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+## Verdict
+
+The accepted identity is `(sealock-main, epoch 51, sequence 906, root
+e3a253b61a510c063bcfbb43974f532f2c4279d46eb62d209b8ef8d320c37553, mirror-k@22, policy 7)`. Authenticating the capture wrappers,
+forming byte-level source quorums, and then following predecessor order yields:
+cap-a-07 rejected (predecessor); cap-a-11 accepted (accepted_quorum); cap-a-18 rejected (incomplete); cap-a-24 rejected (authentication); cap-a-31 accepted (accepted_quorum); cap-a-39 accepted (accepted_quorum); cap-a-46 accepted (accepted_quorum); cap-a-53 accepted (accepted_quorum); cap-a-62 accepted (accepted_quorum); cap-b-05 ignored (retransmission); cap-b-13 ignored (retransmission); cap-b-21 ignored (retransmission); cap-b-28 ignored (retransmission); cap-b-36 ignored (retransmission); cap-b-45 ignored (retransmission); cap-b-57 rejected (competing_envelope). The two byte-identical sequence-901 captures form the accepted
+quorum; the non-primary evidence occurrence is a retransmission, while the
+differently encoded but authentically frame-signed occurrence is a competing
+envelope because it lacks raw-byte quorum.
+`mirror-k@20 -> mirror-m@21 -> mirror-k@22` is an ABA display-name pattern, not an
+identity restoration. Grants in 902 and 903 are effective only on the following
+sequence; policy 7 applies after 905 and governs receipts for 906.
+The checkpoint requires quorum 2 across independently authenticated `alpha` and
+`beta` wrappers and begins with frame key `sk20`, receipt key `rk20`, authority
+`mirror-k@20` and policy 6. Sequence 901 is signed by `sk20`. Sequence 902, still
+verified with `sk20`, changes the displayed authority to `mirror-m@21` and grants
+`sk21`/`rk21` for sequence 903 onward. Sequence 903 is therefore signed by `sk21`,
+returns the displayed authority to `mirror-k@22`, and grants `sk22`/`rk22` for
+sequence 904 onward. Sequences 904, 905 and 906 verify with `sk22`; the policy-7
+record in 905 takes effect only for 906. Thus neither the authority label nor a
+key or policy record can be applied retroactively to its containing frame.
+
+The unique joint runtime closure is:
+
+- `blake3` 1.2.0, `blake3-1.2.0-py3-none-any.whl`, `17f898872aa71c87e8289c024d747604fe09f862aaa49b385ebb8988dace4292`.
+- `cipher` 3.3.1, `cipher-3.3.1-py3-none-any.whl`, `5c8f3a5250ee67d63ab882765833d0ba2fc3d7843ee8054a6bdc9d40eede17f0`.
+- `codec` 2.9.0, `codec-2.9.0-py3-none-any.whl`, `d8b11a043eca063adba9e7e6744537aeb19807281dc7f0b7f5eae24942b89319`.
+- `kernels` 1.4.0, `kernels-1.4.0-py3-none-any.whl`, `888f6f6345103bd2204450ef3a18d27741f5ae1a921bc166309d30edb83761c1`.
+- `ledger` 5.3.0, `ledger-5.3.0.tar.gz`, `56c48453157a32e251c656ee71c676cbee29599ba90dbc41a69831cd2a19c79e`.
+- `nebula` 6.0.0, `nebula-6.0.0-py3-none-any.whl`, `ead79f8c549afd236e5e9ddc8dcdf2b486e225961d7f8c780909a396616c8eec`.
+- `reporter` 3.4.0, `reporter-3.4.0-py3-none-any.whl`, `f549843ccafc27dc33e90b7f1a7c9dd9a0e870975706aeea675e0f7ae36d2ad5`.
+- `vector` 2.7.1, `vector-2.7.1-cp312-abi3-manylinux_2_17_x86_64.whl`, `58bd64519aeeb4ac6271199e02bf9cd0e2be1b0ebf9e7160d13b82f2f0007fe8`.
+
+`cipher 3.6.0` violates reporter's `<3.5` bound. `cipher 3.4.0` is yanked and
+reached through ranges, `vector 2.8.0` has no compatible target file, and the
+native `vector 2.7.1` wheel precedes its valid universal wheel in the target tag
+order. `kernels 1.4.0` is allowed because `vector[simd]` exactly pins it. Yanked
+`ledger 5.4.0` is not exactly pinned; `ledger 5.3.0` activates `codec[blake]`,
+which activates `blake3`, so omitting either is not a fixed point.
+
+The separate Python 3.13 Linux build-host closure is:
+
+- `auditwheel` 6.1.0, `auditwheel-6.1.0-py3-none-any.whl`, `60e89f511f2bbcf431df3717d32248f7c93d0dd2574b007d1e69d72eaf3b42cb`.
