File size: 14,971 Bytes
700c7f4 | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 | # qna014 reference answer
Samples revision: adds the explicit digest domains and token 71 outcomes required by the existing rubric. The original task, repository and rubric are unchanged. See `upstream-qna014-gold.diff` for the original reference.
## Verdict
The accepted identity is `(sealock-main, epoch 51, sequence 906, root
e3a253b61a510c063bcfbb43974f532f2c4279d46eb62d209b8ef8d320c37553, mirror-k@22, policy 7)`. Authenticating the capture wrappers,
forming byte-level source quorums, and then following predecessor order yields:
cap-a-07 rejected (predecessor); cap-a-11 accepted (accepted_quorum); cap-a-18 rejected (incomplete); cap-a-24 rejected (authentication); cap-a-31 accepted (accepted_quorum); cap-a-39 accepted (accepted_quorum); cap-a-46 accepted (accepted_quorum); cap-a-53 accepted (accepted_quorum); cap-a-62 accepted (accepted_quorum); cap-b-05 ignored (retransmission); cap-b-13 ignored (retransmission); cap-b-21 ignored (retransmission); cap-b-28 ignored (retransmission); cap-b-36 ignored (retransmission); cap-b-45 ignored (retransmission); cap-b-57 rejected (competing_envelope). The two byte-identical sequence-901 captures form the accepted
quorum; the non-primary evidence occurrence is a retransmission, while the
differently encoded but authentically frame-signed occurrence is a competing
envelope because it lacks raw-byte quorum.
`mirror-k@20 -> mirror-m@21 -> mirror-k@22` is an ABA display-name pattern, not an
identity restoration. Grants in 902 and 903 are effective only on the following
sequence; policy 7 applies after 905 and governs receipts for 906.
The checkpoint requires quorum 2 across independently authenticated `alpha` and
`beta` wrappers and begins with frame key `sk20`, receipt key `rk20`, authority
`mirror-k@20` and policy 6. Sequence 901 is signed by `sk20`. Sequence 902, still
verified with `sk20`, changes the displayed authority to `mirror-m@21` and grants
`sk21`/`rk21` for sequence 903 onward. Sequence 903 is therefore signed by `sk21`,
returns the displayed authority to `mirror-k@22`, and grants `sk22`/`rk22` for
sequence 904 onward. Sequences 904, 905 and 906 verify with `sk22`; the policy-7
record in 905 takes effect only for 906. Thus neither the authority label nor a
key or policy record can be applied retroactively to its containing frame.
The unique joint runtime closure is:
- `blake3` 1.2.0, `blake3-1.2.0-py3-none-any.whl`, `17f898872aa71c87e8289c024d747604fe09f862aaa49b385ebb8988dace4292`.
- `cipher` 3.3.1, `cipher-3.3.1-py3-none-any.whl`, `5c8f3a5250ee67d63ab882765833d0ba2fc3d7843ee8054a6bdc9d40eede17f0`.
- `codec` 2.9.0, `codec-2.9.0-py3-none-any.whl`, `d8b11a043eca063adba9e7e6744537aeb19807281dc7f0b7f5eae24942b89319`.
- `kernels` 1.4.0, `kernels-1.4.0-py3-none-any.whl`, `888f6f6345103bd2204450ef3a18d27741f5ae1a921bc166309d30edb83761c1`.
- `ledger` 5.3.0, `ledger-5.3.0.tar.gz`, `56c48453157a32e251c656ee71c676cbee29599ba90dbc41a69831cd2a19c79e`.
- `nebula` 6.0.0, `nebula-6.0.0-py3-none-any.whl`, `ead79f8c549afd236e5e9ddc8dcdf2b486e225961d7f8c780909a396616c8eec`.
- `reporter` 3.4.0, `reporter-3.4.0-py3-none-any.whl`, `f549843ccafc27dc33e90b7f1a7c9dd9a0e870975706aeea675e0f7ae36d2ad5`.
