Add 36 bundle(s): cosmwasm_validate_basic_address_count, monero_wallet_rpc_body_size_dos, monero_zmq_eagain_crash, namada_multisig_256key_sig_overflow, namada_tx_repeated_sections_hash_blowup, nimiq_dht_get_first_record_poison, nimiq_dht_sig_length_panic, nimiq_proposal_signer_oob, zcash_zebra_tx_cache_consensus_split

README.md

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 ---
+license: cc-by-4.0
 gated: auto
 extra_gated_heading: "Request access to nr-bundles-public"
 extra_gated_description: "NullRabbit tracks who uses this corpus so we can support integrations, notify users of updates, and credit adopters. Access is granted automatically once you submit this form."
@@ -18,7 +19,6 @@ extra_gated_fields:
   I agree to cite NullRabbit in any published use: checkbox
   I will contact NullRabbit before commercial or production use: checkbox
 extra_gated_button_content: "Request access"
-license: cc-by-4.0
 language:
   - en
 tags:
@@ -46,15 +46,15 @@ size_categories:
   - n<1K
 ---
 
-<!-- nr-bundle-count: 950 -->
-<!-- nr-chains: aptos,bitcoin,bnb-smart-chain,cardano,casper,celestia,conflux,cosmos,dogecoin,ethereum,ethereum-consensus-layer,filecoin,http2,http3,ic,icon,iota,ipfs,kaspa,libp2p,litecoin,monero,near,optimism,polkadot,polkadot-substrate,polygon-pos,qtum,quic,solana,solana-agave,sonic-fantom,starknet,sui,walrus,xrp,zcash -->
+<!-- nr-bundle-count: 986 -->
+<!-- nr-chains: aptos,bitcoin,bnb-smart-chain,cardano,casper,celestia,conflux,cosmos,dogecoin,ethereum,ethereum-consensus-layer,filecoin,http2,http3,ic,icon,iota,ipfs,kaspa,libp2p,litecoin,monero,namada,near,nimiq,optimism,polkadot,polkadot-substrate,polygon-pos,qtum,quic,solana,solana-agave,sonic-fantom,starknet,sui,walrus,xrp,zcash -->
 <!-- Keep the count marker equal to the live dataset's bundle-dir count. scripts/publish_dataset.py
      (--card at publish, --check-card-only for daily monitoring) asserts it and fails loud on drift. -->
 
 # nr-bundles-public
 
 <!-- AUTO:headline:BEGIN — generated by scripts/dataset_card_composition.py from the live+staged bundle set; do not hand-edit -->
-A curated, multi-modal dataset of blockchain validator infrastructure under attack and benign workloads. **950 bundles** across **37 chains and network stacks** (Aptos, Bitcoin, bnb-smart-chain, Cardano, casper, celestia, conflux, Cosmos, Dogecoin, Ethereum, ethereum-consensus-layer, Filecoin, http2, http3, ic, icon, IOTA, ipfs, kaspa, libp2p, Litecoin, Monero, Near, optimism, polkadot, polkadot-substrate, polygon-pos, qtum, quic, Solana, Solana (Agave), sonic-fantom, starknet, Sui, walrus, XRP, zcash), all thirteen families in the taxonomy (twelve attack classes plus `benign`), and **208 attack primitive_ids** — including faithful wire-level reproductions of **151 publicly disclosed CVEs and security advisories** in blockchain node software. Released as the public sample of NullRabbit's bundle corpus, which underpins [NullRabbit Labs'](https://huggingface.co/NullRabbit) ML research on autonomous defence for decentralised networks.
+A curated, multi-modal dataset of blockchain validator infrastructure under attack and benign workloads. **986 bundles** across **39 chains and network stacks** (Aptos, Bitcoin, bnb-smart-chain, Cardano, casper, celestia, conflux, Cosmos, Dogecoin, Ethereum, ethereum-consensus-layer, Filecoin, http2, http3, ic, icon, IOTA, ipfs, kaspa, libp2p, Litecoin, Monero, namada, Near, nimiq, optimism, polkadot, polkadot-substrate, polygon-pos, qtum, quic, Solana, Solana (Agave), sonic-fantom, starknet, Sui, walrus, XRP, zcash), all thirteen families in the taxonomy (twelve attack classes plus `benign`), and **217 attack primitive_ids** — including faithful wire-level reproductions of **162 publicly disclosed CVEs and security advisories** in blockchain node software. Released as the public sample of NullRabbit's bundle corpus, which underpins [NullRabbit Labs'](https://huggingface.co/NullRabbit) ML research on autonomous defence for decentralised networks.
 <!-- AUTO:headline:END -->
 
 ## What this dataset is
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ These are **validator / node-software** vulnerability classes only. On-chain con
 ## What's included
 
 <!-- AUTO:totals:BEGIN — generated by scripts/dataset_card_composition.py; do not hand-edit -->
-**950 bundles total: 943 attack, 7 benign.** By provenance class: **328 `original`** (NullRabbit's own disclosed findings, each with a published operator advisory), **23 legacy-sample** (the 2026-05-13 Solana/Sui curation), and **599 `public-cve-replication`** (faithful reproductions of already-public CVEs / advisories). The raw `packets.pcap` is dropped from every bundle (`BundleFiles.packets_pcap=False`); no pre-termination pcap variant is retained.
+**986 bundles total: 979 attack, 7 benign.** By provenance class: **328 `original`** (NullRabbit's own disclosed findings, each with a published operator advisory), **23 legacy-sample** (the 2026-05-13 Solana/Sui curation), and **635 `public-cve-replication`** (faithful reproductions of already-public CVEs / advisories). The raw `packets.pcap` is dropped from every bundle (`BundleFiles.packets_pcap=False`); no pre-termination pcap variant is retained.
 <!-- AUTO:totals:END -->
 
 The `Pcap modality` column in the tables below specifies which network-layer file is present on disk per bundle: `pre-term TLS` means `pcap_pre_termination.pcap` is retained (encrypted TLS frames; IP/TCP headers visible); `none` means the raw `packets.pcap` was dropped and no pre-term variant exists (`BundleFiles.packets_pcap=False` in the manifest).
@@ -218,9 +218,9 @@ The 2026-07-06 additions (`iota_f10_multiget_amp`, `sui_h02_state_sync_flood`, `
 Posture variations capture distinct attack shapes against the same primitive (saturating throughput, low-volume, distributed-source, mimicry of organic traffic, historical-CVE patterns). Bundles within a primitive are intentionally non-identical so the dataset surfaces the variance the format is designed to represent.
 