+- `buildmeta` 1.1.0, `buildmeta-1.1.0-py3-none-any.whl`, `e30b699c6cf33bc86160600ff2243b88195a666e460510b303faa583522d794a`.
+- `forge` 8.0.0, `forge-8.0.0-py3-none-any.whl`, `3e7954d4ca3333713159d3e692a1d9e779f096c1215947559a18be7390db5e63`.
+- `wheelmaker` 2.4.0, `wheelmaker-2.4.0-py3-none-any.whl`, `669f8e08089a373b44d64281452cd53ebd6f1d211dec9f07fad2f6a7759fd9f8`.
+
+`buildmeta` is activated by `forge[pep517]`; `tomli` is inactive under Python
+3.13; `auditwheel` is activated by wheelmaker on Linux. The recipe digest is
+`4c8e9ddb3857a3aaa99b47b450edd503c325e1ac96246efb1ce643bba45e3995` and the target-bound built-wheel identity is
+`4fb6f009a1e1de5e6ecfd7fde4ae4b3ffbe53770068f60fc381067467a065dbb`. Evaluating those markers under target Python 3.12 selects the
+wrong branch and cannot reproduce the built artifact.
+
+The only fully scoped receipt mapping is:
+
+- `nebula` `nebula-6.0.0-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-z11`.
+- `reporter` `reporter-3.4.0-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-q02`.
+- `cipher` `cipher-3.3.1-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-m77`.
+- `vector` `vector-2.7.1-cp312-abi3-manylinux_2_17_x86_64.whl` -> `r-u31`.
+- `kernels` `kernels-1.4.0-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-n09`.
+- `ledger` `ledger-5.3.0.tar.gz` -> `r-c44`.
+- `codec` `codec-2.9.0-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-h18`.
+- `blake3` `blake3-1.2.0-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-p63`.
+- `forge` `forge-8.0.0-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-f12`.
+- `wheelmaker` `wheelmaker-2.4.0-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-w54`.
+- `buildmeta` `buildmeta-1.1.0-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-b26`.
+- `auditwheel` `auditwheel-6.1.0-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-a88`.
+
+`r-d03` is valid only for sequence 903, policy 6 and `mirror-m@21`; `r-d17` signs
+the current ledger bytes under the wrong filename/metadata tuple; `r-d29` uses
+generation 21 under the final generation-22 authority. `r-v51` validly authorizes
+the universal vector wheel but provenance cannot overrule target tag preference.
+
+The logical request digest is `a3a595931ab3538d4f4cfbfe0b0a11b0032a2f1dfb663b66c10de7e673e374fa`; the logical lock digest
+is `a60bbb3bdd304aa2687c0877b732dd5e787567437958e2f2746db010a8c935c6`. Pretty and compact wire digests are `a7d4f15ea4c082fd095d9c5feeb3234303611606d19c4258f1f59b40147b6f50`
+and `6d6f2e1fc041c0f154ccd5b9340c8a737c722b53e1d24742ea265c9d9777837f`. These six identity domains are not interchangeable.
+`req-992` remains bound to its old request and conflicts. `req-993` resumes with
+token 82; token 81 is fenced. Exact semantic retries and JSON-only reformatting
+retain the request digest and therefore resume the prepared `req-993` operation
+under token 82. The worker-resume record carrying token 81 is stale even though
+its request digest is exact. Reusing `req-992` conflicts because it is bound to
+sequence 903, `mirror-m@21`, policy 6, target generation 30 and request digest
+`f279845086156df8ecc10f578fd397e7efcc8b9fc5c03eb19dd6fcdc11def5e7`.
+Changing only the snapshot, target generation, build generation, root list or
+requested extras creates a different logical request and conflicts with
+`req-993`; changing only JSON whitespace changes a wire digest but is an exact
+semantic retry. A prepared exact retry resumes, a lower-token exact retry is
+fenced, and a committed exact retry returns the recorded result rather than
+publishing again.
+
+The first failed gates are `plan-13 -> authenticated_head_and_policy`, `plan-27 ->
+target_build_context`, `plan-44 -> joint_resolution`, `plan-58 ->
+full_scope_provenance`, `plan-76 -> logical_retry_and_fence`, and `plan-88 ->
+atomic_visibility`. `plan-93` is the unique admissible plan.