- `vector` 2.7.1, `vector-2.7.1-cp312-abi3-manylinux_2_17_x86_64.whl`, `58bd64519aeeb4ac6271199e02bf9cd0e2be1b0ebf9e7160d13b82f2f0007fe8`.
`cipher 3.6.0` violates reporter's `<3.5` bound. `cipher 3.4.0` is yanked and
reached through ranges, `vector 2.8.0` has no compatible target file, and the
native `vector 2.7.1` wheel precedes its valid universal wheel in the target tag
order. `kernels 1.4.0` is allowed because `vector[simd]` exactly pins it. Yanked
`ledger 5.4.0` is not exactly pinned; `ledger 5.3.0` activates `codec[blake]`,
which activates `blake3`, so omitting either is not a fixed point.
The separate Python 3.13 Linux build-host closure is:
- `auditwheel` 6.1.0, `auditwheel-6.1.0-py3-none-any.whl`, `60e89f511f2bbcf431df3717d32248f7c93d0dd2574b007d1e69d72eaf3b42cb`.
- `buildmeta` 1.1.0, `buildmeta-1.1.0-py3-none-any.whl`, `e30b699c6cf33bc86160600ff2243b88195a666e460510b303faa583522d794a`.
- `forge` 8.0.0, `forge-8.0.0-py3-none-any.whl`, `3e7954d4ca3333713159d3e692a1d9e779f096c1215947559a18be7390db5e63`.
- `wheelmaker` 2.4.0, `wheelmaker-2.4.0-py3-none-any.whl`, `669f8e08089a373b44d64281452cd53ebd6f1d211dec9f07fad2f6a7759fd9f8`.
`buildmeta` is activated by `forge[pep517]`; `tomli` is inactive under Python
3.13; `auditwheel` is activated by wheelmaker on Linux. The recipe digest is
`4c8e9ddb3857a3aaa99b47b450edd503c325e1ac96246efb1ce643bba45e3995` and the target-bound built-wheel identity is
`4fb6f009a1e1de5e6ecfd7fde4ae4b3ffbe53770068f60fc381067467a065dbb`. Evaluating those markers under target Python 3.12 selects the
wrong branch and cannot reproduce the built artifact.
The only fully scoped receipt mapping is:
- `nebula` `nebula-6.0.0-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-z11`.
- `reporter` `reporter-3.4.0-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-q02`.
- `cipher` `cipher-3.3.1-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-m77`.
- `vector` `vector-2.7.1-cp312-abi3-manylinux_2_17_x86_64.whl` -> `r-u31`.
- `kernels` `kernels-1.4.0-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-n09`.
- `ledger` `ledger-5.3.0.tar.gz` -> `r-c44`.
- `codec` `codec-2.9.0-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-h18`.
- `blake3` `blake3-1.2.0-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-p63`.
- `forge` `forge-8.0.0-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-f12`.
- `wheelmaker` `wheelmaker-2.4.0-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-w54`.
- `buildmeta` `buildmeta-1.1.0-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-b26`.
- `auditwheel` `auditwheel-6.1.0-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-a88`.
`r-d03` is valid only for sequence 903, policy 6 and `mirror-m@21`; `r-d17` signs
the current ledger bytes under the wrong filename/metadata tuple; `r-d29` uses
generation 21 under the final generation-22 authority. `r-v51` validly authorizes
the universal vector wheel but provenance cannot overrule target tag preference.
The logical request digest is `a3a595931ab3538d4f4cfbfe0b0a11b0032a2f1dfb663b66c10de7e673e374fa`; the logical lock digest
is `a60bbb3bdd304aa2687c0877b732dd5e787567437958e2f2746db010a8c935c6`. Pretty and compact wire digests are `a7d4f15ea4c082fd095d9c5feeb3234303611606d19c4258f1f59b40147b6f50`
and `6d6f2e1fc041c0f154ccd5b9340c8a737c722b53e1d24742ea265c9d9777837f`. These six identity domains are not interchangeable.
