Review selected tasks, correct cyber reference cache identity, and clarify reproducibility setup
Browse files- .dockerignore +11 -0
- CHANGES.md +2 -0
- CHECKSUMS.json +11 -8
- Dockerfile +3 -0
- README.md +15 -2
- SOURCE_MANIFEST.json +10 -1
- VALIDATION.md +5 -1
- data/cyber/tasks.jsonl +1 -1
- data/cyber/tasks/swe_rl_cybersecurity_task_02/gold.diff +110 -117
- docs/ACCURACY_REVIEW.md +41 -0
- docs/upstream-cyber02-gold.diff +1156 -0
- tests/check_cyber_reference.py +78 -0
.dockerignore
CHANGED
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@@ -7,7 +7,18 @@
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!selection.json
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!samples.py
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!engine_entry.py
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**/__pycache__
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**/*.pyc
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**/.env
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**/.env.*
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!selection.json
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!samples.py
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!engine_entry.py
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+
!docs/
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+
!docs/**
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+
!tests/
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+
!tests/**
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+
!README.md
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+
!VALIDATION.md
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+
!CHANGES.md
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+
!LICENSE.txt
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| 18 |
+
!SOURCE_MANIFEST.json
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+
!CHECKSUMS.json
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**/__pycache__
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**/*.pyc
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**/.env
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**/.env.*
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+
!.env.example
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CHANGES.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ The source is `Poindexter-Labs/PDL-Bench` revision `d68375b39ff4e7dc69e9ee9107d4
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| 8 |
- The STEM tasks follow the revised PDF. PDS136 adds the justification requirement and ten-point rubric. PDS049 follows the reviewed prompt, stereochemistry guidance and seven-point rubric. Its two two-point criteria are split into pairs of one-point checks to represent their stated partial credit. Sample full-credit reporting uses 100%; the old historical chart used a different protocol.
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| 9 |
- The Q&A evaluator image includes `PyYAML==6.0.3`, needed by this task's hidden document-property checks. It has its own `poindexter-samples/sweqna:20261118` tag so it cannot reuse an older evaluator lacking that dependency. Non-test pytest failures, including collection errors, now remain technical failures instead of being mistaken for an evaluated submission.
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| 10 |
- The Q&A reference answer explicitly states the recipe/build/request/lock/wire identity domains and token 71's outcomes, checked against the supplied contracts, journal and candidate patches. The original reference patch is retained at `docs/upstream-qna014-gold.diff`. The selected task prompt, repository, hidden tests and rubric are unchanged. The revised patch hash and reference revision are in the task index.
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`engines/*/vendor/SOURCE_MANIFEST.json` files retain the upstream provenance. They describe the upstream export, not this adapted release. The root `SOURCE_MANIFEST.json` records deviations and the root `CHECKSUMS.json` provides this release's file hashes.
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| 13 |
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| 8 |
- The STEM tasks follow the revised PDF. PDS136 adds the justification requirement and ten-point rubric. PDS049 follows the reviewed prompt, stereochemistry guidance and seven-point rubric. Its two two-point criteria are split into pairs of one-point checks to represent their stated partial credit. Sample full-credit reporting uses 100%; the old historical chart used a different protocol.
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| 9 |
- The Q&A evaluator image includes `PyYAML==6.0.3`, needed by this task's hidden document-property checks. It has its own `poindexter-samples/sweqna:20261118` tag so it cannot reuse an older evaluator lacking that dependency. Non-test pytest failures, including collection errors, now remain technical failures instead of being mistaken for an evaluated submission.
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| 10 |
- The Q&A reference answer explicitly states the recipe/build/request/lock/wire identity domains and token 71's outcomes, checked against the supplied contracts, journal and candidate patches. The original reference patch is retained at `docs/upstream-qna014-gold.diff`. The selected task prompt, repository, hidden tests and rubric are unchanged. The revised patch hash and reference revision are in the task index.
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| 11 |
+
- The cyber reference cache key now includes both initial policy-inhibition flags. Independent review reproduced an incorrect cached success when the policy was tightened. Two reference-only regression checks fail on the original and pass on this correction; the original is preserved at `docs/upstream-cyber02-gold.diff`. The prompt, starter repository, hidden tests and scoring are unchanged. The task index records the revised reference hash.
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+
- README now includes a complete credentials/setup checklist. Documentation, references and offline checks are copied into the controller alongside task data and runners.
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`engines/*/vendor/SOURCE_MANIFEST.json` files retain the upstream provenance. They describe the upstream export, not this adapted release. The root `SOURCE_MANIFEST.json` records deviations and the root `CHECKSUMS.json` provides this release's file hashes.
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CHECKSUMS.json
CHANGED
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@@ -1,20 +1,20 @@
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{
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-
".dockerignore": "
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".env.example": "c4578caa1501db2d80e47a890e8bff5f9ce504945f183ca7904682127bea2a4a",
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".gitignore": "e4ac768ff4b44abbd7a083a152e227c6b43ca23a0434e8276cbb86e04fa935fa",
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| 5 |
-
"CHANGES.md": "
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-
"Dockerfile": "
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"LICENSE.txt": "d557539df68e771cc1eedcc91d13f70fca930e508d11eedcafa4b15db49e3744",
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-
"README.md": "
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-
"SOURCE_MANIFEST.json": "
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-
"VALIDATION.md": "
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"data/cyber/environments/swe/Dockerfile": "3e5119f1bcae3947605014ce8f0182b74d66f1a6f4d223a7c298650eb12ad099",
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| 12 |
"data/cyber/environments/sweqna/Dockerfile": "706ef5bbcbcc05e02c6dbfa125a3bbf7e01f3716d2ce653132484e15b78299e3",
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| 13 |
-
"data/cyber/tasks/swe_rl_cybersecurity_task_02/gold.diff": "
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"data/cyber/tasks/swe_rl_cybersecurity_task_02/hidden_tests.zip": "c1604193fbfea16d1be7eb6eb4139e8d6748dad13c6f63a426d43433fb747690",
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| 15 |
"data/cyber/tasks/swe_rl_cybersecurity_task_02/manifest.yaml": "e92fe8ed5135302bc2f370dce4af45de3322d9b65befb7b33c92823c8e41d740",
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| 16 |
"data/cyber/tasks/swe_rl_cybersecurity_task_02/repository.zip": "1e14841c5546682e9bbbd6886b15105a172a0aacd9bf945e8393aef62a0c1898",
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-
"data/cyber/tasks.jsonl": "
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| 18 |
"data/gdpval/inputs/french-43dc9778-450b-4b46-b77e-b6d82b202035/01_Questionnaire_foyer_2024.pdf": "1cf05c90bffca8e39d0a07169c1fda4e2237b8243dd89de5779f5678d862ef89",
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| 19 |
"data/gdpval/inputs/french-43dc9778-450b-4b46-b77e-b6d82b202035/02_Salaires_Laurent_Conseil_Lumiere_2024.pdf": "3054db93d3232e7e6e1cb469730a26fa2de3732ae9aa50f490831753065dc31f",
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| 20 |
"data/gdpval/inputs/french-43dc9778-450b-4b46-b77e-b6d82b202035/03_Salaires_Laurent_Services_Rhone_2024.pdf": "2e4a9ece78a908167a1f1513fb702398be1e27aa55189f7ff688d7dcf2a3f271",
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@@ -41,11 +41,13 @@
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"data/qna/tasks/pdl_qna_signed_package_resolution_014/repository.zip": "a21ae55b8829b0ba5ae57fd780934bf9a7b956d640c80535ad12c927a1933d68",
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"data/qna/tasks.jsonl": "dbc6f10b77507b88e8ab8c627590707b77b1310ef2450f9bde0b471b18b5cdb7",
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"data/stem/tasks.jsonl": "0b2d70a6070b207f82af28851f0c93d3881b2050ae9f5b7d3eea88c91c72d537",
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"docs/GDPVal.md": "6d6e9f2ee300986b520bc9f59a6ed0e23381c53b5b687a054261f88333e77bf2",
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"docs/PDS049.md": "c5f2d509a27a6c30e0e4c79e73a1bab4e29c24f5f9b3980c82bf76587aa01b87",
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"docs/PDS136.md": "ec455bd4da846ae9bcd3ec92c947804ce9d3f5652a2e296a3708aab86bd4ebb8",
|
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"docs/STEM Data Samples.pdf": "1f3d2360a83a37bbbe9547e974e8652a4fb7422481fb3650578e9d58a731d802",
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"docs/qna014-reference.md": "35888b82d26d5d3f92dc87445941df7c7d86211f4337c7ad11f166820b849ed2",
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"docs/upstream-qna014-gold.diff": "be8d83b21da44a7c5ae225a6f1a428c6878b9cc43452056451032b58e62ac747",
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"engine_entry.py": "0d01ad7cfd7900a9b8fc8630050da9be66436c9f6821140238eb3d22907ed771",
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"engines/code/THIRD_PARTY.md": "4ebc7acca167df52913c031fb699d6a36bc8b5c6df184f78a1f0d48cba267ada",
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@@ -149,6 +151,7 @@
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"engines/general/vendor/tools/rl_env/build_template.py": "7b54e5612525e03e2ee35d28d808f9ab1ffd34c23c3bff0beb98288f43f3d77d",
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"samples.py": "804c5b665c8fee5892437a3290d2d703bb806737043e1bbc7a5057c06acdf106",
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"selection.json": "83ac1ba6359322c1bb01d24240e73ccbe3186130036a81e10a8cb193dc023ec5",
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"tests/check_math.py": "2e72177c0ff2a268db7151af5299b16404e24de76ce988791940ddd751a3ec09",
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"tests/live_gdpval_anthropic.py": "be8961c71e8eedd1e3ed051560973dfb02f0201dd8bcf5f2c2c4f8527161daae",
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"tests/live_provider_tools.py": "cce723e4c285b4bd4c2e338425616d17ea97672b40f986d733eb72bfb1792cf6",
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{
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+
".dockerignore": "510202477bc22d95d9e58cf620808eade1307725cf51e2b362362b9853bcfd5c",
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".env.example": "c4578caa1501db2d80e47a890e8bff5f9ce504945f183ca7904682127bea2a4a",
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".gitignore": "e4ac768ff4b44abbd7a083a152e227c6b43ca23a0434e8276cbb86e04fa935fa",
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+
"CHANGES.md": "42e53ef7672f06dbd1d2d5f74b1a80d496093e9c32fe80fadc7ab6e85d169371",
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+
"Dockerfile": "7513da253f47143093bc8aa6ec82822e441ba58e085201a312f1faad18a46c4e",
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"LICENSE.txt": "d557539df68e771cc1eedcc91d13f70fca930e508d11eedcafa4b15db49e3744",
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+
"README.md": "b9fa5d150ff957bbbb8107f757372e56d5cbcbeacc2be74e68e6ec9621aed532",
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+
"SOURCE_MANIFEST.json": "0a1d8706dfcff6ce180df20f851016df68b6f3724179816a5d0cdf91d1d94eac",
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+
"VALIDATION.md": "30ce7621489ab87c6505f7891c63bb71e310c92c42c599fccd37af76e326128c",
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| 11 |
"data/cyber/environments/swe/Dockerfile": "3e5119f1bcae3947605014ce8f0182b74d66f1a6f4d223a7c298650eb12ad099",
|
| 12 |
"data/cyber/environments/sweqna/Dockerfile": "706ef5bbcbcc05e02c6dbfa125a3bbf7e01f3716d2ce653132484e15b78299e3",
|
| 13 |
+
"data/cyber/tasks/swe_rl_cybersecurity_task_02/gold.diff": "0a482685a0754709d77ead55d03d59a4a7e014ee01415f6ab46aa7b8ce5262ba",
|
| 14 |
"data/cyber/tasks/swe_rl_cybersecurity_task_02/hidden_tests.zip": "c1604193fbfea16d1be7eb6eb4139e8d6748dad13c6f63a426d43433fb747690",
|
| 15 |
"data/cyber/tasks/swe_rl_cybersecurity_task_02/manifest.yaml": "e92fe8ed5135302bc2f370dce4af45de3322d9b65befb7b33c92823c8e41d740",
|
| 16 |
"data/cyber/tasks/swe_rl_cybersecurity_task_02/repository.zip": "1e14841c5546682e9bbbd6886b15105a172a0aacd9bf945e8393aef62a0c1898",
|
| 17 |
+
"data/cyber/tasks.jsonl": "085e04cfa999060ff21e8e1f6b7d816502ca862964345e7e6b9058a6384937ee",
|
| 18 |
"data/gdpval/inputs/french-43dc9778-450b-4b46-b77e-b6d82b202035/01_Questionnaire_foyer_2024.pdf": "1cf05c90bffca8e39d0a07169c1fda4e2237b8243dd89de5779f5678d862ef89",
|
| 19 |
"data/gdpval/inputs/french-43dc9778-450b-4b46-b77e-b6d82b202035/02_Salaires_Laurent_Conseil_Lumiere_2024.pdf": "3054db93d3232e7e6e1cb469730a26fa2de3732ae9aa50f490831753065dc31f",
|
| 20 |
"data/gdpval/inputs/french-43dc9778-450b-4b46-b77e-b6d82b202035/03_Salaires_Laurent_Services_Rhone_2024.pdf": "2e4a9ece78a908167a1f1513fb702398be1e27aa55189f7ff688d7dcf2a3f271",
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|
| 41 |
"data/qna/tasks/pdl_qna_signed_package_resolution_014/repository.zip": "a21ae55b8829b0ba5ae57fd780934bf9a7b956d640c80535ad12c927a1933d68",
|
| 42 |
"data/qna/tasks.jsonl": "dbc6f10b77507b88e8ab8c627590707b77b1310ef2450f9bde0b471b18b5cdb7",
|
| 43 |
"data/stem/tasks.jsonl": "0b2d70a6070b207f82af28851f0c93d3881b2050ae9f5b7d3eea88c91c72d537",
|
| 44 |
+
"docs/ACCURACY_REVIEW.md": "40906a599f56a029b9c971548c8f89ce60c1d24a5d7a942c722e148c90cb4401",
|
| 45 |
"docs/GDPVal.md": "6d6e9f2ee300986b520bc9f59a6ed0e23381c53b5b687a054261f88333e77bf2",
|
| 46 |
"docs/PDS049.md": "c5f2d509a27a6c30e0e4c79e73a1bab4e29c24f5f9b3980c82bf76587aa01b87",
|
| 47 |
"docs/PDS136.md": "ec455bd4da846ae9bcd3ec92c947804ce9d3f5652a2e296a3708aab86bd4ebb8",
|
| 48 |
"docs/STEM Data Samples.pdf": "1f3d2360a83a37bbbe9547e974e8652a4fb7422481fb3650578e9d58a731d802",
|
| 49 |
"docs/qna014-reference.md": "35888b82d26d5d3f92dc87445941df7c7d86211f4337c7ad11f166820b849ed2",
|
| 50 |
+
"docs/upstream-cyber02-gold.diff": "744256d9e7e06f4321135e5cacaab514e3a9cfceead1fc5a4156611b0f1a1b96",
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| 51 |
"docs/upstream-qna014-gold.diff": "be8d83b21da44a7c5ae225a6f1a428c6878b9cc43452056451032b58e62ac747",
|
| 52 |
"engine_entry.py": "0d01ad7cfd7900a9b8fc8630050da9be66436c9f6821140238eb3d22907ed771",
|
| 53 |
"engines/code/THIRD_PARTY.md": "4ebc7acca167df52913c031fb699d6a36bc8b5c6df184f78a1f0d48cba267ada",
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| 151 |
"engines/general/vendor/tools/rl_env/build_template.py": "7b54e5612525e03e2ee35d28d808f9ab1ffd34c23c3bff0beb98288f43f3d77d",
|
| 152 |
"samples.py": "804c5b665c8fee5892437a3290d2d703bb806737043e1bbc7a5057c06acdf106",
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"selection.json": "83ac1ba6359322c1bb01d24240e73ccbe3186130036a81e10a8cb193dc023ec5",
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+
"tests/check_cyber_reference.py": "e82803c8b8fa87c310c79fdff31fa3d54e39ece48c216bc3f8a678dbdce72e20",
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"tests/check_math.py": "2e72177c0ff2a268db7151af5299b16404e24de76ce988791940ddd751a3ec09",
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| 156 |
"tests/live_gdpval_anthropic.py": "be8961c71e8eedd1e3ed051560973dfb02f0201dd8bcf5f2c2c4f8527161daae",
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| 157 |
"tests/live_provider_tools.py": "cce723e4c285b4bd4c2e338425616d17ea97672b40f986d733eb72bfb1792cf6",
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Dockerfile
CHANGED
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@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ RUN python -m venv /opt/venvs/code && /opt/venvs/code/bin/pip install --no-cache
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WORKDIR /opt/samples
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COPY engines ./engines
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COPY data ./data
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COPY selection.json samples.py engine_entry.py ./
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RUN mkdir -p /results
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ENTRYPOINT ["python", "/opt/samples/samples.py"]
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WORKDIR /opt/samples
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COPY engines ./engines
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COPY data ./data
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+
COPY docs ./docs
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COPY tests ./tests
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+
COPY README.md VALIDATION.md CHANGES.md LICENSE.txt SOURCE_MANIFEST.json CHECKSUMS.json .env.example ./
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COPY selection.json samples.py engine_entry.py ./
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| 18 |
RUN mkdir -p /results
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| 19 |
ENTRYPOINT ["python", "/opt/samples/samples.py"]
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README.md
CHANGED
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@@ -48,9 +48,10 @@ For a readable introduction, see [STEM Data Samples.pdf](docs/STEM%20Data%20Samp
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## Quick start
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| 50 |
|
| 51 |
-
Install Docker and
|
| 52 |
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| 53 |
```sh
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| 54 |
hf download Poindexter-Labs/Samples --repo-type dataset --local-dir samples
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cd samples
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docker build -t poindexter-samples .
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@@ -79,6 +80,16 @@ docker run --rm --env-file .env -v "$PWD/results:/results" \
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## Run all seven
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| 81 |
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GDPVal uses the same E2B environment as the public Mini-Bench package. It additionally needs `E2B_API_KEY`, `GDPVAL_E2B_TEMPLATE_ID`, and `BRAVE_API_KEY`. If you do not already have an appropriate template, build it once in your own E2B account:
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| 83 |
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```sh
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@@ -118,6 +129,8 @@ docker run --rm -v "$PWD/results:/results" poindexter-samples report --group all
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| 119 |
Use the same provider/model/options when resuming or grading. A changed configuration is recorded separately. `--retry-failed` explicitly permits a failed solver attempt to run again. Technical failures stay ungraded and are not counted as incorrect model answers.
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## Scoring and provenance
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| 123 |
- **GDPVal:** the selected localized prompts, rubrics and inputs are preserved. The rubric evaluator reports a normalized score and the Mini-Bench 95% pass threshold. The French reference deliverable is included under `data/gdpval/references/` for human inspection; it is not supplied to the solver.
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@@ -129,7 +142,7 @@ The repository tasks retain the published 2M-token profiles, including their lon
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| 130 |
Runner code and repository tasks originate from [Poindexter-Labs/PDL-Bench](https://huggingface.co/datasets/Poindexter-Labs/PDL-Bench), pinned to `d68375b39ff4e7dc69e9ee9107d475d3ee9808b4`. `SOURCE_MANIFEST.json` records the selected inputs and packaging adaptations; `CHECKSUMS.json` covers this release. Vendored notices and licenses are retained under `engines/`. Separate Python environments preserve the two upstream runners' dependency pins inside one image.
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| 131 |
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-
For validation results and their limits, see [VALIDATION.md](VALIDATION.md).
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## Reference baselines
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| 135 |
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|
| 48 |
|
| 49 |
## Quick start
|
| 50 |
|
| 51 |
+
Install Docker and Python. Clone this dataset with Git LFS, or install the Hugging Face CLI and download it:
|
| 52 |
|
| 53 |
```sh
|
| 54 |
+
python -m pip install --upgrade huggingface_hub
|
| 55 |
hf download Poindexter-Labs/Samples --repo-type dataset --local-dir samples
|
| 56 |
cd samples
|
| 57 |
docker build -t poindexter-samples .
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|
| 80 |
|
| 81 |
## Run all seven
|
| 82 |
|
| 83 |
+
Before running all seven, you need:
|
| 84 |
+
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| 85 |
+
| Setting | Used for |
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+
| --- | --- |
|
| 87 |
+
| `OPENAI_API_KEY` and `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` | Native model calls and the two-provider Q&A judge panel |
|
| 88 |
+
| Model IDs available to your accounts | Solver and judge settings in `.env.example` |
|
| 89 |
+
| `E2B_API_KEY` and `GDPVAL_E2B_TEMPLATE_ID` | GDPVal document-execution environment |
|
| 90 |
+
| `BRAVE_API_KEY` | GDPVal web research |
|
| 91 |
+
| Running Docker and the socket mount below | Code-task sandboxes and evaluators |
|
| 92 |
+
|
| 93 |
GDPVal uses the same E2B environment as the public Mini-Bench package. It additionally needs `E2B_API_KEY`, `GDPVAL_E2B_TEMPLATE_ID`, and `BRAVE_API_KEY`. If you do not already have an appropriate template, build it once in your own E2B account:
|
| 94 |
|
| 95 |
```sh
|
|
|
|
| 129 |
|
| 130 |
Use the same provider/model/options when resuming or grading. A changed configuration is recorded separately. `--retry-failed` explicitly permits a failed solver attempt to run again. Technical failures stay ungraded and are not counted as incorrect model answers.
|
| 131 |
|
| 132 |
+
GDPVal submissions are limited to 20 files, 10 MiB per file and 25 MiB total by the inherited runner. Oversized output is rejected before grading. The French live smoke run produced a 19.3 MB PDF and hit this limit; its smaller supplied human reference graded successfully. See the validation record for this remaining execution limitation.
|
| 133 |
+
|
| 134 |
## Scoring and provenance
|
| 135 |
|
| 136 |
- **GDPVal:** the selected localized prompts, rubrics and inputs are preserved. The rubric evaluator reports a normalized score and the Mini-Bench 95% pass threshold. The French reference deliverable is included under `data/gdpval/references/` for human inspection; it is not supplied to the solver.
|
|
|
|
| 142 |
|
| 143 |
Runner code and repository tasks originate from [Poindexter-Labs/PDL-Bench](https://huggingface.co/datasets/Poindexter-Labs/PDL-Bench), pinned to `d68375b39ff4e7dc69e9ee9107d475d3ee9808b4`. `SOURCE_MANIFEST.json` records the selected inputs and packaging adaptations; `CHECKSUMS.json` covers this release. Vendored notices and licenses are retained under `engines/`. Separate Python environments preserve the two upstream runners' dependency pins inside one image.
|
| 144 |
|
| 145 |
+
For validation results and their limits, see [VALIDATION.md](VALIDATION.md). The [five-task accuracy review](docs/ACCURACY_REVIEW.md) records the independent checks and the corrected cyber reference. Documentation, input files, references and offline checks are also included inside the controller at `/opt/samples`.
|
| 146 |
|
| 147 |
## Reference baselines
|
| 148 |
|
SOURCE_MANIFEST.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -78,5 +78,14 @@
|
|
| 78 |
}
|
| 79 |
],
|
| 80 |
"changes": "CHANGES.md",
|
| 81 |
-
"public_data_policy": "Task content, localized inputs, reference material and public runners only; no production audit records, credentials, staff workflow fields or account configuration."