 <!-- AUTO:cve-cut:BEGIN — generated by scripts/dataset_card_composition.py; do not hand-edit -->
-### Public-CVE replications (599 bundles)
+### Public-CVE replications (635 bundles)
 
-These 599 bundles are faithful wire-level reproductions of **151 publicly disclosed CVEs / security advisories** (across 121 attack primitives) in blockchain node software, captured against the vulnerable node so the attack signature is real. Each bundle's `provenance.source_class` is `public-cve-replication` and `provenance.public_source` links the original disclosure.
+These 635 bundles are faithful wire-level reproductions of **162 publicly disclosed CVEs / security advisories** (across 130 attack primitives) in blockchain node software, captured against the vulnerable node so the attack signature is real. Each bundle's `provenance.source_class` is `public-cve-replication` and `provenance.public_source` links the original disclosure.
 
 **Bitcoin (106 bundles, 26 primitives)**
 
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ These 599 bundles are faithful wire-level reproductions of **151 publicly disclo
 | `timejacking_peer_time_skew` | `consensus_abuse` | 4 | https://github.com/slowmist/Cryptocurrency-Security-Audit-Guide/blob/main/Blockchain-Common-Vulnerability-List.md |
 | `tx_malleability_txid_mutate` | `consensus_abuse` | 4 | https://github.com/slowmist/Cryptocurrency-Security-Audit-Guide/blob/main/Blockchain-Common-Vulnerability-List.md |
 
-**Cosmos (98 bundles, 10 primitives)**
+**Cosmos (102 bundles, 11 primitives)**
 
 | Primitive | Family | Bundles | Public source |
 |---|---|---|---|
@@ -267,6 +267,7 @@ These 599 bundles are faithful wire-level reproductions of **151 publicly disclo
 | `cosmos_group_divzero_halt` | `consensus_abuse` | 8 | https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-x5vx-95h7-rv4p |
 | `cosmos_p2p_conn_flood` | `connection_exhaustion` | 12 | https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/security/advisories/GHSA-v24h-pjjv-mcp6 |
 | `cosmos_protobuf_nest_bomb` | `compute_amp` | 2 | https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-8wcc-m6j2-qxvm |
+| `cosmwasm_validate_basic_address_count` | `memory_amp` | 4 | https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m3rh-cvr5-x6q4 |
 
 **Ethereum (96 bundles, 18 primitives)**
 
@@ -319,6 +320,16 @@ These 599 bundles are faithful wire-level reproductions of **151 publicly disclo
 | `s2n_quic_crypto_offset_amplification` | `memory_amp` | 4 | CVE-2026-10740 / GHSA-9q54-f358-3fqf — aws/s2n-quic: CRYPTO-frame offset amplification. The CRYPTO-frame reassembly buffer lacks maximum-size enforcement, so a CRYPTO frame (type 0x06) carrying an artificially HIGH offset forces the receiver to reserve reassembly buffer up to that offset even though the delivered body is tiny: a single ~1200-byte packet causes ~9.4 MB of allocation (~7800x). No authentication or valid handshake is required — the crafted CRYPTO frames ride pre-handshake QUIC Initial packets, so an unauthenticated peer can repeatedly transmit them to exhaust server memory (availability DoS, CVSS 3.1 5.3). Affected s2n-quic <= 1.81.0; fixed in 1.82.0. Advisory: https://github.com/aws/s2n-quic/security/advisories/GHSA-9q54-f358-3fqf |
 | `s2n_quic_stream_limit_exhaustion` | `connection_exhaustion` | 4 | GHSA-475v-pq2g-fp9g — AWS s2n-quic <= v1.30.0: 's2n-quic potential denial of service via crafted stream frames' — uncontrolled stream-limit increase when closing remote-initiated streams. https://github.com/aws/s2n-quic/security/advisories/GHSA-475v-pq2g-fp9g |
 
+**Monero (58 bundles, 5 primitives)**
+
+| Primitive | Family | Bundles | Public source |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `monero_levin_array_memcorrupt` | `compute_amp` | 2 | https://www.talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2018-0637 |
+| `monero_portable_storage_oom` | `memory_amp` | 32 | https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/7190 |
+| `monero_rpc_conn_exhaustion` | `connection_exhaustion` | 16 | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-26819 |
+| `monero_wallet_rpc_body_size_dos` | `memory_amp` | 4 | https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/10139 |
+| `monero_zmq_eagain_crash` | `compute_amp` | 4 | https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/9052 |
+
 **libp2p (52 bundles, 13 primitives)**
 
 | Primitive | Family | Bundles | Public source |
@@ -337,15 +348,7 @@ These 599 bundles are faithful wire-level reproductions of **151 publicly disclo
 | `yamux_ping_flood_pending_frames_oom` | `memory_amp` | 4 | https://github.com/libp2p/rust-yamux/security/advisories/GHSA-3999-5ffv-wp2r |
 | `yamux_syn_oversized_body_panic` | `compute_amp` | 4 | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32314 |
 
