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+[
+  {
+    "question": "In which of the following situations would Defendant's mistake most likely constitute a defense to the crime charged?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nMistake of fact is a defense where the reasonable mistake of fact precludes the presence of any mental element required in that crime. La. R.S. 14:16; see State v. Converse, 529 So.2d 459, 465 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 533 So.2d 355 (La.1988).\n\nelements of both offenses because no element of either offense negates an element of the other. Even though reckless murder involves a situation in which the defendant does not intend to kill or injure another person, it does not require that none of his actions be intentional. For example, it does not exclude the possibility that he committed another intentional act, such as setting a fire. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the appellant acted with extreme indifference to human life but did not intend to kill or injure the victim when he threw gasoline around the den;\n\n\u201c[N]egligence is the failure to use due care,\u201d i.e., \u201cthat degree of care which a person of ordinary prudence and reason would exercise under the same circumstances.\u201d Hart v. Doe, 261 S.C. 116, 122, 198 S.E.2d 526, 529 (1973). It is often referred to as either ordinary negligence or simple negligence. \u201cRecklessness implies the doing of a negligent act knowingly\u201d; it is a \u201cconscious failure to exercise due care.\u201d Yaun v. Baldridge, 243 S.C. 414, 419, 134 S.E.2d 248, 251 (1964) (citation omitted). If a person of ordinary reason and prudence would have been conscious of the probability of resulting\n\nD.D.A. v. State, 650 So.2d 571, 578 (Ala.Cr.App.1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also McLaughlin v. State, 586 So.2d 267, 270 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (the element of \u201cextreme indifference to human life\u201d by definition does not apply to the life of the victim, but to human life in general); Gholston v. State, 494 So.2d 876, 883 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (to be reckless, a crime must be directed toward the general public, not toward a particular person); King v. State, 505 So.2d 403, 405 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (reckless murder \u201cdiffers from intentional murder in that it results not from a specific, conscious intent to cause the death\n\nof any particular person, but from an indifference to or disregard of the risks attending appellant's conduct\u201d); Baker v. State, 472 So.2d 700, 703 (Ala.Cr.App.1985) (reckless murder \u201cis intended to embrace those cases where a person has no deliberate intent to kill or injure any particular individual\u201d); Northington v. State, 413 So.2d 1169, 1171 (Ala.Cr.App.1981) (where the defendant's acts were specifically directed at a particular victim and no one else, she could not be convicted of reckless murder under \u00a7 13A\u20136\u20132(a)(2), Code of Alabama 1975).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nIn which of the following situations would Defendant's mistake most likely constitute a defense to the crime charged?\n\n (A) A local ordinance forbids the sale of alcoholic beverages to persons under 18 years of age. Relying on false identification, Defendant sells champagne to a 16-year-old high school student. Defendant is charged with illegal sale of alcoholic beverages.\n (B) Mistaking Defendant for a narcotics suspect, an undercover police officer attempts to arrest him. Defendant, unaware that the person who has grabbed him is an officer, hits him and knocks him unconscious. Defendant is charged with assault.\n (C) Defendant, aged 23, has sexual intercourse with a 15-year-old prostitute who tells Defendant that she is 18. Defendant is charged with the felony of statutory rape under a statute that makes sexual relations with a child under 16 a felony.\n (D) Relying on erroneous advice from his attorney that, if his wife has abandoned him for more than a year, he is free to marry, Defendant remarries and is subsequently charged with bigamy.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "B",
+      "Mistaking Defendant for a narcotics suspect, an undercover police officer attempts to arrest him. Defendant, unaware that the person who has grabbed him is an officer, hits him and knocks him unconscious. Defendant is charged with assault."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_1017",
+    "retrieved_docs": "Mistake of fact is a defense where the reasonable mistake of fact precludes the presence of any mental element required in that crime. La. R.S. 14:16; see State v. Converse, 529 So.2d 459, 465 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 533 So.2d 355 (La.1988).\n\nelements of both offenses because no element of either offense negates an element of the other. Even though reckless murder involves a situation in which the defendant does not intend to kill or injure another person, it does not require that none of his actions be intentional. For example, it does not exclude the possibility that he committed another intentional act, such as setting a fire. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the appellant acted with extreme indifference to human life but did not intend to kill or injure the victim when he threw gasoline around the den;\n\n\u201c[N]egligence is the failure to use due care,\u201d i.e., \u201cthat degree of care which a person of ordinary prudence and reason would exercise under the same circumstances.\u201d Hart v. Doe, 261 S.C. 116, 122, 198 S.E.2d 526, 529 (1973). It is often referred to as either ordinary negligence or simple negligence. \u201cRecklessness implies the doing of a negligent act knowingly\u201d; it is a \u201cconscious failure to exercise due care.\u201d Yaun v. Baldridge, 243 S.C. 414, 419, 134 S.E.2d 248, 251 (1964) (citation omitted). If a person of ordinary reason and prudence would have been conscious of the probability of resulting\n\nD.D.A. v. State, 650 So.2d 571, 578 (Ala.Cr.App.1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also McLaughlin v. State, 586 So.2d 267, 270 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (the element of \u201cextreme indifference to human life\u201d by definition does not apply to the life of the victim, but to human life in general); Gholston v. State, 494 So.2d 876, 883 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (to be reckless, a crime must be directed toward the general public, not toward a particular person); King v. State, 505 So.2d 403, 405 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (reckless murder \u201cdiffers from intentional murder in that it results not from a specific, conscious intent to cause the death\n\nof any particular person, but from an indifference to or disregard of the risks attending appellant's conduct\u201d); Baker v. State, 472 So.2d 700, 703 (Ala.Cr.App.1985) (reckless murder \u201cis intended to embrace those cases where a person has no deliberate intent to kill or injure any particular individual\u201d); Northington v. State, 413 So.2d 1169, 1171 (Ala.Cr.App.1981) (where the defendant's acts were specifically directed at a particular victim and no one else, she could not be convicted of reckless murder under \u00a7 13A\u20136\u20132(a)(2), Code of Alabama 1975)."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Dock had been the unsuccessful suitor of Mary, who had recently announced her engagement to Paul. Angered by her engagement, Dock sent Mary the following letter: \"I hope you know what you arc doing. The man you think you love wears women's clothes when at home. A Friend.\" The receipt of this letter caused Mary great emotional distress. She hysterically telephoned Paul. read him the letter, and told him that she was breaking their engagement. The contents of the letter were not revealed to others. Paul, who was a young attorney in the state attorney's office, suffered serious humiliation and emotional distress as a result of the broken engagement. If Paul asserts a claim against Dock based on defamation and it is proved that Dock's statement was true, such proof will be",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\ntruth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim, and a defendant may attack the falsity prong of a plaintiff's claim by demonstrating the substantial truth of the allegedly defamatory statement.\n\nIn order to prevail on a defamation action, a plaintiff must prove the following four elements: \u201c(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault (negligence or greater) on the part of the publisher; and (4) resulting injury.\u201d Id. \u201cIn other words, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant, with actual malice or other fault, published a false statement with defamatory words which caused plaintiff damages.\u201d Id. (citations and quotations omitted).\n\n804(b)(3). Statements that are not inculpatory are not admissible pursuant to this rule even if they are part of a generally inculpatory statement or narrative. United States v. Ricardo, 472 F.3d 277, 287 (5th Cir.2006) (citing Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600\u201301). However, these rules cannot be applied except in the context of specific evidence.\n\nTo establish assault, the following elements must be proved: (1) the defendant acted either with the intent of making a contact with the person of the plaintiff or with the intent of putting the plaintiff in apprehension of such a contact; (2) the plaintiff was placed in apprehension of an imminent contact with his or her person by the conduct of the defendant; and (3) such contact was or appeared to be harmful or offensive.\n\nDeceit is a statutory cause of action under which \u201c[o]ne who willfully deceives another, with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers.\u201d SDCL 20\u201310\u20131. \u201cA deceit within the meaning of \u00a7 20\u201310\u20131 is either (1) The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true; (2) The assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true; (3) The suppression of\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nDock had been the unsuccessful suitor of Mary, who had recently announced her engagement to Paul. Angered by her engagement, Dock sent Mary the following letter: \"I hope you know what you arc doing. The man you think you love wears women's clothes when at home. A Friend.\" The receipt of this letter caused Mary great emotional distress. She hysterically telephoned Paul. read him the letter, and told him that she was breaking their engagement. The contents of the letter were not revealed to others. Paul, who was a young attorney in the state attorney's office, suffered serious humiliation and emotional distress as a result of the broken engagement. If Paul asserts a claim against Dock based on defamation and it is proved that Dock's statement was true, such proof will be\n\n (A) a defense by itself\n (B) a defense only if Dock was not actuated by malice\n (C) a defense only if Dock reasonably believed it to be true\n (D) no defense by itself\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "A",
+      "a defense by itself"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_102",
+    "retrieved_docs": "truth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim, and a defendant may attack the falsity prong of a plaintiff's claim by demonstrating the substantial truth of the allegedly defamatory statement.\n\nIn order to prevail on a defamation action, a plaintiff must prove the following four elements: \u201c(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault (negligence or greater) on the part of the publisher; and (4) resulting injury.\u201d Id. \u201cIn other words, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant, with actual malice or other fault, published a false statement with defamatory words which caused plaintiff damages.\u201d Id. (citations and quotations omitted).\n\n804(b)(3). Statements that are not inculpatory are not admissible pursuant to this rule even if they are part of a generally inculpatory statement or narrative. United States v. Ricardo, 472 F.3d 277, 287 (5th Cir.2006) (citing Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600\u201301). However, these rules cannot be applied except in the context of specific evidence.\n\nTo establish assault, the following elements must be proved: (1) the defendant acted either with the intent of making a contact with the person of the plaintiff or with the intent of putting the plaintiff in apprehension of such a contact; (2) the plaintiff was placed in apprehension of an imminent contact with his or her person by the conduct of the defendant; and (3) such contact was or appeared to be harmful or offensive.\n\nDeceit is a statutory cause of action under which \u201c[o]ne who willfully deceives another, with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers.\u201d SDCL 20\u201310\u20131. \u201cA deceit within the meaning of \u00a7 20\u201310\u20131 is either (1) The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true; (2) The assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true; (3) The suppression of"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Suppose Sue's contract had called for the conveyance of 'a good and marketable title.\" Pursuant to that contract, Peg paid the purchase price and accepted a deed from Sue containing no covenants of title. Sue's title to the one acre subsequently proved defective and Peg was ejected by Opal. Peg sued Sue. Which of the following results is most likely?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\n\u201cMarketable title is one that may be \u2018freely made the subject of resale\u2019 and that can be sold at a \u2018fair price to a reasonable purchaser or mortgaged to a person of reasonable prudence as security for the loan of money.\u2019 \u201d Kelley v. Leucadia Fin. Corp., 846 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1992) (quoting 77 Am.Jur.2d Vendor and Purchaser \u00a7 131, at 313\u201314 (1975)).\n\nAccordingly, breach of contract remedies are available to a buyer when the seller fails to make any delivery. S.W. Bell, 811 S.W.2d at 576. In contrast, breach of warranty remedies are available to a buyer who has received and accepted goods, but discovers they are defective in some manner. Id. In other words, when a party fails to deliver the goods as promised, a breach of contract occurs. See Chilton Ins. Co. v. Pate & Pate Enter., Inc., 930 S.W.2d 877, 890 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied). Conversely, when a seller delivers nonconforming goods, it is a breach of warranty.\n\nThey are distinguishable as well because they are predicated on the well-settled rule that a trustee in a deed of trust can only do with the trust property what the deed either in express terms or by necessary implication authorizes him to do. In other words, the powers of the person foreclosing under a mortgage or deed of trust are limited and defined by the instrument under which he acts, and he has only such authority as is thus expressly conferred upon him, together with incidental and implied powers that are necessarily included therein. Accordingly, the trustee or mortgagee must\n\nSince the law favors the free and unobstructed use of real property, a restrictive covenant must be strictly construed against those seeking to enforce it, and may not be given an interpretation extending beyond the clear meaning of its terms (see Witter v. Taggart, 78 N.Y.2d 234, 237\u2013238, 573 N.Y.S.2d 146, 577 N.E.2d 338; Wechsler v. Gasparrini, 40 A.D.3d 976, 836 N.Y.S.2d 673; Liebowitz v. Forman, 22 A.D.3d 530, 531, 802 N.Y.S.2d 238; Kaufman v. Fass, 302 A.D.2d 497, 498, 756 N.Y.S.2d 247, cert. denied 540 U.S. 1162, 124 S.Ct. 1173, 157 L.Ed.2d 1207). \u201c \u2018[W]here the language used in\n\nA deed is not legally effective until it has been delivered. While there is no prescribed method for an effective delivery of a deed, manual transfer of the instrument into the hand of the grantee is neither required to effectuate a valid delivery, nor dispositive of the issue. The term delivery in this regard refers to \u201cnot so much a manual act but the intention of the maker ... existing at the time of the transaction ... and not subject to later change of mind.\u201d \u201cDelivery of a deed includes, not only an act by which the grantor evinces a\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nSue owned a five-acre tract of land, one acre of which had previously been owned by Opal, but to which Sue had acquired title by adverse possession. Sue contracted to convey the full five-acre tract to Peg, but the contract did not specify the quality of title Sue would convey. At closing, Peg refused the tendered deed and demanded return of her earnest money.\nSuppose Sue's contract had called for the conveyance of 'a good and marketable title.\" Pursuant to that contract, Peg paid the purchase price and accepted a deed from Sue containing no covenants of title. Sue's title to the one acre subsequently proved defective and Peg was ejected by Opal. Peg sued Sue. Which of the following results is most likely?\n\n (A) Peg will win because Sue's deed was fraudulent.\n (B) Peg will win because the terms of the deed control Sue's liability.\n (C) Sue will win because the terms of the deed control her liability.\n (D) Sue will win because the deed incorporates the terms of the contract.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "Sue will win because the terms of the deed control her liability."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_5",
+    "retrieved_docs": "\u201cMarketable title is one that may be \u2018freely made the subject of resale\u2019 and that can be sold at a \u2018fair price to a reasonable purchaser or mortgaged to a person of reasonable prudence as security for the loan of money.\u2019 \u201d Kelley v. Leucadia Fin. Corp., 846 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1992) (quoting 77 Am.Jur.2d Vendor and Purchaser \u00a7 131, at 313\u201314 (1975)).\n\nAccordingly, breach of contract remedies are available to a buyer when the seller fails to make any delivery. S.W. Bell, 811 S.W.2d at 576. In contrast, breach of warranty remedies are available to a buyer who has received and accepted goods, but discovers they are defective in some manner. Id. In other words, when a party fails to deliver the goods as promised, a breach of contract occurs. See Chilton Ins. Co. v. Pate & Pate Enter., Inc., 930 S.W.2d 877, 890 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied). Conversely, when a seller delivers nonconforming goods, it is a breach of warranty.\n\nThey are distinguishable as well because they are predicated on the well-settled rule that a trustee in a deed of trust can only do with the trust property what the deed either in express terms or by necessary implication authorizes him to do. In other words, the powers of the person foreclosing under a mortgage or deed of trust are limited and defined by the instrument under which he acts, and he has only such authority as is thus expressly conferred upon him, together with incidental and implied powers that are necessarily included therein. Accordingly, the trustee or mortgagee must\n\nSince the law favors the free and unobstructed use of real property, a restrictive covenant must be strictly construed against those seeking to enforce it, and may not be given an interpretation extending beyond the clear meaning of its terms (see Witter v. Taggart, 78 N.Y.2d 234, 237\u2013238, 573 N.Y.S.2d 146, 577 N.E.2d 338; Wechsler v. Gasparrini, 40 A.D.3d 976, 836 N.Y.S.2d 673; Liebowitz v. Forman, 22 A.D.3d 530, 531, 802 N.Y.S.2d 238; Kaufman v. Fass, 302 A.D.2d 497, 498, 756 N.Y.S.2d 247, cert. denied 540 U.S. 1162, 124 S.Ct. 1173, 157 L.Ed.2d 1207). \u201c \u2018[W]here the language used in\n\nA deed is not legally effective until it has been delivered. While there is no prescribed method for an effective delivery of a deed, manual transfer of the instrument into the hand of the grantee is neither required to effectuate a valid delivery, nor dispositive of the issue. The term delivery in this regard refers to \u201cnot so much a manual act but the intention of the maker ... existing at the time of the transaction ... and not subject to later change of mind.\u201d \u201cDelivery of a deed includes, not only an act by which the grantor evinces a"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "James and Mary Green were walking to their car one evening after having seen a movie. As they were passing a dark alleyway, Daves leaped out brandishing a gun. He pushed Mary against the wall of a nearby building, held the gun to her head, and demanded money from James. James handed over his cash. Daves grabbed the cash and ran away. Which of the following, listed in descending order of seriousness, is the most serious crime for which Daves may be convicted?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nLarceny is an element of robbery, and \u201c \u2018there can be no robbery without a larcenous intent....\u2019 \u201d Hook v. State, 315 Md. 25, 30, 553 A.2d 233 (1989) (citation omitted). Therefore, the elements of larceny are important to an understanding of robbery. Larceny is defined as \u201c \u2018the fraudulent taking and carrying away of a thing without claim of right with the intention of converting it to a use other than that of the owner without his consent.\u2019 \u201d Metheny, 359 Md. at 605, 755 A.2d 1088 (quoting Hook, 315 Md. at 31, 553 A.2d 233)(emphasis in Hook ).\n\n\u201c \u2018The essential elements of an attempted robbery are (1) intent to commit robbery and (2) an overt act towards that commission.\u2019 \u201d Leyvas, 221 Ariz. 181, \u00b6 34, 211 P.3d at 1175, quoting State v. Clark, 143 Ariz. 332, 334, 693 P.2d 987, 989 (App.1984).\n\n\u201cMurder is the killing of one human being by another with the requisite malevolent state of mind and without justification, excuse, or mitigation.\u201d Ross v. State, 308 Md. 337, 340, 519 A.2d 735, 736 (1987). The malevolent states of mind that qualify are: (1) the intent to kill, (2) the intent to do grievous bodily harm, (3) the intent to do an act under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life (depraved heart), or (4) the intent to commit a dangerous felony. Id. The General Assembly has determined that certain murders qualify as murder in the first\n\ncausing an explosion, and when: \u201c(1) Another person is present in such building at the time, and \u201c(2) The actor knows that fact, or the circumstances are such as to render the presence of a person therein a reasonable possibility.\u201d 23As was the case in Heard, the appellant was convicted of more than one offense based on crimes committed against one victim. To be guilty of arson, he must have had the intent to start or maintain a fire. See Henderson v. State, 715 So.2d 863 (Ala.Crim.App.1997); Minnis v. State, 690 So.2d 521 (Ala.Crim.App.1996). \u201cThe *851 doctrine of universal malice,\n\nLarceny is the fraudulent and wrongful taking and carrying away the property of another with intent to convert such property to the taker's use without the consent of the owner. Lucero v. Montes, 177 B.R. 325, 331 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1994). ; \u2018[A]n accomplice is one who aids or promotes the perpetrator's crime with knowledge of the perpetrator's unlawful purpose and an intent to assist in the commission of the target crime....\u2019 [Citation.] \u2018In order to be an accomplice, the witness must be chargeable with the crime as a principal (\u00a7 31) and not merely as an accessory after the fact (\u00a7\u00a7 32,\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nJames and Mary Green were walking to their car one evening after having seen a movie. As they were passing a dark alleyway, Daves leaped out brandishing a gun. He pushed Mary against the wall of a nearby building, held the gun to her head, and demanded money from James. James handed over his cash. Daves grabbed the cash and ran away. Which of the following, listed in descending order of seriousness, is the most serious crime for which Daves may be convicted?\n\n (A) Robbery from James Green.\n (B) Larceny from James Green.\n (C) Assault on James and Mary Green.\n (D) Assault on Mary Green.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "A",
+      "Robbery from James Green."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_959",
+    "retrieved_docs": "Larceny is an element of robbery, and \u201c \u2018there can be no robbery without a larcenous intent....\u2019 \u201d Hook v. State, 315 Md. 25, 30, 553 A.2d 233 (1989) (citation omitted). Therefore, the elements of larceny are important to an understanding of robbery. Larceny is defined as \u201c \u2018the fraudulent taking and carrying away of a thing without claim of right with the intention of converting it to a use other than that of the owner without his consent.\u2019 \u201d Metheny, 359 Md. at 605, 755 A.2d 1088 (quoting Hook, 315 Md. at 31, 553 A.2d 233)(emphasis in Hook ).\n\n\u201c \u2018The essential elements of an attempted robbery are (1) intent to commit robbery and (2) an overt act towards that commission.\u2019 \u201d Leyvas, 221 Ariz. 181, \u00b6 34, 211 P.3d at 1175, quoting State v. Clark, 143 Ariz. 332, 334, 693 P.2d 987, 989 (App.1984).\n\n\u201cMurder is the killing of one human being by another with the requisite malevolent state of mind and without justification, excuse, or mitigation.\u201d Ross v. State, 308 Md. 337, 340, 519 A.2d 735, 736 (1987). The malevolent states of mind that qualify are: (1) the intent to kill, (2) the intent to do grievous bodily harm, (3) the intent to do an act under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life (depraved heart), or (4) the intent to commit a dangerous felony. Id. The General Assembly has determined that certain murders qualify as murder in the first\n\ncausing an explosion, and when: \u201c(1) Another person is present in such building at the time, and \u201c(2) The actor knows that fact, or the circumstances are such as to render the presence of a person therein a reasonable possibility.\u201d 23As was the case in Heard, the appellant was convicted of more than one offense based on crimes committed against one victim. To be guilty of arson, he must have had the intent to start or maintain a fire. See Henderson v. State, 715 So.2d 863 (Ala.Crim.App.1997); Minnis v. State, 690 So.2d 521 (Ala.Crim.App.1996). \u201cThe *851 doctrine of universal malice,\n\nLarceny is the fraudulent and wrongful taking and carrying away the property of another with intent to convert such property to the taker's use without the consent of the owner. Lucero v. Montes, 177 B.R. 325, 331 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1994). ; \u2018[A]n accomplice is one who aids or promotes the perpetrator's crime with knowledge of the perpetrator's unlawful purpose and an intent to assist in the commission of the target crime....\u2019 [Citation.] \u2018In order to be an accomplice, the witness must be chargeable with the crime as a principal (\u00a7 31) and not merely as an accessory after the fact (\u00a7\u00a7 32,"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "For this question only, assume the following facts. Amicusbank lent Bouquet $200,000 and Bouquet executed a written instrument providing that Amicusbank \"is entitled to collect the debt from my share of the profits, if any, under the Vintage-Bouquet contract\" Amicusbank gave prompt notice of this transaction to Vintage. If Vintage thereafter refuses to account for any profits to Amicusbank and Amicusbank sues Vintage for Bouquet's share of profits then realized, Vintage's strongest argument in defense is that",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nTo qualify as a third-party beneficiary, a party must show that it is either a \u201cdonee\u201d or \u201ccreditor\u201d beneficiary of the contract. Id. at 651. A party is a donee beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract, when rendered, is a \u201cpure donation\u201d to that party. Id. On the other hand, a party is a creditor beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract is rendered in satisfaction of a legal duty owed to that party. Id. The legal duty may be an indebtedness, contractual obligation, or other legally enforceable commitment owed to the third party. Id. Based on\n\nthe circumstances of this case, we must determine whether the subcontractors qualify as creditor beneficiaries.\n\nFor a third-party beneficiary to succeed on a breach of contract claim under New York law, \u201ca non-party must be the intended beneficiary of the contract, not an incidental beneficiary to whom no duty is owed.\u201d Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 251 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 728 F.2d 52, 63 (2d Cir. 1984)). The non-party \u201cmust establish (1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for his or her benefit, and (3) that the benefit to him or\n\nA deed is not legally effective until it has been delivered. While there is no prescribed method for an effective delivery of a deed, manual transfer of the instrument into the hand of the grantee is neither required to effectuate a valid delivery, nor dispositive of the issue. The term delivery in this regard refers to \u201cnot so much a manual act but the intention of the maker ... existing at the time of the transaction ... and not subject to later change of mind.\u201d \u201cDelivery of a deed includes, not only an act by which the grantor evinces a\n\npurpose to part with the control of the instrument, but a concurring intent thereby to vest the title in the grantee.\" \u201cThe controlling question of delivery in all cases is one of intention.\u201d\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nA written contract was entered into between Bouquet, a financier-investor, and Vintage Corporation, a winery and grape-grower. The contract provided that Bouquet would invest $1,000,000 in Vintage for its capital expansion and, in return, that Vintage, from grapes grown in its famous vineyards, would produce and market at least 500,000 bottles of wine each year for five years under the label \"Premium Vintage-Bouquet' The contract included provisions that the parties would share equally the profits and losses from the venture and that, if feasible, the wine would be distributed by Vintage only through Claret, a wholesale distributor of fine wines. Neither Bouquet nor Vintage had previously dealt with Claret. Claret learned of the contract two days later from reading a trade newspaper. In reliance thereon, he immediately hired an additional sales executive and contracted for enlargement of his wine storage and display facility.\nFor this question only, assume the following facts. Amicusbank lent Bouquet $200,000 and Bouquet executed a written instrument providing that Amicusbank \"is entitled to collect the debt from my share of the profits, if any, under the Vintage-Bouquet contract\" Amicusbank gave prompt notice of this transaction to Vintage. If Vintage thereafter refuses to account for any profits to Amicusbank and Amicusbank sues Vintage for Bouquet's share of profits then realized, Vintage's strongest argument in defense is that\n\n (A) the Bouquet-Vintage contract did not expressly authorize an assignment of rights\n (B) Bouquet and Vintage are partners, not simply debtor and creditor\n (C) Amicusbank is not an assignee of Bouquet's rights under the Bouquet-Vintage contract\n (D) Amicusbank is not an intended third-party beneficiary of the Bouquet-Vintage contract\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "Amicusbank is not an assignee of Bouquet's rights under the Bouquet-Vintage contract"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_484",
+    "retrieved_docs": "To qualify as a third-party beneficiary, a party must show that it is either a \u201cdonee\u201d or \u201ccreditor\u201d beneficiary of the contract. Id. at 651. A party is a donee beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract, when rendered, is a \u201cpure donation\u201d to that party. Id. On the other hand, a party is a creditor beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract is rendered in satisfaction of a legal duty owed to that party. Id. The legal duty may be an indebtedness, contractual obligation, or other legally enforceable commitment owed to the third party. Id. Based on\n\nthe circumstances of this case, we must determine whether the subcontractors qualify as creditor beneficiaries.\n\nFor a third-party beneficiary to succeed on a breach of contract claim under New York law, \u201ca non-party must be the intended beneficiary of the contract, not an incidental beneficiary to whom no duty is owed.\u201d Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 251 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 728 F.2d 52, 63 (2d Cir. 1984)). The non-party \u201cmust establish (1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for his or her benefit, and (3) that the benefit to him or\n\nA deed is not legally effective until it has been delivered. While there is no prescribed method for an effective delivery of a deed, manual transfer of the instrument into the hand of the grantee is neither required to effectuate a valid delivery, nor dispositive of the issue. The term delivery in this regard refers to \u201cnot so much a manual act but the intention of the maker ... existing at the time of the transaction ... and not subject to later change of mind.\u201d \u201cDelivery of a deed includes, not only an act by which the grantor evinces a\n\npurpose to part with the control of the instrument, but a concurring intent thereby to vest the title in the grantee.\" \u201cThe controlling question of delivery in all cases is one of intention.\u201d"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "The prosecutor offers the testimony of a bartender that when he saw the money in Miller's wallet, he said, \"You must have robbed a bank,\" to which Miller made no reply. This evidence is",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nHearsay is generally defined as an out-of-court statement made by a declarant and offered for the truth of the matter asserted (see Nucci v. Proper, 95 N.Y.2d 597, 602, 721 N.Y.S.2d 593, 744 N.E.2d 128 [2001]; People v. Buie, 86 N.Y.2d 501, 505, 634 N.Y.S.2d 415, 658 N.E.2d 192 [1995];\n\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nFor an admission by a party-opponent to be admissible: 1) the statement must be a conscious or voluntary acknowledgment by a party-opponent of the existence of certain facts; 2) the matter acknowledged must be relevant to the cause of the party offering the admission; and 3) the matter acknowledged must be unfavorable to or inconsistent with the position now taken by the party-opponent. Bowls v. Scarborough, 950 S.W.2d 691, 702 (Mo.App.W.D.1997).\n\nHowever, prior consistent statements are admissible as non-hearsay if: (1) the individual who made the prior consistent statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; and (2) the statement is offered in an effort to rebut an express or implied accusation of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication. See Chandler, 702 So.2d at 197\u201398; see also \u00a7 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Both conditions must be met for admission of a prior consistent statement as nonhearsay. Harris v. State, 843 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.2003).\n\n804(b)(3). Statements that are not inculpatory are not admissible pursuant to this rule even if they are part of a generally inculpatory statement or narrative. United States v. Ricardo, 472 F.3d 277, 287 (5th Cir.2006) (citing Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600\u201301). However, these rules cannot be applied except in the context of specific evidence.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nMiller is tried for armed robbery of the First Bank of City.\nThe prosecutor offers the testimony of a bartender that when he saw the money in Miller's wallet, he said, \"You must have robbed a bank,\" to which Miller made no reply. This evidence is\n\n (A) admissible to prove that Miller's conduct caused the bartender to believe that Miller robbed the bank\n (B) admissible as a statement made in the presence of the defendant\n (C) inadmissible, because it would violate Miller's privilege against self-incrimination\n (D) inadmissible, because Miller had no reason to respond to the bartender's statement\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "D",
+      "inadmissible, because Miller had no reason to respond to the bartender's statement"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_279",
+    "retrieved_docs": "Hearsay is generally defined as an out-of-court statement made by a declarant and offered for the truth of the matter asserted (see Nucci v. Proper, 95 N.Y.2d 597, 602, 721 N.Y.S.2d 593, 744 N.E.2d 128 [2001]; People v. Buie, 86 N.Y.2d 501, 505, 634 N.Y.S.2d 415, 658 N.E.2d 192 [1995];\n\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nFor an admission by a party-opponent to be admissible: 1) the statement must be a conscious or voluntary acknowledgment by a party-opponent of the existence of certain facts; 2) the matter acknowledged must be relevant to the cause of the party offering the admission; and 3) the matter acknowledged must be unfavorable to or inconsistent with the position now taken by the party-opponent. Bowls v. Scarborough, 950 S.W.2d 691, 702 (Mo.App.W.D.1997).\n\nHowever, prior consistent statements are admissible as non-hearsay if: (1) the individual who made the prior consistent statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; and (2) the statement is offered in an effort to rebut an express or implied accusation of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication. See Chandler, 702 So.2d at 197\u201398; see also \u00a7 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Both conditions must be met for admission of a prior consistent statement as nonhearsay. Harris v. State, 843 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.2003).\n\n804(b)(3). Statements that are not inculpatory are not admissible pursuant to this rule even if they are part of a generally inculpatory statement or narrative. United States v. Ricardo, 472 F.3d 277, 287 (5th Cir.2006) (citing Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600\u201301). However, these rules cannot be applied except in the context of specific evidence."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "In a trial to a jury, Owner proved that Power Company's negligent maintenance of a transformer caused a fire that destroyed his restaurant. The jury returned a verdict for Owner in the amount of $450,000 for property loss and $500,000 for emotional distress. The trial judge entered judgment in those amounts. Power Company appealed that part of the judgment awarding $500,000 for emotional distress. On appeal, the judgment should be",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nsentiment,\u201d Brown v. Frontier Theatres, 369 S.W.2d at 305, the loss in value to her. Because the injury to Likes's property was not intentional or malicious, or even grossly negligent, we need not decide whether mental anguish arising out of property damage may be legally compensable when a heightened degree of misconduct is found. Compare Luna, 667 S.W.2d at 117 (stating in dicta that mental anguish is recoverable for \u201cwillful tort, willful and wanton disregard, or gross negligence\u201d), with Reinhardt Motors, Inc. v. Boston, 516 So.2d 509, 511 (Ala.1986) (limiting mental anguish for property damage to cases in which the\n\nFor these reasons, we reaffirm today that damages measured by diminution in value are an adequate and appropriate remedy for negligent harm to real or personal property, and that mental anguish based solely on negligent property damage is not compensable as a matter of law. The proper measure of Likes's damages\u2014although she cannot recover on those claims for which the City has sovereign immunity from suit for property damages\u2014is (1) the loss in market value of her property caused by the defendant's negligence and (2) for those items of small or no market value that \u201chave their primary value in\n\ninjury \u201cis committed under circumstances of insult or contumely\u201d and thus constitutes a tort against the plaintiff personally rather than a mere property tort).\n\nConsequential damages\u201d cover all losses that are reasonably foreseeable to the actor, even if they do not result inevitably from the act complained of. See John Hetherington & Sons v. William Firth Co., 210 Mass. 8, 21, 95 N.E. 961 (1911); Smethurst, supra 148 Mass. at 265, 19 N.E. 387; H. L. Oleck, supra s 17. For example, consequential damages in an action based on contract or warranty may include personal *113 injuries caused by the breach. G.L. c. 106, s 2-715. Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 583-589, 296 N.E.2d 183 (1973).\n\nthe damages may not be merely speculative, possible or imaginary, but must be reasonably certain and directly traceable to the breach, not remote or the result of other intervening causes.... In addition, there must be a showing that the particular damages were fairly within the contemplation of the parties to the contract at the time it was made. Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 67 N.Y.2d 257, 261, 502 N.Y.S.2d 131, 132, 493 N.E.2d 234 (1986) (per curiam) (\u201cKenford I \u201d) (citations omitted).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nIn a trial to a jury, Owner proved that Power Company's negligent maintenance of a transformer caused a fire that destroyed his restaurant. The jury returned a verdict for Owner in the amount of $450,000 for property loss and $500,000 for emotional distress. The trial judge entered judgment in those amounts. Power Company appealed that part of the judgment awarding $500,000 for emotional distress. On appeal, the judgment should be\n\n (A) affirmed, because Power Company negligently caused Owner's emotional distress.\n (B) affirmed, because harm arising from emotional distress is as real as harm caused by physical impact.\n (C) reversed, because the law does not recognize a claim for emotional distress incident to negligently caused property loss.\n (D) reversed, unless the jury found that Owner suffered physical harm as a consequence of the emotional distress caused by his property loss.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "reversed, because the law does not recognize a claim for emotional distress incident to negligently caused property loss."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_1080",
+    "retrieved_docs": "sentiment,\u201d Brown v. Frontier Theatres, 369 S.W.2d at 305, the loss in value to her. Because the injury to Likes's property was not intentional or malicious, or even grossly negligent, we need not decide whether mental anguish arising out of property damage may be legally compensable when a heightened degree of misconduct is found. Compare Luna, 667 S.W.2d at 117 (stating in dicta that mental anguish is recoverable for \u201cwillful tort, willful and wanton disregard, or gross negligence\u201d), with Reinhardt Motors, Inc. v. Boston, 516 So.2d 509, 511 (Ala.1986) (limiting mental anguish for property damage to cases in which the\n\nFor these reasons, we reaffirm today that damages measured by diminution in value are an adequate and appropriate remedy for negligent harm to real or personal property, and that mental anguish based solely on negligent property damage is not compensable as a matter of law. The proper measure of Likes's damages\u2014although she cannot recover on those claims for which the City has sovereign immunity from suit for property damages\u2014is (1) the loss in market value of her property caused by the defendant's negligence and (2) for those items of small or no market value that \u201chave their primary value in\n\ninjury \u201cis committed under circumstances of insult or contumely\u201d and thus constitutes a tort against the plaintiff personally rather than a mere property tort).\n\nConsequential damages\u201d cover all losses that are reasonably foreseeable to the actor, even if they do not result inevitably from the act complained of. See John Hetherington & Sons v. William Firth Co., 210 Mass. 8, 21, 95 N.E. 961 (1911); Smethurst, supra 148 Mass. at 265, 19 N.E. 387; H. L. Oleck, supra s 17. For example, consequential damages in an action based on contract or warranty may include personal *113 injuries caused by the breach. G.L. c. 106, s 2-715. Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 583-589, 296 N.E.2d 183 (1973).\n\nthe damages may not be merely speculative, possible or imaginary, but must be reasonably certain and directly traceable to the breach, not remote or the result of other intervening causes.... In addition, there must be a showing that the particular damages were fairly within the contemplation of the parties to the contract at the time it was made. Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 67 N.Y.2d 257, 261, 502 N.Y.S.2d 131, 132, 493 N.E.2d 234 (1986) (per curiam) (\u201cKenford I \u201d) (citations omitted)."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "A federal statute prohibits the sale or resale, in any place in this country, of any product intended for human consumption or ingestion into the human body that contains designated chemicals known to cause cancer, unless the product is clearly labeled as dangerous. The constitutionality of this federal statute may most easily be justified on the basis of the power of Congress to",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nCongress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S., at 37, 57 S.Ct., at 624, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, Wirtz, supra, at 196, n. 27, 88 S.Ct., at 2024, n. 27.\n\nFederal Preemption When state law and federal law conflict, federal law displaces, or preempts, state law, due to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. VI., \u00a7 2. Preemption applies regardless of whether the conflicting laws come from legislatures, courts, administrative agencies, or constitutions. For example, the Voting Rights Act, an act of Congress, preempts state constitutions, and FDA regulations may preempt state court judgments in cases involving prescription drugs. Congress has preempted state regulation in many areas. In some cases, such as medical devices, Congress preempted all state regulation. In others, such as labels on prescription drugs,\n\nCongress allowed federal regulatory agencies to set national minimum standards, but did not preempt state regulations imposing more stringent standards than those imposed by federal regulators. Where rules or regulations do not clearly state whether or not preemption should apply, the Supreme Court tries to follow lawmakers\u2019 intent, and prefers interpretations that avoid preempting state laws.\n\nThe Supremacy Clause restricts the power of state and local governments to regulate federal offices and officeholders. U.S. Const. art. 6, cl. 2.\n\nThe doctrine of the Constitution and of the cases thus far may be summed up in these propositions: (1.) The original jurisdiction of this court cannot be extended by Congress to any other cases than those expressly defined by the Constitution. (2.) The appellate jurisdiction of this court, conferred by the Constitution, extends to all other cases within the judicial power of the United States. (3.) This appellate jurisdiction is subject to such exceptions, and must be exercised under such regulations as Congress, in the exercise of its discretion, has made or may see fit to make.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nA federal statute prohibits the sale or resale, in any place in this country, of any product intended for human consumption or ingestion into the human body that contains designated chemicals known to cause cancer, unless the product is clearly labeled as dangerous. The constitutionality of this federal statute may most easily be justified on the basis of the power of Congress to\n\n (A) regulate commerce among the states.\n (B) enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.\n (C) provide for the general welfare.\n (D) promote science and the useful arts.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "A",
+      "regulate commerce among the states."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_579",
+    "retrieved_docs": "Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S., at 37, 57 S.Ct., at 624, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, Wirtz, supra, at 196, n. 27, 88 S.Ct., at 2024, n. 27.\n\nFederal Preemption When state law and federal law conflict, federal law displaces, or preempts, state law, due to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. VI., \u00a7 2. Preemption applies regardless of whether the conflicting laws come from legislatures, courts, administrative agencies, or constitutions. For example, the Voting Rights Act, an act of Congress, preempts state constitutions, and FDA regulations may preempt state court judgments in cases involving prescription drugs. Congress has preempted state regulation in many areas. In some cases, such as medical devices, Congress preempted all state regulation. In others, such as labels on prescription drugs,\n\nCongress allowed federal regulatory agencies to set national minimum standards, but did not preempt state regulations imposing more stringent standards than those imposed by federal regulators. Where rules or regulations do not clearly state whether or not preemption should apply, the Supreme Court tries to follow lawmakers\u2019 intent, and prefers interpretations that avoid preempting state laws.\n\nThe Supremacy Clause restricts the power of state and local governments to regulate federal offices and officeholders. U.S. Const. art. 6, cl. 2.\n\nThe doctrine of the Constitution and of the cases thus far may be summed up in these propositions: (1.) The original jurisdiction of this court cannot be extended by Congress to any other cases than those expressly defined by the Constitution. (2.) The appellate jurisdiction of this court, conferred by the Constitution, extends to all other cases within the judicial power of the United States. (3.) This appellate jurisdiction is subject to such exceptions, and must be exercised under such regulations as Congress, in the exercise of its discretion, has made or may see fit to make."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "For this question only, assume that soon after the sale, Aberlone won three races and earned $400,000 for Sherwood. Which of the following additional facts, if established by Walker, would best support his chance of obtaining rescission of the sale to Sherwood?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nrescission is a proper remedy when the breach of contract is so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in making the agreement\n\nA condition subsequent is something that may occur after a promise is made, which will excuse the obligation of a party. An example of such a condition is that the obligation of a buyer to complete a purchase may be excused if a property is damaged by a natural disaster or fire before the close of escrow. That a condition, as opposed to a covenant, exists can often be seen by the use of words such as \u201cif,\u201d \u201cwhen,\u201d \u201cunless,\u201d \u201csubject to,\u201d or \u201cconditional upon.\u201d\n\nany definite and seasonable expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance even though it is not a mirror image of the offer unless the acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. However that section still requires a definite expression of acceptance and does not change the basic common law requirement that there must be an objective manifestation of mutual assent. (Ore & Chemical Corp. v. Howard Butcher Trading Co. (E.D.Pa.1978), 455 F.Supp. 1150.)\n\nattending circumstances, as well as by the words they use. In accordance with the rules for the construction of contracts, where a contract is ambiguous on its face, evidence of the surrounding circumstances and the subsequent conduct of the parties in the execution of the contract is admissible to interpret the contract; and the circumstances in which the parties to a contract are placed are generally admissible where such evidence will shed light upon issues in the case. In many instances, facts can be proved only by circumstantial evidence. Such evidence may in fact be the only means of proving\n\n\u201c \u2018Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the obligation impossible or highly impracticable.\u2019 \u201d Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, \u00b6 12, 232 P.3d 1081 (emphases omitted) (quoting Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 261 (1981) (\u201cWhere, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nWalker, who knew nothing about horses, inherited Aberlone, a thoroughbred colt whose disagreeable behavior made him a pest around the barn. Walker sold the colt for $1,500 to Sherwood, an experienced racehorse-trainer who knew of Walker's ignorance about horses. At the time of sale, Walker said to Sherwood, \"I hate to say it, but this horse is bad-tempered and nothing special.\"\nFor this question only, assume that soon after the sale, Aberlone won three races and earned $400,000 for Sherwood. Which of the following additional facts, if established by Walker, would best support his chance of obtaining rescission of the sale to Sherwood?\n\n (A) Walker did not know until after the sale that Sherwood was an experienced racehorse-trainer.\n (B) At a pre-sale exercise session of which Sherwood knew that Walker was not aware, Sherwood clocked Aberlone in record-setting time, far surpassing any previous performance.\n (C) Aberlone was the only thoroughbred that Walker owned, and Walker did not know how to evaluate young and untested racehorses.\n (D) At the time of the sale, Walker was angry and upset over an incident in which Aberlone had reared and thrown a rider.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "B",
+      "At a pre-sale exercise session of which Sherwood knew that Walker was not aware, Sherwood clocked Aberlone in record-setting time, far surpassing any previous performance."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_811",
+    "retrieved_docs": "rescission is a proper remedy when the breach of contract is so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in making the agreement\n\nA condition subsequent is something that may occur after a promise is made, which will excuse the obligation of a party. An example of such a condition is that the obligation of a buyer to complete a purchase may be excused if a property is damaged by a natural disaster or fire before the close of escrow. That a condition, as opposed to a covenant, exists can often be seen by the use of words such as \u201cif,\u201d \u201cwhen,\u201d \u201cunless,\u201d \u201csubject to,\u201d or \u201cconditional upon.\u201d\n\nany definite and seasonable expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance even though it is not a mirror image of the offer unless the acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. However that section still requires a definite expression of acceptance and does not change the basic common law requirement that there must be an objective manifestation of mutual assent. (Ore & Chemical Corp. v. Howard Butcher Trading Co. (E.D.Pa.1978), 455 F.Supp. 1150.)\n\nattending circumstances, as well as by the words they use. In accordance with the rules for the construction of contracts, where a contract is ambiguous on its face, evidence of the surrounding circumstances and the subsequent conduct of the parties in the execution of the contract is admissible to interpret the contract; and the circumstances in which the parties to a contract are placed are generally admissible where such evidence will shed light upon issues in the case. In many instances, facts can be proved only by circumstantial evidence. Such evidence may in fact be the only means of proving\n\n\u201c \u2018Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the obligation impossible or highly impracticable.\u2019 \u201d Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, \u00b6 12, 232 P.3d 1081 (emphases omitted) (quoting Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 261 (1981) (\u201cWhere, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "A burglar stole Collecta's impressionist painting valued at $400,000. Collecta, who had insured the painting for $300,000 with Artistic Insurance Co., promised to pay $25,000 to Snoop, a full-time investigator for Artistic, if he effected the return of the painting to her in good condition. By company rules, Artistic permits its investigators to accept and retain rewards from policyholders for the recovery of insured property. Snoop, by long and skillful detective work, recovered the picture and returned it undamaged to Collecta. If Collecta refuses to pay Snoop anything, and he sues her for $25,000, what is the probable result under the prevailing modern rule?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nUnder the preexisting duty rule, it is well settled that doing what one is legally bound to do is not consideration for a new promise. Puett v. Walker, 332 Mich. 117, 122, 50 N.W.2d 740 (1952). This rule bars the modification of an existing contractual relationship when the purported consideration for the modification consists of the performance or promise to perform that which one party was already required to do under the terms of the existing agreement. Borg\u2013Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Dep't of State, 433 Mich. 16, 22, n. 3, 444 N.W.2d 786 (1989).\n\nTo qualify as a third-party beneficiary, a party must show that it is either a \u201cdonee\u201d or \u201ccreditor\u201d beneficiary of the contract. Id. at 651. A party is a donee beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract, when rendered, is a \u201cpure donation\u201d to that party. Id. On the other hand, a party is a creditor beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract is rendered in satisfaction of a legal duty owed to that party. Id. The legal duty may be an indebtedness, contractual obligation, or other legally enforceable commitment owed to the third party. Id. Based on\n\nCourts of equity will not undertake to enforce the specific performance of a contract for personal services which are material or mechanical, and not peculiar or individual; but where the contract stipulates for special, unique, or extraordinary personal services, or where the services to be rendered are purely intellectual and individual in their character, the courts will grant an injunction in aid of a specific performance. William Rogers Mfg. Co. v. Rogers, 58 Conn. 356, 20 Atl. 467, 7 L. R. A. 779, 18 Am. St. Rep. 278. If a contract implies the performance of personal services requiring special skill,\n\nIn an action for breach of contract, the injured party is entitled to the benefit of the bargain, and the recovery may include the profits which he would have derived from performance of the contract. See Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 116 (2d Cir.1976). New York law, which controls here, permits recovery of lost future profits as damages, but only under rigorous rules: First, it must be demonstrated with certainty that such damages have been caused by the breach and, second, the alleged loss must be capable of proof with reasonable certainty. In other words,\n\nFor a third-party beneficiary to succeed on a breach of contract claim under New York law, \u201ca non-party must be the intended beneficiary of the contract, not an incidental beneficiary to whom no duty is owed.\u201d Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 251 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 728 F.2d 52, 63 (2d Cir. 1984)). The non-party \u201cmust establish (1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for his or her benefit, and (3) that the benefit to him or\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nA burglar stole Collecta's impressionist painting valued at $400,000. Collecta, who had insured the painting for $300,000 with Artistic Insurance Co., promised to pay $25,000 to Snoop, a full-time investigator for Artistic, if he effected the return of the painting to her in good condition. By company rules, Artistic permits its investigators to accept and retain rewards from policyholders for the recovery of insured property. Snoop, by long and skillful detective work, recovered the picture and returned it undamaged to Collecta. If Collecta refuses to pay Snoop anything, and he sues her for $25,000, what is the probable result under the prevailing modern rule?\n\n (A) Collecta wins, because Snoop owed Artistic a preexisting duty to recover the picture if possible.\n (B) Collecta wins, because Artistic, Snoop's employer, had a preexisting duty to return the recovered painting to Collecta.\n (C) Snoop wins, because Collecta will benefit more from return of the $400,000 painting than from receiving the $300,000 policy proceeds.\n (D) Snoop wins, because the preexisting duty rule does not apply if the promise's (Snoop's) duty was owed to a third person.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "D",
+      "Snoop wins, because the preexisting duty rule does not apply if the promise's (Snoop's) duty was owed to a third person."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_933",
+    "retrieved_docs": "Under the preexisting duty rule, it is well settled that doing what one is legally bound to do is not consideration for a new promise. Puett v. Walker, 332 Mich. 117, 122, 50 N.W.2d 740 (1952). This rule bars the modification of an existing contractual relationship when the purported consideration for the modification consists of the performance or promise to perform that which one party was already required to do under the terms of the existing agreement. Borg\u2013Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Dep't of State, 433 Mich. 16, 22, n. 3, 444 N.W.2d 786 (1989).\n\nTo qualify as a third-party beneficiary, a party must show that it is either a \u201cdonee\u201d or \u201ccreditor\u201d beneficiary of the contract. Id. at 651. A party is a donee beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract, when rendered, is a \u201cpure donation\u201d to that party. Id. On the other hand, a party is a creditor beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract is rendered in satisfaction of a legal duty owed to that party. Id. The legal duty may be an indebtedness, contractual obligation, or other legally enforceable commitment owed to the third party. Id. Based on\n\nCourts of equity will not undertake to enforce the specific performance of a contract for personal services which are material or mechanical, and not peculiar or individual; but where the contract stipulates for special, unique, or extraordinary personal services, or where the services to be rendered are purely intellectual and individual in their character, the courts will grant an injunction in aid of a specific performance. William Rogers Mfg. Co. v. Rogers, 58 Conn. 356, 20 Atl. 467, 7 L. R. A. 779, 18 Am. St. Rep. 278. If a contract implies the performance of personal services requiring special skill,\n\nIn an action for breach of contract, the injured party is entitled to the benefit of the bargain, and the recovery may include the profits which he would have derived from performance of the contract. See Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 116 (2d Cir.1976). New York law, which controls here, permits recovery of lost future profits as damages, but only under rigorous rules: First, it must be demonstrated with certainty that such damages have been caused by the breach and, second, the alleged loss must be capable of proof with reasonable certainty. In other words,\n\nFor a third-party beneficiary to succeed on a breach of contract claim under New York law, \u201ca non-party must be the intended beneficiary of the contract, not an incidental beneficiary to whom no duty is owed.\u201d Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 251 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 728 F.2d 52, 63 (2d Cir. 1984)). The non-party \u201cmust establish (1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for his or her benefit, and (3) that the benefit to him or"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "For this question only, assume the following facts. Soon after making its contract with Bouquet, Vintage, without Bouquet's knowledge or assent, sold its vineyards but not its winery to Agribiz, a large agricultural corporation. Under the terms of this sale, Agribiz agreed to sell to Vintage all grapes grown on the land for five years. Agribiz's employees have no experience in wine-grape production, and Agribiz has no reputation in the wine industry as a grape producer or otherwise. The Bouquet-Vintage contract was silent on the matter of Vintage's selling any or all of its business assets. If Bouquet seeks an appropriate judicial remedy against Vintage for entering into the Vintage-Agribiz transaction, is Bouquet likely to prevail?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nrescission is a proper remedy when the breach of contract is so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in making the agreement\n\nunder the doctrine of \u201cpart performance,\u201d which may take an agreement outside of the statute of frauds, **178 there must be an oral agreement that has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and that agreement must be \u201cclear, certain, and unambiguous\u201d in its terms. Rafferty & Towner, Inc. v. NJS Enterprises, LLC, 224 Or.App. 51, 55, 197 P.3d 55 (2008), rev. den., 347 Or. 42, 217 P.3d 688 (2009). Emmert argued that the alleged agreements did not meet that standard. Furthermore, Emmert asserted, any qualifying \u201cpart performance\u201d must be clearly referable to the contract, and Kazlauskas's\n\n[A]n implied contract can arise from the acts and conduct of the parties. Such a contract exists when the facts and circumstances surrounding the parties' relationship imply a mutual intention to contract. Every contract requires a meeting of the minds, but the meeting can be implied from and evidenced by the parties' conduct and course of dealing.\n\n\u201cCalifornia law does not recognize a breach of contract as a \u2018wrongful act\u2019 predicate required for this claim.\u201d \u201c[A] breach of contract claim cannot be transmuted into tort liability by claiming that the breach interfered with the promisee's business.\u201d83 This is true even when a party breaches in order to put the non-breaching party out of business and rid itself of a competitor.84 \u201c[M]otive, regardless of how malevolent, remains irrelevant to a breach of contract claim and does not convert a contract action into a tort claim....\u201d To the extent that Templeton *1194 is alleging a breach of contract, it\n\nattending circumstances, as well as by the words they use. In accordance with the rules for the construction of contracts, where a contract is ambiguous on its face, evidence of the surrounding circumstances and the subsequent conduct of the parties in the execution of the contract is admissible to interpret the contract; and the circumstances in which the parties to a contract are placed are generally admissible where such evidence will shed light upon issues in the case. In many instances, facts can be proved only by circumstantial evidence. Such evidence may in fact be the only means of proving\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nA written contract was entered into between Bouquet, a financier-investor, and Vintage Corporation, a winery and grape-grower. The contract provided that Bouquet would invest $1,000,000 in Vintage for its capital expansion and, in return, that Vintage, from grapes grown in its famous vineyards, would produce and market at least 500,000 bottles of wine each year for five years under the label \"Premium Vintage-Bouquet' The contract included provisions that the parties would share equally the profits and losses from the venture and that, if feasible, the wine would be distributed by Vintage only through Claret, a wholesale distributor of fine wines. Neither Bouquet nor Vintage had previously dealt with Claret. Claret learned of the contract two days later from reading a trade newspaper. In reliance thereon, he immediately hired an additional sales executive and contracted for enlargement of his wine storage and display facility.\nFor this question only, assume the following facts. Soon after making its contract with Bouquet, Vintage, without Bouquet's knowledge or assent, sold its vineyards but not its winery to Agribiz, a large agricultural corporation. Under the terms of this sale, Agribiz agreed to sell to Vintage all grapes grown on the land for five years. Agribiz's employees have no experience in wine-grape production, and Agribiz has no reputation in the wine industry as a grape producer or otherwise. The Bouquet-Vintage contract was silent on the matter of Vintage's selling any or all of its business assets. If Bouquet seeks an appropriate judicial remedy against Vintage for entering into the Vintage-Agribiz transaction, is Bouquet likely to prevail?\n\n (A) Yes, because the Vintage-Agribiz transaction created a significant risk of diminishing the profits in which Bouquet would share under his contract with Vintage.\n (B) Yes, because the Bouquet-Vintage contract did not contain a provision authorizing a delegation of Vintage's duties.\n (C) No, because Vintage remains in a position to perform under the Bouquet-Vintage contract.\n (D) No, because Vintage, as a corporation, must necessarily perform its contracts by delegating duties to individuals.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "A",