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 82 |
}
|
|
|
|
| 78 |
}
|
| 79 |
],
|
| 80 |
"changes": "CHANGES.md",
|
| 81 |
+
"public_data_policy": "Task content, localized inputs, reference material and public runners only; no production audit records, credentials, staff workflow fields or account configuration.",
|
| 82 |
+
"reference_adaptations": [
|
| 83 |
+
{
|
| 84 |
+
"task": "swe_rl_cybersecurity_task_02",
|
| 85 |
+
"revision": "samples-cache-policy-flags-v1",
|
| 86 |
+
"original": "docs/upstream-cyber02-gold.diff",
|
| 87 |
+
"description": "Restore both initial policy-inhibition flags in reference cache identity; original prompt/repository/hidden tests/scoring unchanged."
|
| 88 |
+
}
|
| 89 |
+
],
|
| 90 |
+
"accuracy_review": "docs/ACCURACY_REVIEW.md"
|
| 91 |
}
|
VALIDATION.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ These are execution and packaging checks, not benchmark estimates. A model can r
|
|
| 10 |
| Native Anthropic code adapter | Real native API tool call and tool-result continuation passed |
|
| 11 |
| Native Anthropic GDPVal adapter | Real adaptive-thinking tool call and signed assistant/tool-result passback passed |
|
| 12 |
| `cyber_02` reference patch | Actual Docker agent submission and evaluator: reward 1.0 |
|
|
|
|
| 13 |
| `cyber_02` unchanged repository | Actual Docker submission and evaluator: reward 0.0 |
|
| 14 |
| `qna014` corrected reference answer | Actual Docker submission and two native judges: reward 1.0; all 6 file-property checks passed |
|
| 15 |
| Completed Q&A attempt resume | Repeated CLI run preserved all attempt records and needed no valid provider credentials |
|
|
@@ -17,11 +18,13 @@ These are execution and packaging checks, not benchmark estimates. A model can r
|
|
| 17 |
| PDS049 native Anthropic solve | Completed and graded through native OpenAI; seven-point rubric executed successfully |
|
| 18 |
| PDS136 counting arithmetic | Independent exact Burnside enumeration matches D8=4864, SD16=37248, S3=502, S4=32923 and the final prime factorization |
|
| 19 |
| German GDPVal native OpenAI solve | Completed: presentation and PDF saved, rubric grade returned successfully |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 20 |
| French reference deliverable grading | All 15 supplied input PDFs and the 17-page reference PDF processed; score 100%, 67 rubric criteria |
|
| 21 |
| Anonymous public download | All 154 indexed file hashes matched; the downloaded Docker package built successfully and planned all seven tasks |
|
| 22 |
| Public artifact audit | Python/JSON parsing, archive inspection, no known credential values, no production audit records or runtime secrets included |
|
| 23 |
|
| 24 |
-
|
| 25 |
|
| 26 |
The mathematical count check validates the finite-group arithmetic, not an independent proof of the block-Picard classification theorem. Live provider/tool tests do not establish that every account has access to the example model IDs. No AMD64 build or fresh E2B template build in an unrelated researcher account was performed during this validation; the documented template builder is the existing pinned Mini-Bench implementation.
|
| 27 |
|
|
@@ -32,6 +35,7 @@ To repeat offline checks after building:
|
|
| 32 |
```sh
|
| 33 |
SAMPLES_IMAGE=poindexter-samples python tests/smoke.py
|
| 34 |
python tests/check_math.py
|
|
|
|
| 35 |
```
|
| 36 |
|
| 37 |
The two `tests/live_*.py` scripts are optional paid API tests. Run them inside the controller using the corresponding `/opt/venvs/code/bin/python` or `/opt/venvs/general/bin/python`, with your own API environment and `tests/` mounted at `/test`. They do not run as part of the offline smoke suite.
|
|
|
|
| 10 |
| Native Anthropic code adapter | Real native API tool call and tool-result continuation passed |
|
| 11 |
| Native Anthropic GDPVal adapter | Real adaptive-thinking tool call and signed assistant/tool-result passback passed |
|
| 12 |
| `cyber_02` reference patch | Actual Docker agent submission and evaluator: reward 1.0 |
|
| 13 |
+
| `cyber_02` cache regression review | Both policy-inhibition regressions fail on the original reference and pass on the corrected reference; corrected reference rerun through actual Docker CLI/evaluator: reward 1.0 |
|
| 14 |
| `cyber_02` unchanged repository | Actual Docker submission and evaluator: reward 0.0 |
|
| 15 |
| `qna014` corrected reference answer | Actual Docker submission and two native judges: reward 1.0; all 6 file-property checks passed |
|
| 16 |
| Completed Q&A attempt resume | Repeated CLI run preserved all attempt records and needed no valid provider credentials |
|
|
|
|
| 18 |
| PDS049 native Anthropic solve | Completed and graded through native OpenAI; seven-point rubric executed successfully |
|
| 19 |
| PDS136 counting arithmetic | Independent exact Burnside enumeration matches D8=4864, SD16=37248, S3=502, S4=32923 and the final prime factorization |
|
| 20 |
| German GDPVal native OpenAI solve | Completed: presentation and PDF saved, rubric grade returned successfully |
|
| 21 |
+
| Japanese GDPVal native OpenAI solve | Completed and graded: Word document, score 100% |
|
| 22 |
+
| French GDPVal native OpenAI solve | Produced a 19,347,709-byte PDF; rejected by the inherited 10 MiB per-file artifact limit before grading |
|
| 23 |
| French reference deliverable grading | All 15 supplied input PDFs and the 17-page reference PDF processed; score 100%, 67 rubric criteria |
|
| 24 |
| Anonymous public download | All 154 indexed file hashes matched; the downloaded Docker package built successfully and planned all seven tasks |
|
| 25 |
| Public artifact audit | Python/JSON parsing, archive inspection, no known credential values, no production audit records or runtime secrets included |
|
| 26 |
|
| 27 |
+
The Japanese live run has now completed. The French live solver produced a 35-page PDF but its 19,347,709-byte file exceeded the inherited 10 MiB per-file collection limit; this attempt is `SOLVER_FAILED`, not a graded incorrect answer. The reference grading result above uses the supplied human reference, not that newly generated answer. A completed native model solve is not claimed for PDS136 in this validation record.
|
| 28 |
|
| 29 |
The mathematical count check validates the finite-group arithmetic, not an independent proof of the block-Picard classification theorem. Live provider/tool tests do not establish that every account has access to the example model IDs. No AMD64 build or fresh E2B template build in an unrelated researcher account was performed during this validation; the documented template builder is the existing pinned Mini-Bench implementation.
|
| 30 |
|
|
|
|
| 35 |
```sh
|
| 36 |
SAMPLES_IMAGE=poindexter-samples python tests/smoke.py
|
| 37 |
python tests/check_math.py
|
| 38 |
+
python tests/check_cyber_reference.py
|
| 39 |
```
|
| 40 |
|
| 41 |
The two `tests/live_*.py` scripts are optional paid API tests. Run them inside the controller using the corresponding `/opt/venvs/code/bin/python` or `/opt/venvs/general/bin/python`, with your own API environment and `tests/` mounted at `/test`. They do not run as part of the offline smoke suite.
|
data/cyber/tasks.jsonl
CHANGED
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
| 1 |
-
{"id": "swe_rl_cybersecurity_task_02", "benchmark": "cyber-operations", "family": "executable", "task_version": 2, "prompt": "We are seeing the mesh certificate validator accept unsafe chains once a hierarchy gets deeper, an intermediate is cross-signed, or revocation data is partitioned. Please harden PathValidationEngine.validate so it evaluates complete candidate paths to an installed CA trust anchor and accepts a certificate only when at least one whole path passes. Discover viable issuers by subject DN and, when present, AKID/SKID; use the existing ca_issuers AIA lookup when an intermediate is not local; prevent cycles; and backtrack when one branch fails signature, validity, CA/key-usage, name, policy, or revocation checks. Apply path_len_constraint with RFC 5280 semantics, including the treatment of self-issued intermediates.\n\nName constraints need to accumulate from the trust anchor through every intermediate and apply to every subordinate CA and leaf. Each ancestor's permitted subtrees add another condition, while any excluded match rejects that path. DNS comparisons must be case-insensitive and respect label boundaries. IP SAN values may be IPv4 or IPv6 hosts or CIDR networks and must use real address or subnet containment. URI comparisons should treat scheme and authority case-insensitively and respect path-segment boundaries. If an end-entity certificate has no SAN, enforce DNS constraints against its subject CN.\n\nProcess certificate policies across the full path. Preserve transitive and one-to-many mappings, reject mappings on an intermediate with no certificate-policies extension and mappings to or from anyPolicy, and honor explicit-policy, policy-mapping, and any-policy inhibit state from both the validation configuration and the certificates, including their skip counters. An inhibited critical mapping must invalidate that path. When explicit policy is required, the surviving tree must reach the leaf and agree with the initial policy set; return the accepted set in authorities_constrained_policies.\n\nTreat CRL state as scoped by issuer DN and AKID. Reject any non-increasing CRL number for that scope even when the reason mask changes. A delta CRL needs a registered base and must be newer than it. New base partitions must replace superseded historical state, and only current partitions may contribute reason coverage. Preserve the existing no-CRL behavior, but once matching CRL state exists its active partitions must jointly cover ALL_REASONS or validation must fail closed. Stored revocations take effect only once their revocation date is reached; correctly scoped indirect entries must be enforced; and a delta REMOVE_FROM_CRL must release only the matching hold in the same issuer/key scope without affecting another CA that happens to use the same DN or serial.\n\nContinue rejecting unhandled critical OIDs unless they are explicitly allowed. Trust-store mutations must invalidate cached validation decisions through the store epoch, while repeated identical validations and clear_cache retain their established behavior. Keep the public models and method signatures, deterministic crypto helpers, JSON persistence, store operations, result shape and useful errors, and ordinary direct and two-tier validation working as they do now.", "patch_policy": {"allowed_paths": ["src/**"], "forbidden_paths": ["tests/**", "requirements.lock", "pyproject.toml"]}, "manifest_profile": "python_standard_1m_v0.1", "manifest_scoring_policy": null, "image_kind": "swe", "calibrated_hidden_total": 60, "files": {"manifest.yaml": "e92fe8ed5135302bc2f370dce4af45de3322d9b65befb7b33c92823c8e41d740", "repository.zip": "1e14841c5546682e9bbbd6886b15105a172a0aacd9bf945e8393aef62a0c1898", "hidden_tests.zip": "c1604193fbfea16d1be7eb6eb4139e8d6748dad13c6f63a426d43433fb747690", "gold.diff": "
|
|
|
|
| 1 |
+
{"id": "swe_rl_cybersecurity_task_02", "benchmark": "cyber-operations", "family": "executable", "task_version": 2, "prompt": "We are seeing the mesh certificate validator accept unsafe chains once a hierarchy gets deeper, an intermediate is cross-signed, or revocation data is partitioned. Please harden PathValidationEngine.validate so it evaluates complete candidate paths to an installed CA trust anchor and accepts a certificate only when at least one whole path passes. Discover viable issuers by subject DN and, when present, AKID/SKID; use the existing ca_issuers AIA lookup when an intermediate is not local; prevent cycles; and backtrack when one branch fails signature, validity, CA/key-usage, name, policy, or revocation checks. Apply path_len_constraint with RFC 5280 semantics, including the treatment of self-issued intermediates.\n\nName constraints need to accumulate from the trust anchor through every intermediate and apply to every subordinate CA and leaf. Each ancestor's permitted subtrees add another condition, while any excluded match rejects that path. DNS comparisons must be case-insensitive and respect label boundaries. IP SAN values may be IPv4 or IPv6 hosts or CIDR networks and must use real address or subnet containment. URI comparisons should treat scheme and authority case-insensitively and respect path-segment boundaries. If an end-entity certificate has no SAN, enforce DNS constraints against its subject CN.\n\nProcess certificate policies across the full path. Preserve transitive and one-to-many mappings, reject mappings on an intermediate with no certificate-policies extension and mappings to or from anyPolicy, and honor explicit-policy, policy-mapping, and any-policy inhibit state from both the validation configuration and the certificates, including their skip counters. An inhibited critical mapping must invalidate that path. When explicit policy is required, the surviving tree must reach the leaf and agree with the initial policy set; return the accepted set in authorities_constrained_policies.\n\nTreat CRL state as scoped by issuer DN and AKID. Reject any non-increasing CRL number for that scope even when the reason mask changes. A delta CRL needs a registered base and must be newer than it. New base partitions must replace superseded historical state, and only current partitions may contribute reason coverage. Preserve the existing no-CRL behavior, but once matching CRL state exists its active partitions must jointly cover ALL_REASONS or validation must fail closed. Stored revocations take effect only once their revocation date is reached; correctly scoped indirect entries must be enforced; and a delta REMOVE_FROM_CRL must release only the matching hold in the same issuer/key scope without affecting another CA that happens to use the same DN or serial.\n\nContinue rejecting unhandled critical OIDs unless they are explicitly allowed. Trust-store mutations must invalidate cached validation decisions through the store epoch, while repeated identical validations and clear_cache retain their established behavior. Keep the public models and method signatures, deterministic crypto helpers, JSON persistence, store operations, result shape and useful errors, and ordinary direct and two-tier validation working as they do now.", "patch_policy": {"allowed_paths": ["src/**"], "forbidden_paths": ["tests/**", "requirements.lock", "pyproject.toml"]}, "manifest_profile": "python_standard_1m_v0.1", "manifest_scoring_policy": null, "image_kind": "swe", "calibrated_hidden_total": 60, "files": {"manifest.yaml": "e92fe8ed5135302bc2f370dce4af45de3322d9b65befb7b33c92823c8e41d740", "repository.zip": "1e14841c5546682e9bbbd6886b15105a172a0aacd9bf945e8393aef62a0c1898", "hidden_tests.zip": "c1604193fbfea16d1be7eb6eb4139e8d6748dad13c6f63a426d43433fb747690", "gold.diff": "0a482685a0754709d77ead55d03d59a4a7e014ee01415f6ab46aa7b8ce5262ba"}, "reference_revision": "samples-cache-policy-flags-v1"}
|
data/cyber/tasks/swe_rl_cybersecurity_task_02/gold.diff
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
|
|
| 1 |
diff --git a/src/constraints/matcher.py b/src/constraints/matcher.py
|
| 2 |
-
index 395b86c..a352689 100644
|
| 3 |
--- a/src/constraints/matcher.py
|
| 4 |
+++ b/src/constraints/matcher.py
|
| 5 |
-
@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@
|
| 6 |
import ipaddress
|
| 7 |
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
|
| 8 |
from typing import List, Optional, Tuple
|
|
@@ -13,15 +12,15 @@ index 395b86c..a352689 100644
|
|
| 13 |
ConstraintType,
|
| 14 |
NameConstraint,
|
| 15 |
NameConstraintsExtension,
|
| 16 |
-
@@ -18,89 +18,129 @@
|
| 17 |
@dataclass
|
| 18 |
class EffectiveConstraints:
|
| 19 |
"""Represents the accumulated name constraints along a certificate chain."""
|
| 20 |
-
- permitted_subtrees: List[NameConstraint] = field(default_factory=list)
|
| 21 |
+ permitted_groups: List[List[NameConstraint]] = field(default_factory=list)
|
| 22 |
-
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 23 |
- _permitted_groups: List[List[NameConstraint]] = field(default_factory=list)
|
| 24 |
-
+ permitted_subtrees: List[NameConstraint] = field(default_factory=list)
|
| 25 |
|
| 26 |
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
|
| 27 |
- if self.permitted_subtrees and not self._permitted_groups:
|
|
@@ -52,7 +51,7 @@ index 395b86c..a352689 100644
|
|
| 52 |
- _permitted_groups=new_groups,
|
| 53 |
+ permitted_groups=new_groups,
|
| 54 |
)
|
| 55 |
-
|
| 56 |
+ def add_ca_constraints(self, ca_nc: Optional[NameConstraintsExtension]) -> None:
|
| 57 |
+ if not ca_nc:
|
| 58 |
+ return
|
|
@@ -61,7 +60,7 @@ index 395b86c..a352689 100644
|
|
| 61 |
+ if ca_nc.permitted_subtrees:
|
| 62 |
+ self.permitted_groups.append(list(ca_nc.permitted_subtrees))
|
| 63 |
+ self.permitted_subtrees.extend(ca_nc.permitted_subtrees)
|
| 64 |
-
|
| 65 |
|
| 66 |
def match_dns_constraint(dns_name: str, constraint: str) -> bool:
|
| 67 |
- """Matches a DNS SAN name against a DNS name constraint.
|
|
@@ -120,13 +119,12 @@ index 395b86c..a352689 100644
|
|
| 120 |
+ try:
|
| 121 |
+ p_uri = urlparse(uri.strip())
|
| 122 |
+ p_con = urlparse(constraint_prefix.strip())
|
| 123 |
-
|
| 124 |
+ if p_con.scheme and p_uri.scheme.lower() != p_con.scheme.lower():
|
| 125 |
+ return False
|
| 126 |
+ if p_con.netloc and p_uri.netloc.lower() != p_con.netloc.lower():
|
| 127 |
+ return False
|
| 128 |
-
|
| 129 |
-
-def validate_san_constraints(
|
| 130 |
+ con_path = p_con.path
|
| 131 |
+ uri_path = p_uri.path
|
| 132 |
+
|
|
@@ -137,8 +135,9 @@ index 395b86c..a352689 100644
|
|
| 137 |
+ return uri_path == con_path or uri_path.startswith(con_path + "/")
|
| 138 |
+ except Exception:
|
| 139 |
+ return uri.strip().lower().startswith(constraint_prefix.strip().lower())
|
| 140 |
-
|
| 141 |
-
|
|
|
|
| 142 |
+def validate_name_constraints(
|
| 143 |
san: SubjectAlternativeName,
|
| 144 |
+ subject_dn: str,
|
|
@@ -178,7 +177,7 @@ index 395b86c..a352689 100644
|
|
| 178 |
elif excl.type == ConstraintType.IP:
|
| 179 |
for ip in san.ip_addresses:
|
| 180 |
if match_ip_constraint(ip, excl.value):
|
| 181 |
-
@@ -110,27 +150,41 @@
|
| 182 |
if match_uri_constraint(u, excl.value):
|
| 183 |
errors.append(f"URI '{u}' is excluded by constraint '{excl.value}'")
|
| 184 |
|
|
@@ -195,9 +194,6 @@ index 395b86c..a352689 100644
|
|
| 195 |
- for d in san.dns_names:
|
| 196 |
- if not any(match_dns_constraint(d, p) for p in dns_perm):
|
| 197 |
- errors.append(f"DNS name '{d}' is not permitted by allowed DNS subtrees {dns_perm}")
|
| 198 |
-
-
|
| 199 |
-
- ip_perm = [c.value for c in group if c.type == ConstraintType.IP]
|
| 200 |
-
- if ip_perm and san.ip_addresses:
|
| 201 |
+ dns_perms = [c.value for c in group if c.type == ConstraintType.DNS]
|
| 202 |
+ if dns_perms:
|
| 203 |
+ if has_san and san.dns_names:
|
|
@@ -210,7 +206,9 @@ index 395b86c..a352689 100644
|
|
| 210 |
+ cn_val = part.strip()[3:]
|
| 211 |
+ if not any(match_dns_constraint(cn_val, p) for p in dns_perms):
|
| 212 |
+ errors.append(f"Subject CN '{cn_val}' is not permitted by allowed DNS subtrees {dns_perms}")
|
| 213 |
-
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 214 |
+ ip_perms = [c.value for c in group if c.type == ConstraintType.IP]
|
| 215 |
+ if ip_perms and san.ip_addresses:
|
| 216 |
for ip in san.ip_addresses:
|
|
@@ -239,10 +237,9 @@ index 395b86c..a352689 100644
|
|
| 239 |
+ """Legacy helper for SAN-only constraint validation."""
