in thought, and you annihilate the thing itself with all its
+predicates; how then can there be any room for contradiction?
+Externally, there is nothing to give rise to a contradiction, for a
+thing cannot be necessary externally; nor internally, for, by the
+annihilation or suppression of the thing itself, its internal
+properties are also annihilated. God is omnipotent--that is a necessary
+judgement. His omnipotence cannot be denied, if the existence of a
+Deity is posited--the existence, that is, of an infinite being, the two
+conceptions being identical. But when you say, God does not exist,
+neither omnipotence nor any other predicate is affirmed; they must all
+disappear with the subject, and in this judgement there cannot exist
+the least self-contradiction.
+
+You have thus seen that when the predicate of a judgement is
+annihilated in thought along with the subject, no internal
+contradiction can arise, be the predicate what it may. There is no
+possibility of evading the conclusion--you find yourselves compelled to
+declare: There are certain subjects which cannot be annihilated in
+thought. But this is nothing more than saying: There exist subjects
+which are absolutely necessary--the very hypothesis which you are called
+upon to establish. For I find myself unable to form the slightest
+conception of a thing which when annihilated in thought with all its
+predicates, leaves behind a contradiction; and contradiction is the
+only criterion of impossibility in the sphere of pure à priori
+conceptions.
+
+Against these general considerations, the justice of which no one can
+dispute, one argument is adduced, which is regarded as furnishing a
+satisfactory demonstration from the fact. It is affirmed that there is
+one and only one conception, in which the non-being or annihilation of
+the object is self-contradictory, and this is the conception of an ens
+realissimum. It possesses, you say, all reality, and you feel
+yourselves justified in admitting the possibility of such a being.
+(This I am willing to grant for the present, although the existence of
+a conception which is not self-contradictory is far from being
+sufficient to prove the possibility of an object.)[67] Now the notion
+of all reality embraces in it that of existence; the notion of
+existence lies, therefore, in the conception of this possible thing. If
+this thing is annihilated in thought, the internal possibility of the
+thing is also annihilated, which is self-contradictory.
+
+ [67] A conception is always possible, if it is not self-contradictory.
+ This is the logical criterion of possibility, distinguishing the
+ object of such a conception from the nihil negativum. But it may be,
+ notwithstanding, an empty conception, unless the objective reality of
+ this synthesis, but which it is generated, is demonstrated; and a
+ proof of this kind must be based upon principles of possible
+ experience, and not upon the principle of analysis or contradiction.
+ This remark may be serviceable as a warning against concluding, from
+ the possibility of a conception--which is logical--the possibility of a
+ thing--which is real.
+
+I answer: It is absurd to introduce--under whatever term disguised--into
+the conception of a thing, which is to be cogitated solely in reference
+to its possibility, the conception of its existence. If this is
+admitted, you will have apparently gained the day, but in reality have
+enounced nothing but a mere tautology. I ask, is the proposition, this
+or that thing (which I am admitting to be possible) exists, an
+analytical or a synthetical proposition? If the former, there is no
+addition made to the subject of your thought by the affirmation of its
+existence; but then the conception in your minds is identical with the
+thing itself, or you have supposed the existence of a thing to be
+possible, and then inferred its existence from its internal
+possibility--which is but a miserable tautology. The word reality in the
+conception of the thing, and the word existence in the conception of
+the predicate, will not help you out of the difficulty. For, supposing
+you were to term all positing of a thing reality, you have thereby
+posited the thing with all its predicates in the conception of the
+subject and assumed its actual existence, and this you merely repeat in
+the predicate. But if you confess, as every reasonable person must,
+that every existential proposition is synthetical, how can it be
+maintained that the predicate of existence cannot be denied without
+contradiction?--a property which is the characteristic of analytical
+propositions, alone.
+
+I should have a reasonable hope of putting an end for ever to this
+sophistical mode of argumentation, by a strict definition of the
+conception of existence, did not my own experience teach me that the
+illusion arising from our confounding a logical with a real predicate
+(a predicate which aids in the determination of a thing) resists almost
+all the endeavours of explanation and illustration. A logical predicate
+may be what you please, even the subject may be predicated of itself;
+for logic pays no regard to the content of a judgement. But the
+determination of a conception is a predicate, which adds to and
+enlarges the conception. It must not, therefore, be contained in the
+conception.
+
+Being is evidently not a real predicate, that is, a conception of
+something which is added to the conception of some other thing. It is
+merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations in it.
+Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgement. The proposition, God
+is omnipotent, contains two conceptions, which have a certain object or
+content; the word is, is no additional predicate--it merely indicates
+the relation of the predicate to the subject. Now, if I take the
+subject (God) with all its predicates (omnipotence being one), and say:
+God is, or, There is a God, I add no new predicate to the conception of
+God, I merely posit or affirm the existence of the subject with all its
+predicates--I posit the object in relation to my conception. The content
+of both is the same; and there is no addition made to the conception,
+which expresses merely the possibility of the object, by my cogitating
+the object--in the expression, it is--as absolutely given or existing.
+Thus the real contains no more than the possible. A hundred real
+dollars contain no more than a hundred possible dollars. For, as the
+latter indicate the conception, and the former the object, on the
+supposition that the content of the former was greater than that of the
+latter, my conception would not be an expression of the whole object,
+and would consequently be an inadequate conception of it. But in
+reckoning my wealth there may be said to be more in a hundred real
+dollars than in a hundred possible dollars--that is, in the mere
+conception of them. For the real object--the dollars--is not analytically
+contained in my conception, but forms a synthetical addition to my
+conception (which is merely a determination of my mental state),
+although this objective reality--this existence--apart from my
+conceptions, does not in the least degree increase the aforesaid
+hundred dollars.
+
+By whatever and by whatever number of predicates--even to the complete
+determination of it--I may cogitate a thing, I do not in the least
+augment the object of my conception by the addition of the statement:
+This thing exists. Otherwise, not exactly the same, but something more
+than what was cogitated in my conception, would exist, and I could not
+affirm that the exact object of my conception had real existence. If I
+cogitate a thing as containing all modes of reality except one, the
+mode of reality which is absent is not added to the conception of the
+thing by the affirmation that the thing exists; on the contrary, the
+thing exists--if it exist at all--with the same defect as that cogitated
+in its conception; otherwise not that which was cogitated, but
+something different, exists. Now, if I cogitate a being as the highest
+reality, without defect or imperfection, the question still
+remains--whether this being exists or not? For, although no element is
+wanting in the possible real content of my conception, there is a
+defect in its relation to my mental state, that is, I am ignorant
+whether the cognition of the object indicated by the conception is
+possible à posteriori. And here the cause of the present difficulty
+becomes apparent. If the question regarded an object of sense merely,
+it would be impossible for me to confound the conception with the
+existence of a thing. For the conception merely enables me to cogitate
+an object as according with the general conditions of experience; while
+the existence of the object permits me to cogitate it as contained in
+the sphere of actual experience. At the same time, this connection with
+the world of experience does not in the least augment the conception,
+although a possible perception has been added to the experience of the
+mind. But if we cogitate existence by the pure category alone, it is
+not to be wondered at, that we should find ourselves unable to present
+any criterion sufficient to distinguish it from mere possibility.
+
+Whatever be the content of our conception of an object, it is necessary
+to go beyond it, if we wish to predicate existence of the object. In
+the case of sensuous objects, this is attained by their connection
+according to empirical laws with some one of my perceptions; but there
+is no means of cognizing the existence of objects of pure thought,
+because it must be cognized completely à priori. But all our knowledge
+of existence (be it immediately by perception, or by inferences
+connecting some object with a perception) belongs entirely to the
+sphere of experience--which is in perfect unity with itself; and
+although an existence out of this sphere cannot be absolutely declared
+to be impossible, it is a hypothesis the truth of which we have no
+means of ascertaining.
+
+The notion of a Supreme Being is in many respects a highly useful idea;
+but for the very reason that it is an idea, it is incapable of
+enlarging our cognition with regard to the existence of things. It is
+not even sufficient to instruct us as to the possibility of a being
+which we do not know to exist. The analytical criterion of possibility,
+which consists in the absence of contradiction in propositions, cannot
+be denied it. But the connection of real properties in a thing is a
+synthesis of the possibility of which an à priori judgement cannot be
+formed, because these realities are not presented to us specifically;
+and even if this were to happen, a judgement would still be impossible,
+because the criterion of the possibility of synthetical cognitions must
+be sought for in the world of experience, to which the object of an
+idea cannot belong. And thus the celebrated Leibnitz has utterly failed
+in his attempt to establish upon à priori grounds the possibility of
+this sublime ideal being.
+
+The celebrated ontological or Cartesian argument for the existence of a
+Supreme Being is therefore insufficient; and we may as well hope to
+increase our stock of knowledge by the aid of mere ideas, as the
+merchant to augment his wealth by the addition of noughts to his cash
+account.
+
+Section V. Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the
+Existence of God
+
+It was by no means a natural course of proceeding, but, on the
+contrary, an invention entirely due to the subtlety of the schools, to
+attempt to draw from a mere idea a proof of the existence of an object
+corresponding to it. Such a course would never have been pursued, were
+it not for that need of reason which requires it to suppose the
+existence of a necessary being as a basis for the empirical regress,
+and that, as this necessity must be unconditioned and à priori, reason
+is bound to discover a conception which shall satisfy, if possible,
+this requirement, and enable us to attain to the à priori cognition of
+such a being. This conception was thought to be found in the idea of an
+ens realissimum, and thus this idea was employed for the attainment of
+a better defined knowledge of a necessary being, of the existence of
+which we were convinced, or persuaded, on other grounds. Thus reason
+was seduced from her natural courage; and, instead of concluding with
+the conception of an ens realissimum, an attempt was made to begin with
+it, for the purpose of inferring from it that idea of a necessary
+existence which it was in fact called in to complete. Thus arose that
+unfortunate ontological argument, which neither satisfies the healthy
+common sense of humanity, nor sustains the scientific examination of
+the philosopher.
+
+The cosmological proof, which we are about to examine, retains the
+connection between absolute necessity and the highest reality; but,
+instead of reasoning from this highest reality to a necessary
+existence, like the preceding argument, it concludes from the given
+unconditioned necessity of some being its unlimited reality. The track
+it pursues, whether rational or sophistical, is at least natural, and
+not only goes far to persuade the common understanding, but shows
+itself deserving of respect from the speculative intellect; while it
+contains, at the same time, the outlines of all the arguments employed
+in natural theology--arguments which always have been, and still will
+be, in use and authority. These, however adorned, and hid under
+whatever embellishments of rhetoric and sentiment, are at bottom
+identical with the arguments we are at present to discuss. This proof,
+termed by Leibnitz the argumentum a contingentia mundi, I shall now lay
+before the reader, and subject to a strict examination.
+
+It is framed in the following manner: If something exists, an
+absolutely necessary being must likewise exist. Now I, at least, exist.
+Consequently, there exists an absolutely necessary being. The minor
+contains an experience, the major reasons from a general experience to
+the existence of a necessary being.[68] Thus this argument really
+begins at experience, and is not completely à priori, or ontological.
+The object of all possible experience being the world, it is called the
+cosmological proof. It contains no reference to any peculiar property
+of sensuous objects, by which this world of sense might be
+distinguished from other possible worlds; and in this respect it
+differs from the physico-theological proof, which is based upon the
+consideration of the peculiar constitution of our sensuous world.
+
+ [68] This inference is too well known to require more detailed
+ discussion. It is based upon the spurious transcendental law of
+ causality, that everything which is contingent has a cause, which, if
+ itself contingent, must also have a cause; and so on, till the series
+ of subordinated causes must end with an absolutely necessary cause,
+ without which it would not possess completeness.
+
+The proof proceeds thus: A necessary being can be determined only in
+one way, that is, it can be determined by only one of all possible
+opposed predicates; consequently, it must be completely determined in
+and by its conception. But there is only a single conception of a thing
+possible, which completely determines the thing à priori: that is, the
+conception of the ens realissimum. It follows that the conception of
+the ens realissimum is the only conception by and in which we can
+cogitate a necessary being. Consequently, a Supreme Being necessarily
+exists.
+
+In this cosmological argument are assembled so many sophistical
+propositions that speculative reason seems to have exerted in it all
+her dialectical skill to produce a transcendental illusion of the most
+extreme character. We shall postpone an investigation of this argument
+for the present, and confine ourselves to exposing the stratagem by
+which it imposes upon us an old argument in a new dress, and appeals to
+the agreement of two witnesses, the one with the credentials of pure
+reason, and the other with those of empiricism; while, in fact, it is
+only the former who has changed his dress and voice, for the purpose of
+passing himself off for an additional witness. That it may possess a
+secure foundation, it bases its conclusions upon experience, and thus
+appears to be completely distinct from the ontological argument, which
+places its confidence entirely in pure à priori conceptions. But this
+experience merely aids reason in making one step--to the existence of a
+necessary being. What the properties of this being are cannot be
+learned from experience; and therefore reason abandons it altogether,
+and pursues its inquiries in the sphere of pure conception, for the
+purpose of discovering what the properties of an absolutely necessary
+being ought to be, that is, what among all possible things contain the
+conditions (requisita) of absolute necessity. Reason believes that it
+has discovered these requisites in the conception of an ens
+realissimum--and in it alone, and hence concludes: The ens realissimum
+is an absolutely necessary being. But it is evident that reason has
+here presupposed that the conception of an ens realissimum is perfectly
+adequate to the conception of a being of absolute necessity, that is,
+that we may infer the existence of the latter from that of the former--a
+proposition which formed the basis of the ontological argument, and
+which is now employed in the support of the cosmological argument,
+contrary to the wish and professions of its inventors. For the
+existence of an absolutely necessary being is given in conceptions
+alone. But if I say: "The conception of the ens realissimum is a
+conception of this kind, and in fact the only conception which is
+adequate to our idea of a necessary being," I am obliged to admit, that
+the latter may be inferred from the former. Thus it is properly the
+ontological argument which figures in the cosmological, and constitutes
+the whole strength of the latter; while the spurious basis of
+experience has been of no further use than to conduct us to the
+conception of absolute necessity, being utterly insufficient to
+demonstrate the presence of this attribute in any determinate existence
+or thing. For when we propose to ourselves an aim of this character, we
+must abandon the sphere of experience, and rise to that of pure
+conceptions, which we examine with the purpose of discovering whether
+any one contains the conditions of the possibility of an absolutely
+necessary being. But if the possibility of such a being is thus
+demonstrated, its existence is also proved; for we may then assert
+that, of all possible beings there is one which possesses the attribute
+of necessity--in other words, this being possesses an absolutely
+necessary existence.
+
+All illusions in an argument are more easily detected when they are
+presented in the formal manner employed by the schools, which we now
+proceed to do.
+
+If the proposition: "Every absolutely necessary being is likewise an
+ens realissimum," is correct (and it is this which constitutes the
+nervus probandi of the cosmological argument), it must, like all
+affirmative judgements, be capable of conversion--the conversio per
+accidens, at least. It follows, then, that some entia realissima are
+absolutely necessary beings. But no ens realissimum is in any respect
+different from another, and what is valid of some is valid of all. In
+this present case, therefore, I may employ simple conversion, and say:
+"Every ens realissimum is a necessary being." But as this proposition
+is determined à priori by the conceptions contained in it, the mere
+conception of an ens realissimum must possess the additional attribute
+of absolute necessity. But this is exactly what was maintained in the
+ontological argument, and not recognized by the cosmological, although
+it formed the real ground of its disguised and illusory reasoning.
+
+Thus the second mode employed by speculative reason of demonstrating
+the existence of a Supreme Being, is not only, like the first, illusory
+and inadequate, but possesses the additional blemish of an ignoratio
+elenchi--professing to conduct us by a new road to the desired goal, but
+bringing us back, after a short circuit, to the old path which we had
+deserted at its call.
+
+I mentioned above that this cosmological argument contains a perfect
+nest of dialectical assumptions, which transcendental criticism does
+not find it difficult to expose and to dissipate. I shall merely
+enumerate these, leaving it to the reader, who must by this time be
+well practised in such matters, to investigate the fallacies residing
+therein.
+
+The following fallacies, for example, are discoverable in this mode of
+proof: 1. The transcendental principle: "Everything that is contingent
+must have a cause"--a principle without significance, except in the
+sensuous world. For the purely intellectual conception of the
+contingent cannot produce any synthetical proposition, like that of
+causality, which is itself without significance or distinguishing
+characteristic except in the phenomenal world. But in the present case
+it is employed to help us beyond the limits of its sphere. 2. "From the
+impossibility of an infinite ascending series of causes in the world of
+sense a first cause is inferred"; a conclusion which the principles of
+the employment of reason do not justify even in the sphere of
+experience, and still less when an attempt is made to pass the limits
+of this sphere. 3. Reason allows itself to be satisfied upon
+insufficient grounds, with regard to the completion of this series. It
+removes all conditions (without which, however, no conception of
+Necessity can take place); and, as after this it is beyond our power to
+form any other conceptions, it accepts this as a completion of the
+conception it wishes to form of the series. 4. The logical possibility
+of a conception of the total of reality (the criterion of this
+possibility being the absence of contradiction) is confounded with the
+transcendental, which requires a principle of the practicability of
+such a synthesis--a principle which again refers us to the world of
+experience. And so on.
+
+The aim of the cosmological argument is to avoid the necessity of
+proving the existence of a necessary being priori from mere
+conceptions--a proof which must be ontological, and of which we feel
+ourselves quite incapable. With this purpose, we reason from an actual
+existence--an experience in general, to an absolutely necessary
+condition of that existence. It is in this case unnecessary to
+demonstrate its possibility. For after having proved that it exists,
+the question regarding its possibility is superfluous. Now, when we
+wish to define more strictly the nature of this necessary being, we do
+not look out for some being the conception of which would enable us to
+comprehend the necessity of its being--for if we could do this, an
+empirical presupposition would be unnecessary; no, we try to discover
+merely the negative condition (conditio sine qua non), without which a
+being would not be absolutely necessary. Now this would be perfectly
+admissible in every sort of reasoning, from a consequence to its
+principle; but in the present case it unfortunately happens that the
+condition of absolute necessity can be discovered in but a single
+being, the conception of which must consequently contain all that is
+requisite for demonstrating the presence of absolute necessity, and
+thus entitle me to infer this absolute necessity à priori. That is, it
+must be possible to reason conversely, and say: The thing, to which the
+conception of the highest reality belongs, is absolutely necessary. But
+if I cannot reason thus--and I cannot, unless I believe in the
+sufficiency of the ontological argument--I find insurmountable obstacles
+in my new path, and am really no farther than the point from which I
+set out. The conception of a Supreme Being satisfies all questions à
+priori regarding the internal determinations of a thing, and is for
+this reason an ideal without equal or parallel, the general conception
+of it indicating it as at the same time an ens individuum among all
+possible things. But the conception does not satisfy the question
+regarding its existence--which was the purpose of all our inquiries;
+and, although the existence of a necessary being were admitted, we
+should find it impossible to answer the question: What of all things in
+the world must be regarded as such?
+
+It is certainly allowable to admit the existence of an all-sufficient
+being--a cause of all possible effects--for the purpose of enabling
+reason to introduce unity into its mode and grounds of explanation with
+regard to phenomena. But to assert that such a being necessarily
+exists, is no longer the modest enunciation of an admissible
+hypothesis, but the boldest declaration of an apodeictic certainty; for
+the cognition of that which is absolutely necessary must itself possess
+that character.
+
+The aim of the transcendental ideal formed by the mind is either to
+discover a conception which shall harmonize with the idea of absolute
+necessity, or a conception which shall contain that idea. If the one is
+possible, so is the other; for reason recognizes that alone as
+absolutely necessary which is necessary from its conception. But both
+attempts are equally beyond our power--we find it impossible to satisfy
+the understanding upon this point, and as impossible to induce it to
+remain at rest in relation to this incapacity.
+
+Unconditioned necessity, which, as the ultimate support and stay of all
+existing things, is an indispensable requirement of the mind, is an
+abyss on the verge of which human reason trembles in dismay. Even the
+idea of eternity, terrible and sublime as it is, as depicted by Haller,
+does not produce upon the mental vision such a feeling of awe and
+terror; for, although it measures the duration of things, it does not
+support them. We cannot bear, nor can we rid ourselves of the thought
+that a being, which we regard as the greatest of all possible
+existences, should say to himself: I am from eternity to eternity;
+beside me there is nothing, except that which exists by my will; whence
+then am I? Here all sinks away from under us; and the greatest, as the
+smallest, perfection, hovers without stay or footing in presence of the
+speculative reason, which finds it as easy to part with the one as with
+the other.
+
+Many physical powers, which evidence their existence by their effects,
+are perfectly inscrutable in their nature; they elude all our powers of
+observation. The transcendental object which forms the basis of
+phenomena, and, in connection with it, the reason why our sensibility
+possesses this rather than that particular kind of conditions, are and
+must ever remain hidden from our mental vision; the fact is there, the
+reason of the fact we cannot see. But an ideal of pure reason cannot be
+termed mysterious or inscrutable, because the only credential of its
+reality is the need of it felt by reason, for the purpose of giving
+completeness to the world of synthetical unity. An ideal is not even
+given as a cogitable object, and therefore cannot be inscrutable; on
+the contrary, it must, as a mere idea, be based on the constitution of
+reason itself, and on this account must be capable of explanation and
+solution. For the very essence of reason consists in its ability to
+give an account, of all our conceptions, opinions, and assertions--upon
+objective, or, when they happen to be illusory and fallacious, upon
+subjective grounds.
+
+Detection and Explanation of the Dialectical Illusion in all
+Transcendental Arguments for the Existence of a Necessary Being.
+
+Both of the above arguments are transcendental; in other words, they do
+not proceed upon empirical principles. For, although the cosmological
+argument professed to lay a basis of experience for its edifice of
+reasoning, it did not ground its procedure upon the peculiar
+constitution of experience, but upon pure principles of reason--in
+relation to an existence given by empirical consciousness; utterly
+abandoning its guidance, however, for the purpose of supporting its
+assertions entirely upon pure conceptions. Now what is the cause, in
+these transcendental arguments, of the dialectical, but natural,
+illusion, which connects the conceptions of necessity and supreme
+reality, and hypostatizes that which cannot be anything but an idea?
+What is the cause of this unavoidable step on the part of reason, of
+admitting that some one among all existing things must be necessary,
+while it falls back from the assertion of the existence of such a being
+as from an abyss? And how does reason proceed to explain this anomaly
+to itself, and from the wavering condition of a timid and reluctant
+approbation--always again withdrawn--arrive at a calm and settled insight
+into its cause?
+
+It is something very remarkable that, on the supposition that something
+exists, I cannot avoid the inference that something exists necessarily.
+Upon this perfectly natural--but not on that account reliable--inference
+does the cosmological argument rest. But, let me form any conception
+whatever of a thing, I find that I cannot cogitate the existence of the
+thing as absolutely necessary, and that nothing prevents me--be the
+thing or being what it may--from cogitating its non-existence. I may
+thus be obliged to admit that all existing things have a necessary
+basis, while I cannot cogitate any single or individual thing as
+necessary. In other words, I can never complete the regress through the
+conditions of existence, without admitting the existence of a necessary
+being; but, on the other hand, I cannot make a commencement from this
+being.
+
+If I must cogitate something as existing necessarily as the basis of
+existing things, and yet am not permitted to cogitate any individual
+thing as in itself necessary, the inevitable inference is that
+necessity and contingency are not properties of things
+themselves--otherwise an internal contradiction would result; that
+consequently neither of these principles are objective, but merely
+subjective principles of reason--the one requiring us to seek for a
+necessary ground for everything that exists, that is, to be satisfied
+with no other explanation than that which is complete à priori, the
+other forbidding us ever to hope for the attainment of this
+completeness, that is, to regard no member of the empirical world as
+unconditioned. In this mode of viewing them, both principles, in their
+purely heuristic and regulative character, and as concerning merely the
+formal interest of reason, are quite consistent with each other. The
+one says: "You must philosophize upon nature," as if there existed a
+necessary primal basis of all existing things, solely for the purpose
+of introducing systematic unity into your knowledge, by pursuing an
+idea of this character--a foundation which is arbitrarily admitted to be
+ultimate; while the other warns you to consider no individual
+determination, concerning the existence of things, as such an ultimate
+foundation, that is, as absolutely necessary, but to keep the way
+always open for further progress in the deduction, and to treat every
+determination as determined by some other. But if all that we perceive
+must be regarded as conditionally necessary, it is impossible that
+anything which is empirically given should be absolutely necessary.
+
+It follows from this that you must accept the absolutely necessary as
+out of and beyond the world, inasmuch as it is useful only as a
+principle of the highest possible unity in experience, and you cannot
+discover any such necessary existence in the would, the second rule
+requiring you to regard all empirical causes of unity as themselves
+deduced.
+
+The philosophers of antiquity regarded all the forms of nature as
+contingent; while matter was considered by them, in accordance with the
+judgement of the common reason of mankind, as primal and necessary. But
+if they had regarded matter, not relatively--as the substratum of
+phenomena, but absolutely and in itself--as an independent existence,
+this idea of absolute necessity would have immediately disappeared. For
+there is nothing absolutely connecting reason with such an existence;
+on the contrary, it can annihilate it in thought, always and without
+self-contradiction. But in thought alone lay the idea of absolute
+necessity. A regulative principle must, therefore, have been at the
+foundation of this opinion. In fact, extension and
+impenetrability--which together constitute our conception of matter--form
+the supreme empirical principle of the unity of phenomena, and this
+principle, in so far as it is empirically unconditioned, possesses the
+property of a regulative principle. But, as every determination of
+matter which constitutes what is real in it--and consequently
+impenetrability--is an effect, which must have a cause, and is for this
+reason always derived, the notion of matter cannot harmonize with the
+idea of a necessary being, in its character of the principle of all
+derived unity. For every one of its real properties, being derived,
+must be only conditionally necessary, and can therefore be annihilated
+in thought; and thus the whole existence of matter can be so
+annihilated or suppressed. If this were not the case, we should have
+found in the world of phenomena the highest ground or condition of
+unity--which is impossible, according to the second regulative
+principle. It follows that matter, and, in general, all that forms part
+of the world of sense, cannot be a necessary primal being, nor even a
+principle of empirical unity, but that this being or principle must
+have its place assigned without the world. And, in this way, we can
+proceed in perfect confidence to deduce the phenomena of the world and
+their existence from other phenomena, just as if there existed no
+necessary being; and we can at the same time, strive without ceasing
+towards the attainment of completeness for our deduction, just as if
+such a being--the supreme condition of all existences--were presupposed
+by the mind.
+
+These remarks will have made it evident to the reader that the ideal of
+the Supreme Being, far from being an enouncement of the existence of a
+being in itself necessary, is nothing more than a regulative principle
+of reason, requiring us to regard all connection existing between
+phenomena as if it had its origin from an all-sufficient necessary
+cause, and basing upon this the rule of a systematic and necessary
+unity in the explanation of phenomena. We cannot, at the same time,
+avoid regarding, by a transcendental subreptio, this formal principle
+as constitutive, and hypostatizing this unity. Precisely similar is the
+case with our notion of space. Space is the primal condition of all
+forms, which are properly just so many different limitations of it; and
+thus, although it is merely a principle of sensibility, we cannot help
+regarding it as an absolutely necessary and self-subsistent thing--as an
+object given à priori in itself. In the same way, it is quite natural
+that, as the systematic unity of nature cannot be established as a
+principle for the empirical employment of reason, unless it is based
+upon the idea of an ens realissimum, as the supreme cause, we should
+regard this idea as a real object, and this object, in its character of
+supreme condition, as absolutely necessary, and that in this way a
+regulative should be transformed into a constitutive principle. This
+interchange becomes evident when I regard this supreme being, which,
+relatively to the world, was absolutely (unconditionally) necessary, as
+a thing per se. In this case, I find it impossible to represent this
+necessity in or by any conception, and it exists merely in my own mind,
+as the formal condition of thought, but not as a material and
+hypostatic condition of existence.
+
+Section VI. Of the Impossibility of a Physico-Theological Proof
+
+If, then, neither a pure conception nor the general experience of an
+existing being can provide a sufficient basis for the proof of the
+existence of the Deity, we can make the attempt by the only other
+mode--that of grounding our argument upon a determinate experience of
+the phenomena of the present world, their constitution and disposition,
+and discover whether we can thus attain to a sound conviction of the
+existence of a Supreme Being. This argument we shall term the
+physico-theological argument. If it is shown to be insufficient,
+speculative reason cannot present us with any satisfactory proof of the
+existence of a being corresponding to our transcendental idea.
+
+It is evident from the remarks that have been made in the preceding
+sections, that an answer to this question will be far from being
+difficult or unconvincing. For how can any experience be adequate with
+an idea? The very essence of an idea consists in the fact that no
+experience can ever be discovered congruent or adequate with it. The
+transcendental idea of a necessary and all-sufficient being is so
+immeasurably great, so high above all that is empirical, which is
+always conditioned, that we hope in vain to find materials in the
+sphere of experience sufficiently ample for our conception, and in vain
+seek the unconditioned among things that are conditioned, while
+examples, nay, even guidance is denied us by the laws of empirical
+synthesis.
+
+If the Supreme Being forms a link in the chain of empirical conditions,
+it must be a member of the empirical series, and, like the lower
+members which it precedes, have its origin in some higher member of the
+series. If, on the other hand, we disengage it from the chain, and
+cogitate it as an intelligible being, apart from the series of natural
+causes--how shall reason bridge the abyss that separates the latter from
+the former? All laws respecting the regress from effects to causes, all
+synthetical additions to our knowledge relate solely to possible
+experience and the objects of the sensuous world, and, apart from them,
+are without significance.
+
+The world around us opens before our view so magnificent a spectacle of
+order, variety, beauty, and conformity to ends, that whether we pursue
+our observations into the infinity of space in the one direction, or
+into its illimitable divisions in the other, whether we regard the
+world in its greatest or its least manifestations--even after we have
+attained to the highest summit of knowledge which our weak minds can
+reach, we find that language in the presence of wonders so
+inconceivable has lost its force, and number its power to reckon, nay,
+even thought fails to conceive adequately, and our conception of the
+whole dissolves into an astonishment without power of expression--all
+the more eloquent that it is dumb. Everywhere around us we observe a
+chain of causes and effects, of means and ends, of death and birth;
+and, as nothing has entered of itself into the condition in which we
+find it, we are constantly referred to some other thing, which itself
+suggests the same inquiry regarding its cause, and thus the universe
+must sink into the abyss of nothingness, unless we admit that, besides
+this infinite chain of contingencies, there exists something that is
+primal and self-subsistent--something which, as the cause of this
+phenomenal world, secures its continuance and preservation.
+
+This highest cause--what magnitude shall we attribute to it? Of the
+content of the world we are ignorant; still less can we estimate its
+magnitude by comparison with the sphere of the possible. But this
+supreme cause being a necessity of the human mind, what is there to
+prevent us from attributing to it such a degree of perfection as to
+place it above the sphere of all that is possible? This we can easily
+do, although only by the aid of the faint outline of an abstract
+conception, by representing this being to ourselves as containing in
+itself, as an individual substance, all possible perfection--a
+conception which satisfies that requirement of reason which demands
+parsimony in principles, which is free from self-contradiction, which
+even contributes to the extension of the employment of reason in
+experience, by means of the guidance afforded by this idea to order and
+system, and which in no respect conflicts with any law of experience.
+
+This argument always deserves to be mentioned with respect. It is the
+oldest, the clearest, and that most in conformity with the common
+reason of humanity. It animates the study of nature, as it itself
+derives its existence and draws ever new strength from that source. It
+introduces aims and ends into a sphere in which our observation could
+not of itself have discovered them, and extends our knowledge of
+nature, by directing our attention to a unity, the principle of which
+lies beyond nature. This knowledge of nature again reacts upon this
+idea--its cause; and thus our belief in a divine author of the universe
+rises to the power of an irresistible conviction.
+
+For these reasons it would be utterly hopeless to attempt to rob this
+argument of the authority it has always enjoyed. The mind, unceasingly
+elevated by these considerations, which, although empirical, are so
+remarkably powerful, and continually adding to their force, will not
+suffer itself to be depressed by the doubts suggested by subtle
+speculation; it tears itself out of this state of uncertainty, the
+moment it casts a look upon the wondrous forms of nature and the
+majesty of the universe, and rises from height to height, from
+condition to condition, till it has elevated itself to the supreme and
+unconditioned author of all.
+
+But although we have nothing to object to the reasonableness and
+utility of this procedure, but have rather to commend and encourage it,
+we cannot approve of the claims which this argument advances to
+demonstrative certainty and to a reception upon its own merits, apart
+from favour or support by other arguments. Nor can it injure the cause
+of morality to endeavour to lower the tone of the arrogant sophist, and
+to teach him that modesty and moderation which are the properties of a
+belief that brings calm and content into the mind, without prescribing
+to it an unworthy subjection. I maintain, then, that the
+physico-theological argument is insufficient of itself to prove the
+existence of a Supreme Being, that it must entrust this to the
+ontological argument--to which it serves merely as an introduction, and
+that, consequently, this argument contains the only possible ground of
+proof (possessed by speculative reason) for the existence of this
+being.
+
+The chief momenta in the physico-theological argument are as follow: 1.
+We observe in the world manifest signs of an arrangement full of
+purpose, executed with great wisdom, and argument in whole of a content
+indescribably various, and of an extent without limits. 2. This
+arrangement of means and ends is entirely foreign to the things
+existing in the world--it belongs to them merely as a contingent
+attribute; in other words, the nature of different things could not of
+itself, whatever means were employed, harmoniously tend towards certain
+purposes, were they not chosen and directed for these purposes by a
+rational and disposing principle, in accordance with certain
+fundamental ideas. 3. There exists, therefore, a sublime and wise cause
+(or several), which is not merely a blind, all-powerful nature,
+producing the beings and events which fill the world in unconscious
+fecundity, but a free and intelligent cause of the world. 4. The unity
+of this cause may be inferred from the unity of the reciprocal relation
+existing between the parts of the world, as portions of an artistic
+edifice--an inference which all our observation favours, and all
+principles of analogy support.
+
+In the above argument, it is inferred from the analogy of certain
+products of nature with those of human art, when it compels Nature to
+bend herself to its purposes, as in the case of a house, a ship, or a
+watch, that the same kind of causality--namely, understanding and
+will--resides in nature. It is also declared that the internal
+possibility of this freely-acting nature (which is the source of all
+art, and perhaps also of human reason) is derivable from another and
+superhuman art--a conclusion which would perhaps be found incapable of
+standing the test of subtle transcendental criticism. But to neither of
+these opinions shall we at present object. We shall only remark that it
+must be confessed that, if we are to discuss the subject of cause at
+all, we cannot proceed more securely than with the guidance of the
+analogy subsisting between nature and such products of design--these
+being the only products whose causes and modes of organization are
+completely known to us. Reason would be unable to satisfy her own
+requirements, if she passed from a causality which she does know, to
+obscure and indemonstrable principles of explanation which she does not
+know.
+
+According to the physico-theological argument, the connection and
+harmony existing in the world evidence the contingency of the form
+merely, but not of the matter, that is, of the substance of the world.
+To establish the truth of the latter opinion, it would be necessary to
+prove that all things would be in themselves incapable of this harmony
+and order, unless they were, even as regards their substance, the
+product of a supreme wisdom. But this would require very different
+grounds of proof from those presented by the analogy with human art.