+      "Yes, because the Vintage-Agribiz transaction created a significant risk of diminishing the profits in which Bouquet would share under his contract with Vintage."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_485",
+    "retrieved_docs": "rescission is a proper remedy when the breach of contract is so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in making the agreement\n\nunder the doctrine of \u201cpart performance,\u201d which may take an agreement outside of the statute of frauds, **178 there must be an oral agreement that has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and that agreement must be \u201cclear, certain, and unambiguous\u201d in its terms. Rafferty & Towner, Inc. v. NJS Enterprises, LLC, 224 Or.App. 51, 55, 197 P.3d 55 (2008), rev. den., 347 Or. 42, 217 P.3d 688 (2009). Emmert argued that the alleged agreements did not meet that standard. Furthermore, Emmert asserted, any qualifying \u201cpart performance\u201d must be clearly referable to the contract, and Kazlauskas's\n\n[A]n implied contract can arise from the acts and conduct of the parties. Such a contract exists when the facts and circumstances surrounding the parties' relationship imply a mutual intention to contract. Every contract requires a meeting of the minds, but the meeting can be implied from and evidenced by the parties' conduct and course of dealing.\n\n\u201cCalifornia law does not recognize a breach of contract as a \u2018wrongful act\u2019 predicate required for this claim.\u201d \u201c[A] breach of contract claim cannot be transmuted into tort liability by claiming that the breach interfered with the promisee's business.\u201d83 This is true even when a party breaches in order to put the non-breaching party out of business and rid itself of a competitor.84 \u201c[M]otive, regardless of how malevolent, remains irrelevant to a breach of contract claim and does not convert a contract action into a tort claim....\u201d To the extent that Templeton *1194 is alleging a breach of contract, it\n\nattending circumstances, as well as by the words they use. In accordance with the rules for the construction of contracts, where a contract is ambiguous on its face, evidence of the surrounding circumstances and the subsequent conduct of the parties in the execution of the contract is admissible to interpret the contract; and the circumstances in which the parties to a contract are placed are generally admissible where such evidence will shed light upon issues in the case. In many instances, facts can be proved only by circumstantial evidence. Such evidence may in fact be the only means of proving"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "In an action brought by Bell to enjoin Ogden from erecting the apartment building in such a way as to obstruct the view from Bell's livingroom window, the decision should be for",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nAn easement for light and air will not be implied under any circumstances short of a necessity so absolute as to destroy the use of the plaintiff's building.\n\na landowner has a duty to maintain his or her property in a reasonably safe condition, which includes providing a safe means of ingress and egress to tenants (see Peralta v. Henriquez, 100 N.Y.2d 139, 144, 760 N.Y.S.2d 741, 790 N.E.2d 1170 [2003]; Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 352 N.E.2d 868 [1976]; Gallagher v. St. Raymond's R.C. Church, 21 N.Y.2d 554, 557, 289 N.Y.S.2d 401, 236 N.E.2d 632 [1968] ). The scope of such duty is determined \u201c \u2018in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the\n\nSince the law favors the free and unobstructed use of real property, a restrictive covenant must be strictly construed against those seeking to enforce it, and may not be given an interpretation extending beyond the clear meaning of its terms (see Witter v. Taggart, 78 N.Y.2d 234, 237\u2013238, 573 N.Y.S.2d 146, 577 N.E.2d 338; Wechsler v. Gasparrini, 40 A.D.3d 976, 836 N.Y.S.2d 673; Liebowitz v. Forman, 22 A.D.3d 530, 531, 802 N.Y.S.2d 238; Kaufman v. Fass, 302 A.D.2d 497, 498, 756 N.Y.S.2d 247, cert. denied 540 U.S. 1162, 124 S.Ct. 1173, 157 L.Ed.2d 1207). \u201c \u2018[W]here the language used in\n\nYet the established rule, followed in Maryland, is that proof of color of title is not necessary to establish adverse possession. Color of title is not an element of adverse possession unless made so by statute, as under provisions prescribing a shorter period of limitation than would otherwise be required. While there are a few isolated judicial statements broadly to the effect that color of title, or color of right, is essential to adverse possession, the general rule is well established that, in the absence of contrary statute, color of title is not an essential element of adverse possession and\n\na restrictive covenant is equally capable of two interpretations, the interpretation which limits the restriction must be adopted\u2019 \u201d (Liebowitz v. Forman, 22 A.D.3d at 531, 802 N.Y.S.2d 238, quoting Kaufman v. Fass, 302 A.D.2d at 498, 756 N.Y.S.2d 247, cert. denied 540 U.S. 1162, 124 S.Ct. 1173, 157 L.Ed.2d 1207). Here, the plaintiff established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, as the plain language of the restrictive covenant at issue did not reveal an intent to preclude her proposed use of the property. In opposition, the defendant Village of Scarsdale failed to raise a\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nOgden was the fee simple owner of three adjoining vacant lots fronting on a common street in a primarily residential section of a city which had no zoning laws. The lots were identified as Lots 1, 2, and 3. Ogden conveyed Lot 1 to Akers and Lot 2 to Bell. Ogden retained Lot 3, which consisted of three acres of woodland. Bell, whose lot was between the other two, built a house on his lot. Bell's house included a large window on the side facing Lot 3. The window provided a beautiful view from Bell's living room, thereby adding value to Bell's house. Akers erected a house on his lot. Ogden made no complaint to either Akers or Bell concerning the houses they built. After both Akers and Bell had completed their houses, the two of them agreed to and did build a common driveway running from the street to the rear of their respective lots. The driveway was built on the line between the two houses so that one-half of the way was located on each lot. Akers and Bell exchanged right-ofway deeds by which each of them conveyed to the other, his heirs and assigns, an easement to continue the right of way. Both deeds were properly recorded. After Akers and Bell had lived in their respective houses for thirty years, a new public street was built bordering on the rear of Lots 1, 2, and 3. Akers informed Bell that, since the new street removed the need for their common driveway, he considered the right-of-way terminated; therefore, he intended to discontinue its use and expected Bell to do the same. At about the same time, Ogden began the erection of a six-story apartment house on Lot 3. If the apartment house is completed, it will block the view from Bell's window and will substantially reduce the value of Bell's lot.\nIn an action brought by Bell to enjoin Ogden from erecting the apartment building in such a way as to obstruct the view from Bell's livingroom window, the decision should be for\n\n (A) Bell, because Ogden's proposed building would be an obstruction of Bell's natural right to an easement for light and air\n (B) Bell, because Bell was misled by Ogden's failure to complain when Bell was building his house\n (C) Ogden if, but only if, it can be shown that Ogden's intention to erect such a building was made known to Bell at or prior to the time of Ogden's conveyance to Bell\n (D) Ogden, because Bell has no easement for light, air, or view\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "D",
+      "Ogden, because Bell has no easement for light, air, or view"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_405",
+    "retrieved_docs": "An easement for light and air will not be implied under any circumstances short of a necessity so absolute as to destroy the use of the plaintiff's building.\n\na landowner has a duty to maintain his or her property in a reasonably safe condition, which includes providing a safe means of ingress and egress to tenants (see Peralta v. Henriquez, 100 N.Y.2d 139, 144, 760 N.Y.S.2d 741, 790 N.E.2d 1170 [2003]; Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 352 N.E.2d 868 [1976]; Gallagher v. St. Raymond's R.C. Church, 21 N.Y.2d 554, 557, 289 N.Y.S.2d 401, 236 N.E.2d 632 [1968] ). The scope of such duty is determined \u201c \u2018in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the\n\nSince the law favors the free and unobstructed use of real property, a restrictive covenant must be strictly construed against those seeking to enforce it, and may not be given an interpretation extending beyond the clear meaning of its terms (see Witter v. Taggart, 78 N.Y.2d 234, 237\u2013238, 573 N.Y.S.2d 146, 577 N.E.2d 338; Wechsler v. Gasparrini, 40 A.D.3d 976, 836 N.Y.S.2d 673; Liebowitz v. Forman, 22 A.D.3d 530, 531, 802 N.Y.S.2d 238; Kaufman v. Fass, 302 A.D.2d 497, 498, 756 N.Y.S.2d 247, cert. denied 540 U.S. 1162, 124 S.Ct. 1173, 157 L.Ed.2d 1207). \u201c \u2018[W]here the language used in\n\nYet the established rule, followed in Maryland, is that proof of color of title is not necessary to establish adverse possession. Color of title is not an element of adverse possession unless made so by statute, as under provisions prescribing a shorter period of limitation than would otherwise be required. While there are a few isolated judicial statements broadly to the effect that color of title, or color of right, is essential to adverse possession, the general rule is well established that, in the absence of contrary statute, color of title is not an essential element of adverse possession and\n\na restrictive covenant is equally capable of two interpretations, the interpretation which limits the restriction must be adopted\u2019 \u201d (Liebowitz v. Forman, 22 A.D.3d at 531, 802 N.Y.S.2d 238, quoting Kaufman v. Fass, 302 A.D.2d at 498, 756 N.Y.S.2d 247, cert. denied 540 U.S. 1162, 124 S.Ct. 1173, 157 L.Ed.2d 1207). Here, the plaintiff established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, as the plain language of the restrictive covenant at issue did not reveal an intent to preclude her proposed use of the property. In opposition, the defendant Village of Scarsdale failed to raise a"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Patten suffered from a serious, though not immediately life-threatening, impairment of his circulatory system. Patten's cardiologist recommended a cardiac bypass operation and referred Patten to Dr. Cutter. Cutter did not inform Patten of the 2% risk of death associated with this operation. Cutter defended his decision not to mention the risk statistics to Patten because \"Patten was a worrier and it would significantly lessen his chances of survival to be worried about the nonsurvival rate.\" Cutter successfully performed the bypass operation and Patten made a good recovery. However, when Patten learned of the 2% risk of death associated with the operation, he was furious that Cutter had failed to disclose this information to him. If Patten asserts a claim against Cutter based on negligence, will Patten prevail?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nmaking a truly informed and intelligent decision concerning the proposed medical procedure.\u201d Pauscher, 408 N.W.2d at 359 (citing Cowman, 329 N.W.2d at 425, 427); accord Doe, 476 N.W.2d at 31 (\u201cThat duty is shaped, not by what the medical community would deem material, but by the patient's need for information sufficient to make a truly informed and intelligent decision.\u201d). Several exceptions to the patient rule's disclosure requirement exist that are not applicable to this case. Generally, to succeed on a claim of informed consent, the plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) The existence of a material risk [or information] unknown\n\n\u201cThus, a doctor recommending a particular procedure generally has, among other obligations, the duty to disclose to the patient all material risks involved in the procedure.\u201d Id. (citing Cowman, 329 N.W.2d at 425); accord Doe v. Johnston, 476 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Iowa 1991) (\u201cUnder the [patient] rule, the patient's right to make an informed decision about submitting to a particular medical procedure places a duty on the doctor to disclose all material risks involved in the procedure.\u201d). Under the patient rule, \u201cthe physician's duty to disclose is measured by the patient's need to have access to all information material to\n\nto the patient; (2) A failure to disclose that risk [or information] on the part of the physician; (3) Disclosure of the risk [or information] would have led a reasonable patient in plaintiff's position to reject the medical procedure or choose a different course of treatment; (4) Injury.\n\nA duty of reasonable care generally encompasses a duty not to create an unreasonable risk of harm. See Reighard v. Yates, 2012 UT 45, \u00b6\u00b6 29\u201331, 285 P.3d 1168; B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11, \u00b6 21 & n. 11, 275 P.3d 228. What may be reasonable in one setting may not be reasonable in another. Ordinarily participants cannot reasonably expect instructors or coaches to insulate them from risks inherent in an activity in which they voluntarily engage. See, e.g., Kahn, 31 Cal.4th 990, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103, 75 P.3d at 38\u201343 (majority opinion). But whether, under the\n\nThe elements of a products liability claim are that (1) a product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; (2) the defect existed at the time the product left the defendant's control; and (3) the defect proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 623 n. 3. When products liability is based on a manufacturing-flaw theory, a product is in a defective condition if the user could not have anticipated the danger that the product poses. Id. at 622; see also 4A Minnesota Practice, CIVJIG \u00a7 75.30 (4th ed.1999).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nPatten suffered from a serious, though not immediately life-threatening, impairment of his circulatory system. Patten's cardiologist recommended a cardiac bypass operation and referred Patten to Dr. Cutter. Cutter did not inform Patten of the 2% risk of death associated with this operation. Cutter defended his decision not to mention the risk statistics to Patten because \"Patten was a worrier and it would significantly lessen his chances of survival to be worried about the nonsurvival rate.\" Cutter successfully performed the bypass operation and Patten made a good recovery. However, when Patten learned of the 2% risk of death associated with the operation, he was furious that Cutter had failed to disclose this information to him. If Patten asserts a claim against Cutter based on negligence, will Patten prevail?\n\n (A) No, if Cutter used his best personal judgment in shielding Patten from the risk statistic.\n (B) No, because the operation was successful and Patten suffered no harm.\n (C) Yes, if Patten would have refused the operation had he been informed of the risk.\n (D) Yes, because a patient must be told the risk factor associated with a surgical procedure in order to give an informed consent.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "B",
+      "No, because the operation was successful and Patten suffered no harm."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_945",
+    "retrieved_docs": "making a truly informed and intelligent decision concerning the proposed medical procedure.\u201d Pauscher, 408 N.W.2d at 359 (citing Cowman, 329 N.W.2d at 425, 427); accord Doe, 476 N.W.2d at 31 (\u201cThat duty is shaped, not by what the medical community would deem material, but by the patient's need for information sufficient to make a truly informed and intelligent decision.\u201d). Several exceptions to the patient rule's disclosure requirement exist that are not applicable to this case. Generally, to succeed on a claim of informed consent, the plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) The existence of a material risk [or information] unknown\n\n\u201cThus, a doctor recommending a particular procedure generally has, among other obligations, the duty to disclose to the patient all material risks involved in the procedure.\u201d Id. (citing Cowman, 329 N.W.2d at 425); accord Doe v. Johnston, 476 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Iowa 1991) (\u201cUnder the [patient] rule, the patient's right to make an informed decision about submitting to a particular medical procedure places a duty on the doctor to disclose all material risks involved in the procedure.\u201d). Under the patient rule, \u201cthe physician's duty to disclose is measured by the patient's need to have access to all information material to\n\nto the patient; (2) A failure to disclose that risk [or information] on the part of the physician; (3) Disclosure of the risk [or information] would have led a reasonable patient in plaintiff's position to reject the medical procedure or choose a different course of treatment; (4) Injury.\n\nA duty of reasonable care generally encompasses a duty not to create an unreasonable risk of harm. See Reighard v. Yates, 2012 UT 45, \u00b6\u00b6 29\u201331, 285 P.3d 1168; B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11, \u00b6 21 & n. 11, 275 P.3d 228. What may be reasonable in one setting may not be reasonable in another. Ordinarily participants cannot reasonably expect instructors or coaches to insulate them from risks inherent in an activity in which they voluntarily engage. See, e.g., Kahn, 31 Cal.4th 990, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103, 75 P.3d at 38\u201343 (majority opinion). But whether, under the\n\nThe elements of a products liability claim are that (1) a product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; (2) the defect existed at the time the product left the defendant's control; and (3) the defect proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 623 n. 3. When products liability is based on a manufacturing-flaw theory, a product is in a defective condition if the user could not have anticipated the danger that the product poses. Id. at 622; see also 4A Minnesota Practice, CIVJIG \u00a7 75.30 (4th ed.1999)."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Pedersen's counsel wishes to prove that after the accident Carr went to Pedersen and offered $1,000 to settle Pedersen's claim. The trial judge should rule this evidence",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\n(a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible \u2014 on behalf of any party \u2014 either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction: (1) furnishing, promising, or offering \u2014 or accepting, promising to accept, or offering to accept \u2014 a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and (2) conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim \u2014 except when offered in a criminal case and when the negotiations related to a claim by a public\n\noffice in the exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority. b) Exceptions. The court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as proving a witness\u2019s bias or prejudice, negating a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.\n\nAs articulated by the Federal Advisory Committee in its Note to Rule 403, the \u201cunfair prejudice\u201d language contained in Rule 403 refers to an undue tendency on the part of admissible evidence to suggest a decision made on an improper basis. \u201cUnfair prejudice refers to the tendency of the proposed evidence to adversely affect the objecting party's position by injecting considerations extraneous to the merits of the lawsuit, such as the jury's bias, sympathy, anger or shock.\u201d People v. Goree, 132 Mich.App. 693, 349 N.W.2d 220 (1984). \u201cUnfair prejudice as used in Rule 403 does not mean the damage to\n\nGeneral admissibility. Except as provided in par. (b) 2., evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. This subsection does not exclude the evidence when offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.\n\npolicy, as well as the relevancy and materiality of the testimony. In the absence of a statute or a valid and binding contractual provision to the contrary, circumstantial evidence is regarded by law as competent to prove any given fact in issue in a civil case and is sometimes as cogent and valuable as direct and positive testimony. Upon the issue of reasonableness of conduct, all the surrounding circumstances become facts material to the case. Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish liability where it negates other reasonable causes for injury. Tort claims may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nCarr ran into and injured Pedersen, a pedestrian. With Carr in his car were Wanda and Walter Passenger. Passerby saw the accident and called the police department, which sent Sheriff to investigate. All of these people are available as potential witnesses in the case of Pedersen v. Carr. Pedersen alleges that Carr, while drunk, struck Pedersen who was in a duly marked crosswalk.\nPedersen's counsel wishes to prove that after the accident Carr went to Pedersen and offered $1,000 to settle Pedersen's claim. The trial judge should rule this evidence\n\n (A) admissible as an admission of a party\n (B) admissible as an admission to show Carr's liability, provided the court gives a cautionary instruction that the statement should not be considered as bearing on the issue of damages\n (C) inadmissible since it is not relevant either to the question of liability or the question of damages\n (D) inadmissible because even though relevant and an admission, the policy of the law is to encourage settlement negotiations\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "D",
+      "inadmissible because even though relevant and an admission, the policy of the law is to encourage settlement negotiations"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_379",
+    "retrieved_docs": "(a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible \u2014 on behalf of any party \u2014 either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction: (1) furnishing, promising, or offering \u2014 or accepting, promising to accept, or offering to accept \u2014 a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and (2) conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim \u2014 except when offered in a criminal case and when the negotiations related to a claim by a public\n\noffice in the exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority. b) Exceptions. The court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as proving a witness\u2019s bias or prejudice, negating a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.\n\nAs articulated by the Federal Advisory Committee in its Note to Rule 403, the \u201cunfair prejudice\u201d language contained in Rule 403 refers to an undue tendency on the part of admissible evidence to suggest a decision made on an improper basis. \u201cUnfair prejudice refers to the tendency of the proposed evidence to adversely affect the objecting party's position by injecting considerations extraneous to the merits of the lawsuit, such as the jury's bias, sympathy, anger or shock.\u201d People v. Goree, 132 Mich.App. 693, 349 N.W.2d 220 (1984). \u201cUnfair prejudice as used in Rule 403 does not mean the damage to\n\nGeneral admissibility. Except as provided in par. (b) 2., evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. This subsection does not exclude the evidence when offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.\n\npolicy, as well as the relevancy and materiality of the testimony. In the absence of a statute or a valid and binding contractual provision to the contrary, circumstantial evidence is regarded by law as competent to prove any given fact in issue in a civil case and is sometimes as cogent and valuable as direct and positive testimony. Upon the issue of reasonableness of conduct, all the surrounding circumstances become facts material to the case. Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish liability where it negates other reasonable causes for injury. Tort claims may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Roberta Monk, a famous author, had a life insurance policy with Drummond Life Insurance Company. Her son, Peter, was beneficiary. Roberta disappeared from her residence in the city of Metropolis two years ago and has not been seen since. On the day that Roberta disappeared, Sky Airlines Flight 22 left Metropolis for Rio de Janeiro and vanished; the plane's passenger list included a Roberta Rector. Peter is now suing Drummond Life Insurance Company for the proceeds of his mother's policy. At trial, Peter offers to testify that his mother told him that she planned to write her next novel under the pen name of Roberta Rector. Peter's testimony is",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nA statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant's will. Pa.R.E. 803(3). \u201cPursuant to the state of mind hearsay exception, where a declarant's out-of-court statements demonstrate her state of mind, are made in a natural manner, and are material and relevant, they are admissible pursuant to the exception.\u201d Laich, 777 A.2d at 1060-61.\n\nHearsay is generally defined as an out-of-court statement made by a declarant and offered for the truth of the matter asserted (see Nucci v. Proper, 95 N.Y.2d 597, 602, 721 N.Y.S.2d 593, 744 N.E.2d 128 [2001]; People v. Buie, 86 N.Y.2d 501, 505, 634 N.Y.S.2d 415, 658 N.E.2d 192 [1995];\n\n\u201cAlthough relevant, evidence may be excluded by the trial court if the court determines that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value.... Of course, [a]ll adverse evidence is damaging to one's case, but it is inadmissible only if it creates undue prejudice so that it threatens an injustice were it to be admitted.... The test for determining whether evidence is unduly prejudicial is not whether it is damaging to the defendant but whether it will improperly arouse the emotions of the jury.... Reversal is required only whe[n] an abuse of discretion is manifest or whe[n] injustice appears\n\nAxiomatically, and by its unambiguous terms, the exception renders admissible only those statements that reflect the \u201cdeclarant's then-existing state of mind ... or condition,\u201d Pa.R.E. 803(3), not someone else's state of mind or condition. Nothing in the plain terms of the exception would allow, for instance, a party to introduce an out-of-court statement of one person to prove the intent, motive, feelings, pain, or health of another person. The bounds of the exception are limited to the then-existing state of mind of the declarant only.\n\n\u201cAdmissibility depends on relevance and probative value. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact.\u201d Smith v. Morrison, 47 A.3d 131, 137 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). Evidence, even if relevant, may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the potential prejudice. Unfair prejudice supporting exclusion of relevant evidence means a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or divert the jury's attention away from its duty of\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nRoberta Monk, a famous author, had a life insurance policy with Drummond Life Insurance Company. Her son, Peter, was beneficiary. Roberta disappeared from her residence in the city of Metropolis two years ago and has not been seen since. On the day that Roberta disappeared, Sky Airlines Flight 22 left Metropolis for Rio de Janeiro and vanished; the plane's passenger list included a Roberta Rector. Peter is now suing Drummond Life Insurance Company for the proceeds of his mother's policy. At trial, Peter offers to testify that his mother told him that she planned to write her next novel under the pen name of Roberta Rector. Peter's testimony is\n\n (A) admissible as circumstantial evidence that Roberta Monk was on the plane.\n (B) admissible as a party admission, because Roberta and Peter Monk are in privity with each other.\n (C) inadmissible, because Roberta Monk has not been missing more than seven years.\n (D) inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "A",
+      "admissible as circumstantial evidence that Roberta Monk was on the plane."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_738",
+    "retrieved_docs": "A statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant's will. Pa.R.E. 803(3). \u201cPursuant to the state of mind hearsay exception, where a declarant's out-of-court statements demonstrate her state of mind, are made in a natural manner, and are material and relevant, they are admissible pursuant to the exception.\u201d Laich, 777 A.2d at 1060-61.\n\nHearsay is generally defined as an out-of-court statement made by a declarant and offered for the truth of the matter asserted (see Nucci v. Proper, 95 N.Y.2d 597, 602, 721 N.Y.S.2d 593, 744 N.E.2d 128 [2001]; People v. Buie, 86 N.Y.2d 501, 505, 634 N.Y.S.2d 415, 658 N.E.2d 192 [1995];\n\n\u201cAlthough relevant, evidence may be excluded by the trial court if the court determines that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value.... Of course, [a]ll adverse evidence is damaging to one's case, but it is inadmissible only if it creates undue prejudice so that it threatens an injustice were it to be admitted.... The test for determining whether evidence is unduly prejudicial is not whether it is damaging to the defendant but whether it will improperly arouse the emotions of the jury.... Reversal is required only whe[n] an abuse of discretion is manifest or whe[n] injustice appears\n\nAxiomatically, and by its unambiguous terms, the exception renders admissible only those statements that reflect the \u201cdeclarant's then-existing state of mind ... or condition,\u201d Pa.R.E. 803(3), not someone else's state of mind or condition. Nothing in the plain terms of the exception would allow, for instance, a party to introduce an out-of-court statement of one person to prove the intent, motive, feelings, pain, or health of another person. The bounds of the exception are limited to the then-existing state of mind of the declarant only.\n\n\u201cAdmissibility depends on relevance and probative value. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact.\u201d Smith v. Morrison, 47 A.3d 131, 137 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). Evidence, even if relevant, may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the potential prejudice. Unfair prejudice supporting exclusion of relevant evidence means a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or divert the jury's attention away from its duty of"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "In an action brought by Bell to enjoin Akers from interfering with Bell's continued use of the common driveway between the two lots, the decision should be for",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nA deed is not legally effective until it has been delivered. While there is no prescribed method for an effective delivery of a deed, manual transfer of the instrument into the hand of the grantee is neither required to effectuate a valid delivery, nor dispositive of the issue. The term delivery in this regard refers to \u201cnot so much a manual act but the intention of the maker ... existing at the time of the transaction ... and not subject to later change of mind.\u201d \u201cDelivery of a deed includes, not only an act by which the grantor evinces a\n\nAn easement for light and air will not be implied under any circumstances short of a necessity so absolute as to destroy the use of the plaintiff's building.\n\nThus, the party claiming ownership by adverse possession must prove that the following five elements existed concurrently for 20 years: \u201c(1) continuous, (2) hostile or adverse, (3) actual, (4) open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the premises, (5) under claim of title inconsistent with that of the true owner.\u201d Joiner, 85 Ill.2d at 81, 51 Ill.Dec. 662, 421 N.E.2d at 174.\n\nAxiomatically, and by its unambiguous terms, the exception renders admissible only those statements that reflect the \u201cdeclarant's then-existing state of mind ... or condition,\u201d Pa.R.E. 803(3), not someone else's state of mind or condition. Nothing in the plain terms of the exception would allow, for instance, a party to introduce an out-of-court statement of one person to prove the intent, motive, feelings, pain, or health of another person. The bounds of the exception are limited to the then-existing state of mind of the declarant only.\n\nAn incorporeal hereditament is \u201c[a]n intangible right in land, such as an easement.\u201d In other contexts, Utah courts have recognized an incorporeal hereditament as an interest in real property. In addressing a case involving a license to prospect and mine ore, the Utah Supreme Court discussed the potential for a mining license to ripen into an incorporeal hereditament and stated: This is not to say that a license is an incorporeal hereditament; it means that the grant was a license as long as it remained executory because it was not in proper form for a conveyance of an incorporeal hereditament.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nOgden was the fee simple owner of three adjoining vacant lots fronting on a common street in a primarily residential section of a city which had no zoning laws. The lots were identified as Lots 1, 2, and 3. Ogden conveyed Lot 1 to Akers and Lot 2 to Bell. Ogden retained Lot 3, which consisted of three acres of woodland. Bell, whose lot was between the other two, built a house on his lot. Bell's house included a large window on the side facing Lot 3. The window provided a beautiful view from Bell's living room, thereby adding value to Bell's house. Akers erected a house on his lot. Ogden made no complaint to either Akers or Bell concerning the houses they built. After both Akers and Bell had completed their houses, the two of them agreed to and did build a common driveway running from the street to the rear of their respective lots. The driveway was built on the line between the two houses so that one-half of the way was located on each lot. Akers and Bell exchanged right-ofway deeds by which each of them conveyed to the other, his heirs and assigns, an easement to continue the right of way. Both deeds were properly recorded. After Akers and Bell had lived in their respective houses for thirty years, a new public street was built bordering on the rear of Lots 1, 2, and 3. Akers informed Bell that, since the new street removed the need for their common driveway, he considered the right-of-way terminated; therefore, he intended to discontinue its use and expected Bell to do the same. At about the same time, Ogden began the erection of a six-story apartment house on Lot 3. If the apartment house is completed, it will block the view from Bell's window and will substantially reduce the value of Bell's lot.\nIn an action brought by Bell to enjoin Akers from interfering with Bell's continued use of the common driveway between the two lots, the decision should be for\n\n (A) Akers, because the termination of the necessity for the easement terminated the easement\n (B) Akers, because the continuation of the easement after the change of circumstances would adversely affect the marketability of both lots without adding any commensurate value to either\n (C) Bell, because an incorporeal hereditament lies in grant and cannot be terminated without a writing\n (D) Bell, because the removal of the need for the easement created by express grant does not affect the right to the easement\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "D",
+      "Bell, because the removal of the need for the easement created by express grant does not affect the right to the easement"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_404",
+    "retrieved_docs": "A deed is not legally effective until it has been delivered. While there is no prescribed method for an effective delivery of a deed, manual transfer of the instrument into the hand of the grantee is neither required to effectuate a valid delivery, nor dispositive of the issue. The term delivery in this regard refers to \u201cnot so much a manual act but the intention of the maker ... existing at the time of the transaction ... and not subject to later change of mind.\u201d \u201cDelivery of a deed includes, not only an act by which the grantor evinces a\n\nAn easement for light and air will not be implied under any circumstances short of a necessity so absolute as to destroy the use of the plaintiff's building.\n\nThus, the party claiming ownership by adverse possession must prove that the following five elements existed concurrently for 20 years: \u201c(1) continuous, (2) hostile or adverse, (3) actual, (4) open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the premises, (5) under claim of title inconsistent with that of the true owner.\u201d Joiner, 85 Ill.2d at 81, 51 Ill.Dec. 662, 421 N.E.2d at 174.\n\nAxiomatically, and by its unambiguous terms, the exception renders admissible only those statements that reflect the \u201cdeclarant's then-existing state of mind ... or condition,\u201d Pa.R.E. 803(3), not someone else's state of mind or condition. Nothing in the plain terms of the exception would allow, for instance, a party to introduce an out-of-court statement of one person to prove the intent, motive, feelings, pain, or health of another person. The bounds of the exception are limited to the then-existing state of mind of the declarant only.\n\nAn incorporeal hereditament is \u201c[a]n intangible right in land, such as an easement.\u201d In other contexts, Utah courts have recognized an incorporeal hereditament as an interest in real property. In addressing a case involving a license to prospect and mine ore, the Utah Supreme Court discussed the potential for a mining license to ripen into an incorporeal hereditament and stated: This is not to say that a license is an incorporeal hereditament; it means that the grant was a license as long as it remained executory because it was not in proper form for a conveyance of an incorporeal hereditament."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Plaintiff's estate sued Defendant Stores claiming that Guard, one of Defendant's security personnel, wrongfully shot and killed Plaintiff when Plaintiff fled after being accused of shoplifting. Guard was convicted of manslaughter for killing Plaintiff. At his criminal trial Guard, who was no longer working for Defendant, testified that Defendant's security director had instructed him to stop shoplifters \"at all costs.\" Because Guard's criminal conviction is on appeal, he refuses to testify at the civil trial. Plaintiff's estate then offers an authenticated transcript of Guard's criminal trial testimony concerning the instructions of Defendant's security director. This evidence is",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nHowever, prior consistent statements are admissible as non-hearsay if: (1) the individual who made the prior consistent statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; and (2) the statement is offered in an effort to rebut an express or implied accusation of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication. See Chandler, 702 So.2d at 197\u201398; see also \u00a7 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Both conditions must be met for admission of a prior consistent statement as nonhearsay. Harris v. State, 843 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.2003).\n\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nPast recollection recorded \u201callows a witness with a faded memory to testify from notes or a memorandum that the witness can show was made by her or under her direction while the information was fresh in the witness'[s] memory and reflects that knowledge correctly.\u201d The rule \u201crequires the offering party to prove and the trial judge to find that the witness \u2018has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately\u2019 (taking into account the extent to which the memory can be refreshed from examination of the writing).\u201d Under KRE 803(5), \u201cthe recorded recollection is admissible, but only\n\nA record created by a third party which is adopted by a business may be admitted under the business record exception to the hearsay rule if certain criteria are met: (1) the record must be procured in the normal course of business; (2) the business must show that it relied on the record; and (3) there must be other circumstances indicating the trustworthiness of the document. Military Rules of Evid., Rule 803(6).\n\nA statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant's will. Pa.R.E. 803(3). \u201cPursuant to the state of mind hearsay exception, where a declarant's out-of-court statements demonstrate her state of mind, are made in a natural manner, and are material and relevant, they are admissible pursuant to the exception.\u201d Laich, 777 A.2d at 1060-61.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nPlaintiff's estate sued Defendant Stores claiming that Guard, one of Defendant's security personnel, wrongfully shot and killed Plaintiff when Plaintiff fled after being accused of shoplifting. Guard was convicted of manslaughter for killing Plaintiff. At his criminal trial Guard, who was no longer working for Defendant, testified that Defendant's security director had instructed him to stop shoplifters \"at all costs.\" Because Guard's criminal conviction is on appeal, he refuses to testify at the civil trial. Plaintiff's estate then offers an authenticated transcript of Guard's criminal trial testimony concerning the instructions of Defendant's security director. This evidence is\n\n (A) admissible as a statement of an agent of a party-opponent.\n (B) admissible, because the instruction from the security director is not hearsay.\n (C) admissible, although hearsay, as former testimony.\n (D) inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "D",
+      "inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_1039",
+    "retrieved_docs": "However, prior consistent statements are admissible as non-hearsay if: (1) the individual who made the prior consistent statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; and (2) the statement is offered in an effort to rebut an express or implied accusation of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication. See Chandler, 702 So.2d at 197\u201398; see also \u00a7 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Both conditions must be met for admission of a prior consistent statement as nonhearsay. Harris v. State, 843 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.2003).\n\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nPast recollection recorded \u201callows a witness with a faded memory to testify from notes or a memorandum that the witness can show was made by her or under her direction while the information was fresh in the witness'[s] memory and reflects that knowledge correctly.\u201d The rule \u201crequires the offering party to prove and the trial judge to find that the witness \u2018has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately\u2019 (taking into account the extent to which the memory can be refreshed from examination of the writing).\u201d Under KRE 803(5), \u201cthe recorded recollection is admissible, but only\n\nA record created by a third party which is adopted by a business may be admitted under the business record exception to the hearsay rule if certain criteria are met: (1) the record must be procured in the normal course of business; (2) the business must show that it relied on the record; and (3) there must be other circumstances indicating the trustworthiness of the document. Military Rules of Evid., Rule 803(6).\n\nA statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant's will. Pa.R.E. 803(3). \u201cPursuant to the state of mind hearsay exception, where a declarant's out-of-court statements demonstrate her state of mind, are made in a natural manner, and are material and relevant, they are admissible pursuant to the exception.\u201d Laich, 777 A.2d at 1060-61."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "At the trial of Davis for a murder that occurred in Newtown, the prosecution called Waite, who testified that she saw Davis kill the victim. Davis believed that Waite was 600 miles away in Old Town, engaged in the illegal sale of narcotics, on the day in question. On cross-examination by Davis, Waite was asked whether she had in fact sold narcotics in Old Town on that date. Waite refused to answer on the ground of self-incrimination. The judge, over the prosecutor's objection, ordered that if Waite did not testify, her direct testimony should be stricken. The order to testify or have the testimony stricken can best be supported on the basis that",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nWhen a witness refuses to answer cross-examination questions necessary to test the witness's direct testimony, that refusal undermines the trier of fact's ability to rely on the witness's direct testimony, and the trial court may strike the witness's testimony.\n\nA trial court has discretion to permit leading questions on direct examination when a witness is reluctant, hostile, or overly nervous.\n\nafter verification of its accuracy. Even if admitted, \u2018the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.\u2019 \u201d If a party's notes do refresh the party's recollection, \u201cthere is no need to admit the recording into evidence, because the witness will be able to testify from his or her refreshed memory.\u201d\n\npolicy, as well as the relevancy and materiality of the testimony. In the absence of a statute or a valid and binding contractual provision to the contrary, circumstantial evidence is regarded by law as competent to prove any given fact in issue in a civil case and is sometimes as cogent and valuable as direct and positive testimony. Upon the issue of reasonableness of conduct, all the surrounding circumstances become facts material to the case. Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish liability where it negates other reasonable causes for injury. Tort claims may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence.\n\nHearsay is generally defined as an out-of-court statement made by a declarant and offered for the truth of the matter asserted (see Nucci v. Proper, 95 N.Y.2d 597, 602, 721 N.Y.S.2d 593, 744 N.E.2d 128 [2001]; People v. Buie, 86 N.Y.2d 501, 505, 634 N.Y.S.2d 415, 658 N.E.2d 192 [1995];\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nAt the trial of Davis for a murder that occurred in Newtown, the prosecution called Waite, who testified that she saw Davis kill the victim. Davis believed that Waite was 600 miles away in Old Town, engaged in the illegal sale of narcotics, on the day in question. On cross-examination by Davis, Waite was asked whether she had in fact sold narcotics in Old Town on that date. Waite refused to answer on the ground of self-incrimination. The judge, over the prosecutor's objection, ordered that if Waite did not testify, her direct testimony should be stricken. The order to testify or have the testimony stricken can best be supported on the basis that\n\n (A) Waite had not been charged with any crime and, thus, could claim no privilege against self-incrimination\n (B) Waite's proper invocation of the privilege prevented adequate cross-examination\n (C) the public interest in allowing an accused to defend himself or herself outweighs the interest of a non-party witness in the privilege\n (D) the trial record, independent of testimony, does not establish that Waite's answer could incriminate her\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "B",
+      "Waite's proper invocation of the privilege prevented adequate cross-examination"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_407",
+    "retrieved_docs": "When a witness refuses to answer cross-examination questions necessary to test the witness's direct testimony, that refusal undermines the trier of fact's ability to rely on the witness's direct testimony, and the trial court may strike the witness's testimony.\n\nA trial court has discretion to permit leading questions on direct examination when a witness is reluctant, hostile, or overly nervous.\n\nafter verification of its accuracy. Even if admitted, \u2018the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.\u2019 \u201d If a party's notes do refresh the party's recollection, \u201cthere is no need to admit the recording into evidence, because the witness will be able to testify from his or her refreshed memory.\u201d\n\npolicy, as well as the relevancy and materiality of the testimony. In the absence of a statute or a valid and binding contractual provision to the contrary, circumstantial evidence is regarded by law as competent to prove any given fact in issue in a civil case and is sometimes as cogent and valuable as direct and positive testimony. Upon the issue of reasonableness of conduct, all the surrounding circumstances become facts material to the case. Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish liability where it negates other reasonable causes for injury. Tort claims may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence.\n\nHearsay is generally defined as an out-of-court statement made by a declarant and offered for the truth of the matter asserted (see Nucci v. Proper, 95 N.Y.2d 597, 602, 721 N.Y.S.2d 593, 744 N.E.2d 128 [2001]; People v. Buie, 86 N.Y.2d 501, 505, 634 N.Y.S.2d 415, 658 N.E.2d 192 [1995];"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "In 1956, Silo Cement Company constructed a plant for manufacturing ready-mix concrete in Lakeville. At that time Silo was using bagged cement, which caused little or no dust. In 1970, Petrone bought a home approximately 1,800 feet from the Silo plant. One year ago, Silo stopped using bagged cement and began to receive cement in bulk shipments. Since then at least five truckloads of cement have passed Petrone's house daily. Cement blows off the trucks and into Petrone's house. When the cement arrives at the Silo plant, it is blown by forced air from the trucks into the storage bin. As a consequence cement dust fills the air surrounding the plant to a distance of 2,000 feet. Petrone's house is the only residence within 2,000 feet of the plant. If Petrone asserts a claim against Silo based on nuisance, will Petrone prevail?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nA private nuisance is a substantial invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of his or her land. The invasion must be: substantial, either intentional or negligent, and unreasonable.\u201d In re Chicago Flood Litig., 176 Ill. 2d 179, 204, 223 Ill.Dec. 532, 680 N.E.2d 265, 277 (1997)\n\nFor these reasons, we reaffirm today that damages measured by diminution in value are an adequate and appropriate remedy for negligent harm to real or personal property, and that mental anguish based solely on negligent property damage is not compensable as a matter of law. The proper measure of Likes's damages\u2014although she cannot recover on those claims for which the City has sovereign immunity from suit for property damages\u2014is (1) the loss in market value of her property caused by the defendant's negligence and (2) for those items of small or no market value that \u201chave their primary value in\n\nA duty of reasonable care generally encompasses a duty not to create an unreasonable risk of harm. See Reighard v. Yates, 2012 UT 45, \u00b6\u00b6 29\u201331, 285 P.3d 1168; B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11, \u00b6 21 & n. 11, 275 P.3d 228. What may be reasonable in one setting may not be reasonable in another. Ordinarily participants cannot reasonably expect instructors or coaches to insulate them from risks inherent in an activity in which they voluntarily engage. See, e.g., Kahn, 31 Cal.4th 990, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103, 75 P.3d at 38\u201343 (majority opinion). But whether, under the\n\npolicy, as well as the relevancy and materiality of the testimony. In the absence of a statute or a valid and binding contractual provision to the contrary, circumstantial evidence is regarded by law as competent to prove any given fact in issue in a civil case and is sometimes as cogent and valuable as direct and positive testimony. Upon the issue of reasonableness of conduct, all the surrounding circumstances become facts material to the case. Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish liability where it negates other reasonable causes for injury. Tort claims may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence.\n\nAn easement for light and air will not be implied under any circumstances short of a necessity so absolute as to destroy the use of the plaintiff's building.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nIn 1956, Silo Cement Company constructed a plant for manufacturing ready-mix concrete in Lakeville. At that time Silo was using bagged cement, which caused little or no dust. In 1970, Petrone bought a home approximately 1,800 feet from the Silo plant. One year ago, Silo stopped using bagged cement and began to receive cement in bulk shipments. Since then at least five truckloads of cement have passed Petrone's house daily. Cement blows off the trucks and into Petrone's house. When the cement arrives at the Silo plant, it is blown by forced air from the trucks into the storage bin. As a consequence cement dust fills the air surrounding the plant to a distance of 2,000 feet. Petrone's house is the only residence within 2,000 feet of the plant. If Petrone asserts a claim against Silo based on nuisance, will Petrone prevail?\n\n (A) Yes, unless using bagged cement would substantially increase Silo's costs.\n (B) Yes, if the cement dust interfered unreasonably with the use and enjoyment of Petrone's property.\n (C) No, because Silo is not required to change its industrial methods to accommodate the needs of one individual.\n (D) No, if Silo's methods are in conformity with those in general use in the industry.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "B",
+      "Yes, if the cement dust interfered unreasonably with the use and enjoyment of Petrone's property."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_533",
+    "retrieved_docs": "A private nuisance is a substantial invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of his or her land. The invasion must be: substantial, either intentional or negligent, and unreasonable.\u201d In re Chicago Flood Litig., 176 Ill. 2d 179, 204, 223 Ill.Dec. 532, 680 N.E.2d 265, 277 (1997)\n\nFor these reasons, we reaffirm today that damages measured by diminution in value are an adequate and appropriate remedy for negligent harm to real or personal property, and that mental anguish based solely on negligent property damage is not compensable as a matter of law. The proper measure of Likes's damages\u2014although she cannot recover on those claims for which the City has sovereign immunity from suit for property damages\u2014is (1) the loss in market value of her property caused by the defendant's negligence and (2) for those items of small or no market value that \u201chave their primary value in\n\nA duty of reasonable care generally encompasses a duty not to create an unreasonable risk of harm. See Reighard v. Yates, 2012 UT 45, \u00b6\u00b6 29\u201331, 285 P.3d 1168; B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11, \u00b6 21 & n. 11, 275 P.3d 228. What may be reasonable in one setting may not be reasonable in another. Ordinarily participants cannot reasonably expect instructors or coaches to insulate them from risks inherent in an activity in which they voluntarily engage. See, e.g., Kahn, 31 Cal.4th 990, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103, 75 P.3d at 38\u201343 (majority opinion). But whether, under the\n\npolicy, as well as the relevancy and materiality of the testimony. In the absence of a statute or a valid and binding contractual provision to the contrary, circumstantial evidence is regarded by law as competent to prove any given fact in issue in a civil case and is sometimes as cogent and valuable as direct and positive testimony. Upon the issue of reasonableness of conduct, all the surrounding circumstances become facts material to the case. Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish liability where it negates other reasonable causes for injury. Tort claims may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence.\n\nAn easement for light and air will not be implied under any circumstances short of a necessity so absolute as to destroy the use of the plaintiff's building."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "The constitution of State X authorizes a fivemember state reapportionment board to redraw state legislative districts every ten years. In the last state legislative reapportionment, the board, by a unanimous vote, divided the greater Green metropolitan area, composed of Green City and several contiguous townships, into three equally populated state legislative districts. The result of that districting was that 40% of the area's total black population resided in one of those districts, 45% of the area's total black population resided in the second of those districts, and 15% resided in the third district. Jones is black, is a registered voter, and is a resident of Green City. Jones brings suit in an appropriate court against the members of the state reapportionment board, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that would require the boundary lines of the state legislative districts in the greater Green metropolitan area to be redrawn. His only claim is that the current apportionment violates the Fifteenth Amendment and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it improperly dilutes the voting power of the blacks who reside in that area. If no federal statute is applicable, which of the following facts, if proven, would most strongly support the validity of the action of the state reapportionment board?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nTo prove intentional vote dilution under the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs must show both discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect. York v. City of St. Gabriel, 89 F.Supp.3d 843, 850, 864 (M.D. La. 2015); Backus v. S. Carolina, 857 F.Supp.2d 553, 567 (D.S.C.), summ. aff'd, \u2013\u2013\u2013 U.S. \u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013, 133 S.Ct. 156, 184 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012).\n\nIn assessing whether a State election law impermissibly burdens First Amendment rights, we examine the character and magnitude of the burden and the extent to which the law serves the State's interests. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). Laws imposing severe burdens must be narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests, but lesser burdens receive less exacting scrutiny. California Democratic Party, 120 S.Ct. at 2412; Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364.\n\nIf we determine that a statute treats similarly situated individuals differently, we then evaluate the statute under an equal protection analysis. To determine whether a statute violates equal protection, we will either apply strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review. State v. Hirschfelder, 170 Wash.2d 536, 550, 242 P.3d 876 (2010). Which test applies depends on the classification and rights involved: Suspect classifications, such as race, alienage, and national origin, are subject to strict scrutiny. \u201cStrict scrutiny also applies to laws burdening fundamental rights or liberties.\u201d Intermediate scrutiny applies only if the statute implicates both an important right and\n\nThe Court has ruled that classifications by a State that are based on alienage are \u201cinherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.\u201d Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1852, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971). See Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 601-602, 96 S.Ct. 2264, 2281, 49 L.Ed.2d 65 (1976); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S., at 721, 93 S.Ct. at 2854, 37 L.Ed.2d 910; Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642, 93 S.Ct. 2842, 2847, 37 L.Ed.2d 853 (1973). In undertaking this scrutiny, \u201cthe governmental interest claimed to justify the discrimination is to\n\nbe carefully examined in order to determine whether that interest is legitimate and substantial, and inquiry must be made whether the means adopted to achieve the goal are necessary and precisely drawn.\u201d Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S., at 605, 96 S.Ct., at 2283. See In re Griffths, 413 U.S., at 721-722, 93 S.Ct., at 2854-2855. Alienage classifications by a State that do not withstand this stringent examination cannot stand.8\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nThe constitution of State X authorizes a fivemember state reapportionment board to redraw state legislative districts every ten years. In the last state legislative reapportionment, the board, by a unanimous vote, divided the greater Green metropolitan area, composed of Green City and several contiguous townships, into three equally populated state legislative districts. The result of that districting was that 40% of the area's total black population resided in one of those districts, 45% of the area's total black population resided in the second of those districts, and 15% resided in the third district. Jones is black, is a registered voter, and is a resident of Green City. Jones brings suit in an appropriate court against the members of the state reapportionment board, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that would require the boundary lines of the state legislative districts in the greater Green metropolitan area to be redrawn. His only claim is that the current apportionment violates the Fifteenth Amendment and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it improperly dilutes the voting power of the blacks who reside in that area. If no federal statute is applicable, which of the following facts, if proven, would most strongly support the validity of the action of the state reapportionment board?\n\n (A) In drawing the current district lines, the reapportionment board precisely complied with state constitutional requirements that state legislative districts be compact and follow political subdivision boundaries to the maximum extent feasible.\n (B) The reapportionment board was composed of three white members and two black members and both of the board's black members were satisfied that its plan did not improperly dilute the voting power of the blacks who reside in that area.\n (C) Although the rate of voter registration among blacks is below that of voter registration among whites in the greater Green metropolitan area, two black legislators have been elected from that area during the last 15 years.\n (D) The total black population of the greater Green metropolitan area amounts to only 15% of the population that is required to comprise a single legislative district.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "A",