+
+Only `tr-91` is safe. In `tr-17`, the service rechecks the four fields first,
+stages the group second, then a hook changes target generation 31 to 32 before
+the CAS. The minimal witness is therefore `recheck(31) -> stage -> target=32 ->
+commit`: the accepted value is stale at the committing boundary. In `tr-42`, the
+group is staged and the recheck covers only the snapshot and target generation;
+a concurrent build-generation 12-to-13 or token 82-to-83 change remains invisible
+to its CAS. In `tr-68`, eight classes are atomically committed and `retry_result`
+is published afterward, so an observer between those two operations sees a lock
+without its idempotency result. `tr-91` instead stages lock, entries, runtime
+artifacts, build inputs, receipts, snapshot, target environment, build environment,
+and retry result; immediately rechecks the exact snapshot, target generation 31,
+build generation 12 and token 82; and CAS-commits all nine classes together.
+
+The minimal safe ordered patch series is `P01 -> P03 -> P04 -> P05 -> P06 -> P08
+-> P09 -> P10 -> P11`. P01 replaces capture-order selection with authenticated,
+quorum-based replay. P03 computes the joint extras-and-version fixed point; P04
+consumes that resolution to choose the highest compatible release and first
+authorized target tag; P05 recursively resolves the source recipe under Python
+3.13 while binding its output to the Python 3.12 target. P06 validates and caches
+the full receipt, file, snapshot and key-material domains. P08 detaches the logical
+projection, P09 canonicalizes that detached projection while preserving ordered
+tags, P10 derives semantic retry identity and fencing, and P11 stages the nine-class
+group and commits against all four fence fields.
+
+The ordering has concrete witnesses. Omitting P01 lets the legacy max-sequence
+shortcut treat an unauthenticated or non-quorate capture as state. P04 before P03
+has no joint-resolution object and can select `cipher 3.6.0` or yanked 3.4.0;
+omitting P04 leaves P05 without the selected ledger source. Running P05 in the
+target context activates `tomli` and misses `buildmeta`/`auditwheel`; omitting it
+cannot reproduce the built identity. Omitting P06 accepts `r-d03` by signature or
+reuses its cached decision outside sequence 903. P09 before P08 sorts and rewrites
+the shared captured lock object; omitting P09 leaves wire-identical locks with
+different logical digests. P11 before P10 has no current token-aware retry state;
+omitting P11 permits the `tr-68` eight-plus-one visibility split. These are stateful
+patches, so every later patch also requires the tree produced by its predecessor.
+
+Exclude P02 because canonical-payload deduplication collapses the differently
+encoded sequence-901 signed envelope into the byte-identical retransmission class,
+even though its raw digest is `13a374e8c0f39dd0b1f1487dab047066a3b9bae0333d5db7b04540d6bf92d4a6`
+rather than `611391c91d38c25606897501811b834f093a6824d72540ea6ffdaf74d80103ae`.
+Exclude P07 because artifact-only caching lets the sequence-903 `r-d03` decision
+authorize the same bytes under the final sequence-906 authority. Exclude P12
+because lexically sorting target tags moves `py3-none-any` ahead of the prescribed
+ordered compatibility preference and can choose the authorized universal vector
+wheel instead of `vector-2.7.1-cp312-abi3-manylinux_2_17_x86_64.whl`.
+
+## Rule
+
+Authenticated predecessor order, delayed key effectiveness, post-frame policy
+effectiveness, and raw-envelope retransmission identity jointly determine the
+head. Runtime constraints and extras are solved to a joint fixed point under the
+target environment, while recursive build inputs are solved under the build host
+and bound back to the target output. Receipt scope includes the entire signed
+authority and snapshot tuple.
+
+Retry identity is semantic and immutable; fencing tokens order workers. Physical
+or privately staged bytes are not authority and not public state. A commit is
+valid only when the complete group is staged and the snapshot, both environment
+generations, and current retry token are checked as the final precommit operation.
+
+## Where it is decided
+
+The head follows `contracts/authority.md`, `src/sealock/authority.py`, the
+checkpoint, and both capture files. Runtime and build choices follow
+`contracts/resolution.md`, `resolver.py`, `sourcebuild.py`, the two environment
+files, request, and index. Receipt decisions follow `contracts/provenance.md`,
+`provenance.py`, accepted key grants, and the receipt capture. Retry and visibility
+follow `contracts/retry_publication.md`, `retry.py`, `publication.py`, the journal,
+attempts, and traces. Candidate behavior follows the actual diffs against
+`legacy.py`; no candidate's local claim is authoritative.
+
+## Boundary
+
+Moving the target-generation change in `tr-17` from before the final recheck to
+after a successful CAS makes it a next-request event; moving it between recheck
+and CAS invalidates this request. The same applies independently to snapshot,
+build generation, and token. A newly present artifact or valid signature never
+rescues wrong receipt scope. A committed `req-993` exact retry returns its recorded
+result, whereas state drift requires a new logical request and cannot rebind the
+existing key. Observers see either the previous group or all nine new record
+classes.
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