+This proof can at most, therefore, demonstrate the existence of an
+architect of the world, whose efforts are limited by the capabilities
+of the material with which he works, but not of a creator of the world,
+to whom all things are subject. Thus this argument is utterly
+insufficient for the task before us--a demonstration of the existence of
+an all-sufficient being. If we wish to prove the contingency of matter,
+we must have recourse to a transcendental argument, which the
+physico-theological was constructed expressly to avoid.
+
+We infer, from the order and design visible in the universe, as a
+disposition of a thoroughly contingent character, the existence of a
+cause proportionate thereto. The conception of this cause must contain
+certain determinate qualities, and it must therefore be regarded as the
+conception of a being which possesses all power, wisdom, and so on, in
+one word, all perfection--the conception, that is, of an all-sufficient
+being. For the predicates of very great, astonishing, or immeasurable
+power and excellence, give us no determinate conception of the thing,
+nor do they inform us what the thing may be in itself. They merely
+indicate the relation existing between the magnitude of the object and
+the observer, who compares it with himself and with his own power of
+comprehension, and are mere expressions of praise and reverence, by
+which the object is either magnified, or the observing subject
+depreciated in relation to the object. Where we have to do with the
+magnitude (of the perfection) of a thing, we can discover no
+determinate conception, except that which comprehends all possible
+perfection or completeness, and it is only the total (omnitudo) of
+reality which is completely determined in and through its conception
+alone.
+
+Now it cannot be expected that any one will be bold enough to declare
+that he has a perfect insight into the relation which the magnitude of
+the world he contemplates bears (in its extent as well as in its
+content) to omnipotence, into that of the order and design in the world
+to the highest wisdom, and that of the unity of the world to the
+absolute unity of a Supreme Being. Physico-theology is therefore
+incapable of presenting a determinate conception of a supreme cause of
+the world, and is therefore insufficient as a principle of theology--a
+theology which is itself to be the basis of religion.
+
+The attainment of absolute totality is completely impossible on the
+path of empiricism. And yet this is the path pursued in the
+physico-theological argument. What means shall we employ to bridge the
+abyss?
+
+After elevating ourselves to admiration of the magnitude of the power,
+wisdom, and other attributes of the author of the world, and finding we
+can advance no further, we leave the argument on empirical grounds, and
+proceed to infer the contingency of the world from the order and
+conformity to aims that are observable in it. From this contingency we
+infer, by the help of transcendental conceptions alone, the existence
+of something absolutely necessary; and, still advancing, proceed from
+the conception of the absolute necessity of the first cause to the
+completely determined or determining conception thereof--the conception
+of an all-embracing reality. Thus the physico-theological, failing in
+its undertaking, recurs in its embarrassment to the cosmological
+argument; and, as this is merely the ontological argument in disguise,
+it executes its design solely by the aid of pure reason, although it at
+first professed to have no connection with this faculty and to base its
+entire procedure upon experience alone.
+
+The physico-theologians have therefore no reason to regard with such
+contempt the transcendental mode of argument, and to look down upon it,
+with the conceit of clear-sighted observers of nature, as the
+brain-cobweb of obscure speculatists. For, if they reflect upon and
+examine their own arguments, they will find that, after following for
+some time the path of nature and experience, and discovering themselves
+no nearer their object, they suddenly leave this path and pass into the
+region of pure possibility, where they hope to reach upon the wings of
+ideas what had eluded all their empirical investigations. Gaining, as
+they think, a firm footing after this immense leap, they extend their
+determinate conception--into the possession of which they have come,
+they know not how--over the whole sphere of creation, and explain their
+ideal, which is entirely a product of pure reason, by illustrations
+drawn from experience--though in a degree miserably unworthy of the
+grandeur of the object, while they refuse to acknowledge that they have
+arrived at this cognition or hypothesis by a very different road from
+that of experience.
+
+Thus the physico-theological is based upon the cosmological, and this
+upon the ontological proof of the existence of a Supreme Being; and as
+besides these three there is no other path open to speculative reason,
+the ontological proof, on the ground of pure conceptions of reason, is
+the only possible one, if any proof of a proposition so far
+transcending the empirical exercise of the understanding is possible at
+all.
+
+Section VII. Critique of all Theology based upon Speculative Principles
+of Reason
+
+If by the term theology I understand the cognition of a primal being,
+that cognition is based either upon reason alone (theologia rationalis)
+or upon revelation (theologia revelata). The former cogitates its
+object either by means of pure transcendental conceptions, as an ens
+originarium, realissimum, ens entium, and is termed transcendental
+theology; or, by means of a conception derived from the nature of our
+own mind, as a supreme intelligence, and must then be entitled natural
+theology. The person who believes in a transcendental theology alone,
+is termed a deist; he who acknowledges the possibility of a natural
+theology also, a theist. The former admits that we can cognize by pure
+reason alone the existence of a Supreme Being, but at the same time
+maintains that our conception of this being is purely transcendental,
+and that all we can say of it is that it possesses all reality, without
+being able to define it more closely. The second asserts that reason is
+capable of presenting us, from the analogy with nature, with a more
+definite conception of this being, and that its operations, as the
+cause of all things, are the results of intelligence and free will. The
+former regards the Supreme Being as the cause of the world--whether by
+the necessity of his nature, or as a free agent, is left undetermined;
+the latter considers this being as the author of the world.
+
+Transcendental theology aims either at inferring the existence of a
+Supreme Being from a general experience, without any closer reference
+to the world to which this experience belongs, and in this case it is
+called cosmotheology; or it endeavours to cognize the existence of such
+a being, through mere conceptions, without the aid of experience, and
+is then termed ontotheology.
+
+Natural theology infers the attributes and the existence of an author
+of the world, from the constitution of, the order and unity observable
+in, the world, in which two modes of causality must be admitted to
+exist--those of nature and freedom. Thus it rises from this world to a
+supreme intelligence, either as the principle of all natural, or of all
+moral order and perfection. In the former case it is termed
+physico-theology, in the latter, ethical or moral-theology.[69]
+
+ [69] Not theological ethics; for this science contains ethical laws,
+ which presuppose the existence of a Supreme Governor of the world;
+ while moral-theology, on the contrary, is the expression of a
+ conviction of the existence of a Supreme Being, founded upon ethical
+ laws.
+
+As we are wont to understand by the term God not merely an eternal
+nature, the operations of which are insensate and blind, but a Supreme
+Being, who is the free and intelligent author of all things, and as it
+is this latter view alone that can be of interest to humanity, we
+might, in strict rigour, deny to the deist any belief in God at all,
+and regard him merely as a maintainer of the existence of a primal
+being or thing--the supreme cause of all other things. But, as no one
+ought to be blamed, merely because he does not feel himself justified
+in maintaining a certain opinion, as if he altogether denied its truth
+and asserted the opposite, it is more correct--as it is less harsh--to
+say, the deist believes in a God, the theist in a living God (summa
+intelligentia). We shall now proceed to investigate the sources of all
+these attempts of reason to establish the existence of a Supreme Being.
+
+It may be sufficient in this place to define theoretical knowledge or
+cognition as knowledge of that which is, and practical knowledge as
+knowledge of that which ought to be. In this view, the theoretical
+employment of reason is that by which I cognize à priori (as necessary)
+that something is, while the practical is that by which I cognize à
+priori what ought to happen. Now, if it is an indubitably certain,
+though at the same time an entirely conditioned truth, that something
+is, or ought to happen, either a certain determinate condition of this
+truth is absolutely necessary, or such a condition may be arbitrarily
+presupposed. In the former case the condition is postulated (per
+thesin), in the latter supposed (per hypothesin). There are certain
+practical laws--those of morality--which are absolutely necessary. Now,
+if these laws necessarily presuppose the existence of some being, as
+the condition of the possibility of their obligatory power, this being
+must be postulated, because the conditioned, from which we reason to
+this determinate condition, is itself cognized à priori as absolutely
+necessary. We shall at some future time show that the moral laws not
+merely presuppose the existence of a Supreme Being, but also, as
+themselves absolutely necessary in a different relation, demand or
+postulate it--although only from a practical point of view. The
+discussion of this argument we postpone for the present.
+
+When the question relates merely to that which is, not to that which
+ought to be, the conditioned which is presented in experience is always
+cogitated as contingent. For this reason its condition cannot be
+regarded as absolutely necessary, but merely as relatively necessary,
+or rather as needful; the condition is in itself and à priori a mere
+arbitrary presupposition in aid of the cognition, by reason, of the
+conditioned. If, then, we are to possess a theoretical cognition of the
+absolute necessity of a thing, we cannot attain to this cognition
+otherwise than à priori by means of conceptions; while it is impossible
+in this way to cognize the existence of a cause which bears any
+relation to an existence given in experience.
+
+Theoretical cognition is speculative when it relates to an object or
+certain conceptions of an object which is not given and cannot be
+discovered by means of experience. It is opposed to the cognition of
+nature, which concerns only those objects or predicates which can be
+presented in a possible experience.
+
+The principle that everything which happens (the empirically
+contingent) must have a cause, is a principle of the cognition of
+nature, but not of speculative cognition. For, if we change it into an
+abstract principle, and deprive it of its reference to experience and
+the empirical, we shall find that it cannot with justice be regarded
+any longer as a synthetical proposition, and that it is impossible to
+discover any mode of transition from that which exists to something
+entirely different--termed cause. Nay, more, the conception of a cause
+likewise that of the contingent--loses, in this speculative mode of
+employing it, all significance, for its objective reality and meaning
+are comprehensible from experience alone.
+
+When from the existence of the universe and the things in it the
+existence of a cause of the universe is inferred, reason is proceeding
+not in the natural, but in the speculative method. For the principle of
+the former enounces, not that things themselves or substances, but only
+that which happens or their states--as empirically contingent, have a
+cause: the assertion that the existence of substance itself is
+contingent is not justified by experience, it is the assertion of a
+reason employing its principles in a speculative manner. If, again, I
+infer from the form of the universe, from the way in which all things
+are connected and act and react upon each other, the existence of a
+cause entirely distinct from the universe--this would again be a
+judgement of purely speculative reason; because the object in this
+case--the cause--can never be an object of possible experience. In both
+these cases the principle of causality, which is valid only in the
+field of experience--useless and even meaningless beyond this region,
+would be diverted from its proper destination.
+
+Now I maintain that all attempts of reason to establish a theology by
+the aid of speculation alone are fruitless, that the principles of
+reason as applied to nature do not conduct us to any theological
+truths, and, consequently, that a rational theology can have no
+existence, unless it is founded upon the laws of morality. For all
+synthetical principles of the understanding are valid only as immanent
+in experience; while the cognition of a Supreme Being necessitates
+their being employed transcendentally, and of this the understanding is
+quite incapable. If the empirical law of causality is to conduct us to
+a Supreme Being, this being must belong to the chain of empirical
+objects--in which case it would be, like all phenomena, itself
+conditioned. If the possibility of passing the limits of experience be
+admitted, by means of the dynamical law of the relation of an effect to
+its cause, what kind of conception shall we obtain by this procedure?
+Certainly not the conception of a Supreme Being, because experience
+never presents us with the greatest of all possible effects, and it is
+only an effect of this character that could witness to the existence of
+a corresponding cause. If, for the purpose of fully satisfying the
+requirements of Reason, we recognize her right to assert the existence
+of a perfect and absolutely necessary being, this can be admitted only
+from favour, and cannot be regarded as the result of irresistible
+demonstration. The physico-theological proof may add weight to
+others--if other proofs there are--by connecting speculation with
+experience; but in itself it rather prepares the mind for theological
+cognition, and gives it a right and natural direction, than establishes
+a sure foundation for theology.
+
+It is now perfectly evident that transcendental questions admit only of
+transcendental answers--those presented à priori by pure conceptions
+without the least empirical admixture. But the question in the present
+case is evidently synthetical--it aims at the extension of our cognition
+beyond the bounds of experience--it requires an assurance respecting the
+existence of a being corresponding with the idea in our minds, to which
+no experience can ever be adequate. Now it has been abundantly proved
+that all à priori synthetical cognition is possible only as the
+expression of the formal conditions of a possible experience; and that
+the validity of all principles depends upon their immanence in the
+field of experience, that is, their relation to objects of empirical
+cognition or phenomena. Thus all transcendental procedure in reference
+to speculative theology is without result.
+
+If any one prefers doubting the conclusiveness of the proofs of our
+analytic to losing the persuasion of the validity of these old and time
+honoured arguments, he at least cannot decline answering the
+question--how he can pass the limits of all possible experience by the
+help of mere ideas. If he talks of new arguments, or of improvements
+upon old arguments, I request him to spare me. There is certainly no
+great choice in this sphere of discussion, as all speculative arguments
+must at last look for support to the ontological, and I have,
+therefore, very little to fear from the argumentative fecundity of the
+dogmatical defenders of a non-sensuous reason. Without looking upon
+myself as a remarkably combative person, I shall not decline the
+challenge to detect the fallacy and destroy the pretensions of every
+attempt of speculative theology. And yet the hope of better fortune
+never deserts those who are accustomed to the dogmatical mode of
+procedure. I shall, therefore, restrict myself to the simple and
+equitable demand that such reasoners will demonstrate, from the nature
+of the human mind as well as from that of the other sources of
+knowledge, how we are to proceed to extend our cognition completely à
+priori, and to carry it to that point where experience abandons us, and
+no means exist of guaranteeing the objective reality of our
+conceptions. In whatever way the understanding may have attained to a
+conception, the existence of the object of the conception cannot be
+discovered in it by analysis, because the cognition of the existence of
+the object depends upon the object's being posited and given in itself
+apart from the conception. But it is utterly impossible to go beyond
+our conception, without the aid of experience--which presents to the
+mind nothing but phenomena, or to attain by the help of mere
+conceptions to a conviction of the existence of new kinds of objects or
+supernatural beings.
+
+But although pure speculative reason is far from sufficient to
+demonstrate the existence of a Supreme Being, it is of the highest
+utility in correcting our conception of this being--on the supposition
+that we can attain to the cognition of it by some other means--in making
+it consistent with itself and with all other conceptions of
+intelligible objects, clearing it from all that is incompatible with
+the conception of an ens summun, and eliminating from it all
+limitations or admixtures of empirical elements.
+
+Transcendental theology is still therefore, notwithstanding its
+objective insufficiency, of importance in a negative respect; it is
+useful as a test of the procedure of reason when engaged with pure
+ideas, no other than a transcendental standard being in this case
+admissible. For if, from a practical point of view, the hypothesis of a
+Supreme and All-sufficient Being is to maintain its validity without
+opposition, it must be of the highest importance to define this
+conception in a correct and rigorous manner--as the transcendental
+conception of a necessary being, to eliminate all phenomenal elements
+(anthropomorphism in its most extended signification), and at the same
+time to overflow all contradictory assertions--be they atheistic,
+deistic, or anthropomorphic. This is of course very easy; as the same
+arguments which demonstrated the inability of human reason to affirm
+the existence of a Supreme Being must be alike sufficient to prove the
+invalidity of its denial. For it is impossible to gain from the pure
+speculation of reason demonstration that there exists no Supreme Being,
+as the ground of all that exists, or that this being possesses none of
+those properties which we regard as analogical with the dynamical
+qualities of a thinking being, or that, as the anthropomorphists would
+have us believe, it is subject to all the limitations which sensibility
+imposes upon those intelligences which exist in the world of
+experience.
+
+A Supreme Being is, therefore, for the speculative reason, a mere
+ideal, though a faultless one--a conception which perfects and crowns
+the system of human cognition, but the objective reality of which can
+neither be proved nor disproved by pure reason. If this defect is ever
+supplied by a moral theology, the problematic transcendental theology
+which has preceded, will have been at least serviceable as
+demonstrating the mental necessity existing for the conception, by the
+complete determination of it which it has furnished, and the ceaseless
+testing of the conclusions of a reason often deceived by sense, and not
+always in harmony with its own ideas. The attributes of necessity,
+infinitude, unity, existence apart from the world (and not as a world
+soul), eternity (free from conditions of time), omnipresence (free from
+conditions of space), omnipotence, and others, are pure transcendental
+predicates; and thus the accurate conception of a Supreme Being, which
+every theology requires, is furnished by transcendental theology alone.
+
+APPENDIX. Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason
+
+The result of all the dialectical attempts of pure reason not only
+confirms the truth of what we have already proved in our Transcendental
+Analytic, namely, that all inferences which would lead us beyond the
+limits of experience are fallacious and groundless, but it at the same
+time teaches us this important lesson, that human reason has a natural
+inclination to overstep these limits, and that transcendental ideas are
+as much the natural property of the reason as categories are of the
+understanding. There exists this difference, however, that while the
+categories never mislead us, outward objects being always in perfect
+harmony therewith, ideas are the parents of irresistible illusions, the
+severest and most subtle criticism being required to save us from the
+fallacies which they induce.
+
+Whatever is grounded in the nature of our powers will be found to be in
+harmony with the final purpose and proper employment of these powers,
+when once we have discovered their true direction and aim. We are
+entitled to suppose, therefore, that there exists a mode of employing
+transcendental ideas which is proper and immanent; although, when we
+mistake their meaning, and regard them as conceptions of actual things,
+their mode of application is transcendent and delusive. For it is not
+the idea itself, but only the employment of the idea in relation to
+possible experience, that is transcendent or immanent. An idea is
+employed transcendently, when it is applied to an object falsely
+believed to be adequate with and to correspond to it; immanently, when
+it is applied solely to the employment of the understanding in the
+sphere of experience. Thus all errors of subreptio--of misapplication,
+are to be ascribed to defects of judgement, and not to understanding or
+reason.
+
+Reason never has an immediate relation to an object; it relates
+immediately to the understanding alone. It is only through the
+understanding that it can be employed in the field of experience. It
+does not form conceptions of objects, it merely arranges them and gives
+to them that unity which they are capable of possessing when the sphere
+of their application has been extended as widely as possible. Reason
+avails itself of the conception of the understanding for the sole
+purpose of producing totality in the different series. This totality
+the understanding does not concern itself with; its only occupation is
+the connection of experiences, by which series of conditions in
+accordance with conceptions are established. The object of reason is,
+therefore, the understanding and its proper destination. As the latter
+brings unity into the diversity of objects by means of its conceptions,
+so the former brings unity into the diversity of conceptions by means
+of ideas; as it sets the final aim of a collective unity to the
+operations of the understanding, which without this occupies itself
+with a distributive unity alone.
+
+I accordingly maintain that transcendental ideas can never be employed
+as constitutive ideas, that they cannot be conceptions of objects, and
+that, when thus considered, they assume a fallacious and dialectical
+character. But, on the other hand, they are capable of an admirable and
+indispensably necessary application to objects--as regulative ideas,
+directing the understanding to a certain aim, the guiding lines towards
+which all its laws follow, and in which they all meet in one point.
+This point--though a mere idea (focus imaginarius), that is, not a point
+from which the conceptions of the understanding do really proceed, for
+it lies beyond the sphere of possible experience--serves,
+notwithstanding, to give to these conceptions the greatest possible
+unity combined with the greatest possible extension. Hence arises the
+natural illusion which induces us to believe that these lines proceed
+from an object which lies out of the sphere of empirical cognition,
+just as objects reflected in a mirror appear to be behind it. But this
+illusion--which we may hinder from imposing upon us--is necessary and
+unavoidable, if we desire to see, not only those objects which lie
+before us, but those which are at a great distance behind us; that is
+to say, when, in the present case, we direct the aims of the
+understanding, beyond every given experience, towards an extension as
+great as can possibly be attained.
+
+If we review our cognitions in their entire extent, we shall find that
+the peculiar business of reason is to arrange them into a system, that
+is to say, to give them connection according to a principle. This unity
+presupposes an idea--the idea of the form of a whole (of cognition),
+preceding the determinate cognition of the parts, and containing the
+conditions which determine à priori to every part its place and
+relation to the other parts of the whole system. This idea,
+accordingly, demands complete unity in the cognition of the
+understanding--not the unity of a contingent aggregate, but that of a
+system connected according to necessary laws. It cannot be affirmed
+with propriety that this idea is a conception of an object; it is
+merely a conception of the complete unity of the conceptions of
+objects, in so far as this unity is available to the understanding as a
+rule. Such conceptions of reason are not derived from nature; on the
+contrary, we employ them for the interrogation and investigation of
+nature, and regard our cognition as defective so long as it is not
+adequate to them. We admit that such a thing as pure earth, pure water,
+or pure air, is not to be discovered. And yet we require these
+conceptions (which have their origin in the reason, so far as regards
+their absolute purity and completeness) for the purpose of determining
+the share which each of these natural causes has in every phenomenon.
+Thus the different kinds of matter are all referred to earths, as mere
+weight; to salts and inflammable bodies, as pure force; and finally, to
+water and air, as the vehicula of the former, or the machines employed
+by them in their operations--for the purpose of explaining the chemical
+action and reaction of bodies in accordance with the idea of a
+mechanism. For, although not actually so expressed, the influence of
+such ideas of reason is very observable in the procedure of natural
+philosophers.
+
+If reason is the faculty of deducing the particular from the general,
+and if the general be certain in se and given, it is only necessary
+that the judgement should subsume the particular under the general, the
+particular being thus necessarily determined. I shall term this the
+demonstrative or apodeictic employment of reason. If, however, the
+general is admitted as problematical only, and is a mere idea, the
+particular case is certain, but the universality of the rule which
+applies to this particular case remains a problem. Several particular
+cases, the certainty of which is beyond doubt, are then taken and
+examined, for the purpose of discovering whether the rule is applicable
+to them; and if it appears that all the particular cases which can be
+collected follow from the rule, its universality is inferred, and at
+the same time, all the causes which have not, or cannot be presented to
+our observation, are concluded to be of the same character with those
+which we have observed. This I shall term the hypothetical employment
+of the reason.
+
+The hypothetical exercise of reason by the aid of ideas employed as
+problematical conceptions is properly not constitutive. That is to say,
+if we consider the subject strictly, the truth of the rule, which has
+been employed as an hypothesis, does not follow from the use that is
+made of it by reason. For how can we know all the possible cases that
+may arise? some of which may, however, prove exceptions to the
+universality of the rule. This employment of reason is merely
+regulative, and its sole aim is the introduction of unity into the
+aggregate of our particular cognitions, and thereby the approximating
+of the rule to universality.
+
+The object of the hypothetical employment of reason is therefore the
+systematic unity of cognitions; and this unity is the criterion of the
+truth of a rule. On the other hand, this systematic unity--as a mere
+idea--is in fact merely a unity projected, not to be regarded as given,
+but only in the light of a problem--a problem which serves, however, as
+a principle for the various and particular exercise of the
+understanding in experience, directs it with regard to those cases
+which are not presented to our observation, and introduces harmony and
+consistency into all its operations.
+
+All that we can be certain of from the above considerations is that
+this systematic unity is a logical principle, whose aim is to assist
+the understanding, where it cannot of itself attain to rules, by means
+of ideas, to bring all these various rules under one principle, and
+thus to ensure the most complete consistency and connection that can be
+attained. But the assertion that objects and the understanding by which
+they are cognized are so constituted as to be determined to systematic
+unity, that this may be postulated à priori, without any reference to
+the interest of reason, and that we are justified in declaring all
+possible cognitions--empirical and others--to possess systematic unity,
+and to be subject to general principles from which, notwithstanding
+their various character, they are all derivable,--such an assertion can
+be founded only upon a transcendental principle of reason, which would
+render this systematic unity not subjectively and logically--in its
+character of a method, but objectively necessary.
+
+We shall illustrate this by an example. The conceptions of the
+understanding make us acquainted, among many other kinds of unity, with
+that of the causality of a substance, which is termed power. The
+different phenomenal manifestations of the same substance appear at
+first view to be so very dissimilar that we are inclined to assume the
+existence of just as many different powers as there are different
+effects--as, in the case of the human mind, we have feeling,
+consciousness, imagination, memory, wit, analysis, pleasure, desire and
+so on. Now we are required by a logical maxim to reduce these
+differences to as small a number as possible, by comparing them and
+discovering the hidden identity which exists. We must inquire, for
+example, whether or not imagination (connected with consciousness),
+memory, wit, and analysis are not merely different forms of
+understanding and reason. The idea of a fundamental power, the
+existence of which no effort of logic can assure us of, is the problem
+to be solved, for the systematic representation of the existing variety
+of powers. The logical principle of reason requires us to produce as
+great a unity as is possible in the system of our cognitions; and the
+more the phenomena of this and the other power are found to be
+identical, the more probable does it become, that they are nothing but
+different manifestations of one and the same power, which may be
+called, relatively speaking, a fundamental power. And so with other
+cases.
+
+These relatively fundamental powers must again be compared with each
+other, to discover, if possible, the one radical and absolutely
+fundamental power of which they are but the manifestations. But this
+unity is purely hypothetical. It is not maintained, that this unity
+does really exist, but that we must, in the interest of reason, that
+is, for the establishment of principles for the various rules presented
+by experience, try to discover and introduce it, so far as is
+practicable, into the sphere of our cognitions.
+
+But the transcendental employment of the understanding would lead us to
+believe that this idea of a fundamental power is not problematical, but
+that it possesses objective reality, and thus the systematic unity of
+the various powers or forces in a substance is demanded by the
+understanding and erected into an apodeictic or necessary principle.
+For, without having attempted to discover the unity of the various
+powers existing in nature, nay, even after all our attempts have
+failed, we notwithstanding presuppose that it does exist, and may be,
+sooner or later, discovered. And this reason does, not only, as in the
+case above adduced, with regard to the unity of substance, but where
+many substances, although all to a certain extent homogeneous, are
+discoverable, as in the case of matter in general. Here also does
+reason presuppose the existence of the systematic unity of various
+powers--inasmuch as particular laws of nature are subordinate to general
+laws; and parsimony in principles is not merely an economical principle
+of reason, but an essential law of nature.
+
+We cannot understand, in fact, how a logical principle of unity can of
+right exist, unless we presuppose a transcendental principle, by which
+such a systematic unit--as a property of objects themselves--is regarded
+as necessary à priori. For with what right can reason, in its logical
+exercise, require us to regard the variety of forces which nature
+displays, as in effect a disguised unity, and to deduce them from one
+fundamental force or power, when she is free to admit that it is just
+as possible that all forces should be different in kind, and that a
+systematic unity is not conformable to the design of nature? In this
+view of the case, reason would be proceeding in direct opposition to
+her own destination, by setting as an aim an idea which entirely
+conflicts with the procedure and arrangement of nature. Neither can we
+assert that reason has previously inferred this unity from the
+contingent nature of phenomena. For the law of reason which requires us
+to seek for this unity is a necessary law, inasmuch as without it we
+should not possess a faculty of reason, nor without reason a consistent
+and self-accordant mode of employing the understanding, nor, in the
+absence of this, any proper and sufficient criterion of empirical
+truth. In relation to this criterion, therefore, we must suppose the
+idea of the systematic unity of nature to possess objective validity
+and necessity.
+
+We find this transcendental presupposition lurking in different forms
+in the principles of philosophers, although they have neither
+recognized it nor confessed to themselves its presence. That the
+diversities of individual things do not exclude identity of species,
+that the various species must be considered as merely different
+determinations of a few genera, and these again as divisions of still
+higher races, and so on--that, accordingly, a certain systematic unity
+of all possible empirical conceptions, in so far as they can be deduced
+from higher and more general conceptions, must be sought for, is a
+scholastic maxim or logical principle, without which reason could not
+be employed by us. For we can infer the particular from the general,
+only in so far as general properties of things constitute the
+foundation upon which the particular rest.
+
+That the same unity exists in nature is presupposed by philosophers in
+the well-known scholastic maxim, which forbids us unnecessarily to
+augment the number of entities or principles (entia praeter
+necessitatem non esse multiplicanda). This maxim asserts that nature
+herself assists in the establishment of this unity of reason, and that
+the seemingly infinite diversity of phenomena should not deter us from
+the expectation of discovering beneath this diversity a unity of
+fundamental properties, of which the aforesaid variety is but a more or
+less determined form. This unity, although a mere idea, thinkers have
+found it necessary rather to moderate the desire than to encourage it.
+It was considered a great step when chemists were able to reduce all
+salts to two main genera--acids and alkalis; and they regard this
+difference as itself a mere variety, or different manifestation of one
+and the same fundamental material. The different kinds of earths
+(stones and even metals) chemists have endeavoured to reduce to three,
+and afterwards to two; but still, not content with this advance, they
+cannot but think that behind these diversities there lurks but one
+genus--nay, that even salts and earths have a common principle. It might
+be conjectured that this is merely an economical plan of reason, for
+the purpose of sparing itself trouble, and an attempt of a purely
+hypothetical character, which, when successful, gives an appearance of
+probability to the principle of explanation employed by the reason. But
+a selfish purpose of this kind is easily to be distinguished from the
+idea, according to which every one presupposes that this unity is in
+accordance with the laws of nature, and that reason does not in this
+case request, but requires, although we are quite unable to determine
+the proper limits of this unity.
+
+If the diversity existing in phenomena--a diversity not of form (for in
+this they may be similar) but of content--were so great that the
+subtlest human reason could never by comparison discover in them the
+least similarity (which is not impossible), in this case the logical
+law of genera would be without foundation, the conception of a genus,
+nay, all general conceptions would be impossible, and the faculty of
+the understanding, the exercise of which is restricted to the world of
+conceptions, could not exist. The logical principle of genera,
+accordingly, if it is to be applied to nature (by which I mean objects
+presented to our senses), presupposes a transcendental principle. In
+accordance with this principle, homogeneity is necessarily presupposed
+in the variety of phenomena (although we are unable to determine à
+priori the degree of this homogeneity), because without it no empirical
+conceptions, and consequently no experience, would be possible.
+
+The logical principle of genera, which demands identity in phenomena,
+is balanced by another principle--that of species, which requires
+variety and diversity in things, notwithstanding their accordance in
+the same genus, and directs the understanding to attend to the one no
+less than to the other. This principle (of the faculty of distinction)
+acts as a check upon the reason and reason exhibits in this respect a
+double and conflicting interest--on the one hand, the interest in the
+extent (the interest of generality) in relation to genera; on the
+other, that of the content (the interest of individuality) in relation
+to the variety of species. In the former case, the understanding
+cogitates more under its conceptions, in the latter it cogitates more
+in them. This distinction manifests itself likewise in the habits of
+thought peculiar to natural philosophers, some of whom--the remarkably
+speculative heads--may be said to be hostile to heterogeneity in
+phenomena, and have their eyes always fixed on the unity of genera,
+while others--with a strong empirical tendency--aim unceasingly at the
+analysis of phenomena, and almost destroy in us the hope of ever being
+able to estimate the character of these according to general
+principles.
+
+The latter mode of thought is evidently based upon a logical principle,
+the aim of which is the systematic completeness of all cognitions. This
+principle authorizes me, beginning at the genus, to descend to the
+various and diverse contained under it; and in this way extension, as
+in the former case unity, is assured to the system. For if we merely
+examine the sphere of the conception which indicates a genus, we cannot
+discover how far it is possible to proceed in the division of that
+sphere; just as it is impossible, from the consideration of the space
+occupied by matter, to determine how far we can proceed in the division
+of it. Hence every genus must contain different species, and these
+again different subspecies; and as each of the latter must itself
+contain a sphere (must be of a certain extent, as a conceptus
+communis), reason demands that no species or sub-species is to be
+considered as the lowest possible. For a species or sub-species, being
+always a conception, which contains only what is common to a number of
+different things, does not completely determine any individual thing,
+or relate immediately to it, and must consequently contain other
+conceptions, that is, other sub-species under it. This law of
+specification may be thus expressed: entium varietates non temere sunt
+minuendae.
+
+But it is easy to see that this logical law would likewise be without
+sense or application, were it not based upon a transcendental law of
+specification, which certainly does not require that the differences
+existing in phenomena should be infinite in number, for the logical
+principle, which merely maintains the indeterminateness of the logical
+sphere of a conception, in relation to its possible division, does not
+authorize this statement; while it does impose upon the understanding
+the duty of searching for subspecies to every species, and minor
+differences in every difference. For, were there no lower conceptions,
+neither could there be any higher. Now the understanding cognizes only
+by means of conceptions; consequently, how far soever it may proceed in
+division, never by mere intuition, but always by lower and lower
+conceptions. The cognition of phenomena in their complete determination
+(which is possible only by means of the understanding) requires an
+unceasingly continued specification of conceptions, and a progression
+to ever smaller differences, of which abstraction had been made in the
+conception of the species, and still more in that of the genus.
+
+This law of specification cannot be deduced from experience; it can
+never present us with a principle of so universal an application.
+Empirical specification very soon stops in its distinction of
+diversities, and requires the guidance of the transcendental law, as a
+principle of the reason--a law which imposes on us the necessity of
+never ceasing in our search for differences, even although these may
+not present themselves to the senses. That absorbent earths are of
+different kinds could only be discovered by obeying the anticipatory
+law of reason, which imposes upon the understanding the task of
+discovering the differences existing between these earths, and supposes
+that nature is richer in substances than our senses would indicate. The
+faculty of the understanding belongs to us just as much under the
+presupposition of differences in the objects of nature, as under the
+condition that these objects are homogeneous, because we could not
+possess conceptions, nor make any use of our understanding, were not
+the phenomena included under these conceptions in some respects
+dissimilar, as well as similar, in their character.
+
+Reason thus prepares the sphere of the understanding for the operations
+of this faculty: 1. By the principle of the homogeneity of the diverse
+in higher genera; 2. By the principle of the variety of the homogeneous
+in lower species; and, to complete the systematic unity, it adds, 3. A
+law of the affinity of all conceptions which prescribes a continuous
+transition from one species to every other by the gradual increase of
+diversity. We may term these the principles of the homogeneity, the
+specification, and the continuity of forms. The latter results from the
+union of the two former, inasmuch as we regard the systematic
+connection as complete in thought, in the ascent to higher genera, as
+well as in the descent to lower species. For all diversities must be
+related to each other, as they all spring from one highest genus,
+descending through the different gradations of a more and more extended
+determination.
+
+We may illustrate the systematic unity produced by the three logical
+principles in the following manner. Every conception may be regarded as
+a point, which, as the standpoint of a spectator, has a certain
+horizon, which may be said to enclose a number of things that may be
+viewed, so to speak, from that centre. Within this horizon there must
+be an infinite number of other points, each of which has its own
+horizon, smaller and more circumscribed; in other words, every species
+contains sub-species, according to the principle of specification, and
+the logical horizon consists of smaller horizons (subspecies), but not
+of points (individuals), which possess no extent. But different
+horizons or genera, which include under them so many conceptions, may
+have one common horizon, from which, as from a mid-point, they may be
+surveyed; and we may proceed thus, till we arrive at the highest genus,
+or universal and true horizon, which is determined by the highest
+conception, and which contains under itself all differences and
+varieties, as genera, species, and subspecies.
