# qna014 reference answer Samples revision: adds the explicit digest domains and token 71 outcomes required by the existing rubric. The original task, repository and rubric are unchanged. See `upstream-qna014-gold.diff` for the original reference. ## Verdict The accepted identity is `(sealock-main, epoch 51, sequence 906, root e3a253b61a510c063bcfbb43974f532f2c4279d46eb62d209b8ef8d320c37553, mirror-k@22, policy 7)`. Authenticating the capture wrappers, forming byte-level source quorums, and then following predecessor order yields: cap-a-07 rejected (predecessor); cap-a-11 accepted (accepted_quorum); cap-a-18 rejected (incomplete); cap-a-24 rejected (authentication); cap-a-31 accepted (accepted_quorum); cap-a-39 accepted (accepted_quorum); cap-a-46 accepted (accepted_quorum); cap-a-53 accepted (accepted_quorum); cap-a-62 accepted (accepted_quorum); cap-b-05 ignored (retransmission); cap-b-13 ignored (retransmission); cap-b-21 ignored (retransmission); cap-b-28 ignored (retransmission); cap-b-36 ignored (retransmission); cap-b-45 ignored (retransmission); cap-b-57 rejected (competing_envelope). The two byte-identical sequence-901 captures form the accepted quorum; the non-primary evidence occurrence is a retransmission, while the differently encoded but authentically frame-signed occurrence is a competing envelope because it lacks raw-byte quorum. `mirror-k@20 -> mirror-m@21 -> mirror-k@22` is an ABA display-name pattern, not an identity restoration. Grants in 902 and 903 are effective only on the following sequence; policy 7 applies after 905 and governs receipts for 906. The checkpoint requires quorum 2 across independently authenticated `alpha` and `beta` wrappers and begins with frame key `sk20`, receipt key `rk20`, authority `mirror-k@20` and policy 6. Sequence 901 is signed by `sk20`. Sequence 902, still verified with `sk20`, changes the displayed authority to `mirror-m@21` and grants `sk21`/`rk21` for sequence 903 onward. Sequence 903 is therefore signed by `sk21`, returns the displayed authority to `mirror-k@22`, and grants `sk22`/`rk22` for sequence 904 onward. Sequences 904, 905 and 906 verify with `sk22`; the policy-7 record in 905 takes effect only for 906. Thus neither the authority label nor a key or policy record can be applied retroactively to its containing frame. The unique joint runtime closure is: - `blake3` 1.2.0, `blake3-1.2.0-py3-none-any.whl`, `17f898872aa71c87e8289c024d747604fe09f862aaa49b385ebb8988dace4292`. - `cipher` 3.3.1, `cipher-3.3.1-py3-none-any.whl`, `5c8f3a5250ee67d63ab882765833d0ba2fc3d7843ee8054a6bdc9d40eede17f0`. - `codec` 2.9.0, `codec-2.9.0-py3-none-any.whl`, `d8b11a043eca063adba9e7e6744537aeb19807281dc7f0b7f5eae24942b89319`. - `kernels` 1.4.0, `kernels-1.4.0-py3-none-any.whl`, `888f6f6345103bd2204450ef3a18d27741f5ae1a921bc166309d30edb83761c1`. - `ledger` 5.3.0, `ledger-5.3.0.tar.gz`, `56c48453157a32e251c656ee71c676cbee29599ba90dbc41a69831cd2a19c79e`. - `nebula` 6.0.0, `nebula-6.0.0-py3-none-any.whl`, `ead79f8c549afd236e5e9ddc8dcdf2b486e225961d7f8c780909a396616c8eec`. - `reporter` 3.4.0, `reporter-3.4.0-py3-none-any.whl`, `f549843ccafc27dc33e90b7f1a7c9dd9a0e870975706aeea675e0f7ae36d2ad5`. - `vector` 2.7.1, `vector-2.7.1-cp312-abi3-manylinux_2_17_x86_64.whl`, `58bd64519aeeb4ac6271199e02bf9cd0e2be1b0ebf9e7160d13b82f2f0007fe8`. `cipher 3.6.0` violates reporter's `<3.5` bound. `cipher 3.4.0` is yanked and reached through ranges, `vector 2.8.0` has no compatible target file, and the native `vector 2.7.1` wheel precedes its valid universal wheel in the target tag order. `kernels 1.4.0` is allowed because `vector[simd]` exactly pins it. Yanked `ledger 5.4.0` is not exactly pinned; `ledger 5.3.0` activates `codec[blake]`, which activates `blake3`, so omitting either is not a fixed point. The separate Python 3.13 Linux build-host closure is: - `auditwheel` 6.1.0, `auditwheel-6.1.0-py3-none-any.whl`, `60e89f511f2bbcf431df3717d32248f7c93d0dd2574b007d1e69d72eaf3b42cb`. - `buildmeta` 1.1.0, `buildmeta-1.1.0-py3-none-any.whl`, `e30b699c6cf33bc86160600ff2243b88195a666e460510b303faa583522d794a`. - `forge` 8.0.0, `forge-8.0.0-py3-none-any.whl`, `3e7954d4ca3333713159d3e692a1d9e779f096c1215947559a18be7390db5e63`. - `wheelmaker` 2.4.0, `wheelmaker-2.4.0-py3-none-any.whl`, `669f8e08089a373b44d64281452cd53ebd6f1d211dec9f07fad2f6a7759fd9f8`. `buildmeta` is activated by `forge[pep517]`; `tomli` is inactive under Python 3.13; `auditwheel` is activated by wheelmaker on Linux. The recipe digest is `4c8e9ddb3857a3aaa99b47b450edd503c325e1ac96246efb1ce643bba45e3995` and the target-bound built-wheel identity is `4fb6f009a1e1de5e6ecfd7fde4ae4b3ffbe53770068f60fc381067467a065dbb`. Evaluating those markers under target Python 3.12 selects the wrong branch and cannot reproduce the built artifact. The only fully scoped receipt mapping is: - `nebula` `nebula-6.0.0-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-z11`. - `reporter` `reporter-3.4.0-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-q02`. - `cipher` `cipher-3.3.1-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-m77`. - `vector` `vector-2.7.1-cp312-abi3-manylinux_2_17_x86_64.whl` -> `r-u31`. - `kernels` `kernels-1.4.0-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-n09`. - `ledger` `ledger-5.3.0.tar.gz` -> `r-c44`. - `codec` `codec-2.9.0-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-h18`. - `blake3` `blake3-1.2.0-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-p63`. - `forge` `forge-8.0.0-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-f12`. - `wheelmaker` `wheelmaker-2.4.0-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-w54`. - `buildmeta` `buildmeta-1.1.0-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-b26`. - `auditwheel` `auditwheel-6.1.0-py3-none-any.whl` -> `r-a88`. `r-d03` is valid only for sequence 903, policy 6 and `mirror-m@21`; `r-d17` signs the current ledger bytes under the wrong filename/metadata tuple; `r-d29` uses generation 21 under the final generation-22 authority. `r-v51` validly authorizes the universal vector wheel but provenance cannot overrule target tag preference. The logical request digest is `a3a595931ab3538d4f4cfbfe0b0a11b0032a2f1dfb663b66c10de7e673e374fa`; the logical lock digest is `a60bbb3bdd304aa2687c0877b732dd5e787567437958e2f2746db010a8c935c6`. Pretty and compact wire digests are `a7d4f15ea4c082fd095d9c5feeb3234303611606d19c4258f1f59b40147b6f50` and `6d6f2e1fc041c0f154ccd5b9340c8a737c722b53e1d24742ea265c9d9777837f`. These six identity domains are not interchangeable. `req-992` remains bound to its old request and conflicts. `req-993` resumes with token 82; token 81 is fenced. Exact semantic retries and JSON-only reformatting retain the request digest and therefore resume the prepared `req-993` operation under token 82. The worker-resume record carrying token 81 is stale even though its request digest is exact. Reusing `req-992` conflicts because it is bound to sequence 903, `mirror-m@21`, policy 6, target generation 30 and request digest `f279845086156df8ecc10f578fd397e7efcc8b9fc5c03eb19dd6fcdc11def5e7`. Changing only the snapshot, target generation, build generation, root list or requested extras creates a different logical request and conflicts with `req-993`; changing only JSON whitespace changes a wire digest but is an exact semantic retry. A prepared exact retry resumes, a lower-token exact retry is fenced, and a committed exact retry returns the recorded result rather than publishing again. The first failed gates are `plan-13 -> authenticated_head_and_policy`, `plan-27 -> target_build_context`, `plan-44 -> joint_resolution`, `plan-58 -> full_scope_provenance`, `plan-76 -> logical_retry_and_fence`, and `plan-88 -> atomic_visibility`. `plan-93` is the unique admissible plan. Only `tr-91` is safe. In `tr-17`, the service rechecks the four fields first, stages the group second, then a hook changes target generation 31 to 32 before the CAS. The minimal witness is therefore `recheck(31) -> stage -> target=32 -> commit`: the accepted value is stale at the committing boundary. In `tr-42`, the group is staged and the recheck covers only the snapshot and target generation; a concurrent build-generation 12-to-13 or token 82-to-83 change remains invisible to its CAS. In `tr-68`, eight classes are atomically committed and `retry_result` is published afterward, so an observer between those two operations sees a lock without its idempotency result. `tr-91` instead stages lock, entries, runtime artifacts, build inputs, receipts, snapshot, target environment, build environment, and retry result; immediately rechecks the exact snapshot, target generation 31, build generation 12 and token 82; and CAS-commits all nine classes together. The minimal safe ordered patch series is `P01 -> P03 -> P04 -> P05 -> P06 -> P08 -> P09 -> P10 -> P11`. P01 replaces capture-order selection with authenticated, quorum-based replay. P03 computes the joint extras-and-version fixed point; P04 consumes that resolution to choose the highest compatible release and first authorized target tag; P05 recursively resolves the source recipe under Python 3.13 while binding its output to the Python 3.12 target. P06 validates and caches the full receipt, file, snapshot and key-material domains. P08 detaches the logical projection, P09 canonicalizes that detached projection while preserving ordered tags, P10 derives semantic retry identity and fencing, and P11 stages the nine-class group and commits against all four fence fields. The ordering has concrete witnesses. Omitting P01 lets the legacy max-sequence shortcut treat an unauthenticated or non-quorate capture as state. P04 before P03 has no joint-resolution object and can select `cipher 3.6.0` or yanked 3.4.0; omitting P04 leaves P05 without the selected ledger source. Running P05 in the target context activates `tomli` and misses `buildmeta`/`auditwheel`; omitting it cannot reproduce the built identity. Omitting P06 accepts `r-d03` by signature or reuses its cached decision outside sequence 903. P09 before P08 sorts and rewrites the shared captured lock object; omitting P09 leaves wire-identical