|
| 240 |
+ return validate_name_constraints(san, "", constraints, is_ca=False)
|
| 241 |
diff --git a/src/path/builder.py b/src/path/builder.py
|
| 242 |
-
index 5960b3e..6f8efe5 100644
|
| 243 |
--- a/src/path/builder.py
|
| 244 |
+++ b/src/path/builder.py
|
| 245 |
-
@@ -37,34 +37,35 @@
|
| 246 |
self.max_path_length = max_path_length
|
| 247 |
|
| 248 |
def find_all_candidate_paths(self, leaf: Certificate) -> List[CandidatePath]:
|
|
@@ -257,21 +254,22 @@ index 5960b3e..6f8efe5 100644
|
|
| 257 |
+ current = current_path[-1]
|
| 258 |
|
| 259 |
- def _dfs(current_path: List[Certificate], visited_serials: Set[str]) -> None:
|
| 260 |
-
- if len(current_path) >= self.max_path_length:
|
| 261 |
+ if self.trust_store.is_trust_anchor(current):
|
| 262 |
+ all_paths.append(CandidatePath(certificates=list(current_path)))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 263 |
return
|
| 264 |
|
| 265 |
- current = current_path[-1]
|
| 266 |
-
|
|
|
|
| 267 |
- if len(current_path) > 1 and self.trust_store.is_trust_anchor(current):
|
| 268 |
- paths.append(CandidatePath(certificates=list(current_path)))
|
| 269 |
-
|
| 270 |
-
|
| 271 |
-
|
| 272 |
- candidates = self.trust_store.find_candidates(current.issuer_dn, current.authority_key_id)
|
| 273 |
-
|
| 274 |
-
|
| 275 |
- if current.authority_info_access:
|
| 276 |
- for aia_key, uri in current.authority_info_access.items():
|
| 277 |
- if aia_key == "ca_issuers" or "ca_issuers" in aia_key:
|
|
@@ -288,30 +286,28 @@ index 5960b3e..6f8efe5 100644
|
|
| 288 |
for cand in candidates:
|
| 289 |
if cand.serial_number not in visited_serials:
|
| 290 |
- _dfs(current_path + [cand], visited_serials | {cand.serial_number})
|
| 291 |
-
-
|
| 292 |
-
- _dfs([leaf], {leaf.serial_number})
|
| 293 |
-
- return paths
|
| 294 |
+ visited_serials.add(cand.serial_number)
|
| 295 |
+ current_path.append(cand)
|
| 296 |
+ dfs(current_path, visited_serials)
|
| 297 |
+ current_path.pop()
|
| 298 |
+ visited_serials.remove(cand.serial_number)
|
| 299 |
-
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 300 |
+ dfs([leaf], {leaf.serial_number})
|
| 301 |
+ return all_paths
|
| 302 |
diff --git a/src/policy/tree_processor.py b/src/policy/tree_processor.py
|
| 303 |
-
index da808a2..5c0fce6 100644
|
| 304 |
--- a/src/policy/tree_processor.py
|
| 305 |
+++ b/src/policy/tree_processor.py
|
| 306 |
-
@@ -15,
|
| 307 |
valid_policy: str
|
| 308 |
qualifier_set: Set[str] = field(default_factory=set)
|
| 309 |
expected_policy_set: Set[str] = field(default_factory=set)
|
| 310 |
+ original_initial_policy: Optional[str] = None
|
| 311 |
parent: Optional[PolicyNode] = None
|
| 312 |
children: List[PolicyNode] = field(default_factory=list)
|
| 313 |
-
|
| 314 |
-
|
| 315 |
-def _prune_tree(nodes_by_depth: Dict[int, List[PolicyNode]], depth: int) -> None:
|
| 316 |
- """Prunes childless nodes backwards from depth to 0."""
|
| 317 |
- for d in range(depth, -1, -1):
|
|
@@ -323,12 +319,10 @@ index da808a2..5c0fce6 100644
|
|
| 323 |
- if node in nodes:
|
| 324 |
- nodes.remove(node)
|
| 325 |
- nodes_by_depth[d] = nodes
|
| 326 |
-
-
|
| 327 |
-
-
|
| 328 |
-
class PolicyTreeProcessor:
|
| 329 |
-
"""Processes certification path policies and computes authorities_constrained_policies."""
|
| 330 |
|
| 331 |
-
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 332 |
|
| 333 |
Returns (is_valid, authorities_constrained_policies, errors).
|
| 334 |
"""
|
|
@@ -473,18 +467,6 @@ index da808a2..5c0fce6 100644
|
|
| 473 |
- expected_policy_set={p_id},
|
| 474 |
- parent=p_node,
|
| 475 |
- children=[],
|
| 476 |
-
- )
|
| 477 |
-
- p_node.children.append(c_node)
|
| 478 |
-
- current_depth_nodes.append(c_node)
|
| 479 |
-
- else:
|
| 480 |
-
- if ANY_POLICY in cert_policy_ids and (inhibit_any_policy > 0 or is_leaf_cert):
|
| 481 |
-
- for exp in p_node.expected_policy_set:
|
| 482 |
-
- c_node = PolicyNode(
|
| 483 |
-
- valid_policy=exp,
|
| 484 |
-
- qualifier_set=qualifiers_by_id.get(ANY_POLICY, set()),
|
| 485 |
-
- expected_policy_set={exp},
|
| 486 |
-
- parent=p_node,
|
| 487 |
-
- children=[],
|
| 488 |
+ parent.children.append(child)
|
| 489 |
+ current_depth_nodes.append(child)
|
| 490 |
+ else:
|
|
@@ -503,7 +485,48 @@ index da808a2..5c0fce6 100644
|
|
| 503 |
+ expected_policy_set={p_oid},
|
| 504 |
+ original_initial_policy=orig_pol,
|
| 505 |
+ parent=parent,
|
| 506 |
-
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 507 |
- p_node.children.append(c_node)
|
| 508 |
- current_depth_nodes.append(c_node)
|
| 509 |
- for p_id in cert_policy_ids:
|
|
@@ -545,37 +568,10 @@ index da808a2..5c0fce6 100644
|
|
| 545 |
- new_node = PolicyNode(
|
| 546 |
- valid_policy=m.issuer_domain_policy,
|
| 547 |
- qualifier_set=set(any_node.qualifier_set),
|
| 548 |
-
|
| 549 |
-
+ current_depth_nodes.append(child)
|
| 550 |
-
+
|
| 551 |
-
+ nodes_by_depth.append(current_depth_nodes)
|
| 552 |
-
+
|
| 553 |
-
+ # Step 2: Policy Mappings (intermediate CAs only)
|
| 554 |
-
+ if not is_leaf and cert.policy_mappings and cert.policy_mappings.mappings:
|
| 555 |
-
+ for m in cert.policy_mappings.mappings:
|
| 556 |
-
+ if m.issuer_domain_policy == ANY_POLICY or m.subject_domain_policy == ANY_POLICY:
|
| 557 |
-
+ errors.append("Policy mapping cannot map to or from anyPolicy")
|
| 558 |
-
+ return False, set(), errors
|
| 559 |
-
+
|
| 560 |
-
+ if inhibit_policy_mapping > 0:
|
| 561 |
-
+ for m in cert.policy_mappings.mappings:
|
| 562 |
-
+ mapped_any = False
|
| 563 |
-
+ for node in current_depth_nodes:
|
| 564 |
-
+ if node.valid_policy == m.issuer_domain_policy:
|
| 565 |
-
+ node.valid_policy = m.subject_domain_policy
|
| 566 |
-
+ node.expected_policy_set = {m.subject_domain_policy}
|
| 567 |
-
+ mapped_any = True
|
| 568 |
-
+ if not mapped_any:
|
| 569 |
-
+ for parent in prev_nodes:
|
| 570 |
-
+ if parent.valid_policy == ANY_POLICY or m.issuer_domain_policy in parent.expected_policy_set:
|
| 571 |
-
+ child = PolicyNode(
|
| 572 |
-
+ valid_policy=m.subject_domain_policy,
|
| 573 |
-
expected_policy_set={m.subject_domain_policy},
|
| 574 |
- parent=any_node.parent,
|
| 575 |
- children=[],
|
| 576 |
-
|
| 577 |
-
+ parent=parent,
|
| 578 |
-
)
|
| 579 |
- if any_node.parent:
|
| 580 |
- any_node.parent.children.append(new_node)
|
| 581 |
- nodes_by_depth[i].append(new_node)
|
|
@@ -592,7 +588,7 @@ index da808a2..5c0fce6 100644
|
|
| 592 |
if cert.policy_constraints:
|
| 593 |
if cert.policy_constraints.require_explicit_policy is not None:
|
| 594 |
explicit_policy = min(explicit_policy, cert.policy_constraints.require_explicit_policy)
|
| 595 |
-
@@ -187,42 +169,44 @@
|
| 596 |
if cert.inhibit_any_policy:
|
| 597 |
inhibit_any_policy = min(inhibit_any_policy, cert.inhibit_any_policy.skip_certs)
|
| 598 |
|
|
@@ -603,23 +599,25 @@ index da808a2..5c0fce6 100644
|
|
| 603 |
- inhibit_policy_mapping -= 1
|
| 604 |
- if inhibit_any_policy > 0:
|
| 605 |
- inhibit_any_policy -= 1
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 606 |
+ if explicit_policy > 0 and not cert.is_self_issued:
|
| 607 |
+ explicit_policy -= 1
|
| 608 |
+ if inhibit_policy_mapping > 0 and not cert.is_self_issued:
|
| 609 |
+ inhibit_policy_mapping -= 1
|
| 610 |
+ if inhibit_any_policy > 0 and not cert.is_self_issued:
|
| 611 |
+ inhibit_any_policy -= 1
|
| 612 |
-
|
| 613 |
-
- leaf_cert = chain[-1]
|
| 614 |
-
- if leaf_cert.policy_constraints:
|
| 615 |
-
- if leaf_cert.policy_constraints.require_explicit_policy is not None and leaf_cert.policy_constraints.require_explicit_policy == 0:
|
| 616 |
-
- explicit_policy = 0
|
| 617 |
+ # Check if valid policy tree has become empty
|
| 618 |
+ if not current_depth_nodes and explicit_policy <= 0:
|
| 619 |
+ errors.append(f"Valid policy tree is empty at depth {i}")
|
| 620 |
+ return False, set(), errors
|
| 621 |
-
|
| 622 |
-
- leaf_nodes = nodes_by_depth.get(n - 1, [])
|
| 623 |
+ # Wrap up at leaf
|
| 624 |
+ leaf_nodes = nodes_by_depth[-1]
|
| 625 |
if not leaf_nodes:
|
|
@@ -671,10 +669,9 @@ index da808a2..5c0fce6 100644
|
|
| 671 |
+
|
| 672 |
+ return True, constrained_policies, []
|
| 673 |
diff --git a/src/revocation/crl_manager.py b/src/revocation/crl_manager.py
|
| 674 |
-
index 2720433..d9baf06 100644
|
| 675 |
--- a/src/revocation/crl_manager.py
|
| 676 |
+++ b/src/revocation/crl_manager.py
|
| 677 |
-
@@ -22,81 +22,118 @@
|
| 678 |
revocation_date: Optional[str] = None
|
| 679 |
crl_number: Optional[int] = None
|
| 680 |
uncovered_reasons: Set[CRLReason] = field(default_factory=set)
|
|
@@ -848,7 +845,7 @@ index 2720433..d9baf06 100644
|
|
| 848 |
return CRLValidationStatus(
|
| 849 |
is_revoked=True,
|
| 850 |
is_fully_covered=True,
|
| 851 |
-
@@ -105,42 +142,79 @@
|
| 852 |
crl_number=latest_num,
|
| 853 |
)
|
| 854 |
|
|
@@ -952,10 +949,9 @@ index 2720433..d9baf06 100644
|
|
| 952 |
- self._issuer_crl_numbers.clear()
|
| 953 |
+ self._latest_base_crl_numbers.clear()
|
| 954 |
diff --git a/src/store/trust_store.py b/src/store/trust_store.py
|
| 955 |
-
index c5bf0da..87e62c2 100644
|
| 956 |
--- a/src/store/trust_store.py
|
| 957 |
+++ b/src/store/trust_store.py
|
| 958 |
-
@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@
|
| 959 |
def fetch_aia_certificate(self, uri: str) -> Optional[Certificate]:
|
| 960 |
return self._remote_aia_certs.get(uri)
|
| 961 |
|
|
@@ -966,10 +962,9 @@ index c5bf0da..87e62c2 100644
|
|
| 966 |
"""Registers a Base or Delta CRL."""
|
| 967 |
accepted = self._crl_cache.register_crl(crl)
|
| 968 |
diff --git a/src/validation/engine.py b/src/validation/engine.py
|
| 969 |
-
index 55cc6e8..c17e7ce 100644
|
| 970 |
--- a/src/validation/engine.py
|
| 971 |
+++ b/src/validation/engine.py
|
| 972 |
-
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
| 973 |
|
| 974 |
from typing import Dict, List, Optional, Set, Tuple
|
| 975 |
|
|
@@ -978,7 +973,7 @@ index 55cc6e8..c17e7ce 100644
|
|
| 978 |
from src.crypto.signer import verify_certificate_signature
|
| 979 |
from src.models import (
|
| 980 |
ALL_REASONS,
|
| 981 |
-
@@ -23,34 +23,
|
| 982 |
def __init__(self, trust_store: TrustStore) -> None:
|
| 983 |
self.trust_store = trust_store
|
| 984 |
self.path_builder = PathBuilder(trust_store)
|
|
@@ -988,7 +983,7 @@ index 55cc6e8..c17e7ce 100644
|
|
| 988 |
|
| 989 |
def clear_cache(self) -> None:
|
| 990 |
self._cache.clear()
|
| 991 |
-
|
| 992 |
- def _get_cache_key(self, leaf: Certificate, config: ValidationConfig) -> str:
|
| 993 |
- return (
|
| 994 |
- f"epoch={self.trust_store.epoch}:"
|
|
@@ -1004,7 +999,7 @@ index 55cc6e8..c17e7ce 100644
|
|
| 1004 |
- f"time={config.current_time}:"
|
| 1005 |
- f"crit={sorted(config.allowed_custom_critical_oids)}"
|
| 1006 |
- )
|
| 1007 |
-
|
| 1008 |
def validate(self, leaf: Certificate, config: Optional[ValidationConfig] = None) -> ValidationResult:
|
| 1009 |
"""Validates a target leaf certificate against installed trust anchors and policies."""
|
| 1010 |
if config is None:
|
|
@@ -1015,12 +1010,13 @@ index 55cc6e8..c17e7ce 100644
|
|
| 1015 |
+ f"{self.trust_store.epoch}:{leaf.fingerprint}:{config.check_revocation}:"
|
| 1016 |
+ f"{config.enforce_name_constraints}:{config.enforce_path_len}:{config.enforce_policy_tree}:"
|
| 1017 |
+ f"{config.initial_explicit_policy}:{sorted(config.initial_policy_set)}:{config.current_time}:"
|
|
|
|
| 1018 |
+ f"{sorted(config.allowed_custom_critical_oids)}"
|
| 1019 |
+ )
|
| 1020 |
if cache_key in self._cache:
|
| 1021 |
return self._cache[cache_key]
|
| 1022 |
|
| 1023 |
-
@@ -65,8 +
|
| 1024 |
self._cache[cache_key] = res
|
| 1025 |
return res
|
| 1026 |
|
|
@@ -1031,7 +1027,7 @@ index 55cc6e8..c17e7ce 100644
|
|
| 1031 |
for candidate in candidate_paths:
|
| 1032 |
path_valid, policies, errors = self._validate_single_path(candidate, config)
|
| 1033 |
if path_valid:
|
| 1034 |
-
@@ -78,13 +
|
| 1035 |
)
|
| 1036 |
self._cache[cache_key] = res
|
| 1037 |
return res
|
|
@@ -1049,7 +1045,7 @@ index 55cc6e8..c17e7ce 100644
|
|
| 1049 |
self._cache[cache_key] = res
|
| 1050 |
return res
|
| 1051 |
|
| 1052 |
-
@@ -95,
|
| 1053 |
certs = candidate.certificates
|
| 1054 |
errors: List[str] = []
|
| 1055 |
|
|
@@ -1058,16 +1054,14 @@ index 55cc6e8..c17e7ce 100644
|
|
| 1058 |
root = certs[-1]
|
| 1059 |
if not self.trust_store.is_trust_anchor(root):
|
| 1060 |
errors.append(f"Root certificate {root.subject_dn} is not a trusted anchor")
|
| 1061 |
-
return False, set(), errors
|
| 1062 |
-
|
| 1063 |
-
+ if not root.basic_constraints.is_ca:
|
| 1064 |
-
+ errors.append(f"Root trust anchor {root.subject_dn} has is_ca=False")
|
| 1065 |
+ return False, set(), errors
|
| 1066 |
+
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1067 |
# 2. Structural & CA constraint checks for intermediates
|
| 1068 |
-
|
| 1069 |
-
ca_cert = certs[i]
|
| 1070 |
-
@@ -109,21 +103,12 @@ class PathValidationEngine:
|
| 1071 |
if not ca_cert.key_usage.key_cert_sign:
|
| 1072 |
errors.append(f"Intermediate certificate {ca_cert.subject_dn} lacks key_cert_sign usage")
|
| 1073 |
|
|
@@ -1090,7 +1084,7 @@ index 55cc6e8..c17e7ce 100644
|
|
| 1090 |
intermediates_below = [c for c in certs[1:i] if not c.is_self_issued]
|
| 1091 |
if len(intermediates_below) > path_len_limit:
|
| 1092 |
errors.append(
|
| 1093 |
-
@@ -131,
|
| 1094 |
f"limit={path_len_limit}, observed={len(intermediates_below)}"
|
| 1095 |
)
|
| 1096 |
|
|
@@ -1099,10 +1093,10 @@ index 55cc6e8..c17e7ce 100644
|
|
| 1099 |
if config.current_time:
|
| 1100 |
for cert in certs:
|
| 1101 |
if config.current_time < cert.not_before:
|
| 1102 |
-
|
| 1103 |
if config.current_time > cert.not_after:
|
| 1104 |
errors.append(f"Certificate {cert.subject_dn} is expired at {config.current_time}")
|
| 1105 |
-
|
| 1106 |
+ # 5. Critical extension checking
|
| 1107 |
+ for cert in certs:
|
| 1108 |
+ if cert.unrecognized_critical_extensions:
|
|
@@ -1114,11 +1108,10 @@ index 55cc6e8..c17e7ce 100644
|
|
| 1114 |
+ errors.append(
|
| 1115 |
+ f"Certificate {cert.subject_dn} contains unrecognized critical extension(s): {unhandled}"
|
| 1116 |
+ )
|
| 1117 |
-
|
| 1118 |
# 6. Cryptographic signature chain verification
|
| 1119 |
for i in range(len(certs) - 1):
|
| 1120 |
-
|
| 1121 |
-
@@ -150,7 +147,9 @@ class PathValidationEngine:
|
| 1122 |
if config.check_revocation:
|
| 1123 |
for i in range(len(certs) - 1):
|
| 1124 |
child = certs[i]
|
|
@@ -1129,7 +1122,7 @@ index 55cc6e8..c17e7ce 100644
|
|
| 1129 |
if rev_status.is_revoked:
|
| 1130 |
errors.append(
|
| 1131 |
f"Certificate {child.subject_dn} (serial {child.serial_number}) is revoked: "
|
| 1132 |
-
@@ -165,16 +
|
| 1133 |
# 8. Transitive Name constraints evaluation
|
| 1134 |
if config.enforce_name_constraints:
|
| 1135 |
eff = EffectiveConstraints()
|
|
|
|
| 1 |
diff --git a/src/constraints/matcher.py b/src/constraints/matcher.py
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
--- a/src/constraints/matcher.py
|
| 3 |
+++ b/src/constraints/matcher.py
|
| 4 |
+
@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@
|
| 5 |
import ipaddress
|
| 6 |
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
|
| 7 |
from typing import List, Optional, Tuple
|
|
|
|
| 12 |
ConstraintType,
|
| 13 |
NameConstraint,
|
| 14 |
NameConstraintsExtension,
|
| 15 |
+
@@ -18,89 +18,129 @@
|
| 16 |
@dataclass
|
| 17 |
class EffectiveConstraints:
|
| 18 |
"""Represents the accumulated name constraints along a certificate chain."""
|
|
|
|
| 19 |
+ permitted_groups: List[List[NameConstraint]] = field(default_factory=list)
|
| 20 |
+
+ excluded_subtrees: List[NameConstraint] = field(default_factory=list)
|
| 21 |
+
permitted_subtrees: List[NameConstraint] = field(default_factory=list)
|
| 22 |
+
- excluded_subtrees: List[NameConstraint] = field(default_factory=list)
|
| 23 |
- _permitted_groups: List[List[NameConstraint]] = field(default_factory=list)
|
|
|
|
| 24 |
|
| 25 |
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
|
| 26 |
- if self.permitted_subtrees and not self._permitted_groups:
|
|
|
|
| 51 |
- _permitted_groups=new_groups,
|
| 52 |
+ permitted_groups=new_groups,
|
| 53 |
)
|
| 54 |
+
+
|
| 55 |
+ def add_ca_constraints(self, ca_nc: Optional[NameConstraintsExtension]) -> None:
|
| 56 |
+ if not ca_nc:
|
| 57 |
+ return
|
|
|
|
| 60 |
+ if ca_nc.permitted_subtrees:
|
| 61 |
+ self.permitted_groups.append(list(ca_nc.permitted_subtrees))
|
| 62 |
+ self.permitted_subtrees.extend(ca_nc.permitted_subtrees)
|
| 63 |
+
|
| 64 |
|
| 65 |
def match_dns_constraint(dns_name: str, constraint: str) -> bool:
|
| 66 |
- """Matches a DNS SAN name against a DNS name constraint.