+
+To this highest standpoint I am conducted by the law of homogeneity, as
+to all lower and more variously-determined conceptions by the law of
+specification. Now as in this way there exists no void in the whole
+extent of all possible conceptions, and as out of the sphere of these
+the mind can discover nothing, there arises from the presupposition of
+the universal horizon above mentioned, and its complete division, the
+principle: Non datur vacuum formarum. This principle asserts that there
+are not different primitive and highest genera, which stand isolated,
+so to speak, from each other, but all the various genera are mere
+divisions and limitations of one highest and universal genus; and hence
+follows immediately the principle: Datur continuum formarum. This
+principle indicates that all differences of species limit each other,
+and do not admit of transition from one to another by a saltus, but
+only through smaller degrees of the difference between the one species
+and the other. In one word, there are no species or sub-species which
+(in the view of reason) are the nearest possible to each other;
+intermediate species or sub-species being always possible, the
+difference of which from each of the former is always smaller than the
+difference existing between these.
+
+The first law, therefore, directs us to avoid the notion that there
+exist different primal genera, and enounces the fact of perfect
+homogeneity; the second imposes a check upon this tendency to unity and
+prescribes the distinction of sub-species, before proceeding to apply
+our general conceptions to individuals. The third unites both the
+former, by enouncing the fact of homogeneity as existing even in the
+most various diversity, by means of the gradual transition from one
+species to another. Thus it indicates a relationship between the
+different branches or species, in so far as they all spring from the
+same stem.
+
+But this logical law of the continuum specierum (formarum logicarum)
+presupposes a transcendental principle (lex continui in natura),
+without which the understanding might be led into error, by following
+the guidance of the former, and thus perhaps pursuing a path contrary
+to that prescribed by nature. This law must, consequently, be based
+upon pure transcendental, and not upon empirical, considerations. For,
+in the latter case, it would come later than the system; whereas it is
+really itself the parent of all that is systematic in our cognition of
+nature. These principles are not mere hypotheses employed for the
+purpose of experimenting upon nature; although when any such connection
+is discovered, it forms a solid ground for regarding the hypothetical
+unity as valid in the sphere of nature--and thus they are in this
+respect not without their use. But we go farther, and maintain that it
+is manifest that these principles of parsimony in fundamental causes,
+variety in effects, and affinity in phenomena, are in accordance both
+with reason and nature, and that they are not mere methods or plans
+devised for the purpose of assisting us in our observation of the
+external world.
+
+But it is plain that this continuity of forms is a mere idea, to which
+no adequate object can be discovered in experience. And this for two
+reasons. First, because the species in nature are really divided, and
+hence form quanta discreta; and, if the gradual progression through
+their affinity were continuous, the intermediate members lying between
+two given species must be infinite in number, which is impossible.
+Secondly, because we cannot make any determinate empirical use of this
+law, inasmuch as it does not present us with any criterion of affinity
+which could aid us in determining how far we ought to pursue the
+graduation of differences: it merely contains a general indication that
+it is our duty to seek for and, if possible, to discover them.
+
+When we arrange these principles of systematic unity in the order
+conformable to their employment in experience, they will stand thus:
+Variety, Affinity, Unity, each of them, as ideas, being taken in the
+highest degree of their completeness. Reason presupposes the existence
+of cognitions of the understanding, which have a direct relation to
+experience, and aims at the ideal unity of these cognitions--a unity
+which far transcends all experience or empirical notions. The affinity
+of the diverse, notwithstanding the differences existing between its
+parts, has a relation to things, but a still closer one to the mere
+properties and powers of things. For example, imperfect experience may
+represent the orbits of the planets as circular. But we discover
+variations from this course, and we proceed to suppose that the planets
+revolve in a path which, if not a circle, is of a character very
+similar to it. That is to say, the movements of those planets which do
+not form a circle will approximate more or less to the properties of a
+circle, and probably form an ellipse. The paths of comets exhibit still
+greater variations, for, so far as our observation extends, they do not
+return upon their own course in a circle or ellipse. But we proceed to
+the conjecture that comets describe a parabola, a figure which is
+closely allied to the ellipse. In fact, a parabola is merely an
+ellipse, with its longer axis produced to an indefinite extent. Thus
+these principles conduct us to a unity in the genera of the forms of
+these orbits, and, proceeding farther, to a unity as regards the cause
+of the motions of the heavenly bodies--that is, gravitation. But we go
+on extending our conquests over nature, and endeavour to explain all
+seeming deviations from these rules, and even make additions to our
+system which no experience can ever substantiate--for example, the
+theory, in affinity with that of ellipses, of hyperbolic paths of
+comets, pursuing which, these bodies leave our solar system and,
+passing from sun to sun, unite the most distant parts of the infinite
+universe, which is held together by the same moving power.
+
+The most remarkable circumstance connected with these principles is
+that they seem to be transcendental, and, although only containing
+ideas for the guidance of the empirical exercise of reason, and
+although this empirical employment stands to these ideas in an
+asymptotic relation alone (to use a mathematical term), that is,
+continually approximate, without ever being able to attain to them,
+they possess, notwithstanding, as à priori synthetical propositions,
+objective though undetermined validity, and are available as rules for
+possible experience. In the elaboration of our experience, they may
+also be employed with great advantage, as heuristic[70] principles. A
+transcendental deduction of them cannot be made; such a deduction being
+always impossible in the case of ideas, as has been already shown.
+
+ [70] From the Greek, eurhioko.
+
+We distinguished, in the Transcendental Analytic, the dynamical
+principles of the understanding, which are regulative principles of
+intuition, from the mathematical, which are constitutive principles of
+intuition. These dynamical laws are, however, constitutive in relation
+to experience, inasmuch as they render the conceptions without which
+experience could not exist possible à priori. But the principles of
+pure reason cannot be constitutive even in regard to empirical
+conceptions, because no sensuous schema corresponding to them can be
+discovered, and they cannot therefore have an object in concreto. Now,
+if I grant that they cannot be employed in the sphere of experience, as
+constitutive principles, how shall I secure for them employment and
+objective validity as regulative principles, and in what way can they
+be so employed?
+
+The understanding is the object of reason, as sensibility is the object
+of the understanding. The production of systematic unity in all the
+empirical operations of the understanding is the proper occupation of
+reason; just as it is the business of the understanding to connect the
+various content of phenomena by means of conceptions, and subject them
+to empirical laws. But the operations of the understanding are, without
+the schemata of sensibility, undetermined; and, in the same manner, the
+unity of reason is perfectly undetermined as regards the conditions
+under which, and the extent to which, the understanding ought to carry
+the systematic connection of its conceptions. But, although it is
+impossible to discover in intuition a schema for the complete
+systematic unity of all the conceptions of the understanding, there
+must be some analogon of this schema. This analogon is the idea of the
+maximum of the division and the connection of our cognition in one
+principle. For we may have a determinate notion of a maximum and an
+absolutely perfect, all the restrictive conditions which are connected
+with an indeterminate and various content having been abstracted. Thus
+the idea of reason is analogous with a sensuous schema, with this
+difference, that the application of the categories to the schema of
+reason does not present a cognition of any object (as is the case with
+the application of the categories to sensuous schemata), but merely
+provides us with a rule or principle for the systematic unity of the
+exercise of the understanding. Now, as every principle which imposes
+upon the exercise of the understanding à priori compliance with the
+rule of systematic unity also relates, although only in an indirect
+manner, to an object of experience, the principles of pure reason will
+also possess objective reality and validity in relation to experience.
+But they will not aim at determining our knowledge in regard to any
+empirical object; they will merely indicate the procedure, following
+which the empirical and determinate exercise of the understanding may
+be in complete harmony and connection with itself--a result which is
+produced by its being brought into harmony with the principle of
+systematic unity, so far as that is possible, and deduced from it.
+
+I term all subjective principles, which are not derived from
+observation of the constitution of an object, but from the interest
+which Reason has in producing a certain completeness in her cognition
+of that object, maxims of reason. Thus there are maxims of speculative
+reason, which are based solely upon its speculative interest, although
+they appear to be objective principles.
+
+When principles which are really regulative are regarded as
+constitutive, and employed as objective principles, contradictions must
+arise; but if they are considered as mere maxims, there is no room for
+contradictions of any kind, as they then merely indicate the different
+interests of reason, which occasion differences in the mode of thought.
+In effect, Reason has only one single interest, and the seeming
+contradiction existing between her maxims merely indicates a difference
+in, and a reciprocal limitation of, the methods by which this interest
+is satisfied.
+
+This reasoner has at heart the interest of diversity--in accordance with
+the principle of specification; another, the interest of unity--in
+accordance with the principle of aggregation. Each believes that his
+judgement rests upon a thorough insight into the subject he is
+examining, and yet it has been influenced solely by a greater or less
+degree of adherence to some one of the two principles, neither of which
+are objective, but originate solely from the interest of reason, and on
+this account to be termed maxims rather than principles. When I observe
+intelligent men disputing about the distinctive characteristics of men,
+animals, or plants, and even of minerals, those on the one side
+assuming the existence of certain national characteristics, certain
+well-defined and hereditary distinctions of family, race, and so on,
+while the other side maintain that nature has endowed all races of men
+with the same faculties and dispositions, and that all differences are
+but the result of external and accidental circumstances--I have only to
+consider for a moment the real nature of the subject of discussion, to
+arrive at the conclusion that it is a subject far too deep for us to
+judge of, and that there is little probability of either party being
+able to speak from a perfect insight into and understanding of the
+nature of the subject itself. Both have, in reality, been struggling
+for the twofold interest of reason; the one maintaining the one
+interest, the other the other. But this difference between the maxims
+of diversity and unity may easily be reconciled and adjusted; although,
+so long as they are regarded as objective principles, they must
+occasion not only contradictions and polemic, but place hinderances in
+the way of the advancement of truth, until some means is discovered of
+reconciling these conflicting interests, and bringing reason into union
+and harmony with itself.
+
+The same is the case with the so-called law discovered by Leibnitz, and
+supported with remarkable ability by Bonnet--the law of the continuous
+gradation of created beings, which is nothing more than an inference
+from the principle of affinity; for observation and study of the order
+of nature could never present it to the mind as an objective truth. The
+steps of this ladder, as they appear in experience, are too far apart
+from each other, and the so-called petty differences between different
+kinds of animals are in nature commonly so wide separations that no
+confidence can be placed in such views (particularly when we reflect on
+the great variety of things, and the ease with which we can discover
+resemblances), and no faith in the laws which are said to express the
+aims and purposes of nature. On the other hand, the method of
+investigating the order of nature in the light of this principle, and
+the maxim which requires us to regard this order--it being still
+undetermined how far it extends--as really existing in nature, is beyond
+doubt a legitimate and excellent principle of reason--a principle which
+extends farther than any experience or observation of ours and which,
+without giving us any positive knowledge of anything in the region of
+experience, guides us to the goal of systematic unity.
+
+_Of the Ultimate End of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason._
+
+The ideas of pure reason cannot be, of themselves and in their own
+nature, dialectical; it is from their misemployment alone that
+fallacies and illusions arise. For they originate in the nature of
+reason itself, and it is impossible that this supreme tribunal for all
+the rights and claims of speculation should be itself undeserving of
+confidence and promotive of error. It is to be expected, therefore,
+that these ideas have a genuine and legitimate aim. It is true, the mob
+of sophists raise against reason the cry of inconsistency and
+contradiction, and affect to despise the government of that faculty,
+because they cannot understand its constitution, while it is to its
+beneficial influences alone that they owe the position and the
+intelligence which enable them to criticize and to blame its procedure.
+
+We cannot employ an à priori conception with certainty, until we have
+made a transcendental deduction therefore. The ideas of pure reason do
+not admit of the same kind of deduction as the categories. But if they
+are to possess the least objective validity, and to represent anything
+but mere creations of thought (entia rationis ratiocinantis), a
+deduction of them must be possible. This deduction will complete the
+critical task imposed upon pure reason; and it is to this part Of our
+labours that we now proceed.
+
+There is a great difference between a thing's being presented to the
+mind as an object in an absolute sense, or merely as an ideal object.
+In the former case I employ my conceptions to determine the object; in
+the latter case nothing is present to the mind but a mere schema, which
+does not relate directly to an object, not even in a hypothetical
+sense, but which is useful only for the purpose of representing other
+objects to the mind, in a mediate and indirect manner, by means of
+their relation to the idea in the intellect. Thus I say the conception
+of a supreme intelligence is a mere idea; that is to say, its objective
+reality does not consist in the fact that it has an immediate relation
+to an object (for in this sense we have no means of establishing its
+objective validity), it is merely a schema constructed according to the
+necessary conditions of the unity of reason--the schema of a thing in
+general, which is useful towards the production of the highest degree
+of systematic unity in the empirical exercise of reason, in which we
+deduce this or that object of experience from the imaginary object of
+this idea, as the ground or cause of the said object of experience. In
+this way, the idea is properly a heuristic, and not an ostensive,
+conception; it does not give us any information respecting the
+constitution of an object, it merely indicates how, under the guidance
+of the idea, we ought to investigate the constitution and the relations
+of objects in the world of experience. Now, if it can be shown that the
+three kinds of transcendental ideas (psychological, cosmological, and
+theological), although not relating directly to any object nor
+determining it, do nevertheless, on the supposition of the existence of
+an ideal object, produce systematic unity in the laws of the empirical
+employment of the reason, and extend our empirical cognition, without
+ever being inconsistent or in opposition with it--it must be a necessary
+maxim of reason to regulate its procedure according to these ideas. And
+this forms the transcendental deduction of all speculative ideas, not
+as constitutive principles of the extension of our cognition beyond the
+limits of our experience, but as regulative principles of the
+systematic unity of empirical cognition, which is by the aid of these
+ideas arranged and emended within its own proper limits, to an extent
+unattainable by the operation of the principles of the understanding
+alone.
+
+I shall make this plainer. Guided by the principles involved in these
+ideas, we must, in the first place, so connect all the phenomena,
+actions, and feelings of the mind, as if it were a simple substance,
+which, endowed with personal identity, possesses a permanent existence
+(in this life at least), while its states, among which those of the
+body are to be included as external conditions, are in continual
+change. Secondly, in cosmology, we must investigate the conditions of
+all natural phenomena, internal as well as external, as if they
+belonged to a chain infinite and without any prime or supreme member,
+while we do not, on this account, deny the existence of intelligible
+grounds of these phenomena, although we never employ them to explain
+phenomena, for the simple reason that they are not objects of our
+cognition. Thirdly, in the sphere of theology, we must regard the whole
+system of possible experience as forming an absolute, but dependent and
+sensuously-conditioned unity, and at the same time as based upon a
+sole, supreme, and all-sufficient ground existing apart from the world
+itself--a ground which is a self-subsistent, primeval and creative
+reason, in relation to which we so employ our reason in the field of
+experience, as if all objects drew their origin from that archetype of
+all reason. In other words, we ought not to deduce the internal
+phenomena of the mind from a simple thinking substance, but deduce them
+from each other under the guidance of the regulative idea of a simple
+being; we ought not to deduce the phenomena, order, and unity of the
+universe from a supreme intelligence, but merely draw from this idea of
+a supremely wise cause the rules which must guide reason in its
+connection of causes and effects.
+
+Now there is nothing to hinder us from admitting these ideas to possess
+an objective and hyperbolic existence, except the cosmological ideas,
+which lead reason into an antinomy: the psychological and theological
+ideas are not antinomial. They contain no contradiction; and how, then,
+can any one dispute their objective reality, since he who denies it
+knows as little about their possibility as we who affirm? And yet, when
+we wish to admit the existence of a thing, it is not sufficient to
+convince ourselves that there is no positive obstacle in the way; for
+it cannot be allowable to regard mere creations of thought, which
+transcend, though they do not contradict, all our conceptions, as real
+and determinate objects, solely upon the authority of a speculative
+reason striving to compass its own aims. They cannot, therefore, be
+admitted to be real in themselves; they can only possess a comparative
+reality--that of a schema of the regulative principle of the systematic
+unity of all cognition. They are to be regarded not as actual things,
+but as in some measure analogous to them. We abstract from the object
+of the idea all the conditions which limit the exercise of our
+understanding, but which, on the other hand, are the sole conditions of
+our possessing a determinate conception of any given thing. And thus we
+cogitate a something, of the real nature of which we have not the least
+conception, but which we represent to ourselves as standing in a
+relation to the whole system of phenomena, analogous to that in which
+phenomena stand to each other.
+
+By admitting these ideal beings, we do not really extend our cognitions
+beyond the objects of possible experience; we extend merely the
+empirical unity of our experience, by the aid of systematic unity, the
+schema of which is furnished by the idea, which is therefore valid--not
+as a constitutive, but as a regulative principle. For although we posit
+a thing corresponding to the idea--a something, an actual existence--we
+do not on that account aim at the extension of our cognition by means
+of transcendent conceptions. This existence is purely ideal, and not
+objective; it is the mere expression of the systematic unity which is
+to be the guide of reason in the field of experience. There are no
+attempts made at deciding what the ground of this unity may be, or what
+the real nature of this imaginary being.
+
+Thus the transcendental and only determinate conception of God, which
+is presented to us by speculative reason, is in the strictest sense
+deistic. In other words, reason does not assure us of the objective
+validity of the conception; it merely gives us the idea of something,
+on which the supreme and necessary unity of all experience is based.
+This something we cannot, following the analogy of a real substance,
+cogitate otherwise than as the cause of all things operating in
+accordance with rational laws, if we regard it as an individual object;
+although we should rest contented with the idea alone as a regulative
+principle of reason, and make no attempt at completing the sum of the
+conditions imposed by thought. This attempt is, indeed, inconsistent
+with the grand aim of complete systematic unity in the sphere of
+cognition--a unity to which no bounds are set by reason.
+
+Hence it happens that, admitting a divine being, I can have no
+conception of the internal possibility of its perfection, or of the
+necessity of its existence. The only advantage of this admission is
+that it enables me to answer all other questions relating to the
+contingent, and to give reason the most complete satisfaction as
+regards the unity which it aims at attaining in the world of
+experience. But I cannot satisfy reason with regard to this hypothesis
+itself; and this proves that it is not its intelligence and insight
+into the subject, but its speculative interest alone which induces it
+to proceed from a point lying far beyond the sphere of our cognition,
+for the purpose of being able to consider all objects as parts of a
+systematic whole.
+
+Here a distinction presents itself, in regard to the way in which we
+may cogitate a presupposition--a distinction which is somewhat subtle,
+but of great importance in transcendental philosophy. I may have
+sufficient grounds to admit something, or the existence of something,
+in a relative point of view (suppositio relativa), without being
+justified in admitting it in an absolute sense (suppositio absoluta).
+This distinction is undoubtedly requisite, in the case of a regulative
+principle, the necessity of which we recognize, though we are ignorant
+of the source and cause of that necessity, and which we assume to be
+based upon some ultimate ground, for the purpose of being able to
+cogitate the universality of the principle in a more determinate way.
+For example, I cogitate the existence of a being corresponding to a
+pure transcendental idea. But I cannot admit that this being exists
+absolutely and in itself, because all of the conceptions by which I can
+cogitate an object in a determinate manner fall short of assuring me of
+its existence; nay, the conditions of the objective validity of my
+conceptions are excluded by the idea--by the very fact of its being an
+idea. The conceptions of reality, substance, causality, nay, even that
+of necessity in existence, have no significance out of the sphere of
+empirical cognition, and cannot, beyond that sphere, determine any
+object. They may, accordingly, be employed to explain the possibility
+of things in the world of sense, but they are utterly inadequate to
+explain the possibility of the universe itself considered as a whole;
+because in this case the ground of explanation must lie out of and
+beyond the world, and cannot, therefore, be an object of possible
+experience. Now, I may admit the existence of an incomprehensible being
+of this nature--the object of a mere idea, relatively to the world of
+sense; although I have no ground to admit its existence absolutely and
+in itself. For if an idea (that of a systematic and complete unity, of
+which I shall presently speak more particularly) lies at the foundation
+of the most extended empirical employment of reason, and if this idea
+cannot be adequately represented in concreto, although it is
+indispensably necessary for the approximation of empirical unity to the
+highest possible degree--I am not only authorized, but compelled, to
+realize this idea, that is, to posit a real object corresponding
+thereto. But I cannot profess to know this object; it is to me merely a
+something, to which, as the ground of systematic unity in cognition, I
+attribute such properties as are analogous to the conceptions employed
+by the understanding in the sphere of experience. Following the analogy
+of the notions of reality, substance, causality, and necessity, I
+cogitate a being, which possesses all these attributes in the highest
+degree; and, as this idea is the offspring of my reason alone, I
+cogitate this being as self-subsistent reason, and as the cause of the
+universe operating by means of ideas of the greatest possible harmony
+and unity. Thus I abstract all conditions that would limit my idea,
+solely for the purpose of rendering systematic unity possible in the
+world of empirical diversity, and thus securing the widest possible
+extension for the exercise of reason in that sphere. This I am enabled
+to do, by regarding all connections and relations in the world of
+sense, as if they were the dispositions of a supreme reason, of which
+our reason is but a faint image. I then proceed to cogitate this
+Supreme Being by conceptions which have, properly, no meaning or
+application, except in the world of sense. But as I am authorized to
+employ the transcendental hypothesis of such a being in a relative
+respect alone, that is, as the substratum of the greatest possible
+unity in experience--I may attribute to a being which I regard as
+distinct from the world, such properties as belong solely to the sphere
+of sense and experience. For I do not desire, and am not justified in
+desiring, to cognize this object of my idea, as it exists in itself;
+for I possess no conceptions sufficient for this task, those of
+reality, substance, causality, nay, even that of necessity in
+existence, losing all significance, and becoming merely the signs of
+conceptions, without content and without applicability, when I attempt
+to carry them beyond the limits of the world of sense. I cogitate
+merely the relation of a perfectly unknown being to the greatest
+possible systematic unity of experience, solely for the purpose of
+employing it as the schema of the regulative principle which directs
+reason in its empirical exercise.
+
+It is evident, at the first view, that we cannot presuppose the reality
+of this transcendental object, by means of the conceptions of reality,
+substance, causality, and so on, because these conceptions cannot be
+applied to anything that is distinct from the world of sense. Thus the
+supposition of a Supreme Being or cause is purely relative; it is
+cogitated only in behalf of the systematic unity of experience; such a
+being is but a something, of whose existence in itself we have not the
+least conception. Thus, too, it becomes sufficiently manifest why we
+required the idea of a necessary being in relation to objects given by
+sense, although we can never have the least conception of this being,
+or of its absolute necessity.
+
+And now we can clearly perceive the result of our transcendental
+dialectic, and the proper aim of the ideas of pure reason--which become
+dialectical solely from misunderstanding and inconsiderateness. Pure
+reason is, in fact, occupied with itself, and not with any object.
+Objects are not presented to it to be embraced in the unity of an
+empirical conception; it is only the cognitions of the understanding
+that are presented to it, for the purpose of receiving the unity of a
+rational conception, that is, of being connected according to a
+principle. The unity of reason is the unity of system; and this
+systematic unity is not an objective principle, extending its dominion
+over objects, but a subjective maxim, extending its authority over the
+empirical cognition of objects. The systematic connection which reason
+gives to the empirical employment of the understanding not only
+advances the extension of that employment, but ensures its correctness,
+and thus the principle of a systematic unity of this nature is also
+objective, although only in an indefinite respect (principium vagum).
+It is not, however, a constitutive principle, determining an object to
+which it directly relates; it is merely a regulative principle or
+maxim, advancing and strengthening the empirical exercise of reason, by
+the opening up of new paths of which the understanding is ignorant,
+while it never conflicts with the laws of its exercise in the sphere of
+experience.
+
+But reason cannot cogitate this systematic unity, without at the same
+time cogitating an object of the idea--an object that cannot be
+presented in any experience, which contains no concrete example of a
+complete systematic unity. This being (ens rationis ratiocinatae) is
+therefore a mere idea and is not assumed to be a thing which is real
+absolutely and in itself. On the contrary, it forms merely the
+problematical foundation of the connection which the mind introduces
+among the phenomena of the sensuous world. We look upon this
+connection, in the light of the above-mentioned idea, as if it drew its
+origin from the supposed being which corresponds to the idea. And yet
+all we aim at is the possession of this idea as a secure foundation for
+the systematic unity of experience--a unity indispensable to reason,
+advantageous to the understanding, and promotive of the interests of
+empirical cognition.
+
+We mistake the true meaning of this idea when we regard it as an
+enouncement, or even as a hypothetical declaration of the existence of
+a real thing, which we are to regard as the origin or ground of a
+systematic constitution of the universe. On the contrary, it is left
+completely undetermined what the nature or properties of this so-called
+ground may be. The idea is merely to be adopted as a point of view,
+from which this unity, so essential to reason and so beneficial to the
+understanding, may be regarded as radiating. In one word, this
+transcendental thing is merely the schema of a regulative principle, by
+means of which Reason, so far as in her lies, extends the dominion of
+systematic unity over the whole sphere of experience.
+
+The first object of an idea of this kind is the ego, considered merely
+as a thinking nature or soul. If I wish to investigate the properties
+of a thinking being, I must interrogate experience. But I find that I
+can apply none of the categories to this object, the schema of these
+categories, which is the condition of their application, being given
+only in sensuous intuition. But I cannot thus attain to the cognition
+of a systematic unity of all the phenomena of the internal sense.
+Instead, therefore, of an empirical conception of what the soul really
+is, reason takes the conception of the empirical unity of all thought,
+and, by cogitating this unity as unconditioned and primitive,
+constructs the rational conception or idea of a simple substance which
+is in itself unchangeable, possessing personal identity, and in
+connection with other real things external to it; in one word, it
+constructs the idea of a simple self-subsistent intelligence. But the
+real aim of reason in this procedure is the attainment of principles of
+systematic unity for the explanation of the phenomena of the soul. That
+is, reason desires to be able to represent all the determinations of
+the internal sense as existing in one subject, all powers as deduced
+from one fundamental power, all changes as mere varieties in the
+condition of a being which is permanent and always the same, and all
+phenomena in space as entirely different in their nature from the
+procedure of thought. Essential simplicity (with the other attributes
+predicated of the ego) is regarded as the mere schema of this
+regulative principle; it is not assumed that it is the actual ground of
+the properties of the soul. For these properties may rest upon quite
+different grounds, of which we are completely ignorant; just as the
+above predicates could not give us any knowledge of the soul as it is
+in itself, even if we regarded them as valid in respect of it, inasmuch
+as they constitute a mere idea, which cannot be represented in
+concreto. Nothing but good can result from a psychological idea of this
+kind, if we only take proper care not to consider it as more than an
+idea; that is, if we regard it as valid merely in relation to the
+employment of reason, in the sphere of the phenomena of the soul. Under
+the guidance of this idea, or principle, no empirical laws of corporeal
+phenomena are called in to explain that which is a phenomenon of the
+internal sense alone; no windy hypotheses of the generation,
+annihilation, and palingenesis of souls are admitted. Thus the
+consideration of this object of the internal sense is kept pure, and
+unmixed with heterogeneous elements; while the investigation of reason
+aims at reducing all the grounds of explanation employed in this sphere
+of knowledge to a single principle. All this is best effected, nay,
+cannot be effected otherwise than by means of such a schema, which
+requires us to regard this ideal thing as an actual existence. The
+psychological idea is, therefore, meaningless and inapplicable, except
+as the schema of a regulative conception. For, if I ask whether the
+soul is not really of a spiritual nature--it is a question which has no
+meaning. From such a conception has been abstracted, not merely all
+corporeal nature, but all nature, that is, all the predicates of a
+possible experience; and consequently, all the conditions which enable
+us to cogitate an object to this conception have disappeared. But, if
+these conditions are absent, it is evident that the conception is
+meaningless.
+
+The second regulative idea of speculative reason is the conception of
+the universe. For nature is properly the only object presented to us,
+in regard to which reason requires regulative principles. Nature is
+twofold--thinking and corporeal nature. To cogitate the latter in regard
+to its internal possibility, that is, to determine the application of
+the categories to it, no idea is required--no representation which
+transcends experience. In this sphere, therefore, an idea is
+impossible, sensuous intuition being our only guide; while, in the
+sphere of psychology, we require the fundamental idea (I), which
+contains à priori a certain form of thought namely, the unity of the
+ego. Pure reason has, therefore, nothing left but nature in general,
+and the completeness of conditions in nature in accordance with some
+principle. The absolute totality of the series of these conditions is
+an idea, which can never be fully realized in the empirical exercise of
+reason, while it is serviceable as a rule for the procedure of reason
+in relation to that totality. It requires us, in the explanation of
+given phenomena (in the regress or ascent in the series), to proceed as
+if the series were infinite in itself, that is, were prolonged in
+indefinitum; while on the other hand, where reason is regarded as
+itself the determining cause (in the region of freedom), we are
+required to proceed as if we had not before us an object of sense, but
+of the pure understanding. In this latter case, the conditions do not
+exist in the series of phenomena, but may be placed quite out of and
+beyond it, and the series of conditions may be regarded as if it had an
+absolute beginning from an intelligible cause. All this proves that the
+cosmological ideas are nothing but regulative principles, and not
+constitutive; and that their aim is not to realize an actual totality
+in such series. The full discussion of this subject will be found in
+its proper place in the chapter on the antinomy of pure reason.
+
+The third idea of pure reason, containing the hypothesis of a being
+which is valid merely as a relative hypothesis, is that of the one and
+all-sufficient cause of all cosmological series, in other words, the
+idea of God. We have not the slightest ground absolutely to admit the
+existence of an object corresponding to this idea; for what can empower
+or authorize us to affirm the existence of a being of the highest
+perfection--a being whose existence is absolutely necessary--merely
+because we possess the conception of such a being? The answer is: It is
+the existence of the world which renders this hypothesis necessary. But
+this answer makes it perfectly evident that the idea of this being,
+like all other speculative ideas, is essentially nothing more than a
+demand upon reason that it shall regulate the connection which it and
+its subordinate faculties introduce into the phenomena of the world by
+principles of systematic unity and, consequently, that it shall regard
+all phenomena as originating from one all-embracing being, as the
+supreme and all-sufficient cause. From this it is plain that the only
+aim of reason in this procedure is the establishment of its own formal
+rule for the extension of its dominion in the world of experience; that
+it does not aim at an extension of its cognition beyond the limits of
+experience; and that, consequently, this idea does not contain any
+constitutive principle.
+
+The highest formal unity, which is based upon ideas alone, is the unity
+of all things--a unity in accordance with an aim or purpose; and the
+speculative interest of reason renders it necessary to regard all order
+in the world as if it originated from the intention and design of a
+supreme reason. This principle unfolds to the view of reason in the
+sphere of experience new and enlarged prospects, and invites it to
+connect the phenomena of the world according to teleological laws, and
+in this way to attain to the highest possible degree of systematic
+unity. The hypothesis of a supreme intelligence, as the sole cause of
+the universe--an intelligence which has for us no more than an ideal
+existence--is accordingly always of the greatest service to reason.
+Thus, if we presuppose, in relation to the figure of the earth (which
+is round, but somewhat flattened at the poles),[71] or that of
+mountains or seas, wise designs on the part of an author of the
+universe, we cannot fail to make, by the light of this supposition, a
+great number of interesting discoveries. If we keep to this hypothesis,
+as a principle which is purely regulative, even error cannot be very
+detrimental. For, in this case, error can have no more serious
+consequences than that, where we expected to discover a teleological
+connection (nexus finalis), only a mechanical or physical connection
+appears. In such a case, we merely fail to find the additional form of
+unity we expected, but we do not lose the rational unity which the mind
+requires in its procedure in experience. But even a miscarriage of this
+sort cannot affect the law in its general and teleological relations.
+For although we may convict an anatomist of an error, when he connects
+the limb of some animal with a certain purpose, it is quite impossible
+to prove in a single case that any arrangement of nature, be it what it
+may, is entirely without aim or design. And thus medical physiology, by
+the aid of a principle presented to it by pure reason, extends its very
+limited empirical knowledge of the purposes of the different parts of
+an organized body so far that it may be asserted with the utmost
+confidence, and with the approbation of all reflecting men, that every
+organ or bodily part of an animal has its use and answers a certain
+design. Now, this is a supposition which, if regarded as of a
+constitutive character, goes much farther than any experience or
+observation of ours can justify. Hence it is evident that it is nothing
+more than a regulative principle of reason, which aims at the highest
+degree of systematic unity, by the aid of the idea of a causality
+according to design in a supreme cause--a cause which it regards as the
+highest intelligence.
+
+ [71] The advantages which a circular form, in the case of the earth,
+ has over every other, are well known. But few are aware that the
+ slight flattening at the poles, which gives it the figure of a
+ spheroid, is the only cause which prevents the elevations of
+ continents or even of mountains, perhaps thrown up by some internal
+ convulsion, from continually altering the position of the axis of the
+ earth--and that to some considerable degree in a short time. The great
+ protuberance of the earth under the Equator serves to overbalance the
+ impetus of all other masses of earth, and thus to preserve the axis of
+ the earth, so far as we can observe, in its present position. And yet
+ this wise arrangement has been unthinkingly explained from the
+ equilibrium of the formerly fluid mass.
+
+If, however, we neglect this restriction of the idea to a purely
+regulative influence, reason is betrayed into numerous errors. For it
+has then left the ground of experience, in which alone are to be found
+the criteria of truth, and has ventured into the region of the
+incomprehensible and unsearchable, on the heights of which it loses its
+power and collectedness, because it has completely severed its
+connection with experience.
+
+The first error which arises from our employing the idea of a Supreme
+Being as a constitutive (in repugnance to the very nature of an idea),
+and not as a regulative principle, is the error of inactive reason
+(ignava ratio).[72] We may so term every principle which requires us to
+regard our investigations of nature as absolutely complete, and allows
+reason to cease its inquiries, as if it had fully executed its task.
+Thus the psychological idea of the ego, when employed as a constitutive
+principle for the explanation of the phenomena of the soul, and for the
+extension of our knowledge regarding this subject beyond the limits of
+experience--even to the condition of the soul after death--is convenient
+enough for the purposes of pure reason, but detrimental and even
+ruinous to its interests in the sphere of nature and experience. The
+dogmatizing spiritualist explains the unchanging unity of our
+personality through all changes of condition from the unity of a
+thinking substance, the interest which we take in things and events
+that can happen only after our death, from a consciousness of the
+immaterial nature of our thinking subject, and so on. Thus he dispenses
+with all empirical investigations into the cause of these internal
+phenomena, and with all possible explanations of them upon purely
+natural grounds; while, at the dictation of a transcendent reason, he
+passes by the immanent sources of cognition in experience, greatly to
+his own ease and convenience, but to the sacrifice of all, genuine
+insight and intelligence. These prejudicial consequences become still
+more evident, in the case of the dogmatical treatment of our idea of a
+Supreme Intelligence, and the theological system of nature
+(physico-theology) which is falsely based upon it. For, in this case,
+the aims which we observe in nature, and often those which we merely
+fancy to exist, make the investigation of causes a very easy task, by
+directing us to refer such and such phenomena immediately to the
+unsearchable will and counsel of the Supreme Wisdom, while we ought to
+investigate their causes in the general laws of the mechanism of
+matter. We are thus recommended to consider the labour of reason as
+ended, when we have merely dispensed with its employment, which is
+guided surely and safely only by the order of nature and the series of
+changes in the world--which are arranged according to immanent and
+general laws. This error may be avoided, if we do not merely consider
+from the view-point of final aims certain parts of nature, such as the
+division and structure of a continent, the constitution and direction
+of certain mountain-chains, or even the organization existing in the
+vegetable and animal kingdoms, but look upon this systematic unity of
+nature in a perfectly general way, in relation to the idea of a Supreme
+Intelligence. If we pursue this advice, we lay as a foundation for all
+investigation the conformity to aims of all phenomena of nature in
+accordance with universal laws, for which no particular arrangement of
+nature is exempt, but only cognized by us with more or less difficulty;
+and we possess a regulative principle of the systematic unity of a
+teleological connection, which we do not attempt to anticipate or
+predetermine. All that we do, and ought to do, is to follow out the
+physico-mechanical connection in nature according to general laws, with
+the hope of discovering, sooner or later, the teleological connection
+also. Thus, and thus only, can the principle of final unity aid in the
+extension of the employment of reason in the sphere of experience,
+without being in any case detrimental to its interests.