-**Monero (50 bundles, 3 primitives)**
-
-| Primitive | Family | Bundles | Public source |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| `monero_levin_array_memcorrupt` | `compute_amp` | 2 | https://www.talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2018-0637 |
-| `monero_portable_storage_oom` | `memory_amp` | 32 | https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/7190 |
-| `monero_rpc_conn_exhaustion` | `connection_exhaustion` | 16 | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-26819 |
-
-**zcash (32 bundles, 8 primitives)**
+**zcash (36 bundles, 9 primitives)**
 
 | Primitive | Family | Bundles | Public source |
 |---|---|---|---|
@@ -354,6 +357,7 @@ These 599 bundles are faithful wire-level reproductions of **151 publicly disclo
 | `zcash_zebra_coinbase_script_preallocation_amplification` | `memory_amp` | 4 | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44500 |
 | `zcash_zebra_equihash_solution_preallocation_amplification` | `memory_amp` | 4 | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44500 |
 | `zcash_zebra_headers_message_preallocation_amplification` | `memory_amp` | 4 | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44500 |
+| `zcash_zebra_tx_cache_consensus_split` | `consensus_abuse` | 4 | https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3vmh-33xr-9cqh |
 | `zebra_block_discovery_dos` | `gossip_abuse` | 4 | CVE-2026-44499 / GHSA-h9hm-m2xj-4rq9 — https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-h9hm-m2xj-4rq9 (also https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44499). Permanent Block Discovery Halt in Zebra via Gossip Queue Saturation and Syncer Poisoning. |
 | `zebra_rpc_premature_disconnect_crash` | `connection_exhaustion` | 4 | CVE-2026-41585 / GHSA-29x4-r6jv-ff4w https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-29x4-r6jv-ff4w (Zebra JSON-RPC HTTP middleware: DoS via interrupted/truncated request body from an authenticated client) |
 | `zebra_sync_restart_poisoning` | `gossip_abuse` | 4 | CVE-2026-52737 / GHSA-gvjc-3w7c-92jx — https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-gvjc-3w7c-92jx |
@@ -387,6 +391,14 @@ These 599 bundles are faithful wire-level reproductions of **151 publicly disclo
 | `sui_move_recursion` | `compute_amp` | 4 | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-36184 |
 | `sui_verifier_hamsterwheel` | `compute_amp` | 4 | https://medium.com/certik-skyfall/the-hamsterwheel-an-in-depth-exploration-of-a-novel-attack-vector-on-the-sui-blockchain-522f80623bc7 |
 
+**nimiq (12 bundles, 3 primitives)**
+
+| Primitive | Family | Bundles | Public source |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `nimiq_dht_get_first_record_poison` | `gossip_abuse` | 4 | https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-ccqv-2c9q-mqw5 |
+| `nimiq_dht_sig_length_panic` | `compute_amp` | 4 | https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-27w2-87xv-37c6 |
+| `nimiq_proposal_signer_oob` | `compute_amp` | 4 | https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3661 |
+
 **http3 (8 bundles, 2 primitives)**
 
 | Primitive | Family | Bundles | Public source |
@@ -394,6 +406,13 @@ These 599 bundles are faithful wire-level reproductions of **151 publicly disclo
 | `envoy_http3_qpack_blocked_decode_leak` | `memory_amp` | 4 | GHSA-p7c7-7c47-pwch — envoyproxy/envoy: 'HTTP/3 QPACK blocked-decoding memory exhaustion.' Envoy's HTTP/3 QPACK decoder mis-accounts QUIC flow control for BLOCKED header blocks: when a received field section references dynamic-table entries with a Required Insert Count higher than the entries actually inserted (the encoder-stream inserts have not arrived), the block cannot be decoded and is buffered on the decoder heap, yet 'stream-level and connection-level flow-control windows are returned to the peer even though the payload bytes are still resident in heap memory.' The attacker never sends the referenced inserts (blocks never unblock) and, because the credit was returned, progressively feeds more HEADERS payload bytes into this uncontrolled internal buffer, circumventing QUIC flow-control limits -> unbounded memory growth and DoS of the HTTP/3 stack. Severity High, CVSS 7.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H); no CVE assigned. Affected Envoy < 1.39; fixed 1.35.13, 1.36.9, 1.37.5, 1.38.3. No auth/privileges required. Advisory: https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/security/advisories/GHSA-p7c7-7c47-pwch |
 | `netty_http3_field_section_oom` | `memory_amp` | 4 | CVE-2026-44892 / GHSA-c2rx-5r8w-8xr2 — netty/netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http3 (Maven)): 'Vulnerable Default Configuration Which Leads to Denial of Service via Unbounded HTTP/3 Header Size.' Netty enforces safe 8192-byte header limits for HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2, but the HTTP/3 Http3ConnectionHandler follows RFC 9114's unlimited default: when a peer omits HTTP3_SETTINGS_MAX_FIELD_SECTION_SIZE, maxHeaderListSize defaults to the virtually-unbounded (1L << 62) - 1. A peer that omits the setting and sends a HEADERS block with an enormous number of header fields makes the codec buffer field data until the JVM exhausts heap -> OutOfMemoryError (availability DoS, severity High, CVSS 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H; CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption); CWE-1188 (Insecure Default Initialization)). Fixed 4.2.15.Final (default replaced with a hardcoded 8192-byte cap Http3CodecUtils.DEFAULT_MAX_FIELD_SECTION_SIZE). Affected >= 4.2.0.Final, <= 4.2.14.Final. Advisory: https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-c2rx-5r8w-8xr2 |
 
+**namada (8 bundles, 2 primitives)**
+
+| Primitive | Family | Bundles | Public source |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `namada_multisig_256key_sig_overflow` | `compute_amp` | 4 | https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-82vg-5v4f-f9wq |
+| `namada_tx_repeated_sections_hash_blowup` | `compute_amp` | 4 | https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f8qm-hmm3-fv7f |
+
 **polkadot (4 bundles, 1 primitive)**
 
 | Primitive | Family | Bundles | Public source |

crp_086085e7dad24923/app.parquet

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crp_086085e7dad24923/manifest.json