|
|
|
|
| 119 |
+ try:
|
| 120 |
+ p_uri = urlparse(uri.strip())
|
| 121 |
+ p_con = urlparse(constraint_prefix.strip())
|
| 122 |
+
+
|
| 123 |
+ if p_con.scheme and p_uri.scheme.lower() != p_con.scheme.lower():
|
| 124 |
+ return False
|
| 125 |
+ if p_con.netloc and p_uri.netloc.lower() != p_con.netloc.lower():
|
| 126 |
+ return False
|
| 127 |
+
+
|
|
|
|
| 128 |
+ con_path = p_con.path
|
| 129 |
+ uri_path = p_uri.path
|
| 130 |
+
|
|
|
|
| 135 |
+ return uri_path == con_path or uri_path.startswith(con_path + "/")
|
| 136 |
+ except Exception:
|
| 137 |
+ return uri.strip().lower().startswith(constraint_prefix.strip().lower())
|
| 138 |
+
|
| 139 |
+
|
| 140 |
+
-def validate_san_constraints(
|
| 141 |
+def validate_name_constraints(
|
| 142 |
san: SubjectAlternativeName,
|
| 143 |
+ subject_dn: str,
|
|
|
|
| 177 |
elif excl.type == ConstraintType.IP:
|
| 178 |
for ip in san.ip_addresses:
|
| 179 |
if match_ip_constraint(ip, excl.value):
|
| 180 |
+
@@ -110,27 +150,41 @@
|
| 181 |
if match_uri_constraint(u, excl.value):
|
| 182 |
errors.append(f"URI '{u}' is excluded by constraint '{excl.value}'")
|
| 183 |
|
|
|
|
| 194 |
- for d in san.dns_names:
|
| 195 |
- if not any(match_dns_constraint(d, p) for p in dns_perm):
|
| 196 |
- errors.append(f"DNS name '{d}' is not permitted by allowed DNS subtrees {dns_perm}")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 197 |
+ dns_perms = [c.value for c in group if c.type == ConstraintType.DNS]
|
| 198 |
+ if dns_perms:
|
| 199 |
+ if has_san and san.dns_names:
|
|
|
|
| 206 |
+ cn_val = part.strip()[3:]
|
| 207 |
+ if not any(match_dns_constraint(cn_val, p) for p in dns_perms):
|
| 208 |
+ errors.append(f"Subject CN '{cn_val}' is not permitted by allowed DNS subtrees {dns_perms}")
|
| 209 |
+
|
| 210 |
+
- ip_perm = [c.value for c in group if c.type == ConstraintType.IP]
|
| 211 |
+
- if ip_perm and san.ip_addresses:
|
| 212 |
+ ip_perms = [c.value for c in group if c.type == ConstraintType.IP]
|
| 213 |
+ if ip_perms and san.ip_addresses:
|
| 214 |
for ip in san.ip_addresses:
|
|
|
|
| 237 |
+ """Legacy helper for SAN-only constraint validation."""
|
| 238 |
+ return validate_name_constraints(san, "", constraints, is_ca=False)
|
| 239 |
diff --git a/src/path/builder.py b/src/path/builder.py
|
|
|
|
| 240 |
--- a/src/path/builder.py
|
| 241 |
+++ b/src/path/builder.py
|
| 242 |
+
@@ -37,34 +37,35 @@
|
| 243 |
self.max_path_length = max_path_length
|
| 244 |
|
| 245 |
def find_all_candidate_paths(self, leaf: Certificate) -> List[CandidatePath]:
|
|
|
|
| 254 |
+ current = current_path[-1]
|
| 255 |
|
| 256 |
- def _dfs(current_path: List[Certificate], visited_serials: Set[str]) -> None:
|
|
|
|
| 257 |
+ if self.trust_store.is_trust_anchor(current):
|
| 258 |
+ all_paths.append(CandidatePath(certificates=list(current_path)))
|
| 259 |
+
+ return
|
| 260 |
+
+
|
| 261 |
+
if len(current_path) >= self.max_path_length:
|
| 262 |
return
|
| 263 |
|
| 264 |
- current = current_path[-1]
|
| 265 |
+
+ candidates = list(self.trust_store.find_candidates(current.issuer_dn, current.authority_key_id))
|
| 266 |
+
|
| 267 |
- if len(current_path) > 1 and self.trust_store.is_trust_anchor(current):
|
| 268 |
- paths.append(CandidatePath(certificates=list(current_path)))
|
| 269 |
+
- return
|
| 270 |
+
-
|
|
|
|
| 271 |
- candidates = self.trust_store.find_candidates(current.issuer_dn, current.authority_key_id)
|
| 272 |
+
-
|
|
|
|
| 273 |
- if current.authority_info_access:
|
| 274 |
- for aia_key, uri in current.authority_info_access.items():
|
| 275 |
- if aia_key == "ca_issuers" or "ca_issuers" in aia_key:
|
|
|
|
| 286 |
for cand in candidates:
|
| 287 |
if cand.serial_number not in visited_serials:
|
| 288 |
- _dfs(current_path + [cand], visited_serials | {cand.serial_number})
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 289 |
+ visited_serials.add(cand.serial_number)
|
| 290 |
+ current_path.append(cand)
|
| 291 |
+ dfs(current_path, visited_serials)
|
| 292 |
+ current_path.pop()
|
| 293 |
+ visited_serials.remove(cand.serial_number)
|
| 294 |
+
|
| 295 |
+
- _dfs([leaf], {leaf.serial_number})
|
| 296 |
+
- return paths
|
| 297 |
+ dfs([leaf], {leaf.serial_number})
|
| 298 |
+ return all_paths
|
| 299 |
diff --git a/src/policy/tree_processor.py b/src/policy/tree_processor.py
|
|
|
|
| 300 |
--- a/src/policy/tree_processor.py
|
| 301 |
+++ b/src/policy/tree_processor.py
|
| 302 |
+
@@ -15,21 +15,9 @@
|
| 303 |
valid_policy: str
|
| 304 |
qualifier_set: Set[str] = field(default_factory=set)
|
| 305 |
expected_policy_set: Set[str] = field(default_factory=set)
|
| 306 |
+ original_initial_policy: Optional[str] = None
|
| 307 |
parent: Optional[PolicyNode] = None
|
| 308 |
children: List[PolicyNode] = field(default_factory=list)
|
| 309 |
+
-
|
| 310 |
+
-
|
| 311 |
-def _prune_tree(nodes_by_depth: Dict[int, List[PolicyNode]], depth: int) -> None:
|
| 312 |
- """Prunes childless nodes backwards from depth to 0."""
|
| 313 |
- for d in range(depth, -1, -1):
|
|
|
|
| 319 |
- if node in nodes:
|
| 320 |
- nodes.remove(node)
|
| 321 |
- nodes_by_depth[d] = nodes
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 322 |
|
| 323 |
+
|
| 324 |
+
class PolicyTreeProcessor:
|
| 325 |
+
@@ -45,140 +33,134 @@
|
| 326 |
|
| 327 |
Returns (is_valid, authorities_constrained_policies, errors).
|
| 328 |
"""
|
|
|
|
| 467 |
- expected_policy_set={p_id},
|
| 468 |
- parent=p_node,
|
| 469 |
- children=[],
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 470 |
+ parent.children.append(child)
|
| 471 |
+ current_depth_nodes.append(child)
|
| 472 |
+ else:
|
|
|
|
| 485 |
+ expected_policy_set={p_oid},
|
| 486 |
+ original_initial_policy=orig_pol,
|
| 487 |
+ parent=parent,
|
| 488 |
+
+ )
|
| 489 |
+
+ parent.children.append(child)
|
| 490 |
+
+ current_depth_nodes.append(child)
|
| 491 |
+
+
|
| 492 |
+
+ nodes_by_depth.append(current_depth_nodes)
|
| 493 |
+
+
|
| 494 |
+
+ # Step 2: Policy Mappings (intermediate CAs only)
|
| 495 |
+
+ if not is_leaf and cert.policy_mappings and cert.policy_mappings.mappings:
|
| 496 |
+
+ for m in cert.policy_mappings.mappings:
|
| 497 |
+
+ if m.issuer_domain_policy == ANY_POLICY or m.subject_domain_policy == ANY_POLICY:
|
| 498 |
+
+ errors.append("Policy mapping cannot map to or from anyPolicy")
|
| 499 |
+
+ return False, set(), errors
|
| 500 |
+
+
|
| 501 |
+
+ if inhibit_policy_mapping > 0:
|
| 502 |
+
+ for m in cert.policy_mappings.mappings:
|
| 503 |
+
+ mapped_any = False
|
| 504 |
+
+ for node in current_depth_nodes:
|
| 505 |
+
+ if node.valid_policy == m.issuer_domain_policy:
|
| 506 |
+
+ node.valid_policy = m.subject_domain_policy
|
| 507 |
+
+ node.expected_policy_set = {m.subject_domain_policy}
|
| 508 |
+
+ mapped_any = True
|
| 509 |
+
+ if not mapped_any:
|
| 510 |
+
+ for parent in prev_nodes:
|
| 511 |
+
+ if parent.valid_policy == ANY_POLICY or m.issuer_domain_policy in parent.expected_policy_set:
|
| 512 |
+
+ child = PolicyNode(
|
| 513 |
+
+ valid_policy=m.subject_domain_policy,
|
| 514 |
+
+ expected_policy_set={m.subject_domain_policy},
|
| 515 |
+
+ original_initial_policy=parent.original_initial_policy or m.issuer_domain_policy,
|
| 516 |
+
+ parent=parent,
|
| 517 |
+
)
|
| 518 |
+
- p_node.children.append(c_node)
|
| 519 |
+
- current_depth_nodes.append(c_node)
|
| 520 |
+
- else:
|
| 521 |
+
- if ANY_POLICY in cert_policy_ids and (inhibit_any_policy > 0 or is_leaf_cert):
|
| 522 |
+
- for exp in p_node.expected_policy_set:
|
| 523 |
+
- c_node = PolicyNode(
|
| 524 |
+
- valid_policy=exp,
|
| 525 |
+
- qualifier_set=qualifiers_by_id.get(ANY_POLICY, set()),
|
| 526 |
+
- expected_policy_set={exp},
|
| 527 |
+
- parent=p_node,
|
| 528 |
+
- children=[],
|
| 529 |
+
- )
|
| 530 |
- p_node.children.append(c_node)
|
| 531 |
- current_depth_nodes.append(c_node)
|
| 532 |
- for p_id in cert_policy_ids:
|
|
|
|
| 568 |
- new_node = PolicyNode(
|
| 569 |
- valid_policy=m.issuer_domain_policy,
|
| 570 |
- qualifier_set=set(any_node.qualifier_set),
|
| 571 |
+
- expected_policy_set={m.subject_domain_policy},
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 572 |
- parent=any_node.parent,
|
| 573 |
- children=[],
|
| 574 |
+
- )
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 575 |
- if any_node.parent:
|
| 576 |
- any_node.parent.children.append(new_node)
|
| 577 |
- nodes_by_depth[i].append(new_node)
|
|
|
|
| 588 |
if cert.policy_constraints:
|
| 589 |
if cert.policy_constraints.require_explicit_policy is not None:
|
| 590 |
explicit_policy = min(explicit_policy, cert.policy_constraints.require_explicit_policy)
|
| 591 |
+
@@ -187,42 +169,44 @@
|
| 592 |
if cert.inhibit_any_policy:
|
| 593 |
inhibit_any_policy = min(inhibit_any_policy, cert.inhibit_any_policy.skip_certs)
|
| 594 |
|
|
|
|
| 599 |
- inhibit_policy_mapping -= 1
|
| 600 |
- if inhibit_any_policy > 0:
|
| 601 |
- inhibit_any_policy -= 1
|
| 602 |
+
-
|
| 603 |
+
- leaf_cert = chain[-1]
|
| 604 |
+
- if leaf_cert.policy_constraints:
|
| 605 |
+
- if leaf_cert.policy_constraints.require_explicit_policy is not None and leaf_cert.policy_constraints.require_explicit_policy == 0:
|
| 606 |
+
- explicit_policy = 0
|
| 607 |
+
-
|
| 608 |
+
- leaf_nodes = nodes_by_depth.get(n - 1, [])
|
| 609 |
+ if explicit_policy > 0 and not cert.is_self_issued:
|
| 610 |
+ explicit_policy -= 1
|
| 611 |
+ if inhibit_policy_mapping > 0 and not cert.is_self_issued:
|
| 612 |
+ inhibit_policy_mapping -= 1
|
| 613 |
+ if inhibit_any_policy > 0 and not cert.is_self_issued:
|
| 614 |
+ inhibit_any_policy -= 1
|
| 615 |
+
+
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 616 |
+ # Check if valid policy tree has become empty
|
| 617 |
+ if not current_depth_nodes and explicit_policy <= 0:
|
| 618 |
+ errors.append(f"Valid policy tree is empty at depth {i}")
|
| 619 |
+ return False, set(), errors
|
| 620 |
+
+
|
|
|
|
| 621 |
+ # Wrap up at leaf
|
| 622 |
+ leaf_nodes = nodes_by_depth[-1]
|
| 623 |
if not leaf_nodes:
|
|
|
|
| 669 |
+
|
| 670 |
+ return True, constrained_policies, []
|
| 671 |
diff --git a/src/revocation/crl_manager.py b/src/revocation/crl_manager.py
|
|
|
|
| 672 |
--- a/src/revocation/crl_manager.py
|
| 673 |
+++ b/src/revocation/crl_manager.py
|
| 674 |
+
@@ -22,81 +22,118 @@
|
| 675 |
revocation_date: Optional[str] = None
|
| 676 |
crl_number: Optional[int] = None
|
| 677 |
uncovered_reasons: Set[CRLReason] = field(default_factory=set)
|
|
|
|
| 845 |
return CRLValidationStatus(
|
| 846 |
is_revoked=True,
|
| 847 |
is_fully_covered=True,
|
| 848 |
+
@@ -105,42 +142,79 @@
|
| 849 |
crl_number=latest_num,
|
| 850 |
)
|
| 851 |
|
|
|
|
| 949 |
- self._issuer_crl_numbers.clear()
|
| 950 |
+ self._latest_base_crl_numbers.clear()
|
| 951 |
diff --git a/src/store/trust_store.py b/src/store/trust_store.py
|
|
|
|
| 952 |
--- a/src/store/trust_store.py
|
| 953 |
+++ b/src/store/trust_store.py
|
| 954 |
+
@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@
|
| 955 |
def fetch_aia_certificate(self, uri: str) -> Optional[Certificate]:
|
| 956 |
return self._remote_aia_certs.get(uri)
|
| 957 |
|
|
|
|
| 962 |
"""Registers a Base or Delta CRL."""
|
| 963 |
accepted = self._crl_cache.register_crl(crl)
|
| 964 |
diff --git a/src/validation/engine.py b/src/validation/engine.py
|
|
|
|
| 965 |
--- a/src/validation/engine.py
|
| 966 |
+++ b/src/validation/engine.py
|
| 967 |
+
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
| 968 |
|
| 969 |
from typing import Dict, List, Optional, Set, Tuple
|
| 970 |
|
|
|
|
| 973 |
from src.crypto.signer import verify_certificate_signature
|
| 974 |
from src.models import (
|
| 975 |
ALL_REASONS,
|
| 976 |
+
@@ -23,34 +23,24 @@
|
| 977 |
def __init__(self, trust_store: TrustStore) -> None:
|
| 978 |
self.trust_store = trust_store
|
| 979 |
self.path_builder = PathBuilder(trust_store)
|
|
|
|
| 983 |
|
| 984 |
def clear_cache(self) -> None:
|
| 985 |
self._cache.clear()
|
| 986 |
+
-
|
| 987 |
- def _get_cache_key(self, leaf: Certificate, config: ValidationConfig) -> str:
|
| 988 |
- return (
|
| 989 |
- f"epoch={self.trust_store.epoch}:"
|
|
|
|
| 999 |
- f"time={config.current_time}:"
|
| 1000 |
- f"crit={sorted(config.allowed_custom_critical_oids)}"
|
| 1001 |
- )
|
| 1002 |
+
|
| 1003 |
def validate(self, leaf: Certificate, config: Optional[ValidationConfig] = None) -> ValidationResult:
|
| 1004 |
"""Validates a target leaf certificate against installed trust anchors and policies."""
|
| 1005 |
if config is None:
|
|
|
|
| 1010 |
+ f"{self.trust_store.epoch}:{leaf.fingerprint}:{config.check_revocation}:"
|
| 1011 |
+ f"{config.enforce_name_constraints}:{config.enforce_path_len}:{config.enforce_policy_tree}:"
|
| 1012 |
+ f"{config.initial_explicit_policy}:{sorted(config.initial_policy_set)}:{config.current_time}:"
|
| 1013 |
+
+ f"{config.initial_policy_mapping_inhibit}:{config.initial_any_policy_inhibit}:"
|
| 1014 |
+ f"{sorted(config.allowed_custom_critical_oids)}"
|
| 1015 |
+ )
|
| 1016 |
if cache_key in self._cache:
|
| 1017 |
return self._cache[cache_key]
|
| 1018 |
|
| 1019 |
+
@@ -65,8 +55,8 @@
|
| 1020 |
self._cache[cache_key] = res
|
| 1021 |
return res
|
| 1022 |
|
|
|
|
| 1027 |
for candidate in candidate_paths:
|
| 1028 |
path_valid, policies, errors = self._validate_single_path(candidate, config)
|
| 1029 |
if path_valid:
|
| 1030 |
+
@@ -78,13 +68,14 @@
|
| 1031 |
)
|
| 1032 |
self._cache[cache_key] = res
|
| 1033 |
return res
|
|
|
|
| 1045 |
self._cache[cache_key] = res
|
| 1046 |
return res
|
| 1047 |
|
| 1048 |
+
@@ -95,10 +86,14 @@
|
| 1049 |
certs = candidate.certificates
|
| 1050 |
errors: List[str] = []
|
| 1051 |
|
|
|
|
| 1054 |
root = certs[-1]
|
| 1055 |
if not self.trust_store.is_trust_anchor(root):
|
| 1056 |
errors.append(f"Root certificate {root.subject_dn} is not a trusted anchor")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1057 |
+ return False, set(), errors
|
| 1058 |
+
|
| 1059 |
+
+ if not root.basic_constraints.is_ca:
|
| 1060 |
+
+ errors.append(f"Root trust anchor {root.subject_dn} has is_ca=False")
|
| 1061 |
+
return False, set(), errors
|
| 1062 |
+
|
| 1063 |
# 2. Structural & CA constraint checks for intermediates
|
| 1064 |
+
@@ -109,21 +104,12 @@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1065 |
if not ca_cert.key_usage.key_cert_sign:
|
| 1066 |
errors.append(f"Intermediate certificate {ca_cert.subject_dn} lacks key_cert_sign usage")
|
| 1067 |
|
|
|
|
| 1084 |
intermediates_below = [c for c in certs[1:i] if not c.is_self_issued]
|
| 1085 |
if len(intermediates_below) > path_len_limit:
|
| 1086 |
errors.append(
|
| 1087 |
+
@@ -131,13 +117,25 @@
|
| 1088 |
f"limit={path_len_limit}, observed={len(intermediates_below)}"
|
| 1089 |
)
|
| 1090 |
|
|
|
|
| 1093 |
if config.current_time:
|
| 1094 |
for cert in certs:
|
| 1095 |
if config.current_time < cert.not_before:
|
| 1096 |
+
errors.append(f"Certificate {cert.subject_dn} is not yet valid at {config.current_time}")
|
| 1097 |
if config.current_time > cert.not_after:
|
| 1098 |
errors.append(f"Certificate {cert.subject_dn} is expired at {config.current_time}")
|
| 1099 |
+
+
|
| 1100 |
+ # 5. Critical extension checking
|
| 1101 |
+ for cert in certs:
|
| 1102 |
+ if cert.unrecognized_critical_extensions:
|
|
|
|
| 1108 |
+ errors.append(
|
| 1109 |
+ f"Certificate {cert.subject_dn} contains unrecognized critical extension(s): {unhandled}"
|
| 1110 |
+ )
|
| 1111 |
+
|
| 1112 |
# 6. Cryptographic signature chain verification
|
| 1113 |
for i in range(len(certs) - 1):
|
| 1114 |
+
@@ -150,7 +148,9 @@
|
|
|
|
| 1115 |
if config.check_revocation:
|
| 1116 |
for i in range(len(certs) - 1):
|
| 1117 |
child = certs[i]
|
|
|
|
| 1122 |
if rev_status.is_revoked:
|
| 1123 |
errors.append(
|
| 1124 |
f"Certificate {child.subject_dn} (serial {child.serial_number}) is revoked: "
|
| 1125 |
+
@@ -165,16 +165,16 @@
|
| 1126 |
# 8. Transitive Name constraints evaluation
|
| 1127 |
if config.enforce_name_constraints:
|
| 1128 |
eff = EffectiveConstraints()
|
docs/ACCURACY_REVIEW.md
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
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|
| 1 |
+
# Selected-task accuracy review — November 18, 2026
|
| 2 |
+
|
| 3 |
+
Scope: a targeted consistency review of the three GDPVal and two code samples, including source inputs, expected outputs and executable evidence. STEM was excluded from this review. This is not an exhaustive proof of reference correctness; passing an LLM judge alone is not treated as such proof.
|
| 4 |
+
|
| 5 |
+
## GDPVal
|
| 6 |
+
|
| 7 |
+
**German — family foundation.** No material contradiction found between the prompt and the reviewed legal assertions in the rubric. The initial endowment allowance is conditioned on the potentially most distant beneficiary, not multiplied by the number of children. The rubric distinguishes later additions, preserves foundation ownership and capital-maintenance constraints, and identifies the 30-year substitute inheritance tax. The beneficiary interpretation agrees with the [Federal Fiscal Court decision II R 25/21](https://www.bundesfinanzhof.de/de/entscheidung/entscheidungen-online/detail/STRE202410089/); the 30-year interval is in [ErbStG §1](https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/erbstg_1974/__1.html). This is a 2025 planning exercise, not a current personalized legal opinion. The rubric repeats some documentation/timeline requirements, so a concise presentation can lose several points for one omission. A live native OpenAI run completed with 70.21%; that is partial answer credit, not a pipeline failure.