+
+ [72] This was the term applied by the old dialecticians to a
+ sophistical argument, which ran thus: If it is your fate to die of
+ this disease, you will die, whether you employ a physician or not.
+ Cicero says that this mode of reasoning has received this appellation,
+ because, if followed, it puts an end to the employment of reason in
+ the affairs of life. For a similar reason, I have applied this
+ designation to the sophistical argument of pure reason.
+
+The second error which arises from the misconception of the principle
+of systematic unity is that of perverted reason (perversa ratio,
+usteron roteron rationis). The idea of systematic unity is available as
+a regulative principle in the connection of phenomena according to
+general natural laws; and, how far soever we have to travel upon the
+path of experience to discover some fact or event, this idea requires
+us to believe that we have approached all the more nearly to the
+completion of its use in the sphere of nature, although that completion
+can never be attained. But this error reverses the procedure of reason.
+We begin by hypostatizing the principle of systematic unity, and by
+giving an anthropomorphic determination to the conception of a Supreme
+Intelligence, and then proceed forcibly to impose aims upon nature.
+Thus not only does teleology, which ought to aid in the completion of
+unity in accordance with general laws, operate to the destruction of
+its influence, but it hinders reason from attaining its proper aim,
+that is, the proof, upon natural grounds, of the existence of a supreme
+intelligent cause. For, if we cannot presuppose supreme finality in
+nature à priori, that is, as essentially belonging to nature, how can
+we be directed to endeavour to discover this unity and, rising
+gradually through its different degrees, to approach the supreme
+perfection of an author of all--a perfection which is absolutely
+necessary, and therefore cognizable à priori? The regulative principle
+directs us to presuppose systematic unity absolutely and, consequently,
+as following from the essential nature of things--but only as a unity of
+nature, not merely cognized empirically, but presupposed à priori,
+although only in an indeterminate manner. But if I insist on basing
+nature upon the foundation of a supreme ordaining Being, the unity of
+nature is in effect lost. For, in this case, it is quite foreign and
+unessential to the nature of things, and cannot be cognized from the
+general laws of nature. And thus arises a vicious circular argument,
+what ought to have been proved having been presupposed.
+
+To take the regulative principle of systematic unity in nature for a
+constitutive principle, and to hypostatize and make a cause out of that
+which is properly the ideal ground of the consistent and harmonious
+exercise of reason, involves reason in inextricable embarrassments. The
+investigation of nature pursues its own path under the guidance of the
+chain of natural causes, in accordance with the general laws of nature,
+and ever follows the light of the idea of an author of the universe--not
+for the purpose of deducing the finality, which it constantly pursues,
+from this Supreme Being, but to attain to the cognition of his
+existence from the finality which it seeks in the existence of the
+phenomena of nature, and, if possible, in that of all things to cognize
+this being, consequently, as absolutely necessary. Whether this latter
+purpose succeed or not, the idea is and must always be a true one, and
+its employment, when merely regulative, must always be accompanied by
+truthful and beneficial results.
+
+Complete unity, in conformity with aims, constitutes absolute
+perfection. But if we do not find this unity in the nature of the
+things which go to constitute the world of experience, that is, of
+objective cognition, consequently in the universal and necessary laws
+of nature, how can we infer from this unity the idea of the supreme and
+absolutely necessary perfection of a primal being, which is the origin
+of all causality? The greatest systematic unity, and consequently
+teleological unity, constitutes the very foundation of the possibility
+of the most extended employment of human reason. The idea of unity is
+therefore essentially and indissolubly connected with the nature of our
+reason. This idea is a legislative one; and hence it is very natural
+that we should assume the existence of a legislative reason
+corresponding to it, from which the systematic unity of nature--the
+object of the operations of reason--must be derived.
+
+In the course of our discussion of the antinomies, we stated that it is
+always possible to answer all the questions which pure reason may
+raise; and that the plea of the limited nature of our cognition, which
+is unavoidable and proper in many questions regarding natural
+phenomena, cannot in this case be admitted, because the questions
+raised do not relate to the nature of things, but are necessarily
+originated by the nature of reason itself, and relate to its own
+internal constitution. We can now establish this assertion, which at
+first sight appeared so rash, in relation to the two questions in which
+reason takes the greatest interest, and thus complete our discussion of
+the dialectic of pure reason.
+
+If, then, the question is asked, in relation to transcendental
+theology,[73] first, whether there is anything distinct from the world,
+which contains the ground of cosmical order and connection according to
+general laws? The answer is: Certainly. For the world is a sum of
+phenomena; there must, therefore, be some transcendental basis of these
+phenomena, that is, a basis cogitable by the pure understanding alone.
+If, secondly, the question is asked whether this being is substance,
+whether it is of the greatest reality, whether it is necessary, and so
+forth? I answer that this question is utterly without meaning. For all
+the categories which aid me in forming a conception of an object cannot
+be employed except in the world of sense, and are without meaning when
+not applied to objects of actual or possible experience. Out of this
+sphere, they are not properly conceptions, but the mere marks or
+indices of conceptions, which we may admit, although they cannot,
+without the help of experience, help us to understand any subject or
+thing. If, thirdly, the question is whether we may not cogitate this
+being, which is distinct from the world, in analogy with the objects of
+experience? The answer is: Undoubtedly, but only as an ideal, and not
+as a real object. That is, we must cogitate it only as an unknown
+substratum of the systematic unity, order, and finality of the world--a
+unity which reason must employ as the regulative principle of its
+investigation of nature. Nay, more, we may admit into the idea certain
+anthropomorphic elements, which are promotive of the interests of this
+regulative principle. For it is no more than an idea, which does not
+relate directly to a being distinct from the world, but to the
+regulative principle of the systematic unity of the world, by means,
+however, of a schema of this unity--the schema of a Supreme
+Intelligence, who is the wisely-designing author of the universe. What
+this basis of cosmical unity may be in itself, we know not--we cannot
+discover from the idea; we merely know how we ought to employ the idea
+of this unity, in relation to the systematic operation of reason in the
+sphere of experience.
+
+ [73] After what has been said of the psychological idea of the ego and
+ its proper employment as a regulative principle of the operations of
+ reason, I need not enter into details regarding the transcendental
+ illusion by which the systematic unity of all the various phenomena of
+ the internal sense is hypostatized. The procedure is in this case very
+ similar to that which has been discussed in our remarks on the
+ theological ideal.
+
+But, it will be asked again, can we on these grounds, admit the
+existence of a wise and omnipotent author of the world? Without doubt;
+and not only so, but we must assume the existence of such a being. But
+do we thus extend the limits of our knowledge beyond the field of
+possible experience? By no means. For we have merely presupposed a
+something, of which we have no conception, which we do not know as it
+is in itself; but, in relation to the systematic disposition of the
+universe, which we must presuppose in all our observation of nature, we
+have cogitated this unknown being in analogy with an intelligent
+existence (an empirical conception), that is to say, we have endowed it
+with those attributes, which, judging from the nature of our own
+reason, may contain the ground of such a systematic unity. This idea is
+therefore valid only relatively to the employment in experience of our
+reason. But if we attribute to it absolute and objective validity, we
+overlook the fact that it is merely an ideal being that we cogitate;
+and, by setting out from a basis which is not determinable by
+considerations drawn from experience, we place ourselves in a position
+which incapacitates us from applying this principle to the empirical
+employment of reason.
+
+But, it will be asked further, can I make any use of this conception
+and hypothesis in my investigations into the world and nature? Yes, for
+this very purpose was the idea established by reason as a fundamental
+basis. But may I regard certain arrangements, which seemed to have been
+made in conformity with some fixed aim, as the arrangements of design,
+and look upon them as proceeding from the divine will, with the
+intervention, however, of certain other particular arrangements
+disposed to that end? Yes, you may do so; but at the same time you must
+regard it as indifferent, whether it is asserted that divine wisdom has
+disposed all things in conformity with his highest aims, or that the
+idea of supreme wisdom is a regulative principle in the investigation
+of nature, and at the same time a principle of the systematic unity of
+nature according to general laws, even in those cases where we are
+unable to discover that unity. In other words, it must be perfectly
+indifferent to you whether you say, when you have discovered this
+unity: God has wisely willed it so; or: Nature has wisely arranged
+this. For it was nothing but the systematic unity, which reason
+requires as a basis for the investigation of nature, that justified you
+in accepting the idea of a supreme intelligence as a schema for a
+regulative principle; and, the farther you advance in the discovery of
+design and finality, the more certain the validity of your idea. But,
+as the whole aim of this regulative principle was the discovery of a
+necessary and systematic unity in nature, we have, in so far as we
+attain this, to attribute our success to the idea of a Supreme Being;
+while, at the same time, we cannot, without involving ourselves in
+contradictions, overlook the general laws of nature, as it was in
+reference to them alone that this idea was employed. We cannot, I say,
+overlook the general laws of nature, and regard this conformity to aims
+observable in nature as contingent or hyperphysical in its origin;
+inasmuch as there is no ground which can justify us in the admission of
+a being with such properties distinct from and above nature. All that
+we are authorized to assert is that this idea may be employed as a
+principle, and that the properties of the being which is assumed to
+correspond to it may be regarded as systematically connected in analogy
+with the causal determination of phenomena.
+
+For the same reasons we are justified in introducing into the idea of
+the supreme cause other anthropomorphic elements (for without these we
+could not predicate anything of it); we may regard it as allowable to
+cogitate this cause as a being with understanding, the feelings of
+pleasure and displeasure, and faculties of desire and will
+corresponding to these. At the same time, we may attribute to this
+being infinite perfection--a perfection which necessarily transcends
+that which our knowledge of the order and design in the world authorize
+us to predicate of it. For the regulative law of systematic unity
+requires us to study nature on the supposition that systematic and
+final unity in infinitum is everywhere discoverable, even in the
+highest diversity. For, although we may discover little of this
+cosmical perfection, it belongs to the legislative prerogative of
+reason to require us always to seek for and to expect it; while it must
+always be beneficial to institute all inquiries into nature in
+accordance with this principle. But it is evident that, by this idea of
+a supreme author of all, which I place as the foundation of all
+inquiries into nature, I do not mean to assert the existence of such a
+being, or that I have any knowledge of its existence; and,
+consequently, I do not really deduce anything from the existence of
+this being, but merely from its idea, that is to say, from the nature
+of things in this world, in accordance with this idea. A certain dim
+consciousness of the true use of this idea seems to have dictated to
+the philosophers of all times the moderate language used by them
+regarding the cause of the world. We find them employing the
+expressions wisdom and care of nature, and divine wisdom, as
+synonymous--nay, in purely speculative discussions, preferring the
+former, because it does not carry the appearance of greater pretensions
+than such as we are entitled to make, and at the same time directs
+reason to its proper field of action--nature and her phenomena.
+
+Thus, pure reason, which at first seemed to promise us nothing less
+than the extension of our cognition beyond the limits of experience, is
+found, when thoroughly examined, to contain nothing but regulative
+principles, the virtue and function of which is to introduce into our
+cognition a higher degree of unity than the understanding could of
+itself. These principles, by placing the goal of all our struggles at
+so great a distance, realize for us the most thorough connection
+between the different parts of our cognition, and the highest degree of
+systematic unity. But, on the other hand, if misunderstood and employed
+as constitutive principles of transcendent cognition, they become the
+parents of illusions and contradictions, while pretending to introduce
+us to new regions of knowledge.
+
+Thus all human cognition begins with intuitions, proceeds from thence
+to conceptions, and ends with ideas. Although it possesses, in relation
+to all three elements, à priori sources of cognition, which seemed to
+transcend the limits of all experience, a thoroughgoing criticism
+demonstrates that speculative reason can never, by the aid of these
+elements, pass the bounds of possible experience, and that the proper
+destination of this highest faculty of cognition is to employ all
+methods, and all the principles of these methods, for the purpose of
+penetrating into the innermost secrets of nature, by the aid of the
+principles of unity (among all kinds of which teleological unity is the
+highest), while it ought not to attempt to soar above the sphere of
+experience, beyond which there lies nought for us but the void inane.
+The critical examination, in our Transcendental Analytic, of all the
+propositions which professed to extend cognition beyond the sphere of
+experience, completely demonstrated that they can only conduct us to a
+possible experience. If we were not distrustful even of the clearest
+abstract theorems, if we were not allured by specious and inviting
+prospects to escape from the constraining power of their evidence, we
+might spare ourselves the laborious examination of all the dialectical
+arguments which a transcendent reason adduces in support of its
+pretensions; for we should know with the most complete certainty that,
+however honest such professions might be, they are null and valueless,
+because they relate to a kind of knowledge to which no man can by any
+possibility attain. But, as there is no end to discussion, if we cannot
+discover the true cause of the illusions by which even the wisest are
+deceived, and as the analysis of all our transcendent cognition into
+its elements is of itself of no slight value as a psychological study,
+while it is a duty incumbent on every philosopher--it was found
+necessary to investigate the dialectical procedure of reason in its
+primary sources. And as the inferences of which this dialectic is the
+parent are not only deceitful, but naturally possess a profound
+interest for humanity, it was advisable at the same time, to give a
+full account of the momenta of this dialectical procedure, and to
+deposit it in the archives of human reason, as a warning to all future
+metaphysicians to avoid these causes of speculative error.
+
+II. Transcendental Doctrine of Method
+
+If we regard the sum of the cognition of pure speculative reason as an
+edifice, the idea of which, at least, exists in the human mind, it may
+be said that we have in the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements
+examined the materials and determined to what edifice these belong, and
+what its height and stability. We have found, indeed, that, although we
+had purposed to build for ourselves a tower which should reach to
+Heaven, the supply of materials sufficed merely for a habitation, which
+was spacious enough for all terrestrial purposes, and high enough to
+enable us to survey the level plain of experience, but that the bold
+undertaking designed necessarily failed for want of materials--not to
+mention the confusion of tongues, which gave rise to endless disputes
+among the labourers on the plan of the edifice, and at last scattered
+them over all the world, each to erect a separate building for himself,
+according to his own plans and his own inclinations. Our present task
+relates not to the materials, but to the plan of an edifice; and, as we
+have had sufficient warning not to venture blindly upon a design which
+may be found to transcend our natural powers, while, at the same time,
+we cannot give up the intention of erecting a secure abode for the
+mind, we must proportion our design to the material which is presented
+to us, and which is, at the same time, sufficient for all our wants.
+
+I understand, then, by the transcendental doctrine of method, the
+determination of the formal conditions of a complete system of pure
+reason. We shall accordingly have to treat of the discipline, the
+canon, the architectonic, and, finally, the history of pure reason.
+This part of our Critique will accomplish, from the transcendental
+point of view, what has been usually attempted, but miserably executed,
+under the name of practical logic. It has been badly executed, I say,
+because general logic, not being limited to any particular kind of
+cognition (not even to the pure cognition of the understanding) nor to
+any particular objects, it cannot, without borrowing from other
+sciences, do more than present merely the titles or signs of possible
+methods and the technical expressions, which are employed in the
+systematic parts of all sciences; and thus the pupil is made acquainted
+with names, the meaning and application of which he is to learn only at
+some future time.
+
+Chapter I. The Discipline of Pure Reason
+
+Negative judgements--those which are so not merely as regards their
+logical form, but in respect of their content--are not commonly held in
+especial respect. They are, on the contrary, regarded as jealous
+enemies of our insatiable desire for knowledge; and it almost requires
+an apology to induce us to tolerate, much less to prize and to respect
+them.
+
+All propositions, indeed, may be logically expressed in a negative
+form; but, in relation to the content of our cognition, the peculiar
+province of negative judgements is solely to prevent error. For this
+reason, too, negative propositions, which are framed for the purpose of
+correcting false cognitions where error is absolutely impossible, are
+undoubtedly true, but inane and senseless; that is, they are in reality
+purposeless and, for this reason, often very ridiculous. Such is the
+proposition of the schoolman that Alexander could not have subdued any
+countries without an army.
+
+But where the limits of our possible cognition are very much
+contracted, the attraction to new fields of knowledge great, the
+illusions to which the mind is subject of the most deceptive character,
+and the evil consequences of error of no inconsiderable magnitude--the
+negative element in knowledge, which is useful only to guard us against
+error, is of far more importance than much of that positive instruction
+which makes additions to the sum of our knowledge. The restraint which
+is employed to repress, and finally to extirpate the constant
+inclination to depart from certain rules, is termed discipline. It is
+distinguished from culture, which aims at the formation of a certain
+degree of skill, without attempting to repress or to destroy any other
+mental power, already existing. In the cultivation of a talent, which
+has given evidence of an impulse towards self-development, discipline
+takes a negative,[74] culture and doctrine a positive, part.
+
+ [74] I am well aware that, in the language of the schools, the term
+ discipline is usually employed as synonymous with instruction. But
+ there are so many cases in which it is necessary to distinguish the
+ notion of the former, as a course of corrective training, from that of
+ the latter, as the communication of knowledge, and the nature of
+ things itself demands the appropriation of the most suitable
+ expressions for this distinction, that it is my desire that the former
+ terms should never be employed in any other than a negative
+ signification.
+
+That natural dispositions and talents (such as imagination and wit),
+which ask a free and unlimited development, require in many respects
+the corrective influence of discipline, every one will readily grant.
+But it may well appear strange that reason, whose proper duty it is to
+prescribe rules of discipline to all the other powers of the mind,
+should itself require this corrective. It has, in fact, hitherto
+escaped this humiliation, only because, in presence of its magnificent
+pretensions and high position, no one could readily suspect it to be
+capable of substituting fancies for conceptions, and words for things.
+
+Reason, when employed in the field of experience, does not stand in
+need of criticism, because its principles are subjected to the
+continual test of empirical observations. Nor is criticism requisite in
+the sphere of mathematics, where the conceptions of reason must always
+be presented in concreto in pure intuition, and baseless or arbitrary
+assertions are discovered without difficulty. But where reason is not
+held in a plain track by the influence of empirical or of pure
+intuition, that is, when it is employed in the transcendental sphere of
+pure conceptions, it stands in great need of discipline, to restrain
+its propensity to overstep the limits of possible experience and to
+keep it from wandering into error. In fact, the utility of the
+philosophy of pure reason is entirely of this negative character.
+Particular errors may be corrected by particular animadversions, and
+the causes of these errors may be eradicated by criticism. But where we
+find, as in the case of pure reason, a complete system of illusions and
+fallacies, closely connected with each other and depending upon grand
+general principles, there seems to be required a peculiar and negative
+code of mental legislation, which, under the denomination of a
+discipline, and founded upon the nature of reason and the objects of
+its exercise, shall constitute a system of thorough examination and
+testing, which no fallacy will be able to withstand or escape from,
+under whatever disguise or concealment it may lurk.
+
+But the reader must remark that, in this the second division of our
+transcendental Critique the discipline of pure reason is not directed
+to the content, but to the method of the cognition of pure reason. The
+former task has been completed in the doctrine of elements. But there
+is so much similarity in the mode of employing the faculty of reason,
+whatever be the object to which it is applied, while, at the same time,
+its employment in the transcendental sphere is so essentially different
+in kind from every other, that, without the warning negative influence
+of a discipline specially directed to that end, the errors are
+unavoidable which spring from the unskillful employment of the methods
+which are originated by reason but which are out of place in this
+sphere.
+
+Section I. The Discipline of Pure Reason in the Sphere of Dogmatism
+
+The science of mathematics presents the most brilliant example of the
+extension of the sphere of pure reason without the aid of experience.
+Examples are always contagious; and they exert an especial influence on
+the same faculty, which naturally flatters itself that it will have the
+same good fortune in other case as fell to its lot in one fortunate
+instance. Hence pure reason hopes to be able to extend its empire in
+the transcendental sphere with equal success and security, especially
+when it applies the same method which was attended with such brilliant
+results in the science of mathematics. It is, therefore, of the highest
+importance for us to know whether the method of arriving at
+demonstrative certainty, which is termed mathematical, be identical
+with that by which we endeavour to attain the same degree of certainty
+in philosophy, and which is termed in that science dogmatical.
+
+Philosophical cognition is the cognition of reason by means of
+conceptions; mathematical cognition is cognition by means of the
+construction of conceptions. The construction of a conception is the
+presentation à priori of the intuition which corresponds to the
+conception. For this purpose a non-empirical intuition is requisite,
+which, as an intuition, is an individual object; while, as the
+construction of a conception (a general representation), it must be
+seen to be universally valid for all the possible intuitions which rank
+under that conception. Thus I construct a triangle, by the presentation
+of the object which corresponds to this conception, either by mere
+imagination, in pure intuition, or upon paper, in empirical intuition,
+in both cases completely à priori, without borrowing the type of that
+figure from any experience. The individual figure drawn upon paper is
+empirical; but it serves, notwithstanding, to indicate the conception,
+even in its universality, because in this empirical intuition we keep
+our eye merely on the act of the construction of the conception, and
+pay no attention to the various modes of determining it, for example,
+its size, the length of its sides, the size of its angles, these not in
+the least affecting the essential character of the conception.
+
+Philosophical cognition, accordingly, regards the particular only in
+the general; mathematical the general in the particular, nay, in the
+individual. This is done, however, entirely à priori and by means of
+pure reason, so that, as this individual figure is determined under
+certain universal conditions of construction, the object of the
+conception, to which this individual figure corresponds as its schema,
+must be cogitated as universally determined.
+
+The essential difference of these two modes of cognition consists,
+therefore, in this formal quality; it does not regard the difference of
+the matter or objects of both. Those thinkers who aim at distinguishing
+philosophy from mathematics by asserting that the former has to do with
+quality merely, and the latter with quantity, have mistaken the effect
+for the cause. The reason why mathematical cognition can relate only to
+quantity is to be found in its form alone. For it is the conception of
+quantities only that is capable of being constructed, that is,
+presented à priori in intuition; while qualities cannot be given in any
+other than an empirical intuition. Hence the cognition of qualities by
+reason is possible only through conceptions. No one can find an
+intuition which shall correspond to the conception of reality, except
+in experience; it cannot be presented to the mind à priori and
+antecedently to the empirical consciousness of a reality. We can form
+an intuition, by means of the mere conception of it, of a cone, without
+the aid of experience; but the colour of the cone we cannot know except
+from experience. I cannot present an intuition of a cause, except in an
+example which experience offers to me. Besides, philosophy, as well as
+mathematics, treats of quantities; as, for example, of totality,
+infinity, and so on. Mathematics, too, treats of the difference of
+lines and surfaces--as spaces of different quality, of the continuity of
+extension--as a quality thereof. But, although in such cases they have a
+common object, the mode in which reason considers that object is very
+different in philosophy from what it is in mathematics. The former
+confines itself to the general conceptions; the latter can do nothing
+with a mere conception, it hastens to intuition. In this intuition it
+regards the conception in concreto, not empirically, but in an à priori
+intuition, which it has constructed; and in which, all the results
+which follow from the general conditions of the construction of the
+conception are in all cases valid for the object of the constructed
+conception.
+
+Suppose that the conception of a triangle is given to a philosopher and
+that he is required to discover, by the philosophical method, what
+relation the sum of its angles bears to a right angle. He has nothing
+before him but the conception of a figure enclosed within three right
+lines, and, consequently, with the same number of angles. He may
+analyse the conception of a right line, of an angle, or of the number
+three as long as he pleases, but he will not discover any properties
+not contained in these conceptions. But, if this question is proposed
+to a geometrician, he at once begins by constructing a triangle. He
+knows that two right angles are equal to the sum of all the contiguous
+angles which proceed from one point in a straight line; and he goes on
+to produce one side of his triangle, thus forming two adjacent angles
+which are together equal to two right angles. He then divides the
+exterior of these angles, by drawing a line parallel with the opposite
+side of the triangle, and immediately perceives that he has thus got an
+exterior adjacent angle which is equal to the interior. Proceeding in
+this way, through a chain of inferences, and always on the ground of
+intuition, he arrives at a clear and universally valid solution of the
+question.
+
+But mathematics does not confine itself to the construction of
+quantities (quanta), as in the case of geometry; it occupies itself
+with pure quantity also (quantitas), as in the case of algebra, where
+complete abstraction is made of the properties of the object indicated
+by the conception of quantity. In algebra, a certain method of notation
+by signs is adopted, and these indicate the different possible
+constructions of quantities, the extraction of roots, and so on. After
+having thus denoted the general conception of quantities, according to
+their different relations, the different operations by which quantity
+or number is increased or diminished are presented in intuition in
+accordance with general rules. Thus, when one quantity is to be divided
+by another, the signs which denote both are placed in the form peculiar
+to the operation of division; and thus algebra, by means of a
+symbolical construction of quantity, just as geometry, with its
+ostensive or geometrical construction (a construction of the objects
+themselves), arrives at results which discursive cognition cannot hope
+to reach by the aid of mere conceptions.
+
+Now, what is the cause of this difference in the fortune of the
+philosopher and the mathematician, the former of whom follows the path
+of conceptions, while the latter pursues that of intuitions, which he
+represents, à priori, in correspondence with his conceptions? The cause
+is evident from what has been already demonstrated in the introduction
+to this Critique. We do not, in the present case, want to discover
+analytical propositions, which may be produced merely by analysing our
+conceptions--for in this the philosopher would have the advantage over
+his rival; we aim at the discovery of synthetical propositions--such
+synthetical propositions, moreover, as can be cognized à priori. I must
+not confine myself to that which I actually cogitate in my conception
+of a triangle, for this is nothing more than the mere definition; I
+must try to go beyond that, and to arrive at properties which are not
+contained in, although they belong to, the conception. Now, this is
+impossible, unless I determine the object present to my mind according
+to the conditions, either of empirical, or of pure, intuition. In the
+former case, I should have an empirical proposition (arrived at by
+actual measurement of the angles of the triangle), which would possess
+neither universality nor necessity; but that would be of no value. In
+the latter, I proceed by geometrical construction, by means of which I
+collect, in a pure intuition, just as I would in an empirical
+intuition, all the various properties which belong to the schema of a
+triangle in general, and consequently to its conception, and thus
+construct synthetical propositions which possess the attribute of
+universality.
+
+It would be vain to philosophize upon the triangle, that is, to reflect
+on it discursively; I should get no further than the definition with
+which I had been obliged to set out. There are certainly transcendental
+synthetical propositions which are framed by means of pure conceptions,
+and which form the peculiar distinction of philosophy; but these do not
+relate to any particular thing, but to a thing in general, and enounce
+the conditions under which the perception of it may become a part of
+possible experience. But the science of mathematics has nothing to do
+with such questions, nor with the question of existence in any fashion;
+it is concerned merely with the properties of objects in themselves,
+only in so far as these are connected with the conception of the
+objects.
+
+In the above example, we merely attempted to show the great difference
+which exists between the discursive employment of reason in the sphere
+of conceptions, and its intuitive exercise by means of the construction
+of conceptions. The question naturally arises: What is the cause which
+necessitates this twofold exercise of reason, and how are we to
+discover whether it is the philosophical or the mathematical method
+which reason is pursuing in an argument?
+
+All our knowledge relates, finally, to possible intuitions, for it is
+these alone that present objects to the mind. An à priori or
+non-empirical conception contains either a pure intuition--and in this
+case it can be constructed; or it contains nothing but the synthesis of
+possible intuitions, which are not given à priori. In this latter case,
+it may help us to form synthetical à priori judgements, but only in the
+discursive method, by conceptions, not in the intuitive, by means of
+the construction of conceptions.
+
+The only à priori intuition is that of the pure form of phenomena--space
+and time. A conception of space and time as quanta may be presented à
+priori in intuition, that is, constructed, either alone with their
+quality (figure), or as pure quantity (the mere synthesis of the
+homogeneous), by means of number. But the matter of phenomena, by which
+things are given in space and time, can be presented only in
+perception, à posteriori. The only conception which represents à priori
+this empirical content of phenomena is the conception of a thing in
+general; and the à priori synthetical cognition of this conception can
+give us nothing more than the rule for the synthesis of that which may
+be contained in the corresponding à posteriori perception; it is
+utterly inadequate to present an à priori intuition of the real object,
+which must necessarily be empirical.
+
+Synthetical propositions, which relate to things in general, an à
+priori intuition of which is impossible, are transcendental. For this
+reason transcendental propositions cannot be framed by means of the
+construction of conceptions; they are à priori, and based entirely on
+conceptions themselves. They contain merely the rule, by which we are
+to seek in the world of perception or experience the synthetical unity
+of that which cannot be intuited à priori. But they are incompetent to
+present any of the conceptions which appear in them in an à priori
+intuition; these can be given only à posteriori, in experience, which,
+however, is itself possible only through these synthetical principles.
+
+If we are to form a synthetical judgement regarding a conception,
+we must go beyond it, to the intuition in which it is given. If we
+keep to what is contained in the conception, the judgement is merely
+analytical--it is merely an explanation of what we have cogitated in
+the conception. But I can pass from the conception to the pure or
+empirical intuition which corresponds to it. I can proceed to examine
+my conception in concreto, and to cognize, either à priori or à
+posteriori, what I find in the object of the conception. The former--à
+priori cognition--is rational-mathematical cognition by means of the
+construction of the conception; the latter--à posteriori cognition--is
+purely empirical cognition, which does not possess the attributes
+of necessity and universality. Thus I may analyse the conception I
+have of gold; but I gain no new information from this analysis, I
+merely enumerate the different properties which I had connected with
+the notion indicated by the word. My knowledge has gained in logical
+clearness and arrangement, but no addition has been made to it. But
+if I take the matter which is indicated by this name, and submit
+it to the examination of my senses, I am enabled to form several
+synthetical--although still empirical--propositions. The mathematical
+conception of a triangle I should construct, that is, present à priori
+in intuition, and in this way attain to rational-synthetical cognition.
+But when the transcendental conception of reality, or substance, or
+power is presented to my mind, I find that it does not relate to or
+indicate either an empirical or pure intuition, but that it indicates
+merely the synthesis of empirical intuitions, which cannot of course
+be given à priori. The synthesis in such a conception cannot proceed à
+priori--without the aid of experience--to the intuition which corresponds
+to the conception; and, for this reason, none of these conceptions can
+produce a determinative synthetical proposition, they can never present
+more than a principle of the synthesis[75] of possible empirical
+intuitions. A transcendental proposition is, therefore, a synthetical
+cognition of reason by means of pure conceptions and the discursive
+method, and it renders possible all synthetical unity in empirical
+cognition, though it cannot present us with any intuition à priori.
+
+ [75] In the case of the conception of cause, I do really go beyond the
+ empirical conception of an event--but not to the intuition which
+ presents this conception in concreto, but only to the time-conditions,
+ which may be found in experience to correspond to the conception. My
+ procedure is, therefore, strictly according to conceptions; I cannot
+ in a case of this kind employ the construction of conceptions, because
+ the conception is merely a rule for the synthesis of perceptions,
+ which are not pure intuitions, and which, therefore, cannot be given à
+ priori.
+
+There is thus a twofold exercise of reason. Both modes have the
+properties of universality and an à priori origin in common, but are,
+in their procedure, of widely different character. The reason of this
+is that in the world of phenomena, in which alone objects are presented
+to our minds, there are two main elements--the form of intuition (space
+and time), which can be cognized and determined completely à priori,
+and the matter or content--that which is presented in space and time,
+and which, consequently, contains a something--an existence
+corresponding to our powers of sensation. As regards the latter, which
+can never be given in a determinate mode except by experience, there
+are no à priori notions which relate to it, except the undetermined
+conceptions of the synthesis of possible sensations, in so far as these
+belong (in a possible experience) to the unity of consciousness. As
+regards the former, we can determine our conceptions à priori in
+intuition, inasmuch as we are ourselves the creators of the objects of
+the conceptions in space and time--these objects being regarded simply
+as quanta. In the one case, reason proceeds according to conceptions
+and can do nothing more than subject phenomena to these--which can only
+be determined empirically, that is, à posteriori--in conformity,
+however, with those conceptions as the rules of all empirical
+synthesis. In the other case, reason proceeds by the construction of
+conceptions; and, as these conceptions relate to an à priori intuition,
+they may be given and determined in pure intuition à priori, and
+without the aid of empirical data. The examination and consideration of
+everything that exists in space or time--whether it is a quantum or not,
+in how far the particular something (which fills space or time) is a
+primary substratum, or a mere determination of some other existence,
+whether it relates to anything else--either as cause or effect, whether
+its existence is isolated or in reciprocal connection with and
+dependence upon others, the possibility of this existence, its reality
+and necessity or opposites--all these form part of the cognition of
+reason on the ground of conceptions, and this cognition is termed
+philosophical. But to determine à priori an intuition in space (its
+figure), to divide time into periods, or merely to cognize the quantity
+of an intuition in space and time, and to determine it by number--all
+this is an operation of reason by means of the construction of
+conceptions, and is called mathematical.
+
+The success which attends the efforts of reason in the sphere of
+mathematics naturally fosters the expectation that the same good
+fortune will be its lot, if it applies the mathematical method in other
+regions of mental endeavour besides that of quantities. Its success is
+thus great, because it can support all its conceptions by à priori
+intuitions and, in this way, make itself a master, as it were, over
+nature; while pure philosophy, with its à priori discursive
+conceptions, bungles about in the world of nature, and cannot accredit
+or show any à priori evidence of the reality of these conceptions.
+Masters in the science of mathematics are confident of the success of
+this method; indeed, it is a common persuasion that it is capable of
+being applied to any subject of human thought. They have hardly ever
+reflected or philosophized on their favourite science--a task of great
+difficulty; and the specific difference between the two modes of
+employing the faculty of reason has never entered their thoughts. Rules
+current in the field of common experience, and which common sense
+stamps everywhere with its approval, are regarded by them as axiomatic.
+From what source the conceptions of space and time, with which (as the
+only primitive quanta) they have to deal, enter their minds, is a
+question which they do not trouble themselves to answer; and they think
+it just as unnecessary to examine into the origin of the pure
+conceptions of the understanding and the extent of their validity. All
+they have to do with them is to employ them. In all this they are
+perfectly right, if they do not overstep the limits of the sphere of
+nature. But they pass, unconsciously, from the world of sense to the
+insecure ground of pure transcendental conceptions (instabilis tellus,
+innabilis unda), where they can neither stand nor swim, and where the
+tracks of their footsteps are obliterated by time; while the march of
+mathematics is pursued on a broad and magnificent highway, which the
+latest posterity shall frequent without fear of danger or impediment.
+
+As we have taken upon us the task of determining, clearly and
+certainly, the limits of pure reason in the sphere of
+transcendentalism, and as the efforts of reason in this direction are
+persisted in, even after the plainest and most expressive warnings,
+hope still beckoning us past the limits of experience into the
+splendours of the intellectual world--it becomes necessary to cut away
+the last anchor of this fallacious and fantastic hope. We shall,
+accordingly, show that the mathematical method is unattended in the
+sphere of philosophy by the least advantage--except, perhaps, that it
+more plainly exhibits its own inadequacy--that geometry and philosophy
+are two quite different things, although they go hand in hand in the
+field of natural science, and, consequently, that the procedure of the
+one can never be imitated by the other.