+      "In drawing the current district lines, the reapportionment board precisely complied with state constitutional requirements that state legislative districts be compact and follow political subdivision boundaries to the maximum extent feasible."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_630",
+    "retrieved_docs": "To prove intentional vote dilution under the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs must show both discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect. York v. City of St. Gabriel, 89 F.Supp.3d 843, 850, 864 (M.D. La. 2015); Backus v. S. Carolina, 857 F.Supp.2d 553, 567 (D.S.C.), summ. aff'd, \u2013\u2013\u2013 U.S. \u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013, 133 S.Ct. 156, 184 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012).\n\nIn assessing whether a State election law impermissibly burdens First Amendment rights, we examine the character and magnitude of the burden and the extent to which the law serves the State's interests. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). Laws imposing severe burdens must be narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests, but lesser burdens receive less exacting scrutiny. California Democratic Party, 120 S.Ct. at 2412; Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364.\n\nIf we determine that a statute treats similarly situated individuals differently, we then evaluate the statute under an equal protection analysis. To determine whether a statute violates equal protection, we will either apply strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review. State v. Hirschfelder, 170 Wash.2d 536, 550, 242 P.3d 876 (2010). Which test applies depends on the classification and rights involved: Suspect classifications, such as race, alienage, and national origin, are subject to strict scrutiny. \u201cStrict scrutiny also applies to laws burdening fundamental rights or liberties.\u201d Intermediate scrutiny applies only if the statute implicates both an important right and\n\nThe Court has ruled that classifications by a State that are based on alienage are \u201cinherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.\u201d Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1852, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971). See Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 601-602, 96 S.Ct. 2264, 2281, 49 L.Ed.2d 65 (1976); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S., at 721, 93 S.Ct. at 2854, 37 L.Ed.2d 910; Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642, 93 S.Ct. 2842, 2847, 37 L.Ed.2d 853 (1973). In undertaking this scrutiny, \u201cthe governmental interest claimed to justify the discrimination is to\n\nbe carefully examined in order to determine whether that interest is legitimate and substantial, and inquiry must be made whether the means adopted to achieve the goal are necessary and precisely drawn.\u201d Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S., at 605, 96 S.Ct., at 2283. See In re Griffths, 413 U.S., at 721-722, 93 S.Ct., at 2854-2855. Alienage classifications by a State that do not withstand this stringent examination cannot stand.8"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "The legislature of the state of Chetopah enacted a statute requiring that all law enforcement officers in that state be citizens of the United States. Alien, lawfully admitted to permanent residency five years before the enactment of this statute, sought employment as a forensic pathologist in the Chetopah coroner's office. He was denied such a job solely because he was not a citizen. Alien thereupon brought suit in federal district court against appropriate Chetopah officials seeking to invalidate this citizenship requirement on federal constitutional grounds. The strongest ground upon which to attack this citizenship requirement is that it",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nIf we determine that a statute treats similarly situated individuals differently, we then evaluate the statute under an equal protection analysis. To determine whether a statute violates equal protection, we will either apply strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review. State v. Hirschfelder, 170 Wash.2d 536, 550, 242 P.3d 876 (2010). Which test applies depends on the classification and rights involved: Suspect classifications, such as race, alienage, and national origin, are subject to strict scrutiny. \u201cStrict scrutiny also applies to laws burdening fundamental rights or liberties.\u201d Intermediate scrutiny applies only if the statute implicates both an important right and\n\nbe carefully examined in order to determine whether that interest is legitimate and substantial, and inquiry must be made whether the means adopted to achieve the goal are necessary and precisely drawn.\u201d Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S., at 605, 96 S.Ct., at 2283. See In re Griffths, 413 U.S., at 721-722, 93 S.Ct., at 2854-2855. Alienage classifications by a State that do not withstand this stringent examination cannot stand.8\n\nThe Court has ruled that classifications by a State that are based on alienage are \u201cinherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.\u201d Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1852, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971). See Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 601-602, 96 S.Ct. 2264, 2281, 49 L.Ed.2d 65 (1976); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S., at 721, 93 S.Ct. at 2854, 37 L.Ed.2d 910; Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642, 93 S.Ct. 2842, 2847, 37 L.Ed.2d 853 (1973). In undertaking this scrutiny, \u201cthe governmental interest claimed to justify the discrimination is to\n\nIn assessing whether a State election law impermissibly burdens First Amendment rights, we examine the character and magnitude of the burden and the extent to which the law serves the State's interests. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). Laws imposing severe burdens must be narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests, but lesser burdens receive less exacting scrutiny. California Democratic Party, 120 S.Ct. at 2412; Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364.\n\nUnited States, 282 U.S. 344, 352\u2013354, 51 S.Ct. 153, 156\u2013157, 75 L.Ed. 374 (1931). Most recently, in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988), we held that the independent counsel created by provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 591\u2013599, was an inferior officer. In reaching that conclusion, we relied on several factors: that the independent counsel was subject to removal by a higher officer (the Attorney General), that she performed only limited duties, that her jurisdiction was narrow, and that her tenure was limited. 487 U.S., at 671\u2013672,\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nThe legislature of the state of Chetopah enacted a statute requiring that all law enforcement officers in that state be citizens of the United States. Alien, lawfully admitted to permanent residency five years before the enactment of this statute, sought employment as a forensic pathologist in the Chetopah coroner's office. He was denied such a job solely because he was not a citizen. Alien thereupon brought suit in federal district court against appropriate Chetopah officials seeking to invalidate this citizenship requirement on federal constitutional grounds. The strongest ground upon which to attack this citizenship requirement is that it\n\n (A) constitutes an ex postfJacto law as to previously admitted aliens.\n (B) deprives an alien of a fundamental right to employment without the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.\n (C) denies an alien a right to employment in violation of the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\n (D) denies an alien the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "D",
+      "denies an alien the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_803",
+    "retrieved_docs": "If we determine that a statute treats similarly situated individuals differently, we then evaluate the statute under an equal protection analysis. To determine whether a statute violates equal protection, we will either apply strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review. State v. Hirschfelder, 170 Wash.2d 536, 550, 242 P.3d 876 (2010). Which test applies depends on the classification and rights involved: Suspect classifications, such as race, alienage, and national origin, are subject to strict scrutiny. \u201cStrict scrutiny also applies to laws burdening fundamental rights or liberties.\u201d Intermediate scrutiny applies only if the statute implicates both an important right and\n\nbe carefully examined in order to determine whether that interest is legitimate and substantial, and inquiry must be made whether the means adopted to achieve the goal are necessary and precisely drawn.\u201d Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S., at 605, 96 S.Ct., at 2283. See In re Griffths, 413 U.S., at 721-722, 93 S.Ct., at 2854-2855. Alienage classifications by a State that do not withstand this stringent examination cannot stand.8\n\nThe Court has ruled that classifications by a State that are based on alienage are \u201cinherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.\u201d Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1852, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971). See Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 601-602, 96 S.Ct. 2264, 2281, 49 L.Ed.2d 65 (1976); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S., at 721, 93 S.Ct. at 2854, 37 L.Ed.2d 910; Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642, 93 S.Ct. 2842, 2847, 37 L.Ed.2d 853 (1973). In undertaking this scrutiny, \u201cthe governmental interest claimed to justify the discrimination is to\n\nIn assessing whether a State election law impermissibly burdens First Amendment rights, we examine the character and magnitude of the burden and the extent to which the law serves the State's interests. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). Laws imposing severe burdens must be narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests, but lesser burdens receive less exacting scrutiny. California Democratic Party, 120 S.Ct. at 2412; Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364.\n\nUnited States, 282 U.S. 344, 352\u2013354, 51 S.Ct. 153, 156\u2013157, 75 L.Ed. 374 (1931). Most recently, in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988), we held that the independent counsel created by provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 591\u2013599, was an inferior officer. In reaching that conclusion, we relied on several factors: that the independent counsel was subject to removal by a higher officer (the Attorney General), that she performed only limited duties, that her jurisdiction was narrow, and that her tenure was limited. 487 U.S., at 671\u2013672,"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Assume for this question only that the programs completed on July 5 had cut processing time by one-half for all of HDS's financial transactions. Is HDS entitled to renounce the contract because of Cl\"s delay in completion?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\n\u201cCalifornia law does not recognize a breach of contract as a \u2018wrongful act\u2019 predicate required for this claim.\u201d \u201c[A] breach of contract claim cannot be transmuted into tort liability by claiming that the breach interfered with the promisee's business.\u201d83 This is true even when a party breaches in order to put the non-breaching party out of business and rid itself of a competitor.84 \u201c[M]otive, regardless of how malevolent, remains irrelevant to a breach of contract claim and does not convert a contract action into a tort claim....\u201d To the extent that Templeton *1194 is alleging a breach of contract, it\n\nUnder the defense of impossibility of performance, a party's breach of its contractual obligation will be excused when \u201cchanged circumstances have rendered the promise vitally different from what reasonably should have been within the contemplation of both parties when they entered into the contract.\u201d Colo. Performance Corp. v. Mariposa Assocs., 754 P.2d 401, 407 (Colo.Ct.App.1987) (quotation omitted)\n\nFor a third-party beneficiary to succeed on a breach of contract claim under New York law, \u201ca non-party must be the intended beneficiary of the contract, not an incidental beneficiary to whom no duty is owed.\u201d Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 251 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 728 F.2d 52, 63 (2d Cir. 1984)). The non-party \u201cmust establish (1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for his or her benefit, and (3) that the benefit to him or\n\nunder the doctrine of \u201cpart performance,\u201d which may take an agreement outside of the statute of frauds, **178 there must be an oral agreement that has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and that agreement must be \u201cclear, certain, and unambiguous\u201d in its terms. Rafferty & Towner, Inc. v. NJS Enterprises, LLC, 224 Or.App. 51, 55, 197 P.3d 55 (2008), rev. den., 347 Or. 42, 217 P.3d 688 (2009). Emmert argued that the alleged agreements did not meet that standard. Furthermore, Emmert asserted, any qualifying \u201cpart performance\u201d must be clearly referable to the contract, and Kazlauskas's\n\nOrdinarily, in contracts where time is not of the essence, a failure to complete the work within the specified time will not terminate the contract, but it will subject the contractor to damages for the delay. See 13 Am.Jur.2d Building and Construction Contracts s 47.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nOn March 1, Computer Programs, Inc. (CP) orally agreed with Holiday Department Store (HDS) to write a set of programs for HDS's computer and to coordinate the programs with HDS's billing methods. A subsequent memo, signed by both parties, provided in its entirety: HDS will pay CP $20,000 in two equal installments within one month of completion if CP is successful in shortening by one-half the processing time for the financial transactions now handled on HDS's Zenon 747 computer; CP to complete by July 1. This agreement may be amended only by a signed writing. On June 6, CP demanded $10,000, saying the job was one-half done. After HDS denied liability, the parties orally agreed that HDS should deposit $20,000 in escrow, pending completion to the satisfaction of HDS's computer systems manager. The escrow deposit was thereupon made. On July 5, CP completed the programs, having used an amount of time in which it could have earned $18,000 had it devoted that time to other jobs. Tests by CP and HDS's computer systems manager then showed that the computer programs, not being perfectly coordinated with HDS's billing methods, cut processing time by only 47%. They would, however, save HDS $12,000 a year. Further, if HDS would spend $5,000 to change its invoice preparation methods, as recommended by CP, the programs would cut processing time by a total of 58%, saving HDS another $8,000 a year. HDS's computer systems manager refused in good faith to certify satisfactory completion. HDS requested the escrow agent to return the $20,000 and asserted that nothing was owed to CP even though HDS continued to use the programs.\nAssume for this question only that the programs completed on July 5 had cut processing time by one-half for all of HDS's financial transactions. Is HDS entitled to renounce the contract because of Cl\"s delay in completion?\n\n (A) Yes, because \"CP to complete by July 1\" is an express condition,\n (B) Yes, because the doctrine of substantial performance does not apply to commercial contracts.\n (C) No, because both parties manifested an understanding that time was not of the essence.\n (D) No, because the contract did not contain a liquidated damages clause dealing with delay in completion.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "No, because both parties manifested an understanding that time was not of the essence."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_234",
+    "retrieved_docs": "\u201cCalifornia law does not recognize a breach of contract as a \u2018wrongful act\u2019 predicate required for this claim.\u201d \u201c[A] breach of contract claim cannot be transmuted into tort liability by claiming that the breach interfered with the promisee's business.\u201d83 This is true even when a party breaches in order to put the non-breaching party out of business and rid itself of a competitor.84 \u201c[M]otive, regardless of how malevolent, remains irrelevant to a breach of contract claim and does not convert a contract action into a tort claim....\u201d To the extent that Templeton *1194 is alleging a breach of contract, it\n\nUnder the defense of impossibility of performance, a party's breach of its contractual obligation will be excused when \u201cchanged circumstances have rendered the promise vitally different from what reasonably should have been within the contemplation of both parties when they entered into the contract.\u201d Colo. Performance Corp. v. Mariposa Assocs., 754 P.2d 401, 407 (Colo.Ct.App.1987) (quotation omitted)\n\nFor a third-party beneficiary to succeed on a breach of contract claim under New York law, \u201ca non-party must be the intended beneficiary of the contract, not an incidental beneficiary to whom no duty is owed.\u201d Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 251 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 728 F.2d 52, 63 (2d Cir. 1984)). The non-party \u201cmust establish (1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for his or her benefit, and (3) that the benefit to him or\n\nunder the doctrine of \u201cpart performance,\u201d which may take an agreement outside of the statute of frauds, **178 there must be an oral agreement that has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and that agreement must be \u201cclear, certain, and unambiguous\u201d in its terms. Rafferty & Towner, Inc. v. NJS Enterprises, LLC, 224 Or.App. 51, 55, 197 P.3d 55 (2008), rev. den., 347 Or. 42, 217 P.3d 688 (2009). Emmert argued that the alleged agreements did not meet that standard. Furthermore, Emmert asserted, any qualifying \u201cpart performance\u201d must be clearly referable to the contract, and Kazlauskas's\n\nOrdinarily, in contracts where time is not of the essence, a failure to complete the work within the specified time will not terminate the contract, but it will subject the contractor to damages for the delay. See 13 Am.Jur.2d Building and Construction Contracts s 47."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "If Peterson brings an action, based on negligence, against Dora's mother, will Peterson prevail?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nor from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent (a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.\u201d See also Duncan v. Rzonca, 133 Ill.App.3d 184, 200, 88 Ill.Dec. 288, 478 N.E.2d 603, 613 (1985). 2To establish negligent parental supervision, a plaintiff must show that (1) the parents were aware of specific instances of prior conduct sufficient to put them on notice that the act complained of was\n\nParents in Illinois are not liable for the torts of their minor children merely because of the parent-child relationship. Bishop v. *524 Morich, 250 Ill.App.3d 366, 370, 190 Ill.Dec. 174, 621 N.E.2d 43, 46 (1993). Parents may be liable, however, if they failed to adequately control or supervise their children pursuant to section 316 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (hereinafter Restatement) (Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 316, at 123\u201324 (1965)), which states as follows: \u201cA parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so [as] to control his minor child as to prevent it from intentionally harming others\n\nThis court has previously recognized that contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort. \u201c \u2018[W]here the defendant's conduct is actually intended to inflict *655 harm upon the plaintiff, there is a difference, not merely in degree but in the kind of fault; and the defense [contributory negligence] never has been extended to such intentional torts.\u2019 \u201d **620 Omaha Nat. Bank v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 213 Neb. 873, 881\u201382, 332 N.W.2d 196, 202 (1983), quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts \u00a7 65 (4th ed.1971).\n\nlikely to occur, and (2) the parents had the opportunity to control the child. Bishop, 250 Ill.App.3d at 370, 190 Ill.Dec. 174, 621 N.E.2d at 46.\n\nThe elements of a products liability claim are that (1) a product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; (2) the defect existed at the time the product left the defendant's control; and (3) the defect proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 623 n. 3. When products liability is based on a manufacturing-flaw theory, a product is in a defective condition if the user could not have anticipated the danger that the product poses. Id. at 622; see also 4A Minnesota Practice, CIVJIG \u00a7 75.30 (4th ed.1999).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nDora, who was eight years old, went to the grocery store with her mother. Dora pushed the grocery cart while her mother put items into it. Dora's mother remained near Dora at all times. Peterson, another customer in the store, noticed Dora pushing the cart in a manner that caused Peterson no concern. A short time later, the cart Dora was pushing struck Peterson in the knee, inflicting serious injury.\nIf Peterson brings an action, based on negligence, against Dora's mother, will Peterson prevail?\n\n (A) Yes, if Dora was negligent.\n (B) Yes, because Dora's mother is responsible for any harm caused by Dora.\n (C) Yes, because Dora's mother assumed the risk of her child's actions.\n (D) Yes, if Dora's mother did not adequately supervise Dora's actions.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "D",
+      "Yes, if Dora's mother did not adequately supervise Dora's actions."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_622",
+    "retrieved_docs": "or from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent (a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.\u201d See also Duncan v. Rzonca, 133 Ill.App.3d 184, 200, 88 Ill.Dec. 288, 478 N.E.2d 603, 613 (1985). 2To establish negligent parental supervision, a plaintiff must show that (1) the parents were aware of specific instances of prior conduct sufficient to put them on notice that the act complained of was\n\nParents in Illinois are not liable for the torts of their minor children merely because of the parent-child relationship. Bishop v. *524 Morich, 250 Ill.App.3d 366, 370, 190 Ill.Dec. 174, 621 N.E.2d 43, 46 (1993). Parents may be liable, however, if they failed to adequately control or supervise their children pursuant to section 316 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (hereinafter Restatement) (Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 316, at 123\u201324 (1965)), which states as follows: \u201cA parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so [as] to control his minor child as to prevent it from intentionally harming others\n\nThis court has previously recognized that contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort. \u201c \u2018[W]here the defendant's conduct is actually intended to inflict *655 harm upon the plaintiff, there is a difference, not merely in degree but in the kind of fault; and the defense [contributory negligence] never has been extended to such intentional torts.\u2019 \u201d **620 Omaha Nat. Bank v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 213 Neb. 873, 881\u201382, 332 N.W.2d 196, 202 (1983), quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts \u00a7 65 (4th ed.1971).\n\nlikely to occur, and (2) the parents had the opportunity to control the child. Bishop, 250 Ill.App.3d at 370, 190 Ill.Dec. 174, 621 N.E.2d at 46.\n\nThe elements of a products liability claim are that (1) a product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; (2) the defect existed at the time the product left the defendant's control; and (3) the defect proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 623 n. 3. When products liability is based on a manufacturing-flaw theory, a product is in a defective condition if the user could not have anticipated the danger that the product poses. Id. at 622; see also 4A Minnesota Practice, CIVJIG \u00a7 75.30 (4th ed.1999)."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Deland operates a bank courier service that uses armored trucks to transport money and securities. One of Deland's armored trucks was parked illegally, too close to a street intersection. Pilcher, driving his car at an excessive speed, skidded into the armored truck while trying to make a turn. The truck was not damaged, but Pilcher was injured. Pilcher has brought an action against Deland to recover damages for his loss resulting from the accident. The jurisdiction follows a pure comparative negligence rule. In this action, Pilcher should recover",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nComparative negligence When any person suffers death or damage as a result partly of that person's own fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that death or damage may not be defeated by reason of the fault of the person suffering the damage, but the damages recoverable in respect thereof must be reduced to such extent as the jury thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant's share in the responsibility for the damage. When damages are recoverable by any person by virtue of this section, subject to such\n\nreduction as is mentioned, the court shall instruct the jury to find and record the total damages that would have been recoverable if the claimant had not been at fault, and further instruct the jury to reduce the total damages by dollars and cents, and not by percentage, to the extent considered just and equitable, having regard to the claimant's share in the responsibility for the damages, and instruct the jury to return both amounts with the knowledge that the lesser figure is the final verdict in the case.\n\nFor these reasons, we reaffirm today that damages measured by diminution in value are an adequate and appropriate remedy for negligent harm to real or personal property, and that mental anguish based solely on negligent property damage is not compensable as a matter of law. The proper measure of Likes's damages\u2014although she cannot recover on those claims for which the City has sovereign immunity from suit for property damages\u2014is (1) the loss in market value of her property caused by the defendant's negligence and (2) for those items of small or no market value that \u201chave their primary value in\n\nThis court has previously recognized that contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort. \u201c \u2018[W]here the defendant's conduct is actually intended to inflict *655 harm upon the plaintiff, there is a difference, not merely in degree but in the kind of fault; and the defense [contributory negligence] never has been extended to such intentional torts.\u2019 \u201d **620 Omaha Nat. Bank v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 213 Neb. 873, 881\u201382, 332 N.W.2d 196, 202 (1983), quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts \u00a7 65 (4th ed.1971).\n\nsentiment,\u201d Brown v. Frontier Theatres, 369 S.W.2d at 305, the loss in value to her. Because the injury to Likes's property was not intentional or malicious, or even grossly negligent, we need not decide whether mental anguish arising out of property damage may be legally compensable when a heightened degree of misconduct is found. Compare Luna, 667 S.W.2d at 117 (stating in dicta that mental anguish is recoverable for \u201cwillful tort, willful and wanton disregard, or gross negligence\u201d), with Reinhardt Motors, Inc. v. Boston, 516 So.2d 509, 511 (Ala.1986) (limiting mental anguish for property damage to cases in which the\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nDeland operates a bank courier service that uses armored trucks to transport money and securities. One of Deland's armored trucks was parked illegally, too close to a street intersection. Pilcher, driving his car at an excessive speed, skidded into the armored truck while trying to make a turn. The truck was not damaged, but Pilcher was injured. Pilcher has brought an action against Deland to recover damages for his loss resulting from the accident. The jurisdiction follows a pure comparative negligence rule. In this action, Pilcher should recover\n\n (A) nothing, because Deland was not an active or efficient cause of Pilcher's loss.\n (B) nothing, if Deland was less negligent than Pilcher.\n (C) his entire loss, reduced by a percentage that reflects the negligence attributed to Pilcher.\n (D) his entire loss, because Deland's truck suffered no damage.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "his entire loss, reduced by a percentage that reflects the negligence attributed to Pilcher."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_709",
+    "retrieved_docs": "Comparative negligence When any person suffers death or damage as a result partly of that person's own fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that death or damage may not be defeated by reason of the fault of the person suffering the damage, but the damages recoverable in respect thereof must be reduced to such extent as the jury thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant's share in the responsibility for the damage. When damages are recoverable by any person by virtue of this section, subject to such\n\nreduction as is mentioned, the court shall instruct the jury to find and record the total damages that would have been recoverable if the claimant had not been at fault, and further instruct the jury to reduce the total damages by dollars and cents, and not by percentage, to the extent considered just and equitable, having regard to the claimant's share in the responsibility for the damages, and instruct the jury to return both amounts with the knowledge that the lesser figure is the final verdict in the case.\n\nFor these reasons, we reaffirm today that damages measured by diminution in value are an adequate and appropriate remedy for negligent harm to real or personal property, and that mental anguish based solely on negligent property damage is not compensable as a matter of law. The proper measure of Likes's damages\u2014although she cannot recover on those claims for which the City has sovereign immunity from suit for property damages\u2014is (1) the loss in market value of her property caused by the defendant's negligence and (2) for those items of small or no market value that \u201chave their primary value in\n\nThis court has previously recognized that contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort. \u201c \u2018[W]here the defendant's conduct is actually intended to inflict *655 harm upon the plaintiff, there is a difference, not merely in degree but in the kind of fault; and the defense [contributory negligence] never has been extended to such intentional torts.\u2019 \u201d **620 Omaha Nat. Bank v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 213 Neb. 873, 881\u201382, 332 N.W.2d 196, 202 (1983), quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts \u00a7 65 (4th ed.1971).\n\nsentiment,\u201d Brown v. Frontier Theatres, 369 S.W.2d at 305, the loss in value to her. Because the injury to Likes's property was not intentional or malicious, or even grossly negligent, we need not decide whether mental anguish arising out of property damage may be legally compensable when a heightened degree of misconduct is found. Compare Luna, 667 S.W.2d at 117 (stating in dicta that mental anguish is recoverable for \u201cwillful tort, willful and wanton disregard, or gross negligence\u201d), with Reinhardt Motors, Inc. v. Boston, 516 So.2d 509, 511 (Ala.1986) (limiting mental anguish for property damage to cases in which the"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Assume for this question only that CP's delay in completion did not give HDS the right to renounce the contract and that the parties' escrow agreement was enforceable. Is CP entitled to recover damages for breach of the contract?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nunder the doctrine of \u201cpart performance,\u201d which may take an agreement outside of the statute of frauds, **178 there must be an oral agreement that has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and that agreement must be \u201cclear, certain, and unambiguous\u201d in its terms. Rafferty & Towner, Inc. v. NJS Enterprises, LLC, 224 Or.App. 51, 55, 197 P.3d 55 (2008), rev. den., 347 Or. 42, 217 P.3d 688 (2009). Emmert argued that the alleged agreements did not meet that standard. Furthermore, Emmert asserted, any qualifying \u201cpart performance\u201d must be clearly referable to the contract, and Kazlauskas's\n\n\u201cCalifornia law does not recognize a breach of contract as a \u2018wrongful act\u2019 predicate required for this claim.\u201d \u201c[A] breach of contract claim cannot be transmuted into tort liability by claiming that the breach interfered with the promisee's business.\u201d83 This is true even when a party breaches in order to put the non-breaching party out of business and rid itself of a competitor.84 \u201c[M]otive, regardless of how malevolent, remains irrelevant to a breach of contract claim and does not convert a contract action into a tort claim....\u201d To the extent that Templeton *1194 is alleging a breach of contract, it\n\nIn an action for breach of contract, the injured party is entitled to the benefit of the bargain, and the recovery may include the profits which he would have derived from performance of the contract. See Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 116 (2d Cir.1976). New York law, which controls here, permits recovery of lost future profits as damages, but only under rigorous rules: First, it must be demonstrated with certainty that such damages have been caused by the breach and, second, the alleged loss must be capable of proof with reasonable certainty. In other words,\n\nthe contract was made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.\u201d).\n\nAt common law, a breaching party could not obtain restitution for benefits conferred. The common law rule reflected a belief that breach was \u201cmorally unworthy conduct,\u201d and that a breaching party should not benefit from his own wrong, see Lancellotti v. Thomas, 341 Pa.Super. 1, 491 A.2d 117, 118\u201319 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast to the common law rule, the Restatement rule reflects a policy against awarding a windfall to the non-breaching party. See id. at 119\u201320. The court in Lancellotti rejected the view that breach is morally wrong, see id. at 122 (\u201cRules of contract law are\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nOn March 1, Computer Programs, Inc. (CP) orally agreed with Holiday Department Store (HDS) to write a set of programs for HDS's computer and to coordinate the programs with HDS's billing methods. A subsequent memo, signed by both parties, provided in its entirety: HDS will pay CP $20,000 in two equal installments within one month of completion if CP is successful in shortening by one-half the processing time for the financial transactions now handled on HDS's Zenon 747 computer; CP to complete by July 1. This agreement may be amended only by a signed writing. On June 6, CP demanded $10,000, saying the job was one-half done. After HDS denied liability, the parties orally agreed that HDS should deposit $20,000 in escrow, pending completion to the satisfaction of HDS's computer systems manager. The escrow deposit was thereupon made. On July 5, CP completed the programs, having used an amount of time in which it could have earned $18,000 had it devoted that time to other jobs. Tests by CP and HDS's computer systems manager then showed that the computer programs, not being perfectly coordinated with HDS's billing methods, cut processing time by only 47%. They would, however, save HDS $12,000 a year. Further, if HDS would spend $5,000 to change its invoice preparation methods, as recommended by CP, the programs would cut processing time by a total of 58%, saving HDS another $8,000 a year. HDS's computer systems manager refused in good faith to certify satisfactory completion. HDS requested the escrow agent to return the $20,000 and asserted that nothing was owed to CP even though HDS continued to use the programs.\nAssume for this question only that CP's delay in completion did not give HDS the right to renounce the contract and that the parties' escrow agreement was enforceable. Is CP entitled to recover damages for breach of the contract?\n\n (A) Yes, because CP had substantially performed.\n (B) Yes, because the programs would save HDS $12,000 a year.\n (C) No, because shortening the processing time by one-half was an express condition subsequent.\n (D) No, because HDS's computer systems manager did not certify satisfactory completion of the programs.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "D",
+      "No, because HDS's computer systems manager did not certify satisfactory completion of the programs."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_235",
+    "retrieved_docs": "under the doctrine of \u201cpart performance,\u201d which may take an agreement outside of the statute of frauds, **178 there must be an oral agreement that has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and that agreement must be \u201cclear, certain, and unambiguous\u201d in its terms. Rafferty & Towner, Inc. v. NJS Enterprises, LLC, 224 Or.App. 51, 55, 197 P.3d 55 (2008), rev. den., 347 Or. 42, 217 P.3d 688 (2009). Emmert argued that the alleged agreements did not meet that standard. Furthermore, Emmert asserted, any qualifying \u201cpart performance\u201d must be clearly referable to the contract, and Kazlauskas's\n\n\u201cCalifornia law does not recognize a breach of contract as a \u2018wrongful act\u2019 predicate required for this claim.\u201d \u201c[A] breach of contract claim cannot be transmuted into tort liability by claiming that the breach interfered with the promisee's business.\u201d83 This is true even when a party breaches in order to put the non-breaching party out of business and rid itself of a competitor.84 \u201c[M]otive, regardless of how malevolent, remains irrelevant to a breach of contract claim and does not convert a contract action into a tort claim....\u201d To the extent that Templeton *1194 is alleging a breach of contract, it\n\nIn an action for breach of contract, the injured party is entitled to the benefit of the bargain, and the recovery may include the profits which he would have derived from performance of the contract. See Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 116 (2d Cir.1976). New York law, which controls here, permits recovery of lost future profits as damages, but only under rigorous rules: First, it must be demonstrated with certainty that such damages have been caused by the breach and, second, the alleged loss must be capable of proof with reasonable certainty. In other words,\n\nthe contract was made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.\u201d).\n\nAt common law, a breaching party could not obtain restitution for benefits conferred. The common law rule reflected a belief that breach was \u201cmorally unworthy conduct,\u201d and that a breaching party should not benefit from his own wrong, see Lancellotti v. Thomas, 341 Pa.Super. 1, 491 A.2d 117, 118\u201319 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast to the common law rule, the Restatement rule reflects a policy against awarding a windfall to the non-breaching party. See id. at 119\u201320. The court in Lancellotti rejected the view that breach is morally wrong, see id. at 122 (\u201cRules of contract law are"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Dever was indicted for the murder of Vickers by poison. At trial, the prosecutor calls the county coroner, Dr. Wolfe, who is a board-certified pathologist, to testify that, in accord with good practice in her specialty, she has studied microphotographic slides, made under her supervision by medical assistants, of tissue taken from Vickers' corpse and that it is Wolfe's opinion, based on that study, that Vickers died of poisoning. The slides have not been offered in evidence. Dr. Wolfe's opinion should be",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nAs articulated by the Federal Advisory Committee in its Note to Rule 403, the \u201cunfair prejudice\u201d language contained in Rule 403 refers to an undue tendency on the part of admissible evidence to suggest a decision made on an improper basis. \u201cUnfair prejudice refers to the tendency of the proposed evidence to adversely affect the objecting party's position by injecting considerations extraneous to the merits of the lawsuit, such as the jury's bias, sympathy, anger or shock.\u201d People v. Goree, 132 Mich.App. 693, 349 N.W.2d 220 (1984). \u201cUnfair prejudice as used in Rule 403 does not mean the damage to\n\nmaking a truly informed and intelligent decision concerning the proposed medical procedure.\u201d Pauscher, 408 N.W.2d at 359 (citing Cowman, 329 N.W.2d at 425, 427); accord Doe, 476 N.W.2d at 31 (\u201cThat duty is shaped, not by what the medical community would deem material, but by the patient's need for information sufficient to make a truly informed and intelligent decision.\u201d). Several exceptions to the patient rule's disclosure requirement exist that are not applicable to this case. Generally, to succeed on a claim of informed consent, the plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) The existence of a material risk [or information] unknown\n\nAn expert opinion is competent if it is held to a reasonable degree of scientific or medical certainty. State v. Jackson, 92 Ohio St.3d 436, 751 N.E.2d 946 (2001) citing State v. Benner, 40 Ohio St.3d 301, 313, 533 N.E.2d 701, 714 (1988). The phrase \u201creasonable certainty\u201d is synonymous with the term \u201cprobability.\u201d Id.\n\ncourt is given the discretion to determine when circumstantial evidence should be admitted. This may require the court to evaluate the evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to determine whether its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. One court provided this observation about a court's discretion to allow circumstantial evidence: As has been frequently said, great latitude is allowed in the reception of circumstantial evidence, the aid of which is constantly required, and therefore, where direct evidence of the fact is wanting, the more the jury can see of the surrounding facts and circumstances, the more correct their\n\n\u201cAdmissibility depends on relevance and probative value. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact.\u201d Smith v. Morrison, 47 A.3d 131, 137 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). Evidence, even if relevant, may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the potential prejudice. Unfair prejudice supporting exclusion of relevant evidence means a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or divert the jury's attention away from its duty of\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nDever was indicted for the murder of Vickers by poison. At trial, the prosecutor calls the county coroner, Dr. Wolfe, who is a board-certified pathologist, to testify that, in accord with good practice in her specialty, she has studied microphotographic slides, made under her supervision by medical assistants, of tissue taken from Vickers' corpse and that it is Wolfe's opinion, based on that study, that Vickers died of poisoning. The slides have not been offered in evidence. Dr. Wolfe's opinion should be\n\n (A) excluded, because the cause ofdeathis a critical issue to be decided by the trier of fact\n (B) excluded, because her opinion is based on facts not in evidence\n (C) admitted, because Wolfe followed accepted medical practice in arriving at her opinion\n (D) admitted, because her opinion is based on matters observed pursuant to a duty imposed by law\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "admitted, because Wolfe followed accepted medical practice in arriving at her opinion"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_406",
+    "retrieved_docs": "As articulated by the Federal Advisory Committee in its Note to Rule 403, the \u201cunfair prejudice\u201d language contained in Rule 403 refers to an undue tendency on the part of admissible evidence to suggest a decision made on an improper basis. \u201cUnfair prejudice refers to the tendency of the proposed evidence to adversely affect the objecting party's position by injecting considerations extraneous to the merits of the lawsuit, such as the jury's bias, sympathy, anger or shock.\u201d People v. Goree, 132 Mich.App. 693, 349 N.W.2d 220 (1984). \u201cUnfair prejudice as used in Rule 403 does not mean the damage to\n\nmaking a truly informed and intelligent decision concerning the proposed medical procedure.\u201d Pauscher, 408 N.W.2d at 359 (citing Cowman, 329 N.W.2d at 425, 427); accord Doe, 476 N.W.2d at 31 (\u201cThat duty is shaped, not by what the medical community would deem material, but by the patient's need for information sufficient to make a truly informed and intelligent decision.\u201d). Several exceptions to the patient rule's disclosure requirement exist that are not applicable to this case. Generally, to succeed on a claim of informed consent, the plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) The existence of a material risk [or information] unknown\n\nAn expert opinion is competent if it is held to a reasonable degree of scientific or medical certainty. State v. Jackson, 92 Ohio St.3d 436, 751 N.E.2d 946 (2001) citing State v. Benner, 40 Ohio St.3d 301, 313, 533 N.E.2d 701, 714 (1988). The phrase \u201creasonable certainty\u201d is synonymous with the term \u201cprobability.\u201d Id.\n\ncourt is given the discretion to determine when circumstantial evidence should be admitted. This may require the court to evaluate the evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to determine whether its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. One court provided this observation about a court's discretion to allow circumstantial evidence: As has been frequently said, great latitude is allowed in the reception of circumstantial evidence, the aid of which is constantly required, and therefore, where direct evidence of the fact is wanting, the more the jury can see of the surrounding facts and circumstances, the more correct their\n\n\u201cAdmissibility depends on relevance and probative value. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact.\u201d Smith v. Morrison, 47 A.3d 131, 137 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). Evidence, even if relevant, may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the potential prejudice. Unfair prejudice supporting exclusion of relevant evidence means a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or divert the jury's attention away from its duty of"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "After Orris's conveyance to Powell, title to the earthen dam was in",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nThus, the party claiming ownership by adverse possession must prove that the following five elements existed concurrently for 20 years: \u201c(1) continuous, (2) hostile or adverse, (3) actual, (4) open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the premises, (5) under claim of title inconsistent with that of the true owner.\u201d Joiner, 85 Ill.2d at 81, 51 Ill.Dec. 662, 421 N.E.2d at 174.\n\nthat entry and possession under claim of right, ownership, or title are sufficient. 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession \u00a7 72 (footnotes omitted). See also 4 Tiffany, supra, Adverse Possession \u00a7 1147 (distinguishing \u201ccolor of title,\u201d which \u201crefers to asserting title through an instrument that appears to convey title, but in actuality does not,\u201d from \u201cclaim of title,\u201d which more broadly \u201creflect [s] an intention to assert ownership over the property and claim it as one's own\u201d).\n\nYet the established rule, followed in Maryland, is that proof of color of title is not necessary to establish adverse possession. Color of title is not an element of adverse possession unless made so by statute, as under provisions prescribing a shorter period of limitation than would otherwise be required. While there are a few isolated judicial statements broadly to the effect that color of title, or color of right, is essential to adverse possession, the general rule is well established that, in the absence of contrary statute, color of title is not an essential element of adverse possession and\n\nConversion is the unauthorized and unlawful assumption and exercise of dominion and control over the personal property of another to the exclusion of, or inconsistent with, the owner's rights. Waisath v. Lack's Stores, Inc., 474 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex.1971). The elements of conversion are: (1) the plaintiff owned, had legal possession of, or was entitled to possession of the property; (2) the defendant assumed and exercised dominion and control *387 over the property in an unlawful and unauthorized manner, to the exclusion of and inconsistent with the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the defendant refused the plaintiff's demand for return of\n\nIt ripened into an incorporeal hereditament when the licensee entered into enjoyment thereof and made expenditures and improvements. Other jurisdictions hold that revocation will not be allowed in such a case unless the licensee be compensated for his improvements. This language supports a conclusion that the holder of an incorporeal hereditament would be considered the holder of a form of property interest entitling it to compensation under Utah law.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nOrris had title to Brownacre in fee simple. Without Orris' knowledge, Hull entered Brownacre in 1950 and constructed an earthen dam across a watercourse. The earthen dam trapped water that Hull used to water a herd of cattle he owned. After 12 years of possession of Brownacre, Hull gave possession of Brownacre to Burns. At the same time, Hull also purported to transfer his cattle and all his interests in the dam and water to Burns by a document that was sufficient as a bill of sale to transfer personal property but was insufficient as a deed to transfer real property. One year later, Burns entered into a lease with Orris to lease Brownacre for a period of five years. After the end of the five-year term of the lease, Burns remained on Brownacre for an additional three years and then left Brownacre. At that time Orris conveyed Brownacre by a quitclaim deed to Powell. The period of time to acquire title by adverse possession in the jurisdiction is 10 years.\nAfter Orris's conveyance to Powell, title to the earthen dam was in\n\n (A) the person who then held title to Brownacre in fee simple.\n (B) Burns, as purchaser of the dam under the bill of sale.\n (C) the person who then owned the water rights as an incident thereto.\n (D) Hull, as the builder of the dam.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "A",
+      "the person who then held title to Brownacre in fee simple."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_994",
+    "retrieved_docs": "Thus, the party claiming ownership by adverse possession must prove that the following five elements existed concurrently for 20 years: \u201c(1) continuous, (2) hostile or adverse, (3) actual, (4) open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the premises, (5) under claim of title inconsistent with that of the true owner.\u201d Joiner, 85 Ill.2d at 81, 51 Ill.Dec. 662, 421 N.E.2d at 174.\n\nthat entry and possession under claim of right, ownership, or title are sufficient. 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession \u00a7 72 (footnotes omitted). See also 4 Tiffany, supra, Adverse Possession \u00a7 1147 (distinguishing \u201ccolor of title,\u201d which \u201crefers to asserting title through an instrument that appears to convey title, but in actuality does not,\u201d from \u201cclaim of title,\u201d which more broadly \u201creflect [s] an intention to assert ownership over the property and claim it as one's own\u201d).\n\nYet the established rule, followed in Maryland, is that proof of color of title is not necessary to establish adverse possession. Color of title is not an element of adverse possession unless made so by statute, as under provisions prescribing a shorter period of limitation than would otherwise be required. While there are a few isolated judicial statements broadly to the effect that color of title, or color of right, is essential to adverse possession, the general rule is well established that, in the absence of contrary statute, color of title is not an essential element of adverse possession and\n\nConversion is the unauthorized and unlawful assumption and exercise of dominion and control over the personal property of another to the exclusion of, or inconsistent with, the owner's rights. Waisath v. Lack's Stores, Inc., 474 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex.1971). The elements of conversion are: (1) the plaintiff owned, had legal possession of, or was entitled to possession of the property; (2) the defendant assumed and exercised dominion and control *387 over the property in an unlawful and unauthorized manner, to the exclusion of and inconsistent with the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the defendant refused the plaintiff's demand for return of\n\nIt ripened into an incorporeal hereditament when the licensee entered into enjoyment thereof and made expenditures and improvements. Other jurisdictions hold that revocation will not be allowed in such a case unless the licensee be compensated for his improvements. This language supports a conclusion that the holder of an incorporeal hereditament would be considered the holder of a form of property interest entitling it to compensation under Utah law."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Pat had been under the care of a cardiologist for three years prior to submitting to an elective operation that was performed by Surgeon. Two days thereafter, Pat suffered a stroke, resulting in a coma, caused by a blood clot that lodged in her brain. When it appeared that she had entered a permanent vegetative state, with no hope of recovery, the artificial life-support system that had been provided was withdrawn, and she died a few hours later. The withdrawal of artificial life support had been requested by her family, and duly approved by a court. Surgeon was not involved in that decision, or in its execution. The administrator of Pat's estate thereafter filed a wrongful death action against Surgeon, claiming that Surgeon was negligent in having failed to consult a cardiologist prior to the operation. At the trial the plaintiff offered evidence that accepted medical practice would require examination of the patient by a cardiologist prior to the type of operation that Surgeon performed. In this action, the plaintiff should",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nto the patient; (2) A failure to disclose that risk [or information] on the part of the physician; (3) Disclosure of the risk [or information] would have led a reasonable patient in plaintiff's position to reject the medical procedure or choose a different course of treatment; (4) Injury.\n\nA negligence claim in a medical malpractice action must allege \u201cthe improper performance of a professional service that deviated from the acceptable standard of care.\u201d Zuidema v. Pedicano, 373 N.J. Super. 135, 145 (App. Div. 2004). A plaintiff alleging medical malpractice must prove \u201c(1) the applicable standard of care; (2) a deviation from that standard of care; and (3) that the deviation proximately caused the injury.\u201d Gardner v. Pawliw, 150 N.J. 359, 375 (1997).\n\nmaking a truly informed and intelligent decision concerning the proposed medical procedure.\u201d Pauscher, 408 N.W.2d at 359 (citing Cowman, 329 N.W.2d at 425, 427); accord Doe, 476 N.W.2d at 31 (\u201cThat duty is shaped, not by what the medical community would deem material, but by the patient's need for information sufficient to make a truly informed and intelligent decision.\u201d). Several exceptions to the patient rule's disclosure requirement exist that are not applicable to this case. Generally, to succeed on a claim of informed consent, the plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) The existence of a material risk [or information] unknown\n\nThe elements of a products liability claim are that (1) a product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; (2) the defect existed at the time the product left the defendant's control; and (3) the defect proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 623 n. 3. When products liability is based on a manufacturing-flaw theory, a product is in a defective condition if the user could not have anticipated the danger that the product poses. Id. at 622; see also 4A Minnesota Practice, CIVJIG \u00a7 75.30 (4th ed.1999).\n\nFor a third-party beneficiary to succeed on a breach of contract claim under New York law, \u201ca non-party must be the intended beneficiary of the contract, not an incidental beneficiary to whom no duty is owed.\u201d Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 251 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 728 F.2d 52, 63 (2d Cir. 1984)). The non-party \u201cmust establish (1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for his or her benefit, and (3) that the benefit to him or\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nPat had been under the care of a cardiologist for three years prior to submitting to an elective operation that was performed by Surgeon. Two days thereafter, Pat suffered a stroke, resulting in a coma, caused by a blood clot that lodged in her brain. When it appeared that she had entered a permanent vegetative state, with no hope of recovery, the artificial life-support system that had been provided was withdrawn, and she died a few hours later. The withdrawal of artificial life support had been requested by her family, and duly approved by a court. Surgeon was not involved in that decision, or in its execution. The administrator of Pat's estate thereafter filed a wrongful death action against Surgeon, claiming that Surgeon was negligent in having failed to consult a cardiologist prior to the operation. At the trial the plaintiff offered evidence that accepted medical practice would require examination of the patient by a cardiologist prior to the type of operation that Surgeon performed. In this action, the plaintiff should\n\n (A) prevail, if Surgeon was negligent in failing to have Pat examined by a cardiologist prior to the operation.\n (B) prevail, if the blood clot that caused Pat's death was caused by the operation which Surgeon performed.\n (C) not prevail, absent evidence that a cardiologist, had one examined Pat before the operation, would probably have provided advice that would have changed the outcome.\n (D) not prevail, because Surgeon had nothing to do with the withdrawal of artificial life support, which was the cause of Pat's death.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "not prevail, absent evidence that a cardiologist, had one examined Pat before the operation, would probably have provided advice that would have changed the outcome."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_1114",
+    "retrieved_docs": "to the patient; (2) A failure to disclose that risk [or information] on the part of the physician; (3) Disclosure of the risk [or information] would have led a reasonable patient in plaintiff's position to reject the medical procedure or choose a different course of treatment; (4) Injury.\n\nA negligence claim in a medical malpractice action must allege \u201cthe improper performance of a professional service that deviated from the acceptable standard of care.\u201d Zuidema v. Pedicano, 373 N.J. Super. 135, 145 (App. Div. 2004). A plaintiff alleging medical malpractice must prove \u201c(1) the applicable standard of care; (2) a deviation from that standard of care; and (3) that the deviation proximately caused the injury.\u201d Gardner v. Pawliw, 150 N.J. 359, 375 (1997).\n\nmaking a truly informed and intelligent decision concerning the proposed medical procedure.\u201d Pauscher, 408 N.W.2d at 359 (citing Cowman, 329 N.W.2d at 425, 427); accord Doe, 476 N.W.2d at 31 (\u201cThat duty is shaped, not by what the medical community would deem material, but by the patient's need for information sufficient to make a truly informed and intelligent decision.\u201d). Several exceptions to the patient rule's disclosure requirement exist that are not applicable to this case. Generally, to succeed on a claim of informed consent, the plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) The existence of a material risk [or information] unknown\n\nThe elements of a products liability claim are that (1) a product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; (2) the defect existed at the time the product left the defendant's control; and (3) the defect proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 623 n. 3. When products liability is based on a manufacturing-flaw theory, a product is in a defective condition if the user could not have anticipated the danger that the product poses. Id. at 622; see also 4A Minnesota Practice, CIVJIG \u00a7 75.30 (4th ed.1999).\n\nFor a third-party beneficiary to succeed on a breach of contract claim under New York law, \u201ca non-party must be the intended beneficiary of the contract, not an incidental beneficiary to whom no duty is owed.\u201d Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 251 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 728 F.2d 52, 63 (2d Cir. 1984)). The non-party \u201cmust establish (1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for his or her benefit, and (3) that the benefit to him or"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "After Orris's conveyance to Powell, title to Brownacre was in",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nThus, the party claiming ownership by adverse possession must prove that the following five elements existed concurrently for 20 years: \u201c(1) continuous, (2) hostile or adverse, (3) actual, (4) open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the premises, (5) under claim of title inconsistent with that of the true owner.\u201d Joiner, 85 Ill.2d at 81, 51 Ill.Dec. 662, 421 N.E.2d at 174.\n\nthat entry and possession under claim of right, ownership, or title are sufficient. 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession \u00a7 72 (footnotes omitted). See also 4 Tiffany, supra, Adverse Possession \u00a7 1147 (distinguishing \u201ccolor of title,\u201d which \u201crefers to asserting title through an instrument that appears to convey title, but in actuality does not,\u201d from \u201cclaim of title,\u201d which more broadly \u201creflect [s] an intention to assert ownership over the property and claim it as one's own\u201d).\n\nYet the established rule, followed in Maryland, is that proof of color of title is not necessary to establish adverse possession. Color of title is not an element of adverse possession unless made so by statute, as under provisions prescribing a shorter period of limitation than would otherwise be required. While there are a few isolated judicial statements broadly to the effect that color of title, or color of right, is essential to adverse possession, the general rule is well established that, in the absence of contrary statute, color of title is not an essential element of adverse possession and\n\nA life tenant can sell his or her life estate in property. See generally Reeside v. Annex Bldg. Ass'n of Balt. City, 165 Md. 200, 167 A. 72 (1933). The estate as sold becomes an estate pur autre vie (for the life of the original life tenant). Devecmon v. Devecmon, 43 Md. 335, 348 (1875). A life tenant who does not have the power to dispose of the property cannot convey the remainderman's interest, however. Reeside, supra, 165 Md. 200, 167 A. 72. A remainderman likewise can sell his remainder interest in the property, but cannot convey the life tenant's\n\nIt ripened into an incorporeal hereditament when the licensee entered into enjoyment thereof and made expenditures and improvements. Other jurisdictions hold that revocation will not be allowed in such a case unless the licensee be compensated for his improvements. This language supports a conclusion that the holder of an incorporeal hereditament would be considered the holder of a form of property interest entitling it to compensation under Utah law.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nOrris had title to Brownacre in fee simple. Without Orris' knowledge, Hull entered Brownacre in 1950 and constructed an earthen dam across a watercourse. The earthen dam trapped water that Hull used to water a herd of cattle he owned. After 12 years of possession of Brownacre, Hull gave possession of Brownacre to Burns. At the same time, Hull also purported to transfer his cattle and all his interests in the dam and water to Burns by a document that was sufficient as a bill of sale to transfer personal property but was insufficient as a deed to transfer real property. One year later, Burns entered into a lease with Orris to lease Brownacre for a period of five years. After the end of the five-year term of the lease, Burns remained on Brownacre for an additional three years and then left Brownacre. At that time Orris conveyed Brownacre by a quitclaim deed to Powell. The period of time to acquire title by adverse possession in the jurisdiction is 10 years.\nAfter Orris's conveyance to Powell, title to Brownacre was in\n\n (A) Hull.\n (B) Orris.\n (C) Burns.\n (D) Powell.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "A",