`req-992` remains bound to its old request and conflicts. `req-993` resumes with
token 82; token 81 is fenced. Exact semantic retries and JSON-only reformatting
retain the request digest and therefore resume the prepared `req-993` operation
under token 82. The worker-resume record carrying token 81 is stale even though
its request digest is exact. Reusing `req-992` conflicts because it is bound to
sequence 903, `mirror-m@21`, policy 6, target generation 30 and request digest
`f279845086156df8ecc10f578fd397e7efcc8b9fc5c03eb19dd6fcdc11def5e7`.
Changing only the snapshot, target generation, build generation, root list or
requested extras creates a different logical request and conflicts with
`req-993`; changing only JSON whitespace changes a wire digest but is an exact
semantic retry. A prepared exact retry resumes, a lower-token exact retry is
fenced, and a committed exact retry returns the recorded result rather than
publishing again.
The first failed gates are `plan-13 -> authenticated_head_and_policy`, `plan-27 ->
target_build_context`, `plan-44 -> joint_resolution`, `plan-58 ->
full_scope_provenance`, `plan-76 -> logical_retry_and_fence`, and `plan-88 ->
atomic_visibility`. `plan-93` is the unique admissible plan.
Only `tr-91` is safe. In `tr-17`, the service rechecks the four fields first,
stages the group second, then a hook changes target generation 31 to 32 before
the CAS. The minimal witness is therefore `recheck(31) -> stage -> target=32 ->
commit`: the accepted value is stale at the committing boundary. In `tr-42`, the
group is staged and the recheck covers only the snapshot and target generation;
a concurrent build-generation 12-to-13 or token 82-to-83 change remains invisible
to its CAS. In `tr-68`, eight classes are atomically committed and `retry_result`
is published afterward, so an observer between those two operations sees a lock
without its idempotency result. `tr-91` instead stages lock, entries, runtime
artifacts, build inputs, receipts, snapshot, target environment, build environment,
and retry result; immediately rechecks the exact snapshot, target generation 31,
build generation 12 and token 82; and CAS-commits all nine classes together.
The minimal safe ordered patch series is `P01 -> P03 -> P04 -> P05 -> P06 -> P08
-> P09 -> P10 -> P11`. P01 replaces capture-order selection with authenticated,
quorum-based replay. P03 computes the joint extras-and-version fixed point; P04
consumes that resolution to choose the highest compatible release and first
authorized target tag; P05 recursively resolves the source recipe under Python
3.13 while binding its output to the Python 3.12 target. P06 validates and caches
the full receipt, file, snapshot and key-material domains. P08 detaches the logical
projection, P09 canonicalizes that detached projection while preserving ordered
tags, P10 derives semantic retry identity and fencing, and P11 stages the nine-class
group and commits against all four fence fields.
The ordering has concrete witnesses. Omitting P01 lets the legacy max-sequence
shortcut treat an unauthenticated or non-quorate capture as state. P04 before P03
has no joint-resolution object and can select `cipher 3.6.0` or yanked 3.4.0;
omitting P04 leaves P05 without the selected ledger source. Running P05 in the
target context activates `tomli` and misses `buildmeta`/`auditwheel`; omitting it
cannot reproduce the built identity. Omitting P06 accepts `r-d03` by signature or
reuses its cached decision outside sequence 903. P09 before P08 sorts and rewrites
the shared captured lock object; omitting P09 leaves wire-identical locks with
different logical digests. P11 before P10 has no current token-aware retry state;
omitting P11 permits the `tr-68` eight-plus-one visibility split. These are stateful
patches, so every later patch also requires the tree produced by its predecessor.
Exclude P02 because canonical-payload deduplication collapses the differently
encoded sequence-901 signed envelope into the byte-identical retransmission class,
even though its raw digest is `13a374e8c0f39dd0b1f1487dab047066a3b9bae0333d5db7b04540d6bf92d4a6`
rather than `611391c91d38c25606897501811b834f093a6824d72540ea6ffdaf74d80103ae`.