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+{
+  "bundle_version": 3,
+  "shape": "v0.0",
+  "corpus_id": "crp_086085e7dad24923",
+  "attack_id": "atk_086085e7dad24923",
+  "genome_id": "6c6309eb018f4d69",
+  "assessment_id": null,
+  "family_id": "memory_amp",
+  "primitive_id": "cosmwasm_validate_basic_address_count",
+  "posture": "distributed",
+  "ground_truth_label": "attack",
+  "chain": "cosmos",
+  "run_tag": "knownclass_cosmos_cosmwasm_validate_basic_address_count_distributed_A8000_r2",
+  "target_env": "cosmos-wasmd-cometbft-rpc",
+  "generation_method": "hand",
+  "started_at": "2026-07-17T16:12:04.890044Z",
+  "ended_at": "2026-07-17T16:12:06.479354Z",
+  "attack_parameters": {
+    "posture": "distributed",
+    "rep": 2,
+    "layer": "cometbft-rpc-http",
+    "attack_family_label": "access_config_address_list_dedup_map_blowup",
+    "target_port": 35407,
+    "cometbft_rpc_port_prod": 26657,
+    "rpc_method": "broadcast_tx_sync",
+    "message_type": "/cosmwasm.wasm.v1.MsgStoreCode",
+    "permission": 4,
+    "addresses_per_tx": 8000,
+    "requests": 90,
+    "pace_s": 0.0004,
+    "trigger": "MsgStoreCode.instantiate_permission.AccessConfig.Addresses = N distinct bech32 addrs",
+    "cwa": "CWA-2024-003",
+    "ghsa": "GHSA-m3rh-cvr5-x6q4",
+    "cvss": "6.3 (Moderate) \u2014 remote unauthenticated resource exhaustion at mempool validation (CWE-400)",
+    "cwe": "CWE-400",
+    "package": "CosmWasm wasmd (Go)",
+    "affected_versions": "wasmd < 0.52.0",
+    "fixed_version": "v0.52.0 (commit 76c0c06)",
+    "public_source": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m3rh-cvr5-x6q4",
+    "attempted": 90,
+    "sent": 90,
+    "distinct_src_ips": 10,
+    "bytes_sent_total": 45159210,
+    "mock_posts": 90,
+    "mock_broadcast_tx": 90,
+    "mock_trigger_confirmed": 90,
+    "mock_max_addresses": 8000
+  },
+  "expected_detection_signature": null,
+  "files": {
+    "packets_pcap": false,
+    "host_parquet": false,
+    "app_parquet": false,
+    "protocol_parquet": true,
+    "responses_parquet": false,
+    "vectors_parquet": false
+  },
+  "provenance": {
+    "traffic_source": "reproducer-attack",
+    "fidelity_class": "lab",
+    "target_authorisation": "self-owned",
+    "engagement_id": null,
+    "tooling": {
+      "known_class_cosmwasm_address_count_dos": "1.0"
+    },
+    "pcap_path_pre_termination": null,
+    "public_source": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m3rh-cvr5-x6q4",
+    "public_source_cwa": "https://github.com/CosmWasm/advisories/blob/main/CWAs/CWA-2024-003.md",
+    "source_note": "CWA-2024-003 / GHSA-m3rh-cvr5-x6q4 (CosmWasm wasmd wasmd < 0.52.0): several wasmd message types let an unauthenticated submitter pack a large address list into AccessConfig.Addresses / msg.Addresses; ValidateBasic de-duplicates it with a map, so a single tx (broadcast_tx_sync \u2192 CheckTx) with N addresses drives large memory consumption + map-operation slowdown (CWE-400). Bounded only by tx-size gas + CometBFT max_bytes. Fixed v0.52.0 (commit 76c0c06). https://github.com/CosmWasm/advisories/blob/main/CWAs/CWA-2024-003.md",
+    "class": "known-class-public-disclosure",
+    "source_class": "public-cve-replication",
+    "cwa": "CWA-2024-003",
+    "ghsa": "GHSA-m3rh-cvr5-x6q4",
+    "cvss": "6.3 (Moderate) \u2014 remote unauthenticated resource exhaustion at mempool validation (CWE-400)",
+    "package": "CosmWasm wasmd (Go)",
+    "affected_versions": "wasmd < 0.52.0",
+    "fixed_version": "v0.52.0 (commit 76c0c06)",
+    "attack_family_label": "access_config_address_list_dedup_map_blowup",
+    "tcpdump_returncode": 0,
+    "capture_module": "chains._shared.capture_multimodal"
+  },
+  "notes": "known-class repro (traffic, loopback mock): wasmd MsgStoreCode with an oversized AccessConfig.Addresses list \u2192 ValidateBasic de-dup map blow-up at mempool CheckTx. CWA-2024-003 / GHSA-m3rh-cvr5-x6q4 (CosmWasm wasmd wasmd < 0.52.0): several wasmd message types let an unauthenticated submitter pack a large address list into AccessConfig.Addresses / msg.Addresses; ValidateBasic de-duplicates it with a map, so a single tx (broadcast_tx_sync \u2192 CheckTx) with N addresses drives large memory consumption + map-operation slowdown (CWE-400). Bounded only by tx-size gas + CometBFT max_bytes. Fixed v0.52.0 (commit 76c0c06). https://github.com/CosmWasm/advisories/blob/main/CWAs/CWA-2024-003.md"
+}