+      "Hull."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_993",
+    "retrieved_docs": "Thus, the party claiming ownership by adverse possession must prove that the following five elements existed concurrently for 20 years: \u201c(1) continuous, (2) hostile or adverse, (3) actual, (4) open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the premises, (5) under claim of title inconsistent with that of the true owner.\u201d Joiner, 85 Ill.2d at 81, 51 Ill.Dec. 662, 421 N.E.2d at 174.\n\nthat entry and possession under claim of right, ownership, or title are sufficient. 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession \u00a7 72 (footnotes omitted). See also 4 Tiffany, supra, Adverse Possession \u00a7 1147 (distinguishing \u201ccolor of title,\u201d which \u201crefers to asserting title through an instrument that appears to convey title, but in actuality does not,\u201d from \u201cclaim of title,\u201d which more broadly \u201creflect [s] an intention to assert ownership over the property and claim it as one's own\u201d).\n\nYet the established rule, followed in Maryland, is that proof of color of title is not necessary to establish adverse possession. Color of title is not an element of adverse possession unless made so by statute, as under provisions prescribing a shorter period of limitation than would otherwise be required. While there are a few isolated judicial statements broadly to the effect that color of title, or color of right, is essential to adverse possession, the general rule is well established that, in the absence of contrary statute, color of title is not an essential element of adverse possession and\n\nA life tenant can sell his or her life estate in property. See generally Reeside v. Annex Bldg. Ass'n of Balt. City, 165 Md. 200, 167 A. 72 (1933). The estate as sold becomes an estate pur autre vie (for the life of the original life tenant). Devecmon v. Devecmon, 43 Md. 335, 348 (1875). A life tenant who does not have the power to dispose of the property cannot convey the remainderman's interest, however. Reeside, supra, 165 Md. 200, 167 A. 72. A remainderman likewise can sell his remainder interest in the property, but cannot convey the life tenant's\n\nIt ripened into an incorporeal hereditament when the licensee entered into enjoyment thereof and made expenditures and improvements. Other jurisdictions hold that revocation will not be allowed in such a case unless the licensee be compensated for his improvements. This language supports a conclusion that the holder of an incorporeal hereditament would be considered the holder of a form of property interest entitling it to compensation under Utah law."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Henry hated Wanda, his former wife, for divorcing him and marrying John a short time thereafter. About a month after Wanda married John. Henry secretly entered Wanda and John's rented apartment during their absence by using a master key. Henry placed a microphone behind the bookstand in the bedroom of the apartment, drilled a hole in the nearby wall and poked the wires from the microphone through the hole into the space in the wall, with the result that the microphone appeared to be connected with wires going into the adjoining apartment. Actually, the microphone was not connected to anything. Henry anticipated that Wanda would discover the microphone in a few days and would be upset by the thought that someone had been listening to her conversations with John in their bedroom. Shortly thereafter, as he was putting a book on the stand, John noticed the wires behind the bookstand and discovered the hidden microphone. He then called Wanda and showed her the microphone and wires. Wanda fainted and, in falling, struck her head on the bookstand and suffered a mild concussion. The next day John telephone Henry and accused him of planting the microphone. Henry laughingly admitted it. Because of his concern about Wanda and his anger at Henry, John is emotionally upset and unable to go to work. If Wanda asserts a claim against Henry based on infliction of mental distress, the fact that John was the person who showed her the microphone will",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nsentiment,\u201d Brown v. Frontier Theatres, 369 S.W.2d at 305, the loss in value to her. Because the injury to Likes's property was not intentional or malicious, or even grossly negligent, we need not decide whether mental anguish arising out of property damage may be legally compensable when a heightened degree of misconduct is found. Compare Luna, 667 S.W.2d at 117 (stating in dicta that mental anguish is recoverable for \u201cwillful tort, willful and wanton disregard, or gross negligence\u201d), with Reinhardt Motors, Inc. v. Boston, 516 So.2d 509, 511 (Ala.1986) (limiting mental anguish for property damage to cases in which the\n\nD.D.A. v. State, 650 So.2d 571, 578 (Ala.Cr.App.1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also McLaughlin v. State, 586 So.2d 267, 270 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (the element of \u201cextreme indifference to human life\u201d by definition does not apply to the life of the victim, but to human life in general); Gholston v. State, 494 So.2d 876, 883 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (to be reckless, a crime must be directed toward the general public, not toward a particular person); King v. State, 505 So.2d 403, 405 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (reckless murder \u201cdiffers from intentional murder in that it results not from a specific, conscious intent to cause the death\n\ndepraved heart murder, or reckless homicide manifesting extreme indifference to human life is intended to embrace those cases where a person has no deliberate intent to kill or injure any particular individual.\u201d Haney v. State, 603 So.2d 368, 399 (Ala.Crim.App.1991), aff'd, 603 So.2d 412 (Ala.1992). Assuming, without deciding, that the jury's verdicts in this case were inconsistent, we conclude that they were not mutually exclusive.1 We have carefully examined the appellant's acts and the offenses for which the jury found him guilty. Based on that review, we find that it was not legally impossible for the State to prove the\n\n[I]n order for an excited utterance to be admissible, the following requirements must be met: (1) there must have been an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement; (2) the statement must have been made before there was time to contrive or misrepresent; and (3) the statement must have been made while the person was under the stress of excitement caused by the startling event. Stoll v. State, 762 So.2d 870, 873 (Fla. 2000).\n\nTo convict for a violation of Code \u00a7 18.2-36.1(B), the Commonwealth must prove, inter alia, conduct by an accused \u201cso gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life[.]\u201d Code \u00a7 18.2-36.1(B). 1 Such conduct \u201chas come to be known as \u2018criminal negligence\u2019 \u201d in the context of common law vehicular involuntary manslaughter and requires \u201c \u2018acts of commission or omission of a wanton or willful nature, showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of the rights of others, under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce injury ... and the offender knows or is charged with the knowledge\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nHenry hated Wanda, his former wife, for divorcing him and marrying John a short time thereafter. About a month after Wanda married John. Henry secretly entered Wanda and John's rented apartment during their absence by using a master key. Henry placed a microphone behind the bookstand in the bedroom of the apartment, drilled a hole in the nearby wall and poked the wires from the microphone through the hole into the space in the wall, with the result that the microphone appeared to be connected with wires going into the adjoining apartment. Actually, the microphone was not connected to anything. Henry anticipated that Wanda would discover the microphone in a few days and would be upset by the thought that someone had been listening to her conversations with John in their bedroom. Shortly thereafter, as he was putting a book on the stand, John noticed the wires behind the bookstand and discovered the hidden microphone. He then called Wanda and showed her the microphone and wires. Wanda fainted and, in falling, struck her head on the bookstand and suffered a mild concussion. The next day John telephone Henry and accused him of planting the microphone. Henry laughingly admitted it. Because of his concern about Wanda and his anger at Henry, John is emotionally upset and unable to go to work. If Wanda asserts a claim against Henry based on infliction of mental distress, the fact that John was the person who showed her the microphone will\n\n (A) relieve Henry of liability, because John was careless in so doing\n (B) relieve Henry of liability, because John's conduct was the immediate cause of Wanda's harm\n (C) not relieve Henry of liability, because Henry's goal was achieved\n (D) not relieve Henry of liability, because the conduct of a third person is irrelevant in emotional distress cases\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "not relieve Henry of liability, because Henry's goal was achieved"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_81",
+    "retrieved_docs": "sentiment,\u201d Brown v. Frontier Theatres, 369 S.W.2d at 305, the loss in value to her. Because the injury to Likes's property was not intentional or malicious, or even grossly negligent, we need not decide whether mental anguish arising out of property damage may be legally compensable when a heightened degree of misconduct is found. Compare Luna, 667 S.W.2d at 117 (stating in dicta that mental anguish is recoverable for \u201cwillful tort, willful and wanton disregard, or gross negligence\u201d), with Reinhardt Motors, Inc. v. Boston, 516 So.2d 509, 511 (Ala.1986) (limiting mental anguish for property damage to cases in which the\n\nD.D.A. v. State, 650 So.2d 571, 578 (Ala.Cr.App.1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also McLaughlin v. State, 586 So.2d 267, 270 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (the element of \u201cextreme indifference to human life\u201d by definition does not apply to the life of the victim, but to human life in general); Gholston v. State, 494 So.2d 876, 883 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (to be reckless, a crime must be directed toward the general public, not toward a particular person); King v. State, 505 So.2d 403, 405 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (reckless murder \u201cdiffers from intentional murder in that it results not from a specific, conscious intent to cause the death\n\ndepraved heart murder, or reckless homicide manifesting extreme indifference to human life is intended to embrace those cases where a person has no deliberate intent to kill or injure any particular individual.\u201d Haney v. State, 603 So.2d 368, 399 (Ala.Crim.App.1991), aff'd, 603 So.2d 412 (Ala.1992). Assuming, without deciding, that the jury's verdicts in this case were inconsistent, we conclude that they were not mutually exclusive.1 We have carefully examined the appellant's acts and the offenses for which the jury found him guilty. Based on that review, we find that it was not legally impossible for the State to prove the\n\n[I]n order for an excited utterance to be admissible, the following requirements must be met: (1) there must have been an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement; (2) the statement must have been made before there was time to contrive or misrepresent; and (3) the statement must have been made while the person was under the stress of excitement caused by the startling event. Stoll v. State, 762 So.2d 870, 873 (Fla. 2000).\n\nTo convict for a violation of Code \u00a7 18.2-36.1(B), the Commonwealth must prove, inter alia, conduct by an accused \u201cso gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life[.]\u201d Code \u00a7 18.2-36.1(B). 1 Such conduct \u201chas come to be known as \u2018criminal negligence\u2019 \u201d in the context of common law vehicular involuntary manslaughter and requires \u201c \u2018acts of commission or omission of a wanton or willful nature, showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of the rights of others, under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce injury ... and the offender knows or is charged with the knowledge"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "If Peterson brings an action, based on negligence, against Dora, Dora's best argument in defense would be that",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nA duty of reasonable care generally encompasses a duty not to create an unreasonable risk of harm. See Reighard v. Yates, 2012 UT 45, \u00b6\u00b6 29\u201331, 285 P.3d 1168; B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11, \u00b6 21 & n. 11, 275 P.3d 228. What may be reasonable in one setting may not be reasonable in another. Ordinarily participants cannot reasonably expect instructors or coaches to insulate them from risks inherent in an activity in which they voluntarily engage. See, e.g., Kahn, 31 Cal.4th 990, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103, 75 P.3d at 38\u201343 (majority opinion). But whether, under the\n\nA negligence claim in a medical malpractice action must allege \u201cthe improper performance of a professional service that deviated from the acceptable standard of care.\u201d Zuidema v. Pedicano, 373 N.J. Super. 135, 145 (App. Div. 2004). A plaintiff alleging medical malpractice must prove \u201c(1) the applicable standard of care; (2) a deviation from that standard of care; and (3) that the deviation proximately caused the injury.\u201d Gardner v. Pawliw, 150 N.J. 359, 375 (1997).\n\nIn fact the court espoused the opposite view\u2014that \u201c[t]he degree of care required of a child must be graduated to its age, capacity, and experience, and must be measured by what might ordinarily be expected from a child of like age, capacity, and experience under similar conditions.\u201d 190 P. at 933\u201334 (quoting Gesas v. O.S.L. R.R., 33 Utah 156, 93 P. 274, 279 (1907)). To the extent Herald was endorsing a generally applicable rule, then, it was one counter to the age cutoff adopted by the court today\u2014a rule under which the four-year-old plaintiff could not \u201cbe charged with contributory\n\nThis court has previously recognized that contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort. \u201c \u2018[W]here the defendant's conduct is actually intended to inflict *655 harm upon the plaintiff, there is a difference, not merely in degree but in the kind of fault; and the defense [contributory negligence] never has been extended to such intentional torts.\u2019 \u201d **620 Omaha Nat. Bank v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 213 Neb. 873, 881\u201382, 332 N.W.2d 196, 202 (1983), quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts \u00a7 65 (4th ed.1971).\n\nor from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent (a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.\u201d See also Duncan v. Rzonca, 133 Ill.App.3d 184, 200, 88 Ill.Dec. 288, 478 N.E.2d 603, 613 (1985). 2To establish negligent parental supervision, a plaintiff must show that (1) the parents were aware of specific instances of prior conduct sufficient to put them on notice that the act complained of was\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nDora, who was eight years old, went to the grocery store with her mother. Dora pushed the grocery cart while her mother put items into it. Dora's mother remained near Dora at all times. Peterson, another customer in the store, noticed Dora pushing the cart in a manner that caused Peterson no concern. A short time later, the cart Dora was pushing struck Peterson in the knee, inflicting serious injury.\nIf Peterson brings an action, based on negligence, against Dora, Dora's best argument in defense would be that\n\n (A) Dora exercised care commensurate with her age, intelligence, and experience.\n (B) Dora is not subject to tort liability.\n (C) Dora was subject to parental supervision.\n (D) Peterson assumed the risk that Dora might hit Peterson with the cart.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "A",
+      "Dora exercised care commensurate with her age, intelligence, and experience."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_623",
+    "retrieved_docs": "A duty of reasonable care generally encompasses a duty not to create an unreasonable risk of harm. See Reighard v. Yates, 2012 UT 45, \u00b6\u00b6 29\u201331, 285 P.3d 1168; B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11, \u00b6 21 & n. 11, 275 P.3d 228. What may be reasonable in one setting may not be reasonable in another. Ordinarily participants cannot reasonably expect instructors or coaches to insulate them from risks inherent in an activity in which they voluntarily engage. See, e.g., Kahn, 31 Cal.4th 990, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103, 75 P.3d at 38\u201343 (majority opinion). But whether, under the\n\nA negligence claim in a medical malpractice action must allege \u201cthe improper performance of a professional service that deviated from the acceptable standard of care.\u201d Zuidema v. Pedicano, 373 N.J. Super. 135, 145 (App. Div. 2004). A plaintiff alleging medical malpractice must prove \u201c(1) the applicable standard of care; (2) a deviation from that standard of care; and (3) that the deviation proximately caused the injury.\u201d Gardner v. Pawliw, 150 N.J. 359, 375 (1997).\n\nIn fact the court espoused the opposite view\u2014that \u201c[t]he degree of care required of a child must be graduated to its age, capacity, and experience, and must be measured by what might ordinarily be expected from a child of like age, capacity, and experience under similar conditions.\u201d 190 P. at 933\u201334 (quoting Gesas v. O.S.L. R.R., 33 Utah 156, 93 P. 274, 279 (1907)). To the extent Herald was endorsing a generally applicable rule, then, it was one counter to the age cutoff adopted by the court today\u2014a rule under which the four-year-old plaintiff could not \u201cbe charged with contributory\n\nThis court has previously recognized that contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort. \u201c \u2018[W]here the defendant's conduct is actually intended to inflict *655 harm upon the plaintiff, there is a difference, not merely in degree but in the kind of fault; and the defense [contributory negligence] never has been extended to such intentional torts.\u2019 \u201d **620 Omaha Nat. Bank v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 213 Neb. 873, 881\u201382, 332 N.W.2d 196, 202 (1983), quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts \u00a7 65 (4th ed.1971).\n\nor from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent (a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.\u201d See also Duncan v. Rzonca, 133 Ill.App.3d 184, 200, 88 Ill.Dec. 288, 478 N.E.2d 603, 613 (1985). 2To establish negligent parental supervision, a plaintiff must show that (1) the parents were aware of specific instances of prior conduct sufficient to put them on notice that the act complained of was"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Trawf, the manager of a state fair, contracted with Schweinebauch, a renowned hog breeder, to exhibit Schweinebauch's world champion animal, Megahawg, for the three weeks of the annual fair, at the conclusion of which Schweinebauch would receive an honorarium of $300. Two days before the opening of the fair, Megahawg took sick with boarsitis, a communicable disease among swine, and, under the applicable state quarantine law, very probably could not be exhibited for at least a month. Upon learning this, Trawf can legally pursue which of the following courses of action with respect to his contract with Schweinebauch?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\n\u201c \u2018Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the obligation impossible or highly impracticable.\u2019 \u201d Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, \u00b6 12, 232 P.3d 1081 (emphases omitted) (quoting Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 261 (1981) (\u201cWhere, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which\n\nunder the doctrine of \u201cpart performance,\u201d which may take an agreement outside of the statute of frauds, **178 there must be an oral agreement that has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and that agreement must be \u201cclear, certain, and unambiguous\u201d in its terms. Rafferty & Towner, Inc. v. NJS Enterprises, LLC, 224 Or.App. 51, 55, 197 P.3d 55 (2008), rev. den., 347 Or. 42, 217 P.3d 688 (2009). Emmert argued that the alleged agreements did not meet that standard. Furthermore, Emmert asserted, any qualifying \u201cpart performance\u201d must be clearly referable to the contract, and Kazlauskas's\n\nUnder the preexisting duty rule, it is well settled that doing what one is legally bound to do is not consideration for a new promise. Puett v. Walker, 332 Mich. 117, 122, 50 N.W.2d 740 (1952). This rule bars the modification of an existing contractual relationship when the purported consideration for the modification consists of the performance or promise to perform that which one party was already required to do under the terms of the existing agreement. Borg\u2013Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Dep't of State, 433 Mich. 16, 22, n. 3, 444 N.W.2d 786 (1989).\n\nUnder the defense of impossibility of performance, a party's breach of its contractual obligation will be excused when \u201cchanged circumstances have rendered the promise vitally different from what reasonably should have been within the contemplation of both parties when they entered into the contract.\u201d Colo. Performance Corp. v. Mariposa Assocs., 754 P.2d 401, 407 (Colo.Ct.App.1987) (quotation omitted)\n\n\u201cCalifornia law does not recognize a breach of contract as a \u2018wrongful act\u2019 predicate required for this claim.\u201d \u201c[A] breach of contract claim cannot be transmuted into tort liability by claiming that the breach interfered with the promisee's business.\u201d83 This is true even when a party breaches in order to put the non-breaching party out of business and rid itself of a competitor.84 \u201c[M]otive, regardless of how malevolent, remains irrelevant to a breach of contract claim and does not convert a contract action into a tort claim....\u201d To the extent that Templeton *1194 is alleging a breach of contract, it\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nTrawf, the manager of a state fair, contracted with Schweinebauch, a renowned hog breeder, to exhibit Schweinebauch's world champion animal, Megahawg, for the three weeks of the annual fair, at the conclusion of which Schweinebauch would receive an honorarium of $300. Two days before the opening of the fair, Megahawg took sick with boarsitis, a communicable disease among swine, and, under the applicable state quarantine law, very probably could not be exhibited for at least a month. Upon learning this, Trawf can legally pursue which of the following courses of action with respect to his contract with Schweinebauch?\n\n (A) Suspend his own performance, demand assurances from Schweinebauch, and treat a failure by Schweinebauch to give them as an actionable repudiation.\n (B) Suspend his own performance and recover damages from Schweinebauch for breach of contract unless Schweinebauch at once supplies an undiseased hog of exhibition quality as a substitute for Megahawg.\n (C) Terminate his own performance and treat Megahawg's illness as discharging all remaining duties under the contract.\n (D) Terminate the contract, but only if he (Trawf) seeks promptly to obtain for the exhibit a suitable substitute for Megahawg from another hog owner.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "Terminate his own performance and treat Megahawg's illness as discharging all remaining duties under the contract."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_847",
+    "retrieved_docs": "\u201c \u2018Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the obligation impossible or highly impracticable.\u2019 \u201d Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, \u00b6 12, 232 P.3d 1081 (emphases omitted) (quoting Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 261 (1981) (\u201cWhere, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which\n\nunder the doctrine of \u201cpart performance,\u201d which may take an agreement outside of the statute of frauds, **178 there must be an oral agreement that has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and that agreement must be \u201cclear, certain, and unambiguous\u201d in its terms. Rafferty & Towner, Inc. v. NJS Enterprises, LLC, 224 Or.App. 51, 55, 197 P.3d 55 (2008), rev. den., 347 Or. 42, 217 P.3d 688 (2009). Emmert argued that the alleged agreements did not meet that standard. Furthermore, Emmert asserted, any qualifying \u201cpart performance\u201d must be clearly referable to the contract, and Kazlauskas's\n\nUnder the preexisting duty rule, it is well settled that doing what one is legally bound to do is not consideration for a new promise. Puett v. Walker, 332 Mich. 117, 122, 50 N.W.2d 740 (1952). This rule bars the modification of an existing contractual relationship when the purported consideration for the modification consists of the performance or promise to perform that which one party was already required to do under the terms of the existing agreement. Borg\u2013Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Dep't of State, 433 Mich. 16, 22, n. 3, 444 N.W.2d 786 (1989).\n\nUnder the defense of impossibility of performance, a party's breach of its contractual obligation will be excused when \u201cchanged circumstances have rendered the promise vitally different from what reasonably should have been within the contemplation of both parties when they entered into the contract.\u201d Colo. Performance Corp. v. Mariposa Assocs., 754 P.2d 401, 407 (Colo.Ct.App.1987) (quotation omitted)\n\n\u201cCalifornia law does not recognize a breach of contract as a \u2018wrongful act\u2019 predicate required for this claim.\u201d \u201c[A] breach of contract claim cannot be transmuted into tort liability by claiming that the breach interfered with the promisee's business.\u201d83 This is true even when a party breaches in order to put the non-breaching party out of business and rid itself of a competitor.84 \u201c[M]otive, regardless of how malevolent, remains irrelevant to a breach of contract claim and does not convert a contract action into a tort claim....\u201d To the extent that Templeton *1194 is alleging a breach of contract, it"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "If the court concludes that the Tyres-County contract is an agreement by County to buy its tire requirements from Tyres, Tyres probably will",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nIf a contract provision's meaning is uncertain or is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations after analyzing the language and considering extrinsic evidence (if appropriate), the provision is ambiguous. See Jensen v. Lake Jane Estates, 165 Wash.App. 100, 105, 267 P.3d 435 (2011).\n\nany definite and seasonable expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance even though it is not a mirror image of the offer unless the acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. However that section still requires a definite expression of acceptance and does not change the basic common law requirement that there must be an objective manifestation of mutual assent. (Ore & Chemical Corp. v. Howard Butcher Trading Co. (E.D.Pa.1978), 455 F.Supp. 1150.)\n\nunder the doctrine of \u201cpart performance,\u201d which may take an agreement outside of the statute of frauds, **178 there must be an oral agreement that has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and that agreement must be \u201cclear, certain, and unambiguous\u201d in its terms. Rafferty & Towner, Inc. v. NJS Enterprises, LLC, 224 Or.App. 51, 55, 197 P.3d 55 (2008), rev. den., 347 Or. 42, 217 P.3d 688 (2009). Emmert argued that the alleged agreements did not meet that standard. Furthermore, Emmert asserted, any qualifying \u201cpart performance\u201d must be clearly referable to the contract, and Kazlauskas's\n\nId. Under the Uniform Commercial Code (\u201cUCC\u201d), breach of contract damages are available for failure to perform, but not for delivery of nonconforming goods. Id. We believe that the Chilton court makes a definitive distinction between failure to conform and failure to deliver. See id.\n\nAlthough there is no exact definition to determine when a contract is \u2018divisible\u2019 or \u2018entire,\u2019 a contract is generally not severable or divisible when its purpose, terms and nature contemplate that its parts and consideration shall be interdependent and common to each other. Moulds v. James F. Proctor, D.D.S., P.A. (Aug. 16, 1991), Tenn.App., unreported, 1991 WL 137577.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nResponding to County's written advertisement for bids, Tyres was the successful bidder for the sale of tires to County for County's vehicles. Tyres and County entered into a signed, written agreement that specified, \"It is agreed that Tyres will deliver all tires required by this agreement to County, in accordance with the attached bid form and specifications, for a one-year period beginning September 1, 1990.\" Attached to the agreement was a copy of the bid form and specifications. In the written advertisement to which Tyres had responded, but not in the bid form, County had stated, \"Multiple awards may be issued if they are in the best interests of County.\" No definite quantity of tires to be bought by County from Tyres was specified in any of these documents. In January 1991, Tyres learned that County was buying some of its tires from one of Tyres's competitors. Contending that the Tyres-County agreement was a requirements contract, Tyres sued County for the damages caused by County's buying some of its tires from the competitor.\nIf the court concludes that the Tyres-County contract is an agreement by County to buy its tire requirements from Tyres, Tyres probably will\n\n (A) recover under the contracts clause of the United States Constitution.\n (B) recover under the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.\n (C) not recover, because the agreement lacks mutuality of obligation.\n (D) not recover, because the agreement is indefinite as to quantity.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "B",
+      "recover under the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_767",
+    "retrieved_docs": "If a contract provision's meaning is uncertain or is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations after analyzing the language and considering extrinsic evidence (if appropriate), the provision is ambiguous. See Jensen v. Lake Jane Estates, 165 Wash.App. 100, 105, 267 P.3d 435 (2011).\n\nany definite and seasonable expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance even though it is not a mirror image of the offer unless the acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. However that section still requires a definite expression of acceptance and does not change the basic common law requirement that there must be an objective manifestation of mutual assent. (Ore & Chemical Corp. v. Howard Butcher Trading Co. (E.D.Pa.1978), 455 F.Supp. 1150.)\n\nunder the doctrine of \u201cpart performance,\u201d which may take an agreement outside of the statute of frauds, **178 there must be an oral agreement that has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and that agreement must be \u201cclear, certain, and unambiguous\u201d in its terms. Rafferty & Towner, Inc. v. NJS Enterprises, LLC, 224 Or.App. 51, 55, 197 P.3d 55 (2008), rev. den., 347 Or. 42, 217 P.3d 688 (2009). Emmert argued that the alleged agreements did not meet that standard. Furthermore, Emmert asserted, any qualifying \u201cpart performance\u201d must be clearly referable to the contract, and Kazlauskas's\n\nId. Under the Uniform Commercial Code (\u201cUCC\u201d), breach of contract damages are available for failure to perform, but not for delivery of nonconforming goods. Id. We believe that the Chilton court makes a definitive distinction between failure to conform and failure to deliver. See id.\n\nAlthough there is no exact definition to determine when a contract is \u2018divisible\u2019 or \u2018entire,\u2019 a contract is generally not severable or divisible when its purpose, terms and nature contemplate that its parts and consideration shall be interdependent and common to each other. Moulds v. James F. Proctor, D.D.S., P.A. (Aug. 16, 1991), Tenn.App., unreported, 1991 WL 137577."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Leader is a labor leader in Metropolis. Ten years ago he was divorced. Both he and his first wife have since married other persons. Recently, News, a newspaper in another city, ran a feature article on improper influences it asserted had been used by labor officials to secure favorable rulings from government officials. The story said that in 1960 Leader's first wife, with Leader's knowledge and concurrence, gave sexual favors to the mayor of Metropolis and then persuaded him to grant concessions to Leader's union, with which Metropolis was then negotiating a labor contract. The story named Leader and identified his first wife by her former and current surnames. The reporter for News believed the story to be true, since it had been related to him by two very reliable sources. Leader's first wife suffered emotional distress and became very depressed. If she asserts a claim based on defamation against News, she will",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nIn order to prevail on a defamation action, a plaintiff must prove the following four elements: \u201c(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault (negligence or greater) on the part of the publisher; and (4) resulting injury.\u201d Id. \u201cIn other words, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant, with actual malice or other fault, published a false statement with defamatory words which caused plaintiff damages.\u201d Id. (citations and quotations omitted).\n\ntruth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim, and a defendant may attack the falsity prong of a plaintiff's claim by demonstrating the substantial truth of the allegedly defamatory statement.\n\nTo establish assault, the following elements must be proved: (1) the defendant acted either with the intent of making a contact with the person of the plaintiff or with the intent of putting the plaintiff in apprehension of such a contact; (2) the plaintiff was placed in apprehension of an imminent contact with his or her person by the conduct of the defendant; and (3) such contact was or appeared to be harmful or offensive.\n\nA statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant's will. Pa.R.E. 803(3). \u201cPursuant to the state of mind hearsay exception, where a declarant's out-of-court statements demonstrate her state of mind, are made in a natural manner, and are material and relevant, they are admissible pursuant to the exception.\u201d Laich, 777 A.2d at 1060-61.\n\nFor an admission by a party-opponent to be admissible: 1) the statement must be a conscious or voluntary acknowledgment by a party-opponent of the existence of certain facts; 2) the matter acknowledged must be relevant to the cause of the party offering the admission; and 3) the matter acknowledged must be unfavorable to or inconsistent with the position now taken by the party-opponent. Bowls v. Scarborough, 950 S.W.2d 691, 702 (Mo.App.W.D.1997).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nLeader is a labor leader in Metropolis. Ten years ago he was divorced. Both he and his first wife have since married other persons. Recently, News, a newspaper in another city, ran a feature article on improper influences it asserted had been used by labor officials to secure favorable rulings from government officials. The story said that in 1960 Leader's first wife, with Leader's knowledge and concurrence, gave sexual favors to the mayor of Metropolis and then persuaded him to grant concessions to Leader's union, with which Metropolis was then negotiating a labor contract. The story named Leader and identified his first wife by her former and current surnames. The reporter for News believed the story to be true, since it had been related to him by two very reliable sources. Leader's first wife suffered emotional distress and became very depressed. If she asserts a claim based on defamation against News, she will\n\n (A) prevail, because the story concerned her personal, private life\n (B) prevail if the story was false\n (C) not prevail, because News did not print the story with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity\n (D) not prevail if News exercised ordinary care in determining whether the story was true or false\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "D",
+      "not prevail if News exercised ordinary care in determining whether the story was true or false"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_225",
+    "retrieved_docs": "In order to prevail on a defamation action, a plaintiff must prove the following four elements: \u201c(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault (negligence or greater) on the part of the publisher; and (4) resulting injury.\u201d Id. \u201cIn other words, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant, with actual malice or other fault, published a false statement with defamatory words which caused plaintiff damages.\u201d Id. (citations and quotations omitted).\n\ntruth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim, and a defendant may attack the falsity prong of a plaintiff's claim by demonstrating the substantial truth of the allegedly defamatory statement.\n\nTo establish assault, the following elements must be proved: (1) the defendant acted either with the intent of making a contact with the person of the plaintiff or with the intent of putting the plaintiff in apprehension of such a contact; (2) the plaintiff was placed in apprehension of an imminent contact with his or her person by the conduct of the defendant; and (3) such contact was or appeared to be harmful or offensive.\n\nA statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant's will. Pa.R.E. 803(3). \u201cPursuant to the state of mind hearsay exception, where a declarant's out-of-court statements demonstrate her state of mind, are made in a natural manner, and are material and relevant, they are admissible pursuant to the exception.\u201d Laich, 777 A.2d at 1060-61.\n\nFor an admission by a party-opponent to be admissible: 1) the statement must be a conscious or voluntary acknowledgment by a party-opponent of the existence of certain facts; 2) the matter acknowledged must be relevant to the cause of the party offering the admission; and 3) the matter acknowledged must be unfavorable to or inconsistent with the position now taken by the party-opponent. Bowls v. Scarborough, 950 S.W.2d 691, 702 (Mo.App.W.D.1997)."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "If Vintage refuses to distribute the wine through Claret and Claret then sues Vintage for breach of contract, is it likely that Claret will prevail?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nFor a third-party beneficiary to succeed on a breach of contract claim under New York law, \u201ca non-party must be the intended beneficiary of the contract, not an incidental beneficiary to whom no duty is owed.\u201d Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 251 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 728 F.2d 52, 63 (2d Cir. 1984)). The non-party \u201cmust establish (1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for his or her benefit, and (3) that the benefit to him or\n\nTo qualify as a third-party beneficiary, a party must show that it is either a \u201cdonee\u201d or \u201ccreditor\u201d beneficiary of the contract. Id. at 651. A party is a donee beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract, when rendered, is a \u201cpure donation\u201d to that party. Id. On the other hand, a party is a creditor beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract is rendered in satisfaction of a legal duty owed to that party. Id. The legal duty may be an indebtedness, contractual obligation, or other legally enforceable commitment owed to the third party. Id. Based on\n\nInc., 425 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2005)). \u201cAn intended third party beneficiary will be found when it is appropriate to recognize a right to performance in the third party and the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the third party the benefit of the promised performance.\u201d Trans\u2013Orient Marine Corp. v. Star Trading & Marine, Inc., 925 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 302 (1981)).\n\nher is sufficiently immediate, rather than incidental, to indicate the assumption by the contracting parties of a duty to compensate him if the benefit is lost.\u201d Synovus Bank of Tampa Bay v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 487 F. Supp. 2d 360, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (internal quotations omitted). \u201cIn determining whether the parties intended to benefit the third party, a court \u2018should consider the circumstances surrounding the transaction as well as the actual language of the contract.\u2019 \u201d Bayerische Landesbank, N.Y. Branch v. Aladdin Capital Mgmt. LLC, 692 F.3d 42, 52 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Subaru Distribs. Corp. v. Subaru of Am.,\n\n\u201cCalifornia law does not recognize a breach of contract as a \u2018wrongful act\u2019 predicate required for this claim.\u201d \u201c[A] breach of contract claim cannot be transmuted into tort liability by claiming that the breach interfered with the promisee's business.\u201d83 This is true even when a party breaches in order to put the non-breaching party out of business and rid itself of a competitor.84 \u201c[M]otive, regardless of how malevolent, remains irrelevant to a breach of contract claim and does not convert a contract action into a tort claim....\u201d To the extent that Templeton *1194 is alleging a breach of contract, it\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nA written contract was entered into between Bouquet, a financier-investor, and Vintage Corporation, a winery and grape-grower. The contract provided that Bouquet would invest $1,000,000 in Vintage for its capital expansion and, in return, that Vintage, from grapes grown in its famous vineyards, would produce and market at least 500,000 bottles of wine each year for five years under the label \"Premium Vintage-Bouquet' The contract included provisions that the parties would share equally the profits and losses from the venture and that, if feasible, the wine would be distributed by Vintage only through Claret, a wholesale distributor of fine wines. Neither Bouquet nor Vintage had previously dealt with Claret. Claret learned of the contract two days later from reading a trade newspaper. In reliance thereon, he immediately hired an additional sales executive and contracted for enlargement of his wine storage and display facility.\nIf Vintage refuses to distribute the wine through Claret and Claret then sues Vintage for breach of contract, is it likely that Claret will prevail?\n\n (A) Yes, because Vintage's performance was to run to Claret rather than to Bouquet.\n (B) Yes, because Bouquet and Vintage could reasonably foresee that Claret would change his position in reliance on the contract.\n (C) No, because Bouquet and Vintage did not expressly agree that Claret would have enforceable rights under their contract.\n (D) No, because Bouquet and Vintage, having no apparent motive to benefit Claret, appeared in making the contract to have been protecting or serving only their own interests.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "D",
+      "No, because Bouquet and Vintage, having no apparent motive to benefit Claret, appeared in making the contract to have been protecting or serving only their own interests."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_483",
+    "retrieved_docs": "For a third-party beneficiary to succeed on a breach of contract claim under New York law, \u201ca non-party must be the intended beneficiary of the contract, not an incidental beneficiary to whom no duty is owed.\u201d Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 251 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 728 F.2d 52, 63 (2d Cir. 1984)). The non-party \u201cmust establish (1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for his or her benefit, and (3) that the benefit to him or\n\nTo qualify as a third-party beneficiary, a party must show that it is either a \u201cdonee\u201d or \u201ccreditor\u201d beneficiary of the contract. Id. at 651. A party is a donee beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract, when rendered, is a \u201cpure donation\u201d to that party. Id. On the other hand, a party is a creditor beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract is rendered in satisfaction of a legal duty owed to that party. Id. The legal duty may be an indebtedness, contractual obligation, or other legally enforceable commitment owed to the third party. Id. Based on\n\nInc., 425 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2005)). \u201cAn intended third party beneficiary will be found when it is appropriate to recognize a right to performance in the third party and the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the third party the benefit of the promised performance.\u201d Trans\u2013Orient Marine Corp. v. Star Trading & Marine, Inc., 925 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 302 (1981)).\n\nher is sufficiently immediate, rather than incidental, to indicate the assumption by the contracting parties of a duty to compensate him if the benefit is lost.\u201d Synovus Bank of Tampa Bay v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 487 F. Supp. 2d 360, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (internal quotations omitted). \u201cIn determining whether the parties intended to benefit the third party, a court \u2018should consider the circumstances surrounding the transaction as well as the actual language of the contract.\u2019 \u201d Bayerische Landesbank, N.Y. Branch v. Aladdin Capital Mgmt. LLC, 692 F.3d 42, 52 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Subaru Distribs. Corp. v. Subaru of Am.,\n\n\u201cCalifornia law does not recognize a breach of contract as a \u2018wrongful act\u2019 predicate required for this claim.\u201d \u201c[A] breach of contract claim cannot be transmuted into tort liability by claiming that the breach interfered with the promisee's business.\u201d83 This is true even when a party breaches in order to put the non-breaching party out of business and rid itself of a competitor.84 \u201c[M]otive, regardless of how malevolent, remains irrelevant to a breach of contract claim and does not convert a contract action into a tort claim....\u201d To the extent that Templeton *1194 is alleging a breach of contract, it"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Six years ago, Oscar, owner of Blackacre in fee simple, executed and delivered to Albert an instrument in the proper form of a warranty deed, purporting to convey Blackacre to \"Albert and his heirs.\" At that time, Albert was a widower who had one child, Donna. Three years ago, Albert executed and delivered to Bea an instrument in the proper form of a warranty deed, purporting to convey Blackacre to \"Bea.\" Donna did not join in the deed. Bea was and still is unmarried and childless. The only possibly applicable statute in the jurisdiction states that any deed will be construed to convey the grantor's entire estate, unless expressly limited. Last month, Albert died, never having remarried. Donna is his only heir. Blackacre is now owned by",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nA life tenant can sell his or her life estate in property. See generally Reeside v. Annex Bldg. Ass'n of Balt. City, 165 Md. 200, 167 A. 72 (1933). The estate as sold becomes an estate pur autre vie (for the life of the original life tenant). Devecmon v. Devecmon, 43 Md. 335, 348 (1875). A life tenant who does not have the power to dispose of the property cannot convey the remainderman's interest, however. Reeside, supra, 165 Md. 200, 167 A. 72. A remainderman likewise can sell his remainder interest in the property, but cannot convey the life tenant's\n\nA deed is not legally effective until it has been delivered. While there is no prescribed method for an effective delivery of a deed, manual transfer of the instrument into the hand of the grantee is neither required to effectuate a valid delivery, nor dispositive of the issue. The term delivery in this regard refers to \u201cnot so much a manual act but the intention of the maker ... existing at the time of the transaction ... and not subject to later change of mind.\u201d \u201cDelivery of a deed includes, not only an act by which the grantor evinces a\n\nAn incorporeal hereditament is \u201c[a]n intangible right in land, such as an easement.\u201d In other contexts, Utah courts have recognized an incorporeal hereditament as an interest in real property. In addressing a case involving a license to prospect and mine ore, the Utah Supreme Court discussed the potential for a mining license to ripen into an incorporeal hereditament and stated: This is not to say that a license is an incorporeal hereditament; it means that the grant was a license as long as it remained executory because it was not in proper form for a conveyance of an incorporeal hereditament.\n\npurpose to part with the control of the instrument, but a concurring intent thereby to vest the title in the grantee.\" \u201cThe controlling question of delivery in all cases is one of intention.\u201d\n\nThey are distinguishable as well because they are predicated on the well-settled rule that a trustee in a deed of trust can only do with the trust property what the deed either in express terms or by necessary implication authorizes him to do. In other words, the powers of the person foreclosing under a mortgage or deed of trust are limited and defined by the instrument under which he acts, and he has only such authority as is thus expressly conferred upon him, together with incidental and implied powers that are necessarily included therein. Accordingly, the trustee or mortgagee must\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nSix years ago, Oscar, owner of Blackacre in fee simple, executed and delivered to Albert an instrument in the proper form of a warranty deed, purporting to convey Blackacre to \"Albert and his heirs.\" At that time, Albert was a widower who had one child, Donna. Three years ago, Albert executed and delivered to Bea an instrument in the proper form of a warranty deed, purporting to convey Blackacre to \"Bea.\" Donna did not join in the deed. Bea was and still is unmarried and childless. The only possibly applicable statute in the jurisdiction states that any deed will be construed to convey the grantor's entire estate, unless expressly limited. Last month, Albert died, never having remarried. Donna is his only heir. Blackacre is now owned by\n\n (A) Donna, because Albert's death ended Bea's life estate pur autre vie.\n (B) Bea in fee simple pursuant to Albert's deed.\n (C) Donna and Bea as tenants in common of equal shares.\n (D) Donna and Bea as joint tenants, because both survived Albert.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "B",
+      "Bea in fee simple pursuant to Albert's deed."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_1180",
+    "retrieved_docs": "A life tenant can sell his or her life estate in property. See generally Reeside v. Annex Bldg. Ass'n of Balt. City, 165 Md. 200, 167 A. 72 (1933). The estate as sold becomes an estate pur autre vie (for the life of the original life tenant). Devecmon v. Devecmon, 43 Md. 335, 348 (1875). A life tenant who does not have the power to dispose of the property cannot convey the remainderman's interest, however. Reeside, supra, 165 Md. 200, 167 A. 72. A remainderman likewise can sell his remainder interest in the property, but cannot convey the life tenant's\n\nA deed is not legally effective until it has been delivered. While there is no prescribed method for an effective delivery of a deed, manual transfer of the instrument into the hand of the grantee is neither required to effectuate a valid delivery, nor dispositive of the issue. The term delivery in this regard refers to \u201cnot so much a manual act but the intention of the maker ... existing at the time of the transaction ... and not subject to later change of mind.\u201d \u201cDelivery of a deed includes, not only an act by which the grantor evinces a\n\nAn incorporeal hereditament is \u201c[a]n intangible right in land, such as an easement.\u201d In other contexts, Utah courts have recognized an incorporeal hereditament as an interest in real property. In addressing a case involving a license to prospect and mine ore, the Utah Supreme Court discussed the potential for a mining license to ripen into an incorporeal hereditament and stated: This is not to say that a license is an incorporeal hereditament; it means that the grant was a license as long as it remained executory because it was not in proper form for a conveyance of an incorporeal hereditament.\n\npurpose to part with the control of the instrument, but a concurring intent thereby to vest the title in the grantee.\" \u201cThe controlling question of delivery in all cases is one of intention.\u201d\n\nThey are distinguishable as well because they are predicated on the well-settled rule that a trustee in a deed of trust can only do with the trust property what the deed either in express terms or by necessary implication authorizes him to do. In other words, the powers of the person foreclosing under a mortgage or deed of trust are limited and defined by the instrument under which he acts, and he has only such authority as is thus expressly conferred upon him, together with incidental and implied powers that are necessarily included therein. Accordingly, the trustee or mortgagee must"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "On January 15, Carpenter agreed to repair Householder's house according to certain specifications and to have the work completed by April 1. On March 1, Householder's property was inundated by flood waters which did not abate until March 15. Householder could not get the house in a condition which would permit Carpenter to begin the repairs until March 31. On that date Carpenter notified Householder that he would not repair the house. Which one of the following facts, if it was the only one true and known to both parties on January 15, would best serve Carpenter as the basis for a defense in an action brought against him by Householder for breach of contract?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\n\u201c \u2018Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the obligation impossible or highly impracticable.\u2019 \u201d Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, \u00b6 12, 232 P.3d 1081 (emphases omitted) (quoting Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 261 (1981) (\u201cWhere, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which\n\nUnder the defense of impossibility of performance, a party's breach of its contractual obligation will be excused when \u201cchanged circumstances have rendered the promise vitally different from what reasonably should have been within the contemplation of both parties when they entered into the contract.\u201d Colo. Performance Corp. v. Mariposa Assocs., 754 P.2d 401, 407 (Colo.Ct.App.1987) (quotation omitted)\n\nIt is also well settled that even if the owner proves the existence of the defects or omissions and the cost of repairing them, he is nevertheless barred from recovering the cost thereof if he accepted the work despite the patent defects or imperfections discoverable upon reasonable inspection. Acceptance, however, does not bar the owner from recovering for defects not readily discoverable by ordinary inspection, or for defects which manifest themselves subsequent to the acceptance, or for defects which are explicitly excluded from the terms of the acceptance.\n\nthe contract was made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.\u201d).\n\nunder the doctrine of \u201cpart performance,\u201d which may take an agreement outside of the statute of frauds, **178 there must be an oral agreement that has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and that agreement must be \u201cclear, certain, and unambiguous\u201d in its terms. Rafferty & Towner, Inc. v. NJS Enterprises, LLC, 224 Or.App. 51, 55, 197 P.3d 55 (2008), rev. den., 347 Or. 42, 217 P.3d 688 (2009). Emmert argued that the alleged agreements did not meet that standard. Furthermore, Emmert asserted, any qualifying \u201cpart performance\u201d must be clearly referable to the contract, and Kazlauskas's\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nOn January 15, Carpenter agreed to repair Householder's house according to certain specifications and to have the work completed by April 1. On March 1, Householder's property was inundated by flood waters which did not abate until March 15. Householder could not get the house in a condition which would permit Carpenter to begin the repairs until March 31. On that date Carpenter notified Householder that he would not repair the house. Which one of the following facts, if it was the only one true and known to both parties on January 15, would best serve Carpenter as the basis for a defense in an action brought against him by Householder for breach of contract?\n\n (A) Carpenter's busy schedule permitted him to work on Householder's house only during the month of March.\n (B) Any delay in making the repairs would not seriously affect Householder's use of the property.\n (C) The cost of making repairs was increasing at the rate of 3% a month.\n (D) The area around Householder's property was frequently flooded during the month of March.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "A",
+      "Carpenter's busy schedule permitted him to work on Householder's house only during the month of March."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_409",
+    "retrieved_docs": "\u201c \u2018Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the obligation impossible or highly impracticable.\u2019 \u201d Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, \u00b6 12, 232 P.3d 1081 (emphases omitted) (quoting Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 261 (1981) (\u201cWhere, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which\n\nUnder the defense of impossibility of performance, a party's breach of its contractual obligation will be excused when \u201cchanged circumstances have rendered the promise vitally different from what reasonably should have been within the contemplation of both parties when they entered into the contract.\u201d Colo. Performance Corp. v. Mariposa Assocs., 754 P.2d 401, 407 (Colo.Ct.App.1987) (quotation omitted)\n\nIt is also well settled that even if the owner proves the existence of the defects or omissions and the cost of repairing them, he is nevertheless barred from recovering the cost thereof if he accepted the work despite the patent defects or imperfections discoverable upon reasonable inspection. Acceptance, however, does not bar the owner from recovering for defects not readily discoverable by ordinary inspection, or for defects which manifest themselves subsequent to the acceptance, or for defects which are explicitly excluded from the terms of the acceptance.\n\nthe contract was made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.\u201d).\n\nunder the doctrine of \u201cpart performance,\u201d which may take an agreement outside of the statute of frauds, **178 there must be an oral agreement that has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and that agreement must be \u201cclear, certain, and unambiguous\u201d in its terms. Rafferty & Towner, Inc. v. NJS Enterprises, LLC, 224 Or.App. 51, 55, 197 P.3d 55 (2008), rev. den., 347 Or. 42, 217 P.3d 688 (2009). Emmert argued that the alleged agreements did not meet that standard. Furthermore, Emmert asserted, any qualifying \u201cpart performance\u201d must be clearly referable to the contract, and Kazlauskas's"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Suppose that before closing, the house on the property had been totally destroyed by fire. In determining the rights of Sue and Peg, the court would most likely consider the doctrine of equitable",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nThus, the party claiming ownership by adverse possession must prove that the following five elements existed concurrently for 20 years: \u201c(1) continuous, (2) hostile or adverse, (3) actual, (4) open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the premises, (5) under claim of title inconsistent with that of the true owner.\u201d Joiner, 85 Ill.2d at 81, 51 Ill.Dec. 662, 421 N.E.2d at 174.\n\nA deed is not legally effective until it has been delivered. While there is no prescribed method for an effective delivery of a deed, manual transfer of the instrument into the hand of the grantee is neither required to effectuate a valid delivery, nor dispositive of the issue. The term delivery in this regard refers to \u201cnot so much a manual act but the intention of the maker ... existing at the time of the transaction ... and not subject to later change of mind.\u201d \u201cDelivery of a deed includes, not only an act by which the grantor evinces a\n\nthat entry and possession under claim of right, ownership, or title are sufficient. 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession \u00a7 72 (footnotes omitted). See also 4 Tiffany, supra, Adverse Possession \u00a7 1147 (distinguishing \u201ccolor of title,\u201d which \u201crefers to asserting title through an instrument that appears to convey title, but in actuality does not,\u201d from \u201cclaim of title,\u201d which more broadly \u201creflect [s] an intention to assert ownership over the property and claim it as one's own\u201d).\n\nYet the established rule, followed in Maryland, is that proof of color of title is not necessary to establish adverse possession. Color of title is not an element of adverse possession unless made so by statute, as under provisions prescribing a shorter period of limitation than would otherwise be required. While there are a few isolated judicial statements broadly to the effect that color of title, or color of right, is essential to adverse possession, the general rule is well established that, in the absence of contrary statute, color of title is not an essential element of adverse possession and\n\nConversion is the unauthorized and unlawful assumption and exercise of dominion and control over the personal property of another to the exclusion of, or inconsistent with, the owner's rights. Waisath v. Lack's Stores, Inc., 474 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex.1971). The elements of conversion are: (1) the plaintiff owned, had legal possession of, or was entitled to possession of the property; (2) the defendant assumed and exercised dominion and control *387 over the property in an unlawful and unauthorized manner, to the exclusion of and inconsistent with the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the defendant refused the plaintiff's demand for return of\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nSue owned a five-acre tract of land, one acre of which had previously been owned by Opal, but to which Sue had acquired title by adverse possession. Sue contracted to convey the full five-acre tract to Peg, but the contract did not specify the quality of title Sue would convey. At closing, Peg refused the tendered deed and demanded return of her earnest money.\nSuppose that before closing, the house on the property had been totally destroyed by fire. In determining the rights of Sue and Peg, the court would most likely consider the doctrine of equitable\n\n (A) marshaling\n (B) sequestration\n (C) subrogation\n (D) conversion\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "D",
+      "conversion"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_6",
