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What is the summary of this judgment? | IVIL Appeal No.768 (NT) of 1977 etc. From the judgment Order dated 9.10.1975 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in M.C.C. No.144 of 1966. V.A. Bobde, B.R.Aggarwala and U.A.Rana for the Appellant. S.V.Deshpande and S.K.Agnihotri for the Respondents. | The appellant, a manufacturer of cement, entered into an agreement with the Cement Manufacturing Company of India Limited, for sale of cement. Under the agreement, the appellant was to sell its cement only through the marketing company, and certain sums would be paid for the cement supplied by the marketing company, wh... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATH MISHRA, CJ. These are appeals by special leave 252 and are directed against the separate decisions of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in references under the Madhya Pradesh Sales Tax Act. Civil Appeal No.768/77 relates to the assessment period 1951 52, Civil Appeal 539... | The appellant, a manufacturer of cement, entered into an agreement with the Cement Manufacturing Company of India Limited, for sale of cement. Under the agreement, the appellant was to sell its cement only through the marketing company, and certain sums would be paid for the cement supplied by the marketing company, wh... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | The Marketing Company had the authority to sell cement at such price or prices and upon such terms as it might in its sole discretion consider appropriate. For the three periods referred to above the appellant had supplied cement manufactured by it to the Marketing Company and maintained at the assessment stage for the... | The appellant, a manufacturer of cement, entered into an agreement with the Cement Manufacturing Company of India Limited, for sale of cement. Under the agreement, the appellant was to sell its cement only through the marketing company, and certain sums would be paid for the cement supplied by the marketing company, wh... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | It is seen that the Cement Marketing Company is an independent organisation and is carrying on business as an independent entity. It is also seen that what has actually been taxed are the sales effected by the appellant to the Cement Marketing Company 253 of India and not the sales made to the parties which obtained an... | The appellant, a manufacturer of cement, entered into an agreement with the Cement Manufacturing Company of India Limited, for sale of cement. Under the agreement, the appellant was to sell its cement only through the marketing company, and certain sums would be paid for the cement supplied by the marketing company, wh... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | This Court in Rohtas Industries case on a detailed analysis of the terms of the contract came to hold that there was a sale between the manufacturer and the Marketing Company. It is not in dispute that the agreement between the appellant and the Marketing Company in this case has the same terms as this Court considered... | The appellant, a manufacturer of cement, entered into an agreement with the Cement Manufacturing Company of India Limited, for sale of cement. Under the agreement, the appellant was to sell its cement only through the marketing company, and certain sums would be paid for the cement supplied by the marketing company, wh... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | There was no privity between the manufacturer and the ultimate consumer who was said to have been located outside the State of Madhya Pradesh. The question for consideration is whether the sale that look place between the manufacturer and the Marketing Company can be taken to be covered by the Explanation. The Explanat... | The appellant, a manufacturer of cement, entered into an agreement with the Cement Manufacturing Company of India Limited, for sale of cement. Under the agreement, the appellant was to sell its cement only through the marketing company, and certain sums would be paid for the cement supplied by the marketing company, wh... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | The concept of inter State sale as brought in by the Sixth Amendment or in the subsequent statute known as the Central Sales Tax Act was not in existence for the relevant period now under consideration. The finding recorded by the authorities is that the delivery of the cement was not the direct result of such sale or ... | The appellant, a manufacturer of cement, entered into an agreement with the Cement Manufacturing Company of India Limited, for sale of cement. Under the agreement, the appellant was to sell its cement only through the marketing company, and certain sums would be paid for the cement supplied by the marketing company, wh... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | The ratio of Mohd. Serajuddin vs State of Orissa, is also against the appellant 's stand. We accordingly dismiss the appeals and uphold the decisions of the High Court. There would be no order for costs. V.P.R. Appeals dismissed. | The appellant, a manufacturer of cement, entered into an agreement with the Cement Manufacturing Company of India Limited, for sale of cement. Under the agreement, the appellant was to sell its cement only through the marketing company, and certain sums would be paid for the cement supplied by the marketing company, wh... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | Appeal No. 36 of 1967. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 25, 1966 of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench at Delhi in Letters Patent Appeal No. 36 D of 1966. Bishan Narain, R. Mahatingier and Ganpat Rai, for the appellant. R. H. Dhebar and section P. Nayar, for respondent Nos. | The appellant executed a usufructuary mortgage of his house and continued to reside in it as a tenant under a lease obtained from the mortgagee. In 1949, the mortgagee left for Pakistan. He was declared an evacuee and his mortgagee interest in the mortgaged property vested in the Custodian under section 8 of the. Under... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | 1 and 3. In 1943 he mortgaged the said property with possession in favour of one K. B. Bunyad Hussain but obtained a lease thereof at the same time from the mortgagee and continued to reside therein as tenant. In November 1949, the mortgagee left for Pakistan a whereupon the Custodian of Evacuee Property under the (her... | The appellant executed a usufructuary mortgage of his house and continued to reside in it as a tenant under a lease obtained from the mortgagee. In 1949, the mortgagee left for Pakistan. He was declared an evacuee and his mortgagee interest in the mortgaged property vested in the Custodian under section 8 of the. Under... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | 1,45,735/ was ultimately held to be due as the mortgage debt under the said mortgage. The appellant claimed that he was entitled to obtain vacant possession of the said property against payment by him of the mortgage debt. The claim was rejected on the ground that there was no agreement between the appellant and the Cu... | The appellant executed a usufructuary mortgage of his house and continued to reside in it as a tenant under a lease obtained from the mortgagee. In 1949, the mortgagee left for Pakistan. He was declared an evacuee and his mortgagee interest in the mortgaged property vested in the Custodian under section 8 of the. Under... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | On this finding the Appellate Officer dismissed the appellant 's application as he had neither paid the mortgage money nor put in the verified claims as suggested in the said correspondence and confirmed the order of the Competent Officer under which the property had been ordered to be sold in the absence of any agreem... | The appellant executed a usufructuary mortgage of his house and continued to reside in it as a tenant under a lease obtained from the mortgagee. In 1949, the mortgagee left for Pakistan. He was declared an evacuee and his mortgagee interest in the mortgaged property vested in the Custodian under section 8 of the. Under... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | However, it is conceded by counsel for respondents 1 and 3 that the appellant has since then paid the entire mortgage debt and the Competent Officer has under section 10 of the Separation Act accepted that amount. Two questions on these facts, therefore, arise, for deter mination; (1) whether the order for sale passed ... | The appellant executed a usufructuary mortgage of his house and continued to reside in it as a tenant under a lease obtained from the mortgagee. In 1949, the mortgagee left for Pakistan. He was declared an evacuee and his mortgagee interest in the mortgaged property vested in the Custodian under section 8 of the. Under... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | Under section 60 of that Act, the mortgagor has a right at any time after the principal amount has become due to require the mortgagee on payment or tender of the mortgage debt (a) to deliver to him the mortgage deed and all other documents relating to the mortgaged property which are in the mortgagee 's possession or ... | The appellant executed a usufructuary mortgage of his house and continued to reside in it as a tenant under a lease obtained from the mortgagee. In 1949, the mortgagee left for Pakistan. He was declared an evacuee and his mortgagee interest in the mortgaged property vested in the Custodian under section 8 of the. Under... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | When the mortgagor has tendered or deposited in court the. mortgage debt together with interest thereon and has done all that is to be done by him to enable the mortgagee to take such amount out of court, and a notice, as aforesaid, has been served on the mortgagee under section 83 interest ceases to run. If the mortga... | The appellant executed a usufructuary mortgage of his house and continued to reside in it as a tenant under a lease obtained from the mortgagee. In 1949, the mortgagee left for Pakistan. He was declared an evacuee and his mortgagee interest in the mortgaged property vested in the Custodian under section 8 of the. Under... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | It follows that a mortgagee is not permitted to deal with the property in such a way that upon discharge of the debt the property cannot be restored. [see Fisher. & Lightwood 's Law of Mortgage (8th ed.) p. 482]. Is the position of a mortgagor any the different than under the by reason of the evacuee property legislati... | The appellant executed a usufructuary mortgage of his house and continued to reside in it as a tenant under a lease obtained from the mortgagee. In 1949, the mortgagee left for Pakistan. He was declared an evacuee and his mortgagee interest in the mortgaged property vested in the Custodian under section 8 of the. Under... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | Upon the mortgagee being declared an evacuee and his interest as such mortgagee in the premises in question evacuee property, his interest in the mortgaged property vested under section 8 of the Administration Act in the Custodian from the date of the notice issued under section 7 of the Act. Under section 8 (4) any pe... | The appellant executed a usufructuary mortgage of his house and continued to reside in it as a tenant under a lease obtained from the mortgagee. In 1949, the mortgagee left for Pakistan. He was declared an evacuee and his mortgagee interest in the mortgaged property vested in the Custodian under section 8 of the. Under... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | It is also conceded that the Custodian has refused, notwithstanding demands made by the appellant, to evict these persons from the property and hand over vacant possession to the appellant even on the appellant tendering the mortgage amount. This was presumably done by reason of the fact that though section 12 empowers... | The appellant executed a usufructuary mortgage of his house and continued to reside in it as a tenant under a lease obtained from the mortgagee. In 1949, the mortgagee left for Pakistan. He was declared an evacuee and his mortgagee interest in the mortgaged property vested in the Custodian under section 8 of the. Under... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | Sections 4 and 5 of the Act provide for the appointment of Competent Officers and their jurisdiction. Sec. 7 provides for submission of claims by a person claiming interest in 857 a composite property. (e) of sub section 2 requires that where a claim is made by a mortgagor the total amount due on the mortgage debt and ... | The appellant executed a usufructuary mortgage of his house and continued to reside in it as a tenant under a lease obtained from the mortgagee. In 1949, the mortgagee left for Pakistan. He was declared an evacuee and his mortgagee interest in the mortgaged property vested in the Custodian under section 8 of the. Under... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | Sub section 2 of section 8, however, provides that where the Custodian has determined that the property in question or any interest therein is evacuee property, such determination is binding on the competent officer. The proviso to that sub section lays down that nothing contained in sub section 2 shall debar the compe... | The appellant executed a usufructuary mortgage of his house and continued to reside in it as a tenant under a lease obtained from the mortgagee. In 1949, the mortgagee left for Pakistan. He was declared an evacuee and his mortgagee interest in the mortgaged property vested in the Custodian under section 8 of the. Under... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | (b), he is also empowered in such a case to redeem the mortgaged property. The argument was that where the mortgage amount is tendered by the mortgagor and the competent officer accepts it in satis 858 faction of the debt due under the mortgage, the mortgage debt is satisfied, interest thereon ceases to run and the mor... | The appellant executed a usufructuary mortgage of his house and continued to reside in it as a tenant under a lease obtained from the mortgagee. In 1949, the mortgagee left for Pakistan. He was declared an evacuee and his mortgagee interest in the mortgaged property vested in the Custodian under section 8 of the. Under... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | (b) (i), i.e, to pay to the Custodian the mortgage debt and redeem the mortgaged property. It was said that that being the position under section 10, the appellant was entitled to tender the mort. gage amount in satisfaction of the debt due under the mortgage on condition that the mortgage should be redeemed and posses... | The appellant executed a usufructuary mortgage of his house and continued to reside in it as a tenant under a lease obtained from the mortgagee. In 1949, the mortgagee left for Pakistan. He was declared an evacuee and his mortgagee interest in the mortgaged property vested in the Custodian under section 8 of the. Under... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | It must have been aware of (i) that the Administration Act is, as aforesaid, a self contained code, (ii) that the Custodian appointed thereunder is not an authority subject to the power or control of the Competent Officer, and (iii) that the Administration Act, by sections 10 and 12 thereof, confers several powers on t... | The appellant executed a usufructuary mortgage of his house and continued to reside in it as a tenant under a lease obtained from the mortgagee. In 1949, the mortgagee left for Pakistan. He was declared an evacuee and his mortgagee interest in the mortgaged property vested in the Custodian under section 8 of the. Under... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | It would seem that the two Acts have different objects and schemes and the authorities established under them are independent of each other. The powers conferred 859 on the Competent Officer had, therefore, to be so provided that they could be exercised in harmony and consistently with the pro ' visions of the Administ... | The appellant executed a usufructuary mortgage of his house and continued to reside in it as a tenant under a lease obtained from the mortgagee. In 1949, the mortgagee left for Pakistan. He was declared an evacuee and his mortgagee interest in the mortgaged property vested in the Custodian under section 8 of the. Under... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | (b) of that rule provides that in the case of a claim by a mortgagor or a mortgagee (1) where both the Custodian and claimant agree, the Competent Officer can exercise the powers. conferred on him under sub cl. (i) or sub cl. (iii) of cl. (b) of section 10 of the Act and (ii) where there is no such agreement, he can se... | The appellant executed a usufructuary mortgage of his house and continued to reside in it as a tenant under a lease obtained from the mortgagee. In 1949, the mortgagee left for Pakistan. He was declared an evacuee and his mortgagee interest in the mortgaged property vested in the Custodian under section 8 of the. Under... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | It follows that in the absence of such agreement the mortgagor claimant cannot demand from the Competent Officer that the latter should accept the mortgage amount tendered by him and direct simultaneous delivery of possession of the mortgaged property. The power to redeem the mortgaged property being subject to rule II... | The appellant executed a usufructuary mortgage of his house and continued to reside in it as a tenant under a lease obtained from the mortgagee. In 1949, the mortgagee left for Pakistan. He was declared an evacuee and his mortgagee interest in the mortgaged property vested in the Custodian under section 8 of the. Under... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | If the Custodian is satisfied on hearing the concerned lessee that he is not liable to eviction under a rent control Act in force in the State where the property is situate or has not contravened any of the provisions of the lease, he cannot cancel the lease nor can he evict the lessee except only as provided by cl. (5... | The appellant executed a usufructuary mortgage of his house and continued to reside in it as a tenant under a lease obtained from the mortgagee. In 1949, the mortgagee left for Pakistan. He was declared an evacuee and his mortgagee interest in the mortgaged property vested in the Custodian under section 8 of the. Under... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | The only thing which, the Competent Officer could do in the circumstances was to accept the mortgage amount whereupon interest would cease to run. It is not in dispute that the appellant, insisting as he was 861 all throughout upon being given vacant and not merely symbolical possession, did not actually tender or make... | The appellant executed a usufructuary mortgage of his house and continued to reside in it as a tenant under a lease obtained from the mortgagee. In 1949, the mortgagee left for Pakistan. He was declared an evacuee and his mortgagee interest in the mortgaged property vested in the Custodian under section 8 of the. Under... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | [of in this connection the position of an auction purchaser as decided in Ek Nawas Khan vs The Competent Officer(1)]. But it is conceded that since the passing of the said order the appellant has, paid up the full mortgage amount and the Competent Officer has, as he was bound to do under section 10, proviso, accepted t... | The appellant executed a usufructuary mortgage of his house and continued to reside in it as a tenant under a lease obtained from the mortgagee. In 1949, the mortgagee left for Pakistan. He was declared an evacuee and his mortgagee interest in the mortgaged property vested in the Custodian under section 8 of the. Under... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | That is quite clear. But the order of sale passed by him and confirmed by the Appellate Officer also cannot secondly, because he can order sale only for satisfaction of the mortgage debt and for distribution of the sale proceeds thereof ' between the mortgagor and the mortgagee. There being now no question of the satis... | The appellant executed a usufructuary mortgage of his house and continued to reside in it as a tenant under a lease obtained from the mortgagee. In 1949, the mortgagee left for Pakistan. He was declared an evacuee and his mortgagee interest in the mortgaged property vested in the Custodian under section 8 of the. Under... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | 1960 All. 862 appear to be harsh and unfair as the appellant would be driven to file proceedings for eviction of tenants and allottees now in possession of the property. (see The All India Film Corporation Ltd. vs Raja Gyan Nath) (1). In view of the payment of the mortgage amount by the appellant and the acceptance of ... | The appellant executed a usufructuary mortgage of his house and continued to reside in it as a tenant under a lease obtained from the mortgagee. In 1949, the mortgagee left for Pakistan. He was declared an evacuee and his mortgagee interest in the mortgaged property vested in the Custodian under section 8 of the. Under... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | The order for costs of the appeal would ordinarily follow the result, but in view of the fact that the Competent Officer was entitled to pass the order of sale in the circumstances then prevailing it is fair and equitable, though his order is set aside, that the parties should bear their own costs. V.P.S Appeal allowed... | The appellant executed a usufructuary mortgage of his house and continued to reside in it as a tenant under a lease obtained from the mortgagee. In 1949, the mortgagee left for Pakistan. He was declared an evacuee and his mortgagee interest in the mortgaged property vested in the Custodian under section 8 of the. Under... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | ivil Appeal No. 2072 of 1990. From the Judgment and Order dated 13.5. 1986 of the Calcutta High Court in Suit No. 2479 of 1967. M.K. | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | Banerjee, Subrat Rai Choudhary, Gopal Subramanium, N.P. Aggarwala, Anil Aggarwala, P.C. Sharma, L.P. Aggarwala, Ms. Indira Banerjee, R.N. Jhunjhunwala, Praveen Kumar, C.S. Vaidyanathan, P.R. Seetharaman, D.N. | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | Mukherjee, Raj Kumr Gupta and P.C. Kapur for the appearing parties. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, J. Leave granted. This appeal is directed against the order of the Divi sion Bench of the High Court of Calcutta. The appellant was transposed as the plaintiff in the Original Side suit N... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | 2479/67 in the High Court of Calcutta. The suit was filed for a declaration that the various properties set out in the Schedule belonged and still belong to the joint family consisting of the members mentioned in the plaint. Pending the suit an application was filed for appointment of a receiver for the various propert... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | 38, New Road, Alipore, building with open space was one of the properties belonging to the trust. Grindlays Bank Limited ( 'Grindlays ' for short), respondent No. 1 herein was the original tenant and they were occupying four flats and they surrendered a portion of the tenancy namely two flats i.e. Flats Nos. 1 and 2 wh... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | Question ing the action of the receiver an application was filed in the High Court contending that the receiver had no authority to create any tenancy and that the receiver has virtually created two new tenancies terminating the original tenancy of Grindlays and it was contended before the learned Single Judge of the C... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | More or less the same contentions are advanced before us. Firstly it is submitted that the receiver had no right or authority to create any lease or tenancy in respect of the said flats for a term exceeding three years at a time and such creation of a tenancy should be deemed to be only for a period of three years ' te... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | 1 and 2 was surrendered by the Grindlays and from 1st April, 1978 Tatas was inducted as tenant in respect of the said two flats at a monthly rent of Rs. 1200 and service charge at the rate of Rs.600 per month and since then Tatas is a monthly tenant in respect of the said two flats. It is the case of the Tatas that the... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | However, at all material times they retained the tenancy in respect of Flat Nos. 3 and 4 and continued to be tenant in respect of those flats and they are also governed by the act. In the letters written it is also stated by the Grind lays that their continuation as tenant of flat Nos. 3 and 4 was acknowledged by the r... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | Sen sitting on original Side while appointing the receiver. The learned Judge passed an order restraining the tenants from selling or "transferring" any of the properties mentioned in Schedule 'A '. According to the appellants the transfer includes lease and therefore, the Receiver by creating a new lease i.e. tenancy ... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | which provides for the appointment of Receivers empowers the court to confer upon the Receivers all such powers, as to bringing and defending suits and for the realization, management, protection, preservation and improvement of the property. In Satyanarayan Banerji and Ors. vs Kalyani Prosad Singh Deo Bahadur and Ors.... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | In this Section "living person" includes a company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, but nothing herein contained shall affect any law for the time being in force relating to transfer of property to or by companies, associations or bodies of individuals. " In Mulla Transfer of Property... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | This is a special definition adopted for the purposes of the Law of Property Act, 1925. The word "con veys" in Sec. 5 of the Indian act is obviously used in the wider sense referred to above. Transferor must have an 968 interest in the property. He cannot serve himself from it and yet convey it. " The word 'transfer ' ... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | In Hari Mohan alias Hari Charan Pal vs Atal Krishna Bose and Ors., XXIII Vol. Indian Cases 925, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that "the term 'transfer ' as used in Section 11 or Section 88 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, includes a lease, as a lease is a transfer of an interest in immovable property". It ... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | Sen. Learned counsel for the respondents. referred to various documents mostly in the form of letters between the receiver and the Grindlays. We have perused these letters. They go to show that the Grindlays surren dered those two flats with the consent of the receiver but the stand taken by them is. that their continu... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | 3 and 4 was acknowledged by the receiv er and the same cannot be treated as a new lease. One of the questions is whether mere surrender of Flats Nos. 1 and 2 affects the Grindlays ' tenancy of Flats Nos. 3 and 4. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that after the expiry of the stipulated perio... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | and Kania, J. explaining the nature of the monthly tenancy observed in the following terms: "A characteristic of a periodical tenancy is that as each period commences, it is not a new tenancy, it is really an accretion to the old tenancy. A monthly tenancy, that is, a tenancy subject to a month 's notice, creates in th... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | vs Rarneshwar Dayal Singh and Ors., ; it is ob served: "An interse partition of the mokarrari interest amongst the mokarraridars as alleged by the plaintiffs could not affect their liability qua the lessor for the payment of the whole rent, as several tenants of a tenancy in law constitute but a single tenant, and qua ... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | Chapter 21 of the Calcutta High Court Original Side Rules deals with Receivers. Relevant part of the Rule 5 reads thus: "5. In every order directing the appointment of a Receiver of immovable property, there shall, unless otherwise or dered, be inserted the following directions: (a) that the Receiver shall have all the... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | In Woodfall 's Law of Landlord and Tenant, 25th Edn. Page 969, paragraph 2079 reads as under: "2079. Implied surrender of part only. If a lessee for years accept a new lease by indenture of part of the lands, it is a surrender for that part only, and not for the whole (k); and though a contract for years cannot be so d... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | Surrender by change in nature of tenant 's occupation. A surrender is implied when the tenant remains in occupation of the premises in a capacity inconsistent with his being tenant, where, for instance, he becomes the landlord 's employee, or where the parties agree that the tenant is in future to occupy the premsises ... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | In Hill and Redman 's Law of Landlord and Tenant, 16th Edn. on page 45 1, it is observed: "Any arrangement between the landlord and tenant which operates as a fresh demise will work a surrender of the old tenancy; and this may result from an agreement under which the tenant gives up part of the premises and pays a dimi... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | It can therefore be seen that surrender of the part of the lease does not amount to surrender of the whole. In N.M. Ponniah Nadar vs 972 Smt. Kamalakshmi Ammal, AIR 1989 SC 467 it is held: "A mere increase or reduction of rent will not necessarily import a surrender of an existing lease and the grant of a new tenancy. ... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | We have noticed above that the transfer includes 'lease '. Therefore it becomes necessary at this stage to consider whether there has been violation of injunction granted by Justice A.N. Sen which formed part of the appointment order of the Receiver. So far as the Grindlays are concerned we are unable to accede to the ... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | There is some force in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the lease in favour of Tatas amounts to transfer but the same cannot be said of Grindlays. Therefore the question of evicting them summarily on this ground does not arise. However, the sub mission of the learned counsel is that even the... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | Merely because there is change in a tenancy namely that it has become a monthly tenancy, it does not amount to a new tenancy as contended by the appellant so far as Grind lays are concerned. It is also submitted on behalf of the Grindlays that no new lease has been created by the Receiver and they come within the meani... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | It is also further observed that: "The definition makes a person continuing in possession after the determination of his tenancy a tenant unless a decree or order for eviction has been made against him, thus putting him on par with a person whose contractual tenancy still subsists." In Biswabani (P) Ltd. vs Santosh Kum... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | Such tenancy may be determined by the usual notice to quit at the end of the first or any subsequent year, and it will determine, without any notice to quit, at the end of the term mentioned in the writing. But if the lessee does not enter he will not be liable to an action for not taking possession; nor will an action... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | In that case it was found that the Official Receiver violating the order of the injunction granted lease which the Court found it to be illegal. Then the learned Judge proceeded further to consider whether such an illegality can be rectified in the proceedings before the Court and it was held that "Therefore, by acting... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | But, in the instant case, the facts are different. The injunction granted 975 by A.N. Sen, J. does not apply to the tenancy in favour of Grindlays in respect of flats Nos. 3 and 4 inasmuch as it is an old tenancy though in a modified form. In Ashrafi Devi 's, case as a matter of fact, the learned Judge observed: "There... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | We have already noted that the Grindlays were the tenants in respect of the four flats. They surrendered two flats. This partial surrender does not put an end to the tenancy and we are satisfied that in respect of the Grindlays no new tenan cy is created by the Receiver and they continued to be the tenant and they are ... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | It was observed in para 6 that: "So then the act of the Receiver in letting out the land in the suit is an act of the Court itself and it is done on behalf of the Court, the whole purpose of the Court taking possession through the Receiver appointed by it is to pro tect the property for the benefit of the ultimate succ... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | The Full Bench however took the view that the Receiver appointed by the Court acts as an Officer of the Court and he cannot create a lease which takes the pending matter beyond the purview of the Court and anyone who gets posses sion through such an act could only do so subject to the directions and orders of the Court... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | Further the receiver has not acted in any manner affecting the title. Now coming to the case of Tatas we agree with the High Court that it is a new tenancy. Such a lease comes within the meaning of 'transfer ' and in view of the injunction order passed by A.N. Sen, J. creation of such a new tenancy is legally barred. I... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | 977 In appointing a receiver the Court deals with the possession only until the right is determined, if the right be in dispute. " It is also useful to note a passage from Sir John Woodroffe book "on Receivers": "The Receiver being the officer of the Court from which he derives his appointment, his possession is exclus... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | In Smt. Ashrafi Devi 's case this is precisely the question that is decided, and we have already referred to some of the obser vations made therein. Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji held further: "On behalf of the transferee of the said property, it was contended that the West Bengal Tenancy Premises Act, 1956 protects such... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | The tenancy which is created was in derogation and in violation of the order of the court. Therefore, by acting in violation of the order of the court, no right, in my 978 opinion, can be created in favour of a third party. Indeed, the court has not acted. The action was in breach of the order of the court. " Similarly... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | Therefore the tenancy created in favour of the Tatas was in breach of the order of the court and consequently the Tatas cannot claim any protection under the provisions of the Act and they are liable to be evicted. In the counter affidavit filed on their behalf, it is no doubt stated that they were inducted into posses... | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | 1 Grindlays and allowed as against respondent No. 2 Tatas. In the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs. R.S.S. Appeal dis missed. | The appellant had filed a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule belonged to a joint family and that the trust created by the father of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the said properties was void. Pending the suit, a Receiv er was appointed by Justice A.N... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | ivil Appeal No. 3504 of 1991. the Judgment and Order dated 5.10.1990 of the Bombay High Court in W.P. No. 210 of 1990. Dhruv Mehta, S.K. Mehta and Aman Vachher for the Appellants. | The appellant was injured in a road accident on 22.1.1989, and a claim petition was filed belatedly on 15.3.1990 with a prayer for condonation of delay, before the Claims Tribunal. Meanwhile, the was repealed and the came into force with effect from 1.7.1989. The Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of s... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | Jitender Sharma for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHARMA, J. Special leave is granted. The appellant was injured in a road accident and his claim petition has been dismissed as being barred by limita tion. The accident took place on 22.1.1989. The Motor Vehi cles Act, 1939 was repealed by ... | The appellant was injured in a road accident on 22.1.1989, and a claim petition was filed belatedly on 15.3.1990 with a prayer for condonation of delay, before the Claims Tribunal. Meanwhile, the was repealed and the came into force with effect from 1.7.1989. The Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of s... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | The period of limitation for filing a claim petition both under the old Act and the new Act being six months expired on 22.7.1989. The claim petition of the appellant, however, was filed belatedly on 15.3.1990 with,a prayer for condonation of delay. The Accident Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of su... | The appellant was injured in a road accident on 22.1.1989, and a claim petition was filed belatedly on 15.3.1990 with a prayer for condonation of delay, before the Claims Tribunal. Meanwhile, the was repealed and the came into force with effect from 1.7.1989. The Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of s... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | It has been contended that since the accident took place when the old was in force, the proceeding before the Accident Claims Tribunal must be held to be governed by the old Act, and his petition cannot be dismissed on the basis of the provisions in the new Act. The period of limitation for filing a claim petition both... | The appellant was injured in a road accident on 22.1.1989, and a claim petition was filed belatedly on 15.3.1990 with a prayer for condonation of delay, before the Claims Tribunal. Meanwhile, the was repealed and the came into force with effect from 1.7.1989. The Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of s... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | The ques tion is as to which Act is applicable; the new Act or the old. It has been contended by the learned counsel that under the old Act the appellant had a right to file a claim petition even more than six months after the expiry of the period of limitation, and this right is preserved by reason of the provisions o... | The appellant was injured in a road accident on 22.1.1989, and a claim petition was filed belatedly on 15.3.1990 with a prayer for condonation of delay, before the Claims Tribunal. Meanwhile, the was repealed and the came into force with effect from 1.7.1989. The Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of s... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | Clause (e) is not attracted because, by the enactment of the new law the remedy of the appellant has not been affected at all. His right to claim compensa tion by filing the claim within the same period of limita tion has been preserved. And there was no application for condonation of delay in a proceeding pending at t... | The appellant was injured in a road accident on 22.1.1989, and a claim petition was filed belatedly on 15.3.1990 with a prayer for condonation of delay, before the Claims Tribunal. Meanwhile, the was repealed and the came into force with effect from 1.7.1989. The Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of s... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | The question is whether the appellant has been deprived of an accrued right or privilege in the present case 7. It is true that the appellant earlier could file an application even more than six months after the expiry of the period of limitation, but can this be treated to be a right which the appellant had acquired. ... | The appellant was injured in a road accident on 22.1.1989, and a claim petition was filed belatedly on 15.3.1990 with a prayer for condonation of delay, before the Claims Tribunal. Meanwhile, the was repealed and the came into force with effect from 1.7.1989. The Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of s... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | The second exception is where the new enactment leaves the claimant with such a short period for commencing the legal proceeding so as to make it impractical for him to avail of the remedy. This principle has been followed by this Court in many cases and by way of illustra tion we would like to mention New India Insura... | The appellant was injured in a road accident on 22.1.1989, and a claim petition was filed belatedly on 15.3.1990 with a prayer for condonation of delay, before the Claims Tribunal. Meanwhile, the was repealed and the came into force with effect from 1.7.1989. The Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of s... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | It was held that not having filed a suit before March, 1967 the only remedy of the respondent was by way of an application before the Tribunal. So far the period of limitation was concerned, it was observed that a new law of limitation providing for a shorter period cannot certainly extinguish a vested right of action.... | The appellant was injured in a road accident on 22.1.1989, and a claim petition was filed belatedly on 15.3.1990 with a prayer for condonation of delay, before the Claims Tribunal. Meanwhile, the was repealed and the came into force with effect from 1.7.1989. The Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of s... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | Liberty to apply for a right is not in it selt an accrued right or privilege. To illustrate the point, we may refer to some cases. In Director of Public Works and Another vs Ho Po Sang and Others, ; a Crown lessee in respect of certain premises which were in occupation of tenants and sub tenants entered into an agreeme... | The appellant was injured in a road accident on 22.1.1989, and a claim petition was filed belatedly on 15.3.1990 with a prayer for condonation of delay, before the Claims Tribunal. Meanwhile, the was repealed and the came into force with effect from 1.7.1989. The Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of s... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | Before the certificate could be finally issued, the relevant provision of the Ordinance entitling the lessee to recover vacant possession of the premises was repealed. The lessee claimed the right to vacant possession by relying on certain provi sions dealing with rules of interpretation similar in terms to section 6 o... | The appellant was injured in a road accident on 22.1.1989, and a claim petition was filed belatedly on 15.3.1990 with a prayer for condonation of delay, before the Claims Tribunal. Meanwhile, the was repealed and the came into force with effect from 1.7.1989. The Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of s... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | In Isha Valimohammad & Anr. vs Haji Gulam Mohammad & Haji Dada Trust, [1975] 1 SCR 720 the respondents let out the premises in question to the appellants in 1951 in a place where, by the Saurashtra Rent Control Act, sub letting by a tenant was prohibited. The appellants sub let the premises at a time when the Act was i... | The appellant was injured in a road accident on 22.1.1989, and a claim petition was filed belatedly on 15.3.1990 with a prayer for condonation of delay, before the Claims Tribunal. Meanwhile, the was repealed and the came into force with effect from 1.7.1989. The Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of s... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | This Court held that a notice under the Transfer of Properties Act was not necessary and in that view it con firmed the decree of the High Court. With respect to the finding of the High Court regarding the respondents acquir ing an accrued right even on the assumption that a notice under the Transfer of Properties Act ... | The appellant was injured in a road accident on 22.1.1989, and a claim petition was filed belatedly on 15.3.1990 with a prayer for condonation of delay, before the Claims Tribunal. Meanwhile, the was repealed and the came into force with effect from 1.7.1989. The Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of s... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | The decision partly rested on the ground that the Indian Code of Civil Procedure was not applicable to the State of Madhya Bharat. Subsequently the Code was extended tO that area which had become a part of the State of Madhya Pradesh and a fresh order was passed by the West Bengal Court transferring the decree to Moren... | The appellant was injured in a road accident on 22.1.1989, and a claim petition was filed belatedly on 15.3.1990 with a prayer for condonation of delay, before the Claims Tribunal. Meanwhile, the was repealed and the came into force with effect from 1.7.1989. The Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of s... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | Relying on several English decisions including that in Abbott vs Minister for Lands,, it was observed that the mere right existing at the date of the repeal of statute, to take advantage of provisions of the statute repealed is not a "right accrued" within the meaning of the usual saving clause. In the case before us t... | The appellant was injured in a road accident on 22.1.1989, and a claim petition was filed belatedly on 15.3.1990 with a prayer for condonation of delay, before the Claims Tribunal. Meanwhile, the was repealed and the came into force with effect from 1.7.1989. The Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of s... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | In this background the appellant 's fur ther default has to be considered. If in a given case the accident had taken place more than a year before the new Act coming in force and the claimant had actually filed his petition while the old Act was in force but after a period of one year, the position could be different. ... | The appellant was injured in a road accident on 22.1.1989, and a claim petition was filed belatedly on 15.3.1990 with a prayer for condonation of delay, before the Claims Tribunal. Meanwhile, the was repealed and the came into force with effect from 1.7.1989. The Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of s... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | In the present case the occasion to take the benefit of the provision for condona tion of delay in filing the claim arose only after repeal of the old law. Obviously the ground for condonation set up as 'sufficient cause ' also relates to the time after the re peal. The benefit of the repealed law could not, therefore,... | The appellant was injured in a road accident on 22.1.1989, and a claim petition was filed belatedly on 15.3.1990 with a prayer for condonation of delay, before the Claims Tribunal. Meanwhile, the was repealed and the came into force with effect from 1.7.1989. The Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of s... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | The appeal is dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs. G.N. Appeal dis missed. | The appellant was injured in a road accident on 22.1.1989, and a claim petition was filed belatedly on 15.3.1990 with a prayer for condonation of delay, before the Claims Tribunal. Meanwhile, the was repealed and the came into force with effect from 1.7.1989. The Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of s... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | Civil Appeal No. 3189/1989. From the Judgment and Order dated 11.3.1987 of the Delhi High Court in C.W.P. No. 875 of 1986 R.B. Datar and Ranjit Kumar for the Appellant. | Some persons were plying their business by squatting on pavement in front of a hospital in Delhi and had put up stalls or kiosk allegedly on Tehbazari under a licence under section 321 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Delhi Municipal Corporation tried to remove them by demolishing their stalls etc. The... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | V.B. Saharya for the D.D.A. Jose P. Verghese and O.P. Verma for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SEN, J. The main question involved in this appeal from a judgment and order of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dated March 11, 1987 is whether the High Court was justified, in the facts an... | Some persons were plying their business by squatting on pavement in front of a hospital in Delhi and had put up stalls or kiosk allegedly on Tehbazari under a licence under section 321 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Delhi Municipal Corporation tried to remove them by demolishing their stalls etc. The... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | The issue involved is as to the precedential value of a direction earlier made by this Court on a petition under article 32 of the Constitution based on consent of the parties with the reservation that it should not be treated as a precedent. It appears that sometime in 1984, the appellant Municipal Corporation of Delh... | Some persons were plying their business by squatting on pavement in front of a hospital in Delhi and had put up stalls or kiosk allegedly on Tehbazari under a licence under section 321 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Delhi Municipal Corporation tried to remove them by demolishing their stalls etc. The... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | The Municipal Corporation accordingly under section 322 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 had the right and authority to remove such encroachment without notice, and (ii) that the plaintiffs had no legally enforceable right under the terms of the tehbazari licence, they having committed violation of the term... | Some persons were plying their business by squatting on pavement in front of a hospital in Delhi and had put up stalls or kiosk allegedly on Tehbazari under a licence under section 321 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Delhi Municipal Corporation tried to remove them by demolishing their stalls etc. The... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | Bhalla, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs in all the suits made a statement to the effect: "The plaintiffs shall occupy only 6 ft. x 4 ft. space as allotted to them by the defendants and no further space beyond those limits. They have not constructed any permanent structure on the site and shall not construc... | Some persons were plying their business by squatting on pavement in front of a hospital in Delhi and had put up stalls or kiosk allegedly on Tehbazari under a licence under section 321 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Delhi Municipal Corporation tried to remove them by demolishing their stalls etc. The... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | 430(3) of DMC Act. " The learned Judge accordingly partly decreed the plaintiff 's claim to the extent indicated hereafter: "Consequently, all these suits are partly decreed to the effect that the defendants are restrained permanently from removing the palintiffs from the suit sites without terminating the Tehbazari pe... | Some persons were plying their business by squatting on pavement in front of a hospital in Delhi and had put up stalls or kiosk allegedly on Tehbazari under a licence under section 321 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Delhi Municipal Corporation tried to remove them by demolishing their stalls etc. The... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | It could not take recourse to its power of removal of encroachment without notice under section 322(a) of the Act. It is equally evident that the learned Subordinate Judge partly decreed the plaintiffs ' claim only to that extent that it restrained the Municipal Corporation from taking any steps for removal of such enc... | Some persons were plying their business by squatting on pavement in front of a hospital in Delhi and had put up stalls or kiosk allegedly on Tehbazari under a licence under section 321 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Delhi Municipal Corporation tried to remove them by demolishing their stalls etc. The... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | Two of the squatters, namely, one Jamna Das and his brother moved this Court by petition under article 32 of the Constitution, being Writ Petition Nos. 981 82/84 Jamna Das & Anr. vs Delhi Administration & Ors., seeking a writ in the nature of mandamus ordaining the Municipal Corporation to allot each of them a suitable... | Some persons were plying their business by squatting on pavement in front of a hospital in Delhi and had put up stalls or kiosk allegedly on Tehbazari under a licence under section 321 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Delhi Municipal Corporation tried to remove them by demolishing their stalls etc. The... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | It was averred that the Municipal Corporation could not take recourse to its power of eviction under section 322(a) of the Act without terminating the tehbazari licence in their favour and without following the procedure prescribed by proviso (a) to section 430(3) of the Act. Several adjournments were taken in an effor... | Some persons were plying their business by squatting on pavement in front of a hospital in Delhi and had put up stalls or kiosk allegedly on Tehbazari under a licence under section 321 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Delhi Municipal Corporation tried to remove them by demolishing their stalls etc. The... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | The Court also made it clear that the direction should not be treated as a precedent. Presumably because of the direction made by this Court in Jamna Das ' case. the respondent Gurnam Kaur moved the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution in April, l986 for the issuance of an appropriate writ or direction rest... | Some persons were plying their business by squatting on pavement in front of a hospital in Delhi and had put up stalls or kiosk allegedly on Tehbazari under a licence under section 321 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Delhi Municipal Corporation tried to remove them by demolishing their stalls etc. The... |
What is the summary of this judgment? | The High Court gave an option to the Municipal Corporation either to construct a stall similar to the one they had constructed in compliance with the direction made by this Court in Jamna Das ' case or, in the alternative, furnish to the respondent a plan of the stall with requisite permission so that she could build h... | Some persons were plying their business by squatting on pavement in front of a hospital in Delhi and had put up stalls or kiosk allegedly on Tehbazari under a licence under section 321 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Delhi Municipal Corporation tried to remove them by demolishing their stalls etc. The... |
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