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+  "corpus_id": "crp_091d842eb5474d7b",
+  "attack_id": "atk_091d842eb5474d7b",
+  "genome_id": "de21a42ac2db50e8",
+  "assessment_id": null,
+  "family_id": "consensus_abuse",
+  "primitive_id": "zcash_zebra_tx_cache_consensus_split",
+  "posture": "historical-cve",
+  "ground_truth_label": "attack",
+  "chain": "zcash",
+  "run_tag": "knownclass_zcash_zcash_zebra_tx_cache_consensus_split_auth_r3",
+  "target_env": "zebrad-4.2.0-regtest-nu5-cachesplit",
+  "generation_method": "hand",
+  "started_at": "2026-07-17T18:50:40.261209Z",
+  "ended_at": "2026-07-17T18:50:46.103003Z",
+  "attack_parameters": {
+    "posture": "historical-cve",
+    "rep": 3,
+    "layer": "consensus",
+    "cve": "CVE-2026-34377",
+    "ghsa": "GHSA-3vmh-33xr-9cqh",
+    "cvss": "8.4 (High) \u2014 remote unauthenticated consensus split via verification-cache mined-txid skip",
+    "mechanism": "find_verified_unmined_tx mined-txid cache skips authorizing-data re-verification",
+    "vector": "sendrawtransaction(txA valid) warms cache; submitblock(block with txB invalid-auth, same ZIP-244 mined txid) accepted by the vulnerable node",
+    "node": "zebrad 4.2.0 / zebra-consensus 5.0.0 (VULNERABLE; fixed 4.3.0/5.0.1)",
+    "coinbase_txid": "bdcc54b73724b4a6ff9fa61541d4aa2f45ce07c3376156a7d1134a8cafc384f2",
+    "rpc_port": 18233,
+    "package": "zebra-consensus / ZcashFoundation/zebra (Rust)",
+    "affected_versions": "Zebra < v4.3.0 / zebra-consensus < v5.0.1",
+    "fixed_version": "v4.3.0 / zebra-consensus v5.0.1"
+  },
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+  "files": {
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+  },
+  "provenance": {
+    "traffic_source": "reproducer-attack",
+    "fidelity_class": "lab",
+    "target_authorisation": "self-owned",
+    "engagement_id": null,
+    "tooling": {
+      "cachesplit": "zebra-chain block-injector",
+      "zebrad": "4.2.0 (consensus 5.0.0)",
+      "known_class_zebra_tx_cache_split": "1.0"
+    },
+    "pcap_path_pre_termination": null,
+    "public_source": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3vmh-33xr-9cqh",
+    "source_note": "CVE-2026-34377 / GHSA-3vmh-33xr-9cqh (ZcashFoundation/zebra, Zebra < v4.3.0 / zebra-consensus < v5.0.1): Zebra caches tx verification keyed by the ZIP-244 mined txid (excludes transparent authorizing data), so find_verified_unmined_tx returns a cached 'verified' hit and block verification skips re-checking a tx's signature. sendrawtransaction of a valid tx (txA) warms the cache under the mined txid; a submitted block containing a sibling txB with the SAME mined txid but a corrupted signature is then accepted \u2192 the vulnerable node includes an invalid-signature tx (consensus divergence from patched Zebra / zcashd, which reject it). Reproduced live against vulnerable zebrad 4.2.0. Fixed v4.3.0 / zebra-consensus v5.0.1. https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3vmh-33xr-9cqh",
+    "class": "known-class-public-disclosure",
+    "source_class": "public-cve-replication",
+    "cve": "CVE-2026-34377",
+    "ghsa": "GHSA-3vmh-33xr-9cqh",
+    "cvss": "8.4 (High) \u2014 remote unauthenticated consensus split via verification-cache mined-txid skip",
+    "package": "zebra-consensus / ZcashFoundation/zebra (Rust)",
+    "affected_versions": "Zebra < v4.3.0 / zebra-consensus < v5.0.1",
+    "fixed_version": "v4.3.0 / zebra-consensus v5.0.1",
+    "tcpdump_returncode": 0,
+    "capture_module": "chains._shared.capture_multimodal"
+  },
+  "notes": "known-class live repro (traffic + host + prometheus): Zebra verification-cache consensus split \u2014 the vulnerable node accepts a block whose tx has an invalid signature because a valid sibling with the same ZIP-244 mined txid is in the mempool. CVE-2026-34377 / GHSA-3vmh-33xr-9cqh (ZcashFoundation/zebra, Zebra < v4.3.0 / zebra-consensus < v5.0.1): Zebra caches tx verification keyed by the ZIP-244 mined txid (excludes transparent authorizing data), so find_verified_unmined_tx returns a cached 'verified' hit and block verification skips re-checking a tx's signature. sendrawtransaction of a valid tx (txA) warms the cache under the mined txid; a submitted block containing a sibling txB with the SAME mined txid but a corrupted signature is then accepted \u2192 the vulnerable node includes an invalid-signature tx (consensus divergence from patched Zebra / zcashd, which reject it). Reproduced live against vulnerable zebrad 4.2.0. Fixed v4.3.0 / zebra-consensus v5.0.1. https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3vmh-33xr-9cqh"
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+  "corpus_id": "crp_0fd43b2f0652416f",
+  "attack_id": "atk_0fd43b2f0652416f",
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+  "family_id": "memory_amp",
+  "primitive_id": "monero_wallet_rpc_body_size_dos",
+  "posture": "saturating",
+  "ground_truth_label": "attack",
+  "chain": "monero",
+  "run_tag": "knownclass_monero_monero_wallet_rpc_body_size_dos_saturating_N200_r1",
+  "target_env": "monero-wallet-rpc",
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+  "started_at": "2026-07-17T08:36:04.053328Z",
+  "ended_at": "2026-07-17T08:36:05.866437Z",
+  "attack_parameters": {
+    "posture": "saturating",
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+    "layer": "monero-wallet-rpc-http",
+    "attack_family_label": "monero_wallet_rpc_unbounded_body",
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+    "ghpr_id": "GHPR-monero-project-monero-10139",
+    "public_source": "https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/10139",
+    "affected_versions": "monero-wallet-rpc before PR #10139 (m_max_content_length unset \u2014 unbounded body)",
+    "fixed_versions": "monero after PR #10139 (m_max_content_length = 100 MiB, matching core RPC)",
+    "cvss_severity": "availability-only (remote memory-exhaustion DoS when wallet-rpc is exposed)",
+    "impact": "unbounded wallet-rpc request body buffered in memory -> memory-exhaustion DoS",
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+    "fidelity_class": "lab",