+    "retrieved_docs": "Thus, the party claiming ownership by adverse possession must prove that the following five elements existed concurrently for 20 years: \u201c(1) continuous, (2) hostile or adverse, (3) actual, (4) open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the premises, (5) under claim of title inconsistent with that of the true owner.\u201d Joiner, 85 Ill.2d at 81, 51 Ill.Dec. 662, 421 N.E.2d at 174.\n\nA deed is not legally effective until it has been delivered. While there is no prescribed method for an effective delivery of a deed, manual transfer of the instrument into the hand of the grantee is neither required to effectuate a valid delivery, nor dispositive of the issue. The term delivery in this regard refers to \u201cnot so much a manual act but the intention of the maker ... existing at the time of the transaction ... and not subject to later change of mind.\u201d \u201cDelivery of a deed includes, not only an act by which the grantor evinces a\n\nthat entry and possession under claim of right, ownership, or title are sufficient. 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession \u00a7 72 (footnotes omitted). See also 4 Tiffany, supra, Adverse Possession \u00a7 1147 (distinguishing \u201ccolor of title,\u201d which \u201crefers to asserting title through an instrument that appears to convey title, but in actuality does not,\u201d from \u201cclaim of title,\u201d which more broadly \u201creflect [s] an intention to assert ownership over the property and claim it as one's own\u201d).\n\nYet the established rule, followed in Maryland, is that proof of color of title is not necessary to establish adverse possession. Color of title is not an element of adverse possession unless made so by statute, as under provisions prescribing a shorter period of limitation than would otherwise be required. While there are a few isolated judicial statements broadly to the effect that color of title, or color of right, is essential to adverse possession, the general rule is well established that, in the absence of contrary statute, color of title is not an essential element of adverse possession and\n\nConversion is the unauthorized and unlawful assumption and exercise of dominion and control over the personal property of another to the exclusion of, or inconsistent with, the owner's rights. Waisath v. Lack's Stores, Inc., 474 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex.1971). The elements of conversion are: (1) the plaintiff owned, had legal possession of, or was entitled to possession of the property; (2) the defendant assumed and exercised dominion and control *387 over the property in an unlawful and unauthorized manner, to the exclusion of and inconsistent with the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the defendant refused the plaintiff's demand for return of"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Defendant, an avid fan of his home town football team, shot at the leg ofa star playerfor a rival team, intending to injure his leg enough to hospitalize for a few weeks, but not to kill him. The victim died of loss of blood.",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nInvoluntary manslaughter is defined as (1) the unintentional killing of another without malice, but while engaged in an unlawful activity not naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm; or (2) the unintentional killing of another without malice, while engaged in a lawful activity with reckless disregard for the safety of others. State v. Crosby, 355 S.C. 47, 51-52, 584 S.E.2d 110, 112 (2003). \u201cTo constitute involuntary manslaughter, there must be a finding of criminal negligence, statutorily defined as a reckless disregard of the safety of others.\u201d Id. at 52, 584 S.E.2d at 112. Further, \u201ca person can be\n\nD.D.A. v. State, 650 So.2d 571, 578 (Ala.Cr.App.1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also McLaughlin v. State, 586 So.2d 267, 270 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (the element of \u201cextreme indifference to human life\u201d by definition does not apply to the life of the victim, but to human life in general); Gholston v. State, 494 So.2d 876, 883 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (to be reckless, a crime must be directed toward the general public, not toward a particular person); King v. State, 505 So.2d 403, 405 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (reckless murder \u201cdiffers from intentional murder in that it results not from a specific, conscious intent to cause the death\n\nAn essential element of first-degree murder is malice aforethought. See State v. Lee, 494 N.W.2d 706, 707 (Iowa 1993); see also Iowa Code \u00a7 707.1 (\u201cA person who kills another person with malice aforethought either express or implied commits murder.\u201d). \u201cMalice aforethought\u201d is defined as \u201c \u2018a fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to another that exists before the act is committed.\u2019 \u201d Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d at 49 (citation omitted).\n\nelements of both offenses because no element of either offense negates an element of the other. Even though reckless murder involves a situation in which the defendant does not intend to kill or injure another person, it does not require that none of his actions be intentional. For example, it does not exclude the possibility that he committed another intentional act, such as setting a fire. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the appellant acted with extreme indifference to human life but did not intend to kill or injure the victim when he threw gasoline around the den;\n\n\u201cMurder is the killing of one human being by another with the requisite malevolent state of mind and without justification, excuse, or mitigation.\u201d Ross v. State, 308 Md. 337, 340, 519 A.2d 735, 736 (1987). The malevolent states of mind that qualify are: (1) the intent to kill, (2) the intent to do grievous bodily harm, (3) the intent to do an act under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life (depraved heart), or (4) the intent to commit a dangerous felony. Id. The General Assembly has determined that certain murders qualify as murder in the first\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nSelect from the choices (A-D) the most serious offense of which the defendant could be properly convicted.\nDefendant, an avid fan of his home town football team, shot at the leg ofa star playerfor a rival team, intending to injure his leg enough to hospitalize for a few weeks, but not to kill him. The victim died of loss of blood.\n\n (A) Involuntary manslaughter\n (B) Voluntary manslaughter\n (C) Murder\n (D) None of the above\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "Murder"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_130",
+    "retrieved_docs": "Involuntary manslaughter is defined as (1) the unintentional killing of another without malice, but while engaged in an unlawful activity not naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm; or (2) the unintentional killing of another without malice, while engaged in a lawful activity with reckless disregard for the safety of others. State v. Crosby, 355 S.C. 47, 51-52, 584 S.E.2d 110, 112 (2003). \u201cTo constitute involuntary manslaughter, there must be a finding of criminal negligence, statutorily defined as a reckless disregard of the safety of others.\u201d Id. at 52, 584 S.E.2d at 112. Further, \u201ca person can be\n\nD.D.A. v. State, 650 So.2d 571, 578 (Ala.Cr.App.1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also McLaughlin v. State, 586 So.2d 267, 270 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (the element of \u201cextreme indifference to human life\u201d by definition does not apply to the life of the victim, but to human life in general); Gholston v. State, 494 So.2d 876, 883 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (to be reckless, a crime must be directed toward the general public, not toward a particular person); King v. State, 505 So.2d 403, 405 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (reckless murder \u201cdiffers from intentional murder in that it results not from a specific, conscious intent to cause the death\n\nAn essential element of first-degree murder is malice aforethought. See State v. Lee, 494 N.W.2d 706, 707 (Iowa 1993); see also Iowa Code \u00a7 707.1 (\u201cA person who kills another person with malice aforethought either express or implied commits murder.\u201d). \u201cMalice aforethought\u201d is defined as \u201c \u2018a fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to another that exists before the act is committed.\u2019 \u201d Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d at 49 (citation omitted).\n\nelements of both offenses because no element of either offense negates an element of the other. Even though reckless murder involves a situation in which the defendant does not intend to kill or injure another person, it does not require that none of his actions be intentional. For example, it does not exclude the possibility that he committed another intentional act, such as setting a fire. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the appellant acted with extreme indifference to human life but did not intend to kill or injure the victim when he threw gasoline around the den;\n\n\u201cMurder is the killing of one human being by another with the requisite malevolent state of mind and without justification, excuse, or mitigation.\u201d Ross v. State, 308 Md. 337, 340, 519 A.2d 735, 736 (1987). The malevolent states of mind that qualify are: (1) the intent to kill, (2) the intent to do grievous bodily harm, (3) the intent to do an act under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life (depraved heart), or (4) the intent to commit a dangerous felony. Id. The General Assembly has determined that certain murders qualify as murder in the first"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Assume for this question only that CP was in breach of contract because of its four-day delay in completion and that an express condition precedent to HDS's duty to pay the contract price has failed. Can CP nevertheless recover the reasonable value of its services?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nAt common law, a breaching party could not obtain restitution for benefits conferred. The common law rule reflected a belief that breach was \u201cmorally unworthy conduct,\u201d and that a breaching party should not benefit from his own wrong, see Lancellotti v. Thomas, 341 Pa.Super. 1, 491 A.2d 117, 118\u201319 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast to the common law rule, the Restatement rule reflects a policy against awarding a windfall to the non-breaching party. See id. at 119\u201320. The court in Lancellotti rejected the view that breach is morally wrong, see id. at 122 (\u201cRules of contract law are\n\nIn an action for breach of contract, the injured party is entitled to the benefit of the bargain, and the recovery may include the profits which he would have derived from performance of the contract. See Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 116 (2d Cir.1976). New York law, which controls here, permits recovery of lost future profits as damages, but only under rigorous rules: First, it must be demonstrated with certainty that such damages have been caused by the breach and, second, the alleged loss must be capable of proof with reasonable certainty. In other words,\n\nrescission is a proper remedy when the breach of contract is so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in making the agreement\n\nInc., 425 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2005)). \u201cAn intended third party beneficiary will be found when it is appropriate to recognize a right to performance in the third party and the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the third party the benefit of the promised performance.\u201d Trans\u2013Orient Marine Corp. v. Star Trading & Marine, Inc., 925 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 302 (1981)).\n\nA condition precedent is a condition or an event that must occur before a right, claim, duty, or interests arises. Compare condition subsequent. In a contract, a condition precedent is an event that must occur before the parties are obligated to perform. For example, an insurance contract may require the insurer to pay to rebuild the customer\u2019s home if it is destroyed by fire during the policy period. The fire is a condition precedent. The fire must occur before the insurer is obligated to pay.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nOn March 1, Computer Programs, Inc. (CP) orally agreed with Holiday Department Store (HDS) to write a set of programs for HDS's computer and to coordinate the programs with HDS's billing methods. A subsequent memo, signed by both parties, provided in its entirety: HDS will pay CP $20,000 in two equal installments within one month of completion if CP is successful in shortening by one-half the processing time for the financial transactions now handled on HDS's Zenon 747 computer; CP to complete by July 1. This agreement may be amended only by a signed writing. On June 6, CP demanded $10,000, saying the job was one-half done. After HDS denied liability, the parties orally agreed that HDS should deposit $20,000 in escrow, pending completion to the satisfaction of HDS's computer systems manager. The escrow deposit was thereupon made. On July 5, CP completed the programs, having used an amount of time in which it could have earned $18,000 had it devoted that time to other jobs. Tests by CP and HDS's computer systems manager then showed that the computer programs, not being perfectly coordinated with HDS's billing methods, cut processing time by only 47%. They would, however, save HDS $12,000 a year. Further, if HDS would spend $5,000 to change its invoice preparation methods, as recommended by CP, the programs would cut processing time by a total of 58%, saving HDS another $8,000 a year. HDS's computer systems manager refused in good faith to certify satisfactory completion. HDS requested the escrow agent to return the $20,000 and asserted that nothing was owed to CP even though HDS continued to use the programs.\nAssume for this question only that CP was in breach of contract because of its four-day delay in completion and that an express condition precedent to HDS's duty to pay the contract price has failed. Can CP nevertheless recover the reasonable value of its services?\n\n (A) Yes, because continued use of the programs by HDS would save at least $12,000 a year.\n (B) Yes, because HDS was continuing to use programs created by CP for which, as HDS knew, CP expected to be paid.\n (C) No, because failure of an express condition precedent excused HDS from any duty to compensate CP.\n (D) No, because such a recovery by CP would be inconsistent with a claim by HOS against CP for breach of contract.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "B",
+      "Yes, because HDS was continuing to use programs created by CP for which, as HDS knew, CP expected to be paid."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_236",
+    "retrieved_docs": "At common law, a breaching party could not obtain restitution for benefits conferred. The common law rule reflected a belief that breach was \u201cmorally unworthy conduct,\u201d and that a breaching party should not benefit from his own wrong, see Lancellotti v. Thomas, 341 Pa.Super. 1, 491 A.2d 117, 118\u201319 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast to the common law rule, the Restatement rule reflects a policy against awarding a windfall to the non-breaching party. See id. at 119\u201320. The court in Lancellotti rejected the view that breach is morally wrong, see id. at 122 (\u201cRules of contract law are\n\nIn an action for breach of contract, the injured party is entitled to the benefit of the bargain, and the recovery may include the profits which he would have derived from performance of the contract. See Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 116 (2d Cir.1976). New York law, which controls here, permits recovery of lost future profits as damages, but only under rigorous rules: First, it must be demonstrated with certainty that such damages have been caused by the breach and, second, the alleged loss must be capable of proof with reasonable certainty. In other words,\n\nrescission is a proper remedy when the breach of contract is so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in making the agreement\n\nInc., 425 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2005)). \u201cAn intended third party beneficiary will be found when it is appropriate to recognize a right to performance in the third party and the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the third party the benefit of the promised performance.\u201d Trans\u2013Orient Marine Corp. v. Star Trading & Marine, Inc., 925 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 302 (1981)).\n\nA condition precedent is a condition or an event that must occur before a right, claim, duty, or interests arises. Compare condition subsequent. In a contract, a condition precedent is an event that must occur before the parties are obligated to perform. For example, an insurance contract may require the insurer to pay to rebuild the customer\u2019s home if it is destroyed by fire during the policy period. The fire is a condition precedent. The fire must occur before the insurer is obligated to pay."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Pratt sued Danvers for injuries suffered by Pratt when their automobiles collided. At trial, Pratt offers into evidence a properly authenticated letter from Danvers that says, \"Your claim seems too high, but, because I might have been a little negligent, I'm prepared to offer you half of what you ask\" The letter is",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\n(a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible \u2014 on behalf of any party \u2014 either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction: (1) furnishing, promising, or offering \u2014 or accepting, promising to accept, or offering to accept \u2014 a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and (2) conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim \u2014 except when offered in a criminal case and when the negotiations related to a claim by a public\n\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nFor an admission by a party-opponent to be admissible: 1) the statement must be a conscious or voluntary acknowledgment by a party-opponent of the existence of certain facts; 2) the matter acknowledged must be relevant to the cause of the party offering the admission; and 3) the matter acknowledged must be unfavorable to or inconsistent with the position now taken by the party-opponent. Bowls v. Scarborough, 950 S.W.2d 691, 702 (Mo.App.W.D.1997).\n\nSimilarly, proximate cause may be proved by circumstantial evidence even though there is no eyewitness evidence. The law does not require every fact and circumstance which make up a case of negligence to be proved by direct and positive testimony or by the testimony of eyewitnesses. Negligence and freedom from contributory negligence may be shown by circumstantial, as well as the conditions and circumstances leading up to and surrounding the incident causing the plaintiff's injury. Similarly, the terms of an oral contract, and the assent of the parties to it, may be shown by the actions of the parties and\n\nattending circumstances, as well as by the words they use. In accordance with the rules for the construction of contracts, where a contract is ambiguous on its face, evidence of the surrounding circumstances and the subsequent conduct of the parties in the execution of the contract is admissible to interpret the contract; and the circumstances in which the parties to a contract are placed are generally admissible where such evidence will shed light upon issues in the case. In many instances, facts can be proved only by circumstantial evidence. Such evidence may in fact be the only means of proving\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nPratt sued Danvers for injuries suffered by Pratt when their automobiles collided. At trial, Pratt offers into evidence a properly authenticated letter from Danvers that says, \"Your claim seems too high, but, because I might have been a little negligent, I'm prepared to offer you half of what you ask\" The letter is\n\n (A) admissible as an admission by a party-opponent\n (B) admissible as a statement against pecuniary interest\n (C) inadmissible, because Danver's statement is lay opinion on a legal issue\n (D) inadmissible, because Danver's statement was made in an effort to settle the claim\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "D",
+      "inadmissible, because Danver's statement was made in an effort to settle the claim"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_471",
+    "retrieved_docs": "(a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible \u2014 on behalf of any party \u2014 either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction: (1) furnishing, promising, or offering \u2014 or accepting, promising to accept, or offering to accept \u2014 a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and (2) conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim \u2014 except when offered in a criminal case and when the negotiations related to a claim by a public\n\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nFor an admission by a party-opponent to be admissible: 1) the statement must be a conscious or voluntary acknowledgment by a party-opponent of the existence of certain facts; 2) the matter acknowledged must be relevant to the cause of the party offering the admission; and 3) the matter acknowledged must be unfavorable to or inconsistent with the position now taken by the party-opponent. Bowls v. Scarborough, 950 S.W.2d 691, 702 (Mo.App.W.D.1997).\n\nSimilarly, proximate cause may be proved by circumstantial evidence even though there is no eyewitness evidence. The law does not require every fact and circumstance which make up a case of negligence to be proved by direct and positive testimony or by the testimony of eyewitnesses. Negligence and freedom from contributory negligence may be shown by circumstantial, as well as the conditions and circumstances leading up to and surrounding the incident causing the plaintiff's injury. Similarly, the terms of an oral contract, and the assent of the parties to it, may be shown by the actions of the parties and\n\nattending circumstances, as well as by the words they use. In accordance with the rules for the construction of contracts, where a contract is ambiguous on its face, evidence of the surrounding circumstances and the subsequent conduct of the parties in the execution of the contract is admissible to interpret the contract; and the circumstances in which the parties to a contract are placed are generally admissible where such evidence will shed light upon issues in the case. In many instances, facts can be proved only by circumstantial evidence. Such evidence may in fact be the only means of proving"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Chase, as seller, and Scott, as buyer, enter into a written contract for the sale and purchase of land which is complete in all respects except that no reference is made to the quality of title to be conveyed. Which of the following will result?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\n\u201cMarketable title is one that may be \u2018freely made the subject of resale\u2019 and that can be sold at a \u2018fair price to a reasonable purchaser or mortgaged to a person of reasonable prudence as security for the loan of money.\u2019 \u201d Kelley v. Leucadia Fin. Corp., 846 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1992) (quoting 77 Am.Jur.2d Vendor and Purchaser \u00a7 131, at 313\u201314 (1975)).\n\nAccordingly, breach of contract remedies are available to a buyer when the seller fails to make any delivery. S.W. Bell, 811 S.W.2d at 576. In contrast, breach of warranty remedies are available to a buyer who has received and accepted goods, but discovers they are defective in some manner. Id. In other words, when a party fails to deliver the goods as promised, a breach of contract occurs. See Chilton Ins. Co. v. Pate & Pate Enter., Inc., 930 S.W.2d 877, 890 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied). Conversely, when a seller delivers nonconforming goods, it is a breach of warranty.\n\nIf a contract provision's meaning is uncertain or is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations after analyzing the language and considering extrinsic evidence (if appropriate), the provision is ambiguous. See Jensen v. Lake Jane Estates, 165 Wash.App. 100, 105, 267 P.3d 435 (2011).\n\nA condition subsequent is something that may occur after a promise is made, which will excuse the obligation of a party. An example of such a condition is that the obligation of a buyer to complete a purchase may be excused if a property is damaged by a natural disaster or fire before the close of escrow. That a condition, as opposed to a covenant, exists can often be seen by the use of words such as \u201cif,\u201d \u201cwhen,\u201d \u201cunless,\u201d \u201csubject to,\u201d or \u201cconditional upon.\u201d\n\nA deed is not legally effective until it has been delivered. While there is no prescribed method for an effective delivery of a deed, manual transfer of the instrument into the hand of the grantee is neither required to effectuate a valid delivery, nor dispositive of the issue. The term delivery in this regard refers to \u201cnot so much a manual act but the intention of the maker ... existing at the time of the transaction ... and not subject to later change of mind.\u201d \u201cDelivery of a deed includes, not only an act by which the grantor evinces a\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nChase, as seller, and Scott, as buyer, enter into a written contract for the sale and purchase of land which is complete in all respects except that no reference is made to the quality of title to be conveyed. Which of the following will result?\n\n (A) The contract will be unenforceable.\n (B) Chase will be required to convey a marketable title.\n (C) Chase will be required to convey only what he owned on the date of the contract.\n (D) Chase will be required to convey only what he owned on the date of the contract plus whatever additional title rights he may acquire prior to the closing date.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "B",
+      "Chase will be required to convey a marketable title."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_385",
+    "retrieved_docs": "\u201cMarketable title is one that may be \u2018freely made the subject of resale\u2019 and that can be sold at a \u2018fair price to a reasonable purchaser or mortgaged to a person of reasonable prudence as security for the loan of money.\u2019 \u201d Kelley v. Leucadia Fin. Corp., 846 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1992) (quoting 77 Am.Jur.2d Vendor and Purchaser \u00a7 131, at 313\u201314 (1975)).\n\nAccordingly, breach of contract remedies are available to a buyer when the seller fails to make any delivery. S.W. Bell, 811 S.W.2d at 576. In contrast, breach of warranty remedies are available to a buyer who has received and accepted goods, but discovers they are defective in some manner. Id. In other words, when a party fails to deliver the goods as promised, a breach of contract occurs. See Chilton Ins. Co. v. Pate & Pate Enter., Inc., 930 S.W.2d 877, 890 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied). Conversely, when a seller delivers nonconforming goods, it is a breach of warranty.\n\nIf a contract provision's meaning is uncertain or is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations after analyzing the language and considering extrinsic evidence (if appropriate), the provision is ambiguous. See Jensen v. Lake Jane Estates, 165 Wash.App. 100, 105, 267 P.3d 435 (2011).\n\nA condition subsequent is something that may occur after a promise is made, which will excuse the obligation of a party. An example of such a condition is that the obligation of a buyer to complete a purchase may be excused if a property is damaged by a natural disaster or fire before the close of escrow. That a condition, as opposed to a covenant, exists can often be seen by the use of words such as \u201cif,\u201d \u201cwhen,\u201d \u201cunless,\u201d \u201csubject to,\u201d or \u201cconditional upon.\u201d\n\nA deed is not legally effective until it has been delivered. While there is no prescribed method for an effective delivery of a deed, manual transfer of the instrument into the hand of the grantee is neither required to effectuate a valid delivery, nor dispositive of the issue. The term delivery in this regard refers to \u201cnot so much a manual act but the intention of the maker ... existing at the time of the transaction ... and not subject to later change of mind.\u201d \u201cDelivery of a deed includes, not only an act by which the grantor evinces a"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Which of the following statements concerning the order of performances is LEAST accurate?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nA condition precedent is a condition or an event that must occur before a right, claim, duty, or interests arises. Compare condition subsequent. In a contract, a condition precedent is an event that must occur before the parties are obligated to perform. For example, an insurance contract may require the insurer to pay to rebuild the customer\u2019s home if it is destroyed by fire during the policy period. The fire is a condition precedent. The fire must occur before the insurer is obligated to pay.\n\nIf a contract provision's meaning is uncertain or is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations after analyzing the language and considering extrinsic evidence (if appropriate), the provision is ambiguous. See Jensen v. Lake Jane Estates, 165 Wash.App. 100, 105, 267 P.3d 435 (2011).\n\nA condition subsequent is something that may occur after a promise is made, which will excuse the obligation of a party. An example of such a condition is that the obligation of a buyer to complete a purchase may be excused if a property is damaged by a natural disaster or fire before the close of escrow. That a condition, as opposed to a covenant, exists can often be seen by the use of words such as \u201cif,\u201d \u201cwhen,\u201d \u201cunless,\u201d \u201csubject to,\u201d or \u201cconditional upon.\u201d\n\n\u201c \u2018Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the obligation impossible or highly impracticable.\u2019 \u201d Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, \u00b6 12, 232 P.3d 1081 (emphases omitted) (quoting Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 261 (1981) (\u201cWhere, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which\n\n[A]n implied contract can arise from the acts and conduct of the parties. Such a contract exists when the facts and circumstances surrounding the parties' relationship imply a mutual intention to contract. Every contract requires a meeting of the minds, but the meeting can be implied from and evidenced by the parties' conduct and course of dealing.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nAlpha and Beta made a written contract pursuant to which Alpha promised to convey a specified apartment house to Beta in return for Beta's promise (1) to convey a 100-acre farm to Alpha and (2) to pay Alpha $1,000 in cash six months after the exchange of the apartment house and the farm. The contract contained the following provision: \"It is understood and agreed that Beta's obligation to pay the $1,000 six months after the exchangeof the apartment house and the farm shall be voided if Alpha has not, within three months after the aforesaid exchange, removed the existing shed in the parking area in the rear of the said apartment house.\"\nWhich of the following statements concerning the order of performances is LEAST accurate?\n\n (A) Alpha's tendering of good title to the apartment house is a condition precedent to Beta's duty to convey good title to the farm.\n (B) Beta's tendering of good title to the farm is a condition precedent to Alpha's duty to convey good title to the apartment house.\n (C) Beta's tendering of good title to the farm is a condition subsequent to Alpha's duty to convey good title to the apartment house.\n (D) Alpha's tendering of good title to the apartment house and Beta's tendering of good title to the farm are concurrent conditions.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "Beta's tendering of good title to the farm is a condition subsequent to Alpha's duty to convey good title to the apartment house."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_137",
+    "retrieved_docs": "A condition precedent is a condition or an event that must occur before a right, claim, duty, or interests arises. Compare condition subsequent. In a contract, a condition precedent is an event that must occur before the parties are obligated to perform. For example, an insurance contract may require the insurer to pay to rebuild the customer\u2019s home if it is destroyed by fire during the policy period. The fire is a condition precedent. The fire must occur before the insurer is obligated to pay.\n\nIf a contract provision's meaning is uncertain or is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations after analyzing the language and considering extrinsic evidence (if appropriate), the provision is ambiguous. See Jensen v. Lake Jane Estates, 165 Wash.App. 100, 105, 267 P.3d 435 (2011).\n\nA condition subsequent is something that may occur after a promise is made, which will excuse the obligation of a party. An example of such a condition is that the obligation of a buyer to complete a purchase may be excused if a property is damaged by a natural disaster or fire before the close of escrow. That a condition, as opposed to a covenant, exists can often be seen by the use of words such as \u201cif,\u201d \u201cwhen,\u201d \u201cunless,\u201d \u201csubject to,\u201d or \u201cconditional upon.\u201d\n\n\u201c \u2018Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the obligation impossible or highly impracticable.\u2019 \u201d Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, \u00b6 12, 232 P.3d 1081 (emphases omitted) (quoting Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 261 (1981) (\u201cWhere, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which\n\n[A]n implied contract can arise from the acts and conduct of the parties. Such a contract exists when the facts and circumstances surrounding the parties' relationship imply a mutual intention to contract. Every contract requires a meeting of the minds, but the meeting can be implied from and evidenced by the parties' conduct and course of dealing."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "For this question only, assume that a valid federal administrative rule, adopted under a federal consumer product safety act, regulates the design of snipe traps. The rule was issued to prevent traps from causing injury to human beings, e.g., by pinching fingers while persons were setting the traps. No other federal law applies. Which of the following best states the effect of the federal rule on the Midland state statute?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nFederal Preemption When state law and federal law conflict, federal law displaces, or preempts, state law, due to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. VI., \u00a7 2. Preemption applies regardless of whether the conflicting laws come from legislatures, courts, administrative agencies, or constitutions. For example, the Voting Rights Act, an act of Congress, preempts state constitutions, and FDA regulations may preempt state court judgments in cases involving prescription drugs. Congress has preempted state regulation in many areas. In some cases, such as medical devices, Congress preempted all state regulation. In others, such as labels on prescription drugs,\n\nCongress allowed federal regulatory agencies to set national minimum standards, but did not preempt state regulations imposing more stringent standards than those imposed by federal regulators. Where rules or regulations do not clearly state whether or not preemption should apply, the Supreme Court tries to follow lawmakers\u2019 intent, and prefers interpretations that avoid preempting state laws.\n\nThe elements of a products liability claim are that (1) a product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; (2) the defect existed at the time the product left the defendant's control; and (3) the defect proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 623 n. 3. When products liability is based on a manufacturing-flaw theory, a product is in a defective condition if the user could not have anticipated the danger that the product poses. Id. at 622; see also 4A Minnesota Practice, CIVJIG \u00a7 75.30 (4th ed.1999).\n\nThe political question doctrine \u201c \u2018excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch.\u2019 \u201d Bancoult, 445 F.3d at 432 (quoting Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986)). The doctrine applies where, \u201c[p]rominent on the surface\u201d of the case is: [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or\n\n(a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible \u2014 on behalf of any party \u2014 either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction: (1) furnishing, promising, or offering \u2014 or accepting, promising to accept, or offering to accept \u2014 a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and (2) conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim \u2014 except when offered in a criminal case and when the negotiations related to a claim by a public\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nThree states, East Winnetka, Midland, and West Hampton, are located next to one another in that order. The states of East Winnetka and West Hampton permit the hunting and trapping of snipe, but the state of Midland strictly forbids these activities in order to protect snipe, a rare species of animal, from extinction. The state of Midland has a state statute that provides, \"Possession of snipe traps is prohibited. Any game warden finding a snipe trap within the state shall seize and destroy it.\" Snipe traps cost about $15 each. Prentis is a resident of West Hampton and an ardent snipe trapper. She drove her car to East Winnetka to purchase a new improved snipe trap from a manufacturer there. In the course of her trip back across Midland with the trap in her car, Prentis stopped in a Midland state park to camp for a few nights. While she was in that park, a Midland game warden saw the trap, which was visible on the front seat of her car. The warden seized the trap and destroyed it in accordance with the Midland statute after Prentis admitted that the seized item was a prohibited snipe trap. No federal statutes or federal administrative regulations apply.\nFor this question only, assume that a valid federal administrative rule, adopted under a federal consumer product safety act, regulates the design of snipe traps. The rule was issued to prevent traps from causing injury to human beings, e.g., by pinching fingers while persons were setting the traps. No other federal law applies. Which of the following best states the effect of the federal rule on the Midland state statute?\n\n (A) The federal rule preempts the Midland state statute, because the federal rule regulates the same subject matter: snipe traps.\n (B) The federal rule preempts the Midland state statute, because the federal rule does not contain affirmative authorization for continued state regulation.\n (C) The federal rule does not preempt the Midland state statute, because the Midland state statute regulates wild animals, a field of exclusive state power.\n (D) The federal rule does not preempt the Midland state statute, because the purposes of the federal rule and the Midland state statute are different.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "D",
+      "The federal rule does not preempt the Midland state statute, because the purposes of the federal rule and the Midland state statute are different."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_992",
+    "retrieved_docs": "Federal Preemption When state law and federal law conflict, federal law displaces, or preempts, state law, due to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. VI., \u00a7 2. Preemption applies regardless of whether the conflicting laws come from legislatures, courts, administrative agencies, or constitutions. For example, the Voting Rights Act, an act of Congress, preempts state constitutions, and FDA regulations may preempt state court judgments in cases involving prescription drugs. Congress has preempted state regulation in many areas. In some cases, such as medical devices, Congress preempted all state regulation. In others, such as labels on prescription drugs,\n\nCongress allowed federal regulatory agencies to set national minimum standards, but did not preempt state regulations imposing more stringent standards than those imposed by federal regulators. Where rules or regulations do not clearly state whether or not preemption should apply, the Supreme Court tries to follow lawmakers\u2019 intent, and prefers interpretations that avoid preempting state laws.\n\nThe elements of a products liability claim are that (1) a product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; (2) the defect existed at the time the product left the defendant's control; and (3) the defect proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 623 n. 3. When products liability is based on a manufacturing-flaw theory, a product is in a defective condition if the user could not have anticipated the danger that the product poses. Id. at 622; see also 4A Minnesota Practice, CIVJIG \u00a7 75.30 (4th ed.1999).\n\nThe political question doctrine \u201c \u2018excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch.\u2019 \u201d Bancoult, 445 F.3d at 432 (quoting Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986)). The doctrine applies where, \u201c[p]rominent on the surface\u201d of the case is: [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or\n\n(a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible \u2014 on behalf of any party \u2014 either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction: (1) furnishing, promising, or offering \u2014 or accepting, promising to accept, or offering to accept \u2014 a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and (2) conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim \u2014 except when offered in a criminal case and when the negotiations related to a claim by a public"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Which of the following best describes the constitutionality of the Attorney General's action?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nThe doctrine of separation of powers also places limits on congressional authority to investigate. Congress cannot, under the guise of an investigation, usurp the power of another branch of government. It cannot investigate matters where the means of redress is purely judicial. Nor can Congress investigate matters committed to the President\u2019s discretion. For example, Congress could not undertake an investigation to determine an individual\u2019s entitlement to a pardon because the Constitution granted the pardon power to the President, not Congress. While Congress can investigate conduct that may be criminal, Congress itself lacks the authority to bring criminal charges or otherwise\n\ninitiate a criminal prosecution. If a congressional investigation uncovers evidence of criminal activity, however, Congress may refer the matter to the Department of Justice for investigation and, potentially, prosecution. Sometimes, the DOJ investigation predates the congressional investigation. No matter which branch of government moves first to investigate, however, the end result is that a congressional investigation often will run parallel to a criminal investigation. As a result, evidence developed in a congressional investigation might be used by the DOJ in its criminal investigation or in a prosecution. Ultimately, nearly any matter can be anchored in some fashion to Congress\u2019s legislative\n\nof deciding whether legislation is appropriate, to information gathering on matters of national importance, to oversight of federal departments and executive agencies. As a result, a congressional committee has broad discretion regarding both the scope of its investigation and the relevance of the information it requests. Although congressional authority to investigate is broad, it is not unlimited. Because Congress\u2019s authority to investigate is tied to its authority to legislate, limits on congressional investigations are necessarily linked to the limits on Congress\u2019s constitutional authority. For example, Congress has no general authority to investigate the purely private affair of an ordinary citizen.\n\nAlthough the Constitution does not expressly authorize Congress to conduct investigations, Congress \u2013 and the courts \u2013 have long recognized that Congress has an inherent, constitutional prerogative to conduct investigations. In fact, the first congressional investigation occurred as early as 1792, when the House of Representatives convened a committee to investigate the defeat of General Arthur St. Clair in the Battle of the Wabash in what was then known as the Northwest Territory (and now known as Ohio). Congress has the authority to conduct investigations \u201cin aid of its legislative function.\u201d That authority can extend to investigations for the purpose\n\nthe entire Executive Branch. Under this theory, commonly referred to as the Unitary Executive Theory, any decision that the President makes regarding the Executive Branch would not be subject to any sort of review or oversight (i.e. Congress would not be able to investigate the President's firings of any members of the Executive Branch). While the Supreme Court has not directly embraced or rejected this theory, Justice Alito has made comments which have caused some to think that he endorses the theory: \"The president has not just some executive powers, but the executive power \u2014 the whole thing.\"\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nGreen is cited for contempt of the House of Representatives after she refused to answer certain questions posed by a House Committee concerning her acts while serving as a United States Ambassador. A federal statute authorizes the Attorney General to prosecute contempts of Congress. Pursuant to this law, the House directs the Attorney General to begin criminal proceedings against Green. A federal grand jury indicts Green, but the Attorney General refuses to sign the indictment.\nWhich of the following best describes the constitutionality of the Attorney General's action?\n\n (A) Illegal, because the Attorney General must prosecute if the House of Representatives directs\n (B) Illegal, because the Attorney General must prosecute those who violate federal law\n (C) Legal, because ambassadors are immune from prosecution for acts committed in the course of their duties\n (D) Legal, because the decision to prosecute is an exclusively executive act\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "D",
+      "Legal, because the decision to prosecute is an exclusively executive act"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_199",
+    "retrieved_docs": "The doctrine of separation of powers also places limits on congressional authority to investigate. Congress cannot, under the guise of an investigation, usurp the power of another branch of government. It cannot investigate matters where the means of redress is purely judicial. Nor can Congress investigate matters committed to the President\u2019s discretion. For example, Congress could not undertake an investigation to determine an individual\u2019s entitlement to a pardon because the Constitution granted the pardon power to the President, not Congress. While Congress can investigate conduct that may be criminal, Congress itself lacks the authority to bring criminal charges or otherwise\n\ninitiate a criminal prosecution. If a congressional investigation uncovers evidence of criminal activity, however, Congress may refer the matter to the Department of Justice for investigation and, potentially, prosecution. Sometimes, the DOJ investigation predates the congressional investigation. No matter which branch of government moves first to investigate, however, the end result is that a congressional investigation often will run parallel to a criminal investigation. As a result, evidence developed in a congressional investigation might be used by the DOJ in its criminal investigation or in a prosecution. Ultimately, nearly any matter can be anchored in some fashion to Congress\u2019s legislative\n\nof deciding whether legislation is appropriate, to information gathering on matters of national importance, to oversight of federal departments and executive agencies. As a result, a congressional committee has broad discretion regarding both the scope of its investigation and the relevance of the information it requests. Although congressional authority to investigate is broad, it is not unlimited. Because Congress\u2019s authority to investigate is tied to its authority to legislate, limits on congressional investigations are necessarily linked to the limits on Congress\u2019s constitutional authority. For example, Congress has no general authority to investigate the purely private affair of an ordinary citizen.\n\nAlthough the Constitution does not expressly authorize Congress to conduct investigations, Congress \u2013 and the courts \u2013 have long recognized that Congress has an inherent, constitutional prerogative to conduct investigations. In fact, the first congressional investigation occurred as early as 1792, when the House of Representatives convened a committee to investigate the defeat of General Arthur St. Clair in the Battle of the Wabash in what was then known as the Northwest Territory (and now known as Ohio). Congress has the authority to conduct investigations \u201cin aid of its legislative function.\u201d That authority can extend to investigations for the purpose\n\nthe entire Executive Branch. Under this theory, commonly referred to as the Unitary Executive Theory, any decision that the President makes regarding the Executive Branch would not be subject to any sort of review or oversight (i.e. Congress would not be able to investigate the President's firings of any members of the Executive Branch). While the Supreme Court has not directly embraced or rejected this theory, Justice Alito has made comments which have caused some to think that he endorses the theory: \"The president has not just some executive powers, but the executive power \u2014 the whole thing.\""
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "In a prosecution of Dale for murdering Vera, Dale testified that the killing had occurred in self defense when Vera tried to shoot him. In rebuttal, the prosecution seeks to call Walter, Vera's father, to testify that the day before the killing, Vera told Walter that she loved Dale so much she could never hurt him. Walter's testimony is",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nHearsay is generally defined as an out-of-court statement made by a declarant and offered for the truth of the matter asserted (see Nucci v. Proper, 95 N.Y.2d 597, 602, 721 N.Y.S.2d 593, 744 N.E.2d 128 [2001]; People v. Buie, 86 N.Y.2d 501, 505, 634 N.Y.S.2d 415, 658 N.E.2d 192 [1995];\n\nHowever, prior consistent statements are admissible as non-hearsay if: (1) the individual who made the prior consistent statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; and (2) the statement is offered in an effort to rebut an express or implied accusation of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication. See Chandler, 702 So.2d at 197\u201398; see also \u00a7 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Both conditions must be met for admission of a prior consistent statement as nonhearsay. Harris v. State, 843 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.2003).\n\n\u201cHearsay is an assertion of fact or belief made out of court and offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d Mercer v. United States, 864 A.2d 110, 117 (D.C.2004).\n\nA record created by a third party which is adopted by a business may be admitted under the business record exception to the hearsay rule if certain criteria are met: (1) the record must be procured in the normal course of business; (2) the business must show that it relied on the record; and (3) there must be other circumstances indicating the trustworthiness of the document. Military Rules of Evid., Rule 803(6).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nIn a prosecution of Dale for murdering Vera, Dale testified that the killing had occurred in self defense when Vera tried to shoot him. In rebuttal, the prosecution seeks to call Walter, Vera's father, to testify that the day before the killing, Vera told Walter that she loved Dale so much she could never hurt him. Walter's testimony is\n\n (A) admissible within the hearsay exception for statements of the declarant's then existing state of mind.\n (B) admissible, because Vera is unavailable as a witness.\n (C) inadmissible as hearsay not within any exception.\n (D) inadmissible, because Vera's character is not an issue.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "A",
+      "admissible within the hearsay exception for statements of the declarant's then existing state of mind."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_722",
+    "retrieved_docs": "The Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nHearsay is generally defined as an out-of-court statement made by a declarant and offered for the truth of the matter asserted (see Nucci v. Proper, 95 N.Y.2d 597, 602, 721 N.Y.S.2d 593, 744 N.E.2d 128 [2001]; People v. Buie, 86 N.Y.2d 501, 505, 634 N.Y.S.2d 415, 658 N.E.2d 192 [1995];\n\nHowever, prior consistent statements are admissible as non-hearsay if: (1) the individual who made the prior consistent statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; and (2) the statement is offered in an effort to rebut an express or implied accusation of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication. See Chandler, 702 So.2d at 197\u201398; see also \u00a7 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Both conditions must be met for admission of a prior consistent statement as nonhearsay. Harris v. State, 843 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.2003).\n\n\u201cHearsay is an assertion of fact or belief made out of court and offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d Mercer v. United States, 864 A.2d 110, 117 (D.C.2004).\n\nA record created by a third party which is adopted by a business may be admitted under the business record exception to the hearsay rule if certain criteria are met: (1) the record must be procured in the normal course of business; (2) the business must show that it relied on the record; and (3) there must be other circumstances indicating the trustworthiness of the document. Military Rules of Evid., Rule 803(6)."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "If Peterson brings an action, based on negligence, against the grocery store, the store's best defense will be that",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nIn Tennessee, while there is generally no duty for business to protect their customers from crimes occurring on their premises, a duty to take reasonable steps to protect customers arises if the business knows, or has reason to know, either from what has been or should have been observed or from past experience, that criminal acts against its customers on its premises are reasonably foreseeable, either generally or at some particular time. In determining the duty that exists, the foreseeability of harm and the gravity of harm must be balanced against the commensurate burden imposed on the business to protect\n\nor from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent (a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.\u201d See also Duncan v. Rzonca, 133 Ill.App.3d 184, 200, 88 Ill.Dec. 288, 478 N.E.2d 603, 613 (1985). 2To establish negligent parental supervision, a plaintiff must show that (1) the parents were aware of specific instances of prior conduct sufficient to put them on notice that the act complained of was\n\nsentiment,\u201d Brown v. Frontier Theatres, 369 S.W.2d at 305, the loss in value to her. Because the injury to Likes's property was not intentional or malicious, or even grossly negligent, we need not decide whether mental anguish arising out of property damage may be legally compensable when a heightened degree of misconduct is found. Compare Luna, 667 S.W.2d at 117 (stating in dicta that mental anguish is recoverable for \u201cwillful tort, willful and wanton disregard, or gross negligence\u201d), with Reinhardt Motors, Inc. v. Boston, 516 So.2d 509, 511 (Ala.1986) (limiting mental anguish for property damage to cases in which the\n\nThis court has previously recognized that contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort. \u201c \u2018[W]here the defendant's conduct is actually intended to inflict *655 harm upon the plaintiff, there is a difference, not merely in degree but in the kind of fault; and the defense [contributory negligence] never has been extended to such intentional torts.\u2019 \u201d **620 Omaha Nat. Bank v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 213 Neb. 873, 881\u201382, 332 N.W.2d 196, 202 (1983), quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts \u00a7 65 (4th ed.1971).\n\nSimilarly, proximate cause may be proved by circumstantial evidence even though there is no eyewitness evidence. The law does not require every fact and circumstance which make up a case of negligence to be proved by direct and positive testimony or by the testimony of eyewitnesses. Negligence and freedom from contributory negligence may be shown by circumstantial, as well as the conditions and circumstances leading up to and surrounding the incident causing the plaintiff's injury. Similarly, the terms of an oral contract, and the assent of the parties to it, may be shown by the actions of the parties and\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nDora, who was eight years old, went to the grocery store with her mother. Dora pushed the grocery cart while her mother put items into it. Dora's mother remained near Dora at all times. Peterson, another customer in the store, noticed Dora pushing the cart in a manner that caused Peterson no concern. A short time later, the cart Dora was pushing struck Peterson in the knee, inflicting serious injury.\nIf Peterson brings an action, based on negligence, against the grocery store, the store's best defense will be that\n\n (A) a store owes no duty to its customers to control the use of its shopping carts.\n (B) a store owes no duty to its customers to control the conduct of other customers.\n (C) any negligence of the store was not the proximate cause of Peterson's injury.\n (D) a supervised child pushing a cart does not pose an unreasonable risk to other customers.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "D",
+      "a supervised child pushing a cart does not pose an unreasonable risk to other customers."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_621",
+    "retrieved_docs": "In Tennessee, while there is generally no duty for business to protect their customers from crimes occurring on their premises, a duty to take reasonable steps to protect customers arises if the business knows, or has reason to know, either from what has been or should have been observed or from past experience, that criminal acts against its customers on its premises are reasonably foreseeable, either generally or at some particular time. In determining the duty that exists, the foreseeability of harm and the gravity of harm must be balanced against the commensurate burden imposed on the business to protect\n\nor from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent (a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.\u201d See also Duncan v. Rzonca, 133 Ill.App.3d 184, 200, 88 Ill.Dec. 288, 478 N.E.2d 603, 613 (1985). 2To establish negligent parental supervision, a plaintiff must show that (1) the parents were aware of specific instances of prior conduct sufficient to put them on notice that the act complained of was\n\nsentiment,\u201d Brown v. Frontier Theatres, 369 S.W.2d at 305, the loss in value to her. Because the injury to Likes's property was not intentional or malicious, or even grossly negligent, we need not decide whether mental anguish arising out of property damage may be legally compensable when a heightened degree of misconduct is found. Compare Luna, 667 S.W.2d at 117 (stating in dicta that mental anguish is recoverable for \u201cwillful tort, willful and wanton disregard, or gross negligence\u201d), with Reinhardt Motors, Inc. v. Boston, 516 So.2d 509, 511 (Ala.1986) (limiting mental anguish for property damage to cases in which the\n\nThis court has previously recognized that contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort. \u201c \u2018[W]here the defendant's conduct is actually intended to inflict *655 harm upon the plaintiff, there is a difference, not merely in degree but in the kind of fault; and the defense [contributory negligence] never has been extended to such intentional torts.\u2019 \u201d **620 Omaha Nat. Bank v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 213 Neb. 873, 881\u201382, 332 N.W.2d 196, 202 (1983), quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts \u00a7 65 (4th ed.1971).\n\nSimilarly, proximate cause may be proved by circumstantial evidence even though there is no eyewitness evidence. The law does not require every fact and circumstance which make up a case of negligence to be proved by direct and positive testimony or by the testimony of eyewitnesses. Negligence and freedom from contributory negligence may be shown by circumstantial, as well as the conditions and circumstances leading up to and surrounding the incident causing the plaintiff's injury. Similarly, the terms of an oral contract, and the assent of the parties to it, may be shown by the actions of the parties and"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "The committee wants you to draft a statute governing the recording of deeds that fixes priorities of title, as reflected on the public record, as definitely as possible. Which of the following, divorced from other policy considerations, would best accomplish this particular result?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nYet the established rule, followed in Maryland, is that proof of color of title is not necessary to establish adverse possession. Color of title is not an element of adverse possession unless made so by statute, as under provisions prescribing a shorter period of limitation than would otherwise be required. While there are a few isolated judicial statements broadly to the effect that color of title, or color of right, is essential to adverse possession, the general rule is well established that, in the absence of contrary statute, color of title is not an essential element of adverse possession and\n\nthat entry and possession under claim of right, ownership, or title are sufficient. 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession \u00a7 72 (footnotes omitted). See also 4 Tiffany, supra, Adverse Possession \u00a7 1147 (distinguishing \u201ccolor of title,\u201d which \u201crefers to asserting title through an instrument that appears to convey title, but in actuality does not,\u201d from \u201cclaim of title,\u201d which more broadly \u201creflect [s] an intention to assert ownership over the property and claim it as one's own\u201d).\n\nThus, the party claiming ownership by adverse possession must prove that the following five elements existed concurrently for 20 years: \u201c(1) continuous, (2) hostile or adverse, (3) actual, (4) open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the premises, (5) under claim of title inconsistent with that of the true owner.\u201d Joiner, 85 Ill.2d at 81, 51 Ill.Dec. 662, 421 N.E.2d at 174.\n\nA deed is not legally effective until it has been delivered. While there is no prescribed method for an effective delivery of a deed, manual transfer of the instrument into the hand of the grantee is neither required to effectuate a valid delivery, nor dispositive of the issue. The term delivery in this regard refers to \u201cnot so much a manual act but the intention of the maker ... existing at the time of the transaction ... and not subject to later change of mind.\u201d \u201cDelivery of a deed includes, not only an act by which the grantor evinces a\n\nA deed to personalty needs no attesting witness to make it valid; in other respects, the principles applicable to deeds to lands are applicable to deeds to personalty. However, generally a deed is not necessary to convey title to personalty.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nAssume for the purposes of these questions that you are counsel to the state legislative committee that is responsible for real estate laws in your state.\nThe committee wants you to draft a statute governing the recording of deeds that fixes priorities of title, as reflected on the public record, as definitely as possible. Which of the following, divorced from other policy considerations, would best accomplish this particular result?\n\n (A) Eliminate the requirement of witnesses to deeds.\n (B) Make time of recording the controlling factor.\n (C) Make irrebuttable the declarations in the deeds that valuable consideration was paid.\n (D) Make the protection of bona fide purchasers the controlling factor.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "B",
+      "Make time of recording the controlling factor."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_68",