+
+The evidence of mathematics rests upon definitions, axioms, and
+demonstrations. I shall be satisfied with showing that none of these
+forms can be employed or imitated in philosophy in the sense in which
+they are understood by mathematicians; and that the geometrician, if he
+employs his method in philosophy, will succeed only in building
+card-castles, while the employment of the philosophical method in
+mathematics can result in nothing but mere verbiage. The essential
+business of philosophy, indeed, is to mark out the limits of the
+science; and even the mathematician, unless his talent is naturally
+circumscribed and limited to this particular department of knowledge,
+cannot turn a deaf ear to the warnings of philosophy, or set himself
+above its direction.
+
+I. Of Definitions. A definition is, as the term itself indicates, the
+representation, upon primary grounds, of the complete conception of a
+thing within its own limits.[76] Accordingly, an empirical conception
+cannot be defined, it can only be explained. For, as there are in such
+a conception only a certain number of marks or signs, which denote a
+certain class of sensuous objects, we can never be sure that we do not
+cogitate under the word which indicates the same object, at one time a
+greater, at another a smaller number of signs. Thus, one person may
+cogitate in his conception of gold, in addition to its properties of
+weight, colour, malleability, that of resisting rust, while another
+person may be ignorant of this quality. We employ certain signs only so
+long as we require them for the sake of distinction; new observations
+abstract some and add new ones, so that an empirical conception never
+remains within permanent limits. It is, in fact, useless to define a
+conception of this kind. If, for example, we are speaking of water and
+its properties, we do not stop at what we actually think by the word
+water, but proceed to observation and experiment; and the word, with
+the few signs attached to it, is more properly a designation than a
+conception of the thing. A definition in this case would evidently be
+nothing more than a determination of the word. In the second place, no
+à priori conception, such as those of substance, cause, right, fitness,
+and so on, can be defined. For I can never be sure, that the clear
+representation of a given conception (which is given in a confused
+state) has been fully developed, until I know that the representation
+is adequate with its object. But, inasmuch as the conception, as it is
+presented to the mind, may contain a number of obscure representations,
+which we do not observe in our analysis, although we employ them in our
+application of the conception, I can never be sure that my analysis is
+complete, while examples may make this probable, although they can
+never demonstrate the fact. Instead of the word definition, I should
+rather employ the term exposition--a more modest expression, which the
+critic may accept without surrendering his doubts as to the
+completeness of the analysis of any such conception. As, therefore,
+neither empirical nor à priori conceptions are capable of definition,
+we have to see whether the only other kind of conceptions--arbitrary
+conceptions--can be subjected to this mental operation. Such a
+conception can always be defined; for I must know thoroughly what I
+wished to cogitate in it, as it was I who created it, and it was not
+given to my mind either by the nature of my understanding or by
+experience. At the same time, I cannot say that, by such a definition,
+I have defined a real object. If the conception is based upon empirical
+conditions, if, for example, I have a conception of a clock for a ship,
+this arbitrary conception does not assure me of the existence or even
+of the possibility of the object. My definition of such a conception
+would with more propriety be termed a declaration of a project than a
+definition of an object. There are no other conceptions which can bear
+definition, except those which contain an arbitrary synthesis, which
+can be constructed à priori. Consequently, the science of mathematics
+alone possesses definitions. For the object here thought is presented à
+priori in intuition; and thus it can never contain more or less than
+the conception, because the conception of the object has been given by
+the definition--and primarily, that is, without deriving the definition
+from any other source. Philosophical definitions are, therefore, merely
+expositions of given conceptions, while mathematical definitions are
+constructions of conceptions originally formed by the mind itself; the
+former are produced by analysis, the completeness of which is never
+demonstratively certain, the latter by a synthesis. In a mathematical
+definition the conception is formed, in a philosophical definition it
+is only explained. From this it follows:
+
+ [76] The definition must describe the conception completely that is,
+ omit none of the marks or signs of which it composed; within its own
+ limits, that is, it must be precise, and enumerate no more signs than
+ belong to the conception; and on primary grounds, that is to say, the
+ limitations of the bounds of the conception must not be deduced from
+ other conceptions, as in this case a proof would be necessary, and the
+ so-called definition would be incapable of taking its place at the
+ head of all the judgements we have to form regarding an object.
+
+(a) That we must not imitate, in philosophy, the mathematical usage of
+commencing with definitions--except by way of hypothesis or experiment.
+For, as all so-called philosophical definitions are merely analyses of
+given conceptions, these conceptions, although only in a confused form,
+must precede the analysis; and the incomplete exposition must precede
+the complete, so that we may be able to draw certain inferences from
+the characteristics which an incomplete analysis has enabled us to
+discover, before we attain to the complete exposition or definition of
+the conception. In one word, a full and clear definition ought, in
+philosophy, rather to form the conclusion than the commencement of our
+labours.[77] In mathematics, on the contrary, we cannot have a
+conception prior to the definition; it is the definition which gives us
+the conception, and it must for this reason form the commencement of
+every chain of mathematical reasoning.
+
+ [77] Philosophy abounds in faulty definitions, especially such as
+ contain some of the elements requisite to form a complete definition.
+ If a conception could not be employed in reasoning before it had been
+ defined, it would fare ill with all philosophical thought. But, as
+ incompletely defined conceptions may always be employed without
+ detriment to truth, so far as our analysis of the elements contained
+ in them proceeds, imperfect definitions, that is, propositions which
+ are properly not definitions, but merely approximations thereto, may
+ be used with great advantage. In mathematics, definition belongs ad
+ esse, in philosophy ad melius esse. It is a difficult task to
+ construct a proper definition. Jurists are still without a complete
+ definition of the idea of right.
+
+(b) Mathematical definitions cannot be erroneous. For the conception is
+given only in and through the definition, and thus it contains only
+what has been cogitated in the definition. But although a definition
+cannot be incorrect, as regards its content, an error may sometimes,
+although seldom, creep into the form. This error consists in a want of
+precision. Thus the common definition of a circle--that it is a curved
+line, every point in which is equally distant from another point called
+the centre--is faulty, from the fact that the determination indicated by
+the word curved is superfluous. For there ought to be a particular
+theorem, which may be easily proved from the definition, to the effect
+that every line, which has all its points at equal distances from
+another point, must be a curved line--that is, that not even the
+smallest part of it can be straight. Analytical definitions, on the
+other hand, may be erroneous in many respects, either by the
+introduction of signs which do not actually exist in the conception, or
+by wanting in that completeness which forms the essential of a
+definition. In the latter case, the definition is necessarily
+defective, because we can never be fully certain of the completeness of
+our analysis. For these reasons, the method of definition employed in
+mathematics cannot be imitated in philosophy.
+
+2. Of Axioms. These, in so far as they are immediately certain, are à
+priori synthetical principles. Now, one conception cannot be connected
+synthetically and yet immediately with another; because, if we wish to
+proceed out of and beyond a conception, a third mediating cognition is
+necessary. And, as philosophy is a cognition of reason by the aid of
+conceptions alone, there is to be found in it no principle which
+deserves to be called an axiom. Mathematics, on the other hand, may
+possess axioms, because it can always connect the predicates of an
+object à priori, and without any mediating term, by means of the
+construction of conceptions in intuition. Such is the case with the
+proposition: Three points can always lie in a plane. On the other hand,
+no synthetical principle which is based upon conceptions, can ever be
+immediately certain (for example, the proposition: Everything that
+happens has a cause), because I require a mediating term to connect the
+two conceptions of event and cause--namely, the condition of
+time-determination in an experience, and I cannot cognize any such
+principle immediately and from conceptions alone. Discursive principles
+are, accordingly, very different from intuitive principles or axioms.
+The former always require deduction, which in the case of the latter
+may be altogether dispensed with. Axioms are, for this reason, always
+self-evident, while philosophical principles, whatever may be the
+degree of certainty they possess, cannot lay any claim to such a
+distinction. No synthetical proposition of pure transcendental reason
+can be so evident, as is often rashly enough declared, as the
+statement, twice two are four. It is true that in the Analytic I
+introduced into the list of principles of the pure understanding,
+certain axioms of intuition; but the principle there discussed was not
+itself an axiom, but served merely to present the principle of the
+possibility of axioms in general, while it was really nothing more than
+a principle based upon conceptions. For it is one part of the duty of
+transcendental philosophy to establish the possibility of mathematics
+itself. Philosophy possesses, then, no axioms, and has no right to
+impose its à priori principles upon thought, until it has established
+their authority and validity by a thoroughgoing deduction.
+
+3. Of Demonstrations. Only an apodeictic proof, based upon intuition,
+can be termed a demonstration. Experience teaches us what is, but it
+cannot convince us that it might not have been otherwise. Hence a proof
+upon empirical grounds cannot be apodeictic. À priori conceptions, in
+discursive cognition, can never produce intuitive certainty or
+evidence, however certain the judgement they present may be.
+Mathematics alone, therefore, contains demonstrations, because it does
+not deduce its cognition from conceptions, but from the construction of
+conceptions, that is, from intuition, which can be given à priori in
+accordance with conceptions. The method of algebra, in equations, from
+which the correct answer is deduced by reduction, is a kind of
+construction--not geometrical, but by symbols--in which all conceptions,
+especially those of the relations of quantities, are represented in
+intuition by signs; and thus the conclusions in that science are
+secured from errors by the fact that every proof is submitted to ocular
+evidence. Philosophical cognition does not possess this advantage, it
+being required to consider the general always in abstracto (by means of
+conceptions), while mathematics can always consider it in concreto (in
+an individual intuition), and at the same time by means of à priori
+representation, whereby all errors are rendered manifest to the senses.
+The former--discursive proofs--ought to be termed acroamatic proofs,
+rather than demonstrations, as only words are employed in them, while
+demonstrations proper, as the term itself indicates, always require a
+reference to the intuition of the object.
+
+It follows from all these considerations that it is not consonant with
+the nature of philosophy, especially in the sphere of pure reason, to
+employ the dogmatical method, and to adorn itself with the titles and
+insignia of mathematical science. It does not belong to that order, and
+can only hope for a fraternal union with that science. Its attempts at
+mathematical evidence are vain pretensions, which can only keep it back
+from its true aim, which is to detect the illusory procedure of reason
+when transgressing its proper limits, and by fully explaining and
+analysing our conceptions, to conduct us from the dim regions of
+speculation to the clear region of modest self-knowledge. Reason must
+not, therefore, in its transcendental endeavours, look forward with
+such confidence, as if the path it is pursuing led straight to its aim,
+nor reckon with such security upon its premisses, as to consider it
+unnecessary to take a step back, or to keep a strict watch for errors,
+which, overlooked in the principles, may be detected in the arguments
+themselves--in which case it may be requisite either to determine these
+principles with greater strictness, or to change them entirely.
+
+I divide all apodeictic propositions, whether demonstrable or
+immediately certain, into dogmata and mathemata. A direct synthetical
+proposition, based on conceptions, is a dogma; a proposition of the
+same kind, based on the construction of conceptions, is a mathema.
+Analytical judgements do not teach us any more about an object than
+what was contained in the conception we had of it; because they do not
+extend our cognition beyond our conception of an object, they merely
+elucidate the conception. They cannot therefore be with propriety
+termed dogmas. Of the two kinds of à priori synthetical propositions
+above mentioned, only those which are employed in philosophy can,
+according to the general mode of speech, bear this name; those of
+arithmetic or geometry would not be rightly so denominated. Thus the
+customary mode of speaking confirms the explanation given above, and
+the conclusion arrived at, that only those judgements which are based
+upon conceptions, not on the construction of conceptions, can be termed
+dogmatical.
+
+Thus, pure reason, in the sphere of speculation, does not contain a
+single direct synthetical judgement based upon conceptions. By means of
+ideas, it is, as we have shown, incapable of producing synthetical
+judgements, which are objectively valid; by means of the conceptions of
+the understanding, it establishes certain indubitable principles, not,
+however, directly on the basis of conceptions, but only indirectly by
+means of the relation of these conceptions to something of a purely
+contingent nature, namely, possible experience. When experience is
+presupposed, these principles are apodeictically certain, but in
+themselves, and directly, they cannot even be cognized à priori. Thus
+the given conceptions of cause and event will not be sufficient for the
+demonstration of the proposition: Every event has a cause. For this
+reason, it is not a dogma; although from another point of view, that of
+experience, it is capable of being proved to demonstration. The proper
+term for such a proposition is principle, and not theorem (although it
+does require to be proved), because it possesses the remarkable
+peculiarity of being the condition of the possibility of its own ground
+of proof, that is, experience, and of forming a necessary
+presupposition in all empirical observation.
+
+If then, in the speculative sphere of pure reason, no dogmata are to be
+found; all dogmatical methods, whether borrowed from mathematics, or
+invented by philosophical thinkers, are alike inappropriate and
+inefficient. They only serve to conceal errors and fallacies, and to
+deceive philosophy, whose duty it is to see that reason pursues a safe
+and straight path. A philosophical method may, however, be
+systematical. For our reason is, subjectively considered, itself a
+system, and, in the sphere of mere conceptions, a system of
+investigation according to principles of unity, the material being
+supplied by experience alone. But this is not the proper place for
+discussing the peculiar method of transcendental philosophy, as our
+present task is simply to examine whether our faculties are capable of
+erecting an edifice on the basis of pure reason, and how far they may
+proceed with the materials at their command.
+
+Section II. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemics
+
+Reason must be subject, in all its operations, to criticism, which must
+always be permitted to exercise its functions without restraint;
+otherwise its interests are imperilled and its influence obnoxious to
+suspicion. There is nothing, however useful, however sacred it may be,
+that can claim exemption from the searching examination of this supreme
+tribunal, which has no respect of persons. The very existence of reason
+depends upon this freedom; for the voice of reason is not that of a
+dictatorial and despotic power, it is rather like the vote of the
+citizens of a free state, every member of which must have the privilege
+of giving free expression to his doubts, and possess even the right of
+veto.
+
+But while reason can never decline to submit itself to the tribunal of
+criticism, it has not always cause to dread the judgement of this
+court. Pure reason, however, when engaged in the sphere of dogmatism,
+is not so thoroughly conscious of a strict observance of its highest
+laws, as to appear before a higher judicial reason with perfect
+confidence. On the contrary, it must renounce its magnificent
+dogmatical pretensions in philosophy.
+
+Very different is the case when it has to defend itself, not before a
+judge, but against an equal. If dogmatical assertions are advanced on
+the negative side, in opposition to those made by reason on the
+positive side, its justification kat authrhopon is complete, although
+the proof of its propositions is kat aletheian unsatisfactory.
+
+By the polemic of pure reason I mean the defence of its propositions
+made by reason, in opposition to the dogmatical counter-propositions
+advanced by other parties. The question here is not whether its own
+statements may not also be false; it merely regards the fact that
+reason proves that the opposite cannot be established with
+demonstrative certainty, nor even asserted with a higher degree of
+probability. Reason does not hold her possessions upon sufferance; for,
+although she cannot show a perfectly satisfactory title to them, no one
+can prove that she is not the rightful possessor.
+
+It is a melancholy reflection that reason, in its highest exercise,
+falls into an antithetic; and that the supreme tribunal for the
+settlement of differences should not be at union with itself. It is
+true that we had to discuss the question of an apparent antithetic, but
+we found that it was based upon a misconception. In conformity with the
+common prejudice, phenomena were regarded as things in themselves, and
+thus an absolute completeness in their synthesis was required in the
+one mode or in the other (it was shown to be impossible in both); a
+demand entirely out of place in regard to phenomena. There was, then,
+no real self-contradiction of reason in the propositions: The series of
+phenomena given in themselves has an absolutely first beginning; and:
+This series is absolutely and in itself without beginning. The two
+propositions are perfectly consistent with each other, because
+phenomena as phenomena are in themselves nothing, and consequently the
+hypothesis that they are things in themselves must lead to
+self-contradictory inferences.
+
+But there are cases in which a similar misunderstanding cannot be
+provided against, and the dispute must remain unsettled. Take, for
+example, the theistic proposition: There is a Supreme Being; and on the
+other hand, the atheistic counter-statement: There exists no Supreme
+Being; or, in psychology: Everything that thinks possesses the
+attribute of absolute and permanent unity, which is utterly different
+from the transitory unity of material phenomena; and the
+counter-proposition: The soul is not an immaterial unity, and its
+nature is transitory, like that of phenomena. The objects of these
+questions contain no heterogeneous or contradictory elements, for they
+relate to things in themselves, and not to phenomena. There would
+arise, indeed, a real contradiction, if reason came forward with a
+statement on the negative side of these questions alone. As regards the
+criticism to which the grounds of proof on the affirmative side must be
+subjected, it may be freely admitted, without necessitating the
+surrender of the affirmative propositions, which have, at least, the
+interest of reason in their favour--an advantage which the opposite
+party cannot lay claim to.
+
+I cannot agree with the opinion of several admirable thinkers--Sulzer
+among the rest--that, in spite of the weakness of the arguments hitherto
+in use, we may hope, one day, to see sufficient demonstrations of the
+two cardinal propositions of pure reason--the existence of a Supreme
+Being, and the immortality of the soul. I am certain, on the contrary,
+that this will never be the case. For on what ground can reason base
+such synthetical propositions, which do not relate to the objects of
+experience and their internal possibility? But it is also
+demonstratively certain that no one will ever be able to maintain the
+contrary with the least show of probability. For, as he can attempt
+such a proof solely upon the basis of pure reason, he is bound to prove
+that a Supreme Being, and a thinking subject in the character of a pure
+intelligence, are impossible. But where will he find the knowledge
+which can enable him to enounce synthetical judgements in regard to
+things which transcend the region of experience? We may, therefore,
+rest assured that the opposite never will be demonstrated. We need not,
+then, have recourse to scholastic arguments; we may always admit the
+truth of those propositions which are consistent with the speculative
+interests of reason in the sphere of experience, and form, moreover,
+the only means of uniting the speculative with the practical interest.
+Our opponent, who must not be considered here as a critic solely, we
+can be ready to meet with a non liquet which cannot fail to disconcert
+him; while we cannot deny his right to a similar retort, as we have on
+our side the advantage of the support of the subjective maxim of
+reason, and can therefore look upon all his sophistical arguments with
+calm indifference.
+
+From this point of view, there is properly no antithetic of pure
+reason. For the only arena for such a struggle would be upon the field
+of pure theology and psychology; but on this ground there can appear no
+combatant whom we need to fear. Ridicule and boasting can be his only
+weapons; and these may be laughed at, as mere child's play. This
+consideration restores to Reason her courage; for what source of
+confidence could be found, if she, whose vocation it is to destroy
+error, were at variance with herself and without any reasonable hope of
+ever reaching a state of permanent repose?
+
+Everything in nature is good for some purpose. Even poisons are
+serviceable; they destroy the evil effects of other poisons generated
+in our system, and must always find a place in every complete
+pharmacopoeia. The objections raised against the fallacies and
+sophistries of speculative reason, are objections given by the nature
+of this reason itself, and must therefore have a destination and
+purpose which can only be for the good of humanity. For what purpose
+has Providence raised many objects, in which we have the deepest
+interest, so far above us, that we vainly try to cognize them with
+certainty, and our powers of mental vision are rather excited than
+satisfied by the glimpses we may chance to seize? It is very doubtful
+whether it is for our benefit to advance bold affirmations regarding
+subjects involved in such obscurity; perhaps it would even be
+detrimental to our best interests. But it is undoubtedly always
+beneficial to leave the investigating, as well as the critical reason,
+in perfect freedom, and permit it to take charge of its own interests,
+which are advanced as much by its limitation, as by its extension of
+its views, and which always suffer by the interference of foreign
+powers forcing it, against its natural tendencies, to bend to certain
+preconceived designs.
+
+Allow your opponent to say what he thinks reasonable, and combat him
+only with the weapons of reason. Have no anxiety for the practical
+interests of humanity--these are never imperilled in a purely
+speculative dispute. Such a dispute serves merely to disclose the
+antinomy of reason, which, as it has its source in the nature of
+reason, ought to be thoroughly investigated. Reason is benefited by the
+examination of a subject on both sides, and its judgements are
+corrected by being limited. It is not the matter that may give occasion
+to dispute, but the manner. For it is perfectly permissible to employ,
+in the presence of reason, the language of a firmly rooted faith, even
+after we have been obliged to renounce all pretensions to knowledge.
+
+If we were to ask the dispassionate David Hume--a philosopher endowed,
+in a degree that few are, with a well-balanced judgement: What motive
+induced you to spend so much labour and thought in undermining the
+consoling and beneficial persuasion that reason is capable of assuring
+us of the existence, and presenting us with a determinate conception of
+a Supreme Being?--his answer would be: Nothing but the desire of
+teaching reason to know its own powers better, and, at the same time, a
+dislike of the procedure by which that faculty was compelled to support
+foregone conclusions, and prevented from confessing the internal
+weaknesses which it cannot but feel when it enters upon a rigid
+self-examination. If, on the other hand, we were to ask Priestley--a
+philosopher who had no taste for transcendental speculation, but was
+entirely devoted to the principles of empiricism--what his motives were
+for overturning those two main pillars of religion--the doctrines of the
+freedom of the will and the immortality of the soul (in his view the
+hope of a future life is but the expectation of the miracle of
+resurrection)--this philosopher, himself a zealous and pious teacher of
+religion, could give no other answer than this: I acted in the interest
+of reason, which always suffers, when certain objects are explained and
+judged by a reference to other supposed laws than those of material
+nature--the only laws which we know in a determinate manner. It would be
+unfair to decry the latter philosopher, who endeavoured to harmonize
+his paradoxical opinions with the interests of religion, and to
+undervalue an honest and reflecting man, because he finds himself at a
+loss the moment he has left the field of natural science. The same
+grace must be accorded to Hume, a man not less well-disposed, and quite
+as blameless in his moral character, and who pushed his abstract
+speculations to an extreme length, because, as he rightly believed, the
+object of them lies entirely beyond the bounds of natural science, and
+within the sphere of pure ideas.
+
+What is to be done to provide against the danger which seems in the
+present case to menace the best interests of humanity? The course to be
+pursued in reference to this subject is a perfectly plain and natural
+one. Let each thinker pursue his own path; if he shows talent, if he
+gives evidence of profound thought, in one word, if he shows that he
+possesses the power of reasoning--reason is always the gainer. If you
+have recourse to other means, if you attempt to coerce reason, if you
+raise the cry of treason to humanity, if you excite the feelings of the
+crowd, which can neither understand nor sympathize with such subtle
+speculations--you will only make yourselves ridiculous. For the question
+does not concern the advantage or disadvantage which we are expected to
+reap from such inquiries; the question is merely how far reason can
+advance in the field of speculation, apart from all kinds of interest,
+and whether we may depend upon the exertions of speculative reason, or
+must renounce all reliance on it. Instead of joining the combatants, it
+is your part to be a tranquil spectator of the struggle--a laborious
+struggle for the parties engaged, but attended, in its progress as well
+as in its result, with the most advantageous consequences for the
+interests of thought and knowledge. It is absurd to expect to be
+enlightened by Reason, and at the same time to prescribe to her what
+side of the question she must adopt. Moreover, reason is sufficiently
+held in check by its own power, the limits imposed on it by its own
+nature are sufficient; it is unnecessary for you to place over it
+additional guards, as if its power were dangerous to the constitution
+of the intellectual state. In the dialectic of reason there is no
+victory gained which need in the least disturb your tranquility.
+
+The strife of dialectic is a necessity of reason, and we cannot but
+wish that it had been conducted long ere this with that perfect freedom
+which ought to be its essential condition. In this case, we should have
+had at an earlier period a matured and profound criticism, which must
+have put an end to all dialectical disputes, by exposing the illusions
+and prejudices in which they originated.
+
+There is in human nature an unworthy propensity--a propensity which,
+like everything that springs from nature, must in its final purpose be
+conducive to the good of humanity--to conceal our real sentiments, and
+to give expression only to certain received opinions, which are
+regarded as at once safe and promotive of the common good. It is true,
+this tendency, not only to conceal our real sentiments, but to profess
+those which may gain us favour in the eyes of society, has not only
+civilized, but, in a certain measure, moralized us; as no one can break
+through the outward covering of respectability, honour, and morality,
+and thus the seemingly-good examples which we see around us form an
+excellent school for moral improvement, so long as our belief in their
+genuineness remains unshaken. But this disposition to represent
+ourselves as better than we are, and to utter opinions which are not
+our own, can be nothing more than a kind of provisionary arrangement of
+nature to lead us from the rudeness of an uncivilized state, and to
+teach us how to assume at least the appearance and manner of the good
+we see. But when true principles have been developed, and have obtained
+a sure foundation in our habit of thought, this conventionalism must be
+attacked with earnest vigour, otherwise it corrupts the heart, and
+checks the growth of good dispositions with the mischievous weed of
+fair appearances.
+
+I am sorry to remark the same tendency to misrepresentation and
+hypocrisy in the sphere of speculative discussion, where there is less
+temptation to restrain the free expression of thought. For what can be
+more prejudicial to the interests of intelligence than to falsify our
+real sentiments, to conceal the doubts which we feel in regard to our
+statements, or to maintain the validity of grounds of proof which we
+well know to be insufficient? So long as mere personal vanity is the
+source of these unworthy artifices--and this is generally the case in
+speculative discussions, which are mostly destitute of practical
+interest, and are incapable of complete demonstration--the vanity of the
+opposite party exaggerates as much on the other side; and thus the
+result is the same, although it is not brought about so soon as if the
+dispute had been conducted in a sincere and upright spirit. But where
+the mass entertains the notion that the aim of certain subtle
+speculators is nothing less than to shake the very foundations of
+public welfare and morality--it seems not only prudent, but even praise
+worthy, to maintain the good cause by illusory arguments, rather than
+to give to our supposed opponents the advantage of lowering our
+declarations to the moderate tone of a merely practical conviction, and
+of compelling us to confess our inability to attain to apodeictic
+certainty in speculative subjects. But we ought to reflect that there
+is nothing, in the world more fatal to the maintenance of a good cause
+than deceit, misrepresentation, and falsehood. That the strictest laws
+of honesty should be observed in the discussion of a purely speculative
+subject is the least requirement that can be made. If we could reckon
+with security even upon so little, the conflict of speculative reason
+regarding the important questions of God, immortality, and freedom,
+would have been either decided long ago, or would very soon be brought
+to a conclusion. But, in general, the uprightness of the defence stands
+in an inverse ratio to the goodness of the cause; and perhaps more
+honesty and fairness are shown by those who deny than by those who
+uphold these doctrines.
+
+I shall persuade myself, then, that I have readers who do not wish to
+see a righteous cause defended by unfair arguments. Such will now
+recognize the fact that, according to the principles of this Critique,
+if we consider not what is, but what ought to be the case, there can be
+really no polemic of pure reason. For how can two persons dispute about
+a thing, the reality of which neither can present in actual or even in
+possible experience? Each adopts the plan of meditating on his idea for
+the purpose of drawing from the idea, if he can, what is more than the
+idea, that is, the reality of the object which it indicates. How shall
+they settle the dispute, since neither is able to make his assertions
+directly comprehensible and certain, but must restrict himself to
+attacking and confuting those of his opponent? All statements enounced
+by pure reason transcend the conditions of possible experience, beyond
+the sphere of which we can discover no criterion of truth, while they
+are at the same time framed in accordance with the laws of the
+understanding, which are applicable only to experience; and thus it is
+the fate of all such speculative discussions that while the one party
+attacks the weaker side of his opponent, he infallibly lays open his
+own weaknesses.
+
+The critique of pure reason may be regarded as the highest tribunal for
+all speculative disputes; for it is not involved in these disputes,
+which have an immediate relation to certain objects and not to the laws
+of the mind, but is instituted for the purpose of determining the
+rights and limits of reason.
+
+Without the control of criticism, reason is, as it were, in a state of
+nature, and can only establish its claims and assertions by war.
+Criticism, on the contrary, deciding all questions according to the
+fundamental laws of its own institution, secures to us the peace of law
+and order, and enables us to discuss all differences in the more
+tranquil manner of a legal process. In the former case, disputes are
+ended by victory, which both sides may claim and which is followed by a
+hollow armistice; in the latter, by a sentence, which, as it strikes at
+the root of all speculative differences, ensures to all concerned a
+lasting peace. The endless disputes of a dogmatizing reason compel us
+to look for some mode of arriving at a settled decision by a critical
+investigation of reason itself; just as Hobbes maintains that the state
+of nature is a state of injustice and violence, and that we must leave
+it and submit ourselves to the constraint of law, which indeed limits
+individual freedom, but only that it may consist with the freedom of
+others and with the common good of all.
+
+This freedom will, among other things, permit of our openly stating the
+difficulties and doubts which we are ourselves unable to solve, without
+being decried on that account as turbulent and dangerous citizens. This
+privilege forms part of the native rights of human reason, which
+recognizes no other judge than the universal reason of humanity; and as
+this reason is the source of all progress and improvement, such a
+privilege is to be held sacred and inviolable. It is unwise, moreover,
+to denounce as dangerous any bold assertions against, or rash attacks
+upon, an opinion which is held by the largest and most moral class of
+the community; for that would be giving them an importance which they
+do not deserve. When I hear that the freedom of the will, the hope of a
+future life, and the existence of God have been overthrown by the
+arguments of some able writer, I feel a strong desire to read his book;
+for I expect that he will add to my knowledge and impart greater
+clearness and distinctness to my views by the argumentative power shown
+in his writings. But I am perfectly certain, even before I have opened
+the book, that he has not succeeded in a single point, not because I
+believe I am in possession of irrefutable demonstrations of these
+important propositions, but because this transcendental critique, which
+has disclosed to me the power and the limits of pure reason, has fully
+convinced me that, as it is insufficient to establish the affirmative,
+it is as powerless, and even more so, to assure us of the truth of the
+negative answer to these questions. From what source does this
+free-thinker derive his knowledge that there is, for example, no
+Supreme Being? This proposition lies out of the field of possible
+experience, and, therefore, beyond the limits of human cognition. But I
+would not read at, all the answer which the dogmatical maintainer of
+the good cause makes to his opponent, because I know well beforehand,
+that he will merely attack the fallacious grounds of his adversary,
+without being able to establish his own assertions. Besides, a new
+illusory argument, in the construction of which talent and acuteness
+are shown, is suggestive of new ideas and new trains of reasoning, and
+in this respect the old and everyday sophistries are quite useless.
+Again, the dogmatical opponent of religion gives employment to
+criticism, and enables us to test and correct its principles, while
+there is no occasion for anxiety in regard to the influence and results
+of his reasoning.
+
+But, it will be said, must we not warn the youth entrusted to
+academical care against such writings, must we not preserve them from
+the knowledge of these dangerous assertions, until their judgement is
+ripened, or rather until the doctrines which we wish to inculcate are
+so firmly rooted in their minds as to withstand all attempts at
+instilling the contrary dogmas, from whatever quarter they may come?
+
+If we are to confine ourselves to the dogmatical procedure in the
+sphere of pure reason, and find ourselves unable to settle such
+disputes otherwise than by becoming a party in them, and setting
+counter-assertions against the statements advanced by our opponents,
+there is certainly no plan more advisable for the moment, but, at the
+same time, none more absurd and inefficient for the future, than this
+retaining of the youthful mind under guardianship for a time, and thus
+preserving it--for so long at least--from seduction into error. But when,
+at a later period, either curiosity, or the prevalent fashion of
+thought places such writings in their hands, will the so-called
+convictions of their youth stand firm? The young thinker, who has in
+his armoury none but dogmatical weapons with which to resist the
+attacks of his opponent, and who cannot detect the latent dialectic
+which lies in his own opinions as well as in those of the opposite
+party, sees the advance of illusory arguments and grounds of proof
+which have the advantage of novelty, against as illusory grounds of
+proof destitute of this advantage, and which, perhaps, excite the
+suspicion that the natural credulity of his youth has been abused by
+his instructors. He thinks he can find no better means of showing that
+he has out grown the discipline of his minority than by despising those
+well-meant warnings, and, knowing no system of thought but that of
+dogmatism, he drinks deep draughts of the poison that is to sap the
+principles in which his early years were trained.
+
+Exactly the opposite of the system here recommended ought to be pursued
+in academical instruction. This can only be effected, however, by a
+thorough training in the critical investigation of pure reason. For, in
+order to bring the principles of this critique into exercise as soon as
+possible, and to demonstrate their perfect even in the presence of the
+highest degree of dialectical illusion, the student ought to examine
+the assertions made on both sides of speculative questions step by
+step, and to test them by these principles. It cannot be a difficult
+task for him to show the fallacies inherent in these propositions, and
+thus he begins early to feel his own power of securing himself against
+the influence of such sophistical arguments, which must finally lose,
+for him, all their illusory power. And, although the same blows which
+overturn the edifice of his opponent are as fatal to his own
+speculative structures, if such he has wished to rear; he need not feel
+any sorrow in regard to this seeming misfortune, as he has now before
+him a fair prospect into the practical region in which he may
+reasonably hope to find a more secure foundation for a rational system.
+
+There is, accordingly, no proper polemic in the sphere of pure reason.
+Both parties beat the air and fight with their own shadows, as they
+pass beyond the limits of nature, and can find no tangible point of
+attack--no firm footing for their dogmatical conflict. Fight as
+vigorously as they may, the shadows which they hew down, immediately
+start up again, like the heroes in Walhalla, and renew the bloodless
+and unceasing contest.
+
+But neither can we admit that there is any proper sceptical employment
+of pure reason, such as might be based upon the principle of neutrality
+in all speculative disputes. To excite reason against itself, to place
+weapons in the hands of the party on the one side as well as in those
+of the other, and to remain an undisturbed and sarcastic spectator of
+the fierce struggle that ensues, seems, from the dogmatical point of
+view, to be a part fitting only a malevolent disposition. But, when the
+sophist evidences an invincible obstinacy and blindness, and a pride
+which no criticism can moderate, there is no other practicable course
+than to oppose to this pride and obstinacy similar feelings and
+pretensions on the other side, equally well or ill founded, so that
+reason, staggered by the reflections thus forced upon it, finds it
+necessary to moderate its confidence in such pretensions and to listen
+to the advice of criticism. But we cannot stop at these doubts, much
+less regard the conviction of our ignorance, not only as a cure for the
+conceit natural to dogmatism, but as the settlement of the disputes in
+which reason is involved with itself. On the contrary, scepticism is
+merely a means of awakening reason from its dogmatic dreams and
+exciting it to a more careful investigation into its own powers and
+pretensions. But, as scepticism appears to be the shortest road to a
+permanent peace in the domain of philosophy, and as it is the track
+pursued by the many who aim at giving a philosophical colouring to
+their contemptuous dislike of all inquiries of this kind, I think it
+necessary to present to my readers this mode of thought in its true
+light.
+
+_Scepticism not a Permanent State for Human Reason._
+
+The consciousness of ignorance--unless this ignorance is recognized to
+be absolutely necessary ought, instead of forming the conclusion of my
+inquiries, to be the strongest motive to the pursuit of them. All
+ignorance is either ignorance of things or of the limits of knowledge.