+    "target_authorisation": "self-owned",
+    "engagement_id": null,
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+      "known_class_monero_wallet_rpc_body_dos": "1.0"
+    },
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+    "public_source": "https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/10139",
+    "source_note": "monero PR #10139: monero-wallet-rpc did not bound the HTTP request body size (core RPC caps at 1 MiB), so an oversized POST body to a wallet-rpc endpoint is buffered unbounded in memory \u2192 resource-exhaustion DoS. Fixed by setting m_max_content_length. Modelled as the oversized-POST-body wire signature. https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/10139",
+    "class": "monero-wallet-rpc-unbounded-body",
+    "source_class": "public-cve-replication",
+    "ghpr_id": "GHPR-monero-project-monero-10139",
+    "public_url": "https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/10139",
+    "affected_versions": "monero-wallet-rpc before PR #10139 (m_max_content_length unset \u2014 unbounded body)",
+    "fixed_versions": "monero after PR #10139 (m_max_content_length = 100 MiB, matching core RPC)",
+    "cvss_severity": "availability-only (remote memory-exhaustion DoS when wallet-rpc is exposed)",
+    "tcpdump_returncode": 0,
+    "capture_module": "chains._shared.capture_multimodal"
+  },
+  "notes": "known-class repro (traffic): monero wallet-rpc unbounded-body memory DoS (PR #10139). monero PR #10139: monero-wallet-rpc did not bound the HTTP request body size (core RPC caps at 1 MiB), so an oversized POST body to a wallet-rpc endpoint is buffered unbounded in memory \u2192 resource-exhaustion DoS. Fixed by setting m_max_content_length. Modelled as the oversized-POST-body wire signature. https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/10139"
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+  "corpus_id": "crp_111a7bcb584b4f1f",
+  "attack_id": "atk_111a7bcb584b4f1f",
+  "genome_id": "05e010587eb2c055",
+  "assessment_id": null,
+  "family_id": "gossip_abuse",
+  "primitive_id": "nimiq_dht_get_first_record_poison",
+  "posture": "saturating",
+  "ground_truth_label": "attack",
+  "chain": "nimiq",
+  "run_tag": "knownclass_nimiq_nimiq_dht_get_first_record_poison_saturating_N1500_r1",
+  "target_env": "nimiq-core-rs-albatross-dht-node",
+  "generation_method": "hand",
+  "started_at": "2026-07-17T16:12:17.703158Z",
+  "ended_at": "2026-07-17T16:12:19.751399Z",
+  "attack_parameters": {
+    "posture": "saturating",
+    "rep": 1,
+    "layer": "libp2p-kad-dht",
+    "attack_family_label": "dht_get_invalid_first_record_accumulator_poison",
+    "protocol": "/nimiq/kad/0.0.1",
+    "message_type": "GET_VALUE",
+    "target_port": 33873,
+    "record_type": "TaggedSigned<ValidatorRecord>",
+    "record_tag": 3,
+    "signature_length_sent": 64,
+    "signature_all_zero_invalid": true,
+    "get_responses": 1500,
+    "poison_call": "handle_dht_get first-record DhtResults init",
+    "cve": "CVE-2026-46541",
+    "ghsa": "GHSA-ccqv-2c9q-mqw5",
+    "cvss": "7.5 (High) \u2014 remote unauthenticated discovery/routing DoS via poisoned DHT get",
+    "package": "nimiq-network-libp2p / nimiq/core-rs-albatross (Rust)",
+    "affected_versions": "nimiq/core-rs-albatross <= v1.3.0",
+    "fixed_version": "v1.4.0 (PR #3707)",
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+    "mock_peers": 1
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+    "fidelity_class": "lab",
+    "target_authorisation": "self-owned",
+    "engagement_id": null,
+    "tooling": {
+      "known_class_nimiq_dht_get_poison": "1.0"
+    },
+    "pcap_path_pre_termination": null,
+    "public_source": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-ccqv-2c9q-mqw5",
+    "source_note": "CVE-2026-46541 / GHSA-ccqv-2c9q-mqw5 (nimiq/core-rs-albatross, nimiq/core-rs-albatross <= v1.3.0): handle_dht_get initializes its DhtResults accumulator only off the first DHT record and only when it verifies; a malicious peer that answers a Kademlia get (/nimiq/kad/0.0.1) first with an invalid ValidatorRecord (correct 64-byte signature length so it does not panic, but cryptographically invalid so verification fails) leaves DhtResults uninitialized, and every subsequent valid record is discarded -> peer/validator discovery + routing DoS (CWE-754). Fixed in v1.4.0 (PR #3707) (store_dht_record + DhtNoValidRecord). https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-ccqv-2c9q-mqw5",
+    "class": "known-class-public-disclosure",
+    "source_class": "public-cve-replication",
+    "cve": "CVE-2026-46541",
+    "ghsa": "GHSA-ccqv-2c9q-mqw5",
+    "cvss": "7.5 (High) \u2014 remote unauthenticated discovery/routing DoS via poisoned DHT get",
+    "package": "nimiq-network-libp2p / nimiq/core-rs-albatross (Rust)",
+    "affected_versions": "nimiq/core-rs-albatross <= v1.3.0",
+    "fixed_version": "v1.4.0 (PR #3707)",
+    "attack_family_label": "dht_get_invalid_first_record_accumulator_poison",
+    "tcpdump_returncode": 0,
+    "capture_module": "chains._shared.capture_multimodal"
+  },
+  "notes": "known-class repro (traffic, loopback mock): nimiq DHT GET_VALUE response carrying a ValidatorRecord with a 64-byte-but-invalid (all-zero) signature \u2192 handle_dht_get first-record verification fails \u2192 DhtResults poisoned \u2192 discovery/routing DoS. CVE-2026-46541 / GHSA-ccqv-2c9q-mqw5 (nimiq/core-rs-albatross, nimiq/core-rs-albatross <= v1.3.0): handle_dht_get initializes its DhtResults accumulator only off the first DHT record and only when it verifies; a malicious peer that answers a Kademlia get (/nimiq/kad/0.0.1) first with an invalid ValidatorRecord (correct 64-byte signature length so it does not panic, but cryptographically invalid so verification fails) leaves DhtResults uninitialized, and every subsequent valid record is discarded -> peer/validator discovery + routing DoS (CWE-754). Fixed in v1.4.0 (PR #3707) (store_dht_record + DhtNoValidRecord). https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-ccqv-2c9q-mqw5"
+}