+    "retrieved_docs": "Yet the established rule, followed in Maryland, is that proof of color of title is not necessary to establish adverse possession. Color of title is not an element of adverse possession unless made so by statute, as under provisions prescribing a shorter period of limitation than would otherwise be required. While there are a few isolated judicial statements broadly to the effect that color of title, or color of right, is essential to adverse possession, the general rule is well established that, in the absence of contrary statute, color of title is not an essential element of adverse possession and\n\nthat entry and possession under claim of right, ownership, or title are sufficient. 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession \u00a7 72 (footnotes omitted). See also 4 Tiffany, supra, Adverse Possession \u00a7 1147 (distinguishing \u201ccolor of title,\u201d which \u201crefers to asserting title through an instrument that appears to convey title, but in actuality does not,\u201d from \u201cclaim of title,\u201d which more broadly \u201creflect [s] an intention to assert ownership over the property and claim it as one's own\u201d).\n\nThus, the party claiming ownership by adverse possession must prove that the following five elements existed concurrently for 20 years: \u201c(1) continuous, (2) hostile or adverse, (3) actual, (4) open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the premises, (5) under claim of title inconsistent with that of the true owner.\u201d Joiner, 85 Ill.2d at 81, 51 Ill.Dec. 662, 421 N.E.2d at 174.\n\nA deed is not legally effective until it has been delivered. While there is no prescribed method for an effective delivery of a deed, manual transfer of the instrument into the hand of the grantee is neither required to effectuate a valid delivery, nor dispositive of the issue. The term delivery in this regard refers to \u201cnot so much a manual act but the intention of the maker ... existing at the time of the transaction ... and not subject to later change of mind.\u201d \u201cDelivery of a deed includes, not only an act by which the grantor evinces a\n\nA deed to personalty needs no attesting witness to make it valid; in other respects, the principles applicable to deeds to lands are applicable to deeds to personalty. However, generally a deed is not necessary to convey title to personalty."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Pedersen's counsel wants to introduce testimony of Sheriff that at the police station Carr told Sheriff, \"I think this was probably my fault.\" The trial judge should rule this testimony",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nHowever, prior consistent statements are admissible as non-hearsay if: (1) the individual who made the prior consistent statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; and (2) the statement is offered in an effort to rebut an express or implied accusation of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication. See Chandler, 702 So.2d at 197\u201398; see also \u00a7 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Both conditions must be met for admission of a prior consistent statement as nonhearsay. Harris v. State, 843 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.2003).\n\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nFor an admission by a party-opponent to be admissible: 1) the statement must be a conscious or voluntary acknowledgment by a party-opponent of the existence of certain facts; 2) the matter acknowledged must be relevant to the cause of the party offering the admission; and 3) the matter acknowledged must be unfavorable to or inconsistent with the position now taken by the party-opponent. Bowls v. Scarborough, 950 S.W.2d 691, 702 (Mo.App.W.D.1997).\n\nFor purposes of exception to hearsay rule for admissions by a party-opponent, an \u201cadmission\u201d is a statement made by a party-opponent or by one in privity with or identified in legal interest with that party.\n\n804(b)(3). Statements that are not inculpatory are not admissible pursuant to this rule even if they are part of a generally inculpatory statement or narrative. United States v. Ricardo, 472 F.3d 277, 287 (5th Cir.2006) (citing Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600\u201301). However, these rules cannot be applied except in the context of specific evidence.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nCarr ran into and injured Pedersen, a pedestrian. With Carr in his car were Wanda and Walter Passenger. Passerby saw the accident and called the police department, which sent Sheriff to investigate. All of these people are available as potential witnesses in the case of Pedersen v. Carr. Pedersen alleges that Carr, while drunk, struck Pedersen who was in a duly marked crosswalk.\nPedersen's counsel wants to introduce testimony of Sheriff that at the police station Carr told Sheriff, \"I think this was probably my fault.\" The trial judge should rule this testimony\n\n (A) admissible as a part of the res gestae\n (B) admissible as an admission of a party\n (C) inadmissible because it includes a conclusion of law which the declarant was not qualified to make\n (D) inadmissible because it constitutes an opinion rather than an admission of specific facts\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "B",
+      "admissible as an admission of a party"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_378",
+    "retrieved_docs": "However, prior consistent statements are admissible as non-hearsay if: (1) the individual who made the prior consistent statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; and (2) the statement is offered in an effort to rebut an express or implied accusation of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication. See Chandler, 702 So.2d at 197\u201398; see also \u00a7 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Both conditions must be met for admission of a prior consistent statement as nonhearsay. Harris v. State, 843 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.2003).\n\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nFor an admission by a party-opponent to be admissible: 1) the statement must be a conscious or voluntary acknowledgment by a party-opponent of the existence of certain facts; 2) the matter acknowledged must be relevant to the cause of the party offering the admission; and 3) the matter acknowledged must be unfavorable to or inconsistent with the position now taken by the party-opponent. Bowls v. Scarborough, 950 S.W.2d 691, 702 (Mo.App.W.D.1997).\n\nFor purposes of exception to hearsay rule for admissions by a party-opponent, an \u201cadmission\u201d is a statement made by a party-opponent or by one in privity with or identified in legal interest with that party.\n\n804(b)(3). Statements that are not inculpatory are not admissible pursuant to this rule even if they are part of a generally inculpatory statement or narrative. United States v. Ricardo, 472 F.3d 277, 287 (5th Cir.2006) (citing Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600\u201301). However, these rules cannot be applied except in the context of specific evidence."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "A group of children, ranging in age from 8 to 15, regularly played football on the common area of an apartment complex owned by O'Neill. Most of the children lived in the apartment complex, but some lived elsewhere. O'Neill knew that the children played on the common area and had not objected. Peter, a 13-year-old who did not live in the apartment complex, fell over a sprinkler head while running for a pass and broke his leg. Although Peter had played football on the common area before, he had never noticed the sprinkler heads, which protruded one inch above the ground and were part of a permanently installed underground sprinkler system. If a claim is asserted on Peter's behalf, Peter will",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\na landowner has a duty to maintain his or her property in a reasonably safe condition, which includes providing a safe means of ingress and egress to tenants (see Peralta v. Henriquez, 100 N.Y.2d 139, 144, 760 N.Y.S.2d 741, 790 N.E.2d 1170 [2003]; Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 352 N.E.2d 868 [1976]; Gallagher v. St. Raymond's R.C. Church, 21 N.Y.2d 554, 557, 289 N.Y.S.2d 401, 236 N.E.2d 632 [1968] ). The scope of such duty is determined \u201c \u2018in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the\n\nA duty of reasonable care generally encompasses a duty not to create an unreasonable risk of harm. See Reighard v. Yates, 2012 UT 45, \u00b6\u00b6 29\u201331, 285 P.3d 1168; B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11, \u00b6 21 & n. 11, 275 P.3d 228. What may be reasonable in one setting may not be reasonable in another. Ordinarily participants cannot reasonably expect instructors or coaches to insulate them from risks inherent in an activity in which they voluntarily engage. See, e.g., Kahn, 31 Cal.4th 990, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103, 75 P.3d at 38\u201343 (majority opinion). But whether, under the\n\nFor these reasons, we reaffirm today that damages measured by diminution in value are an adequate and appropriate remedy for negligent harm to real or personal property, and that mental anguish based solely on negligent property damage is not compensable as a matter of law. The proper measure of Likes's damages\u2014although she cannot recover on those claims for which the City has sovereign immunity from suit for property damages\u2014is (1) the loss in market value of her property caused by the defendant's negligence and (2) for those items of small or no market value that \u201chave their primary value in\n\nor from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent (a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.\u201d See also Duncan v. Rzonca, 133 Ill.App.3d 184, 200, 88 Ill.Dec. 288, 478 N.E.2d 603, 613 (1985). 2To establish negligent parental supervision, a plaintiff must show that (1) the parents were aware of specific instances of prior conduct sufficient to put them on notice that the act complained of was\n\nsentiment,\u201d Brown v. Frontier Theatres, 369 S.W.2d at 305, the loss in value to her. Because the injury to Likes's property was not intentional or malicious, or even grossly negligent, we need not decide whether mental anguish arising out of property damage may be legally compensable when a heightened degree of misconduct is found. Compare Luna, 667 S.W.2d at 117 (stating in dicta that mental anguish is recoverable for \u201cwillful tort, willful and wanton disregard, or gross negligence\u201d), with Reinhardt Motors, Inc. v. Boston, 516 So.2d 509, 511 (Ala.1986) (limiting mental anguish for property damage to cases in which the\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nA group of children, ranging in age from 8 to 15, regularly played football on the common area of an apartment complex owned by O'Neill. Most of the children lived in the apartment complex, but some lived elsewhere. O'Neill knew that the children played on the common area and had not objected. Peter, a 13-year-old who did not live in the apartment complex, fell over a sprinkler head while running for a pass and broke his leg. Although Peter had played football on the common area before, he had never noticed the sprinkler heads, which protruded one inch above the ground and were part of a permanently installed underground sprinkler system. If a claim is asserted on Peter's behalf, Peter will\n\n (A) prevail if the sprinkler head was a hazard that Peter probably would not discover\n (B) prevail, because O'Neill had not objected to children playing on the common area\n (C) not prevail, because Peter did not live in the apartment complex\n (D) not prevail unless the sprinkler heads were abnormally dangerous to users of the common area\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "A",
+      "prevail if the sprinkler head was a hazard that Peter probably would not discover"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_430",
+    "retrieved_docs": "a landowner has a duty to maintain his or her property in a reasonably safe condition, which includes providing a safe means of ingress and egress to tenants (see Peralta v. Henriquez, 100 N.Y.2d 139, 144, 760 N.Y.S.2d 741, 790 N.E.2d 1170 [2003]; Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 352 N.E.2d 868 [1976]; Gallagher v. St. Raymond's R.C. Church, 21 N.Y.2d 554, 557, 289 N.Y.S.2d 401, 236 N.E.2d 632 [1968] ). The scope of such duty is determined \u201c \u2018in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the\n\nA duty of reasonable care generally encompasses a duty not to create an unreasonable risk of harm. See Reighard v. Yates, 2012 UT 45, \u00b6\u00b6 29\u201331, 285 P.3d 1168; B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11, \u00b6 21 & n. 11, 275 P.3d 228. What may be reasonable in one setting may not be reasonable in another. Ordinarily participants cannot reasonably expect instructors or coaches to insulate them from risks inherent in an activity in which they voluntarily engage. See, e.g., Kahn, 31 Cal.4th 990, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103, 75 P.3d at 38\u201343 (majority opinion). But whether, under the\n\nFor these reasons, we reaffirm today that damages measured by diminution in value are an adequate and appropriate remedy for negligent harm to real or personal property, and that mental anguish based solely on negligent property damage is not compensable as a matter of law. The proper measure of Likes's damages\u2014although she cannot recover on those claims for which the City has sovereign immunity from suit for property damages\u2014is (1) the loss in market value of her property caused by the defendant's negligence and (2) for those items of small or no market value that \u201chave their primary value in\n\nor from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent (a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.\u201d See also Duncan v. Rzonca, 133 Ill.App.3d 184, 200, 88 Ill.Dec. 288, 478 N.E.2d 603, 613 (1985). 2To establish negligent parental supervision, a plaintiff must show that (1) the parents were aware of specific instances of prior conduct sufficient to put them on notice that the act complained of was\n\nsentiment,\u201d Brown v. Frontier Theatres, 369 S.W.2d at 305, the loss in value to her. Because the injury to Likes's property was not intentional or malicious, or even grossly negligent, we need not decide whether mental anguish arising out of property damage may be legally compensable when a heightened degree of misconduct is found. Compare Luna, 667 S.W.2d at 117 (stating in dicta that mental anguish is recoverable for \u201cwillful tort, willful and wanton disregard, or gross negligence\u201d), with Reinhardt Motors, Inc. v. Boston, 516 So.2d 509, 511 (Ala.1986) (limiting mental anguish for property damage to cases in which the"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Zeller contracted in writing to deliver to Baker 100 bushels of wheat on August 1 at $3.50 a bushel. Because his suppliers had not delivered enough wheat to him by that time, Zeller on August 1 had only 95 bushels of wheat with which to fulfill his contract with Baker. If Zeller tenders 95 bushels of wheat to Baker on August 1, and Baker refused to accept or pay for any of the wheat, which of the following best states the legal relationship between Zeller and Baker?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nAccordingly, breach of contract remedies are available to a buyer when the seller fails to make any delivery. S.W. Bell, 811 S.W.2d at 576. In contrast, breach of warranty remedies are available to a buyer who has received and accepted goods, but discovers they are defective in some manner. Id. In other words, when a party fails to deliver the goods as promised, a breach of contract occurs. See Chilton Ins. Co. v. Pate & Pate Enter., Inc., 930 S.W.2d 877, 890 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied). Conversely, when a seller delivers nonconforming goods, it is a breach of warranty.\n\nany definite and seasonable expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance even though it is not a mirror image of the offer unless the acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. However that section still requires a definite expression of acceptance and does not change the basic common law requirement that there must be an objective manifestation of mutual assent. (Ore & Chemical Corp. v. Howard Butcher Trading Co. (E.D.Pa.1978), 455 F.Supp. 1150.)\n\nattending circumstances, as well as by the words they use. In accordance with the rules for the construction of contracts, where a contract is ambiguous on its face, evidence of the surrounding circumstances and the subsequent conduct of the parties in the execution of the contract is admissible to interpret the contract; and the circumstances in which the parties to a contract are placed are generally admissible where such evidence will shed light upon issues in the case. In many instances, facts can be proved only by circumstantial evidence. Such evidence may in fact be the only means of proving\n\nId. Under the Uniform Commercial Code (\u201cUCC\u201d), breach of contract damages are available for failure to perform, but not for delivery of nonconforming goods. Id. We believe that the Chilton court makes a definitive distinction between failure to conform and failure to deliver. See id.\n\nIt is also well settled that even if the owner proves the existence of the defects or omissions and the cost of repairing them, he is nevertheless barred from recovering the cost thereof if he accepted the work despite the patent defects or imperfections discoverable upon reasonable inspection. Acceptance, however, does not bar the owner from recovering for defects not readily discoverable by ordinary inspection, or for defects which manifest themselves subsequent to the acceptance, or for defects which are explicitly excluded from the terms of the acceptance.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nZeller contracted in writing to deliver to Baker 100 bushels of wheat on August 1 at $3.50 a bushel. Because his suppliers had not delivered enough wheat to him by that time, Zeller on August 1 had only 95 bushels of wheat with which to fulfill his contract with Baker. If Zeller tenders 95 bushels of wheat to Baker on August 1, and Baker refused to accept or pay for any of the wheat, which of the following best states the legal relationship between Zeller and Baker?\n\n (A) Zeller has a cause of action against Baker, because Zeller has substantially performed his contract.\n (B) Zeller is excused from performing his contract because of impossibility of performance.\n (C) Baker has a cause of action against Zeller for Zeller's failure to deliver 100 bushels of wheat.\n (D) Baker is obligated to give Zeller a reasonable time to attempt to obtain the other five bushels of wheat.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "Baker has a cause of action against Zeller for Zeller's failure to deliver 100 bushels of wheat."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_452",
+    "retrieved_docs": "Accordingly, breach of contract remedies are available to a buyer when the seller fails to make any delivery. S.W. Bell, 811 S.W.2d at 576. In contrast, breach of warranty remedies are available to a buyer who has received and accepted goods, but discovers they are defective in some manner. Id. In other words, when a party fails to deliver the goods as promised, a breach of contract occurs. See Chilton Ins. Co. v. Pate & Pate Enter., Inc., 930 S.W.2d 877, 890 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied). Conversely, when a seller delivers nonconforming goods, it is a breach of warranty.\n\nany definite and seasonable expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance even though it is not a mirror image of the offer unless the acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. However that section still requires a definite expression of acceptance and does not change the basic common law requirement that there must be an objective manifestation of mutual assent. (Ore & Chemical Corp. v. Howard Butcher Trading Co. (E.D.Pa.1978), 455 F.Supp. 1150.)\n\nattending circumstances, as well as by the words they use. In accordance with the rules for the construction of contracts, where a contract is ambiguous on its face, evidence of the surrounding circumstances and the subsequent conduct of the parties in the execution of the contract is admissible to interpret the contract; and the circumstances in which the parties to a contract are placed are generally admissible where such evidence will shed light upon issues in the case. In many instances, facts can be proved only by circumstantial evidence. Such evidence may in fact be the only means of proving\n\nId. Under the Uniform Commercial Code (\u201cUCC\u201d), breach of contract damages are available for failure to perform, but not for delivery of nonconforming goods. Id. We believe that the Chilton court makes a definitive distinction between failure to conform and failure to deliver. See id.\n\nIt is also well settled that even if the owner proves the existence of the defects or omissions and the cost of repairing them, he is nevertheless barred from recovering the cost thereof if he accepted the work despite the patent defects or imperfections discoverable upon reasonable inspection. Acceptance, however, does not bar the owner from recovering for defects not readily discoverable by ordinary inspection, or for defects which manifest themselves subsequent to the acceptance, or for defects which are explicitly excluded from the terms of the acceptance."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Bell's refusal to pay anything to Ames when he finished painting was a",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nIt is also well settled that even if the owner proves the existence of the defects or omissions and the cost of repairing them, he is nevertheless barred from recovering the cost thereof if he accepted the work despite the patent defects or imperfections discoverable upon reasonable inspection. Acceptance, however, does not bar the owner from recovering for defects not readily discoverable by ordinary inspection, or for defects which manifest themselves subsequent to the acceptance, or for defects which are explicitly excluded from the terms of the acceptance.\n\nIn an action for breach of contract, the injured party is entitled to the benefit of the bargain, and the recovery may include the profits which he would have derived from performance of the contract. See Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 116 (2d Cir.1976). New York law, which controls here, permits recovery of lost future profits as damages, but only under rigorous rules: First, it must be demonstrated with certainty that such damages have been caused by the breach and, second, the alleged loss must be capable of proof with reasonable certainty. In other words,\n\nany definite and seasonable expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance even though it is not a mirror image of the offer unless the acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. However that section still requires a definite expression of acceptance and does not change the basic common law requirement that there must be an objective manifestation of mutual assent. (Ore & Chemical Corp. v. Howard Butcher Trading Co. (E.D.Pa.1978), 455 F.Supp. 1150.)\n\nunder the doctrine of \u201cpart performance,\u201d which may take an agreement outside of the statute of frauds, **178 there must be an oral agreement that has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and that agreement must be \u201cclear, certain, and unambiguous\u201d in its terms. Rafferty & Towner, Inc. v. NJS Enterprises, LLC, 224 Or.App. 51, 55, 197 P.3d 55 (2008), rev. den., 347 Or. 42, 217 P.3d 688 (2009). Emmert argued that the alleged agreements did not meet that standard. Furthermore, Emmert asserted, any qualifying \u201cpart performance\u201d must be clearly referable to the contract, and Kazlauskas's\n\nTo qualify as a third-party beneficiary, a party must show that it is either a \u201cdonee\u201d or \u201ccreditor\u201d beneficiary of the contract. Id. at 651. A party is a donee beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract, when rendered, is a \u201cpure donation\u201d to that party. Id. On the other hand, a party is a creditor beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract is rendered in satisfaction of a legal duty owed to that party. Id. The legal duty may be an indebtedness, contractual obligation, or other legally enforceable commitment owed to the third party. Id. Based on\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nAmes had painted Bell's house under a contract which called for payment of $2,000. Bell, contending in good faith that the porch had not been painted properly, refused to pay anything. On June 15, Ames mailed a letter to Bell stating, \"I am in serious need of money. Please send the $2,000 to me before July 1.\" On June 18, Bell replied, \"I will settle for $1,800 provided you agree to repaint the porch.\" Ames did not reply to this letter. Thereafter Bell mailed a check for $1,800 marked \"Payment in full on the Ames-Bell painting contract as per letter dated June 18.\" Ames received the check on June 30. Because he was badly in need of money, Ames cashed the check without objection and spent the proceeds but has refused to repaint the porch.\nBell's refusal to pay anything to Ames when he finished painting was a\n\n (A) partial breach of contract only if Ames had properly or substantially painted the porch\n (B) partial breach of contract whether or not Ames had properly or substantially painted the porch\n (C) total breach of contract only if Ames had properly or substantially painted the porch\n (D) total breach of contract whether or not Ames had properly or substantially painted the porch\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "total breach of contract only if Ames had properly or substantially painted the porch"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_156",
+    "retrieved_docs": "It is also well settled that even if the owner proves the existence of the defects or omissions and the cost of repairing them, he is nevertheless barred from recovering the cost thereof if he accepted the work despite the patent defects or imperfections discoverable upon reasonable inspection. Acceptance, however, does not bar the owner from recovering for defects not readily discoverable by ordinary inspection, or for defects which manifest themselves subsequent to the acceptance, or for defects which are explicitly excluded from the terms of the acceptance.\n\nIn an action for breach of contract, the injured party is entitled to the benefit of the bargain, and the recovery may include the profits which he would have derived from performance of the contract. See Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 116 (2d Cir.1976). New York law, which controls here, permits recovery of lost future profits as damages, but only under rigorous rules: First, it must be demonstrated with certainty that such damages have been caused by the breach and, second, the alleged loss must be capable of proof with reasonable certainty. In other words,\n\nany definite and seasonable expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance even though it is not a mirror image of the offer unless the acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. However that section still requires a definite expression of acceptance and does not change the basic common law requirement that there must be an objective manifestation of mutual assent. (Ore & Chemical Corp. v. Howard Butcher Trading Co. (E.D.Pa.1978), 455 F.Supp. 1150.)\n\nunder the doctrine of \u201cpart performance,\u201d which may take an agreement outside of the statute of frauds, **178 there must be an oral agreement that has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and that agreement must be \u201cclear, certain, and unambiguous\u201d in its terms. Rafferty & Towner, Inc. v. NJS Enterprises, LLC, 224 Or.App. 51, 55, 197 P.3d 55 (2008), rev. den., 347 Or. 42, 217 P.3d 688 (2009). Emmert argued that the alleged agreements did not meet that standard. Furthermore, Emmert asserted, any qualifying \u201cpart performance\u201d must be clearly referable to the contract, and Kazlauskas's\n\nTo qualify as a third-party beneficiary, a party must show that it is either a \u201cdonee\u201d or \u201ccreditor\u201d beneficiary of the contract. Id. at 651. A party is a donee beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract, when rendered, is a \u201cpure donation\u201d to that party. Id. On the other hand, a party is a creditor beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract is rendered in satisfaction of a legal duty owed to that party. Id. The legal duty may be an indebtedness, contractual obligation, or other legally enforceable commitment owed to the third party. Id. Based on"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Congress enacts a statute punishing \"each and every conspiracy entered into by any two or more persons for the purpose of denying Black persons housing, employment, or education, solely because of their race\"' Under which of the following constitutional provisions is the authority of Congress to pass such a statute most clearly and easily justifiable?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nThe Thirteenth Amendment was passed in the aftermath of the Civil War as an attempt to promote equality between black and white citizens. The language declares that \u201cneither slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist within the United States,\u201d U.S. Const. amend. XIII, \u00a7 1, and empowers Congress to enforce its provisions, see U.S. Const. amend. XIII, \u00a7 2. The Supreme Court has interpreted this *991 grant of power broadly, finding that Congress can affirmatively enforce the ban on slavery and involuntary servitude, and enact legislation to erase \u201call badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.\u201d Civil Rights\n\nIf we determine that a statute treats similarly situated individuals differently, we then evaluate the statute under an equal protection analysis. To determine whether a statute violates equal protection, we will either apply strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review. State v. Hirschfelder, 170 Wash.2d 536, 550, 242 P.3d 876 (2010). Which test applies depends on the classification and rights involved: Suspect classifications, such as race, alienage, and national origin, are subject to strict scrutiny. \u201cStrict scrutiny also applies to laws burdening fundamental rights or liberties.\u201d Intermediate scrutiny applies only if the statute implicates both an important right and\n\nCases, 109 U.S. 3, 20, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883). Moreover, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968), the Supreme Court opened the door to the inclusion of private acts of racial discrimination within the \u201cbadges and incidents of slavery\u201d language as stated in the Civil Rights Cases. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 413, 88 S.Ct. 2186 (holding that 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1982, a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 which allows victims of racial discrimination to sue private defendants, was a valid exercise of Congress'\n\ninitiate a criminal prosecution. If a congressional investigation uncovers evidence of criminal activity, however, Congress may refer the matter to the Department of Justice for investigation and, potentially, prosecution. Sometimes, the DOJ investigation predates the congressional investigation. No matter which branch of government moves first to investigate, however, the end result is that a congressional investigation often will run parallel to a criminal investigation. As a result, evidence developed in a congressional investigation might be used by the DOJ in its criminal investigation or in a prosecution. Ultimately, nearly any matter can be anchored in some fashion to Congress\u2019s legislative\n\nTo prove intentional vote dilution under the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs must show both discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect. York v. City of St. Gabriel, 89 F.Supp.3d 843, 850, 864 (M.D. La. 2015); Backus v. S. Carolina, 857 F.Supp.2d 553, 567 (D.S.C.), summ. aff'd, \u2013\u2013\u2013 U.S. \u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013, 133 S.Ct. 156, 184 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nCongress enacts a statute punishing \"each and every conspiracy entered into by any two or more persons for the purpose of denying Black persons housing, employment, or education, solely because of their race\"' Under which of the following constitutional provisions is the authority of Congress to pass such a statute most clearly and easily justifiable?\n\n (A) The obligation of contracts clause\n (B) The general welfare clause of Article I, 8\n (C) The Thirteenth Amendment\n (D) The Fourteenth Amendment\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "The Thirteenth Amendment"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_475",
+    "retrieved_docs": "The Thirteenth Amendment was passed in the aftermath of the Civil War as an attempt to promote equality between black and white citizens. The language declares that \u201cneither slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist within the United States,\u201d U.S. Const. amend. XIII, \u00a7 1, and empowers Congress to enforce its provisions, see U.S. Const. amend. XIII, \u00a7 2. The Supreme Court has interpreted this *991 grant of power broadly, finding that Congress can affirmatively enforce the ban on slavery and involuntary servitude, and enact legislation to erase \u201call badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.\u201d Civil Rights\n\nIf we determine that a statute treats similarly situated individuals differently, we then evaluate the statute under an equal protection analysis. To determine whether a statute violates equal protection, we will either apply strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review. State v. Hirschfelder, 170 Wash.2d 536, 550, 242 P.3d 876 (2010). Which test applies depends on the classification and rights involved: Suspect classifications, such as race, alienage, and national origin, are subject to strict scrutiny. \u201cStrict scrutiny also applies to laws burdening fundamental rights or liberties.\u201d Intermediate scrutiny applies only if the statute implicates both an important right and\n\nCases, 109 U.S. 3, 20, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883). Moreover, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968), the Supreme Court opened the door to the inclusion of private acts of racial discrimination within the \u201cbadges and incidents of slavery\u201d language as stated in the Civil Rights Cases. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 413, 88 S.Ct. 2186 (holding that 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1982, a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 which allows victims of racial discrimination to sue private defendants, was a valid exercise of Congress'\n\ninitiate a criminal prosecution. If a congressional investigation uncovers evidence of criminal activity, however, Congress may refer the matter to the Department of Justice for investigation and, potentially, prosecution. Sometimes, the DOJ investigation predates the congressional investigation. No matter which branch of government moves first to investigate, however, the end result is that a congressional investigation often will run parallel to a criminal investigation. As a result, evidence developed in a congressional investigation might be used by the DOJ in its criminal investigation or in a prosecution. Ultimately, nearly any matter can be anchored in some fashion to Congress\u2019s legislative\n\nTo prove intentional vote dilution under the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs must show both discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect. York v. City of St. Gabriel, 89 F.Supp.3d 843, 850, 864 (M.D. La. 2015); Backus v. S. Carolina, 857 F.Supp.2d 553, 567 (D.S.C.), summ. aff'd, \u2013\u2013\u2013 U.S. \u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013, 133 S.Ct. 156, 184 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012)."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "For this question only, assume that Farmer rightfully refused Painter's demand for payment. If Painter immediately terminates the contract without painting the third barn, what is Painter entitled to recover from Farmer?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\na \u201ctotal breach\u201d is a breach that \u201cso substantially impairs the value of the contract to the injured party at the time of the breach that it is just in the circumstances to allow him to recover damages based on all his remaining rights to performance.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 243(4).\n\nAt common law, a breaching party could not obtain restitution for benefits conferred. The common law rule reflected a belief that breach was \u201cmorally unworthy conduct,\u201d and that a breaching party should not benefit from his own wrong, see Lancellotti v. Thomas, 341 Pa.Super. 1, 491 A.2d 117, 118\u201319 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast to the common law rule, the Restatement rule reflects a policy against awarding a windfall to the non-breaching party. See id. at 119\u201320. The court in Lancellotti rejected the view that breach is morally wrong, see id. at 122 (\u201cRules of contract law are\n\nnot rules of punishment; *323 the contract breaker is not an outlaw.\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)), and joined the many other jurisdictions that had already adopted Restatement Section 374. See id. at 120\u201321. Under the Restatement, a breaching party can recover for the value of benefits conferred in excess of damages. The contract price is frequently used as evidence of the value of the benefit conferred. See generally Corbin on Contracts, supra, \u00a7 1124 & n.17, at 104.\n\nthe contract was made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.\u201d).\n\nIn an action for breach of contract, the injured party is entitled to the benefit of the bargain, and the recovery may include the profits which he would have derived from performance of the contract. See Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 116 (2d Cir.1976). New York law, which controls here, permits recovery of lost future profits as damages, but only under rigorous rules: First, it must be demonstrated with certainty that such damages have been caused by the breach and, second, the alleged loss must be capable of proof with reasonable certainty. In other words,\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nIn a single writing, Painter contracted with Farmer to paint three identical barns on her rural estate for $2,000 each. The contract provided for Farmer's payment of $6,000 upon Painter's completion of the work on all three barns. Painter did not ask for any payment when the first barn was completely painted, but she demanded $4,000 after painting the second barn.\nFor this question only, assume that Farmer rightfully refused Painter's demand for payment. If Painter immediately terminates the contract without painting the third barn, what is Painter entitled to recover from Farmer?\n\n (A) Nothing, because payment was expressly conditioned on completion of all three barns.\n (B) Painter's expenditures plus anticipated profit\" in painting the first two barns, up to a maximum recovery of $4,000.\n (C) The reasonable value of Painter's services in painting the two barns, less Farmer's damages, if any, for Painter's failure to paint the third barn.\n (D) The amount that the combined value of the two painted barns has been increased by Painter's work.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "The reasonable value of Painter's services in painting the two barns, less Farmer's damages, if any, for Painter's failure to paint the third barn."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_1015",
+    "retrieved_docs": "a \u201ctotal breach\u201d is a breach that \u201cso substantially impairs the value of the contract to the injured party at the time of the breach that it is just in the circumstances to allow him to recover damages based on all his remaining rights to performance.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 243(4).\n\nAt common law, a breaching party could not obtain restitution for benefits conferred. The common law rule reflected a belief that breach was \u201cmorally unworthy conduct,\u201d and that a breaching party should not benefit from his own wrong, see Lancellotti v. Thomas, 341 Pa.Super. 1, 491 A.2d 117, 118\u201319 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast to the common law rule, the Restatement rule reflects a policy against awarding a windfall to the non-breaching party. See id. at 119\u201320. The court in Lancellotti rejected the view that breach is morally wrong, see id. at 122 (\u201cRules of contract law are\n\nnot rules of punishment; *323 the contract breaker is not an outlaw.\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)), and joined the many other jurisdictions that had already adopted Restatement Section 374. See id. at 120\u201321. Under the Restatement, a breaching party can recover for the value of benefits conferred in excess of damages. The contract price is frequently used as evidence of the value of the benefit conferred. See generally Corbin on Contracts, supra, \u00a7 1124 & n.17, at 104.\n\nthe contract was made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.\u201d).\n\nIn an action for breach of contract, the injured party is entitled to the benefit of the bargain, and the recovery may include the profits which he would have derived from performance of the contract. See Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 116 (2d Cir.1976). New York law, which controls here, permits recovery of lost future profits as damages, but only under rigorous rules: First, it must be demonstrated with certainty that such damages have been caused by the breach and, second, the alleged loss must be capable of proof with reasonable certainty. In other words,"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "A federal statute provides that the United States Supreme Court has authority to review any case filed in a United States Court of Appeals, even though that case has not yet been decided by the court of appeals. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), an agency in the executive branch of the federal government, issued an important environmental rule. Although the rule had not yet been enforced against them, companies that would be adversely affected by the rule filed a petition for review of the rule in a court of appeals, seeking a declaration that the rule was invalid solely because it was beyond the statutory authority of the EPA. The companies made no constitutional claim. A statute specifically provides for direct review of EPA rules by a court of appeals without any initial action in a district court. The companies have filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court requesting immediate review of this case by the Supreme Court before the court of appeals has actually decided the case. The EPA acknowledges that the case is important enough to warrant Supreme Court review and that it should be decided promptly, but it asks the Supreme Court to dismiss the petition on jurisdictional grounds. The best constitutional argument in support of the EPA's request is that",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nThe political question doctrine \u201c \u2018excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch.\u2019 \u201d Bancoult, 445 F.3d at 432 (quoting Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986)). The doctrine applies where, \u201c[p]rominent on the surface\u201d of the case is: [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or\n\nThe doctrine of separation of powers also places limits on congressional authority to investigate. Congress cannot, under the guise of an investigation, usurp the power of another branch of government. It cannot investigate matters where the means of redress is purely judicial. Nor can Congress investigate matters committed to the President\u2019s discretion. For example, Congress could not undertake an investigation to determine an individual\u2019s entitlement to a pardon because the Constitution granted the pardon power to the President, not Congress. While Congress can investigate conduct that may be criminal, Congress itself lacks the authority to bring criminal charges or otherwise\n\n[3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). \u201c \u2018[U]nless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar,\u2019 we may not dismiss the claims\n\ninitiate a criminal prosecution. If a congressional investigation uncovers evidence of criminal activity, however, Congress may refer the matter to the Department of Justice for investigation and, potentially, prosecution. Sometimes, the DOJ investigation predates the congressional investigation. No matter which branch of government moves first to investigate, however, the end result is that a congressional investigation often will run parallel to a criminal investigation. As a result, evidence developed in a congressional investigation might be used by the DOJ in its criminal investigation or in a prosecution. Ultimately, nearly any matter can be anchored in some fashion to Congress\u2019s legislative\n\n2, cl. 2. 5678As we recognized in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125, 96 S.Ct. 612, 685, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam), the Appointments Clause of Article II is more than a matter of \u201cetiquette or protocol\u201d; it is among the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme. By vesting the President with the exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior) officers of the United States, the Appointments Clause prevents congressional encroachment upon the Executive and Judicial Branches. See id., at 128\u2013131, 96 S.Ct., at 686\u2013688; Weiss, supra, at 183\u2013185, 114 S.Ct., at 763\u2013765 (SOUTER, J., concurring); Freytag\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nA federal statute provides that the United States Supreme Court has authority to review any case filed in a United States Court of Appeals, even though that case has not yet been decided by the court of appeals. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), an agency in the executive branch of the federal government, issued an important environmental rule. Although the rule had not yet been enforced against them, companies that would be adversely affected by the rule filed a petition for review of the rule in a court of appeals, seeking a declaration that the rule was invalid solely because it was beyond the statutory authority of the EPA. The companies made no constitutional claim. A statute specifically provides for direct review of EPA rules by a court of appeals without any initial action in a district court. The companies have filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court requesting immediate review of this case by the Supreme Court before the court of appeals has actually decided the case. The EPA acknowledges that the case is important enough to warrant Supreme Court review and that it should be decided promptly, but it asks the Supreme Court to dismiss the petition on jurisdictional grounds. The best constitutional argument in support of the EPA's request is that\n\n (A) the case is not within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as defined by Article III, and it is not a proper subject of that court's appellate jurisdiction because it has not yet been decided by any lower court.\n (B) the case is appellate in nature, but it is beyond the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, because Article III states that its jurisdiction extends only to cases arising under the Constitution.\n (C) Article III precludes federal courts from reviewing the validity of any federal agency rule in any proceeding other than an action to enforce the rule.\n (D) Article III provides that all federal cases, except those within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, must be initiated by an action in a federal district court.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "A",
+      "the case is not within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as defined by Article III, and it is not a proper subject of that court's appellate jurisdiction because it has not yet been decided by any lower court."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_1083",
+    "retrieved_docs": "The political question doctrine \u201c \u2018excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch.\u2019 \u201d Bancoult, 445 F.3d at 432 (quoting Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986)). The doctrine applies where, \u201c[p]rominent on the surface\u201d of the case is: [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or\n\nThe doctrine of separation of powers also places limits on congressional authority to investigate. Congress cannot, under the guise of an investigation, usurp the power of another branch of government. It cannot investigate matters where the means of redress is purely judicial. Nor can Congress investigate matters committed to the President\u2019s discretion. For example, Congress could not undertake an investigation to determine an individual\u2019s entitlement to a pardon because the Constitution granted the pardon power to the President, not Congress. While Congress can investigate conduct that may be criminal, Congress itself lacks the authority to bring criminal charges or otherwise\n\n[3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). \u201c \u2018[U]nless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar,\u2019 we may not dismiss the claims\n\ninitiate a criminal prosecution. If a congressional investigation uncovers evidence of criminal activity, however, Congress may refer the matter to the Department of Justice for investigation and, potentially, prosecution. Sometimes, the DOJ investigation predates the congressional investigation. No matter which branch of government moves first to investigate, however, the end result is that a congressional investigation often will run parallel to a criminal investigation. As a result, evidence developed in a congressional investigation might be used by the DOJ in its criminal investigation or in a prosecution. Ultimately, nearly any matter can be anchored in some fashion to Congress\u2019s legislative\n\n2, cl. 2. 5678As we recognized in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125, 96 S.Ct. 612, 685, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam), the Appointments Clause of Article II is more than a matter of \u201cetiquette or protocol\u201d; it is among the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme. By vesting the President with the exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior) officers of the United States, the Appointments Clause prevents congressional encroachment upon the Executive and Judicial Branches. See id., at 128\u2013131, 96 S.Ct., at 686\u2013688; Weiss, supra, at 183\u2013185, 114 S.Ct., at 763\u2013765 (SOUTER, J., concurring); Freytag"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "A statute of the state of Kiowa provided state monetary grants to private dance, theater, and opera groups located in that state. The statute required recipients of such grants to use the granted monies for the acquisition, construction, and maintenance of appropriate facilities for the public performance of their performing arts. The last section of the statute conditioned the award of each such grant on the recipient's agreement to refrain from all kinds of political lobbying calculated to secure additional tax support for the performing arts. The strongest constitutional basis for an attack upon the validity of the last section of the statute would be based upon the",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nIn assessing whether a State election law impermissibly burdens First Amendment rights, we examine the character and magnitude of the burden and the extent to which the law serves the State's interests. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). Laws imposing severe burdens must be narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests, but lesser burdens receive less exacting scrutiny. California Democratic Party, 120 S.Ct. at 2412; Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364.\n\nIf we determine that a statute treats similarly situated individuals differently, we then evaluate the statute under an equal protection analysis. To determine whether a statute violates equal protection, we will either apply strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review. State v. Hirschfelder, 170 Wash.2d 536, 550, 242 P.3d 876 (2010). Which test applies depends on the classification and rights involved: Suspect classifications, such as race, alienage, and national origin, are subject to strict scrutiny. \u201cStrict scrutiny also applies to laws burdening fundamental rights or liberties.\u201d Intermediate scrutiny applies only if the statute implicates both an important right and\n\nThe Supremacy Clause restricts the power of state and local governments to regulate federal offices and officeholders. U.S. Const. art. 6, cl. 2.\n\n[3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). \u201c \u2018[U]nless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar,\u2019 we may not dismiss the claims\n\nThe Thirteenth Amendment was passed in the aftermath of the Civil War as an attempt to promote equality between black and white citizens. The language declares that \u201cneither slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist within the United States,\u201d U.S. Const. amend. XIII, \u00a7 1, and empowers Congress to enforce its provisions, see U.S. Const. amend. XIII, \u00a7 2. The Supreme Court has interpreted this *991 grant of power broadly, finding that Congress can affirmatively enforce the ban on slavery and involuntary servitude, and enact legislation to erase \u201call badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.\u201d Civil Rights\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nA statute of the state of Kiowa provided state monetary grants to private dance, theater, and opera groups located in that state. The statute required recipients of such grants to use the granted monies for the acquisition, construction, and maintenance of appropriate facilities for the public performance of their performing arts. The last section of the statute conditioned the award of each such grant on the recipient's agreement to refrain from all kinds of political lobbying calculated to secure additional tax support for the performing arts. The strongest constitutional basis for an attack upon the validity of the last section of the statute would be based upon the\n\n (A) commerce clause.\n (B) obligation of contracts clause.\n (C) Fifth Amendment.\n (D) First and Fourteenth Amendments.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "D",
+      "First and Fourteenth Amendments."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_842",
+    "retrieved_docs": "In assessing whether a State election law impermissibly burdens First Amendment rights, we examine the character and magnitude of the burden and the extent to which the law serves the State's interests. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). Laws imposing severe burdens must be narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests, but lesser burdens receive less exacting scrutiny. California Democratic Party, 120 S.Ct. at 2412; Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364.\n\nIf we determine that a statute treats similarly situated individuals differently, we then evaluate the statute under an equal protection analysis. To determine whether a statute violates equal protection, we will either apply strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review. State v. Hirschfelder, 170 Wash.2d 536, 550, 242 P.3d 876 (2010). Which test applies depends on the classification and rights involved: Suspect classifications, such as race, alienage, and national origin, are subject to strict scrutiny. \u201cStrict scrutiny also applies to laws burdening fundamental rights or liberties.\u201d Intermediate scrutiny applies only if the statute implicates both an important right and\n\nThe Supremacy Clause restricts the power of state and local governments to regulate federal offices and officeholders. U.S. Const. art. 6, cl. 2.\n\n[3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). \u201c \u2018[U]nless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar,\u2019 we may not dismiss the claims\n\nThe Thirteenth Amendment was passed in the aftermath of the Civil War as an attempt to promote equality between black and white citizens. The language declares that \u201cneither slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist within the United States,\u201d U.S. Const. amend. XIII, \u00a7 1, and empowers Congress to enforce its provisions, see U.S. Const. amend. XIII, \u00a7 2. The Supreme Court has interpreted this *991 grant of power broadly, finding that Congress can affirmatively enforce the ban on slavery and involuntary servitude, and enact legislation to erase \u201call badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.\u201d Civil Rights"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Is Farmer obligated to make the $4,000 payment?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nTo qualify as a third-party beneficiary, a party must show that it is either a \u201cdonee\u201d or \u201ccreditor\u201d beneficiary of the contract. Id. at 651. A party is a donee beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract, when rendered, is a \u201cpure donation\u201d to that party. Id. On the other hand, a party is a creditor beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract is rendered in satisfaction of a legal duty owed to that party. Id. The legal duty may be an indebtedness, contractual obligation, or other legally enforceable commitment owed to the third party. Id. Based on\n\nUnder the preexisting duty rule, it is well settled that doing what one is legally bound to do is not consideration for a new promise. Puett v. Walker, 332 Mich. 117, 122, 50 N.W.2d 740 (1952). This rule bars the modification of an existing contractual relationship when the purported consideration for the modification consists of the performance or promise to perform that which one party was already required to do under the terms of the existing agreement. Borg\u2013Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Dep't of State, 433 Mich. 16, 22, n. 3, 444 N.W.2d 786 (1989).\n\nFor a third-party beneficiary to succeed on a breach of contract claim under New York law, \u201ca non-party must be the intended beneficiary of the contract, not an incidental beneficiary to whom no duty is owed.\u201d Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 251 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 728 F.2d 52, 63 (2d Cir. 1984)). The non-party \u201cmust establish (1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for his or her benefit, and (3) that the benefit to him or\n\nOrdinarily, in contracts where time is not of the essence, a failure to complete the work within the specified time will not terminate the contract, but it will subject the contractor to damages for the delay. See 13 Am.Jur.2d Building and Construction Contracts s 47.\n\nany definite and seasonable expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance even though it is not a mirror image of the offer unless the acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. However that section still requires a definite expression of acceptance and does not change the basic common law requirement that there must be an objective manifestation of mutual assent. (Ore & Chemical Corp. v. Howard Butcher Trading Co. (E.D.Pa.1978), 455 F.Supp. 1150.)\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nIn a single writing, Painter contracted with Farmer to paint three identical barns on her rural estate for $2,000 each. The contract provided for Farmer's payment of $6,000 upon Painter's completion of the work on all three barns. Painter did not ask for any payment when the first barn was completely painted, but she demanded $4,000 after painting the second barn.\nIs Farmer obligated to make the $4,000 payment?\n\n (A) No, because Farmer has no duty under the contract to pay anything to Painter until all three barns have been painted.\n (B) No, because Painter waived her right, if any, to payment on a per-barn basis by failing to demand $2,000 upon completion of the first barn.\n (C) Yes, because the contract is divisible.\n (D) Yes, because Painter has substantially performed the entire contract.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "A",
+      "No, because Farmer has no duty under the contract to pay anything to Painter until all three barns have been painted."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_1014",
+    "retrieved_docs": "To qualify as a third-party beneficiary, a party must show that it is either a \u201cdonee\u201d or \u201ccreditor\u201d beneficiary of the contract. Id. at 651. A party is a donee beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract, when rendered, is a \u201cpure donation\u201d to that party. Id. On the other hand, a party is a creditor beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract is rendered in satisfaction of a legal duty owed to that party. Id. The legal duty may be an indebtedness, contractual obligation, or other legally enforceable commitment owed to the third party. Id. Based on\n\nUnder the preexisting duty rule, it is well settled that doing what one is legally bound to do is not consideration for a new promise. Puett v. Walker, 332 Mich. 117, 122, 50 N.W.2d 740 (1952). This rule bars the modification of an existing contractual relationship when the purported consideration for the modification consists of the performance or promise to perform that which one party was already required to do under the terms of the existing agreement. Borg\u2013Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Dep't of State, 433 Mich. 16, 22, n. 3, 444 N.W.2d 786 (1989).\n\nFor a third-party beneficiary to succeed on a breach of contract claim under New York law, \u201ca non-party must be the intended beneficiary of the contract, not an incidental beneficiary to whom no duty is owed.\u201d Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 251 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 728 F.2d 52, 63 (2d Cir. 1984)). The non-party \u201cmust establish (1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for his or her benefit, and (3) that the benefit to him or\n\nOrdinarily, in contracts where time is not of the essence, a failure to complete the work within the specified time will not terminate the contract, but it will subject the contractor to damages for the delay. See 13 Am.Jur.2d Building and Construction Contracts s 47.\n\nany definite and seasonable expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance even though it is not a mirror image of the offer unless the acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. However that section still requires a definite expression of acceptance and does not change the basic common law requirement that there must be an objective manifestation of mutual assent. (Ore & Chemical Corp. v. Howard Butcher Trading Co. (E.D.Pa.1978), 455 F.Supp. 1150.)"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "If HDS denies liability on the ground that CP had orally agreed to coordinate with HDS's methods of accounting, and CP seeks in litigation to bar introduction of that agreement because of the parol evidence rule, HDS's most effective argument is that",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nunder the doctrine of \u201cpart performance,\u201d which may take an agreement outside of the statute of frauds, **178 there must be an oral agreement that has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and that agreement must be \u201cclear, certain, and unambiguous\u201d in its terms. Rafferty & Towner, Inc. v. NJS Enterprises, LLC, 224 Or.App. 51, 55, 197 P.3d 55 (2008), rev. den., 347 Or. 42, 217 P.3d 688 (2009). Emmert argued that the alleged agreements did not meet that standard. Furthermore, Emmert asserted, any qualifying \u201cpart performance\u201d must be clearly referable to the contract, and Kazlauskas's\n\nA completely integrated agreement is one adopted by the parties as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement. It is contrasted with a partially integrated agreement, where the writing represents the agreement of the parties with respect to the matters stated therein but where there may be additional consistent oral terms. Id. at \u00a7 210. Whether an agreement is integrated ultimately depends upon the intent of the parties. Stamenich v. Markovic, 462 A.2d 452, 456 (D.C.1983).\n\nafter verification of its accuracy. Even if admitted, \u2018the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.\u2019 \u201d If a party's notes do refresh the party's recollection, \u201cthere is no need to admit the recording into evidence, because the witness will be able to testify from his or her refreshed memory.\u201d\n\nattending circumstances, as well as by the words they use. In accordance with the rules for the construction of contracts, where a contract is ambiguous on its face, evidence of the surrounding circumstances and the subsequent conduct of the parties in the execution of the contract is admissible to interpret the contract; and the circumstances in which the parties to a contract are placed are generally admissible where such evidence will shed light upon issues in the case. In many instances, facts can be proved only by circumstantial evidence. Such evidence may in fact be the only means of proving\n\nPast recollection recorded \u201callows a witness with a faded memory to testify from notes or a memorandum that the witness can show was made by her or under her direction while the information was fresh in the witness'[s] memory and reflects that knowledge correctly.\u201d The rule \u201crequires the offering party to prove and the trial judge to find that the witness \u2018has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately\u2019 (taking into account the extent to which the memory can be refreshed from examination of the writing).\u201d Under KRE 803(5), \u201cthe recorded recollection is admissible, but only\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nOn March 1, Computer Programs, Inc. (CP) orally agreed with Holiday Department Store (HDS) to write a set of programs for HDS's computer and to coordinate the programs with HDS's billing methods. A subsequent memo, signed by both parties, provided in its entirety: HDS will pay CP $20,000 in two equal installments within one month of completion if CP is successful in shortening by one-half the processing time for the financial transactions now handled on HDS's Zenon 747 computer; CP to complete by July 1. This agreement may be amended only by a signed writing. On June 6, CP demanded $10,000, saying the job was one-half done. After HDS denied liability, the parties orally agreed that HDS should deposit $20,000 in escrow, pending completion to the satisfaction of HDS's computer systems manager. The escrow deposit was thereupon made. On July 5, CP completed the programs, having used an amount of time in which it could have earned $18,000 had it devoted that time to other jobs. Tests by CP and HDS's computer systems manager then showed that the computer programs, not being perfectly coordinated with HDS's billing methods, cut processing time by only 47%. They would, however, save HDS $12,000 a year. Further, if HDS would spend $5,000 to change its invoice preparation methods, as recommended by CP, the programs would cut processing time by a total of 58%, saving HDS another $8,000 a year. HDS's computer systems manager refused in good faith to certify satisfactory completion. HDS requested the escrow agent to return the $20,000 and asserted that nothing was owed to CP even though HDS continued to use the programs.\nIf HDS denies liability on the ground that CP had orally agreed to coordinate with HDS's methods of accounting, and CP seeks in litigation to bar introduction of that agreement because of the parol evidence rule, HDS's most effective argument is that\n\n (A) the parol evidence rule does not bar the introduction of evidence for the purpose of interpreting a written agreement\n (B) the memorandum was not a completely integrated agreement\n (C) HDS detrimentally relied on the oral promise of coordination in signing the memorandum\n (D) the memorandum was not a partially integrated agreement\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "B",