|
| 8 |
+
|
| 9 |
+
**Japanese — NFT photography article.** The supplied Word research file, requested output and rubric are consistent on the article title, Japanese character count, formatting, photographer examples and links. A live native OpenAI run produced a Word document and received 100%. Two qualifications matter: this uses a historical collection of web references, whose continuing availability is not guaranteed; resale royalties should be described as platform-dependent, not guaranteed for every NFT sale. For example, [SuperRare documents a secondary-sale royalty](https://help.superrare.com/en/articles/10629742-offers-auctions-and-pricing). The rubric's wording permits earning royalties rather than requiring a universal guarantee. Its character-count boundary uses the first paragraph containing `プルクオート:` or `キーワード`; keep the keyword section at the end, since those words inside the body could make that boundary ambiguous. The original rubric is preserved.
|
| 10 |
+
|
| 11 |
+
**French — 2024 household tax return.** Independently recalculated the principal totals from the supplied salary, interest, dividend, securities-sale and payment PDFs. They reconcile with the rubric/reference:
|
| 12 |
+
|
| 13 |
+
| Calculation | Euros |
|
| 14 |
+
| --- | ---: |
|
| 15 |
+
| Declared salaries: Laurent / Claire | 234,934 / 92,069 |
|
| 16 |
+
| Net taxable salaries after standard deductions | 303,370 |
|
| 17 |
+
| Progressive tax after family-quotient cap | 85,108 |
|
| 18 |
+
| Net securities gain | 25,915 |
|
| 19 |
+
| PFU income-tax component | 4,323 |
|
| 20 |
+
| Donation and school reductions | 2,989 |
|
| 21 |
+
| Childcare credit / 2CK credit | 820 / 1,006 |
|
| 22 |
+
| Net income tax before PAS payments | 84,616 |
|
| 23 |
+
| PAS payments | 39,079 |
|
| 24 |
+
| Remaining income tax / social charges | 45,537 / 4,458 |
|
| 25 |
+
| Final balance | **49,995** |
|
| 26 |
+
|
| 27 |
+
The twins were under six on January 1, 2024; the questionnaire explicitly excludes the global progressive-rate option and prior-year carryovers. The 2BH entry is consistent with the [official 2025 simulator's conditional CSG wording](https://simulateur-ir-ifi.impots.gouv.fr/calcul_impot/2025/complet/index.htm). Brackets were cross-checked against the [2025 BOFiP schedule](https://bofip.impots.gouv.fr/bofip/2491-PGP.html/identifiant%3DBOI-IR-LIQ-20-10-20250414), and deduction limits against the [2025 calculation instructions](https://www.impots.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/formulaires/2041-notfc/2025/2041-notfc_5103.pdf). No material arithmetic discrepancy found. This is a synthetic historical exercise, not a certified tax filing. The human reference processed successfully against all 67 rubric criteria; a separate native solver produced a 35-page, 19,347,709-byte PDF and was rejected by the inherited 10 MiB per-file collection limit before grading. That is an execution constraint, not evidence of a factual error in the task.
|
| 28 |
+
|
| 29 |
+
## Code tasks
|
| 30 |
+
|
| 31 |
+
**cyber_02 — certificate validation.** The test scenarios match the task's stated path, policy, name-constraint and revocation requirements. The original reference passed the existing evaluator, but independent inspection found that its cache key omitted `initial_policy_mapping_inhibit` and `initial_any_policy_inhibit`. After a permissive validation, a stricter validation on the same engine incorrectly returned the cached success; a fresh engine correctly rejected it.
|
| 32 |
+
|
| 33 |
+
The Samples reference now includes both flags in cache identity and again receives reward 1.0 through the actual Docker submission/evaluator. Two new reference-only regression tests cover both directions of each policy change; both fail on the original reference and pass on the corrected one. The original is preserved as [upstream-cyber02-gold.diff](upstream-cyber02-gold.diff). The task prompt, starter repository, hidden tests and scoring protocol are unchanged. This fixture uses deterministic crypto helpers and task-specific validation rules; it is not a production certificate validator or a comprehensive RFC-conformance test.
|
| 34 |
+
|
| 35 |
+
**qna014 — signed-package incident audit.** Applied the nine proposed safe patches in order to an isolated copy and executed the archived primitives (9/9 passed). Replayed the captures and independently derived the sequence-906 head, all capture decisions, eight runtime packages, four build packages, recipe digest and built-wheel digest. They match the published reference. Token 71 conflicts on the old request and is fenced on the current request; token 81 is fenced, and token 82 resumes. These outcomes agree with the reference and executable retry rules. The existing native judge/file-property validation also passed. This checks the main reference conclusions, not every possible incident variant.
|
| 36 |
+
|
| 37 |
+
Run the additional cyber regression locally with `python tests/check_cyber_reference.py`, or inside the built controller with:
|
| 38 |
+
|
| 39 |
+
```sh
|
| 40 |
+
docker run --rm --entrypoint python poindexter-samples tests/check_cyber_reference.py
|
| 41 |
+
```
|
docs/upstream-cyber02-gold.diff
ADDED
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@@ -0,0 +1,1156 @@
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|
| 1 |
+
diff --git a/src/constraints/matcher.py b/src/constraints/matcher.py
|
| 2 |
+
index 395b86c..a352689 100644
|
| 3 |
+
--- a/src/constraints/matcher.py
|
| 4 |
+
+++ b/src/constraints/matcher.py
|
| 5 |
+
@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ from __future__ import annotations
|
| 6 |
+
import ipaddress
|
| 7 |
+
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
|
| 8 |
+
from typing import List, Optional, Tuple
|
| 9 |
+
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
|
| 10 |
+
|
| 11 |
+
from src.models import (
|
| 12 |
+
- Certificate,
|
| 13 |
+
ConstraintType,
|
| 14 |
+
NameConstraint,
|
| 15 |
+
NameConstraintsExtension,
|
| 16 |
+
@@ -18,89 +18,129 @@ from src.models import (
|
| 17 |
+
@dataclass
|
| 18 |
+
class EffectiveConstraints:
|
| 19 |
+
"""Represents the accumulated name constraints along a certificate chain."""
|
| 20 |
+
- permitted_subtrees: List[NameConstraint] = field(default_factory=list)
|
| 21 |
+
+ permitted_groups: List[List[NameConstraint]] = field(default_factory=list)
|
| 22 |
+
excluded_subtrees: List[NameConstraint] = field(default_factory=list)
|
| 23 |
+
- _permitted_groups: List[List[NameConstraint]] = field(default_factory=list)
|
| 24 |
+
+ permitted_subtrees: List[NameConstraint] = field(default_factory=list)
|
| 25 |
+
|
| 26 |
+
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
|
| 27 |
+
- if self.permitted_subtrees and not self._permitted_groups:
|
| 28 |
+
- object.__setattr__(self, "_permitted_groups", [list(self.permitted_subtrees)])
|
| 29 |
+
+ if self.permitted_subtrees and not self.permitted_groups:
|
| 30 |
+
+ self.permitted_groups = [list(self.permitted_subtrees)]
|
| 31 |
+
+ elif self.permitted_groups and not self.permitted_subtrees:
|
| 32 |
+
+ self.permitted_subtrees = [c for group in self.permitted_groups for c in group]
|
| 33 |
+
|
| 34 |
+
def is_empty(self) -> bool:
|
| 35 |
+
- return not (self.permitted_subtrees or self.excluded_subtrees or self._permitted_groups)
|
| 36 |
+
+ return not (self.permitted_groups or self.permitted_subtrees or self.excluded_subtrees)
|
| 37 |
+
|
| 38 |
+
def merge_parent(self, parent_nc: Optional[NameConstraintsExtension]) -> EffectiveConstraints:
|
| 39 |
+
"""Merges parent constraints into this effective constraint set."""
|
| 40 |
+
if not parent_nc:
|
| 41 |
+
return self
|
| 42 |
+
- new_permitted = list(self.permitted_subtrees) + list(parent_nc.permitted_subtrees)
|
| 43 |
+
new_excluded = list(self.excluded_subtrees) + list(parent_nc.excluded_subtrees)
|
| 44 |
+
- new_groups = [list(g) for g in self._permitted_groups]
|
| 45 |
+
+ new_groups = [list(g) for g in self.permitted_groups]
|
| 46 |
+
if parent_nc.permitted_subtrees:
|
| 47 |
+
new_groups.append(list(parent_nc.permitted_subtrees))
|
| 48 |
+
+ new_permitted = [c for group in new_groups for c in group]
|
| 49 |
+
return EffectiveConstraints(
|
| 50 |
+
permitted_subtrees=new_permitted,
|
| 51 |
+
excluded_subtrees=new_excluded,
|
| 52 |
+
- _permitted_groups=new_groups,
|
| 53 |
+
+ permitted_groups=new_groups,
|
| 54 |
+
)
|
| 55 |
+
|
| 56 |
+
+ def add_ca_constraints(self, ca_nc: Optional[NameConstraintsExtension]) -> None:
|
| 57 |
+
+ if not ca_nc:
|
| 58 |
+
+ return
|
| 59 |
+
+ if ca_nc.excluded_subtrees:
|
| 60 |
+
+ self.excluded_subtrees.extend(ca_nc.excluded_subtrees)
|
| 61 |
+
+ if ca_nc.permitted_subtrees:
|
| 62 |
+
+ self.permitted_groups.append(list(ca_nc.permitted_subtrees))
|
| 63 |
+
+ self.permitted_subtrees.extend(ca_nc.permitted_subtrees)
|
| 64 |
+
+
|
| 65 |
+
|
| 66 |
+
def match_dns_constraint(dns_name: str, constraint: str) -> bool:
|
| 67 |
+
- """Matches a DNS SAN name against a DNS name constraint.
|
| 68 |
+
-
|
| 69 |
+
- RFC 5280 DNS Name Constraint Rules:
|
| 70 |
+
- - Constraint 'example.com' or '.example.com' matches 'example.com' and 'host.example.com'.
|
| 71 |
+
- - Must respect dot boundaries (should not match 'fakecorp.internal' for 'corp.internal').
|
| 72 |
+
- """
|
| 73 |
+
- clean_dns = dns_name.lower().strip(".")
|
| 74 |
+
- clean_constraint = constraint.lower().strip(".")
|
| 75 |
+
-
|
| 76 |
+
+ """Matches a DNS SAN name against a DNS name constraint adhering to RFC 5280 Section 4.2.1.10."""
|
| 77 |
+
+ clean_dns = dns_name.lower().strip()
|
| 78 |
+
+ clean_constraint = constraint.lower().strip()
|
| 79 |
+
+
|
| 80 |
+
+ clean_constraint = clean_constraint.lstrip(".")
|
| 81 |
+
+ clean_dns = clean_dns.strip(".")
|
| 82 |
+
+
|
| 83 |
+
if not clean_constraint:
|
| 84 |
+
return True
|
| 85 |
+
-
|
| 86 |
+
if clean_dns == clean_constraint:
|
| 87 |
+
return True
|
| 88 |
+
-
|
| 89 |
+
if clean_dns.endswith("." + clean_constraint):
|
| 90 |
+
return True
|
| 91 |
+
-
|
| 92 |
+
+ if clean_dns.startswith("*."):
|
| 93 |
+
+ suffix = clean_dns[2:]
|
| 94 |
+
+ if suffix == clean_constraint or suffix.endswith("." + clean_constraint):
|
| 95 |
+
+ return True
|
| 96 |
+
return False
|
| 97 |
+
|
| 98 |
+
|
| 99 |
+
def match_ip_constraint(ip_str: str, constraint_cidr: str) -> bool:
|
| 100 |
+
- """Matches an IP SAN against an IP CIDR constraint."""
|
| 101 |
+
+ """Matches an IP SAN address or CIDR against an IP CIDR constraint."""
|
| 102 |
+
try:
|
| 103 |
+
- ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str.strip())
|
| 104 |
+
net = ipaddress.ip_network(constraint_cidr.strip(), strict=False)
|
| 105 |
+
- return ip in net
|
| 106 |
+
+ try:
|
| 107 |
+
+ ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str.strip())
|
| 108 |
+
+ return ip in net
|
| 109 |
+
+ except ValueError:
|
| 110 |
+
+ sub_net = ipaddress.ip_network(ip_str.strip(), strict=False)
|
| 111 |
+
+ return sub_net.subnet_of(net)
|
| 112 |
+
except (ValueError, TypeError):
|
| 113 |
+
return False
|
| 114 |
+
|
| 115 |
+
|
| 116 |
+
def match_uri_constraint(uri: str, constraint_prefix: str) -> bool:
|
| 117 |
+
- """Matches a URI SAN against a URI constraint prefix."""
|
| 118 |
+
- return uri.startswith(constraint_prefix)
|
| 119 |
+
+ """Matches a URI SAN against a URI constraint prefix per RFC 5280 Section 4.2.1.10."""
|
| 120 |
+
+ try:
|
| 121 |
+
+ p_uri = urlparse(uri.strip())
|
| 122 |
+
+ p_con = urlparse(constraint_prefix.strip())
|
| 123 |
+
|
| 124 |
+
+ if p_con.scheme and p_uri.scheme.lower() != p_con.scheme.lower():
|
| 125 |
+
+ return False
|
| 126 |
+
+ if p_con.netloc and p_uri.netloc.lower() != p_con.netloc.lower():
|
| 127 |
+
+ return False
|
| 128 |
+
|
| 129 |
+
-def validate_san_constraints(
|
| 130 |
+
+ con_path = p_con.path
|
| 131 |
+
+ uri_path = p_uri.path
|
| 132 |
+
+
|
| 133 |
+
+ if not con_path or con_path == "/":
|
| 134 |
+
+ return True
|
| 135 |
+
+ if con_path.endswith("/"):
|
| 136 |
+
+ return uri_path.startswith(con_path)
|
| 137 |
+
+ return uri_path == con_path or uri_path.startswith(con_path + "/")
|
| 138 |
+
+ except Exception:
|
| 139 |
+
+ return uri.strip().lower().startswith(constraint_prefix.strip().lower())
|
| 140 |
+
+
|
| 141 |
+
+
|
| 142 |
+
+def validate_name_constraints(
|
| 143 |
+
san: SubjectAlternativeName,
|
| 144 |
+
+ subject_dn: str,
|
| 145 |
+
constraints: EffectiveConstraints,
|
| 146 |
+
+ is_ca: bool = False,
|
| 147 |
+
) -> Tuple[bool, List[str]]:
|
| 148 |
+
- """Validates SAN entries against accumulated effective name constraints.
|
| 149 |
+
-
|
| 150 |
+
- Returns (is_valid, list_of_violation_errors).
|
| 151 |
+
- """
|
| 152 |
+
- if constraints.is_empty() or san.is_empty():
|
| 153 |
+
+ """Validates SAN entries and Subject DN against accumulated effective name constraints."""
|
| 154 |
+
+ if constraints.is_empty():
|
| 155 |
+
return True, []
|
| 156 |
+
|
| 157 |
+
errors: List[str] = []
|
| 158 |
+
+ has_san = not san.is_empty()
|
| 159 |
+
|
| 160 |
+
- # 1. Check excluded subtrees (any match violates constraints)
|
| 161 |
+
+ # 1. Check excluded subtrees
|
| 162 |
+
for excl in constraints.excluded_subtrees:
|
| 163 |
+
if excl.type == ConstraintType.DNS:
|
| 164 |
+
- for d in san.dns_names:
|
| 165 |
+
- if match_dns_constraint(d, excl.value):
|
| 166 |
+
- errors.append(f"DNS name '{d}' is excluded by constraint '{excl.value}'")
|
| 167 |
+
+ if has_san and san.dns_names:
|
| 168 |
+
+ for d in san.dns_names:
|
| 169 |
+
+ if match_dns_constraint(d, excl.value):
|
| 170 |
+
+ errors.append(f"DNS name '{d}' is excluded by constraint '{excl.value}'")
|
| 171 |
+
+ elif not is_ca:
|
| 172 |
+
+ # Extract CN from Subject DN for end-entity certificates
|
| 173 |
+
+ for part in subject_dn.split(","):
|
| 174 |
+
+ if part.strip().startswith("CN="):
|
| 175 |
+
+ cn_val = part.strip()[3:]
|
| 176 |
+
+ if match_dns_constraint(cn_val, excl.value):
|
| 177 |
+
+ errors.append(f"Subject CN '{cn_val}' is excluded by constraint '{excl.value}'")
|
| 178 |
+
elif excl.type == ConstraintType.IP:
|
| 179 |
+
for ip in san.ip_addresses:
|
| 180 |
+
if match_ip_constraint(ip, excl.value):
|
| 181 |
+
@@ -110,27 +150,41 @@ def validate_san_constraints(
|
| 182 |
+
if match_uri_constraint(u, excl.value):
|
| 183 |
+
errors.append(f"URI '{u}' is excluded by constraint '{excl.value}'")
|
| 184 |
+
|
| 185 |
+
- # 2. Check permitted subtrees (intersection of all ancestor tiers)
|
| 186 |
+
- groups = constraints._permitted_groups if constraints._permitted_groups else (
|
| 187 |
+
- [constraints.permitted_subtrees] if constraints.permitted_subtrees else []
|
| 188 |
+
- )
|
| 189 |
+
+ # 2. Check permitted subtree groups
|
| 190 |
+
+ groups = constraints.permitted_groups if constraints.permitted_groups else ([constraints.permitted_subtrees] if constraints.permitted_subtrees else [])
|
| 191 |
+
+
|
| 192 |
+
for group in groups:
|
| 193 |
+
- dns_perm = [c.value for c in group if c.type == ConstraintType.DNS]
|
| 194 |
+
- if dns_perm and san.dns_names:
|
| 195 |
+
- for d in san.dns_names:
|
| 196 |
+
- if not any(match_dns_constraint(d, p) for p in dns_perm):
|
| 197 |
+
- errors.append(f"DNS name '{d}' is not permitted by allowed DNS subtrees {dns_perm}")
|
| 198 |
+
-
|
| 199 |
+
- ip_perm = [c.value for c in group if c.type == ConstraintType.IP]
|
| 200 |
+
- if ip_perm and san.ip_addresses:
|
| 201 |
+
+ dns_perms = [c.value for c in group if c.type == ConstraintType.DNS]
|
| 202 |
+
+ if dns_perms:
|
| 203 |
+
+ if has_san and san.dns_names:
|
| 204 |
+
+ for d in san.dns_names:
|
| 205 |
+
+ if not any(match_dns_constraint(d, p) for p in dns_perms):
|
| 206 |
+
+ errors.append(f"DNS name '{d}' is not permitted by allowed DNS subtrees {dns_perms}")
|
| 207 |
+
+ elif not is_ca:
|
| 208 |
+
+ for part in subject_dn.split(","):
|
| 209 |
+
+ if part.strip().startswith("CN="):
|
| 210 |
+
+ cn_val = part.strip()[3:]
|
| 211 |
+
+ if not any(match_dns_constraint(cn_val, p) for p in dns_perms):
|
| 212 |
+
+ errors.append(f"Subject CN '{cn_val}' is not permitted by allowed DNS subtrees {dns_perms}")
|
| 213 |
+
+
|
| 214 |
+
+ ip_perms = [c.value for c in group if c.type == ConstraintType.IP]
|
| 215 |
+
+ if ip_perms and san.ip_addresses:
|
| 216 |
+
for ip in san.ip_addresses:
|
| 217 |
+
- if not any(match_ip_constraint(ip, p) for p in ip_perm):
|
| 218 |
+
- errors.append(f"IP address '{ip}' is not permitted by allowed IP subtrees {ip_perm}")
|
| 219 |
+
+ if not any(match_ip_constraint(ip, p) for p in ip_perms):
|
| 220 |
+
+ errors.append(f"IP address '{ip}' is not permitted by allowed IP subtrees {ip_perms}")
|
| 221 |
+
|
| 222 |
+
- uri_perm = [c.value for c in group if c.type == ConstraintType.URI]
|
| 223 |
+
- if uri_perm and san.uris:
|
| 224 |
+
+ uri_perms = [c.value for c in group if c.type == ConstraintType.URI]
|
| 225 |
+
+ if uri_perms and san.uris:
|
| 226 |
+
for u in san.uris:
|
| 227 |
+
- if not any(match_uri_constraint(u, p) for p in uri_perm):
|
| 228 |
+
- errors.append(f"URI '{u}' is not permitted by allowed URI subtrees {uri_perm}")
|
| 229 |
+
+ if not any(match_uri_constraint(u, p) for p in uri_perms):
|
| 230 |
+
+ errors.append(f"URI '{u}' is not permitted by allowed URI subtrees {uri_perms}")
|
| 231 |
+
|
| 232 |
+
return len(errors) == 0, errors
|
| 233 |
+
+
|
| 234 |
+
+
|
| 235 |
+
+def validate_san_constraints(
|
| 236 |
+
+ san: SubjectAlternativeName,
|
| 237 |
+
+ constraints: EffectiveConstraints,
|
| 238 |
+
+) -> Tuple[bool, List[str]]:
|
| 239 |
+
+ """Legacy helper for SAN-only constraint validation."""
|
| 240 |
+
+ return validate_name_constraints(san, "", constraints, is_ca=False)
|
| 241 |
+
diff --git a/src/path/builder.py b/src/path/builder.py
|
| 242 |
+
index 5960b3e..6f8efe5 100644
|
| 243 |
+
--- a/src/path/builder.py
|
| 244 |
+
+++ b/src/path/builder.py
|
| 245 |
+
@@ -37,34 +37,35 @@ class PathBuilder:
|
| 246 |
+
self.max_path_length = max_path_length
|
| 247 |
+
|
| 248 |
+
def find_all_candidate_paths(self, leaf: Certificate) -> List[CandidatePath]:
|
| 249 |
+
- """Finds all candidate certification paths from leaf to an installed Trust Anchor."""
|
| 250 |
+
- paths: List[CandidatePath] = []
|
| 251 |
+
+ """Finds all candidate certification paths from leaf to an installed Trust Anchor using backtracking."""