locks with different logical digests. P11 before P10 has no current token-aware retry state; omitting P11 permits the `tr-68` eight-plus-one visibility split. These are stateful patches, so every later patch also requires the tree produced by its predecessor. Exclude P02 because canonical-payload deduplication collapses the differently encoded sequence-901 signed envelope into the byte-identical retransmission class, even though its raw digest is `13a374e8c0f39dd0b1f1487dab047066a3b9bae0333d5db7b04540d6bf92d4a6` rather than `611391c91d38c25606897501811b834f093a6824d72540ea6ffdaf74d80103ae`. Exclude P07 because artifact-only caching lets the sequence-903 `r-d03` decision authorize the same bytes under the final sequence-906 authority. Exclude P12 because lexically sorting target tags moves `py3-none-any` ahead of the prescribed ordered compatibility preference and can choose the authorized universal vector wheel instead of `vector-2.7.1-cp312-abi3-manylinux_2_17_x86_64.whl`. The digest domains are concrete. `sourcebuild.build_identity` hashes the canonical complete recipe object (`backend`, `requirements`, `steps`, and `target_tag`) to obtain the recipe digest above. Its built-output digest binds the source artifact digest, backend, that recipe digest, the sorted complete build-input list (each project/version/filename/artifact_digest), and the selected target tag. Dependency markers resolve those inputs under build Python 3.13; the output target is Python 3.12. Artifact identity describes the package bytes. Metadata identity describes the associated project/version/file and dependency/recipe declarations; matching artifact bytes do not establish matching metadata or receipt scope. Logical-lock identity hashes the detached canonical lock projection (including its entries and receipts), while logical-request identity hashes the detached request projection, including the snapshot and environment generations, roots and requested extras. Wire identity hashes the actual serialized bytes, so JSON-only reformatting can change a wire digest while retaining both logical identities. These distinctions follow `contracts/provenance.md`, `canonical.py`, `sourcebuild.py`, `retry.py`, and the P08/P09 canonicalization changes. Token 71 belongs to the prepared `req-992` entry for the old sequence-903 request. It cannot authorize the current sequence-906 request: using `req-992` with token 71 conflicts on its immutable logical request digest. If token 71 is presented for the current `req-993` entry, it is lower than 82 and is fenced, just like 81. Token 82 can resume the exact current prepared request. P10 checks a lower token before checking the request digest, so a stale-token attempt is classified as fenced even when another mismatch is also present. An exact retry of the old request with its own token 71 is only an old-request resume at the retry layer; it still cannot pass the final current-snapshot/environment/token publication checks. This follows `artifacts/retry_journal.jsonl`, `contracts/retry_publication.md`, and the executable `retry_action` change in P10. ## Rule Authenticated predecessor order, delayed key effectiveness, post-frame policy effectiveness, and raw-envelope retransmission identity jointly determine the head. Runtime constraints and extras are solved to a joint fixed point under the target environment, while recursive build inputs are solved under the build host and bound back to the target output. Receipt scope includes the entire signed authority and snapshot tuple. Retry identity is semantic and immutable; fencing tokens order workers. Physical or privately staged bytes are not authority and not public state. A commit is valid only when the complete group is staged and the snapshot, both environment generations, and current retry token are checked as the final precommit operation. ## Where it is decided The head follows `contracts/authority.md`, `src/sealock/authority.py`, the checkpoint, and both capture files. Runtime and build choices follow `contracts/resolution.md`, `resolver.py`, `sourcebuild.py`, the two environment files, request, and index. Receipt decisions follow `contracts/provenance.md`, `provenance.py`, accepted key grants, and the receipt capture. Retry and visibility follow `contracts/retry_publication.md`, `retry.py`, `publication.py`, the journal, attempts, and traces. Candidate behavior follows the actual diffs against `legacy.py`; no candidate's local claim is authoritative. ## Boundary Moving the target-generation change in `tr-17` from before the final recheck to after a successful CAS makes it a next-request event; moving it between recheck and CAS invalidates this request. The same applies independently to snapshot, build generation, and token. A newly present artifact or valid signature never rescues wrong receipt scope. A committed `req-993` exact retry returns its recorded result, whereas state drift requires a new logical request and cannot rebind the existing key. Observers see either the previous group or all nine new record classes.