+      "the memorandum was not a completely integrated agreement"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_231",
+    "retrieved_docs": "under the doctrine of \u201cpart performance,\u201d which may take an agreement outside of the statute of frauds, **178 there must be an oral agreement that has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and that agreement must be \u201cclear, certain, and unambiguous\u201d in its terms. Rafferty & Towner, Inc. v. NJS Enterprises, LLC, 224 Or.App. 51, 55, 197 P.3d 55 (2008), rev. den., 347 Or. 42, 217 P.3d 688 (2009). Emmert argued that the alleged agreements did not meet that standard. Furthermore, Emmert asserted, any qualifying \u201cpart performance\u201d must be clearly referable to the contract, and Kazlauskas's\n\nA completely integrated agreement is one adopted by the parties as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement. It is contrasted with a partially integrated agreement, where the writing represents the agreement of the parties with respect to the matters stated therein but where there may be additional consistent oral terms. Id. at \u00a7 210. Whether an agreement is integrated ultimately depends upon the intent of the parties. Stamenich v. Markovic, 462 A.2d 452, 456 (D.C.1983).\n\nafter verification of its accuracy. Even if admitted, \u2018the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.\u2019 \u201d If a party's notes do refresh the party's recollection, \u201cthere is no need to admit the recording into evidence, because the witness will be able to testify from his or her refreshed memory.\u201d\n\nattending circumstances, as well as by the words they use. In accordance with the rules for the construction of contracts, where a contract is ambiguous on its face, evidence of the surrounding circumstances and the subsequent conduct of the parties in the execution of the contract is admissible to interpret the contract; and the circumstances in which the parties to a contract are placed are generally admissible where such evidence will shed light upon issues in the case. In many instances, facts can be proved only by circumstantial evidence. Such evidence may in fact be the only means of proving\n\nPast recollection recorded \u201callows a witness with a faded memory to testify from notes or a memorandum that the witness can show was made by her or under her direction while the information was fresh in the witness'[s] memory and reflects that knowledge correctly.\u201d The rule \u201crequires the offering party to prove and the trial judge to find that the witness \u2018has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately\u2019 (taking into account the extent to which the memory can be refreshed from examination of the writing).\u201d Under KRE 803(5), \u201cthe recorded recollection is admissible, but only"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "For this question only, assume that on November 26 Joiner without legal excuse repudiated the contract and that Galley, after a reasonable and prolonged effort, could not find anyone to remodel his kitchen for a price approximating the price agreed to by Joiner. If one year later Galley brings an action for specific performance against Joiner, which of the following will provide Joiner with the best defense?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nCourts of equity will not undertake to enforce the specific performance of a contract for personal services which are material or mechanical, and not peculiar or individual; but where the contract stipulates for special, unique, or extraordinary personal services, or where the services to be rendered are purely intellectual and individual in their character, the courts will grant an injunction in aid of a specific performance. William Rogers Mfg. Co. v. Rogers, 58 Conn. 356, 20 Atl. 467, 7 L. R. A. 779, 18 Am. St. Rep. 278. If a contract implies the performance of personal services requiring special skill,\n\nInc., 425 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2005)). \u201cAn intended third party beneficiary will be found when it is appropriate to recognize a right to performance in the third party and the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the third party the benefit of the promised performance.\u201d Trans\u2013Orient Marine Corp. v. Star Trading & Marine, Inc., 925 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 302 (1981)).\n\nTo qualify as a third-party beneficiary, a party must show that it is either a \u201cdonee\u201d or \u201ccreditor\u201d beneficiary of the contract. Id. at 651. A party is a donee beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract, when rendered, is a \u201cpure donation\u201d to that party. Id. On the other hand, a party is a creditor beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract is rendered in satisfaction of a legal duty owed to that party. Id. The legal duty may be an indebtedness, contractual obligation, or other legally enforceable commitment owed to the third party. Id. Based on\n\nIf a contract provision's meaning is uncertain or is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations after analyzing the language and considering extrinsic evidence (if appropriate), the provision is ambiguous. See Jensen v. Lake Jane Estates, 165 Wash.App. 100, 105, 267 P.3d 435 (2011).\n\nIn analyzing a contract clause claim, a court must consider the following four factors: whether a contractual obligation exists; whether governmental action has impaired that obligation; whether the impairment of the contract is substantial; and whether the government action serves an important public purpose. Kaufman, Litwin & Feinstein v. Edgar, 301 Ill.App.3d 826, 837, 235 Ill.Dec. 183, 704 N.E.2d 756 (1998). The contract clauses notwithstanding, contractual rights remain subject to the police power of the state. Lincoln Towers Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Boozell, 291 Ill.App.3d 965, 968\u201369, 225 Ill.Dec. 909, 684 N.E.2d 900 (1997). The state always retains the authority\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nOn November 15, Joiner in a signed writing contracted with Galley for an agreed price to personally remodel Galley's kitchen according to specifications provided by Galley, and to start work on December 1. Joiner agreed to provide all materials for the job in addition to all of the labor required.\nFor this question only, assume that on November 26 Joiner without legal excuse repudiated the contract and that Galley, after a reasonable and prolonged effort, could not find anyone to remodel his kitchen for a price approximating the price agreed to by Joiner. If one year later Galley brings an action for specific performance against Joiner, which of the following will provide Joiner with the best defense?\n\n (A) An action for equitable relief not brought within a reasonable time is barred by laches.\n (B) Specific performance is generally not available as a remedy to enforce a contractual duty to perform personal services.\n (C) Specific performance is generally not available as a remedy in the case of an anticipatory repudiation.\n (D) Specific performance is not available as a remedy where even nominal damages could have been recovered as a remedy at law.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "B",
+      "Specific performance is generally not available as a remedy to enforce a contractual duty to perform personal services."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_889",
+    "retrieved_docs": "Courts of equity will not undertake to enforce the specific performance of a contract for personal services which are material or mechanical, and not peculiar or individual; but where the contract stipulates for special, unique, or extraordinary personal services, or where the services to be rendered are purely intellectual and individual in their character, the courts will grant an injunction in aid of a specific performance. William Rogers Mfg. Co. v. Rogers, 58 Conn. 356, 20 Atl. 467, 7 L. R. A. 779, 18 Am. St. Rep. 278. If a contract implies the performance of personal services requiring special skill,\n\nInc., 425 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2005)). \u201cAn intended third party beneficiary will be found when it is appropriate to recognize a right to performance in the third party and the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the third party the benefit of the promised performance.\u201d Trans\u2013Orient Marine Corp. v. Star Trading & Marine, Inc., 925 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 302 (1981)).\n\nTo qualify as a third-party beneficiary, a party must show that it is either a \u201cdonee\u201d or \u201ccreditor\u201d beneficiary of the contract. Id. at 651. A party is a donee beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract, when rendered, is a \u201cpure donation\u201d to that party. Id. On the other hand, a party is a creditor beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract is rendered in satisfaction of a legal duty owed to that party. Id. The legal duty may be an indebtedness, contractual obligation, or other legally enforceable commitment owed to the third party. Id. Based on\n\nIf a contract provision's meaning is uncertain or is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations after analyzing the language and considering extrinsic evidence (if appropriate), the provision is ambiguous. See Jensen v. Lake Jane Estates, 165 Wash.App. 100, 105, 267 P.3d 435 (2011).\n\nIn analyzing a contract clause claim, a court must consider the following four factors: whether a contractual obligation exists; whether governmental action has impaired that obligation; whether the impairment of the contract is substantial; and whether the government action serves an important public purpose. Kaufman, Litwin & Feinstein v. Edgar, 301 Ill.App.3d 826, 837, 235 Ill.Dec. 183, 704 N.E.2d 756 (1998). The contract clauses notwithstanding, contractual rights remain subject to the police power of the state. Lincoln Towers Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Boozell, 291 Ill.App.3d 965, 968\u201369, 225 Ill.Dec. 909, 684 N.E.2d 900 (1997). The state always retains the authority"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Pitt sued Dow for damages for injuries that Pitt incurred when a badly rotted limb fell from a curbside tree in front of Dow's home and hit Pitt. Dow claimed that the tree was on city property and thus was the responsibility of the city. At trial, Pitt offered testimony that a week after the accident, Dow had cut the tree down with a chainsaw. The offered evidence is",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nSimilarly, proximate cause may be proved by circumstantial evidence even though there is no eyewitness evidence. The law does not require every fact and circumstance which make up a case of negligence to be proved by direct and positive testimony or by the testimony of eyewitnesses. Negligence and freedom from contributory negligence may be shown by circumstantial, as well as the conditions and circumstances leading up to and surrounding the incident causing the plaintiff's injury. Similarly, the terms of an oral contract, and the assent of the parties to it, may be shown by the actions of the parties and\n\npolicy, as well as the relevancy and materiality of the testimony. In the absence of a statute or a valid and binding contractual provision to the contrary, circumstantial evidence is regarded by law as competent to prove any given fact in issue in a civil case and is sometimes as cogent and valuable as direct and positive testimony. Upon the issue of reasonableness of conduct, all the surrounding circumstances become facts material to the case. Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish liability where it negates other reasonable causes for injury. Tort claims may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence.\n\nGeneral admissibility. Except as provided in par. (b) 2., evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. This subsection does not exclude the evidence when offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.\n\nA duty of reasonable care generally encompasses a duty not to create an unreasonable risk of harm. See Reighard v. Yates, 2012 UT 45, \u00b6\u00b6 29\u201331, 285 P.3d 1168; B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11, \u00b6 21 & n. 11, 275 P.3d 228. What may be reasonable in one setting may not be reasonable in another. Ordinarily participants cannot reasonably expect instructors or coaches to insulate them from risks inherent in an activity in which they voluntarily engage. See, e.g., Kahn, 31 Cal.4th 990, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103, 75 P.3d at 38\u201343 (majority opinion). But whether, under the\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nPitt sued Dow for damages for injuries that Pitt incurred when a badly rotted limb fell from a curbside tree in front of Dow's home and hit Pitt. Dow claimed that the tree was on city property and thus was the responsibility of the city. At trial, Pitt offered testimony that a week after the accident, Dow had cut the tree down with a chainsaw. The offered evidence is\n\n (A) inadmissible, because there is a policy to encourage safety precautions\n (B) inadmissible, because it is irrelevant to the condition of the tree at the time of the accident\n (C) admissible to show the tree was on Dow's property\n (D) admissible to show the tree was in a rotted condition\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "admissible to show the tree was on Dow's property"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_414",
+    "retrieved_docs": "The Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nSimilarly, proximate cause may be proved by circumstantial evidence even though there is no eyewitness evidence. The law does not require every fact and circumstance which make up a case of negligence to be proved by direct and positive testimony or by the testimony of eyewitnesses. Negligence and freedom from contributory negligence may be shown by circumstantial, as well as the conditions and circumstances leading up to and surrounding the incident causing the plaintiff's injury. Similarly, the terms of an oral contract, and the assent of the parties to it, may be shown by the actions of the parties and\n\npolicy, as well as the relevancy and materiality of the testimony. In the absence of a statute or a valid and binding contractual provision to the contrary, circumstantial evidence is regarded by law as competent to prove any given fact in issue in a civil case and is sometimes as cogent and valuable as direct and positive testimony. Upon the issue of reasonableness of conduct, all the surrounding circumstances become facts material to the case. Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish liability where it negates other reasonable causes for injury. Tort claims may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence.\n\nGeneral admissibility. Except as provided in par. (b) 2., evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. This subsection does not exclude the evidence when offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.\n\nA duty of reasonable care generally encompasses a duty not to create an unreasonable risk of harm. See Reighard v. Yates, 2012 UT 45, \u00b6\u00b6 29\u201331, 285 P.3d 1168; B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11, \u00b6 21 & n. 11, 275 P.3d 228. What may be reasonable in one setting may not be reasonable in another. Ordinarily participants cannot reasonably expect instructors or coaches to insulate them from risks inherent in an activity in which they voluntarily engage. See, e.g., Kahn, 31 Cal.4th 990, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103, 75 P.3d at 38\u201343 (majority opinion). But whether, under the"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Homer lived on the second floor of a small convenience store/gas station that he owned. One night he refused to sell Augie a six- pack of beer after hours, saying he could not violate the state laws. Augie became enraged and deliberately drove his car into one of the gasoline pumps, severing it from its base. There was an ensuing explosion causing a ball of fire to go from the underground gasoline tank into the building. As a result, the building burned to the ground and Homer was killed. In a common-law jurisdiction, if Augie is charged with murder and arson, he should be",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nelements of both offenses because no element of either offense negates an element of the other. Even though reckless murder involves a situation in which the defendant does not intend to kill or injure another person, it does not require that none of his actions be intentional. For example, it does not exclude the possibility that he committed another intentional act, such as setting a fire. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the appellant acted with extreme indifference to human life but did not intend to kill or injure the victim when he threw gasoline around the den;\n\ncausing an explosion, and when: \u201c(1) Another person is present in such building at the time, and \u201c(2) The actor knows that fact, or the circumstances are such as to render the presence of a person therein a reasonable possibility.\u201d 23As was the case in Heard, the appellant was convicted of more than one offense based on crimes committed against one victim. To be guilty of arson, he must have had the intent to start or maintain a fire. See Henderson v. State, 715 So.2d 863 (Ala.Crim.App.1997); Minnis v. State, 690 So.2d 521 (Ala.Crim.App.1996). \u201cThe *851 doctrine of universal malice,\n\nWith regard to reckless murder, \u00a7 13A-6-2(a), Ala.Code 1975, provides: \u201cA person commits the crime of murder if he or she does any of the following: \u201c.... \u201c(2) Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, he or she recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to a person other than himself or herself, and thereby causes the death of another person.\u201d With regard to first-degree arson, \u00a7 13A-7-41(a), Ala.Code 1975, provides: \u201cA person commits the crime of arson in the first degree if he intentionally damages a building by starting or maintaining a fire or\n\n\u201cMurder is the killing of one human being by another with the requisite malevolent state of mind and without justification, excuse, or mitigation.\u201d Ross v. State, 308 Md. 337, 340, 519 A.2d 735, 736 (1987). The malevolent states of mind that qualify are: (1) the intent to kill, (2) the intent to do grievous bodily harm, (3) the intent to do an act under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life (depraved heart), or (4) the intent to commit a dangerous felony. Id. The General Assembly has determined that certain murders qualify as murder in the first\n\nAn essential element of first-degree murder is malice aforethought. See State v. Lee, 494 N.W.2d 706, 707 (Iowa 1993); see also Iowa Code \u00a7 707.1 (\u201cA person who kills another person with malice aforethought either express or implied commits murder.\u201d). \u201cMalice aforethought\u201d is defined as \u201c \u2018a fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to another that exists before the act is committed.\u2019 \u201d Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d at 49 (citation omitted).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nHomer lived on the second floor of a small convenience store/gas station that he owned. One night he refused to sell Augie a six- pack of beer after hours, saying he could not violate the state laws. Augie became enraged and deliberately drove his car into one of the gasoline pumps, severing it from its base. There was an ensuing explosion causing a ball of fire to go from the underground gasoline tank into the building. As a result, the building burned to the ground and Homer was killed. In a common-law jurisdiction, if Augie is charged with murder and arson, he should be\n\n (A) convicted of both offenses.\n (B) convicted of involuntary manslaughter and acquitted of arson.\n (C) convicted of arson and involuntary manslaughter.\n (D) acquitted of both offenses.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "A",
+      "convicted of both offenses."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_1054",
+    "retrieved_docs": "elements of both offenses because no element of either offense negates an element of the other. Even though reckless murder involves a situation in which the defendant does not intend to kill or injure another person, it does not require that none of his actions be intentional. For example, it does not exclude the possibility that he committed another intentional act, such as setting a fire. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the appellant acted with extreme indifference to human life but did not intend to kill or injure the victim when he threw gasoline around the den;\n\ncausing an explosion, and when: \u201c(1) Another person is present in such building at the time, and \u201c(2) The actor knows that fact, or the circumstances are such as to render the presence of a person therein a reasonable possibility.\u201d 23As was the case in Heard, the appellant was convicted of more than one offense based on crimes committed against one victim. To be guilty of arson, he must have had the intent to start or maintain a fire. See Henderson v. State, 715 So.2d 863 (Ala.Crim.App.1997); Minnis v. State, 690 So.2d 521 (Ala.Crim.App.1996). \u201cThe *851 doctrine of universal malice,\n\nWith regard to reckless murder, \u00a7 13A-6-2(a), Ala.Code 1975, provides: \u201cA person commits the crime of murder if he or she does any of the following: \u201c.... \u201c(2) Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, he or she recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to a person other than himself or herself, and thereby causes the death of another person.\u201d With regard to first-degree arson, \u00a7 13A-7-41(a), Ala.Code 1975, provides: \u201cA person commits the crime of arson in the first degree if he intentionally damages a building by starting or maintaining a fire or\n\n\u201cMurder is the killing of one human being by another with the requisite malevolent state of mind and without justification, excuse, or mitigation.\u201d Ross v. State, 308 Md. 337, 340, 519 A.2d 735, 736 (1987). The malevolent states of mind that qualify are: (1) the intent to kill, (2) the intent to do grievous bodily harm, (3) the intent to do an act under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life (depraved heart), or (4) the intent to commit a dangerous felony. Id. The General Assembly has determined that certain murders qualify as murder in the first\n\nAn essential element of first-degree murder is malice aforethought. See State v. Lee, 494 N.W.2d 706, 707 (Iowa 1993); see also Iowa Code \u00a7 707.1 (\u201cA person who kills another person with malice aforethought either express or implied commits murder.\u201d). \u201cMalice aforethought\u201d is defined as \u201c \u2018a fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to another that exists before the act is committed.\u2019 \u201d Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d at 49 (citation omitted)."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "If CP in fact had half-completed the job on June 6, would it then have been entitled to $10,000 ?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nunder the doctrine of \u201cpart performance,\u201d which may take an agreement outside of the statute of frauds, **178 there must be an oral agreement that has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and that agreement must be \u201cclear, certain, and unambiguous\u201d in its terms. Rafferty & Towner, Inc. v. NJS Enterprises, LLC, 224 Or.App. 51, 55, 197 P.3d 55 (2008), rev. den., 347 Or. 42, 217 P.3d 688 (2009). Emmert argued that the alleged agreements did not meet that standard. Furthermore, Emmert asserted, any qualifying \u201cpart performance\u201d must be clearly referable to the contract, and Kazlauskas's\n\nany definite and seasonable expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance even though it is not a mirror image of the offer unless the acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. However that section still requires a definite expression of acceptance and does not change the basic common law requirement that there must be an objective manifestation of mutual assent. (Ore & Chemical Corp. v. Howard Butcher Trading Co. (E.D.Pa.1978), 455 F.Supp. 1150.)\n\nOrdinarily, in contracts where time is not of the essence, a failure to complete the work within the specified time will not terminate the contract, but it will subject the contractor to damages for the delay. See 13 Am.Jur.2d Building and Construction Contracts s 47.\n\nUnder the defense of impossibility of performance, a party's breach of its contractual obligation will be excused when \u201cchanged circumstances have rendered the promise vitally different from what reasonably should have been within the contemplation of both parties when they entered into the contract.\u201d Colo. Performance Corp. v. Mariposa Assocs., 754 P.2d 401, 407 (Colo.Ct.App.1987) (quotation omitted)\n\nInc., 425 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2005)). \u201cAn intended third party beneficiary will be found when it is appropriate to recognize a right to performance in the third party and the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the third party the benefit of the promised performance.\u201d Trans\u2013Orient Marine Corp. v. Star Trading & Marine, Inc., 925 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 302 (1981)).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nOn March 1, Computer Programs, Inc. (CP) orally agreed with Holiday Department Store (HDS) to write a set of programs for HDS's computer and to coordinate the programs with HDS's billing methods. A subsequent memo, signed by both parties, provided in its entirety: HDS will pay CP $20,000 in two equal installments within one month of completion if CP is successful in shortening by one-half the processing time for the financial transactions now handled on HDS's Zenon 747 computer; CP to complete by July 1. This agreement may be amended only by a signed writing. On June 6, CP demanded $10,000, saying the job was one-half done. After HDS denied liability, the parties orally agreed that HDS should deposit $20,000 in escrow, pending completion to the satisfaction of HDS's computer systems manager. The escrow deposit was thereupon made. On July 5, CP completed the programs, having used an amount of time in which it could have earned $18,000 had it devoted that time to other jobs. Tests by CP and HDS's computer systems manager then showed that the computer programs, not being perfectly coordinated with HDS's billing methods, cut processing time by only 47%. They would, however, save HDS $12,000 a year. Further, if HDS would spend $5,000 to change its invoice preparation methods, as recommended by CP, the programs would cut processing time by a total of 58%, saving HDS another $8,000 a year. HDS's computer systems manager refused in good faith to certify satisfactory completion. HDS requested the escrow agent to return the $20,000 and asserted that nothing was owed to CP even though HDS continued to use the programs.\nIf CP in fact had half-completed the job on June 6, would it then have been entitled to $10,000 ?\n\n (A) Yes, because June 6 was within one month of completion.\n (B) Yes, because CP had done one-half the job.\n (C) No, because of a constructive condition precedent requiring at least substantial completion of the work before HDS would have a duty to pay.\n (D) No, because \"within one month of completion\" would, in these circumstances, be interpreted to mean \"within one month after completion.\"\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "D",
+      "No, because \"within one month of completion\" would, in these circumstances, be interpreted to mean \"within one month after completion.\""
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_232",
+    "retrieved_docs": "under the doctrine of \u201cpart performance,\u201d which may take an agreement outside of the statute of frauds, **178 there must be an oral agreement that has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and that agreement must be \u201cclear, certain, and unambiguous\u201d in its terms. Rafferty & Towner, Inc. v. NJS Enterprises, LLC, 224 Or.App. 51, 55, 197 P.3d 55 (2008), rev. den., 347 Or. 42, 217 P.3d 688 (2009). Emmert argued that the alleged agreements did not meet that standard. Furthermore, Emmert asserted, any qualifying \u201cpart performance\u201d must be clearly referable to the contract, and Kazlauskas's\n\nany definite and seasonable expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance even though it is not a mirror image of the offer unless the acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. However that section still requires a definite expression of acceptance and does not change the basic common law requirement that there must be an objective manifestation of mutual assent. (Ore & Chemical Corp. v. Howard Butcher Trading Co. (E.D.Pa.1978), 455 F.Supp. 1150.)\n\nOrdinarily, in contracts where time is not of the essence, a failure to complete the work within the specified time will not terminate the contract, but it will subject the contractor to damages for the delay. See 13 Am.Jur.2d Building and Construction Contracts s 47.\n\nUnder the defense of impossibility of performance, a party's breach of its contractual obligation will be excused when \u201cchanged circumstances have rendered the promise vitally different from what reasonably should have been within the contemplation of both parties when they entered into the contract.\u201d Colo. Performance Corp. v. Mariposa Assocs., 754 P.2d 401, 407 (Colo.Ct.App.1987) (quotation omitted)\n\nInc., 425 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2005)). \u201cAn intended third party beneficiary will be found when it is appropriate to recognize a right to performance in the third party and the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the third party the benefit of the promised performance.\u201d Trans\u2013Orient Marine Corp. v. Star Trading & Marine, Inc., 925 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 302 (1981))."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Suppose Peg pays the purchase price and accepts a deed. Subsequently, Sue's title to the one acre proves inadequate and Opal ejects Peg from that acre. Peg sues Sue for damages. Which of the following statements applies most accurately to the determination of Peg's rights?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nAccordingly, breach of contract remedies are available to a buyer when the seller fails to make any delivery. S.W. Bell, 811 S.W.2d at 576. In contrast, breach of warranty remedies are available to a buyer who has received and accepted goods, but discovers they are defective in some manner. Id. In other words, when a party fails to deliver the goods as promised, a breach of contract occurs. See Chilton Ins. Co. v. Pate & Pate Enter., Inc., 930 S.W.2d 877, 890 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied). Conversely, when a seller delivers nonconforming goods, it is a breach of warranty.\n\nthat entry and possession under claim of right, ownership, or title are sufficient. 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession \u00a7 72 (footnotes omitted). See also 4 Tiffany, supra, Adverse Possession \u00a7 1147 (distinguishing \u201ccolor of title,\u201d which \u201crefers to asserting title through an instrument that appears to convey title, but in actuality does not,\u201d from \u201cclaim of title,\u201d which more broadly \u201creflect [s] an intention to assert ownership over the property and claim it as one's own\u201d).\n\nIt ripened into an incorporeal hereditament when the licensee entered into enjoyment thereof and made expenditures and improvements. Other jurisdictions hold that revocation will not be allowed in such a case unless the licensee be compensated for his improvements. This language supports a conclusion that the holder of an incorporeal hereditament would be considered the holder of a form of property interest entitling it to compensation under Utah law.\n\nA deed is not legally effective until it has been delivered. While there is no prescribed method for an effective delivery of a deed, manual transfer of the instrument into the hand of the grantee is neither required to effectuate a valid delivery, nor dispositive of the issue. The term delivery in this regard refers to \u201cnot so much a manual act but the intention of the maker ... existing at the time of the transaction ... and not subject to later change of mind.\u201d \u201cDelivery of a deed includes, not only an act by which the grantor evinces a\n\nThey are distinguishable as well because they are predicated on the well-settled rule that a trustee in a deed of trust can only do with the trust property what the deed either in express terms or by necessary implication authorizes him to do. In other words, the powers of the person foreclosing under a mortgage or deed of trust are limited and defined by the instrument under which he acts, and he has only such authority as is thus expressly conferred upon him, together with incidental and implied powers that are necessarily included therein. Accordingly, the trustee or mortgagee must\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nSue owned a five-acre tract of land, one acre of which had previously been owned by Opal, but to which Sue had acquired title by adverse possession. Sue contracted to convey the full five-acre tract to Peg, but the contract did not specify the quality of title Sue would convey. At closing, Peg refused the tendered deed and demanded return of her earnest money.\nSuppose Peg pays the purchase price and accepts a deed. Subsequently, Sue's title to the one acre proves inadequate and Opal ejects Peg from that acre. Peg sues Sue for damages. Which of the following statements applies most accurately to the determination of Peg's rights?\n\n (A) Sue's deed was fraudulent.\n (B) The terms of the deed control Sue's liability.\n (C) The only remedy available for breach of warranty of title is rescission.\n (D) Peg's rights are based on the implied covenant that the title conveyed shall he marketable.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "B",
+      "The terms of the deed control Sue's liability."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_4",
+    "retrieved_docs": "Accordingly, breach of contract remedies are available to a buyer when the seller fails to make any delivery. S.W. Bell, 811 S.W.2d at 576. In contrast, breach of warranty remedies are available to a buyer who has received and accepted goods, but discovers they are defective in some manner. Id. In other words, when a party fails to deliver the goods as promised, a breach of contract occurs. See Chilton Ins. Co. v. Pate & Pate Enter., Inc., 930 S.W.2d 877, 890 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied). Conversely, when a seller delivers nonconforming goods, it is a breach of warranty.\n\nthat entry and possession under claim of right, ownership, or title are sufficient. 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession \u00a7 72 (footnotes omitted). See also 4 Tiffany, supra, Adverse Possession \u00a7 1147 (distinguishing \u201ccolor of title,\u201d which \u201crefers to asserting title through an instrument that appears to convey title, but in actuality does not,\u201d from \u201cclaim of title,\u201d which more broadly \u201creflect [s] an intention to assert ownership over the property and claim it as one's own\u201d).\n\nIt ripened into an incorporeal hereditament when the licensee entered into enjoyment thereof and made expenditures and improvements. Other jurisdictions hold that revocation will not be allowed in such a case unless the licensee be compensated for his improvements. This language supports a conclusion that the holder of an incorporeal hereditament would be considered the holder of a form of property interest entitling it to compensation under Utah law.\n\nA deed is not legally effective until it has been delivered. While there is no prescribed method for an effective delivery of a deed, manual transfer of the instrument into the hand of the grantee is neither required to effectuate a valid delivery, nor dispositive of the issue. The term delivery in this regard refers to \u201cnot so much a manual act but the intention of the maker ... existing at the time of the transaction ... and not subject to later change of mind.\u201d \u201cDelivery of a deed includes, not only an act by which the grantor evinces a\n\nThey are distinguishable as well because they are predicated on the well-settled rule that a trustee in a deed of trust can only do with the trust property what the deed either in express terms or by necessary implication authorizes him to do. In other words, the powers of the person foreclosing under a mortgage or deed of trust are limited and defined by the instrument under which he acts, and he has only such authority as is thus expressly conferred upon him, together with incidental and implied powers that are necessarily included therein. Accordingly, the trustee or mortgagee must"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Kontractor agreed to build a power plant for a public utility. Subbo agreed with Kontractor to lay the foundation for $200,000. Subbo supplied goods and services worth $150,000, for which Kontractor made progress payments aggregating $100,000 as required by the subcontract. Subbo then breached by refusing unjustifiably to perform further. Kontractor reasonably spent $120,000 to have the work completed by another subcontractor. Subbo sues Kontractor for the reasonable value of benefits conferred, and Kontractor counterclaims for breach of contract. Which of the following should be the court's decision?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nIn an action for breach of contract, the injured party is entitled to the benefit of the bargain, and the recovery may include the profits which he would have derived from performance of the contract. See Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 116 (2d Cir.1976). New York law, which controls here, permits recovery of lost future profits as damages, but only under rigorous rules: First, it must be demonstrated with certainty that such damages have been caused by the breach and, second, the alleged loss must be capable of proof with reasonable certainty. In other words,\n\nAt common law, a breaching party could not obtain restitution for benefits conferred. The common law rule reflected a belief that breach was \u201cmorally unworthy conduct,\u201d and that a breaching party should not benefit from his own wrong, see Lancellotti v. Thomas, 341 Pa.Super. 1, 491 A.2d 117, 118\u201319 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast to the common law rule, the Restatement rule reflects a policy against awarding a windfall to the non-breaching party. See id. at 119\u201320. The court in Lancellotti rejected the view that breach is morally wrong, see id. at 122 (\u201cRules of contract law are\n\nAccordingly, breach of contract remedies are available to a buyer when the seller fails to make any delivery. S.W. Bell, 811 S.W.2d at 576. In contrast, breach of warranty remedies are available to a buyer who has received and accepted goods, but discovers they are defective in some manner. Id. In other words, when a party fails to deliver the goods as promised, a breach of contract occurs. See Chilton Ins. Co. v. Pate & Pate Enter., Inc., 930 S.W.2d 877, 890 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied). Conversely, when a seller delivers nonconforming goods, it is a breach of warranty.\n\nthe damages may not be merely speculative, possible or imaginary, but must be reasonably certain and directly traceable to the breach, not remote or the result of other intervening causes.... In addition, there must be a showing that the particular damages were fairly within the contemplation of the parties to the contract at the time it was made. Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 67 N.Y.2d 257, 261, 502 N.Y.S.2d 131, 132, 493 N.E.2d 234 (1986) (per curiam) (\u201cKenford I \u201d) (citations omitted).\n\n\u201cIn a breach of contract action, upon proof of liability, the non-breaching party may recover damages for 1) the losses proximately caused by the breach, 2) that were reasonably foreseeable, and 3) that have been proven with reasonable certainty.\u201d Hoang v. Hewitt Ave. Assocs., LLC, 177 Md.App. 562, 594, 936 A.2d 915 (2007) (citations omitted).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nKontractor agreed to build a power plant for a public utility. Subbo agreed with Kontractor to lay the foundation for $200,000. Subbo supplied goods and services worth $150,000, for which Kontractor made progress payments aggregating $100,000 as required by the subcontract. Subbo then breached by refusing unjustifiably to perform further. Kontractor reasonably spent $120,000 to have the work completed by another subcontractor. Subbo sues Kontractor for the reasonable value of benefits conferred, and Kontractor counterclaims for breach of contract. Which of the following should be the court's decision?\n\n (A) Subbo recovers $50,000, the benefit conferred on Kontractor for which Subbo has not been paid.\n (B) Subbo recovers $30,000, the benefit Subbo conferred on Kontractor minus the $20,000 in damages incurred by Kontractor.\n (C) Kontractor recovers $20,000, the excess over the contract price that was paid by Kontractor for the performance it had bargained to receive from Subbo.\n (D) Neither party recovers anything, because Subbo committed a material, unexcused breach and Kontractor received a $50,000 benefit from Subbo for which Subbo has not been paid.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "Kontractor recovers $20,000, the excess over the contract price that was paid by Kontractor for the performance it had bargained to receive from Subbo."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_1138",
+    "retrieved_docs": "In an action for breach of contract, the injured party is entitled to the benefit of the bargain, and the recovery may include the profits which he would have derived from performance of the contract. See Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 116 (2d Cir.1976). New York law, which controls here, permits recovery of lost future profits as damages, but only under rigorous rules: First, it must be demonstrated with certainty that such damages have been caused by the breach and, second, the alleged loss must be capable of proof with reasonable certainty. In other words,\n\nAt common law, a breaching party could not obtain restitution for benefits conferred. The common law rule reflected a belief that breach was \u201cmorally unworthy conduct,\u201d and that a breaching party should not benefit from his own wrong, see Lancellotti v. Thomas, 341 Pa.Super. 1, 491 A.2d 117, 118\u201319 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast to the common law rule, the Restatement rule reflects a policy against awarding a windfall to the non-breaching party. See id. at 119\u201320. The court in Lancellotti rejected the view that breach is morally wrong, see id. at 122 (\u201cRules of contract law are\n\nAccordingly, breach of contract remedies are available to a buyer when the seller fails to make any delivery. S.W. Bell, 811 S.W.2d at 576. In contrast, breach of warranty remedies are available to a buyer who has received and accepted goods, but discovers they are defective in some manner. Id. In other words, when a party fails to deliver the goods as promised, a breach of contract occurs. See Chilton Ins. Co. v. Pate & Pate Enter., Inc., 930 S.W.2d 877, 890 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied). Conversely, when a seller delivers nonconforming goods, it is a breach of warranty.\n\nthe damages may not be merely speculative, possible or imaginary, but must be reasonably certain and directly traceable to the breach, not remote or the result of other intervening causes.... In addition, there must be a showing that the particular damages were fairly within the contemplation of the parties to the contract at the time it was made. Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 67 N.Y.2d 257, 261, 502 N.Y.S.2d 131, 132, 493 N.E.2d 234 (1986) (per curiam) (\u201cKenford I \u201d) (citations omitted).\n\n\u201cIn a breach of contract action, upon proof of liability, the non-breaching party may recover damages for 1) the losses proximately caused by the breach, 2) that were reasonably foreseeable, and 3) that have been proven with reasonable certainty.\u201d Hoang v. Hewitt Ave. Assocs., LLC, 177 Md.App. 562, 594, 936 A.2d 915 (2007) (citations omitted)."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Abel owned Blackacre in fee simple. Three years ago, Abel and Betty agreed to a month- to-month tenancy with Betty paying Abel rent each month. After six months of Betty's occupancy, Abel suggested to Betty that she could buy Blackacre for a monthly payment of no more than her rent. Abel and Betty orally agreed that Betty would pay $25,000 in cash, the annual real estate taxes, the annual fire insurance premiums, and the costs of maintaining Blackacre, plus the monthly mortgage payments that Abel owed on Blackacre. They further orally agreed that within six years Betty could pay whatever mortgage balances were then due and Abel would give her a warranty deed to the property. Betty's average monthly payments did turn out to be about the same as her monthly rent. Betty fully complied with all of the obligations she had undertaken. She made some structural modifications to Blackacre. Blackacre is now worth 50% more than it was when Abel and Betty made their oral agreement. Betty made her financing arrangements and was ready to complete the purchase of Blackacre, but Abel refused to close. Betty brought an appropriate action for specific performance against Abel to enforce the agreement. The court should rule for",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nunder the doctrine of \u201cpart performance,\u201d which may take an agreement outside of the statute of frauds, **178 there must be an oral agreement that has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and that agreement must be \u201cclear, certain, and unambiguous\u201d in its terms. Rafferty & Towner, Inc. v. NJS Enterprises, LLC, 224 Or.App. 51, 55, 197 P.3d 55 (2008), rev. den., 347 Or. 42, 217 P.3d 688 (2009). Emmert argued that the alleged agreements did not meet that standard. Furthermore, Emmert asserted, any qualifying \u201cpart performance\u201d must be clearly referable to the contract, and Kazlauskas's\n\nA deed is not legally effective until it has been delivered. While there is no prescribed method for an effective delivery of a deed, manual transfer of the instrument into the hand of the grantee is neither required to effectuate a valid delivery, nor dispositive of the issue. The term delivery in this regard refers to \u201cnot so much a manual act but the intention of the maker ... existing at the time of the transaction ... and not subject to later change of mind.\u201d \u201cDelivery of a deed includes, not only an act by which the grantor evinces a\n\nIn an action for breach of contract, the injured party is entitled to the benefit of the bargain, and the recovery may include the profits which he would have derived from performance of the contract. See Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 116 (2d Cir.1976). New York law, which controls here, permits recovery of lost future profits as damages, but only under rigorous rules: First, it must be demonstrated with certainty that such damages have been caused by the breach and, second, the alleged loss must be capable of proof with reasonable certainty. In other words,\n\nYet the established rule, followed in Maryland, is that proof of color of title is not necessary to establish adverse possession. Color of title is not an element of adverse possession unless made so by statute, as under provisions prescribing a shorter period of limitation than would otherwise be required. While there are a few isolated judicial statements broadly to the effect that color of title, or color of right, is essential to adverse possession, the general rule is well established that, in the absence of contrary statute, color of title is not an essential element of adverse possession and\n\nThey are distinguishable as well because they are predicated on the well-settled rule that a trustee in a deed of trust can only do with the trust property what the deed either in express terms or by necessary implication authorizes him to do. In other words, the powers of the person foreclosing under a mortgage or deed of trust are limited and defined by the instrument under which he acts, and he has only such authority as is thus expressly conferred upon him, together with incidental and implied powers that are necessarily included therein. Accordingly, the trustee or mortgagee must\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nAbel owned Blackacre in fee simple. Three years ago, Abel and Betty agreed to a month- to-month tenancy with Betty paying Abel rent each month. After six months of Betty's occupancy, Abel suggested to Betty that she could buy Blackacre for a monthly payment of no more than her rent. Abel and Betty orally agreed that Betty would pay $25,000 in cash, the annual real estate taxes, the annual fire insurance premiums, and the costs of maintaining Blackacre, plus the monthly mortgage payments that Abel owed on Blackacre. They further orally agreed that within six years Betty could pay whatever mortgage balances were then due and Abel would give her a warranty deed to the property. Betty's average monthly payments did turn out to be about the same as her monthly rent. Betty fully complied with all of the obligations she had undertaken. She made some structural modifications to Blackacre. Blackacre is now worth 50% more than it was when Abel and Betty made their oral agreement. Betty made her financing arrangements and was ready to complete the purchase of Blackacre, but Abel refused to close. Betty brought an appropriate action for specific performance against Abel to enforce the agreement. The court should rule for\n\n (A) Abel, because the agreements were oral and violated the statute of frauds.\n (B) Abel, subject to the return of the $25,000, because the arrangement was still a tenancy.\n (C) Betty, because the doctrine of part performance applies.\n (D) Betty, because the statute of frauds does not apply to oral purchase and sale agreements between landlords and tenants in possession.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "Betty, because the doctrine of part performance applies."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_1057",
+    "retrieved_docs": "under the doctrine of \u201cpart performance,\u201d which may take an agreement outside of the statute of frauds, **178 there must be an oral agreement that has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and that agreement must be \u201cclear, certain, and unambiguous\u201d in its terms. Rafferty & Towner, Inc. v. NJS Enterprises, LLC, 224 Or.App. 51, 55, 197 P.3d 55 (2008), rev. den., 347 Or. 42, 217 P.3d 688 (2009). Emmert argued that the alleged agreements did not meet that standard. Furthermore, Emmert asserted, any qualifying \u201cpart performance\u201d must be clearly referable to the contract, and Kazlauskas's\n\nA deed is not legally effective until it has been delivered. While there is no prescribed method for an effective delivery of a deed, manual transfer of the instrument into the hand of the grantee is neither required to effectuate a valid delivery, nor dispositive of the issue. The term delivery in this regard refers to \u201cnot so much a manual act but the intention of the maker ... existing at the time of the transaction ... and not subject to later change of mind.\u201d \u201cDelivery of a deed includes, not only an act by which the grantor evinces a\n\nIn an action for breach of contract, the injured party is entitled to the benefit of the bargain, and the recovery may include the profits which he would have derived from performance of the contract. See Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 116 (2d Cir.1976). New York law, which controls here, permits recovery of lost future profits as damages, but only under rigorous rules: First, it must be demonstrated with certainty that such damages have been caused by the breach and, second, the alleged loss must be capable of proof with reasonable certainty. In other words,\n\nYet the established rule, followed in Maryland, is that proof of color of title is not necessary to establish adverse possession. Color of title is not an element of adverse possession unless made so by statute, as under provisions prescribing a shorter period of limitation than would otherwise be required. While there are a few isolated judicial statements broadly to the effect that color of title, or color of right, is essential to adverse possession, the general rule is well established that, in the absence of contrary statute, color of title is not an essential element of adverse possession and\n\nThey are distinguishable as well because they are predicated on the well-settled rule that a trustee in a deed of trust can only do with the trust property what the deed either in express terms or by necessary implication authorizes him to do. In other words, the powers of the person foreclosing under a mortgage or deed of trust are limited and defined by the instrument under which he acts, and he has only such authority as is thus expressly conferred upon him, together with incidental and implied powers that are necessarily included therein. Accordingly, the trustee or mortgagee must"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "After waiting until all the customers had left, Max entered a small grocery store just before closing time. He went up to the lone clerk in the store and said, \"Hand over all the money in the cash register or you will get hurt.\" The clerk fainted and struck his head on the edge of the counter. As Max went behind the counter to open the cash register, two customers entered the store. Max ran out before he was able to open the register drawer. On this evidence Max could be convicted of",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\n\u201c \u2018The essential elements of an attempted robbery are (1) intent to commit robbery and (2) an overt act towards that commission.\u2019 \u201d Leyvas, 221 Ariz. 181, \u00b6 34, 211 P.3d at 1175, quoting State v. Clark, 143 Ariz. 332, 334, 693 P.2d 987, 989 (App.1984).\n\nLarceny is an element of robbery, and \u201c \u2018there can be no robbery without a larcenous intent....\u2019 \u201d Hook v. State, 315 Md. 25, 30, 553 A.2d 233 (1989) (citation omitted). Therefore, the elements of larceny are important to an understanding of robbery. Larceny is defined as \u201c \u2018the fraudulent taking and carrying away of a thing without claim of right with the intention of converting it to a use other than that of the owner without his consent.\u2019 \u201d Metheny, 359 Md. at 605, 755 A.2d 1088 (quoting Hook, 315 Md. at 31, 553 A.2d 233)(emphasis in Hook ).\n\nLarceny is the fraudulent and wrongful taking and carrying away the property of another with intent to convert such property to the taker's use without the consent of the owner. Lucero v. Montes, 177 B.R. 325, 331 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1994). ; \u2018[A]n accomplice is one who aids or promotes the perpetrator's crime with knowledge of the perpetrator's unlawful purpose and an intent to assist in the commission of the target crime....\u2019 [Citation.] \u2018In order to be an accomplice, the witness must be chargeable with the crime as a principal (\u00a7 31) and not merely as an accessory after the fact (\u00a7\u00a7 32,\n\nelements of both offenses because no element of either offense negates an element of the other. Even though reckless murder involves a situation in which the defendant does not intend to kill or injure another person, it does not require that none of his actions be intentional. For example, it does not exclude the possibility that he committed another intentional act, such as setting a fire. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the appellant acted with extreme indifference to human life but did not intend to kill or injure the victim when he threw gasoline around the den;\n\nConversion is the unauthorized and unlawful assumption and exercise of dominion and control over the personal property of another to the exclusion of, or inconsistent with, the owner's rights. Waisath v. Lack's Stores, Inc., 474 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex.1971). The elements of conversion are: (1) the plaintiff owned, had legal possession of, or was entitled to possession of the property; (2) the defendant assumed and exercised dominion and control *387 over the property in an unlawful and unauthorized manner, to the exclusion of and inconsistent with the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the defendant refused the plaintiff's demand for return of\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nAfter waiting until all the customers had left, Max entered a small grocery store just before closing time. He went up to the lone clerk in the store and said, \"Hand over all the money in the cash register or you will get hurt.\" The clerk fainted and struck his head on the edge of the counter. As Max went behind the counter to open the cash register, two customers entered the store. Max ran out before he was able to open the register drawer. On this evidence Max could be convicted of\n\n (A) robbery.\n (B) assault and robbery.\n (C) attempted robbery.\n (D) assault and attempted robbery.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "attempted robbery."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_588",
+    "retrieved_docs": "\u201c \u2018The essential elements of an attempted robbery are (1) intent to commit robbery and (2) an overt act towards that commission.\u2019 \u201d Leyvas, 221 Ariz. 181, \u00b6 34, 211 P.3d at 1175, quoting State v. Clark, 143 Ariz. 332, 334, 693 P.2d 987, 989 (App.1984).\n\nLarceny is an element of robbery, and \u201c \u2018there can be no robbery without a larcenous intent....\u2019 \u201d Hook v. State, 315 Md. 25, 30, 553 A.2d 233 (1989) (citation omitted). Therefore, the elements of larceny are important to an understanding of robbery. Larceny is defined as \u201c \u2018the fraudulent taking and carrying away of a thing without claim of right with the intention of converting it to a use other than that of the owner without his consent.\u2019 \u201d Metheny, 359 Md. at 605, 755 A.2d 1088 (quoting Hook, 315 Md. at 31, 553 A.2d 233)(emphasis in Hook ).\n\nLarceny is the fraudulent and wrongful taking and carrying away the property of another with intent to convert such property to the taker's use without the consent of the owner. Lucero v. Montes, 177 B.R. 325, 331 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1994). ; \u2018[A]n accomplice is one who aids or promotes the perpetrator's crime with knowledge of the perpetrator's unlawful purpose and an intent to assist in the commission of the target crime....\u2019 [Citation.] \u2018In order to be an accomplice, the witness must be chargeable with the crime as a principal (\u00a7 31) and not merely as an accessory after the fact (\u00a7\u00a7 32,\n\nelements of both offenses because no element of either offense negates an element of the other. Even though reckless murder involves a situation in which the defendant does not intend to kill or injure another person, it does not require that none of his actions be intentional. For example, it does not exclude the possibility that he committed another intentional act, such as setting a fire. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the appellant acted with extreme indifference to human life but did not intend to kill or injure the victim when he threw gasoline around the den;\n\nConversion is the unauthorized and unlawful assumption and exercise of dominion and control over the personal property of another to the exclusion of, or inconsistent with, the owner's rights. Waisath v. Lack's Stores, Inc., 474 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex.1971). The elements of conversion are: (1) the plaintiff owned, had legal possession of, or was entitled to possession of the property; (2) the defendant assumed and exercised dominion and control *387 over the property in an unlawful and unauthorized manner, to the exclusion of and inconsistent with the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the defendant refused the plaintiff's demand for return of"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Scott held up a drugstore at 10:30 at night, and drove away. His car broke down in an isolated area just outside the small city in which the crime occurred. Scott walked to the nearest house and asked Henry, the homeowner, if he could stay until the next morning, explaining that he had been searching for his sister's home and had run out of gas. Henry agreed to let him sleep on a couch in the basement. During the course of the night, Henry began to doubt the story Scott had told him. Early the next morning, Henry called the police and said he was suspicious and frightened of a stranger whom he had allowed to stay the night. The police went immediately to the house to assist Henry and walked through the open front door. They found Scott and Henry drinking coffee in the kitchen. When they saw Scott, they realized he matched the description of the drugstore robber. They arrested Scott and in his jacket they found drugs taken during the robbery. Scott moves to suppress the evidence of the drugs. If the court finds that the police did not have probable cause to believe Scott was the robber until they saw him inside Henry's house and realized he matched the description, the court should",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nThe Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. This court interprets \u00a7 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, which specifically addresses searches and seizures, as providing the same protection. Daniel, 291 Kan. at 498, 242 P.3d 1186. Warrantless searches are considered unreasonable unless they fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, such as consent, search incident to lawful arrest, stop and frisk, probable cause plus exigent circumstances, the emergency doctrine, inventory searches, plain view or feel, and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses. State v. Fitzgerald, *235 286 Kan. 1124,\n\n1127, 192 P.3d 171 (2008). The State bears the burden to prove a warrantless search was lawful. Daniel, 291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. To supplement the bare text of the Fourth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule as a deterrent barring the introduction of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment in criminal prosecutions. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. \u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2426\u201327, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011). In Kansas, our court has similarly recognized the exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings as an appropriate remedy for an unlawful search. See Daniel,\n\n291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. But neither the Fourth Amendment nor \u00a7 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights expressly prohibits the use of evidence obtained in violation of their respective protections. 291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. Exclusion is not a personal constitutional right; rather, its purpose is to deter future violations by the State. Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2426; Daniel, 291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. Accordingly, exceptions to the exclusionary rule exist. See 291 Kan. at 492, 242 P.3d 1186.\n\nConsensual searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment \u201cbecause it is no doubt reasonable for the police to conduct a search once they have been permitted to do so.\u201d Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250-51, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). In order for a consensual search to be valid, consent must actually be given (either express or implied), and the person giving consent must have (actual or apparent) authority to do so. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 185-86, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990).\n\nGeneral admissibility. Except as provided in par. (b) 2., evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. This subsection does not exclude the evidence when offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nScott held up a drugstore at 10:30 at night, and drove away. His car broke down in an isolated area just outside the small city in which the crime occurred. Scott walked to the nearest house and asked Henry, the homeowner, if he could stay until the next morning, explaining that he had been searching for his sister's home and had run out of gas. Henry agreed to let him sleep on a couch in the basement. During the course of the night, Henry began to doubt the story Scott had told him. Early the next morning, Henry called the police and said he was suspicious and frightened of a stranger whom he had allowed to stay the night. The police went immediately to the house to assist Henry and walked through the open front door. They found Scott and Henry drinking coffee in the kitchen. When they saw Scott, they realized he matched the description of the drugstore robber. They arrested Scott and in his jacket they found drugs taken during the robbery. Scott moves to suppress the evidence of the drugs. If the court finds that the police did not have probable cause to believe Scott was the robber until they saw him inside Henry's house and realized he matched the description, the court should\n\n (A) grant the motion, because, as a guest, Scott has sufficient standing to contest the entry of the house without a warrant.\n (B) grant the motion, because, as a guest, Scott has sufficient standing to contest the lack of probable cause at the time of the entry.\n (C) deny the motion, because Scott had no ownership or other possessory interest in the premises.\n (D) deny the motion, because the police had the permission of the owner to enter the house.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "D",