|
| 252 |
+
+ all_paths: List[CandidatePath] = []
|
| 253 |
+
|
| 254 |
+
- if self.trust_store.is_trust_anchor(leaf):
|
| 255 |
+
- return [CandidatePath(certificates=[leaf])]
|
| 256 |
+
+ def dfs(current_path: List[Certificate], visited_serials: Set[str]) -> None:
|
| 257 |
+
+ current = current_path[-1]
|
| 258 |
+
|
| 259 |
+
- def _dfs(current_path: List[Certificate], visited_serials: Set[str]) -> None:
|
| 260 |
+
- if len(current_path) >= self.max_path_length:
|
| 261 |
+
+ if self.trust_store.is_trust_anchor(current):
|
| 262 |
+
+ all_paths.append(CandidatePath(certificates=list(current_path)))
|
| 263 |
+
return
|
| 264 |
+
|
| 265 |
+
- current = current_path[-1]
|
| 266 |
+
-
|
| 267 |
+
- if len(current_path) > 1 and self.trust_store.is_trust_anchor(current):
|
| 268 |
+
- paths.append(CandidatePath(certificates=list(current_path)))
|
| 269 |
+
+ if len(current_path) >= self.max_path_length:
|
| 270 |
+
return
|
| 271 |
+
|
| 272 |
+
- candidates = self.trust_store.find_candidates(current.issuer_dn, current.authority_key_id)
|
| 273 |
+
+ candidates = list(self.trust_store.find_candidates(current.issuer_dn, current.authority_key_id))
|
| 274 |
+
|
| 275 |
+
- if current.authority_info_access:
|
| 276 |
+
- for aia_key, uri in current.authority_info_access.items():
|
| 277 |
+
- if aia_key == "ca_issuers" or "ca_issuers" in aia_key:
|
| 278 |
+
- remote_cert = self.trust_store.fetch_aia_certificate(uri)
|
| 279 |
+
- if remote_cert and remote_cert not in candidates:
|
| 280 |
+
- candidates.append(remote_cert)
|
| 281 |
+
+ # Lazy AIA ca_issuers resolution
|
| 282 |
+
+ if current.authority_info_access and "ca_issuers" in current.authority_info_access:
|
| 283 |
+
+ aia_url = current.authority_info_access["ca_issuers"]
|
| 284 |
+
+ remote_cert = self.trust_store.fetch_remote_aia_certificate(aia_url)
|
| 285 |
+
+ if remote_cert and remote_cert not in candidates:
|
| 286 |
+
+ candidates.append(remote_cert)
|
| 287 |
+
|
| 288 |
+
for cand in candidates:
|
| 289 |
+
if cand.serial_number not in visited_serials:
|
| 290 |
+
- _dfs(current_path + [cand], visited_serials | {cand.serial_number})
|
| 291 |
+
-
|
| 292 |
+
- _dfs([leaf], {leaf.serial_number})
|
| 293 |
+
- return paths
|
| 294 |
+
+ visited_serials.add(cand.serial_number)
|
| 295 |
+
+ current_path.append(cand)
|
| 296 |
+
+ dfs(current_path, visited_serials)
|
| 297 |
+
+ current_path.pop()
|
| 298 |
+
+ visited_serials.remove(cand.serial_number)
|
| 299 |
+
+
|
| 300 |
+
+ dfs([leaf], {leaf.serial_number})
|
| 301 |
+
+ return all_paths
|
| 302 |
+
diff --git a/src/policy/tree_processor.py b/src/policy/tree_processor.py
|
| 303 |
+
index da808a2..5c0fce6 100644
|
| 304 |
+
--- a/src/policy/tree_processor.py
|
| 305 |
+
+++ b/src/policy/tree_processor.py
|
| 306 |
+
@@ -15,23 +15,11 @@ class PolicyNode:
|
| 307 |
+
valid_policy: str
|
| 308 |
+
qualifier_set: Set[str] = field(default_factory=set)
|
| 309 |
+
expected_policy_set: Set[str] = field(default_factory=set)
|
| 310 |
+
+ original_initial_policy: Optional[str] = None
|
| 311 |
+
parent: Optional[PolicyNode] = None
|
| 312 |
+
children: List[PolicyNode] = field(default_factory=list)
|
| 313 |
+
|
| 314 |
+
|
| 315 |
+
-def _prune_tree(nodes_by_depth: Dict[int, List[PolicyNode]], depth: int) -> None:
|
| 316 |
+
- """Prunes childless nodes backwards from depth to 0."""
|
| 317 |
+
- for d in range(depth, -1, -1):
|
| 318 |
+
- nodes = nodes_by_depth.get(d, [])
|
| 319 |
+
- to_remove = [node for node in nodes if len(node.children) == 0]
|
| 320 |
+
- for node in to_remove:
|
| 321 |
+
- if node.parent and node in node.parent.children:
|
| 322 |
+
- node.parent.children.remove(node)
|
| 323 |
+
- if node in nodes:
|
| 324 |
+
- nodes.remove(node)
|
| 325 |
+
- nodes_by_depth[d] = nodes
|
| 326 |
+
-
|
| 327 |
+
-
|
| 328 |
+
class PolicyTreeProcessor:
|
| 329 |
+
"""Processes certification path policies and computes authorities_constrained_policies."""
|
| 330 |
+
|
| 331 |
+
@@ -45,140 +33,134 @@ class PolicyTreeProcessor:
|
| 332 |
+
|
| 333 |
+
Returns (is_valid, authorities_constrained_policies, errors).
|
| 334 |
+
"""
|
| 335 |
+
- n = len(path_certificates)
|
| 336 |
+
- if n == 0:
|
| 337 |
+
- return False, set(), ["Empty certificate path"]
|
| 338 |
+
-
|
| 339 |
+
- # Chain from Root (depth 0) to Leaf (depth n-1)
|
| 340 |
+
- chain = list(reversed(path_certificates))
|
| 341 |
+
-
|
| 342 |
+
- root_node = PolicyNode(
|
| 343 |
+
- valid_policy=ANY_POLICY,
|
| 344 |
+
- qualifier_set=set(),
|
| 345 |
+
- expected_policy_set={ANY_POLICY},
|
| 346 |
+
- parent=None,
|
| 347 |
+
- children=[],
|
| 348 |
+
- )
|
| 349 |
+
- nodes_by_depth: dict[int, List[PolicyNode]] = {0: [root_node]}
|
| 350 |
+
-
|
| 351 |
+
- explicit_policy = 0 if self.config.initial_explicit_policy else (n + 1)
|
| 352 |
+
- inhibit_policy_mapping = 0 if self.config.initial_policy_mapping_inhibit else (n + 1)
|
| 353 |
+
- inhibit_any_policy = 0 if self.config.initial_any_policy_inhibit else (n + 1)
|
| 354 |
+
-
|
| 355 |
+
+ errors: List[str] = []
|
| 356 |
+
+ # Path from root to leaf
|
| 357 |
+
+ certs = path_certificates[::-1]
|
| 358 |
+
+ n = len(certs)
|
| 359 |
+
+
|
| 360 |
+
+ # Initialize state variables from ValidationConfig
|
| 361 |
+
+ explicit_policy = 0 if self.config.initial_explicit_policy else n + 1
|
| 362 |
+
+ inhibit_policy_mapping = 0 if self.config.initial_policy_mapping_inhibit else n + 1
|
| 363 |
+
+ inhibit_any_policy = 0 if self.config.initial_any_policy_inhibit else n + 1
|
| 364 |
+
+
|
| 365 |
+
+ # Root certificate at index 0 (depth 0)
|
| 366 |
+
+ root_cert = certs[0]
|
| 367 |
+
+
|
| 368 |
+
+ # Read root constraints if present
|
| 369 |
+
+ if root_cert.policy_constraints:
|
| 370 |
+
+ if root_cert.policy_constraints.require_explicit_policy is not None:
|
| 371 |
+
+ explicit_policy = min(explicit_policy, root_cert.policy_constraints.require_explicit_policy)
|
| 372 |
+
+ if root_cert.policy_constraints.inhibit_policy_mapping is not None:
|
| 373 |
+
+ inhibit_policy_mapping = min(inhibit_policy_mapping, root_cert.policy_constraints.inhibit_policy_mapping)
|
| 374 |
+
+ if root_cert.inhibit_any_policy:
|
| 375 |
+
+ inhibit_any_policy = min(inhibit_any_policy, root_cert.inhibit_any_policy.skip_certs)
|
| 376 |
+
+
|
| 377 |
+
+ root_policies: Set[str] = set()
|
| 378 |
+
+ if root_cert.certificate_policies and root_cert.certificate_policies.policies:
|
| 379 |
+
+ root_policies = {p.policy_identifier for p in root_cert.certificate_policies.policies}
|
| 380 |
+
+
|
| 381 |
+
+ if not root_policies or ANY_POLICY in root_policies:
|
| 382 |
+
+ root_node = PolicyNode(
|
| 383 |
+
+ valid_policy=ANY_POLICY,
|
| 384 |
+
+ expected_policy_set={ANY_POLICY},
|
| 385 |
+
+ original_initial_policy=ANY_POLICY,
|
| 386 |
+
+ )
|
| 387 |
+
+ nodes_by_depth: List[List[PolicyNode]] = [[root_node]]
|
| 388 |
+
+ else:
|
| 389 |
+
+ root_nodes: List[PolicyNode] = [
|
| 390 |
+
+ PolicyNode(
|
| 391 |
+
+ valid_policy=p,
|
| 392 |
+
+ expected_policy_set={p},
|
| 393 |
+
+ original_initial_policy=p,
|
| 394 |
+
+ )
|
| 395 |
+
+ for p in root_policies
|
| 396 |
+
+ ]
|
| 397 |
+
+ nodes_by_depth = [root_nodes]
|
| 398 |
+
+
|
| 399 |
+
+ # Process certificates from index 1 to n-1 (depth 1 to n-1)
|
| 400 |
+
for i in range(1, n):
|
| 401 |
+
- cert = chain[i]
|
| 402 |
+
- is_leaf_cert = (i == n - 1)
|
| 403 |
+
-
|
| 404 |
+
- if cert.certificate_policies is None:
|
| 405 |
+
- if is_leaf_cert:
|
| 406 |
+
- if explicit_policy == 0:
|
| 407 |
+
- return False, set(), ["Explicit policy required but leaf certificate contains no policies"]
|
| 408 |
+
- return True, set(), []
|
| 409 |
+
-
|
| 410 |
+
- current_depth_nodes: List[PolicyNode] = []
|
| 411 |
+
- for p_node in nodes_by_depth.get(i - 1, []):
|
| 412 |
+
- for exp in p_node.expected_policy_set:
|
| 413 |
+
- c_node = PolicyNode(
|
| 414 |
+
- valid_policy=exp,
|
| 415 |
+
- qualifier_set=set(p_node.qualifier_set),
|
| 416 |
+
- expected_policy_set={exp},
|
| 417 |
+
- parent=p_node,
|
| 418 |
+
- children=[],
|
| 419 |
+
- )
|
| 420 |
+
- p_node.children.append(c_node)
|
| 421 |
+
- current_depth_nodes.append(c_node)
|
| 422 |
+
- nodes_by_depth[i] = current_depth_nodes
|
| 423 |
+
- else:
|
| 424 |
+
- cert_policies = cert.certificate_policies.policies
|
| 425 |
+
- cert_policy_ids = {p.policy_identifier for p in cert_policies}
|
| 426 |
+
- qualifiers_by_id = {p.policy_identifier: set(p.qualifiers) for p in cert_policies}
|
| 427 |
+
-
|
| 428 |
+
- current_depth_nodes = []
|
| 429 |
+
- parent_nodes = nodes_by_depth.get(i - 1, [])
|
| 430 |
+
-
|
| 431 |
+
- for p_node in parent_nodes:
|
| 432 |
+
- if p_node.valid_policy == ANY_POLICY:
|
| 433 |
+
- if ANY_POLICY in cert_policy_ids and (inhibit_any_policy > 0 or is_leaf_cert):
|
| 434 |
+
- c_node = PolicyNode(
|
| 435 |
+
- valid_policy=ANY_POLICY,
|
| 436 |
+
- qualifier_set=qualifiers_by_id.get(ANY_POLICY, set()),
|
| 437 |
+
- expected_policy_set={ANY_POLICY},
|
| 438 |
+
- parent=p_node,
|
| 439 |
+
- children=[],
|
| 440 |
+
+ cert = certs[i]
|
| 441 |
+
+ is_leaf = (i == n - 1)
|
| 442 |
+
+ prev_nodes = nodes_by_depth[i - 1]
|
| 443 |
+
+ current_depth_nodes: List[PolicyNode] = []
|
| 444 |
+
+
|
| 445 |
+
+ # Check if intermediate has mappings but no certificate policies
|
| 446 |
+
+ if not is_leaf and cert.policy_mappings and (not cert.certificate_policies or not cert.certificate_policies.policies):
|
| 447 |
+
+ errors.append(f"Intermediate certificate {cert.subject_dn} contains policy_mappings without certificate_policies")
|
| 448 |
+
+ return False, set(), errors
|
| 449 |
+
+
|
| 450 |
+
+ # Step 1: Certificate Policies
|
| 451 |
+
+ if cert.certificate_policies and cert.certificate_policies.policies:
|
| 452 |
+
+ cert_p_oids = {p.policy_identifier for p in cert.certificate_policies.policies}
|
| 453 |
+
+
|
| 454 |
+
+ # Check for anyPolicy wildcard expansion
|
| 455 |
+
+ if ANY_POLICY in cert_p_oids and inhibit_any_policy > 0:
|
| 456 |
+
+ for parent in prev_nodes:
|
| 457 |
+
+ for exp_p in parent.expected_policy_set:
|
| 458 |
+
+ orig_pol = parent.original_initial_policy if parent.original_initial_policy != ANY_POLICY else exp_p
|
| 459 |
+
+ child = PolicyNode(
|
| 460 |
+
+ valid_policy=exp_p,
|
| 461 |
+
+ expected_policy_set={exp_p},
|
| 462 |
+
+ original_initial_policy=orig_pol,
|
| 463 |
+
+ parent=parent,
|
| 464 |
+
)
|
| 465 |
+
- p_node.children.append(c_node)
|
| 466 |
+
- current_depth_nodes.append(c_node)
|
| 467 |
+
- for p_id in cert_policy_ids:
|
| 468 |
+
- if p_id != ANY_POLICY:
|
| 469 |
+
- if ANY_POLICY in p_node.expected_policy_set or p_id in p_node.expected_policy_set:
|
| 470 |
+
- c_node = PolicyNode(
|
| 471 |
+
- valid_policy=p_id,
|
| 472 |
+
- qualifier_set=qualifiers_by_id.get(p_id, set()),
|
| 473 |
+
- expected_policy_set={p_id},
|
| 474 |
+
- parent=p_node,
|
| 475 |
+
- children=[],
|
| 476 |
+
- )
|
| 477 |
+
- p_node.children.append(c_node)
|
| 478 |
+
- current_depth_nodes.append(c_node)
|
| 479 |
+
- else:
|
| 480 |
+
- if ANY_POLICY in cert_policy_ids and (inhibit_any_policy > 0 or is_leaf_cert):
|
| 481 |
+
- for exp in p_node.expected_policy_set:
|
| 482 |
+
- c_node = PolicyNode(
|
| 483 |
+
- valid_policy=exp,
|
| 484 |
+
- qualifier_set=qualifiers_by_id.get(ANY_POLICY, set()),
|
| 485 |
+
- expected_policy_set={exp},
|
| 486 |
+
- parent=p_node,
|
| 487 |
+
- children=[],
|
| 488 |
+
+ parent.children.append(child)
|
| 489 |
+
+ current_depth_nodes.append(child)
|
| 490 |
+
+ else:
|
| 491 |
+
+ # Explicit policy processing
|
| 492 |
+
+ for p_oid in cert_p_oids:
|
| 493 |
+
+ if p_oid == ANY_POLICY:
|
| 494 |
+
+ continue
|
| 495 |
+
+ for parent in prev_nodes:
|
| 496 |
+
+ if parent.valid_policy == p_oid or (
|
| 497 |
+
+ parent.valid_policy == ANY_POLICY
|
| 498 |
+
+ and (ANY_POLICY in parent.expected_policy_set or p_oid in parent.expected_policy_set)
|
| 499 |
+
+ ) or (p_oid in parent.expected_policy_set):
|
| 500 |
+
+ orig_pol = parent.original_initial_policy if parent.original_initial_policy != ANY_POLICY else p_oid
|
| 501 |
+
+ child = PolicyNode(
|
| 502 |
+
+ valid_policy=p_oid,
|
| 503 |
+
+ expected_policy_set={p_oid},
|
| 504 |
+
+ original_initial_policy=orig_pol,
|
| 505 |
+
+ parent=parent,
|
| 506 |
+
)
|
| 507 |
+
- p_node.children.append(c_node)
|
| 508 |
+
- current_depth_nodes.append(c_node)
|
| 509 |
+
- for p_id in cert_policy_ids:
|
| 510 |
+
- if p_id != ANY_POLICY:
|
| 511 |
+
- if p_id in p_node.expected_policy_set:
|
| 512 |
+
- c_node = PolicyNode(
|
| 513 |
+
- valid_policy=p_id,
|
| 514 |
+
- qualifier_set=qualifiers_by_id.get(p_id, set()),
|
| 515 |
+
- expected_policy_set={p_id},
|
| 516 |
+
- parent=p_node,
|
| 517 |
+
- children=[],
|
| 518 |
+
- )
|
| 519 |
+
- p_node.children.append(c_node)
|
| 520 |
+
- current_depth_nodes.append(c_node)
|
| 521 |
+
-
|
| 522 |
+
- _prune_tree(nodes_by_depth, i - 1)
|
| 523 |
+
- nodes_by_depth[i] = current_depth_nodes
|
| 524 |
+
-
|
| 525 |
+
- if not current_depth_nodes:
|
| 526 |
+
- if explicit_policy == 0 or (is_leaf_cert and self.config.initial_explicit_policy):
|
| 527 |
+
- return False, set(), [f"Valid policy tree is empty at depth {i}"]
|
| 528 |
+
-
|
| 529 |
+
- if not is_leaf_cert:
|
| 530 |
+
- if cert.policy_mappings:
|
| 531 |
+
- if inhibit_policy_mapping > 0:
|
| 532 |
+
- for m in cert.policy_mappings.mappings:
|
| 533 |
+
- if m.issuer_domain_policy == ANY_POLICY or m.subject_domain_policy == ANY_POLICY:
|
| 534 |
+
- return False, set(), ["Policy mapping cannot map to or from anyPolicy"]
|
| 535 |
+
-
|
| 536 |
+
- mapped_any = False
|
| 537 |
+
- for node in nodes_by_depth.get(i, []):
|
| 538 |
+
- if node.valid_policy == m.issuer_domain_policy:
|
| 539 |
+
- node.expected_policy_set = {m.subject_domain_policy}
|
| 540 |
+
- mapped_any = True
|
| 541 |
+
-
|
| 542 |
+
- if not mapped_any:
|
| 543 |
+
- any_nodes = [node for node in nodes_by_depth.get(i, []) if node.valid_policy == ANY_POLICY]
|
| 544 |
+
- for any_node in any_nodes:
|
| 545 |
+
- new_node = PolicyNode(
|
| 546 |
+
- valid_policy=m.issuer_domain_policy,
|
| 547 |
+
- qualifier_set=set(any_node.qualifier_set),
|
| 548 |
+
+ parent.children.append(child)
|
| 549 |
+
+ current_depth_nodes.append(child)
|
| 550 |
+
+
|
| 551 |
+
+ nodes_by_depth.append(current_depth_nodes)
|
| 552 |
+
+
|
| 553 |
+
+ # Step 2: Policy Mappings (intermediate CAs only)
|
| 554 |
+
+ if not is_leaf and cert.policy_mappings and cert.policy_mappings.mappings:
|
| 555 |
+
+ for m in cert.policy_mappings.mappings:
|
| 556 |
+
+ if m.issuer_domain_policy == ANY_POLICY or m.subject_domain_policy == ANY_POLICY:
|
| 557 |
+
+ errors.append("Policy mapping cannot map to or from anyPolicy")
|
| 558 |
+
+ return False, set(), errors
|
| 559 |
+
+
|
| 560 |
+
+ if inhibit_policy_mapping > 0:
|
| 561 |
+
+ for m in cert.policy_mappings.mappings:
|
| 562 |
+
+ mapped_any = False
|
| 563 |
+
+ for node in current_depth_nodes:
|
| 564 |
+
+ if node.valid_policy == m.issuer_domain_policy:
|
| 565 |
+
+ node.valid_policy = m.subject_domain_policy
|
| 566 |
+
+ node.expected_policy_set = {m.subject_domain_policy}
|
| 567 |
+
+ mapped_any = True
|
| 568 |
+
+ if not mapped_any:
|
| 569 |
+
+ for parent in prev_nodes:
|
| 570 |
+
+ if parent.valid_policy == ANY_POLICY or m.issuer_domain_policy in parent.expected_policy_set:
|
| 571 |
+
+ child = PolicyNode(
|
| 572 |
+
+ valid_policy=m.subject_domain_policy,
|
| 573 |
+
expected_policy_set={m.subject_domain_policy},
|
| 574 |
+
- parent=any_node.parent,
|
| 575 |
+
- children=[],
|
| 576 |
+
+ original_initial_policy=parent.original_initial_policy or m.issuer_domain_policy,
|
| 577 |
+
+ parent=parent,
|
| 578 |
+
)
|
| 579 |
+
- if any_node.parent:
|
| 580 |
+
- any_node.parent.children.append(new_node)
|
| 581 |
+
- nodes_by_depth[i].append(new_node)
|
| 582 |
+
-
|
| 583 |
+
+ parent.children.append(child)
|
| 584 |
+
+ current_depth_nodes.append(child)
|
| 585 |
+
+ else:
|
| 586 |
+
+ if cert.policy_mappings.critical:
|
| 587 |
+
+ errors.append("Critical policy mapping present while inhibit_policy_mapping is 0")
|
| 588 |
+
+ return False, set(), errors
|
| 589 |
+
+
|
| 590 |
+
+ # Step 3: Update state variables (intermediate CAs only)
|
| 591 |
+
+ if not is_leaf:
|
| 592 |
+
if cert.policy_constraints:
|
| 593 |
+
if cert.policy_constraints.require_explicit_policy is not None:
|
| 594 |
+
explicit_policy = min(explicit_policy, cert.policy_constraints.require_explicit_policy)
|
| 595 |
+
@@ -187,42 +169,44 @@ class PolicyTreeProcessor:
|
| 596 |
+
if cert.inhibit_any_policy:
|
| 597 |
+
inhibit_any_policy = min(inhibit_any_policy, cert.inhibit_any_policy.skip_certs)
|
| 598 |
+
|
| 599 |
+
- if not cert.is_self_issued:
|
| 600 |
+
- if explicit_policy > 0:
|
| 601 |
+
- explicit_policy -= 1
|
| 602 |
+
- if inhibit_policy_mapping > 0:
|
| 603 |
+
- inhibit_policy_mapping -= 1
|
| 604 |
+
- if inhibit_any_policy > 0:
|
| 605 |
+
- inhibit_any_policy -= 1
|
| 606 |
+
+ if explicit_policy > 0 and not cert.is_self_issued:
|
| 607 |
+
+ explicit_policy -= 1
|
| 608 |
+
+ if inhibit_policy_mapping > 0 and not cert.is_self_issued:
|
| 609 |
+
+ inhibit_policy_mapping -= 1
|
| 610 |
+
+ if inhibit_any_policy > 0 and not cert.is_self_issued:
|
| 611 |
+
+ inhibit_any_policy -= 1
|
| 612 |
+
|
| 613 |
+
- leaf_cert = chain[-1]
|
| 614 |
+
- if leaf_cert.policy_constraints:
|
| 615 |
+
- if leaf_cert.policy_constraints.require_explicit_policy is not None and leaf_cert.policy_constraints.require_explicit_policy == 0:
|
| 616 |
+
- explicit_policy = 0
|
| 617 |
+
+ # Check if valid policy tree has become empty
|
| 618 |
+
+ if not current_depth_nodes and explicit_policy <= 0:
|
| 619 |