+If my ignorance is accidental and not necessary, it must incite me, in
+the first case, to a dogmatical inquiry regarding the objects of which
+I am ignorant; in the second, to a critical investigation into the
+bounds of all possible knowledge. But that my ignorance is absolutely
+necessary and unavoidable, and that it consequently absolves from the
+duty of all further investigation, is a fact which cannot be made out
+upon empirical grounds--from observation--but upon critical grounds
+alone, that is, by a thoroughgoing investigation into the primary
+sources of cognition. It follows that the determination of the bounds
+of reason can be made only on à priori grounds; while the empirical
+limitation of reason, which is merely an indeterminate cognition of an
+ignorance that can never be completely removed, can take place only à
+posteriori. In other words, our empirical knowledge is limited by that
+which yet remains for us to know. The former cognition of our
+ignorance, which is possible only on a rational basis, is a science;
+the latter is merely a perception, and we cannot say how far the
+inferences drawn from it may extend. If I regard the earth, as it
+really appears to my senses, as a flat surface, I am ignorant how far
+this surface extends. But experience teaches me that, how far soever I
+go, I always see before me a space in which I can proceed farther; and
+thus I know the limits--merely visual--of my actual knowledge of the
+earth, although I am ignorant of the limits of the earth itself. But if
+I have got so far as to know that the earth is a sphere, and that its
+surface is spherical, I can cognize à priori and determine upon
+principles, from my knowledge of a small part of this surface--say to
+the extent of a degree--the diameter and circumference of the earth; and
+although I am ignorant of the objects which this surface contains, I
+have a perfect knowledge of its limits and extent.
+
+The sum of all the possible objects of our cognition seems to us to be
+a level surface, with an apparent horizon--that which forms the limit of
+its extent, and which has been termed by us the idea of unconditioned
+totality. To reach this limit by empirical means is impossible, and all
+attempts to determine it à priori according to a principle, are alike
+in vain. But all the questions raised by pure reason relate to that
+which lies beyond this horizon, or, at least, in its boundary line.
+
+The celebrated David Hume was one of those geographers of human reason
+who believe that they have given a sufficient answer to all such
+questions by declaring them to lie beyond the horizon of our
+knowledge--a horizon which, however, Hume was unable to determine. His
+attention especially was directed to the principle of causality; and he
+remarked with perfect justice that the truth of this principle, and
+even the objective validity of the conception of a cause, was not
+commonly based upon clear insight, that is, upon à priori cognition.
+Hence he concluded that this law does not derive its authority from its
+universality and necessity, but merely from its general applicability
+in the course of experience, and a kind of subjective necessity thence
+arising, which he termed habit. From the inability of reason to
+establish this principle as a necessary law for the acquisition of all
+experience, he inferred the nullity of all the attempts of reason to
+pass the region of the empirical.
+
+This procedure of subjecting the facta of reason to examination, and,
+if necessary, to disapproval, may be termed the censura of reason. This
+censura must inevitably lead us to doubts regarding all transcendent
+employment of principles. But this is only the second step in our
+inquiry. The first step in regard to the subjects of pure reason, and
+which marks the infancy of that faculty, is that of dogmatism. The
+second, which we have just mentioned, is that of scepticism, and it
+gives evidence that our judgement has been improved by experience. But
+a third step is necessary--indicative of the maturity and manhood of the
+judgement, which now lays a firm foundation upon universal and
+necessary principles. This is the period of criticism, in which we do
+not examine the facta of reason, but reason itself, in the whole extent
+of its powers, and in regard to its capability of à priori cognition;
+and thus we determine not merely the empirical and ever-shifting bounds
+of our knowledge, but its necessary and eternal limits. We demonstrate
+from indubitable principles, not merely our ignorance in respect to
+this or that subject, but in regard to all possible questions of a
+certain class. Thus scepticism is a resting place for reason, in which
+it may reflect on its dogmatical wanderings and gain some knowledge of
+the region in which it happens to be, that it may pursue its way with
+greater certainty; but it cannot be its permanent dwelling-place. It
+must take up its abode only in the region of complete certitude,
+whether this relates to the cognition of objects themselves, or to the
+limits which bound all our cognition.
+
+Reason is not to be considered as an indefinitely extended plane, of
+the bounds of which we have only a general knowledge; it ought rather
+to be compared to a sphere, the radius of which may be found from the
+curvature of its surface--that is, the nature of à priori synthetical
+propositions--and, consequently, its circumference and extent. Beyond
+the sphere of experience there are no objects which it can cognize;
+nay, even questions regarding such supposititious objects relate only
+to the subjective principles of a complete determination of the
+relations which exist between the understanding-conceptions which lie
+within this sphere.
+
+We are actually in possession of à priori synthetical cognitions, as is
+proved by the existence of the principles of the understanding, which
+anticipate experience. If any one cannot comprehend the possibility of
+these principles, he may have some reason to doubt whether they are
+really à priori; but he cannot on this account declare them to be
+impossible, and affirm the nullity of the steps which reason may have
+taken under their guidance. He can only say: If we perceived their
+origin and their authenticity, we should be able to determine the
+extent and limits of reason; but, till we can do this, all propositions
+regarding the latter are mere random assertions. In this view, the
+doubt respecting all dogmatical philosophy, which proceeds without the
+guidance of criticism, is well grounded; but we cannot therefore deny
+to reason the ability to construct a sound philosophy, when the way has
+been prepared by a thorough critical investigation. All the conceptions
+produced, and all the questions raised, by pure reason, do not lie in
+the sphere of experience, but in that of reason itself, and hence they
+must be solved, and shown to be either valid or inadmissible, by that
+faculty. We have no right to decline the solution of such problems, on
+the ground that the solution can be discovered only from the nature of
+things, and under pretence of the limitation of human faculties, for
+reason is the sole creator of all these ideas, and is therefore bound
+either to establish their validity or to expose their illusory nature.
+
+The polemic of scepticism is properly directed against the dogmatist,
+who erects a system of philosophy without having examined the
+fundamental objective principles on which it is based, for the purpose
+of evidencing the futility of his designs, and thus bringing him to a
+knowledge of his own powers. But, in itself, scepticism does not give
+us any certain information in regard to the bounds of our knowledge.
+All unsuccessful dogmatical attempts of reason are facia, which it is
+always useful to submit to the censure of the sceptic. But this cannot
+help us to any decision regarding the expectations which reason
+cherishes of better success in future endeavours; the investigations of
+scepticism cannot, therefore, settle the dispute regarding the rights
+and powers of human reason.
+
+Hume is perhaps the ablest and most ingenious of all sceptical
+philosophers, and his writings have, undoubtedly, exerted the most
+powerful influence in awakening reason to a thorough investigation into
+its own powers. It will, therefore, well repay our labours to consider
+for a little the course of reasoning which he followed and the errors
+into which he strayed, although setting out on the path of truth and
+certitude.
+
+Hume was probably aware, although he never clearly developed the
+notion, that we proceed in judgements of a certain class beyond our
+conception of the object. I have termed this kind of judgement
+synthetical. As regard the manner in which I pass beyond my conception
+by the aid of experience, no doubts can be entertained. Experience is
+itself a synthesis of perceptions; and it employs perceptions to
+increment the conception, which I obtain by means of another
+perception. But we feel persuaded that we are able to proceed beyond a
+conception, and to extend our cognition à priori. We attempt this in
+two ways--either, through the pure understanding, in relation to that
+which may become an object of experience, or, through pure reason, in
+relation to such properties of things, or of the existence of things,
+as can never be presented in any experience. This sceptical philosopher
+did not distinguish these two kinds of judgements, as he ought to have
+done, but regarded this augmentation of conceptions, and, if we may so
+express ourselves, the spontaneous generation of understanding and
+reason, independently of the impregnation of experience, as altogether
+impossible. The so-called à priori principles of these faculties he
+consequently held to be invalid and imaginary, and regarded them as
+nothing but subjective habits of thought originating in experience, and
+therefore purely empirical and contingent rules, to which we attribute
+a spurious necessity and universality. In support of this strange
+assertion, he referred us to the generally acknowledged principle of
+the relation between cause and effect. No faculty of the mind can
+conduct us from the conception of a thing to the existence of something
+else; and hence he believed he could infer that, without experience, we
+possess no source from which we can augment a conception, and no ground
+sufficient to justify us in framing a judgement that is to extend our
+cognition à priori. That the light of the sun, which shines upon a
+piece of wax, at the same time melts it, while it hardens clay, no
+power of the understanding could infer from the conceptions which we
+previously possessed of these substances; much less is there any à
+priori law that could conduct us to such a conclusion, which experience
+alone can certify. On the other hand, we have seen in our discussion of
+transcendental logic, that, although we can never proceed immediately
+beyond the content of the conception which is given us, we can always
+cognize completely à priori--in relation, however, to a third term,
+namely, possible experience--the law of its connection with other
+things. For example, if I observe that a piece of wax melts, I can
+cognize à priori that there must have been something (the sun's heat)
+preceding, which this law; although, without the aid of experience, I
+could not cognize à priori and in a determinate manner either the cause
+from the effect, or the effect from the cause. Hume was, therefore,
+wrong in inferring, from the contingency of the determination according
+to law, the contingency of the law itself; and the passing beyond the
+conception of a thing to possible experience (which is an à priori
+proceeding, constituting the objective reality of the conception), he
+confounded with our synthesis of objects in actual experience, which is
+always, of course, empirical. Thus, too, he regarded the principle of
+affinity, which has its seat in the understanding and indicates a
+necessary connection, as a mere rule of association, lying in the
+imitative faculty of imagination, which can present only contingent,
+and not objective connections.
+
+The sceptical errors of this remarkably acute thinker arose principally
+from a defect, which was common to him with the dogmatists, namely,
+that he had never made a systematic review of all the different kinds
+of à priori synthesis performed by the understanding. Had he done so,
+he would have found, to take one example among many, that the principle
+of permanence was of this character, and that it, as well as the
+principle of causality, anticipates experience. In this way he might
+have been able to describe the determinate limits of the à priori
+operations of understanding and reason. But he merely declared the
+understanding to be limited, instead of showing what its limits were;
+he created a general mistrust in the power of our faculties, without
+giving us any determinate knowledge of the bounds of our necessary and
+unavoidable ignorance; he examined and condemned some of the principles
+of the understanding, without investigating all its powers with the
+completeness necessary to criticism. He denies, with truth, certain
+powers to the understanding, but he goes further, and declares it to be
+utterly inadequate to the à priori extension of knowledge, although he
+has not fully examined all the powers which reside in the faculty; and
+thus the fate which always overtakes scepticism meets him too. That is
+to say, his own declarations are doubted, for his objections were based
+upon facta, which are contingent, and not upon principles, which can
+alone demonstrate the necessary invalidity of all dogmatical
+assertions.
+
+As Hume makes no distinction between the well-grounded claims of the
+understanding and the dialectical pretensions of reason, against which,
+however, his attacks are mainly directed, reason does not feel itself
+shut out from all attempts at the extension of à priori cognition, and
+hence it refuses, in spite of a few checks in this or that quarter, to
+relinquish such efforts. For one naturally arms oneself to resist an
+attack, and becomes more obstinate in the resolve to establish the
+claims he has advanced. But a complete review of the powers of reason,
+and the conviction thence arising that we are in possession of a
+limited field of action, while we must admit the vanity of higher
+claims, puts an end to all doubt and dispute, and induces reason to
+rest satisfied with the undisturbed possession of its limited domain.
+
+To the uncritical dogmatist, who has not surveyed the sphere of his
+understanding, nor determined, in accordance with principles, the
+limits of possible cognition, who, consequently, is ignorant of his own
+powers, and believes he will discover them by the attempts he makes in
+the field of cognition, these attacks of scepticism are not only
+dangerous, but destructive. For if there is one proposition in his
+chain of reasoning which he cannot prove, or the fallacy in which he
+cannot evolve in accordance with a principle, suspicion falls on all
+his statements, however plausible they may appear.
+
+And thus scepticism, the bane of dogmatical philosophy, conducts us to
+a sound investigation into the understanding and the reason. When we
+are thus far advanced, we need fear no further attacks; for the limits
+of our domain are clearly marked out, and we can make no claims nor
+become involved in any disputes regarding the region that lies beyond
+these limits. Thus the sceptical procedure in philosophy does not
+present any solution of the problems of reason, but it forms an
+excellent exercise for its powers, awakening its circumspection, and
+indicating the means whereby it may most fully establish its claims to
+its legitimate possessions.
+
+Section III. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Hypothesis
+
+This critique of reason has now taught us that all its efforts to
+extend the bounds of knowledge, by means of pure speculation, are
+utterly fruitless. So much the wider field, it may appear, lies open to
+hypothesis; as, where we cannot know with certainty, we are at liberty
+to make guesses and to form suppositions.
+
+Imagination may be allowed, under the strict surveillance of reason, to
+invent suppositions; but, these must be based on something that is
+perfectly certain--and that is the possibility of the object. If we are
+well assured upon this point, it is allowable to have recourse to
+supposition in regard to the reality of the object; but this
+supposition must, unless it is utterly groundless, be connected, as its
+ground of explanation, with that which is really given and absolutely
+certain. Such a supposition is termed a hypothesis.
+
+It is beyond our power to form the least conception à priori of the
+possibility of dynamical connection in phenomena; and the category of
+the pure understanding will not enable us to excogitate any such
+connection, but merely helps us to understand it, when we meet with it
+in experience. For this reason we cannot, in accordance with the
+categories, imagine or invent any object or any property of an object
+not given, or that may not be given in experience, and employ it in a
+hypothesis; otherwise, we should be basing our chain of reasoning upon
+mere chimerical fancies, and not upon conceptions of things. Thus, we
+have no right to assume the existence of new powers, not existing in
+nature--for example, an understanding with a non-sensuous intuition, a
+force of attraction without contact, or some new kind of substances
+occupying space, and yet without the property of impenetrability--and,
+consequently, we cannot assume that there is any other kind of
+community among substances than that observable in experience, any kind
+of presence than that in space, or any kind of duration than that in
+time. In one word, the conditions of possible experience are for reason
+the only conditions of the possibility of things; reason cannot venture
+to form, independently of these conditions, any conceptions of things,
+because such conceptions, although not self-contradictory, are without
+object and without application.
+
+The conceptions of reason are, as we have already shown, mere ideas,
+and do not relate to any object in any kind of experience. At the same
+time, they do not indicate imaginary or possible objects. They are
+purely problematical in their nature and, as aids to the heuristic
+exercise of the faculties, form the basis of the regulative principles
+for the systematic employment of the understanding in the field of
+experience. If we leave this ground of experience, they become mere
+fictions of thought, the possibility of which is quite indemonstrable;
+and they cannot, consequently, be employed as hypotheses in the
+explanation of real phenomena. It is quite admissible to cogitate the
+soul as simple, for the purpose of enabling ourselves to employ the
+idea of a perfect and necessary unity of all the faculties of the mind
+as the principle of all our inquiries into its internal phenomena,
+although we cannot cognize this unity in concreto. But to assume that
+the soul is a simple substance (a transcendental conception) would be
+enouncing a proposition which is not only indemonstrable--as many
+physical hypotheses are--but a proposition which is purely arbitrary,
+and in the highest degree rash. The simple is never presented in
+experience; and, if by substance is here meant the permanent object of
+sensuous intuition, the possibility of a simple phenomenon is perfectly
+inconceivable. Reason affords no good grounds for admitting the
+existence of intelligible beings, or of intelligible properties of
+sensuous things, although--as we have no conception either of their
+possibility or of their impossibility--it will always be out of our
+power to affirm dogmatically that they do not exist. In the explanation
+of given phenomena, no other things and no other grounds of explanation
+can be employed than those which stand in connection with the given
+phenomena according to the known laws of experience. A transcendental
+hypothesis, in which a mere idea of reason is employed to explain the
+phenomena of nature, would not give us any better insight into a
+phenomenon, as we should be trying to explain what we do not
+sufficiently understand from known empirical principles, by what we do
+not understand at all. The principles of such a hypothesis might
+conduce to the satisfaction of reason, but it would not assist the
+understanding in its application to objects. Order and conformity to
+aims in the sphere of nature must be themselves explained upon natural
+grounds and according to natural laws; and the wildest hypotheses, if
+they are only physical, are here more admissible than a hyperphysical
+hypothesis, such as that of a divine author. For such a hypothesis
+would introduce the principle of ignava ratio, which requires us to
+give up the search for causes that might be discovered in the course of
+experience and to rest satisfied with a mere idea. As regards the
+absolute totality of the grounds of explanation in the series of these
+causes, this can be no hindrance to the understanding in the case of
+phenomena; because, as they are to us nothing more than phenomena, we
+have no right to look for anything like completeness in the synthesis
+of the series of their conditions.
+
+Transcendental hypotheses are therefore inadmissible; and we cannot use
+the liberty of employing, in the absence of physical, hyperphysical
+grounds of explanation. And this for two reasons; first, because such
+hypothesis do not advance reason, but rather stop it in its progress;
+secondly, because this licence would render fruitless all its exertions
+in its own proper sphere, which is that of experience. For, when the
+explanation of natural phenomena happens to be difficult, we have
+constantly at hand a transcendental ground of explanation, which lifts
+us above the necessity of investigating nature; and our inquiries are
+brought to a close, not because we have obtained all the requisite
+knowledge, but because we abut upon a principle which is
+incomprehensible and which, indeed, is so far back in the track of
+thought as to contain the conception of the absolutely primal being.
+
+The next requisite for the admissibility of a hypothesis is its
+sufficiency. That is, it must determine à priori the consequences which
+are given in experience and which are supposed to follow from the
+hypothesis itself. If we require to employ auxiliary hypotheses, the
+suspicion naturally arises that they are mere fictions; because the
+necessity for each of them requires the same justification as in the
+case of the original hypothesis, and thus their testimony is invalid.
+If we suppose the existence of an infinitely perfect cause, we possess
+sufficient grounds for the explanation of the conformity to aims, the
+order and the greatness which we observe in the universe; but we find
+ourselves obliged, when we observe the evil in the world and the
+exceptions to these laws, to employ new hypothesis in support of the
+original one. We employ the idea of the simple nature of the human soul
+as the foundation of all the theories we may form of its phenomena; but
+when we meet with difficulties in our way, when we observe in the soul
+phenomena similar to the changes which take place in matter, we require
+to call in new auxiliary hypotheses. These may, indeed, not be false,
+but we do not know them to be true, because the only witness to their
+certitude is the hypothesis which they themselves have been called in
+to explain.
+
+We are not discussing the above-mentioned assertions regarding the
+immaterial unity of the soul and the existence of a Supreme Being as
+dogmata, which certain philosophers profess to demonstrate à priori,
+but purely as hypotheses. In the former case, the dogmatist must take
+care that his arguments possess the apodeictic certainty of a
+demonstration. For the assertion that the reality of such ideas is
+probable is as absurd as a proof of the probability of a proposition in
+geometry. Pure abstract reason, apart from all experience, can either
+cognize nothing at all; and hence the judgements it enounces are never
+mere opinions, they are either apodeictic certainties, or declarations
+that nothing can be known on the subject. Opinions and probable
+judgements on the nature of things can only be employed to explain
+given phenomena, or they may relate to the effect, in accordance with
+empirical laws, of an actually existing cause. In other words, we must
+restrict the sphere of opinion to the world of experience and nature.
+Beyond this region opinion is mere invention; unless we are groping
+about for the truth on a path not yet fully known, and have some hopes
+of stumbling upon it by chance.
+
+But, although hypotheses are inadmissible in answers to the questions
+of pure speculative reason, they may be employed in the defence of
+these answers. That is to say, hypotheses are admissible in polemic,
+but not in the sphere of dogmatism. By the defence of statements of
+this character, I do not mean an attempt at discovering new grounds for
+their support, but merely the refutation of the arguments of opponents.
+All à priori synthetical propositions possess the peculiarity that,
+although the philosopher who maintains the reality of the ideas
+contained in the proposition is not in possession of sufficient
+knowledge to establish the certainty of his statements, his opponent is
+as little able to prove the truth of the opposite. This equality of
+fortune does not allow the one party to be superior to the other in the
+sphere of speculative cognition; and it is this sphere, accordingly,
+that is the proper arena of these endless speculative conflicts. But we
+shall afterwards show that, in relation to its practical exercise,
+Reason has the right of admitting what, in the field of pure
+speculation, she would not be justified in supposing, except upon
+perfectly sufficient grounds; because all such suppositions destroy the
+necessary completeness of speculation--a condition which the practical
+reason, however, does not consider to be requisite. In this sphere,
+therefore, Reason is mistress of a possession, her title to which she
+does not require to prove--which, in fact, she could not do. The burden
+of proof accordingly rests upon the opponent. But as he has just as
+little knowledge regarding the subject discussed, and is as little able
+to prove the non-existence of the object of an idea, as the philosopher
+on the other side is to demonstrate its reality, it is evident that
+there is an advantage on the side of the philosopher who maintains his
+proposition as a practically necessary supposition (melior est conditio
+possidentis). For he is at liberty to employ, in self-defence, the same
+weapons as his opponent makes use of in attacking him; that is, he has
+a right to use hypotheses not for the purpose of supporting the
+arguments in favour of his own propositions, but to show that his
+opponent knows no more than himself regarding the subject under
+discussion and cannot boast of any speculative advantage.
+
+Hypotheses are, therefore, admissible in the sphere of pure reason only
+as weapons for self-defence, and not as supports to dogmatical
+assertions. But the opposing party we must always seek for in
+ourselves. For speculative reason is, in the sphere of
+transcendentalism, dialectical in its own nature. The difficulties and
+objections we have to fear lie in ourselves. They are like old but
+never superannuated claims; and we must seek them out, and settle them
+once and for ever, if we are to expect a permanent peace. External
+tranquility is hollow and unreal. The root of these contradictions,
+which lies in the nature of human reason, must be destroyed; and this
+can only be done by giving it, in the first instance, freedom to grow,
+nay, by nourishing it, that it may send out shoots, and thus betray its
+own existence. It is our duty, therefore, to try to discover new
+objections, to put weapons in the bands of our opponent, and to grant
+him the most favourable position in the arena that he can wish. We have
+nothing to fear from these concessions; on the contrary, we may rather
+hope that we shall thus make ourselves master of a possession which no
+one will ever venture to dispute.
+
+The thinker requires, to be fully equipped, the hypotheses of pure
+reason, which, although but leaden weapons (for they have not been
+steeled in the armoury of experience), are as useful as any that can be
+employed by his opponents. If, accordingly, we have assumed, from a
+non-speculative point of view, the immaterial nature of the soul, and
+are met by the objection that experience seems to prove that the growth
+and decay of our mental faculties are mere modifications of the
+sensuous organism--we can weaken the force of this objection by the
+assumption that the body is nothing but the fundamental phenomenon, to
+which, as a necessary condition, all sensibility, and consequently all
+thought, relates in the present state of our existence; and that the
+separation of soul and body forms the conclusion of the sensuous
+exercise of our power of cognition and the beginning of the
+intellectual. The body would, in this view of the question, be
+regarded, not as the cause of thought, but merely as its restrictive
+condition, as promotive of the sensuous and animal, but as a hindrance
+to the pure and spiritual life; and the dependence of the animal life
+on the constitution of the body, would not prove that the whole life of
+man was also dependent on the state of the organism. We might go still
+farther, and discover new objections, or carry out to their extreme
+consequences those which have already been adduced.
+
+Generation, in the human race as well as among the irrational animals,
+depends on so many accidents--of occasion, of proper sustenance, of the
+laws enacted by the government of a country of vice even, that it is
+difficult to believe in the eternal existence of a being whose life has
+begun under circumstances so mean and trivial, and so entirely
+dependent upon our own control. As regards the continuance of the
+existence of the whole race, we need have no difficulties, for accident
+in single cases is subject to general laws; but, in the case of each
+individual, it would seem as if we could hardly expect so wonderful an
+effect from causes so insignificant. But, in answer to these
+objections, we may adduce the transcendental hypothesis that all life
+is properly intelligible, and not subject to changes of time, and that
+it neither began in birth, nor will end in death. We may assume that
+this life is nothing more than a sensuous representation of pure
+spiritual life; that the whole world of sense is but an image, hovering
+before the faculty of cognition which we exercise in this sphere, and
+with no more objective reality than a dream; and that if we could
+intuite ourselves and other things as they really are, we should see
+ourselves in a world of spiritual natures, our connection with which
+did not begin at our birth and will not cease with the destruction of
+the body. And so on.
+
+We cannot be said to know what has been above asserted, nor do we
+seriously maintain the truth of these assertions; and the notions
+therein indicated are not even ideas of reason, they are purely
+fictitious conceptions. But this hypothetical procedure is in perfect
+conformity with the laws of reason. Our opponent mistakes the absence
+of empirical conditions for a proof of the complete impossibility of
+all that we have asserted; and we have to show him that he has not
+exhausted the whole sphere of possibility and that he can as little
+compass that sphere by the laws of experience and nature, as we can lay
+a secure foundation for the operations of reason beyond the region of
+experience. Such hypothetical defences against the pretensions of an
+opponent must not be regarded as declarations of opinion. The
+philosopher abandons them, so soon as the opposite party renounces its
+dogmatical conceit. To maintain a simply negative position in relation
+to propositions which rest on an insecure foundation, well befits the
+moderation of a true philosopher; but to uphold the objections urged
+against an opponent as proofs of the opposite statement is a proceeding
+just as unwarrantable and arrogant as it is to attack the position of a
+philosopher who advances affirmative propositions regarding such a
+subject.
+
+It is evident, therefore, that hypotheses, in the speculative sphere,
+are valid, not as independent propositions, but only relatively to
+opposite transcendent assumptions. For, to make the principles of
+possible experience conditions of the possibility of things in general
+is just as transcendent a procedure as to maintain the objective
+reality of ideas which can be applied to no objects except such as lie
+without the limits of possible experience. The judgements enounced by
+pure reason must be necessary, or they must not be enounced at all.
+Reason cannot trouble herself with opinions. But the hypotheses we have
+been discussing are merely problematical judgements, which can neither
+be confuted nor proved; while, therefore, they are not personal
+opinions, they are indispensable as answers to objections which are
+liable to be raised. But we must take care to confine them to this
+function, and guard against any assumption on their part of absolute
+validity, a proceeding which would involve reason in inextricable
+difficulties and contradictions.
+
+Section IV. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Relation to Proofs
+
+It is a peculiarity, which distinguishes the proofs of transcendental
+synthetical propositions from those of all other à priori synthetical
+cognitions, that reason, in the case of the former, does not apply its
+conceptions directly to an object, but is first obliged to prove, à
+priori, the objective validity of these conceptions and the possibility
+of their syntheses. This is not merely a prudential rule, it is
+essential to the very possibility of the proof of a transcendental
+proposition. If I am required to pass, à priori, beyond the conception
+of an object, I find that it is utterly impossible without the guidance
+of something which is not contained in the conception. In mathematics,
+it is à priori intuition that guides my synthesis; and, in this case,
+all our conclusions may be drawn immediately from pure intuition. In
+transcendental cognition, so long as we are dealing only with
+conceptions of the understanding, we are guided by possible experience.
+That is to say, a proof in the sphere of transcendental cognition does
+not show that the given conception (that of an event, for example)
+leads directly to another conception (that of a cause)--for this would
+be a saltus which nothing can justify; but it shows that experience
+itself, and consequently the object of experience, is impossible
+without the connection indicated by these conceptions. It follows that
+such a proof must demonstrate the possibility of arriving,
+synthetically and à priori, at a certain knowledge of things, which was
+not contained in our conceptions of these things. Unless we pay
+particular attention to this requirement, our proofs, instead of
+pursuing the straight path indicated by reason, follow the tortuous
+road of mere subjective association. The illusory conviction, which
+rests upon subjective causes of association, and which is considered as
+resulting from the perception of a real and objective natural affinity,
+is always open to doubt and suspicion. For this reason, all the
+attempts which have been made to prove the principle of sufficient
+reason, have, according to the universal admission of philosophers,
+been quite unsuccessful; and, before the appearance of transcendental
+criticism, it was considered better, as this principle could not be
+abandoned, to appeal boldly to the common sense of mankind (a
+proceeding which always proves that the problem, which reason ought to
+solve, is one in which philosophers find great difficulties), rather
+than attempt to discover new dogmatical proofs.
+
+But, if the proposition to be proved is a proposition of pure reason,
+and if I aim at passing beyond my empirical conceptions by the aid of
+mere ideas, it is necessary that the proof should first show that such
+a step in synthesis is possible (which it is not), before it proceeds
+to prove the truth of the proposition itself. The so-called proof of
+the simple nature of the soul from the unity of apperception, is a very
+plausible one. But it contains no answer to the objection, that, as the
+notion of absolute simplicity is not a conception which is directly
+applicable to a perception, but is an idea which must be inferred--if at
+all--from observation, it is by no means evident how the mere fact of
+consciousness, which is contained in all thought, although in so far a
+simple representation, can conduct me to the consciousness and
+cognition of a thing which is purely a thinking substance. When I
+represent to my mind the power of my body as in motion, my body in this
+thought is so far absolute unity, and my representation of it is a
+simple one; and hence I can indicate this representation by the motion
+of a point, because I have made abstraction of the size or volume of
+the body. But I cannot hence infer that, given merely the moving power
+of a body, the body may be cogitated as simple substance, merely
+because the representation in my mind takes no account of its content
+in space, and is consequently simple. The simple, in abstraction, is
+very different from the objectively simple; and hence the Ego, which is
+simple in the first sense, may, in the second sense, as indicating the
+soul itself, be a very complex conception, with a very various content.
+Thus it is evident that in all such arguments there lurks a paralogism.
+We guess (for without some such surmise our suspicion would not be
+excited in reference to a proof of this character) at the presence of
+the paralogism, by keeping ever before us a criterion of the
+possibility of those synthetical propositions which aim at proving more
+than experience can teach us. This criterion is obtained from the
+observation that such proofs do not lead us directly from the subject
+of the proposition to be proved to the required predicate, but find it
+necessary to presuppose the possibility of extending our cognition à
+priori by means of ideas. We must, accordingly, always use the greatest
+caution; we require, before attempting any proof, to consider how it is
+possible to extend the sphere of cognition by the operations of pure
+reason, and from what source we are to derive knowledge, which is not
+obtained from the analysis of conceptions, nor relates, by
+anticipation, to possible experience. We shall thus spare ourselves
+much severe and fruitless labour, by not expecting from reason what is
+beyond its power, or rather by subjecting it to discipline, and
+teaching it to moderate its vehement desires for the extension of the
+sphere of cognition.
+
+The first rule for our guidance is, therefore, not to attempt a
+transcendental proof, before we have considered from what source we are
+to derive the principles upon which the proof is to be based, and what
+right we have to expect that our conclusions from these principles will
+be veracious. If they are principles of the understanding, it is vain
+to expect that we should attain by their means to ideas of pure reason;
+for these principles are valid only in regard to objects of possible
+experience. If they are principles of pure reason, our labour is alike
+in vain. For the principles of reason, if employed as objective, are
+without exception dialectical and possess no validity or truth, except
+as regulative principles of the systematic employment of reason in
+experience. But when such delusive proof are presented to us, it is our
+duty to meet them with the non liquet of a matured judgement; and,
+although we are unable to expose the particular sophism upon which the
+proof is based, we have a right to demand a deduction of the principles
+employed in it; and, if these principles have their origin in pure
+reason alone, such a deduction is absolutely impossible. And thus it is
+unnecessary that we should trouble ourselves with the exposure and
+confutation of every sophistical illusion; we may, at once, bring all
+dialectic, which is inexhaustible in the production of fallacies,
+before the bar of critical reason, which tests the principles upon
+which all dialectical procedure is based. The second peculiarity of
+transcendental proof is that a transcendental proposition cannot rest
+upon more than a single proof. If I am drawing conclusions, not from
+conceptions, but from intuition corresponding to a conception, be it
+pure intuition, as in mathematics, or empirical, as in natural science,
+the intuition which forms the basis of my inferences presents me with
+materials for many synthetical propositions, which I can connect in
+various modes, while, as it is allowable to proceed from different
+points in the intention, I can arrive by different paths at the same
+proposition.
+
+But every transcendental proposition sets out from a conception, and
+posits the synthetical condition of the possibility of an object
+according to this conception. There must, therefore, be but one ground
+of proof, because it is the conception alone which determines the
+object; and thus the proof cannot contain anything more than the
+determination of the object according to the conception. In our
+Transcendental Analytic, for example, we inferred the principle: Every
+event has a cause, from the only condition of the objective possibility
+of our conception of an event. This is that an event cannot be
+determined in time, and consequently cannot form a part of experience,
+unless it stands under this dynamical law. This is the only possible
+ground of proof; for our conception of an event possesses objective
+validity, that is, is a true conception, only because the law of
+causality determines an object to which it can refer. Other arguments
+in support of this principle have been attempted--such as that from the
+contingent nature of a phenomenon; but when this argument is
+considered, we can discover no criterion of contingency, except the
+fact of an event--of something happening, that is to say, the existence
+which is preceded by the non-existence of an object, and thus we fall
+back on the very thing to be proved. If the proposition: "Every
+thinking being is simple," is to be proved, we keep to the conception
+of the ego, which is simple, and to which all thought has a relation.
+The same is the case with the transcendental proof of the existence of
+a Deity, which is based solely upon the harmony and reciprocal fitness
+of the conceptions of an ens realissimum and a necessary being, and
+cannot be attempted in any other manner.
+
+This caution serves to simplify very much the criticism of all
+propositions of reason. When reason employs conceptions alone, only one
+proof of its thesis is possible, if any. When, therefore, the dogmatist
+advances with ten arguments in favour of a proposition, we may be sure
+that not one of them is conclusive. For if he possessed one which
+proved the proposition he brings forward to demonstration--as must
+always be the case with the propositions of pure reason--what need is
+there for any more? His intention can only be similar to that of the
+advocate who had different arguments for different judges; this
+availing himself of the weakness of those who examine his arguments,
+who, without going into any profound investigation, adopt the view of
+the case which seems most probable at first sight and decide according
+to it.
+
+The third rule for the guidance of pure reason in the conduct of a
+proof is that all transcendental proofs must never be apagogic or
+indirect, but always ostensive or direct. The direct or ostensive proof
+not only establishes the truth of the proposition to be proved, but
+exposes the grounds of its truth; the apagogic, on the other hand, may
+assure us of the truth of the proposition, but it cannot enable us to
+comprehend the grounds of its possibility. The latter is, accordingly,
+rather an auxiliary to an argument, than a strictly philosophical and
+rational mode of procedure. In one respect, however, they have an
+advantage over direct proofs, from the fact that the mode of arguing by
+contradiction, which they employ, renders our understanding of the
+question more clear, and approximates the proof to the certainty of an
+intuitional demonstration.
+
+The true reason why indirect proofs are employed in different sciences
+is this. When the grounds upon which we seek to base a cognition are
+too various or too profound, we try whether or not we may not discover
+the truth of our cognition from its consequences. The modus ponens of
+reasoning from the truth of its inferences to the truth of a
+proposition would be admissible if all the inferences that can be drawn
+from it are known to be true; for in this case there can be only one
+possible ground for these inferences, and that is the true one. But
+this is a quite impracticable procedure, as it surpasses all our powers
+to discover all the possible inferences that can be drawn from a
+proposition. But this mode of reasoning is employed, under favour, when
+we wish to prove the truth of an hypothesis; in which case we admit the
+truth of the conclusion--which is supported by analogy--that, if all the
+inferences we have drawn and examined agree with the proposition
+assumed, all other possible inferences will also agree with it. But, in
+this way, an hypothesis can never be established as a demonstrated
+truth. The modus tollens of reasoning from known inferences to the
+unknown proposition, is not only a rigorous, but a very easy mode of
+proof. For, if it can be shown that but one inference from a
+proposition is false, then the proposition must itself be false.