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+  "posture": "low-volume",
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+  "chain": "monero",
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+  "started_at": "2026-07-17T08:36:01.882458Z",
+  "ended_at": "2026-07-17T08:36:03.527113Z",
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+    "ghpr_id": "GHPR-monero-project-monero-10139",
+    "public_source": "https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/10139",
+    "affected_versions": "monero-wallet-rpc before PR #10139 (m_max_content_length unset \u2014 unbounded body)",
+    "fixed_versions": "monero after PR #10139 (m_max_content_length = 100 MiB, matching core RPC)",
+    "cvss_severity": "availability-only (remote memory-exhaustion DoS when wallet-rpc is exposed)",
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+    "fidelity_class": "lab",
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+    "public_source": "https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/10139",
+    "source_note": "monero PR #10139: monero-wallet-rpc did not bound the HTTP request body size (core RPC caps at 1 MiB), so an oversized POST body to a wallet-rpc endpoint is buffered unbounded in memory \u2192 resource-exhaustion DoS. Fixed by setting m_max_content_length. Modelled as the oversized-POST-body wire signature. https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/10139",
+    "class": "monero-wallet-rpc-unbounded-body",
+    "source_class": "public-cve-replication",
+    "ghpr_id": "GHPR-monero-project-monero-10139",
+    "public_url": "https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/10139",
+    "affected_versions": "monero-wallet-rpc before PR #10139 (m_max_content_length unset \u2014 unbounded body)",
+    "fixed_versions": "monero after PR #10139 (m_max_content_length = 100 MiB, matching core RPC)",
+    "cvss_severity": "availability-only (remote memory-exhaustion DoS when wallet-rpc is exposed)",
+    "tcpdump_returncode": 0,
+    "capture_module": "chains._shared.capture_multimodal"
+  },
+  "notes": "known-class repro (traffic): monero wallet-rpc unbounded-body memory DoS (PR #10139). monero PR #10139: monero-wallet-rpc did not bound the HTTP request body size (core RPC caps at 1 MiB), so an oversized POST body to a wallet-rpc endpoint is buffered unbounded in memory \u2192 resource-exhaustion DoS. Fixed by setting m_max_content_length. Modelled as the oversized-POST-body wire signature. https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/10139"
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+  "family_id": "compute_amp",
+  "primitive_id": "nimiq_proposal_signer_oob",
+  "posture": "low-volume",
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+  "chain": "nimiq",
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+  "target_env": "nimiq-core-rs-albatross-validator",
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+  "started_at": "2026-07-17T09:14:52.106600Z",
+  "ended_at": "2026-07-17T09:14:53.627886Z",
+  "attack_parameters": {
+    "posture": "low-volume",
+    "rep": 0,
+    "layer": "libp2p-gossipsub",
+    "attack_family_label": "tendermint_proposal_signer_out_of_bounds_panic",
+    "protocol": "/meshsub/1.1.0",
+    "gossip_topic": "tendermint-proposal",
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+    "message_type": "SignedProposal",
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+    "cve": "CVE-2026-32605",
+    "ghsa": "GHSA-g99c-h7j7-rfhv",
+    "cvss": "7.5 (High) \u2014 remote unauthenticated validator panic via gossiped proposal",
+    "package": "nimiq-validator / nimiq/core-rs-albatross (Rust)",
+    "affected_versions": "nimiq/core-rs-albatross before v1.3.0",
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+    "fidelity_class": "lab",
+    "target_authorisation": "self-owned",
+    "engagement_id": null,
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+      "known_class_nimiq_proposal_signer_oob": "1.0"
+    },
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+    "public_source": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3661",
+    "source_note": "CVE-2026-32605 / GHSA-g99c-h7j7-rfhv (nimiq/core-rs-albatross, nimiq/core-rs-albatross before v1.3.0): ProposalSender::send bounds-checked the gossiped SignedProposal.signer with `>` instead of `>=`, so signer == validators.num_validators() slipped through and get_validator_by_slot_band(signer) indexed one past the validator set \u2192 out-of-bounds panic BEFORE signature verification \u2192 remote unauthenticated validator crash DoS (CWE-125/193). Fixed in v1.3.0 (PR #3661, commit 5108d8c). https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3661",
+    "class": "known-class-public-disclosure",
+    "source_class": "public-cve-replication",
+    "cve": "CVE-2026-32605",
+    "ghsa": "GHSA-g99c-h7j7-rfhv",
+    "cvss": "7.5 (High) \u2014 remote unauthenticated validator panic via gossiped proposal",
+    "package": "nimiq-validator / nimiq/core-rs-albatross (Rust)",
+    "affected_versions": "nimiq/core-rs-albatross before v1.3.0",
+    "fixed_version": "v1.3.0 (PR #3661, commit 5108d8c)",
+    "attack_family_label": "tendermint_proposal_signer_out_of_bounds_panic",
+    "tcpdump_returncode": 0,
+    "capture_module": "chains._shared.capture_multimodal"
+  },
+  "notes": "known-class repro (traffic, loopback mock): nimiq tendermint-proposal gossip with signer == num_validators \u2192 get_validator_by_slot_band OOB panic (remote crash DoS). CVE-2026-32605 / GHSA-g99c-h7j7-rfhv, fixed v1.3.0 (PR #3661, commit 5108d8c). https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3661"