+
+ errors.append(f"Valid policy tree is empty at depth {i}")
|
| 620 |
+
+ return False, set(), errors
|
| 621 |
+
|
| 622 |
+
- leaf_nodes = nodes_by_depth.get(n - 1, [])
|
| 623 |
+
+ # Wrap up at leaf
|
| 624 |
+
+ leaf_nodes = nodes_by_depth[-1]
|
| 625 |
+
if not leaf_nodes:
|
| 626 |
+
- if explicit_policy == 0 or self.config.initial_explicit_policy:
|
| 627 |
+
- return False, set(), ["No valid certificate policy tree for explicit policy requirement"]
|
| 628 |
+
+ if explicit_policy <= 0:
|
| 629 |
+
+ errors.append("No valid policy tree path exists to the leaf certificate")
|
| 630 |
+
+ return False, set(), errors
|
| 631 |
+
return True, set(), []
|
| 632 |
+
|
| 633 |
+
- valid_policies: Set[str] = set()
|
| 634 |
+
- for node in leaf_nodes:
|
| 635 |
+
- if node.valid_policy == ANY_POLICY:
|
| 636 |
+
- valid_policies.update(self.config.initial_policy_set)
|
| 637 |
+
+ # Form constrained policies in terms of relying party / root domain and leaf domain
|
| 638 |
+
+ constrained_policies: Set[str] = set()
|
| 639 |
+
+ for n in leaf_nodes:
|
| 640 |
+
+ if ANY_POLICY in self.config.initial_policy_set:
|
| 641 |
+
+ constrained_policies.add(n.valid_policy)
|
| 642 |
+
+ if n.original_initial_policy:
|
| 643 |
+
+ constrained_policies.add(n.original_initial_policy)
|
| 644 |
+
else:
|
| 645 |
+
- curr = node
|
| 646 |
+
- while curr.parent and curr.parent.parent is not None:
|
| 647 |
+
- curr = curr.parent
|
| 648 |
+
- ancestor_depth_1 = curr
|
| 649 |
+
- if ancestor_depth_1.valid_policy != ANY_POLICY:
|
| 650 |
+
- valid_policies.add(ancestor_depth_1.valid_policy)
|
| 651 |
+
- valid_policies.add(node.valid_policy)
|
| 652 |
+
-
|
| 653 |
+
- if explicit_policy == 0 or self.config.initial_explicit_policy:
|
| 654 |
+
- if ANY_POLICY not in self.config.initial_policy_set:
|
| 655 |
+
- intersection = valid_policies.intersection(self.config.initial_policy_set)
|
| 656 |
+
- if not intersection:
|
| 657 |
+
- return False, set(), [f"No valid policy in intersection with initial policy set: {valid_policies}"]
|
| 658 |
+
-
|
| 659 |
+
- return True, valid_policies, []
|
| 660 |
+
+ if n.valid_policy in self.config.initial_policy_set:
|
| 661 |
+
+ constrained_policies.add(n.valid_policy)
|
| 662 |
+
+ if n.original_initial_policy and n.original_initial_policy in self.config.initial_policy_set:
|
| 663 |
+
+ constrained_policies.add(n.original_initial_policy)
|
| 664 |
+
+ constrained_policies.add(n.valid_policy)
|
| 665 |
+
+ if n.valid_policy == ANY_POLICY:
|
| 666 |
+
+ constrained_policies.update(self.config.initial_policy_set)
|
| 667 |
+
+
|
| 668 |
+
+ if not constrained_policies and explicit_policy <= 0:
|
| 669 |
+
+ errors.append(f"No valid policies in intersection with initial policy set: {self.config.initial_policy_set}")
|
| 670 |
+
+ return False, set(), errors
|
| 671 |
+
+
|
| 672 |
+
+ return True, constrained_policies, []
|
| 673 |
+
diff --git a/src/revocation/crl_manager.py b/src/revocation/crl_manager.py
|
| 674 |
+
index 2720433..d9baf06 100644
|
| 675 |
+
--- a/src/revocation/crl_manager.py
|
| 676 |
+
+++ b/src/revocation/crl_manager.py
|
| 677 |
+
@@ -22,81 +22,118 @@ class CRLValidationStatus:
|
| 678 |
+
revocation_date: Optional[str] = None
|
| 679 |
+
crl_number: Optional[int] = None
|
| 680 |
+
uncovered_reasons: Set[CRLReason] = field(default_factory=set)
|
| 681 |
+
+ error_message: Optional[str] = None
|
| 682 |
+
|
| 683 |
+
|
| 684 |
+
class CRLCache:
|
| 685 |
+
- """Maintains Base and Delta CRLs with partition reason support."""
|
| 686 |
+
+ """Maintains Base and Delta CRLs with partition reason support and monotonic sequence ordering."""
|
| 687 |
+
|
| 688 |
+
def __init__(self) -> None:
|
| 689 |
+
- # Key: (issuer_dn, authority_key_id, frozenset(covered_reasons)) -> list of CertificateRevocationList
|
| 690 |
+
- self._crls: Dict[Tuple[str, str, frozenset[CRLReason]], List[CertificateRevocationList]] = {}
|
| 691 |
+
+ # Key: (issuer_dn, authority_key_id) -> list of CertificateRevocationList
|
| 692 |
+
+ self._crls: Dict[Tuple[str, str], List[CertificateRevocationList]] = {}
|
| 693 |
+
+ # Indirect CRLs: list of CertificateRevocationList
|
| 694 |
+
+ self._indirect_crls: List[CertificateRevocationList] = []
|
| 695 |
+
# Active revocations: (issuer_dn, authority_key_id, serial) -> RevokedCertificateEntry
|
| 696 |
+
self._active_revocations: Dict[Tuple[str, str, str], RevokedCertificateEntry] = {}
|
| 697 |
+
- # Tracks latest observed CRL number: (issuer_dn, authority_key_id, frozenset(covered_reasons)) -> max_crl_number
|
| 698 |
+
- self._latest_crl_numbers: Dict[Tuple[str, str, frozenset[CRLReason]], int] = {}
|
| 699 |
+
- # Tracks max CRL number per issuer: (issuer_dn, authority_key_id) -> max_crl_number
|
| 700 |
+
- self._issuer_crl_numbers: Dict[Tuple[str, str], int] = {}
|
| 701 |
+
+ # Tracks latest observed CRL number for monotonic ordering: (issuer_dn, authority_key_id) -> max_crl_number
|
| 702 |
+
+ self._latest_crl_numbers: Dict[Tuple[str, str], int] = {}
|
| 703 |
+
+ # Tracks latest base CRL number per issuer: (issuer_dn, authority_key_id) -> max_base_crl_number
|
| 704 |
+
+ self._latest_base_crl_numbers: Dict[Tuple[str, str], int] = {}
|
| 705 |
+
|
| 706 |
+
def register_crl(self, crl: CertificateRevocationList) -> bool:
|
| 707 |
+
- """Registers a Base or Delta CRL into the cache."""
|
| 708 |
+
+ """Registers a Base or Delta CRL into the cache. Enforces monotonic sequence numbers and RFC 5280 constraints."""
|
| 709 |
+
akid = crl.authority_key_id or ""
|
| 710 |
+
- reasons_key = frozenset(crl.covered_reasons)
|
| 711 |
+
- scope_key = (crl.issuer_dn, akid, reasons_key)
|
| 712 |
+
-
|
| 713 |
+
- # Monotonic CRL sequence check
|
| 714 |
+
- if scope_key in self._latest_crl_numbers:
|
| 715 |
+
- if crl.crl_number <= self._latest_crl_numbers[scope_key]:
|
| 716 |
+
- return False # Reject stale replay or non-monotonic number
|
| 717 |
+
-
|
| 718 |
+
- self._latest_crl_numbers[scope_key] = crl.crl_number
|
| 719 |
+
- issuer_key = (crl.issuer_dn, akid)
|
| 720 |
+
- self._issuer_crl_numbers[issuer_key] = max(
|
| 721 |
+
- crl.crl_number, self._issuer_crl_numbers.get(issuer_key, 0)
|
| 722 |
+
- )
|
| 723 |
+
-
|
| 724 |
+
- if scope_key not in self._crls:
|
| 725 |
+
- self._crls[scope_key] = []
|
| 726 |
+
- self._crls[scope_key].append(crl)
|
| 727 |
+
-
|
| 728 |
+
- # Process revoked entries
|
| 729 |
+
- for entry in crl.revoked_entries:
|
| 730 |
+
- rev_key = (crl.issuer_dn, akid, entry.serial_number)
|
| 731 |
+
- if crl.is_delta and entry.reason == CRLReason.REMOVE_FROM_CRL:
|
| 732 |
+
- # Un-revoke if placed on hold
|
| 733 |
+
- if rev_key in self._active_revocations:
|
| 734 |
+
- del self._active_revocations[rev_key]
|
| 735 |
+
- for k in list(self._active_revocations.keys()):
|
| 736 |
+
- if k[0] == crl.issuer_dn and k[2] == entry.serial_number:
|
| 737 |
+
- del self._active_revocations[k]
|
| 738 |
+
+ key = (crl.issuer_dn, akid)
|
| 739 |
+
+
|
| 740 |
+
+ # RFC 5280 Section 5.2.4: Delta CRL validation
|
| 741 |
+
+ if crl.is_delta:
|
| 742 |
+
+ if crl.base_crl_number is None:
|
| 743 |
+
+ return False
|
| 744 |
+
+ # Base CRL with crl_number >= base_crl_number must exist
|
| 745 |
+
+ max_base = self._latest_base_crl_numbers.get(key)
|
| 746 |
+
+ if max_base is None or max_base < crl.base_crl_number:
|
| 747 |
+
+ return False
|
| 748 |
+
+ if crl.crl_number <= crl.base_crl_number:
|
| 749 |
+
+ return False
|
| 750 |
+
+
|
| 751 |
+
+ # Monotonic CRL number replay protection per (issuer_dn, AKID)
|
| 752 |
+
+ if key in self._latest_crl_numbers and crl.crl_number <= self._latest_crl_numbers[key]:
|
| 753 |
+
+ return False
|
| 754 |
+
+
|
| 755 |
+
+ self._latest_crl_numbers[key] = crl.crl_number
|
| 756 |
+
+ if not crl.is_delta:
|
| 757 |
+
+ self._latest_base_crl_numbers[key] = max(self._latest_base_crl_numbers.get(key, 0), crl.crl_number)
|
| 758 |
+
+
|
| 759 |
+
+ if crl.is_indirect:
|
| 760 |
+
+ self._indirect_crls.append(crl)
|
| 761 |
+
+
|
| 762 |
+
+ if key not in self._crls:
|
| 763 |
+
+ self._crls[key] = []
|
| 764 |
+
+
|
| 765 |
+
+ if not crl.is_delta:
|
| 766 |
+
+ if crl.covered_reasons is None or crl.covered_reasons == ALL_REASONS:
|
| 767 |
+
+ self._crls[key] = [crl]
|
| 768 |
+
else:
|
| 769 |
+
- self._active_revocations[rev_key] = entry
|
| 770 |
+
-
|
| 771 |
+
- return True
|
| 772 |
+
+ replaced = False
|
| 773 |
+
+ for idx, existing in enumerate(self._crls[key]):
|
| 774 |
+
+ if existing.covered_reasons and (existing.covered_reasons & crl.covered_reasons):
|
| 775 |
+
+ self._crls[key][idx] = crl
|
| 776 |
+
+ replaced = True
|
| 777 |
+
+ break
|
| 778 |
+
+ if not replaced:
|
| 779 |
+
+ if len(self._crls[key]) >= 2:
|
| 780 |
+
+ self._crls[key].pop(0)
|
| 781 |
+
+ self._crls[key].append(crl)
|
| 782 |
+
+ else:
|
| 783 |
+
+ self._crls[key].append(crl)
|
| 784 |
+
+
|
| 785 |
+
+ if not crl.is_delta:
|
| 786 |
+
+ # Clear previous active revocations for this issuer/AKID that match covered reasons
|
| 787 |
+
+ keys_to_remove = [
|
| 788 |
+
+ k for k in self._active_revocations
|
| 789 |
+
+ if k[0] == crl.issuer_dn and k[1] == akid
|
| 790 |
+
+ and self._active_revocations[k].reason in crl.covered_reasons
|
| 791 |
+
+ ]
|
| 792 |
+
+ for k in keys_to_remove:
|
| 793 |
+
+ del self._active_revocations[k]
|
| 794 |
+
+
|
| 795 |
+
+ for entry in crl.revoked_entries:
|
| 796 |
+
+ if entry.reason != CRLReason.REMOVE_FROM_CRL:
|
| 797 |
+
+ iss_dn = entry.certificate_issuer if (crl.is_indirect and entry.certificate_issuer) else crl.issuer_dn
|
| 798 |
+
+ self._active_revocations[(iss_dn, akid, entry.serial_number)] = entry
|
| 799 |
+
+ return True
|
| 800 |
+
+ else:
|
| 801 |
+
+ # Delta CRL updates
|
| 802 |
+
+ for entry in crl.revoked_entries:
|
| 803 |
+
+ iss_dn = entry.certificate_issuer if (crl.is_indirect and entry.certificate_issuer) else crl.issuer_dn
|
| 804 |
+
+ rev_key = (iss_dn, akid, entry.serial_number)
|
| 805 |
+
+ if entry.reason == CRLReason.REMOVE_FROM_CRL:
|
| 806 |
+
+ self._active_revocations.pop(rev_key, None)
|
| 807 |
+
+ self._active_revocations.pop((iss_dn, "", entry.serial_number), None)
|
| 808 |
+
+ else:
|
| 809 |
+
+ self._active_revocations[rev_key] = entry
|
| 810 |
+
+ return True
|
| 811 |
+
|
| 812 |
+
def check_revocation(
|
| 813 |
+
- self, cert: Certificate, required_reasons: Optional[Set[CRLReason]] = None
|
| 814 |
+
+ self,
|
| 815 |
+
+ cert: Certificate,
|
| 816 |
+
+ required_reasons: Optional[Set[CRLReason]] = None,
|
| 817 |
+
+ current_time: Optional[str] = None,
|
| 818 |
+
) -> CRLValidationStatus:
|
| 819 |
+
- """Checks if a certificate is revoked and verifies complete reason code coverage across CRL partitions."""
|
| 820 |
+
+ """Checks if a certificate is revoked and verifies complete reason code coverage across valid CRL partitions."""
|
| 821 |
+
+ if required_reasons is None:
|
| 822 |
+
+ required_reasons = set(ALL_REASONS)
|
| 823 |
+
+
|
| 824 |
+
akid = cert.authority_key_id or ""
|
| 825 |
+
key = (cert.issuer_dn, akid)
|
| 826 |
+
|
| 827 |
+
- # Check active revocations
|
| 828 |
+
+ # 1. Check direct active revocations
|
| 829 |
+
rev_key = (cert.issuer_dn, akid, cert.serial_number)
|
| 830 |
+
if rev_key in self._active_revocations:
|
| 831 |
+
entry = self._active_revocations[rev_key]
|
| 832 |
+
- latest_num = self._issuer_crl_numbers.get(key, 0)
|
| 833 |
+
- return CRLValidationStatus(
|
| 834 |
+
- is_revoked=True,
|
| 835 |
+
- is_fully_covered=True,
|
| 836 |
+
- reason=entry.reason,
|
| 837 |
+
- revocation_date=entry.revocation_date,
|
| 838 |
+
- crl_number=latest_num,
|
| 839 |
+
- )
|
| 840 |
+
-
|
| 841 |
+
- # Fallback check by issuer_dn and serial
|
| 842 |
+
- for (iss_dn, auth_id, ser), entry in self._active_revocations.items():
|
| 843 |
+
- if iss_dn == cert.issuer_dn and ser == cert.serial_number:
|
| 844 |
+
- latest_num = self._issuer_crl_numbers.get((iss_dn, auth_id), 0)
|
| 845 |
+
+ # Check future scheduled revocation date
|
| 846 |
+
+ if current_time is None or entry.revocation_date <= current_time:
|
| 847 |
+
+ latest_num = self._latest_crl_numbers.get(key, 0)
|
| 848 |
+
return CRLValidationStatus(
|
| 849 |
+
is_revoked=True,
|
| 850 |
+
is_fully_covered=True,
|
| 851 |
+
@@ -105,42 +142,79 @@ class CRLCache:
|
| 852 |
+
crl_number=latest_num,
|
| 853 |
+
)
|
| 854 |
+
|
| 855 |
+
- # Find matching registered CRLs for this issuer
|
| 856 |
+
- matching_crl_lists = [
|
| 857 |
+
- crl_list for (iss, auth, _), crl_list in self._crls.items()
|
| 858 |
+
- if iss == cert.issuer_dn and (not akid or not auth or auth == akid)
|
| 859 |
+
- ]
|
| 860 |
+
-
|
| 861 |
+
- if not matching_crl_lists:
|
| 862 |
+
+ # Search by issuer DN without AKID
|
| 863 |
+
+ for (iss_dn, entry_akid, sn), entry in self._active_revocations.items():
|
| 864 |
+
+ if iss_dn == cert.issuer_dn and sn == cert.serial_number:
|
| 865 |
+
+ if not akid or not entry_akid or akid == entry_akid:
|
| 866 |
+
+ if current_time is None or entry.revocation_date <= current_time:
|
| 867 |
+
+ latest_num = self._latest_crl_numbers.get((iss_dn, entry_akid), 0)
|
| 868 |
+
+ return CRLValidationStatus(
|
| 869 |
+
+ is_revoked=True,
|
| 870 |
+
+ is_fully_covered=True,
|
| 871 |
+
+ reason=entry.reason,
|
| 872 |
+
+ revocation_date=entry.revocation_date,
|
| 873 |
+
+ crl_number=latest_num,
|
| 874 |
+
+ )
|
| 875 |
+
+
|
| 876 |
+
+ # 2. Check Indirect CRLs
|
| 877 |
+
+ for ind_crl in self._indirect_crls:
|
| 878 |
+
+ if current_time:
|
| 879 |
+
+ if ind_crl.next_update and current_time > ind_crl.next_update:
|
| 880 |
+
+ continue
|
| 881 |
+
+ if ind_crl.this_update and current_time < ind_crl.this_update:
|
| 882 |
+
+ continue
|
| 883 |
+
+ for entry in ind_crl.revoked_entries:
|
| 884 |
+
+ if entry.serial_number == cert.serial_number:
|
| 885 |
+
+ entry_issuer = entry.certificate_issuer or ind_crl.issuer_dn
|
| 886 |
+
+ if entry_issuer == cert.issuer_dn:
|
| 887 |
+
+ if current_time is None or entry.revocation_date <= current_time:
|
| 888 |
+
+ return CRLValidationStatus(
|
| 889 |
+
+ is_revoked=True,
|
| 890 |
+
+ is_fully_covered=True,
|
| 891 |
+
+ reason=entry.reason,
|
| 892 |
+
+ revocation_date=entry.revocation_date,
|
| 893 |
+
+ crl_number=ind_crl.crl_number,
|
| 894 |
+
+ )
|
| 895 |
+
+
|
| 896 |
+
+ # 3. Check reason code coverage across active and unexpired CRL partitions for this issuing CA
|
| 897 |
+
+ registered_crl_list = list(self._crls.get(key, []))
|
| 898 |
+
+ if not registered_crl_list and not akid:
|
| 899 |
+
+ for (iss_dn, _), crls in self._crls.items():
|
| 900 |
+
+ if iss_dn == cert.issuer_dn:
|
| 901 |
+
+ registered_crl_list.extend(crls)
|
| 902 |
+
+
|
| 903 |
+
+ if not registered_crl_list:
|
| 904 |
+
return CRLValidationStatus(is_revoked=False, is_fully_covered=True)
|
| 905 |
+
|
| 906 |
+
- covered_union: Set[CRLReason] = set()
|
| 907 |
+
- for crl_list in matching_crl_lists:
|
| 908 |
+
- for crl in crl_list:
|
| 909 |
+
- covered_union.update(crl.covered_reasons)
|
| 910 |
+
-
|
| 911 |
+
- target_reasons = required_reasons if required_reasons is not None else ALL_REASONS
|
| 912 |
+
- uncovered = target_reasons - covered_union
|
| 913 |
+
-
|
| 914 |
+
+ # Only use latest CRL per partition and check freshness against current_time
|
| 915 |
+
+ total_covered: Set[CRLReason] = set()
|
| 916 |
+
+ for crl in registered_crl_list:
|
| 917 |
+
+ if current_time:
|
| 918 |
+
+ if crl.next_update and current_time > crl.next_update:
|
| 919 |
+
+ # CRL is expired -> skip coverage contribution
|
| 920 |
+
+ continue
|
| 921 |
+
+ if crl.this_update and current_time < crl.this_update:
|
| 922 |
+
+ # CRL is from future -> skip
|
| 923 |
+
+ continue
|
| 924 |
+
+ total_covered.update(crl.covered_reasons)
|
| 925 |
+
+
|
| 926 |
+
+ uncovered = required_reasons - total_covered
|
| 927 |
+
if uncovered:
|
| 928 |
+
return CRLValidationStatus(
|
| 929 |
+
is_revoked=False,
|
| 930 |
+
is_fully_covered=False,
|
| 931 |
+
uncovered_reasons=uncovered,
|
| 932 |
+
+ error_message=f"Incomplete CRL reason coverage for {cert.issuer_dn}: missing {uncovered}",
|
| 933 |
+
)
|
| 934 |
+
|
| 935 |
+
- latest_num = self._issuer_crl_numbers.get(key, 0)
|
| 936 |
+
- return CRLValidationStatus(
|
| 937 |
+
- is_revoked=False,
|
| 938 |
+
- is_fully_covered=True,
|
| 939 |
+
- crl_number=latest_num,
|
| 940 |
+
- )
|
| 941 |
+
+ return CRLValidationStatus(is_revoked=False, is_fully_covered=True)
|
| 942 |
+
|
| 943 |
+
def get_latest_crl_number(self, issuer_dn: str, akid: str) -> Optional[int]:
|
| 944 |
+
- return self._issuer_crl_numbers.get((issuer_dn, akid))
|
| 945 |
+
+ return self._latest_crl_numbers.get((issuer_dn, akid))
|
| 946 |
+
|
| 947 |
+
def clear(self) -> None:
|
| 948 |
+
self._crls.clear()
|
| 949 |
+
+ self._indirect_crls.clear()
|
| 950 |
+
self._active_revocations.clear()
|
| 951 |
+
self._latest_crl_numbers.clear()
|
| 952 |
+
- self._issuer_crl_numbers.clear()
|
| 953 |
+
+ self._latest_base_crl_numbers.clear()
|
| 954 |
+
diff --git a/src/store/trust_store.py b/src/store/trust_store.py
|
| 955 |
+
index c5bf0da..87e62c2 100644
|
| 956 |
+
--- a/src/store/trust_store.py
|
| 957 |
+
+++ b/src/store/trust_store.py
|
| 958 |
+
@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@ class TrustStore:
|
| 959 |
+
def fetch_aia_certificate(self, uri: str) -> Optional[Certificate]:
|
| 960 |
+
return self._remote_aia_certs.get(uri)
|
| 961 |
+
|
| 962 |
+
+ def fetch_remote_aia_certificate(self, uri: str) -> Optional[Certificate]:
|
| 963 |
+
+ return self.fetch_aia_certificate(uri)
|
| 964 |
+
+
|
| 965 |
+
def register_crl(self, crl: CertificateRevocationList) -> bool:
|
| 966 |
+
"""Registers a Base or Delta CRL."""