+Instead, then, of examining, in an ostensive argument, the whole series
+of the grounds on which the truth of a proposition rests, we need only
+take the opposite of this proposition, and if one inference from it be
+false, then must the opposite be itself false; and, consequently, the
+proposition which we wished to prove must be true.
+
+The apagogic method of proof is admissible only in those sciences where
+it is impossible to mistake a subjective representation for an
+objective cognition. Where this is possible, it is plain that the
+opposite of a given proposition may contradict merely the subjective
+conditions of thought, and not the objective cognition; or it may
+happen that both propositions contradict each other only under a
+subjective condition, which is incorrectly considered to be objective,
+and, as the condition is itself false, both propositions may be false,
+and it will, consequently, be impossible to conclude the truth of the
+one from the falseness of the other.
+
+In mathematics such subreptions are impossible; and it is in this
+science, accordingly, that the indirect mode of proof has its true
+place. In the science of nature, where all assertion is based upon
+empirical intuition, such subreptions may be guarded against by the
+repeated comparison of observations; but this mode of proof is of
+little value in this sphere of knowledge. But the transcendental
+efforts of pure reason are all made in the sphere of the subjective,
+which is the real medium of all dialectical illusion; and thus reason
+endeavours, in its premisses, to impose upon us subjective
+representations for objective cognitions. In the transcendental sphere
+of pure reason, then, and in the case of synthetical propositions, it
+is inadmissible to support a statement by disproving the
+counter-statement. For only two cases are possible; either, the
+counter-statement is nothing but the enouncement of the inconsistency
+of the opposite opinion with the subjective conditions of reason, which
+does not affect the real case (for example, we cannot comprehend the
+unconditioned necessity of the existence of a being, and hence every
+speculative proof of the existence of such a being must be opposed on
+subjective grounds, while the possibility of this being in itself
+cannot with justice be denied); or, both propositions, being
+dialectical in their nature, are based upon an impossible conception.
+In this latter case the rule applies: non entis nulla sunt predicata;
+that is to say, what we affirm and what we deny, respecting such an
+object, are equally untrue, and the apagogic mode of arriving at the
+truth is in this case impossible. If, for example, we presuppose that
+the world of sense is given in itself in its totality, it is false,
+either that it is infinite, or that it is finite and limited in space.
+Both are false, because the hypothesis is false. For the notion of
+phenomena (as mere representations) which are given in themselves (as
+objects) is self-contradictory; and the infinitude of this imaginary
+whole would, indeed, be unconditioned, but would be inconsistent (as
+everything in the phenomenal world is conditioned) with the
+unconditioned determination and finitude of quantities which is
+presupposed in our conception.
+
+The apagogic mode of proof is the true source of those illusions which
+have always had so strong an attraction for the admirers of dogmatical
+philosophy. It may be compared to a champion who maintains the honour
+and claims of the party he has adopted by offering battle to all who
+doubt the validity of these claims and the purity of that honour; while
+nothing can be proved in this way, except the respective strength of
+the combatants, and the advantage, in this respect, is always on the
+side of the attacking party. Spectators, observing that each party is
+alternately conqueror and conquered, are led to regard the subject of
+dispute as beyond the power of man to decide upon. But such an opinion
+cannot be justified; and it is sufficient to apply to these reasoners
+the remark:
+
+_Non defensoribus istis
+Tempus eget._
+
+Each must try to establish his assertions by a transcendental deduction
+of the grounds of proof employed in his argument, and thus enable us to
+see in what way the claims of reason may be supported. If an opponent
+bases his assertions upon subjective grounds, he may be refuted with
+ease; not, however to the advantage of the dogmatist, who likewise
+depends upon subjective sources of cognition and is in like manner
+driven into a corner by his opponent. But, if parties employ the direct
+method of procedure, they will soon discover the difficulty, nay, the
+impossibility of proving their assertions, and will be forced to appeal
+to prescription and precedence; or they will, by the help of criticism,
+discover with ease the dogmatical illusions by which they had been
+mocked, and compel reason to renounce its exaggerated pretensions to
+speculative insight and to confine itself within the limits of its
+proper sphere--that of practical principles.
+
+Chapter II. The Canon of Pure Reason
+
+It is a humiliating consideration for human reason that it is
+incompetent to discover truth by means of pure speculation, but, on the
+contrary, stands in need of discipline to check its deviations from the
+straight path and to expose the illusions which it originates. But, on
+the other hand, this consideration ought to elevate and to give it
+confidence, for this discipline is exercised by itself alone, and it is
+subject to the censure of no other power. The bounds, moreover, which
+it is forced to set to its speculative exercise, form likewise a check
+upon the fallacious pretensions of opponents; and thus what remains of
+its possessions, after these exaggerated claims have been disallowed,
+is secure from attack or usurpation. The greatest, and perhaps the
+only, use of all philosophy of pure reason is, accordingly, of a purely
+negative character. It is not an organon for the extension, but a
+discipline for the determination, of the limits of its exercise; and
+without laying claim to the discovery of new truth, it has the modest
+merit of guarding against error.
+
+At the same time, there must be some source of positive cognitions
+which belong to the domain of pure reason and which become the causes
+of error only from our mistaking their true character, while they form
+the goal towards which reason continually strives. How else can we
+account for the inextinguishable desire in the human mind to find a
+firm footing in some region beyond the limits of the world of
+experience? It hopes to attain to the possession of a knowledge in
+which it has the deepest interest. It enters upon the path of pure
+speculation; but in vain. We have some reason, however, to expect that,
+in the only other way that lies open to it--the path of practical
+reason--it may meet with better success.
+
+I understand by a canon a list of the à priori principles of the proper
+employment of certain faculties of cognition. Thus general logic, in
+its analytical department, is a formal canon for the faculties of
+understanding and reason. In the same way, Transcendental Analytic was
+seen to be a canon of the pure understanding; for it alone is competent
+to enounce true à priori synthetical cognitions. But, when no proper
+employment of a faculty of cognition is possible, no canon can exist.
+But the synthetical cognition of pure speculative reason is, as has
+been shown, completely impossible. There cannot, therefore, exist any
+canon for the speculative exercise of this faculty--for its speculative
+exercise is entirely dialectical; and, consequently, transcendental
+logic, in this respect, is merely a discipline, and not a canon. If,
+then, there is any proper mode of employing the faculty of pure
+reason--in which case there must be a canon for this faculty--this canon
+will relate, not to the speculative, but to the practical use of
+reason. This canon we now proceed to investigate.
+
+Section I. Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Reason
+
+There exists in the faculty of reason a natural desire to venture
+beyond the field of experience, to attempt to reach the utmost bounds
+of all cognition by the help of ideas alone, and not to rest satisfied
+until it has fulfilled its course and raised the sum of its cognitions
+into a self-subsistent systematic whole. Is the motive for this
+endeavour to be found in its speculative, or in its practical interests
+alone?
+
+Setting aside, at present, the results of the labours of pure reason in
+its speculative exercise, I shall merely inquire regarding the problems
+the solution of which forms its ultimate aim, whether reached or not,
+and in relation to which all other aims are but partial and
+intermediate. These highest aims must, from the nature of reason,
+possess complete unity; otherwise the highest interest of humanity
+could not be successfully promoted.
+
+The transcendental speculation of reason relates to three things: the
+freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of
+God. The speculative interest which reason has in those questions is
+very small; and, for its sake alone, we should not undertake the labour
+of transcendental investigation--a labour full of toil and ceaseless
+struggle. We should be loth to undertake this labour, because the
+discoveries we might make would not be of the smallest use in the
+sphere of concrete or physical investigation. We may find out that the
+will is free, but this knowledge only relates to the intelligible cause
+of our volition. As regards the phenomena or expressions of this will,
+that is, our actions, we are bound, in obedience to an inviolable
+maxim, without which reason cannot be employed in the sphere of
+experience, to explain these in the same way as we explain all the
+other phenomena of nature, that is to say, according to its
+unchangeable laws. We may have discovered the spirituality and
+immortality of the soul, but we cannot employ this knowledge to explain
+the phenomena of this life, nor the peculiar nature of the future,
+because our conception of an incorporeal nature is purely negative and
+does not add anything to our knowledge, and the only inferences to be
+drawn from it are purely fictitious. If, again, we prove the existence
+of a supreme intelligence, we should be able from it to make the
+conformity to aims existing in the arrangement of the world
+comprehensible; but we should not be justified in deducing from it any
+particular arrangement or disposition, or inferring any where it is not
+perceived. For it is a necessary rule of the speculative use of reason
+that we must not overlook natural causes, or refuse to listen to the
+teaching of experience, for the sake of deducing what we know and
+perceive from something that transcends all our knowledge. In one word,
+these three propositions are, for the speculative reason, always
+transcendent, and cannot be employed as immanent principles in relation
+to the objects of experience; they are, consequently, of no use to us
+in this sphere, being but the valueless results of the severe but
+unprofitable efforts of reason.
+
+If, then, the actual cognition of these three cardinal propositions is
+perfectly useless, while Reason uses her utmost endeavours to induce us
+to admit them, it is plain that their real value and importance relate
+to our practical, and not to our speculative interest.
+
+I term all that is possible through free will, practical. But if the
+conditions of the exercise of free volition are empirical, reason can
+have only a regulative, and not a constitutive, influence upon it, and
+is serviceable merely for the introduction of unity into its empirical
+laws. In the moral philosophy of prudence, for example, the sole
+business of reason is to bring about a union of all the ends, which are
+aimed at by our inclinations, into one ultimate end--that of
+happiness--and to show the agreement which should exist among the means
+of attaining that end. In this sphere, accordingly, reason cannot
+present to us any other than pragmatical laws of free action, for our
+guidance towards the aims set up by the senses, and is incompetent to
+give us laws which are pure and determined completely à priori. On the
+other hand, pure practical laws, the ends of which have been given by
+reason entirely à priori, and which are not empirically conditioned,
+but are, on the contrary, absolutely imperative in their nature, would
+be products of pure reason. Such are the moral laws; and these alone
+belong to the sphere of the practical exercise of reason, and admit of
+a canon.
+
+All the powers of reason, in the sphere of what may be termed pure
+philosophy, are, in fact, directed to the three above-mentioned
+problems alone. These again have a still higher end--the answer to the
+question, what we ought to do, if the will is free, if there is a God
+and a future world. Now, as this problem relates to our in reference to
+the highest aim of humanity, it is evident that the ultimate intention
+of nature, in the constitution of our reason, has been directed to the
+moral alone.
+
+We must take care, however, in turning our attention to an object which
+is foreign[78] to the sphere of transcendental philosophy, not to
+injure the unity of our system by digressions, nor, on the other hand,
+to fail in clearness, by saying too little on the new subject of
+discussion. I hope to avoid both extremes, by keeping as close as
+possible to the transcendental, and excluding all psychological, that
+is, empirical, elements.
+
+ [78] All practical conceptions relate to objects of pleasure and pain,
+ and consequently--in an indirect manner, at least--to objects of
+ feeling. But as feeling is not a faculty of representation, but lies
+ out of the sphere of our powers of cognition, the elements of our
+ judgements, in so far as they relate to pleasure or pain, that is, the
+ elements of our practical judgements, do not belong to transcendental
+ philosophy, which has to do with pure à priori cognitions alone.
+
+I have to remark, in the first place, that at present I treat of the
+conception of freedom in the practical sense only, and set aside the
+corresponding transcendental conception, which cannot be employed as a
+ground of explanation in the phenomenal world, but is itself a problem
+for pure reason. A will is purely animal (arbitrium brutum) when it is
+determined by sensuous impulses or instincts only, that is, when it is
+determined in a pathological manner. A will, which can be determined
+independently of sensuous impulses, consequently by motives presented
+by reason alone, is called a free will (arbitrium liberum); and
+everything which is connected with this free will, either as principle
+or consequence, is termed practical. The existence of practical freedom
+can be proved from experience alone. For the human will is not
+determined by that alone which immediately affects the senses; on the
+contrary, we have the power, by calling up the notion of what is useful
+or hurtful in a more distant relation, of overcoming the immediate
+impressions on our sensuous faculty of desire. But these considerations
+of what is desirable in relation to our whole state, that is, is in the
+end good and useful, are based entirely upon reason. This faculty,
+accordingly, enounces laws, which are imperative or objective laws of
+freedom and which tell us what ought to take place, thus distinguishing
+themselves from the laws of nature, which relate to that which does
+take place. The laws of freedom or of free will are hence termed
+practical laws.
+
+Whether reason is not itself, in the actual delivery of these laws,
+determined in its turn by other influences, and whether the action
+which, in relation to sensuous impulses, we call free, may not, in
+relation to higher and more remote operative causes, really form a part
+of nature--these are questions which do not here concern us. They are
+purely speculative questions; and all we have to do, in the practical
+sphere, is to inquire into the rule of conduct which reason has to
+present. Experience demonstrates to us the existence of practical
+freedom as one of the causes which exist in nature, that is, it shows
+the causal power of reason in the determination of the will. The idea
+of transcendental freedom, on the contrary, requires that reason--in
+relation to its causal power of commencing a series of phenomena--should
+be independent of all sensuous determining causes; and thus it seems to
+be in opposition to the law of nature and to all possible experience.
+It therefore remains a problem for the human mind. But this problem
+does not concern reason in its practical use; and we have, therefore,
+in a canon of pure reason, to do with only two questions, which relate
+to the practical interest of pure reason: Is there a God? and, Is there
+a future life? The question of transcendental freedom is purely
+speculative, and we may therefore set it entirely aside when we come to
+treat of practical reason. Besides, we have already discussed this
+subject in the antinomy of pure reason.
+
+Section II. Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Determining Ground of
+the Ultimate End of Pure Reason
+
+Reason conducted us, in its speculative use, through the field of
+experience and, as it can never find complete satisfaction in that
+sphere, from thence to speculative ideas--which, however, in the end
+brought us back again to experience, and thus fulfilled the purpose of
+reason, in a manner which, though useful, was not at all in accordance
+with our expectations. It now remains for us to consider whether pure
+reason can be employed in a practical sphere, and whether it will here
+conduct us to those ideas which attain the highest ends of pure reason,
+as we have just stated them. We shall thus ascertain whether, from the
+point of view of its practical interest, reason may not be able to
+supply us with that which, on the speculative side, it wholly denies
+us.
+
+The whole interest of reason, speculative as well as practical, is
+centred in the three following questions:
+
+1. WHAT CAN I KNOW?
+2. WHAT OUGHT I TO DO?
+3. WHAT MAY I HOPE?
+
+The first question is purely speculative. We have, as I flatter myself,
+exhausted all the replies of which it is susceptible, and have at last
+found the reply with which reason must content itself, and with which
+it ought to be content, so long as it pays no regard to the practical.
+But from the two great ends to the attainment of which all these
+efforts of pure reason were in fact directed, we remain just as far
+removed as if we had consulted our ease and declined the task at the
+outset. So far, then, as knowledge is concerned, thus much, at least,
+is established, that, in regard to those two problems, it lies beyond
+our reach.
+
+The second question is purely practical. As such it may indeed fall
+within the province of pure reason, but still it is not transcendental,
+but moral, and consequently cannot in itself form the subject of our
+criticism.
+
+The third question: If I act as I ought to do, what may I then hope?--is
+at once practical and theoretical. The practical forms a clue to the
+answer of the theoretical, and--in its highest form--speculative
+question. For all hoping has happiness for its object and stands in
+precisely the same relation to the practical and the law of morality as
+knowing to the theoretical cognition of things and the law of nature.
+The former arrives finally at the conclusion that something is (which
+determines the ultimate end), because something ought to take place;
+the latter, that something is (which operates as the highest cause),
+because something does take place.
+
+Happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires; extensive, in regard
+to their multiplicity; intensive, in regard to their degree; and
+protensive, in regard to their duration. The practical law based on the
+motive of happiness I term a pragmatical law (or prudential rule); but
+that law, assuming such to exist, which has no other motive than the
+worthiness of being happy, I term a moral or ethical law. The first
+tells us what we have to do, if we wish to become possessed of
+happiness; the second dictates how we ought to act, in order to deserve
+happiness. The first is based upon empirical principles; for it is only
+by experience that I can learn either what inclinations exist which
+desire satisfaction, or what are the natural means of satisfying them.
+The second takes no account of our desires or the means of satisfying
+them, and regards only the freedom of a rational being, and the
+necessary conditions under which alone this freedom can harmonize with
+the distribution of happiness according to principles. This second law
+may therefore rest upon mere ideas of pure reason, and may be cognized
+à priori.
+
+I assume that there are pure moral laws which determine, entirely à
+priori (without regard to empirical motives, that is, to happiness),
+the conduct of a rational being, or in other words, to use which it
+makes of its freedom, and that these laws are absolutely imperative
+(not merely hypothetically, on the supposition of other empirical
+ends), and therefore in all respects necessary. I am warranted in
+assuming this, not only by the arguments of the most enlightened
+moralists, but by the moral judgement of every man who will make the
+attempt to form a distinct conception of such a law.
+
+Pure reason, then, contains, not indeed in its speculative, but in its
+practical, or, more strictly, its moral use, principles of the
+possibility of experience, of such actions, namely, as, in accordance
+with ethical precepts, might be met with in the history of man. For
+since reason commands that such actions should take place, it must be
+possible for them to take place; and hence a particular kind of
+systematic unity--the moral--must be possible. We have found, it is true,
+that the systematic unity of nature could not be established according
+to speculative principles of reason, because, while reason possesses a
+causal power in relation to freedom, it has none in relation to the
+whole sphere of nature; and, while moral principles of reason can
+produce free actions, they cannot produce natural laws. It is, then, in
+its practical, but especially in its moral use, that the principles of
+pure reason possess objective reality.
+
+I call the world a moral world, in so far as it may be in accordance
+with all the ethical laws--which, by virtue of the freedom of reasonable
+beings, it can be, and according to the necessary laws of morality it
+ought to be. But this world must be conceived only as an intelligible
+world, inasmuch as abstraction is therein made of all conditions
+(ends), and even of all impediments to morality (the weakness or
+pravity of human nature). So far, then, it is a mere idea--though still
+a practical idea--which may have, and ought to have, an influence on the
+world of sense, so as to bring it as far as possible into conformity
+with itself. The idea of a moral world has, therefore, objective
+reality, not as referring to an object of intelligible intuition--for of
+such an object we can form no conception whatever--but to the world of
+sense--conceived, however, as an object of pure reason in its practical
+use--and to a corpus mysticum of rational beings in it, in so far as the
+liberum arbitrium of the individual is placed, under and by virtue of
+moral laws, in complete systematic unity both with itself and with the
+freedom of all others.
+
+That is the answer to the first of the two questions of pure reason
+which relate to its practical interest: Do that which will render thee
+worthy of happiness. The second question is this: If I conduct myself
+so as not to be unworthy of happiness, may I hope thereby to obtain
+happiness? In order to arrive at the solution of this question, we must
+inquire whether the principles of pure reason, which prescribe à priori
+the law, necessarily also connect this hope with it.
+
+I say, then, that just as the moral principles are necessary according
+to reason in its practical use, so it is equally necessary according to
+reason in its theoretical use to assume that every one has ground to
+hope for happiness in the measure in which he has made himself worthy
+of it in his conduct, and that therefore the system of morality is
+inseparably (though only in the idea of pure reason) connected with
+that of happiness.
+
+Now in an intelligible, that is, in the moral world, in the conception
+of which we make abstraction of all the impediments to morality
+(sensuous desires), such a system of happiness, connected with and
+proportioned to morality, may be conceived as necessary, because
+freedom of volition--partly incited, and partly restrained by moral
+laws--would be itself the cause of general happiness; and thus rational
+beings, under the guidance of such principles, would be themselves the
+authors both of their own enduring welfare and that of others. But such
+a system of self-rewarding morality is only an idea, the carrying out
+of which depends upon the condition that every one acts as he ought; in
+other words, that all actions of reasonable beings be such as they
+would be if they sprung from a Supreme Will, comprehending in, or
+under, itself all particular wills. But since the moral law is binding
+on each individual in the use of his freedom of volition, even if
+others should not act in conformity with this law, neither the nature
+of things, nor the causality of actions and their relation to morality,
+determine how the consequences of these actions will be related to
+happiness; and the necessary connection of the hope of happiness with
+the unceasing endeavour to become worthy of happiness, cannot be
+cognized by reason, if we take nature alone for our guide. This
+connection can be hoped for only on the assumption that the cause of
+nature is a supreme reason, which governs according to moral laws.
+
+I term the idea of an intelligence in which the morally most perfect
+will, united with supreme blessedness, is the cause of all happiness in
+the world, so far as happiness stands in strict relation to morality
+(as the worthiness of being happy), the ideal of the supreme Good. It
+is only, then, in the ideal of the supreme original good, that pure
+reason can find the ground of the practically necessary connection of
+both elements of the highest derivative good, and accordingly of an
+intelligible, that is, moral world. Now since we are necessitated by
+reason to conceive ourselves as belonging to such a world, while the
+senses present to us nothing but a world of phenomena, we must assume
+the former as a consequence of our conduct in the world of sense (since
+the world of sense gives us no hint of it), and therefore as future in
+relation to us. Thus God and a future life are two hypotheses which,
+according to the principles of pure reason, are inseparable from the
+obligation which this reason imposes upon us.
+
+Morality per se constitutes a system. But we can form no system of
+happiness, except in so far as it is dispensed in strict proportion to
+morality. But this is only possible in the intelligible world, under a
+wise author and ruler. Such a ruler, together with life in such a
+world, which we must look upon as future, reason finds itself compelled
+to assume; or it must regard the moral laws as idle dreams, since the
+necessary consequence which this same reason connects with them must,
+without this hypothesis, fall to the ground. Hence also the moral laws
+are universally regarded as commands, which they could not be did they
+not connect à priori adequate consequences with their dictates, and
+thus carry with them promises and threats. But this, again, they could
+not do, did they not reside in a necessary being, as the Supreme Good,
+which alone can render such a teleological unity possible.
+
+Leibnitz termed the world, when viewed in relation to the rational
+beings which it contains, and the moral relations in which they stand
+to each other, under the government of the Supreme Good, the kingdom of
+Grace, and distinguished it from the kingdom of Nature, in which these
+rational beings live, under moral laws, indeed, but expect no other
+consequences from their actions than such as follow according to the
+course of nature in the world of sense. To view ourselves, therefore,
+as in the kingdom of grace, in which all happiness awaits us, except in
+so far as we ourselves limit our participation in it by actions which
+render us unworthy of happiness, is a practically necessary idea of
+reason.
+
+Practical laws, in so far as they are subjective grounds of actions,
+that is, subjective principles, are termed maxims. The judgements of
+moral according to in its purity and ultimate results are framed
+according ideas; the observance of its laws, according to maxims.
+
+The whole course of our life must be subject to moral maxims; but this
+is impossible, unless with the moral law, which is a mere idea, reason
+connects an efficient cause which ordains to all conduct which is in
+conformity with the moral law an issue either in this or in another
+life, which is in exact conformity with our highest aims. Thus, without
+a God and without a world, invisible to us now, but hoped for, the
+glorious ideas of morality are, indeed, objects of approbation and of
+admiration, but cannot be the springs of purpose and action. For they
+do not satisfy all the aims which are natural to every rational being,
+and which are determined à priori by pure reason itself, and necessary.
+
+Happiness alone is, in the view of reason, far from being the complete
+good. Reason does not approve of it (however much inclination may
+desire it), except as united with desert. On the other hand, morality
+alone, and with it, mere desert, is likewise far from being the
+complete good. To make it complete, he who conducts himself in a manner
+not unworthy of happiness, must be able to hope for the possession of
+happiness. Even reason, unbiased by private ends, or interested
+considerations, cannot judge otherwise, if it puts itself in the place
+of a being whose business it is to dispense all happiness to others.
+For in the practical idea both points are essentially combined, though
+in such a way that participation in happiness is rendered possible by
+the moral disposition, as its condition, and not conversely, the moral
+disposition by the prospect of happiness. For a disposition which
+should require the prospect of happiness as its necessary condition
+would not be moral, and hence also would not be worthy of complete
+happiness--a happiness which, in the view of reason, recognizes no
+limitation but such as arises from our own immoral conduct.
+
+Happiness, therefore, in exact proportion with the morality of rational
+beings (whereby they are made worthy of happiness), constitutes alone
+the supreme good of a world into which we absolutely must transport
+ourselves according to the commands of pure but practical reason. This
+world is, it is true, only an intelligible world; for of such a
+systematic unity of ends as it requires, the world of sense gives us no
+hint. Its reality can be based on nothing else but the hypothesis of a
+supreme original good. In it independent reason, equipped with all the
+sufficiency of a supreme cause, founds, maintains, and fulfils the
+universal order of things, with the most perfect teleological harmony,
+however much this order may be hidden from us in the world of sense.
+
+This moral theology has the peculiar advantage, in contrast with
+speculative theology, of leading inevitably to the conception of a
+sole, perfect, and rational First Cause, whereof speculative theology
+does not give us any indication on objective grounds, far less any
+convincing evidence. For we find neither in transcendental nor in
+natural theology, however far reason may lead us in these, any ground
+to warrant us in assuming the existence of one only Being, which stands
+at the head of all natural causes, and on which these are entirely
+dependent. On the other hand, if we take our stand on moral unity as a
+necessary law of the universe, and from this point of view consider
+what is necessary to give this law adequate efficiency and, for us,
+obligatory force, we must come to the conclusion that there is one only
+supreme will, which comprehends all these laws in itself. For how,
+under different wills, should we find complete unity of ends? This will
+must be omnipotent, that all nature and its relation to morality in the
+world may be subject to it; omniscient, that it may have knowledge of
+the most secret feelings and their moral worth; omnipresent, that it
+may be at hand to supply every necessity to which the highest weal of
+the world may give rise; eternal, that this harmony of nature and
+liberty may never fail; and so on.
+
+But this systematic unity of ends in this world of intelligences--which,
+as mere nature, is only a world of sense, but, as a system of freedom
+of volition, may be termed an intelligible, that is, moral world
+(regnum gratiae)--leads inevitably also to the teleological unity of all
+things which constitute this great whole, according to universal
+natural laws--just as the unity of the former is according to universal
+and necessary moral laws--and unites the practical with the speculative
+reason. The world must be represented as having originated from an
+idea, if it is to harmonize with that use of reason without which we
+cannot even consider ourselves as worthy of reason--namely, the moral
+use, which rests entirely on the idea of the supreme good. Hence the
+investigation of nature receives a teleological direction, and becomes,
+in its widest extension, physico-theology. But this, taking its rise in
+moral order as a unity founded on the essence of freedom, and not
+accidentally instituted by external commands, establishes the
+teleological view of nature on grounds which must be inseparably
+connected with the internal possibility of things. This gives rise to a
+transcendental theology, which takes the ideal of the highest
+ontological perfection as a principle of systematic unity; and this
+principle connects all things according to universal and necessary
+natural laws, because all things have their origin in the absolute
+necessity of the one only Primal Being.
+
+What use can we make of our understanding, even in respect of
+experience, if we do not propose ends to ourselves? But the highest
+ends are those of morality, and it is only pure reason that can give us
+the knowledge of these. Though supplied with these, and putting
+ourselves under their guidance, we can make no teleological use of the
+knowledge of nature, as regards cognition, unless nature itself has
+established teleological unity. For without this unity we should not
+even possess reason, because we should have no school for reason, and
+no cultivation through objects which afford the materials for its
+conceptions. But teleological unity is a necessary unity, and founded
+on the essence of the individual will itself. Hence this will, which is
+the condition of the application of this unity in concreto, must be so
+likewise. In this way the transcendental enlargement of our rational
+cognition would be, not the cause, but merely the effect of the
+practical teleology which pure reason imposes upon us.
+
+Hence, also, we find in the history of human reason that, before the
+moral conceptions were sufficiently purified and determined, and before
+men had attained to a perception of the systematic unity of ends
+according to these conceptions and from necessary principles, the
+knowledge of nature, and even a considerable amount of intellectual
+culture in many other sciences, could produce only rude and vague
+conceptions of the Deity, sometimes even admitting of an astonishing
+indifference with regard to this question altogether. But the more
+enlarged treatment of moral ideas, which was rendered necessary by the
+extreme pure moral law of our religion, awakened the interest, and
+thereby quickened the perceptions of reason in relation to this object.
+In this way, and without the help either of an extended acquaintance
+with nature, or of a reliable transcendental insight (for these have
+been wanting in all ages), a conception of the Divine Being was arrived
+at, which we now hold to be the correct one, not because speculative
+reason convinces us of its correctness, but because it accords with the
+moral principles of reason. Thus it is to pure reason, but only in its
+practical use, that we must ascribe the merit of having connected with
+our highest interest a cognition, of which mere speculation was able
+only to form a conjecture, but the validity of which it was unable to
+establish--and of having thereby rendered it, not indeed a demonstrated
+dogma, but a hypothesis absolutely necessary to the essential ends of
+reason.
+
+But if practical reason has reached this elevation, and has attained to
+the conception of a sole Primal Being as the supreme good, it must not,
+therefore, imagine that it has transcended the empirical conditions of
+its application, and risen to the immediate cognition of new objects;
+it must not presume to start from the conception which it has gained,
+and to deduce from it the moral laws themselves. For it was these very
+laws, the internal practical necessity of which led us to the
+hypothesis of an independent cause, or of a wise ruler of the universe,
+who should give them effect. Hence we are not entitled to regard them
+as accidental and derived from the mere will of the ruler, especially
+as we have no conception of such a will, except as formed in accordance
+with these laws. So far, then, as practical reason has the right to
+conduct us, we shall not look upon actions as binding on us, because
+they are the commands of God, but we shall regard them as divine
+commands, because we are internally bound by them. We shall study
+freedom under the teleological unity which accords with principles of
+reason; we shall look upon ourselves as acting in conformity with the
+divine will only in so far as we hold sacred the moral law which reason
+teaches us from the nature of actions themselves, and we shall believe
+that we can obey that will only by promoting the weal of the universe
+in ourselves and in others. Moral theology is, therefore, only of
+immanent use. It teaches us to fulfil our destiny here in the world, by
+placing ourselves in harmony with the general system of ends, and warns
+us against the fanaticism, nay, the crime of depriving reason of its
+legislative authority in the moral conduct of life, for the purpose of
+directly connecting this authority with the idea of the Supreme Being.
+For this would be, not an immanent, but a transcendent use of moral
+theology, and, like the transcendent use of mere speculation, would
+inevitably pervert and frustrate the ultimate ends of reason.
+
+Section III. Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief
+
+The holding of a thing to be true is a phenomenon in our understanding
+which may rest on objective grounds, but requires, also, subjective
+causes in the mind of the person judging. If a judgement is valid for
+every rational being, then its ground is objectively sufficient, and it
+is termed a conviction. If, on the other hand, it has its ground in the
+particular character of the subject, it is termed a persuasion.
+
+Persuasion is a mere illusion, the ground of the judgement, which lies
+solely in the subject, being regarded as objective. Hence a judgement
+of this kind has only private validity--is only valid for the individual
+who judges, and the holding of a thing to be true in this way cannot be
+communicated. But truth depends upon agreement with the object, and
+consequently the judgements of all understandings, if true, must be in
+agreement with each other (consentientia uni tertio consentiunt inter
+se). Conviction may, therefore, be distinguished, from an external
+point of view, from persuasion, by the possibility of communicating it
+and by showing its validity for the reason of every man; for in this
+case the presumption, at least, arises that the agreement of all
+judgements with each other, in spite of the different characters of
+individuals, rests upon the common ground of the agreement of each with
+the object, and thus the correctness of the judgement is established.
+
+Persuasion, accordingly, cannot be subjectively distinguished from
+conviction, that is, so long as the subject views its judgement simply
+as a phenomenon of its own mind. But if we inquire whether the grounds
+of our judgement, which are valid for us, produce the same effect on
+the reason of others as on our own, we have then the means, though only
+subjective means, not, indeed, of producing conviction, but of
+detecting the merely private validity of the judgement; in other words,
+of discovering that there is in it the element of mere persuasion.
+
+If we can, in addition to this, develop the subjective causes of the
+judgement, which we have taken for its objective grounds, and thus
+explain the deceptive judgement as a phenomenon in our mind, apart
+altogether from the objective character of the object, we can then
+expose the illusion and need be no longer deceived by it, although, if
+its subjective cause lies in our nature, we cannot hope altogether to
+escape its influence.
+
+I can only maintain, that is, affirm as necessarily valid for every
+one, that which produces conviction. Persuasion I may keep for myself,
+if it is agreeable to me; but I cannot, and ought not, to attempt to
+impose it as binding upon others.
+
+Holding for true, or the subjective validity of a judgement in relation
+to conviction (which is, at the same time, objectively valid), has the
+three following degrees: opinion, belief, and knowledge. Opinion is a
+consciously insufficient judgement, subjectively as well as
+objectively. Belief is subjectively sufficient, but is recognized as
+being objectively insufficient. Knowledge is both subjectively and
+objectively sufficient. Subjective sufficiency is termed conviction
+(for myself); objective sufficiency is termed certainty (for all). I
+need not dwell longer on the explanation of such simple conceptions.
+
+I must never venture to be of opinion, without knowing something, at
+least, by which my judgement, in itself merely problematical, is
+brought into connection with the truth--which connection, although not
+perfect, is still something more than an arbitrary fiction. Moreover,
+the law of such a connection must be certain. For if, in relation to
+this law, I have nothing more than opinion, my judgement is but a play
+of the imagination, without the least relation to truth. In the
+judgements of pure reason, opinion has no place. For, as they do not
+rest on empirical grounds and as the sphere of pure reason is that of
+necessary truth and à priori cognition, the principle of connection in
+it requires universality and necessity, and consequently perfect
+certainty--otherwise we should have no guide to the truth at all. Hence
+it is absurd to have an opinion in pure mathematics; we must know, or
+abstain from forming a judgement altogether. The case is the same with
+the maxims of morality. For we must not hazard an action on the mere
+opinion that it is allowed, but we must know it to be so. In the
+transcendental sphere of reason, on the other hand, the term opinion is
+too weak, while the word knowledge is too strong. From the merely
+speculative point of view, therefore, we cannot form a judgement at
+all. For the subjective grounds of a judgement, such as produce belief,
+cannot be admitted in speculative inquiries, inasmuch as they cannot
+stand without empirical support and are incapable of being communicated
+to others in equal measure.
+
+But it is only from the practical point of view that a theoretically
+insufficient judgement can be termed belief. Now the practical
+reference is either to skill or to morality; to the former, when the
+end proposed is arbitrary and accidental, to the latter, when it is
+absolutely necessary.