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+  "primitive_id": "monero_zmq_eagain_crash",
+  "posture": "low-volume",
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+  "chain": "monero",
+  "run_tag": "knownclass_monero_monero_zmq_eagain_crash_low-volume_N100_r0",
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+  "started_at": "2026-07-17T08:36:10.213402Z",
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+    "ghpr_id": "GHPR-monero-project-monero-9052",
+    "public_source": "https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/9052",
+    "affected_versions": "monero before PR #9052 (ZMQ-RPC with ZMQ-PUB enabled; unhandled zmq_read EAGAIN)",
+    "fixed_versions": "monero after PR #9052 (EAGAIN handled / invalid messages filtered)",
+    "cvss_severity": "availability-only (remote permanent ZMQ-RPC crash until restart)",
+    "impact": "invalid HTTP message on ZMQ-RPC port -> unhandled zmq_read EAGAIN -> permanent crash DoS",
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+      "known_class_monero_zmq_eagain_crash": "1.0"
+    },
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+    "public_source": "https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/9052",
+    "source_note": "monero PR #9052: with ZMQ-PUB enabled the ZMQ-RPC server uses zmq_poll; an INVALID non-ZMQ message (e.g. a browser HTTP request to the ZMQ-RPC TCP port) bypasses the poll filter, reaches zmq_read which returns EAGAIN, and the unhandled spurious wakeup PERMANENTLY crashes ZMQ-RPC until restart (remote availability DoS). Fixed by handling EAGAIN. Modelled as the HTTP-to-ZMQ-port wire signature. https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/9052",
+    "class": "monero-zmq-rpc-http-eagain-crash",
+    "source_class": "public-cve-replication",
+    "ghpr_id": "GHPR-monero-project-monero-9052",
+    "public_url": "https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/9052",
+    "affected_versions": "monero before PR #9052 (ZMQ-RPC with ZMQ-PUB enabled; unhandled zmq_read EAGAIN)",
+    "fixed_versions": "monero after PR #9052 (EAGAIN handled / invalid messages filtered)",
+    "cvss_severity": "availability-only (remote permanent ZMQ-RPC crash until restart)",
+    "tcpdump_returncode": 0,
+    "capture_module": "chains._shared.capture_multimodal"
+  },
+  "notes": "known-class repro (traffic): monero ZMQ-RPC HTTP-EAGAIN permanent crash (PR #9052). monero PR #9052: with ZMQ-PUB enabled the ZMQ-RPC server uses zmq_poll; an INVALID non-ZMQ message (e.g. a browser HTTP request to the ZMQ-RPC TCP port) bypasses the poll filter, reaches zmq_read which returns EAGAIN, and the unhandled spurious wakeup PERMANENTLY crashes ZMQ-RPC until restart (remote availability DoS). Fixed by handling EAGAIN. Modelled as the HTTP-to-ZMQ-port wire signature. https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/9052"
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+  "assessment_id": null,
+  "family_id": "compute_amp",
+  "primitive_id": "namada_multisig_256key_sig_overflow",
+  "posture": "distributed",
+  "ground_truth_label": "attack",
+  "chain": "namada",
+  "run_tag": "knownclass_namada_namada_multisig_256key_sig_overflow_distributed_N160_r2",
+  "target_env": "namada-cometbft-rpc",
+  "generation_method": "hand",
+  "started_at": "2026-07-17T15:38:28.881531Z",
+  "ended_at": "2026-07-17T15:38:30.003680Z",
+  "attack_parameters": {
+    "posture": "distributed",
+    "rep": 2,
+    "layer": "cometbft-rpc-http",
+    "attack_family_label": "authorization_256_pubkey_u8_overflow_panic",
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+    "trigger": "Authorization section with 256 Ed25519 pubkeys + 256 signatures (u8 count overflow)",
+    "cve": "GHSA-82vg-5v4f-f9wq (no CVE assigned)",
+    "ghsa": "GHSA-82vg-5v4f-f9wq",
+    "cvss": "High \u2014 remote unauthenticated node panic at mempool validation",
+    "package": "namada-apps / anoma/namada (Rust)",
+    "affected_versions": "namada-apps <= 1.0.0",
+    "fixed_version": "v1.1.0",
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+    "public_source": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-82vg-5v4f-f9wq",
+    "source_note": "GHSA-82vg-5v4f-f9wq (anoma/namada <=1.0.0): a transaction whose Authorization section carries 256 public keys (Signer::PubKeys) or more with valid matching signatures triggers an integer overflow (u8 index/count) in Tx::verify_signatures during mempool CheckTx \u2192 node panic; remote unauthenticated crash DoS. Fixed v1.1.0. https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-82vg-5v4f-f9wq",
+    "class": "known-class-public-disclosure",
+    "source_class": "public-cve-replication",
+    "cve": "GHSA-82vg-5v4f-f9wq (no CVE assigned)",
+    "ghsa": "GHSA-82vg-5v4f-f9wq",
+    "cvss": "High \u2014 remote unauthenticated node panic at mempool validation",
+    "package": "namada-apps / anoma/namada (Rust)",
+    "affected_versions": "namada-apps <= 1.0.0",
+    "fixed_version": "v1.1.0",
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+    "tcpdump_returncode": 0,
+    "capture_module": "chains._shared.capture_multimodal"
+  },
+  "notes": "known-class repro (traffic, loopback mock): namada Authorization 256-pubkey u8-overflow panic at mempool validation. GHSA-82vg-5v4f-f9wq (no CVE assigned) / GHSA-82vg-5v4f-f9wq, fixed v1.1.0. https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-82vg-5v4f-f9wq"
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