Exclude P07 because artifact-only caching lets the sequence-903 `r-d03` decision
authorize the same bytes under the final sequence-906 authority. Exclude P12
because lexically sorting target tags moves `py3-none-any` ahead of the prescribed
ordered compatibility preference and can choose the authorized universal vector
wheel instead of `vector-2.7.1-cp312-abi3-manylinux_2_17_x86_64.whl`.
The digest domains are concrete. `sourcebuild.build_identity` hashes the canonical
complete recipe object (`backend`, `requirements`, `steps`, and `target_tag`) to
obtain the recipe digest above. Its built-output digest binds the source artifact
digest, backend, that recipe digest, the sorted complete build-input list (each
project/version/filename/artifact_digest), and the selected target tag. Dependency
markers resolve those inputs under build Python 3.13; the output target is Python
3.12. Artifact identity describes the package bytes. Metadata identity describes
the associated project/version/file and dependency/recipe declarations; matching
artifact bytes do not establish matching metadata or receipt scope. Logical-lock
identity hashes the detached canonical lock projection (including its entries and
receipts), while logical-request identity hashes the detached request projection,
including the snapshot and environment generations, roots and requested extras.
Wire identity hashes the actual serialized bytes, so JSON-only reformatting can
change a wire digest while retaining both logical identities. These distinctions
follow `contracts/provenance.md`, `canonical.py`, `sourcebuild.py`, `retry.py`, and
the P08/P09 canonicalization changes.
Token 71 belongs to the prepared `req-992` entry for the old sequence-903 request.
It cannot authorize the current sequence-906 request: using `req-992` with token
71 conflicts on its immutable logical request digest. If token 71 is presented
for the current `req-993` entry, it is lower than 82 and is fenced, just like 81.
Token 82 can resume the exact current prepared request. P10 checks a lower token
before checking the request digest, so a stale-token attempt is classified as
fenced even when another mismatch is also present. An exact retry of the old
request with its own token 71 is only an old-request resume at the retry layer;
it still cannot pass the final current-snapshot/environment/token publication
checks. This follows `artifacts/retry_journal.jsonl`, `contracts/retry_publication.md`,
and the executable `retry_action` change in P10.
## Rule
Authenticated predecessor order, delayed key effectiveness, post-frame policy
effectiveness, and raw-envelope retransmission identity jointly determine the
head. Runtime constraints and extras are solved to a joint fixed point under the
target environment, while recursive build inputs are solved under the build host
and bound back to the target output. Receipt scope includes the entire signed
authority and snapshot tuple.
Retry identity is semantic and immutable; fencing tokens order workers. Physical
or privately staged bytes are not authority and not public state. A commit is
valid only when the complete group is staged and the snapshot, both environment
generations, and current retry token are checked as the final precommit operation.
## Where it is decided
The head follows `contracts/authority.md`, `src/sealock/authority.py`, the
checkpoint, and both capture files. Runtime and build choices follow
`contracts/resolution.md`, `resolver.py`, `sourcebuild.py`, the two environment
files, request, and index. Receipt decisions follow `contracts/provenance.md`,
`provenance.py`, accepted key grants, and the receipt capture. Retry and visibility
follow `contracts/retry_publication.md`, `retry.py`, `publication.py`, the journal,
attempts, and traces. Candidate behavior follows the actual diffs against
`legacy.py`; no candidate's local claim is authoritative.
## Boundary
Moving the target-generation change in `tr-17` from before the final recheck to
after a successful CAS makes it a next-request event; moving it between recheck
and CAS invalidates this request. The same applies independently to snapshot,
build generation, and token. A newly present artifact or valid signature never
rescues wrong receipt scope. A committed `req-993` exact retry returns its recorded
result, whereas state drift requires a new logical request and cannot rebind the
existing key. Observers see either the previous group or all nine new record
classes.
|