|
| 967 |
+
accepted = self._crl_cache.register_crl(crl)
|
| 968 |
+
diff --git a/src/validation/engine.py b/src/validation/engine.py
|
| 969 |
+
index 55cc6e8..c17e7ce 100644
|
| 970 |
+
--- a/src/validation/engine.py
|
| 971 |
+
+++ b/src/validation/engine.py
|
| 972 |
+
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
|
| 973 |
+
|
| 974 |
+
from typing import Dict, List, Optional, Set, Tuple
|
| 975 |
+
|
| 976 |
+
-from src.constraints.matcher import EffectiveConstraints, validate_san_constraints
|
| 977 |
+
+from src.constraints.matcher import EffectiveConstraints, validate_name_constraints
|
| 978 |
+
from src.crypto.signer import verify_certificate_signature
|
| 979 |
+
from src.models import (
|
| 980 |
+
ALL_REASONS,
|
| 981 |
+
@@ -23,34 +23,23 @@ class PathValidationEngine:
|
| 982 |
+
def __init__(self, trust_store: TrustStore) -> None:
|
| 983 |
+
self.trust_store = trust_store
|
| 984 |
+
self.path_builder = PathBuilder(trust_store)
|
| 985 |
+
- # Cache key: summary string -> ValidationResult
|
| 986 |
+
+ # Cache key: (leaf_fingerprint, epoch, config_hash) -> ValidationResult
|
| 987 |
+
self._cache: Dict[str, ValidationResult] = {}
|
| 988 |
+
|
| 989 |
+
def clear_cache(self) -> None:
|
| 990 |
+
self._cache.clear()
|
| 991 |
+
|
| 992 |
+
- def _get_cache_key(self, leaf: Certificate, config: ValidationConfig) -> str:
|
| 993 |
+
- return (
|
| 994 |
+
- f"epoch={self.trust_store.epoch}:"
|
| 995 |
+
- f"leaf={leaf.fingerprint}:"
|
| 996 |
+
- f"rev={config.check_revocation}:"
|
| 997 |
+
- f"nc={config.enforce_name_constraints}:"
|
| 998 |
+
- f"pl={config.enforce_path_len}:"
|
| 999 |
+
- f"pt={config.enforce_policy_tree}:"
|
| 1000 |
+
- f"pols={sorted(config.initial_policy_set)}:"
|
| 1001 |
+
- f"exp={config.initial_explicit_policy}:"
|
| 1002 |
+
- f"map_inh={config.initial_policy_mapping_inhibit}:"
|
| 1003 |
+
- f"any_inh={config.initial_any_policy_inhibit}:"
|
| 1004 |
+
- f"time={config.current_time}:"
|
| 1005 |
+
- f"crit={sorted(config.allowed_custom_critical_oids)}"
|
| 1006 |
+
- )
|
| 1007 |
+
-
|
| 1008 |
+
def validate(self, leaf: Certificate, config: Optional[ValidationConfig] = None) -> ValidationResult:
|
| 1009 |
+
"""Validates a target leaf certificate against installed trust anchors and policies."""
|
| 1010 |
+
if config is None:
|
| 1011 |
+
config = ValidationConfig()
|
| 1012 |
+
|
| 1013 |
+
- cache_key = self._get_cache_key(leaf, config)
|
| 1014 |
+
+ cache_key = (
|
| 1015 |
+
+ f"{self.trust_store.epoch}:{leaf.fingerprint}:{config.check_revocation}:"
|
| 1016 |
+
+ f"{config.enforce_name_constraints}:{config.enforce_path_len}:{config.enforce_policy_tree}:"
|
| 1017 |
+
+ f"{config.initial_explicit_policy}:{sorted(config.initial_policy_set)}:{config.current_time}:"
|
| 1018 |
+
+ f"{sorted(config.allowed_custom_critical_oids)}"
|
| 1019 |
+
+ )
|
| 1020 |
+
if cache_key in self._cache:
|
| 1021 |
+
return self._cache[cache_key]
|
| 1022 |
+
|
| 1023 |
+
@@ -65,8 +54,8 @@ class PathValidationEngine:
|
| 1024 |
+
self._cache[cache_key] = res
|
| 1025 |
+
return res
|
| 1026 |
+
|
| 1027 |
+
- # 2. Backtracking: try candidate paths until a valid one is found
|
| 1028 |
+
- last_errors: List[str] = []
|
| 1029 |
+
+ # 2. Explore all candidate paths, backtracking if one fails
|
| 1030 |
+
+ all_candidate_errors: List[str] = []
|
| 1031 |
+
for candidate in candidate_paths:
|
| 1032 |
+
path_valid, policies, errors = self._validate_single_path(candidate, config)
|
| 1033 |
+
if path_valid:
|
| 1034 |
+
@@ -78,13 +67,14 @@ class PathValidationEngine:
|
| 1035 |
+
)
|
| 1036 |
+
self._cache[cache_key] = res
|
| 1037 |
+
return res
|
| 1038 |
+
- last_errors = errors
|
| 1039 |
+
+ all_candidate_errors.extend(errors)
|
| 1040 |
+
|
| 1041 |
+
res = ValidationResult(
|
| 1042 |
+
is_valid=False,
|
| 1043 |
+
- error_message=f"Path validation failed: {'; '.join(last_errors)}",
|
| 1044 |
+
- errors=last_errors,
|
| 1045 |
+
+ error_message=f"Path validation failed: {'; '.join(all_candidate_errors)}",
|
| 1046 |
+
+ errors=all_candidate_errors,
|
| 1047 |
+
)
|
| 1048 |
+
+
|
| 1049 |
+
self._cache[cache_key] = res
|
| 1050 |
+
return res
|
| 1051 |
+
|
| 1052 |
+
@@ -95,12 +85,16 @@ class PathValidationEngine:
|
| 1053 |
+
certs = candidate.certificates
|
| 1054 |
+
errors: List[str] = []
|
| 1055 |
+
|
| 1056 |
+
- # 1. Root must be a trust anchor
|
| 1057 |
+
+ # 1. Root must be a trust anchor and must be a CA
|
| 1058 |
+
root = certs[-1]
|
| 1059 |
+
if not self.trust_store.is_trust_anchor(root):
|
| 1060 |
+
errors.append(f"Root certificate {root.subject_dn} is not a trusted anchor")
|
| 1061 |
+
return False, set(), errors
|
| 1062 |
+
|
| 1063 |
+
+ if not root.basic_constraints.is_ca:
|
| 1064 |
+
+ errors.append(f"Root trust anchor {root.subject_dn} has is_ca=False")
|
| 1065 |
+
+ return False, set(), errors
|
| 1066 |
+
+
|
| 1067 |
+
# 2. Structural & CA constraint checks for intermediates
|
| 1068 |
+
for i in range(1, len(certs)):
|
| 1069 |
+
ca_cert = certs[i]
|
| 1070 |
+
@@ -109,21 +103,12 @@ class PathValidationEngine:
|
| 1071 |
+
if not ca_cert.key_usage.key_cert_sign:
|
| 1072 |
+
errors.append(f"Intermediate certificate {ca_cert.subject_dn} lacks key_cert_sign usage")
|
| 1073 |
+
|
| 1074 |
+
- # 3. Unrecognized critical extensions
|
| 1075 |
+
- for cert in certs:
|
| 1076 |
+
- for oid in cert.unrecognized_critical_extensions:
|
| 1077 |
+
- if oid not in config.allowed_custom_critical_oids:
|
| 1078 |
+
- errors.append(
|
| 1079 |
+
- f"Certificate {cert.subject_dn} contains unrecognized critical extension: {oid}"
|
| 1080 |
+
- )
|
| 1081 |
+
-
|
| 1082 |
+
- # 4. Path length constraints
|
| 1083 |
+
+ # 3. Path length constraints (self-issued intermediate certs do not count)
|
| 1084 |
+
if config.enforce_path_len:
|
| 1085 |
+
for i in range(1, len(certs)):
|
| 1086 |
+
ca_cert = certs[i]
|
| 1087 |
+
path_len_limit = ca_cert.basic_constraints.path_len_constraint
|
| 1088 |
+
if path_len_limit is not None:
|
| 1089 |
+
- # Number of non-self-issued intermediate certificates between this CA and the leaf
|
| 1090 |
+
intermediates_below = [c for c in certs[1:i] if not c.is_self_issued]
|
| 1091 |
+
if len(intermediates_below) > path_len_limit:
|
| 1092 |
+
errors.append(
|
| 1093 |
+
@@ -131,7 +116,7 @@ class PathValidationEngine:
|
| 1094 |
+
f"limit={path_len_limit}, observed={len(intermediates_below)}"
|
| 1095 |
+
)
|
| 1096 |
+
|
| 1097 |
+
- # 5. Validity period checking
|
| 1098 |
+
+ # 4. Validity period checking
|
| 1099 |
+
if config.current_time:
|
| 1100 |
+
for cert in certs:
|
| 1101 |
+
if config.current_time < cert.not_before:
|
| 1102 |
+
@@ -139,6 +124,18 @@ class PathValidationEngine:
|
| 1103 |
+
if config.current_time > cert.not_after:
|
| 1104 |
+
errors.append(f"Certificate {cert.subject_dn} is expired at {config.current_time}")
|
| 1105 |
+
|
| 1106 |
+
+ # 5. Critical extension checking
|
| 1107 |
+
+ for cert in certs:
|
| 1108 |
+
+ if cert.unrecognized_critical_extensions:
|
| 1109 |
+
+ unhandled = [
|
| 1110 |
+
+ oid for oid in cert.unrecognized_critical_extensions
|
| 1111 |
+
+ if oid not in config.allowed_custom_critical_oids
|
| 1112 |
+
+ ]
|
| 1113 |
+
+ if unhandled:
|
| 1114 |
+
+ errors.append(
|
| 1115 |
+
+ f"Certificate {cert.subject_dn} contains unrecognized critical extension(s): {unhandled}"
|
| 1116 |
+
+ )
|
| 1117 |
+
+
|
| 1118 |
+
# 6. Cryptographic signature chain verification
|
| 1119 |
+
for i in range(len(certs) - 1):
|
| 1120 |
+
child = certs[i]
|
| 1121 |
+
@@ -150,7 +147,9 @@ class PathValidationEngine:
|
| 1122 |
+
if config.check_revocation:
|
| 1123 |
+
for i in range(len(certs) - 1):
|
| 1124 |
+
child = certs[i]
|
| 1125 |
+
- rev_status = self.trust_store.crl_cache.check_revocation(child, ALL_REASONS)
|
| 1126 |
+
+ rev_status = self.trust_store.crl_cache.check_revocation(
|
| 1127 |
+
+ child, ALL_REASONS, current_time=config.current_time
|
| 1128 |
+
+ )
|
| 1129 |
+
if rev_status.is_revoked:
|
| 1130 |
+
errors.append(
|
| 1131 |
+
f"Certificate {child.subject_dn} (serial {child.serial_number}) is revoked: "
|
| 1132 |
+
@@ -165,16 +164,16 @@ class PathValidationEngine:
|
| 1133 |
+
# 8. Transitive Name constraints evaluation
|
| 1134 |
+
if config.enforce_name_constraints:
|
| 1135 |
+
eff = EffectiveConstraints()
|
| 1136 |
+
- if certs[-1].name_constraints:
|
| 1137 |
+
- eff = eff.merge_parent(certs[-1].name_constraints)
|
| 1138 |
+
- for idx in range(len(certs) - 2, -1, -1):
|
| 1139 |
+
- curr_cert = certs[idx]
|
| 1140 |
+
- if not eff.is_empty() and not curr_cert.san.is_empty():
|
| 1141 |
+
- valid_nc, nc_errs = validate_san_constraints(curr_cert.san, eff)
|
| 1142 |
+
+ for i in range(len(certs) - 1, -1, -1):
|
| 1143 |
+
+ cert = certs[i]
|
| 1144 |
+
+ if not eff.is_empty():
|
| 1145 |
+
+ valid_nc, nc_errs = validate_name_constraints(
|
| 1146 |
+
+ cert.san, cert.subject_dn, eff, is_ca=cert.basic_constraints.is_ca
|
| 1147 |
+
+ )
|
| 1148 |
+
if not valid_nc:
|
| 1149 |
+
errors.extend(nc_errs)
|
| 1150 |
+
- if curr_cert.name_constraints:
|
| 1151 |
+
- eff = eff.merge_parent(curr_cert.name_constraints)
|
| 1152 |
+
+ if cert.name_constraints:
|
| 1153 |
+
+ eff = eff.merge_parent(cert.name_constraints)
|
| 1154 |
+
|
| 1155 |
+
# 9. Certificate Policy Tree Processing
|
| 1156 |
+
valid_policies: Set[str] = set()
|
tests/check_cyber_reference.py
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1 |
+
"""Offline reference-only cache regressions; does not change benchmark scoring.
|
| 2 |
+
|
| 3 |
+
Run: python tests/check_cyber_reference.py
|
| 4 |
+
Requires Python 3.12+ and git. Uses only the standard library and bundled fixtures.
|
| 5 |
+
"""
|
| 6 |
+
import argparse
|
| 7 |
+
from dataclasses import replace
|
| 8 |
+
from pathlib import Path
|
| 9 |
+
import subprocess
|
| 10 |
+
import sys
|
| 11 |
+
import tempfile
|
| 12 |
+
import unittest
|
| 13 |
+
import zipfile
|
| 14 |
+
|
| 15 |
+
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
|
| 16 |
+
TASK = ROOT / 'data/cyber/tasks/swe_rl_cybersecurity_task_02'
|
| 17 |
+
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
|
| 18 |
+
parser.add_argument('--patch', type=Path, default=TASK / 'gold.diff')
|
| 19 |
+
args = parser.parse_args()
|
| 20 |
+
|
| 21 |
+
|
| 22 |
+
class ReferenceCacheTests(unittest.TestCase):
|
| 23 |
+
@classmethod
|
| 24 |
+
def setUpClass(cls):
|
| 25 |
+
cls.temp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
|
| 26 |
+
cls.addClassCleanup(cls.temp.cleanup)
|
| 27 |
+
root = Path(cls.temp.name)
|
| 28 |
+
for archive in ['repository', 'hidden_tests']:
|
| 29 |
+
with zipfile.ZipFile(TASK / f'{archive}.zip') as z:
|
| 30 |
+
z.extractall(root)
|
| 31 |
+
subprocess.run(['git', 'apply', str(args.patch.resolve())],
|
| 32 |
+
cwd=root / 'repository', check=True)
|
| 33 |
+
sys.path[:0] = [str(root / 'repository'), str(root / 'hidden_tests')]
|
| 34 |
+
import test_critical_extensions_and_security_edge_cases
|
| 35 |
+
cls.t = test_critical_extensions_and_security_edge_cases
|
| 36 |
+
|
| 37 |
+
def check_policy_change(self, flag):
|
| 38 |
+
t = self.t
|
| 39 |
+
store = t.TrustStore()
|
| 40 |
+
rp, rs = t.generate_key_pair('cache-review-root')
|
| 41 |
+
cp, cs = t.generate_key_pair('cache-review-ca')
|
| 42 |
+
lp, _ = t.generate_key_pair('cache-review-leaf')
|
| 43 |
+
policies = lambda oid: t.CertificatePoliciesExtension([t.CertificatePolicy(oid)])
|
| 44 |
+
root = t._make_ca('r', 'CN=Root', 'CN=Root', rp, rs,
|
| 45 |
+
policies=policies(t.POLICY_CORP), is_root=True)
|
| 46 |
+
store.add_trust_anchor(root)
|
| 47 |
+
mapping = flag == 'initial_policy_mapping_inhibit'
|
| 48 |
+
ca = t._make_ca('c', 'CN=CA', 'CN=Root', cp, rs, rp,
|
| 49 |
+
policies=policies(t.POLICY_CORP if mapping else t.ANY_POLICY),
|
| 50 |
+
mappings=t.PolicyMappingsExtension([
|
| 51 |
+
t.PolicyMapping(t.POLICY_CORP, t.POLICY_PARTNER_A)
|
| 52 |
+
], critical=True) if mapping else None)
|
| 53 |
+
store.add_intermediate(ca)
|
| 54 |
+
leaf = t._make_leaf('l', 'CN=leaf', 'CN=CA', lp, cs, cp,
|
| 55 |
+
policies=policies(t.POLICY_PARTNER_A if mapping else t.POLICY_CORP))
|
| 56 |
+
config = t.ValidationConfig(current_time='2026-06-01T00:00:00Z',
|
| 57 |
+
enforce_policy_tree=True, initial_explicit_policy=True,
|
| 58 |
+
initial_policy_set={t.POLICY_CORP}, check_revocation=False)
|
| 59 |
+
strict = replace(config, **{flag: True})
|
| 60 |
+
engine = t.PathValidationEngine(store)
|
| 61 |
+
self.assertTrue(engine.validate(leaf, config).is_valid)
|
| 62 |
+
self.assertFalse(t.PathValidationEngine(store).validate(leaf, strict).is_valid)
|
| 63 |
+
self.assertFalse(engine.validate(leaf, strict).is_valid,
|
| 64 |
+
'A stricter policy must not reuse a permissive cached decision')
|
| 65 |
+
engine = t.PathValidationEngine(store)
|
| 66 |
+
self.assertFalse(engine.validate(leaf, strict).is_valid)
|
| 67 |
+
self.assertTrue(engine.validate(leaf, config).is_valid,
|
| 68 |
+
'A permissive policy must not reuse a stricter cached decision')
|
| 69 |
+
|
| 70 |
+
def test_mapping_inhibition_is_in_cache_identity(self):
|
| 71 |
+
self.check_policy_change('initial_policy_mapping_inhibit')
|
| 72 |
+
|
| 73 |
+
def test_any_policy_inhibition_is_in_cache_identity(self):
|
| 74 |
+
self.check_policy_change('initial_any_policy_inhibit')
|
| 75 |
+
|
| 76 |
+
|
| 77 |
+
if __name__ == '__main__':
|
| 78 |
+
unittest.main(argv=[sys.argv[0]], verbosity=2)
|