+
+If we propose to ourselves any end whatever, the conditions of its
+attainment are hypothetically necessary. The necessity is subjectively,
+but still only comparatively, sufficient, if I am acquainted with no
+other conditions under which the end can be attained. On the other
+hand, it is sufficient, absolutely and for every one, if I know for
+certain that no one can be acquainted with any other conditions under
+which the attainment of the proposed end would be possible. In the
+former case my supposition--my judgement with regard to certain
+conditions--is a merely accidental belief; in the latter it is a
+necessary belief. The physician must pursue some course in the case of
+a patient who is in danger, but is ignorant of the nature of the
+disease. He observes the symptoms, and concludes, according to the best
+of his judgement, that it is a case of phthisis. His belief is, even in
+his own judgement, only contingent: another man might, perhaps come
+nearer the truth. Such a belief, contingent indeed, but still forming
+the ground of the actual use of means for the attainment of certain
+ends, I term Pragmatical belief.
+
+The usual test, whether that which any one maintains is merely his
+persuasion, or his subjective conviction at least, that is, his firm
+belief, is a bet. It frequently happens that a man delivers his
+opinions with so much boldness and assurance, that he appears to be
+under no apprehension as to the possibility of his being in error. The
+offer of a bet startles him, and makes him pause. Sometimes it turns
+out that his persuasion may be valued at a ducat, but not at ten. For
+he does not hesitate, perhaps, to venture a ducat, but if it is
+proposed to stake ten, he immediately becomes aware of the possibility
+of his being mistaken--a possibility which has hitherto escaped his
+observation. If we imagine to ourselves that we have to stake the
+happiness of our whole life on the truth of any proposition, our
+judgement drops its air of triumph, we take the alarm, and discover the
+actual strength of our belief. Thus pragmatical belief has degrees,
+varying in proportion to the interests at stake.
+
+Now, in cases where we cannot enter upon any course of action in
+reference to some object, and where, accordingly, our judgement is
+purely theoretical, we can still represent to ourselves, in thought,
+the possibility of a course of action, for which we suppose that we
+have sufficient grounds, if any means existed of ascertaining the truth
+of the matter. Thus we find in purely theoretical judgements an
+analogon of practical judgements, to which the word belief may properly
+be applied, and which we may term doctrinal belief. I should not
+hesitate to stake my all on the truth of the proposition--if there were
+any possibility of bringing it to the test of experience--that, at
+least, some one of the planets, which we see, is inhabited. Hence I say
+that I have not merely the opinion, but the strong belief, on the
+correctness of which I would stake even many of the advantages of life,
+that there are inhabitants in other worlds.
+
+Now we must admit that the doctrine of the existence of God belongs to
+doctrinal belief. For, although in respect to the theoretical cognition
+of the universe I do not require to form any theory which necessarily
+involves this idea, as the condition of my explanation of the phenomena
+which the universe presents, but, on the contrary, am rather bound so
+to use my reason as if everything were mere nature, still teleological
+unity is so important a condition of the application of my reason to
+nature, that it is impossible for me to ignore it--especially since, in
+addition to these considerations, abundant examples of it are supplied
+by experience. But the sole condition, so far as my knowledge extends,
+under which this unity can be my guide in the investigation of nature,
+is the assumption that a supreme intelligence has ordered all things
+according to the wisest ends. Consequently, the hypothesis of a wise
+author of the universe is necessary for my guidance in the
+investigation of nature--is the condition under which alone I can fulfil
+an end which is contingent indeed, but by no means unimportant.
+Moreover, since the result of my attempts so frequently confirms the
+utility of this assumption, and since nothing decisive can be adduced
+against it, it follows that it would be saying far too little to term
+my judgement, in this case, a mere opinion, and that, even in this
+theoretical connection, I may assert that I firmly believe in God.
+Still, if we use words strictly, this must not be called a practical,
+but a doctrinal belief, which the theology of nature (physico-theology)
+must also produce in my mind. In the wisdom of a Supreme Being, and in
+the shortness of life, so inadequate to the development of the glorious
+powers of human nature, we may find equally sufficient grounds for a
+doctrinal belief in the future life of the human soul.
+
+The expression of belief is, in such cases, an expression of modesty
+from the objective point of view, but, at the same time, of firm
+confidence, from the subjective. If I should venture to term this
+merely theoretical judgement even so much as a hypothesis which I am
+entitled to assume; a more complete conception, with regard to another
+world and to the cause of the world, might then be justly required of
+me than I am, in reality, able to give. For, if I assume anything, even
+as a mere hypothesis, I must, at least, know so much of the properties
+of such a being as will enable me, not to form the conception, but to
+imagine the existence of it. But the word belief refers only to the
+guidance which an idea gives me, and to its subjective influence on the
+conduct of my reason, which forces me to hold it fast, though I may not
+be in a position to give a speculative account of it.
+
+But mere doctrinal belief is, to some extent, wanting in stability. We
+often quit our hold of it, in consequence of the difficulties which
+occur in speculation, though in the end we inevitably return to it
+again.
+
+It is quite otherwise with moral belief. For in this sphere action is
+absolutely necessary, that is, I must act in obedience to the moral law
+in all points. The end is here incontrovertibly established, and there
+is only one condition possible, according to the best of my perception,
+under which this end can harmonize with all other ends, and so have
+practical validity--namely, the existence of a God and of a future
+world. I know also, to a certainty, that no one can be acquainted with
+any other conditions which conduct to the same unity of ends under the
+moral law. But since the moral precept is, at the same time, my maxim
+(as reason requires that it should be), I am irresistibly constrained
+to believe in the existence of God and in a future life; and I am sure
+that nothing can make me waver in this belief, since I should thereby
+overthrow my moral maxims, the renunciation of which would render me
+hateful in my own eyes.
+
+Thus, while all the ambitious attempts of reason to penetrate beyond
+the limits of experience end in disappointment, there is still enough
+left to satisfy us in a practical point of view. No one, it is true,
+will be able to boast that he knows that there is a God and a future
+life; for, if he knows this, he is just the man whom I have long wished
+to find. All knowledge, regarding an object of mere reason, can be
+communicated; and I should thus be enabled to hope that my own
+knowledge would receive this wonderful extension, through the
+instrumentality of his instruction. No, my conviction is not logical,
+but moral certainty; and since it rests on subjective grounds (of the
+moral sentiment), I must not even say: It is morally certain that there
+is a God, etc., but: I am morally certain, that is, my belief in God
+and in another world is so interwoven with my moral nature that I am
+under as little apprehension of having the former torn from me as of
+losing the latter.
+
+The only point in this argument that may appear open to suspicion is
+that this rational belief presupposes the existence of moral
+sentiments. If we give up this assumption, and take a man who is
+entirely indifferent with regard to moral laws, the question which
+reason proposes, becomes then merely a problem for speculation and may,
+indeed, be supported by strong grounds from analogy, but not by such as
+will compel the most obstinate scepticism to give way.[79] But in these
+questions no man is free from all interest. For though the want of good
+sentiments may place him beyond the influence of moral interests, still
+even in this case enough may be left to make him fear the existence of
+God and a future life. For he cannot pretend to any certainty of the
+non-existence of God and of a future life, unless--since it could only
+be proved by mere reason, and therefore apodeictically--he is prepared
+to establish the impossibility of both, which certainly no reasonable
+man would undertake to do. This would be a negative belief, which could
+not, indeed, produce morality and good sentiments, but still could
+produce an analogon of these, by operating as a powerful restraint on
+the outbreak of evil dispositions.
+
+ [79] The human mind (as, I believe, every rational being must of
+ necessity do) takes a natural interest in morality, although this
+ interest is not undivided, and may not be practically in
+ preponderance. If you strengthen and increase it, you will find the
+ reason become docile, more enlightened, and more capable of uniting
+ the speculative interest with the practical. But if you do not take
+ care at the outset, or at least midway, to make men good, you will
+ never force them into an honest belief.
+
+But, it will be said, is this all that pure reason can effect, in
+opening up prospects beyond the limits of experience? Nothing more than
+two articles of belief? Common sense could have done as much as this,
+without taking the philosophers to counsel in the matter!
+
+I shall not here eulogize philosophy for the benefits which the
+laborious efforts of its criticism have conferred on human reason--even
+granting that its merit should turn out in the end to be only
+negative--for on this point something more will be said in the next
+section. But, I ask, do you require that that knowledge which concerns
+all men, should transcend the common understanding, and should only be
+revealed to you by philosophers? The very circumstance which has called
+forth your censure, is the best confirmation of the correctness of our
+previous assertions, since it discloses, what could not have been
+foreseen, that Nature is not chargeable with any partial distribution
+of her gifts in those matters which concern all men without distinction
+and that, in respect to the essential ends of human nature, we cannot
+advance further with the help of the highest philosophy, than under the
+guidance which nature has vouchsafed to the meanest understanding.
+
+Chapter III. The Architectonic of Pure Reason
+
+By the term architectonic I mean the art of constructing a system.
+Without systematic unity, our knowledge cannot become science; it will
+be an aggregate, and not a system. Thus architectonic is the doctrine
+of the scientific in cognition, and therefore necessarily forms part of
+our methodology.
+
+Reason cannot permit our knowledge to remain in an unconnected and
+rhapsodistic state, but requires that the sum of our cognitions should
+constitute a system. It is thus alone that they can advance the ends of
+reason. By a system I mean the unity of various cognitions under one
+idea. This idea is the conception--given by reason--of the form of a
+whole, in so far as the conception determines à priori not only the
+limits of its content, but the place which each of its parts is to
+occupy. The scientific idea contains, therefore, the end and the form
+of the whole which is in accordance with that end. The unity of the
+end, to which all the parts of the system relate, and through which all
+have a relation to each other, communicates unity to the whole system,
+so that the absence of any part can be immediately detected from our
+knowledge of the rest; and it determines à priori the limits of the
+system, thus excluding all contingent or arbitrary additions. The whole
+is thus an organism (articulatio), and not an aggregate (coacervatio);
+it may grow from within (per intussusceptionem), but it cannot increase
+by external additions (per appositionem). It is, thus, like an animal
+body, the growth of which does not add any limb, but, without changing
+their proportions, makes each in its sphere stronger and more active.
+
+We require, for the execution of the idea of a system, a schema, that
+is, a content and an arrangement of parts determined à priori by the
+principle which the aim of the system prescribes. A schema which is not
+projected in accordance with an idea, that is, from the standpoint of
+the highest aim of reason, but merely empirically, in accordance with
+accidental aims and purposes (the number of which cannot be
+predetermined), can give us nothing more than technical unity. But the
+schema which is originated from an idea (in which case reason presents
+us with aims à priori, and does not look for them to experience), forms
+the basis of architectonical unity. A science, in the proper
+acceptation of that term, cannot be formed technically, that is, from
+observation of the similarity existing between different objects, and
+the purely contingent use we make of our knowledge in concreto with
+reference to all kinds of arbitrary external aims; its constitution
+must be framed on architectonical principles, that is, its parts must
+be shown to possess an essential affinity, and be capable of being
+deduced from one supreme and internal aim or end, which forms the
+condition of the possibility of the scientific whole. The schema of a
+science must give à priori the plan of it (monogramma), and the
+division of the whole into parts, in conformity with the idea of the
+science; and it must also distinguish this whole from all others,
+according to certain understood principles.
+
+No one will attempt to construct a science, unless he have some idea to
+rest on as a proper basis. But, in the elaboration of the science, he
+finds that the schema, nay, even the definition which he at first gave
+of the science, rarely corresponds with his idea; for this idea lies,
+like a germ, in our reason, its parts undeveloped and hid even from
+microscopical observation. For this reason, we ought to explain and
+define sciences, not according to the description which the originator
+gives of them, but according to the idea which we find based in reason
+itself, and which is suggested by the natural unity of the parts of
+the science already accumulated. For it will often be found that the
+originator of a science and even his latest successors remain attached
+to an erroneous idea, which they cannot render clear to themselves, and
+that they thus fail in determining the true content, the articulation
+or systematic unity, and the limits of their science.
+
+It is unfortunate that, only after having occupied ourselves for a long
+time in the collection of materials, under the guidance of an idea
+which lies undeveloped in the mind, but not according to any definite
+plan of arrangement--nay, only after we have spent much time and labour
+in the technical disposition of our materials, does it become possible
+to view the idea of a science in a clear light, and to project,
+according to architectonical principles, a plan of the whole, in
+accordance with the aims of reason. Systems seem, like certain worms,
+to be formed by a kind of generatio aequivoca--by the mere confluence of
+conceptions, and to gain completeness only with the progress of time.
+But the schema or germ of all lies in reason; and thus is not only
+every system organized according to its own idea, but all are united
+into one grand system of human knowledge, of which they form members.
+For this reason, it is possible to frame an architectonic of all human
+cognition, the formation of which, at the present time, considering the
+immense materials collected or to be found in the ruins of old systems,
+would not indeed be very difficult. Our purpose at present is merely to
+sketch the plan of the architectonic of all cognition given by pure
+reason; and we begin from the point where the main root of human
+knowledge divides into two, one of which is reason. By reason I
+understand here the whole higher faculty of cognition, the rational
+being placed in contradistinction to the empirical.
+
+If I make complete abstraction of the content of cognition, objectively
+considered, all cognition is, from a subjective point of view, either
+historical or rational. Historical cognition is cognitio ex datis,
+rational, cognitio ex principiis. Whatever may be the original source
+of a cognition, it is, in relation to the person who possesses it,
+merely historical, if he knows only what has been given him from
+another quarter, whether that knowledge was communicated by direct
+experience or by instruction. Thus the person who has learned a system
+of philosophy--say the Wolfian--although he has a perfect knowledge of
+all the principles, definitions, and arguments in that philosophy, as
+well as of the divisions that have been made of the system, possesses
+really no more than an historical knowledge of the Wolfian system; he
+knows only what has been told him, his judgements are only those which
+he has received from his teachers. Dispute the validity of a
+definition, and he is completely at a loss to find another. He has
+formed his mind on another's; but the imitative faculty is not the
+productive. His knowledge has not been drawn from reason; and although,
+objectively considered, it is rational knowledge, subjectively, it is
+merely historical. He has learned this or that philosophy and is merely
+a plaster cast of a living man. Rational cognitions which are
+objective, that is, which have their source in reason, can be so termed
+from a subjective point of view, only when they have been drawn by the
+individual himself from the sources of reason, that is, from
+principles; and it is in this way alone that criticism, or even the
+rejection of what has been already learned, can spring up in the mind.
+
+All rational cognition is, again, based either on conceptions, or on
+the construction of conceptions. The former is termed philosophical,
+the latter mathematical. I have already shown the essential difference
+of these two methods of cognition in the first chapter. A cognition may
+be objectively philosophical and subjectively historical--as is the case
+with the majority of scholars and those who cannot look beyond the
+limits of their system, and who remain in a state of pupilage all their
+lives. But it is remarkable that mathematical knowledge, when committed
+to memory, is valid, from the subjective point of view, as rational
+knowledge also, and that the same distinction cannot be drawn here as
+in the case of philosophical cognition. The reason is that the only way
+of arriving at this knowledge is through the essential principles of
+reason, and thus it is always certain and indisputable; because reason
+is employed in concreto--but at the same time à priori--that is, in pure
+and, therefore, infallible intuition; and thus all causes of illusion
+and error are excluded. Of all the à priori sciences of reason,
+therefore, mathematics alone can be learned. Philosophy--unless it be in
+an historical manner--cannot be learned; we can at most learn to
+philosophize.
+
+Philosophy is the system of all philosophical cognition. We must use
+this term in an objective sense, if we understand by it the archetype
+of all attempts at philosophizing, and the standard by which all
+subjective philosophies are to be judged. In this sense, philosophy is
+merely the idea of a possible science, which does not exist in
+concreto, but to which we endeavour in various ways to approximate,
+until we have discovered the right path to pursue--a path overgrown by
+the errors and illusions of sense--and the image we have hitherto tried
+in vain to shape has become a perfect copy of the great prototype.
+Until that time, we cannot learn philosophy--it does not exist; if it
+does, where is it, who possesses it, and how shall we know it? We can
+only learn to philosophize; in other words, we can only exercise our
+powers of reasoning in accordance with general principles, retaining at
+the same time, the right of investigating the sources of these
+principles, of testing, and even of rejecting them.
+
+Until then, our conception of philosophy is only a scholastic
+conception--a conception, that is, of a system of cognition which we are
+trying to elaborate into a science; all that we at present know being
+the systematic unity of this cognition, and consequently the logical
+completeness of the cognition for the desired end. But there is also a
+cosmical conception (conceptus cosmicus) of philosophy, which has
+always formed the true basis of this term, especially when philosophy
+was personified and presented to us in the ideal of a philosopher. In
+this view philosophy is the science of the relation of all cognition to
+the ultimate and essential aims of human reason (teleologia rationis
+humanae), and the philosopher is not merely an artist--who occupies
+himself with conceptions--but a lawgiver, legislating for human reason.
+In this sense of the word, it would be in the highest degree arrogant
+to assume the title of philosopher, and to pretend that we had reached
+the perfection of the prototype which lies in the idea alone.
+
+The mathematician, the natural philosopher, and the logician--how far
+soever the first may have advanced in rational, and the two latter in
+philosophical knowledge--are merely artists, engaged in the arrangement
+and formation of conceptions; they cannot be termed philosophers. Above
+them all, there is the ideal teacher, who employs them as instruments
+for the advancement of the essential aims of human reason. Him alone
+can we call philosopher; but he nowhere exists. But the idea of his
+legislative power resides in the mind of every man, and it alone
+teaches us what kind of systematic unity philosophy demands in view of
+the ultimate aims of reason. This idea is, therefore, a cosmical
+conception.[80]
+
+ [80] By a cosmical conception, I mean one in which all men necessarily
+ take an interest; the aim of a science must accordingly be determined
+ according to scholastic conceptions, if it is regarded merely as a
+ means to certain arbitrarily proposed ends.
+
+In view of the complete systematic unity of reason, there can only be
+one ultimate end of all the operations of the mind. To this all other
+aims are subordinate, and nothing more than means for its attainment.
+This ultimate end is the destination of man, and the philosophy which
+relates to it is termed moral philosophy. The superior position
+occupied by moral philosophy, above all other spheres for the
+operations of reason, sufficiently indicates the reason why the
+ancients always included the idea--and in an especial manner--of moralist
+in that of philosopher. Even at the present day, we call a man who
+appears to have the power of self-government, even although his
+knowledge may be very limited, by the name of philosopher.
+
+The legislation of human reason, or philosophy, has two objects--nature
+and freedom--and thus contains not only the laws of nature, but also
+those of ethics, at first in two separate systems, which, finally,
+merge into one grand philosophical system of cognition. The philosophy
+of nature relates to that which is, that of ethics to that which ought
+to be.
+
+But all philosophy is either cognition on the basis of pure reason, or
+the cognition of reason on the basis of empirical principles. The
+former is termed pure, the latter empirical philosophy.
+
+The philosophy of pure reason is either propædeutic, that is, an
+inquiry into the powers of reason in regard to pure à priori cognition,
+and is termed critical philosophy; or it is, secondly, the system of
+pure reason--a science containing the systematic presentation of the
+whole body of philosophical knowledge, true as well as illusory, given
+by pure reason--and is called metaphysic. This name may, however, be
+also given to the whole system of pure philosophy, critical philosophy
+included, and may designate the investigation into the sources or
+possibility of à priori cognition, as well as the presentation of the à
+priori cognitions which form a system of pure philosophy--excluding, at
+the same time, all empirical and mathematical elements.
+
+Metaphysic is divided into that of the speculative and that of the
+practical use of pure reason, and is, accordingly, either the
+metaphysic of nature, or the metaphysic of ethics. The former contains
+all the pure rational principles--based upon conceptions alone (and thus
+excluding mathematics)--of all theoretical cognition; the latter, the
+principles which determine and necessitate à priori all action. Now
+moral philosophy alone contains a code of laws--for the regulation of
+our actions--which are deduced from principles entirely à priori. Hence
+the metaphysic of ethics is the only pure moral philosophy, as it is
+not based upon anthropological or other empirical considerations. The
+metaphysic of speculative reason is what is commonly called metaphysic
+in the more limited sense. But as pure moral philosophy properly forms
+a part of this system of cognition, we must allow it to retain the name
+of metaphysic, although it is not requisite that we should insist on so
+terming it in our present discussion.
+
+It is of the highest importance to separate those cognitions which
+differ from others both in kind and in origin, and to take great care
+that they are not confounded with those with which they are generally
+found connected. What the chemist does in the analysis of substances,
+what the mathematician in pure mathematics, is, in a still higher
+degree, the duty of the philosopher, that the value of each different
+kind of cognition, and the part it takes in the operations of the mind,
+may be clearly defined. Human reason has never wanted a metaphysic of
+some kind, since it attained the power of thought, or rather of
+reflection; but it has never been able to keep this sphere of thought
+and cognition pure from all admixture of foreign elements. The idea of
+a science of this kind is as old as speculation itself; and what mind
+does not speculate--either in the scholastic or in the popular fashion?
+At the same time, it must be admitted that even thinkers by profession
+have been unable clearly to explain the distinction between the two
+elements of our cognition--the one completely à priori, the other à
+posteriori; and hence the proper definition of a peculiar kind of
+cognition, and with it the just idea of a science which has so long and
+so deeply engaged the attention of the human mind, has never been
+established. When it was said: "Metaphysic is the science of the first
+principles of human cognition," this definition did not signalize a
+peculiarity in kind, but only a difference in degree; these first
+principles were thus declared to be more general than others, but no
+criterion of distinction from empirical principles was given. Of these
+some are more general, and therefore higher, than others; and--as we
+cannot distinguish what is completely à priori from that which is known
+to be à posteriori--where shall we draw the line which is to separate
+the higher and so-called first principles, from the lower and
+subordinate principles of cognition? What would be said if we were
+asked to be satisfied with a division of the epochs of the world into
+the earlier centuries and those following them? "Does the fifth, or the
+tenth century belong to the earlier centuries?" it would be asked. In
+the same way I ask: Does the conception of extension belong to
+metaphysics? You answer, "Yes." Well, that of body too? "Yes." And that
+of a fluid body? You stop, you are unprepared to admit this; for if you
+do, everything will belong to metaphysics. From this it is evident that
+the mere degree of subordination--of the particular to the
+general--cannot determine the limits of a science; and that, in the
+present case, we must expect to find a difference in the conceptions of
+metaphysics both in kind and in origin. The fundamental idea of
+metaphysics was obscured on another side by the fact that this kind of
+à priori cognition showed a certain similarity in character with the
+science of mathematics. Both have the property in common of possessing
+an à priori origin; but, in the one, our knowledge is based upon
+conceptions, in the other, on the construction of conceptions. Thus a
+decided dissimilarity between philosophical and mathematical cognition
+comes out--a dissimilarity which was always felt, but which could not be
+made distinct for want of an insight into the criteria of the
+difference. And thus it happened that, as philosophers themselves
+failed in the proper development of the idea of their science, the
+elaboration of the science could not proceed with a definite aim, or
+under trustworthy guidance. Thus, too, philosophers, ignorant of the
+path they ought to pursue and always disputing with each other
+regarding the discoveries which each asserted he had made, brought
+their science into disrepute with the rest of the world, and finally,
+even among themselves.
+
+All pure à priori cognition forms, therefore, in view of the peculiar
+faculty which originates it, a peculiar and distinct unity; and
+metaphysic is the term applied to the philosophy which attempts to
+represent that cognition in this systematic unity. The speculative part
+of metaphysic, which has especially appropriated this appellation--that
+which we have called the metaphysic of nature--and which considers
+everything, as it is (not as it ought to be), by means of à priori
+conceptions, is divided in the following manner.
+
+Metaphysic, in the more limited acceptation of the term, consists of
+two parts--transcendental philosophy and the physiology of pure reason.
+The former presents the system of all the conceptions and principles
+belonging to the understanding and the reason, and which relate to
+objects in general, but not to any particular given objects
+(Ontologia); the latter has nature for its subject-matter, that is, the
+sum of given objects--whether given to the senses, or, if we will, to
+some other kind of intuition--and is accordingly physiology, although
+only rationalis. But the use of the faculty of reason in this rational
+mode of regarding nature is either physical or hyperphysical, or, more
+properly speaking, immanent or transcendent. The former relates to
+nature, in so far as our knowledge regarding it may be applied in
+experience (in concreto); the latter to that connection of the objects
+of experience, which transcends all experience. Transcendent physiology
+has, again, an internal and an external connection with its object,
+both, however, transcending possible experience; the former is the
+physiology of nature as a whole, or transcendental cognition of the
+world, the latter of the connection of the whole of nature with a being
+above nature, or transcendental cognition of God.
+
+Immanent physiology, on the contrary, considers nature as the sum of
+all sensuous objects, consequently, as it is presented to us--but still
+according to à priori conditions, for it is under these alone that
+nature can be presented to our minds at all. The objects of immanent
+physiology are of two kinds: 1. Those of the external senses, or
+corporeal nature; 2. The object of the internal sense, the soul, or, in
+accordance with our fundamental conceptions of it, thinking nature. The
+metaphysics of corporeal nature is called physics; but, as it must
+contain only the principles of an à priori cognition of nature, we must
+term it rational physics. The metaphysics of thinking nature is called
+psychology, and for the same reason is to be regarded as merely the
+rational cognition of the soul.
+
+Thus the whole system of metaphysics consists of four principal parts:
+1. Ontology; 2. Rational Physiology; 3. Rational cosmology; and 4.
+Rational theology. The second part--that of the rational doctrine of
+nature--may be subdivided into two, physica rationalis[81] and
+psychologia rationalis.
+
+ [81] It must not be supposed that I mean by this appellation what is
+ generally called physica general is, and which is rather mathematics
+ than a philosophy of nature. For the metaphysic of nature is
+ completely different from mathematics, nor is it so rich in results,
+ although it is of great importance as a critical test of the
+ application of pure understanding--cognition to nature. For want of its
+ guidance, even mathematicians, adopting certain common notions--which
+ are, in fact, metaphysical--have unconsciously crowded their theories
+ of nature with hypotheses, the fallacy of which becomes evident upon
+ the application of the principles of this metaphysic, without
+ detriment, however, to the employment of mathematics in this sphere of
+ cognition.
+
+The fundamental idea of a philosophy of pure reason of necessity
+dictates this division; it is, therefore, architectonical--in accordance
+with the highest aims of reason, and not merely technical, or according
+to certain accidentally-observed similarities existing between the
+different parts of the whole science. For this reason, also, is the
+division immutable and of legislative authority. But the reader may
+observe in it a few points to which he ought to demur, and which may
+weaken his conviction of its truth and legitimacy.
+
+In the first place, how can I desire an à priori cognition or
+metaphysic of objects, in so far as they are given à posteriori? and
+how is it possible to cognize the nature of things according to à
+priori principles, and to attain to a rational physiology? The answer
+is this. We take from experience nothing more than is requisite to
+present us with an object (in general) of the external or of the
+internal sense; in the former case, by the mere conception of matter
+(impenetrable and inanimate extension), in the latter, by the
+conception of a thinking being--given in the internal empirical
+representation, I think. As to the rest, we must not employ in our
+metaphysic of these objects any empirical principles (which add to the
+content of our conceptions by means of experience), for the purpose of
+forming by their help any judgements respecting these objects.
+
+Secondly, what place shall we assign to empirical psychology, which has
+always been considered a part of metaphysics, and from which in our
+time such important philosophical results have been expected, after the
+hope of constructing an à priori system of knowledge had been
+abandoned? I answer: It must be placed by the side of empirical physics
+or physics proper; that is, must be regarded as forming a part of
+applied philosophy, the à priori principles of which are contained in
+pure philosophy, which is therefore connected, although it must not be
+confounded, with psychology. Empirical psychology must therefore be
+banished from the sphere of metaphysics, and is indeed excluded by the
+very idea of that science. In conformity, however, with scholastic
+usage, we must permit it to occupy a place in metaphysics--but only as
+an appendix to it. We adopt this course from motives of economy; as
+psychology is not as yet full enough to occupy our attention as an
+independent study, while it is, at the same time, of too great
+importance to be entirely excluded or placed where it has still less
+affinity than it has with the subject of metaphysics. It is a stranger
+who has been long a guest; and we make it welcome to stay, until it can
+take up a more suitable abode in a complete system of anthropology--the
+pendant to empirical physics.
+
+The above is the general idea of metaphysics, which, as more was
+expected from it than could be looked for with justice, and as these
+pleasant expectations were unfortunately never realized, fell into
+general disrepute. Our Critique must have fully convinced the reader
+that, although metaphysics cannot form the foundation of religion, it
+must always be one of its most important bulwarks, and that human
+reason, which naturally pursues a dialectical course, cannot do without
+this science, which checks its tendencies towards dialectic and, by
+elevating reason to a scientific and clear self-knowledge, prevents the
+ravages which a lawless speculative reason would infallibly commit in
+the sphere of morals as well as in that of religion. We may be sure,
+therefore, whatever contempt may be thrown upon metaphysics by those
+who judge a science not by its own nature, but according to the
+accidental effects it may have produced, that it can never be
+completely abandoned, that we must always return to it as to a beloved
+one who has been for a time estranged, because the questions with which
+it is engaged relate to the highest aims of humanity, and reason must
+always labour either to attain to settled views in regard to these, or
+to destroy those which others have already established.
+
+Metaphysic, therefore--that of nature, as well as that of ethics, but in
+an especial manner the criticism which forms the propædeutic to all
+the operations of reason--forms properly that department of knowledge
+which may be termed, in the truest sense of the word, philosophy. The
+path which it pursues is that of science, which, when it has once been
+discovered, is never lost, and never misleads. Mathematics, natural
+science, the common experience of men, have a high value as means, for
+the most part, to accidental ends--but at last also, to those which are
+necessary and essential to the existence of humanity. But to guide them
+to this high goal, they require the aid of rational cognition on the
+basis of pure conceptions, which, be it termed as it may, is properly
+nothing but metaphysics.
+
+For the same reason, metaphysics forms likewise the completion of the
+culture of human reason. In this respect, it is indispensable, setting
+aside altogether the influence which it exerts as a science. For its
+subject-matter is the elements and highest maxims of reason, which form
+the basis of the possibility of some sciences and of the use of all.
+That, as a purely speculative science, it is more useful in preventing
+error than in the extension of knowledge, does not detract from its
+value; on the contrary, the supreme office of censor which it occupies
+assures to it the highest authority and importance. This office it
+administers for the purpose of securing order, harmony, and well-being
+to science, and of directing its noble and fruitful labours to the
+highest possible aim--the happiness of all mankind.
+
+Chapter IV. The History of Pure Reason
+
+This title is placed here merely for the purpose of designating a
+division of the system of pure reason of which I do not intend to treat
+at present. I shall content myself with casting a cursory glance, from
+a purely transcendental point of view--that of the nature of pure
+reason--on the labours of philosophers up to the present time. They have
+aimed at erecting an edifice of philosophy; but to my eye this edifice
+appears to be in a very ruinous condition.
+
+It is very remarkable, although naturally it could not have been
+otherwise, that, in the infancy of philosophy, the study of the nature
+of God and the constitution of a future world formed the commencement,
+rather than the conclusion, as we should have it, of the speculative
+efforts of the human mind. However rude the religious conceptions
+generated by the remains of the old manners and customs of a less
+cultivated time, the intelligent classes were not thereby prevented
+from devoting themselves to free inquiry into the existence and nature
+of God; and they easily saw that there could be no surer way of
+pleasing the invisible ruler of the world, and of attaining to
+happiness in another world at least, than a good and honest course of
+life in this. Thus theology and morals formed the two chief motives, or
+rather the points of attraction in all abstract inquiries. But it was
+the former that especially occupied the attention of speculative
+reason, and which afterwards became so celebrated under the name of
+metaphysics.
+
+I shall not at present indicate the periods of time at which the
+greatest changes in metaphysics took place, but shall merely give a
+hasty sketch of the different ideas which occasioned the most important
+revolutions in this sphere of thought. There are three different ends
+in relation to which these revolutions have taken place.
+
+1. In relation to the object of the cognition of reason, philosophers
+may be divided into sensualists and intellectualists. Epicurus may be
+regarded as the head of the former, Plato of the latter. The
+distinction here signalized, subtle as it is, dates from the earliest
+times, and was long maintained. The former asserted that reality
+resides in sensuous objects alone, and that everything else is merely
+imaginary; the latter, that the senses are the parents of illusion and
+that truth is to be found in the understanding alone. The former did
+not deny to the conceptions of the understanding a certain kind of
+reality; but with them it was merely logical, with the others it was
+mystical. The former admitted intellectual conceptions, but declared
+that sensuous objects alone possessed real existence. The latter
+maintained that all real objects were intelligible, and believed that
+the pure understanding possessed a faculty of intuition apart from
+sense, which, in their opinion, served only to confuse the ideas of the
+understanding.
+
+2. In relation to the origin of the pure cognitions of reason, we find
+one school maintaining that they are derived entirely from experience,
+and another that they have their origin in reason alone. Aristotle
+may be regarded as the head of the empiricists, and Plato of the
+noologists. Locke, the follower of Aristotle in modern times, and
+Leibnitz of Plato (although he cannot be said to have imitated him in
+his mysticism), have not been able to bring this question to a settled
+conclusion. The procedure of Epicurus in his sensual system, in which
+he always restricted his conclusions to the sphere of experience, was
+much more consequent than that of Aristotle and Locke. The latter
+especially, after having derived all the conceptions and principles
+of the mind from experience, goes so far, in the employment of these
+conceptions and principles, as to maintain that we can prove the
+existence of God and the immortality of the soul--both of them objects
+lying beyond the limits of possible experience--with the same force of
+demonstration, as any mathematical proposition.
+
+3. In relation to method. Method is procedure according to principles.
+We may divide the methods at present employed in the field of inquiry
+into the naturalistic and the scientific. The naturalist of pure reason
+lays it down as his principle that common reason, without the aid of
+science--which he calls sound reason, or common sense--can give a more
+satisfactory answer to the most important questions of metaphysics than
+speculation is able to do. He must maintain, therefore, that we can
+determine the content and circumference of the moon more certainly by
+the naked eye, than by the aid of mathematical reasoning. But this
+system is mere misology reduced to principles; and, what is the most
+absurd thing in this doctrine, the neglect of all scientific means is
+paraded as a peculiar method of extending our cognition. As regards
+those who are naturalists because they know no better, they are
+certainly not to be blamed. They follow common sense, without parading
+their ignorance as a method which is to teach us the wonderful secret,
+how we are to find the truth which lies at the bottom of the well of
+Democritus.
+
+Quod sapio satis est mihi, non ego curo Esse quod
+Arcesilas aerumnosique Solones. PERSIUS
+--Satirae, iii. 78-79.
+
+is their motto, under which they may lead a pleasant and praiseworthy
+life, without troubling themselves with science or troubling science
+with them.
+
+As regards those who wish to pursue a scientific method, they have now
+the choice of following either the dogmatical or the sceptical, while
+they are bound never to desert the systematic mode of procedure. When I
+mention, in relation to the former, the celebrated Wolf, and as regards
+the latter, David Hume, I may leave, in accordance with my present
+intention, all others unnamed. The critical path alone is still open.
+If my reader has been kind and patient enough to accompany me on this
+hitherto untravelled route, he can now judge whether, if he and others
+will contribute their exertions towards making this narrow footpath a
+high road of thought, that which many centuries have failed to
+accomplish may not be executed before the close of the present--namely,
+to bring Reason to perfect contentment in regard to that which has
+always, but without permanent results, occupied her powers and engaged
+her ardent desire for knowledge.
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