+      "deny the motion, because the police had the permission of the owner to enter the house."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_1118",
+    "retrieved_docs": "The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. This court interprets \u00a7 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, which specifically addresses searches and seizures, as providing the same protection. Daniel, 291 Kan. at 498, 242 P.3d 1186. Warrantless searches are considered unreasonable unless they fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, such as consent, search incident to lawful arrest, stop and frisk, probable cause plus exigent circumstances, the emergency doctrine, inventory searches, plain view or feel, and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses. State v. Fitzgerald, *235 286 Kan. 1124,\n\n1127, 192 P.3d 171 (2008). The State bears the burden to prove a warrantless search was lawful. Daniel, 291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. To supplement the bare text of the Fourth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule as a deterrent barring the introduction of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment in criminal prosecutions. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. \u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2426\u201327, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011). In Kansas, our court has similarly recognized the exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings as an appropriate remedy for an unlawful search. See Daniel,\n\n291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. But neither the Fourth Amendment nor \u00a7 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights expressly prohibits the use of evidence obtained in violation of their respective protections. 291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. Exclusion is not a personal constitutional right; rather, its purpose is to deter future violations by the State. Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2426; Daniel, 291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. Accordingly, exceptions to the exclusionary rule exist. See 291 Kan. at 492, 242 P.3d 1186.\n\nConsensual searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment \u201cbecause it is no doubt reasonable for the police to conduct a search once they have been permitted to do so.\u201d Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250-51, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). In order for a consensual search to be valid, consent must actually be given (either express or implied), and the person giving consent must have (actual or apparent) authority to do so. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 185-86, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990).\n\nGeneral admissibility. Except as provided in par. (b) 2., evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. This subsection does not exclude the evidence when offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "A state statute provides that only citizens of the United States may be employed by that state. In an action brought in a federal court, a resident alien who was prevented from obtaining state employment as a garbage collector solely because of his alien status challenged the statute's constitutionality as applied to his circumstances. Which of the following statements concerning the burden of persuasion applicable to this suit is correct?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nIf we determine that a statute treats similarly situated individuals differently, we then evaluate the statute under an equal protection analysis. To determine whether a statute violates equal protection, we will either apply strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review. State v. Hirschfelder, 170 Wash.2d 536, 550, 242 P.3d 876 (2010). Which test applies depends on the classification and rights involved: Suspect classifications, such as race, alienage, and national origin, are subject to strict scrutiny. \u201cStrict scrutiny also applies to laws burdening fundamental rights or liberties.\u201d Intermediate scrutiny applies only if the statute implicates both an important right and\n\nbe carefully examined in order to determine whether that interest is legitimate and substantial, and inquiry must be made whether the means adopted to achieve the goal are necessary and precisely drawn.\u201d Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S., at 605, 96 S.Ct., at 2283. See In re Griffths, 413 U.S., at 721-722, 93 S.Ct., at 2854-2855. Alienage classifications by a State that do not withstand this stringent examination cannot stand.8\n\nThe Court has ruled that classifications by a State that are based on alienage are \u201cinherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.\u201d Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1852, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971). See Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 601-602, 96 S.Ct. 2264, 2281, 49 L.Ed.2d 65 (1976); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S., at 721, 93 S.Ct. at 2854, 37 L.Ed.2d 910; Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642, 93 S.Ct. 2842, 2847, 37 L.Ed.2d 853 (1973). In undertaking this scrutiny, \u201cthe governmental interest claimed to justify the discrimination is to\n\nIn assessing whether a State election law impermissibly burdens First Amendment rights, we examine the character and magnitude of the burden and the extent to which the law serves the State's interests. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). Laws imposing severe burdens must be narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests, but lesser burdens receive less exacting scrutiny. California Democratic Party, 120 S.Ct. at 2412; Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364.\n\nas nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine.\u201d Bancoult, 445 F.3d at 432\u201333 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nA state statute provides that only citizens of the United States may be employed by that state. In an action brought in a federal court, a resident alien who was prevented from obtaining state employment as a garbage collector solely because of his alien status challenged the statute's constitutionality as applied to his circumstances. Which of the following statements concerning the burden of persuasion applicable to this suit is correct?\n\n (A) The alien must demonstrate that there is no rational relationship between the citizenship requirement and any legitimate state interest.\n (B) The alien must demonstrate that the citizenship requirement is not necessary to advance an important state interest.\n (C) The state must demonstrate that there is a rational relationship between the citizenship requirement and a legitimate state interest.\n (D) The state must demonstrate that the citizenship requirement is necessary to advance an important state interest.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "D",
+      "The state must demonstrate that the citizenship requirement is necessary to advance an important state interest."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_539",
+    "retrieved_docs": "If we determine that a statute treats similarly situated individuals differently, we then evaluate the statute under an equal protection analysis. To determine whether a statute violates equal protection, we will either apply strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review. State v. Hirschfelder, 170 Wash.2d 536, 550, 242 P.3d 876 (2010). Which test applies depends on the classification and rights involved: Suspect classifications, such as race, alienage, and national origin, are subject to strict scrutiny. \u201cStrict scrutiny also applies to laws burdening fundamental rights or liberties.\u201d Intermediate scrutiny applies only if the statute implicates both an important right and\n\nbe carefully examined in order to determine whether that interest is legitimate and substantial, and inquiry must be made whether the means adopted to achieve the goal are necessary and precisely drawn.\u201d Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S., at 605, 96 S.Ct., at 2283. See In re Griffths, 413 U.S., at 721-722, 93 S.Ct., at 2854-2855. Alienage classifications by a State that do not withstand this stringent examination cannot stand.8\n\nThe Court has ruled that classifications by a State that are based on alienage are \u201cinherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.\u201d Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1852, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971). See Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 601-602, 96 S.Ct. 2264, 2281, 49 L.Ed.2d 65 (1976); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S., at 721, 93 S.Ct. at 2854, 37 L.Ed.2d 910; Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642, 93 S.Ct. 2842, 2847, 37 L.Ed.2d 853 (1973). In undertaking this scrutiny, \u201cthe governmental interest claimed to justify the discrimination is to\n\nIn assessing whether a State election law impermissibly burdens First Amendment rights, we examine the character and magnitude of the burden and the extent to which the law serves the State's interests. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). Laws imposing severe burdens must be narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests, but lesser burdens receive less exacting scrutiny. California Democratic Party, 120 S.Ct. at 2412; Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364.\n\nas nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine.\u201d Bancoult, 445 F.3d at 432\u201333 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691)."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Plaintiff Construction Co. sued Defendant Development Co. for money owed on a cost- plus contract that required notice of proposed expenditures beyond original estimates. Defendant asserted that it never received the required notice. At trial Plaintiff calls its general manager, Witness, to testify that it is Plaintiffs routine practice to send cost overrun notices as required by the contract. Witness also offers a photocopy of the cost overrun notice letter to Defendant on which Plaintiff is relying, and which he has taken from Plaintiff's regular business files. On the issue of giving notice, the letter copy is",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nA record created by a third party which is adopted by a business may be admitted under the business record exception to the hearsay rule if certain criteria are met: (1) the record must be procured in the normal course of business; (2) the business must show that it relied on the record; and (3) there must be other circumstances indicating the trustworthiness of the document. Military Rules of Evid., Rule 803(6).\n\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nPast recollection recorded \u201callows a witness with a faded memory to testify from notes or a memorandum that the witness can show was made by her or under her direction while the information was fresh in the witness'[s] memory and reflects that knowledge correctly.\u201d The rule \u201crequires the offering party to prove and the trial judge to find that the witness \u2018has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately\u2019 (taking into account the extent to which the memory can be refreshed from examination of the writing).\u201d Under KRE 803(5), \u201cthe recorded recollection is admissible, but only\n\n804(b)(3). Statements that are not inculpatory are not admissible pursuant to this rule even if they are part of a generally inculpatory statement or narrative. United States v. Ricardo, 472 F.3d 277, 287 (5th Cir.2006) (citing Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600\u201301). However, these rules cannot be applied except in the context of specific evidence.\n\nHowever, prior consistent statements are admissible as non-hearsay if: (1) the individual who made the prior consistent statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; and (2) the statement is offered in an effort to rebut an express or implied accusation of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication. See Chandler, 702 So.2d at 197\u201398; see also \u00a7 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Both conditions must be met for admission of a prior consistent statement as nonhearsay. Harris v. State, 843 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.2003).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nPlaintiff Construction Co. sued Defendant Development Co. for money owed on a cost- plus contract that required notice of proposed expenditures beyond original estimates. Defendant asserted that it never received the required notice. At trial Plaintiff calls its general manager, Witness, to testify that it is Plaintiffs routine practice to send cost overrun notices as required by the contract. Witness also offers a photocopy of the cost overrun notice letter to Defendant on which Plaintiff is relying, and which he has taken from Plaintiff's regular business files. On the issue of giving notice, the letter copy is\n\n (A) admissible, though hearsay, under the business record exception.\n (B) admissible, because of the routine practices of the company.\n (C) inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception.\n (D) inadmissible, because it is not the best evidence of the notice.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "B",
+      "admissible, because of the routine practices of the company."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_1071",
+    "retrieved_docs": "A record created by a third party which is adopted by a business may be admitted under the business record exception to the hearsay rule if certain criteria are met: (1) the record must be procured in the normal course of business; (2) the business must show that it relied on the record; and (3) there must be other circumstances indicating the trustworthiness of the document. Military Rules of Evid., Rule 803(6).\n\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nPast recollection recorded \u201callows a witness with a faded memory to testify from notes or a memorandum that the witness can show was made by her or under her direction while the information was fresh in the witness'[s] memory and reflects that knowledge correctly.\u201d The rule \u201crequires the offering party to prove and the trial judge to find that the witness \u2018has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately\u2019 (taking into account the extent to which the memory can be refreshed from examination of the writing).\u201d Under KRE 803(5), \u201cthe recorded recollection is admissible, but only\n\n804(b)(3). Statements that are not inculpatory are not admissible pursuant to this rule even if they are part of a generally inculpatory statement or narrative. United States v. Ricardo, 472 F.3d 277, 287 (5th Cir.2006) (citing Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600\u201301). However, these rules cannot be applied except in the context of specific evidence.\n\nHowever, prior consistent statements are admissible as non-hearsay if: (1) the individual who made the prior consistent statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; and (2) the statement is offered in an effort to rebut an express or implied accusation of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication. See Chandler, 702 So.2d at 197\u201398; see also \u00a7 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Both conditions must be met for admission of a prior consistent statement as nonhearsay. Harris v. State, 843 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.2003)."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Yancey moves to suppress the use of the jewelry. The court should",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nThe Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. This court interprets \u00a7 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, which specifically addresses searches and seizures, as providing the same protection. Daniel, 291 Kan. at 498, 242 P.3d 1186. Warrantless searches are considered unreasonable unless they fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, such as consent, search incident to lawful arrest, stop and frisk, probable cause plus exigent circumstances, the emergency doctrine, inventory searches, plain view or feel, and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses. State v. Fitzgerald, *235 286 Kan. 1124,\n\nConsensual searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment \u201cbecause it is no doubt reasonable for the police to conduct a search once they have been permitted to do so.\u201d Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250-51, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). In order for a consensual search to be valid, consent must actually be given (either express or implied), and the person giving consent must have (actual or apparent) authority to do so. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 185-86, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990).\n\n291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. But neither the Fourth Amendment nor \u00a7 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights expressly prohibits the use of evidence obtained in violation of their respective protections. 291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. Exclusion is not a personal constitutional right; rather, its purpose is to deter future violations by the State. Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2426; Daniel, 291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. Accordingly, exceptions to the exclusionary rule exist. See 291 Kan. at 492, 242 P.3d 1186.\n\n1127, 192 P.3d 171 (2008). The State bears the burden to prove a warrantless search was lawful. Daniel, 291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. To supplement the bare text of the Fourth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule as a deterrent barring the introduction of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment in criminal prosecutions. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. \u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2426\u201327, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011). In Kansas, our court has similarly recognized the exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings as an appropriate remedy for an unlawful search. See Daniel,\n\nD.D.A. v. State, 650 So.2d 571, 578 (Ala.Cr.App.1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also McLaughlin v. State, 586 So.2d 267, 270 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (the element of \u201cextreme indifference to human life\u201d by definition does not apply to the life of the victim, but to human life in general); Gholston v. State, 494 So.2d 876, 883 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (to be reckless, a crime must be directed toward the general public, not toward a particular person); King v. State, 505 So.2d 403, 405 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (reckless murder \u201cdiffers from intentional murder in that it results not from a specific, conscious intent to cause the death\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nThe police suspected that Yancey, a 16-year-old high school student, had committed a series of burglaries. Two officers went to Yancey's high school and asked the principal to call Yancey out of class and to search his backpack. While the officers waited, the principal took Yancey into the hall where she asked to look in his backpack. When Yancey refused, the principal grabbed it from him, injuring Yancey's shoulder in the process. In the backpack, she found jewelry that she turned over to the officers. The officers believed that the jewelry had been taken in one of the burglaries. They arrested Yancey, took him to the station, and gave him Miranda warnings. Yancey asked to see a lawyer. The police called Yancey's parents to the station. When Yancey's parents arrived, the police asked them to speak with Yancey. They put them in a room and secretly recorded their conversation with a concealed electronic device. Yancey broke down and confessed to his parents that he had committed the burglaries. Yancey was charged with the burglaries.\nYancey moves to suppress the use of the jewelry. The court should\n\n (A) deny the motion on the ground that the search was incident to a lawful arrest.\n (B) deny the motion on the ground that school searches are reasonable if conducted by school personnel on school grounds on the basis of reasonable suspicion.\n (C) grant the motion on the ground that the search was conducted with excessive force.\n (D) grant the motion on the ground that the search was conducted without probable cause or a warrant.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "D",
+      "grant the motion on the ground that the search was conducted without probable cause or a warrant."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_891",
+    "retrieved_docs": "The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. This court interprets \u00a7 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, which specifically addresses searches and seizures, as providing the same protection. Daniel, 291 Kan. at 498, 242 P.3d 1186. Warrantless searches are considered unreasonable unless they fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, such as consent, search incident to lawful arrest, stop and frisk, probable cause plus exigent circumstances, the emergency doctrine, inventory searches, plain view or feel, and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses. State v. Fitzgerald, *235 286 Kan. 1124,\n\nConsensual searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment \u201cbecause it is no doubt reasonable for the police to conduct a search once they have been permitted to do so.\u201d Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250-51, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). In order for a consensual search to be valid, consent must actually be given (either express or implied), and the person giving consent must have (actual or apparent) authority to do so. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 185-86, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990).\n\n291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. But neither the Fourth Amendment nor \u00a7 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights expressly prohibits the use of evidence obtained in violation of their respective protections. 291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. Exclusion is not a personal constitutional right; rather, its purpose is to deter future violations by the State. Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2426; Daniel, 291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. Accordingly, exceptions to the exclusionary rule exist. See 291 Kan. at 492, 242 P.3d 1186.\n\n1127, 192 P.3d 171 (2008). The State bears the burden to prove a warrantless search was lawful. Daniel, 291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. To supplement the bare text of the Fourth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule as a deterrent barring the introduction of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment in criminal prosecutions. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. \u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2426\u201327, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011). In Kansas, our court has similarly recognized the exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings as an appropriate remedy for an unlawful search. See Daniel,\n\nD.D.A. v. State, 650 So.2d 571, 578 (Ala.Cr.App.1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also McLaughlin v. State, 586 So.2d 267, 270 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (the element of \u201cextreme indifference to human life\u201d by definition does not apply to the life of the victim, but to human life in general); Gholston v. State, 494 So.2d 876, 883 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (to be reckless, a crime must be directed toward the general public, not toward a particular person); King v. State, 505 So.2d 403, 405 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (reckless murder \u201cdiffers from intentional murder in that it results not from a specific, conscious intent to cause the death"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Pawn sued Dalton for injuries received when she fell down a stairway in Dalton's apartment building. Pawn, a guest in the building, alleged that she caught the heel of her shoe in a tear in the stair carpet. Pawn calls Witt, a tenant, to testify that Young, another tenant, had said to him a week before Pawn's fall: \"When I paid my rent this morning, I told the manager he had better fix that torn carpet.\" Young's statement, reported by Witt, is",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nA statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant's will. Pa.R.E. 803(3). \u201cPursuant to the state of mind hearsay exception, where a declarant's out-of-court statements demonstrate her state of mind, are made in a natural manner, and are material and relevant, they are admissible pursuant to the exception.\u201d Laich, 777 A.2d at 1060-61.\n\nAxiomatically, and by its unambiguous terms, the exception renders admissible only those statements that reflect the \u201cdeclarant's then-existing state of mind ... or condition,\u201d Pa.R.E. 803(3), not someone else's state of mind or condition. Nothing in the plain terms of the exception would allow, for instance, a party to introduce an out-of-court statement of one person to prove the intent, motive, feelings, pain, or health of another person. The bounds of the exception are limited to the then-existing state of mind of the declarant only.\n\nHowever, prior consistent statements are admissible as non-hearsay if: (1) the individual who made the prior consistent statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; and (2) the statement is offered in an effort to rebut an express or implied accusation of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication. See Chandler, 702 So.2d at 197\u201398; see also \u00a7 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Both conditions must be met for admission of a prior consistent statement as nonhearsay. Harris v. State, 843 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.2003).\n\nHearsay is generally defined as an out-of-court statement made by a declarant and offered for the truth of the matter asserted (see Nucci v. Proper, 95 N.Y.2d 597, 602, 721 N.Y.S.2d 593, 744 N.E.2d 128 [2001]; People v. Buie, 86 N.Y.2d 501, 505, 634 N.Y.S.2d 415, 658 N.E.2d 192 [1995];\n\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nPawn sued Dalton for injuries received when she fell down a stairway in Dalton's apartment building. Pawn, a guest in the building, alleged that she caught the heel of her shoe in a tear in the stair carpet. Pawn calls Witt, a tenant, to testify that Young, another tenant, had said to him a week before Pawn's fall: \"When I paid my rent this morning, I told the manager he had better fix that torn carpet.\" Young's statement, reported by Witt, is\n\n (A) admissible, to prove that the carpet was defective.\n (B) admissible, to prove that Dalton had notice of the defect.\n (C) admissible, to prove both that the carpet was defective and that Dalton had notice of the defect.\n (D) inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "D",
+      "inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_831",
+    "retrieved_docs": "A statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant's will. Pa.R.E. 803(3). \u201cPursuant to the state of mind hearsay exception, where a declarant's out-of-court statements demonstrate her state of mind, are made in a natural manner, and are material and relevant, they are admissible pursuant to the exception.\u201d Laich, 777 A.2d at 1060-61.\n\nAxiomatically, and by its unambiguous terms, the exception renders admissible only those statements that reflect the \u201cdeclarant's then-existing state of mind ... or condition,\u201d Pa.R.E. 803(3), not someone else's state of mind or condition. Nothing in the plain terms of the exception would allow, for instance, a party to introduce an out-of-court statement of one person to prove the intent, motive, feelings, pain, or health of another person. The bounds of the exception are limited to the then-existing state of mind of the declarant only.\n\nHowever, prior consistent statements are admissible as non-hearsay if: (1) the individual who made the prior consistent statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; and (2) the statement is offered in an effort to rebut an express or implied accusation of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication. See Chandler, 702 So.2d at 197\u201398; see also \u00a7 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Both conditions must be met for admission of a prior consistent statement as nonhearsay. Harris v. State, 843 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.2003).\n\nHearsay is generally defined as an out-of-court statement made by a declarant and offered for the truth of the matter asserted (see Nucci v. Proper, 95 N.Y.2d 597, 602, 721 N.Y.S.2d 593, 744 N.E.2d 128 [2001]; People v. Buie, 86 N.Y.2d 501, 505, 634 N.Y.S.2d 415, 658 N.E.2d 192 [1995];\n\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Oscar, owner of Greenacre, conveyed Greenacre by quitclaim deed as a gift to Ann, who did not then record her deed. Later, Oscar conveyed Greenacre by warranty deed to Belle, who paid valuable consideration, knew nothing of Ann's claim, and promptly and properly recorded. Next, Ann recorded her deed. Then Belle conveyed Greenacre by quitclaim deed to her son Cal as a gift. When the possible conflict with Ann was discovered, Cal recorded his deed. Greenacre at all relevant times has been vacant unoccupied land. The recording act of the jurisdiction provides: \"No unrecorded conveyance or mortgage of real property shall be good against subsequent purchasers for value without notice, who shall first record.\" No other statute is applicable. Cal has sued Ann to establish who owns Greenacre. The court will hold for",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nYet the established rule, followed in Maryland, is that proof of color of title is not necessary to establish adverse possession. Color of title is not an element of adverse possession unless made so by statute, as under provisions prescribing a shorter period of limitation than would otherwise be required. While there are a few isolated judicial statements broadly to the effect that color of title, or color of right, is essential to adverse possession, the general rule is well established that, in the absence of contrary statute, color of title is not an essential element of adverse possession and\n\nA life tenant can sell his or her life estate in property. See generally Reeside v. Annex Bldg. Ass'n of Balt. City, 165 Md. 200, 167 A. 72 (1933). The estate as sold becomes an estate pur autre vie (for the life of the original life tenant). Devecmon v. Devecmon, 43 Md. 335, 348 (1875). A life tenant who does not have the power to dispose of the property cannot convey the remainderman's interest, however. Reeside, supra, 165 Md. 200, 167 A. 72. A remainderman likewise can sell his remainder interest in the property, but cannot convey the life tenant's\n\nIt ripened into an incorporeal hereditament when the licensee entered into enjoyment thereof and made expenditures and improvements. Other jurisdictions hold that revocation will not be allowed in such a case unless the licensee be compensated for his improvements. This language supports a conclusion that the holder of an incorporeal hereditament would be considered the holder of a form of property interest entitling it to compensation under Utah law.\n\nAn incorporeal hereditament is \u201c[a]n intangible right in land, such as an easement.\u201d In other contexts, Utah courts have recognized an incorporeal hereditament as an interest in real property. In addressing a case involving a license to prospect and mine ore, the Utah Supreme Court discussed the potential for a mining license to ripen into an incorporeal hereditament and stated: This is not to say that a license is an incorporeal hereditament; it means that the grant was a license as long as it remained executory because it was not in proper form for a conveyance of an incorporeal hereditament.\n\nA deed is not legally effective until it has been delivered. While there is no prescribed method for an effective delivery of a deed, manual transfer of the instrument into the hand of the grantee is neither required to effectuate a valid delivery, nor dispositive of the issue. The term delivery in this regard refers to \u201cnot so much a manual act but the intention of the maker ... existing at the time of the transaction ... and not subject to later change of mind.\u201d \u201cDelivery of a deed includes, not only an act by which the grantor evinces a\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nOscar, owner of Greenacre, conveyed Greenacre by quitclaim deed as a gift to Ann, who did not then record her deed. Later, Oscar conveyed Greenacre by warranty deed to Belle, who paid valuable consideration, knew nothing of Ann's claim, and promptly and properly recorded. Next, Ann recorded her deed. Then Belle conveyed Greenacre by quitclaim deed to her son Cal as a gift. When the possible conflict with Ann was discovered, Cal recorded his deed. Greenacre at all relevant times has been vacant unoccupied land. The recording act of the jurisdiction provides: \"No unrecorded conveyance or mortgage of real property shall be good against subsequent purchasers for value without notice, who shall first record.\" No other statute is applicable. Cal has sued Ann to establish who owns Greenacre. The court will hold for\n\n (A) Cal, because Ann was a donee.\n (B) Cal, because Belle's purchase cut off Ann's rights.\n (C) Ann, because she recorded before Cal.\n (D) Ann, because Cal was a subsequent donee.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "B",
+      "Cal, because Belle's purchase cut off Ann's rights."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_910",
+    "retrieved_docs": "Yet the established rule, followed in Maryland, is that proof of color of title is not necessary to establish adverse possession. Color of title is not an element of adverse possession unless made so by statute, as under provisions prescribing a shorter period of limitation than would otherwise be required. While there are a few isolated judicial statements broadly to the effect that color of title, or color of right, is essential to adverse possession, the general rule is well established that, in the absence of contrary statute, color of title is not an essential element of adverse possession and\n\nA life tenant can sell his or her life estate in property. See generally Reeside v. Annex Bldg. Ass'n of Balt. City, 165 Md. 200, 167 A. 72 (1933). The estate as sold becomes an estate pur autre vie (for the life of the original life tenant). Devecmon v. Devecmon, 43 Md. 335, 348 (1875). A life tenant who does not have the power to dispose of the property cannot convey the remainderman's interest, however. Reeside, supra, 165 Md. 200, 167 A. 72. A remainderman likewise can sell his remainder interest in the property, but cannot convey the life tenant's\n\nIt ripened into an incorporeal hereditament when the licensee entered into enjoyment thereof and made expenditures and improvements. Other jurisdictions hold that revocation will not be allowed in such a case unless the licensee be compensated for his improvements. This language supports a conclusion that the holder of an incorporeal hereditament would be considered the holder of a form of property interest entitling it to compensation under Utah law.\n\nAn incorporeal hereditament is \u201c[a]n intangible right in land, such as an easement.\u201d In other contexts, Utah courts have recognized an incorporeal hereditament as an interest in real property. In addressing a case involving a license to prospect and mine ore, the Utah Supreme Court discussed the potential for a mining license to ripen into an incorporeal hereditament and stated: This is not to say that a license is an incorporeal hereditament; it means that the grant was a license as long as it remained executory because it was not in proper form for a conveyance of an incorporeal hereditament.\n\nA deed is not legally effective until it has been delivered. While there is no prescribed method for an effective delivery of a deed, manual transfer of the instrument into the hand of the grantee is neither required to effectuate a valid delivery, nor dispositive of the issue. The term delivery in this regard refers to \u201cnot so much a manual act but the intention of the maker ... existing at the time of the transaction ... and not subject to later change of mind.\u201d \u201cDelivery of a deed includes, not only an act by which the grantor evinces a"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "The prosecution, in its case in chief, offers evidence that when Miller was arrested one day after the crime, he had a quantity of heroin and a hypodermic needle in his possession. This evidence should be",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nGeneral admissibility. Except as provided in par. (b) 2., evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. This subsection does not exclude the evidence when offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.\n\n\u201cAdmissibility depends on relevance and probative value. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact.\u201d Smith v. Morrison, 47 A.3d 131, 137 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). Evidence, even if relevant, may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the potential prejudice. Unfair prejudice supporting exclusion of relevant evidence means a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or divert the jury's attention away from its duty of\n\ncourt is given the discretion to determine when circumstantial evidence should be admitted. This may require the court to evaluate the evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to determine whether its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. One court provided this observation about a court's discretion to allow circumstantial evidence: As has been frequently said, great latitude is allowed in the reception of circumstantial evidence, the aid of which is constantly required, and therefore, where direct evidence of the fact is wanting, the more the jury can see of the surrounding facts and circumstances, the more correct their\n\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\n\u201cAlthough relevant, evidence may be excluded by the trial court if the court determines that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value.... Of course, [a]ll adverse evidence is damaging to one's case, but it is inadmissible only if it creates undue prejudice so that it threatens an injustice were it to be admitted.... The test for determining whether evidence is unduly prejudicial is not whether it is damaging to the defendant but whether it will improperly arouse the emotions of the jury.... Reversal is required only whe[n] an abuse of discretion is manifest or whe[n] injustice appears\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nMiller is tried for armed robbery of the First Bank of City.\nThe prosecution, in its case in chief, offers evidence that when Miller was arrested one day after the crime, he had a quantity of heroin and a hypodermic needle in his possession. This evidence should be\n\n (A) admitted to prove Miller's motive to commit the crime\n (B) admitted to prove Miller's propensity to commit crimes\n (C) excluded, because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice\n (D) excluded, because such evidence may be offered only to rebut evidence of good character offered by defendant\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "excluded, because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_278",
+    "retrieved_docs": "General admissibility. Except as provided in par. (b) 2., evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. This subsection does not exclude the evidence when offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.\n\n\u201cAdmissibility depends on relevance and probative value. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact.\u201d Smith v. Morrison, 47 A.3d 131, 137 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). Evidence, even if relevant, may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the potential prejudice. Unfair prejudice supporting exclusion of relevant evidence means a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or divert the jury's attention away from its duty of\n\ncourt is given the discretion to determine when circumstantial evidence should be admitted. This may require the court to evaluate the evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to determine whether its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. One court provided this observation about a court's discretion to allow circumstantial evidence: As has been frequently said, great latitude is allowed in the reception of circumstantial evidence, the aid of which is constantly required, and therefore, where direct evidence of the fact is wanting, the more the jury can see of the surrounding facts and circumstances, the more correct their\n\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\n\u201cAlthough relevant, evidence may be excluded by the trial court if the court determines that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value.... Of course, [a]ll adverse evidence is damaging to one's case, but it is inadmissible only if it creates undue prejudice so that it threatens an injustice were it to be admitted.... The test for determining whether evidence is unduly prejudicial is not whether it is damaging to the defendant but whether it will improperly arouse the emotions of the jury.... Reversal is required only whe[n] an abuse of discretion is manifest or whe[n] injustice appears"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "If County defends by offering proof of the advertisement concerning the possibility of multiple awards, should the court admit the evidence?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nIf a contract provision's meaning is uncertain or is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations after analyzing the language and considering extrinsic evidence (if appropriate), the provision is ambiguous. See Jensen v. Lake Jane Estates, 165 Wash.App. 100, 105, 267 P.3d 435 (2011).\n\nunder the doctrine of \u201cpart performance,\u201d which may take an agreement outside of the statute of frauds, **178 there must be an oral agreement that has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and that agreement must be \u201cclear, certain, and unambiguous\u201d in its terms. Rafferty & Towner, Inc. v. NJS Enterprises, LLC, 224 Or.App. 51, 55, 197 P.3d 55 (2008), rev. den., 347 Or. 42, 217 P.3d 688 (2009). Emmert argued that the alleged agreements did not meet that standard. Furthermore, Emmert asserted, any qualifying \u201cpart performance\u201d must be clearly referable to the contract, and Kazlauskas's\n\nattending circumstances, as well as by the words they use. In accordance with the rules for the construction of contracts, where a contract is ambiguous on its face, evidence of the surrounding circumstances and the subsequent conduct of the parties in the execution of the contract is admissible to interpret the contract; and the circumstances in which the parties to a contract are placed are generally admissible where such evidence will shed light upon issues in the case. In many instances, facts can be proved only by circumstantial evidence. Such evidence may in fact be the only means of proving\n\nany definite and seasonable expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance even though it is not a mirror image of the offer unless the acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. However that section still requires a definite expression of acceptance and does not change the basic common law requirement that there must be an objective manifestation of mutual assent. (Ore & Chemical Corp. v. Howard Butcher Trading Co. (E.D.Pa.1978), 455 F.Supp. 1150.)\n\n(a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible \u2014 on behalf of any party \u2014 either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction: (1) furnishing, promising, or offering \u2014 or accepting, promising to accept, or offering to accept \u2014 a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and (2) conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim \u2014 except when offered in a criminal case and when the negotiations related to a claim by a public\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nResponding to County's written advertisement for bids, Tyres was the successful bidder for the sale of tires to County for County's vehicles. Tyres and County entered into a signed, written agreement that specified, \"It is agreed that Tyres will deliver all tires required by this agreement to County, in accordance with the attached bid form and specifications, for a one-year period beginning September 1, 1990.\" Attached to the agreement was a copy of the bid form and specifications. In the written advertisement to which Tyres had responded, but not in the bid form, County had stated, \"Multiple awards may be issued if they are in the best interests of County.\" No definite quantity of tires to be bought by County from Tyres was specified in any of these documents. In January 1991, Tyres learned that County was buying some of its tires from one of Tyres's competitors. Contending that the Tyres-County agreement was a requirements contract, Tyres sued County for the damages caused by County's buying some of its tires from the competitor.\nIf County defends by offering proof of the advertisement concerning the possibility of multiple awards, should the court admit the evidence?\n\n (A) Yes, because the provision in the written agreement, \"all tires required by this agreement,\" is ambiguous.\n (B) Yes, because the advertisement was in writing.\n (C) No, because of the parol evidence rule.\n (D) No, because it would make the contract illusory.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "A",
+      "Yes, because the provision in the written agreement, \"all tires required by this agreement,\" is ambiguous."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_766",
+    "retrieved_docs": "If a contract provision's meaning is uncertain or is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations after analyzing the language and considering extrinsic evidence (if appropriate), the provision is ambiguous. See Jensen v. Lake Jane Estates, 165 Wash.App. 100, 105, 267 P.3d 435 (2011).\n\nunder the doctrine of \u201cpart performance,\u201d which may take an agreement outside of the statute of frauds, **178 there must be an oral agreement that has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and that agreement must be \u201cclear, certain, and unambiguous\u201d in its terms. Rafferty & Towner, Inc. v. NJS Enterprises, LLC, 224 Or.App. 51, 55, 197 P.3d 55 (2008), rev. den., 347 Or. 42, 217 P.3d 688 (2009). Emmert argued that the alleged agreements did not meet that standard. Furthermore, Emmert asserted, any qualifying \u201cpart performance\u201d must be clearly referable to the contract, and Kazlauskas's\n\nattending circumstances, as well as by the words they use. In accordance with the rules for the construction of contracts, where a contract is ambiguous on its face, evidence of the surrounding circumstances and the subsequent conduct of the parties in the execution of the contract is admissible to interpret the contract; and the circumstances in which the parties to a contract are placed are generally admissible where such evidence will shed light upon issues in the case. In many instances, facts can be proved only by circumstantial evidence. Such evidence may in fact be the only means of proving\n\nany definite and seasonable expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance even though it is not a mirror image of the offer unless the acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. However that section still requires a definite expression of acceptance and does not change the basic common law requirement that there must be an objective manifestation of mutual assent. (Ore & Chemical Corp. v. Howard Butcher Trading Co. (E.D.Pa.1978), 455 F.Supp. 1150.)\n\n(a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible \u2014 on behalf of any party \u2014 either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction: (1) furnishing, promising, or offering \u2014 or accepting, promising to accept, or offering to accept \u2014 a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and (2) conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim \u2014 except when offered in a criminal case and when the negotiations related to a claim by a public"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "PullCo sued Davidson, its former vice president, for return of $230,000 that had been embezzled during the previous two years. Called by PullCo as an adverse witness, Davidson testified that his annual salary had been $75,000, and he denied the embezzlement. PullCo calls banker Witt to show that, during the two-year period, Davidson had deposited $250,000 in his bank account. Witt's testimony is",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\npolicy, as well as the relevancy and materiality of the testimony. In the absence of a statute or a valid and binding contractual provision to the contrary, circumstantial evidence is regarded by law as competent to prove any given fact in issue in a civil case and is sometimes as cogent and valuable as direct and positive testimony. Upon the issue of reasonableness of conduct, all the surrounding circumstances become facts material to the case. Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish liability where it negates other reasonable causes for injury. Tort claims may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence.\n\nCircumstantial evidence is evidence that relies on an inference to connect it to a conclusion of fact. Direct evidence, by contrast, supports the truth of a fact without the need for additional evidence or inference. Circumstantial evidence is legal evidence and the jury must consider it when it is sufficient to sustain or negate a party's burden of proof.1 Circumstantial evidence has probative value equal to that of testimonial direct evidence. Many forms of circumstantial evidence have a logical tendency to prove or disprove some fact in issue. They may or may not be admissible depending upon considerations of public\n\n\u201cAdmissibility depends on relevance and probative value. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact.\u201d Smith v. Morrison, 47 A.3d 131, 137 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). Evidence, even if relevant, may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the potential prejudice. Unfair prejudice supporting exclusion of relevant evidence means a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or divert the jury's attention away from its duty of\n\nintent, knowledge, fraud, or illicit sexual relations. Circumstantial evidence must do more than raise a suspicion. It must amount to proof. There must be some reasonable connection between the facts proved and the fact at issue. A fact cannot be established by circumstantial evidence where there is direct, uncontradicted, reasonable, and unimpeached evidence that the fact does not exist. In some instances, circumstantial evidence may outweigh or be more satisfactory or convincing than direct or positive testimony. Circumstantial evidence cannot be based on mere speculation, guess, or conjecture; it must justify an inference of probability as distinguished from possibility. The\n\nCircumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. State v. Lilly, 468 So.2d 1154 (La.1985); State v. Turner, 591 So.2d 391 (La.App. 2d Cir.1991), writ denied, 597 So.2d 1027 (La.1992).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nPullCo sued Davidson, its former vice president, for return of $230,000 that had been embezzled during the previous two years. Called by PullCo as an adverse witness, Davidson testified that his annual salary had been $75,000, and he denied the embezzlement. PullCo calls banker Witt to show that, during the two-year period, Davidson had deposited $250,000 in his bank account. Witt's testimony is\n\n (A) admissible as circumstantial evidence of Davidson's guilt.\n (B) admissible to impeach Davidson.\n (C) inadmissible, because its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value.\n (D) inadmissible, because the deposits could have come from legitimate sources.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "A",
+      "admissible as circumstantial evidence of Davidson's guilt."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_1019",
+    "retrieved_docs": "policy, as well as the relevancy and materiality of the testimony. In the absence of a statute or a valid and binding contractual provision to the contrary, circumstantial evidence is regarded by law as competent to prove any given fact in issue in a civil case and is sometimes as cogent and valuable as direct and positive testimony. Upon the issue of reasonableness of conduct, all the surrounding circumstances become facts material to the case. Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish liability where it negates other reasonable causes for injury. Tort claims may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence.\n\nCircumstantial evidence is evidence that relies on an inference to connect it to a conclusion of fact. Direct evidence, by contrast, supports the truth of a fact without the need for additional evidence or inference. Circumstantial evidence is legal evidence and the jury must consider it when it is sufficient to sustain or negate a party's burden of proof.1 Circumstantial evidence has probative value equal to that of testimonial direct evidence. Many forms of circumstantial evidence have a logical tendency to prove or disprove some fact in issue. They may or may not be admissible depending upon considerations of public\n\n\u201cAdmissibility depends on relevance and probative value. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact.\u201d Smith v. Morrison, 47 A.3d 131, 137 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). Evidence, even if relevant, may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the potential prejudice. Unfair prejudice supporting exclusion of relevant evidence means a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or divert the jury's attention away from its duty of\n\nintent, knowledge, fraud, or illicit sexual relations. Circumstantial evidence must do more than raise a suspicion. It must amount to proof. There must be some reasonable connection between the facts proved and the fact at issue. A fact cannot be established by circumstantial evidence where there is direct, uncontradicted, reasonable, and unimpeached evidence that the fact does not exist. In some instances, circumstantial evidence may outweigh or be more satisfactory or convincing than direct or positive testimony. Circumstantial evidence cannot be based on mere speculation, guess, or conjecture; it must justify an inference of probability as distinguished from possibility. The\n\nCircumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. State v. Lilly, 468 So.2d 1154 (La.1985); State v. Turner, 591 So.2d 391 (La.App. 2d Cir.1991), writ denied, 597 So.2d 1027 (La.1992)."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "The United States Department of Energy regularly transports nuclear materials through Centerville on the way to a nuclear weapons processing plant it operates in a nearby state. The city of Centerville recently adopted an ordinance prohibiting the transportation of any nuclear materials in or through the city. The ordinance declares that its purpose is to protect the health and safety of the residents of that city. May the Department of Energy continue to transport these nuclear materials through the city of Centerville?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nFederal Preemption When state law and federal law conflict, federal law displaces, or preempts, state law, due to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. VI., \u00a7 2. Preemption applies regardless of whether the conflicting laws come from legislatures, courts, administrative agencies, or constitutions. For example, the Voting Rights Act, an act of Congress, preempts state constitutions, and FDA regulations may preempt state court judgments in cases involving prescription drugs. Congress has preempted state regulation in many areas. In some cases, such as medical devices, Congress preempted all state regulation. In others, such as labels on prescription drugs,\n\nCongress allowed federal regulatory agencies to set national minimum standards, but did not preempt state regulations imposing more stringent standards than those imposed by federal regulators. Where rules or regulations do not clearly state whether or not preemption should apply, the Supreme Court tries to follow lawmakers\u2019 intent, and prefers interpretations that avoid preempting state laws.\n\nThe Supremacy Clause restricts the power of state and local governments to regulate federal offices and officeholders. U.S. Const. art. 6, cl. 2.\n\nCongress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S., at 37, 57 S.Ct., at 624, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, Wirtz, supra, at 196, n. 27, 88 S.Ct., at 2024, n. 27.\n\nIn assessing whether a State election law impermissibly burdens First Amendment rights, we examine the character and magnitude of the burden and the extent to which the law serves the State's interests. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). Laws imposing severe burdens must be narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests, but lesser burdens receive less exacting scrutiny. California Democratic Party, 120 S.Ct. at 2412; Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nThe United States Department of Energy regularly transports nuclear materials through Centerville on the way to a nuclear weapons processing plant it operates in a nearby state. The city of Centerville recently adopted an ordinance prohibiting the transportation of any nuclear materials in or through the city. The ordinance declares that its purpose is to protect the health and safety of the residents of that city. May the Department of Energy continue to transport these nuclear materials through the city of Centerville?\n\n (A) No, because the ordinance is rationally related to the public health and safety of Centerville residents.\n (B) No, because the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states certain unenumerated sovereign powers.\n (C) Yes, because the Department of Energy is a federal agency engaged in a lawful federal function and, therefore, its activities may not be regulated by a local government without the consent of Congress.\n (D) Yes, because the ordinance enacted by Centerville is invalid because it denies persons transporting such materials the equal protection of the laws.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "Yes, because the Department of Energy is a federal agency engaged in a lawful federal function and, therefore, its activities may not be regulated by a local government without the consent of Congress."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_798",
+    "retrieved_docs": "Federal Preemption When state law and federal law conflict, federal law displaces, or preempts, state law, due to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. VI., \u00a7 2. Preemption applies regardless of whether the conflicting laws come from legislatures, courts, administrative agencies, or constitutions. For example, the Voting Rights Act, an act of Congress, preempts state constitutions, and FDA regulations may preempt state court judgments in cases involving prescription drugs. Congress has preempted state regulation in many areas. In some cases, such as medical devices, Congress preempted all state regulation. In others, such as labels on prescription drugs,\n\nCongress allowed federal regulatory agencies to set national minimum standards, but did not preempt state regulations imposing more stringent standards than those imposed by federal regulators. Where rules or regulations do not clearly state whether or not preemption should apply, the Supreme Court tries to follow lawmakers\u2019 intent, and prefers interpretations that avoid preempting state laws.\n\nThe Supremacy Clause restricts the power of state and local governments to regulate federal offices and officeholders. U.S. Const. art. 6, cl. 2.\n\nCongress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S., at 37, 57 S.Ct., at 624, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, Wirtz, supra, at 196, n. 27, 88 S.Ct., at 2024, n. 27.\n\nIn assessing whether a State election law impermissibly burdens First Amendment rights, we examine the character and magnitude of the burden and the extent to which the law serves the State's interests. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). Laws imposing severe burdens must be narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests, but lesser burdens receive less exacting scrutiny. California Democratic Party, 120 S.Ct. at 2412; Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "At a party for coworkers at Defendant's home, Victim accused Defendant of making advances toward his wife. Victim and his wife left the party. The next day at work, Defendant saw Victim and struck him on the head with a softdrink bottle. Victim fell into a coma and died two weeks after the incident. This jurisdiction defines aggravated assault as an assault with any weapon or dangerous implement and punishes it as a felony. It defines murder as the unlawful killing of a person with malice aforethought or in the course of an independent felony. Defendant may be found guilty of murder",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nInvoluntary manslaughter is defined as (1) the unintentional killing of another without malice, but while engaged in an unlawful activity not naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm; or (2) the unintentional killing of another without malice, while engaged in a lawful activity with reckless disregard for the safety of others. State v. Crosby, 355 S.C. 47, 51-52, 584 S.E.2d 110, 112 (2003). \u201cTo constitute involuntary manslaughter, there must be a finding of criminal negligence, statutorily defined as a reckless disregard of the safety of others.\u201d Id. at 52, 584 S.E.2d at 112. Further, \u201ca person can be\n\nelements of both offenses because no element of either offense negates an element of the other. Even though reckless murder involves a situation in which the defendant does not intend to kill or injure another person, it does not require that none of his actions be intentional. For example, it does not exclude the possibility that he committed another intentional act, such as setting a fire. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the appellant acted with extreme indifference to human life but did not intend to kill or injure the victim when he threw gasoline around the den;\n\nAn essential element of first-degree murder is malice aforethought. See State v. Lee, 494 N.W.2d 706, 707 (Iowa 1993); see also Iowa Code \u00a7 707.1 (\u201cA person who kills another person with malice aforethought either express or implied commits murder.\u201d). \u201cMalice aforethought\u201d is defined as \u201c \u2018a fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to another that exists before the act is committed.\u2019 \u201d Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d at 49 (citation omitted).\n\nD.D.A. v. State, 650 So.2d 571, 578 (Ala.Cr.App.1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also McLaughlin v. State, 586 So.2d 267, 270 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (the element of \u201cextreme indifference to human life\u201d by definition does not apply to the life of the victim, but to human life in general); Gholston v. State, 494 So.2d 876, 883 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (to be reckless, a crime must be directed toward the general public, not toward a particular person); King v. State, 505 So.2d 403, 405 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (reckless murder \u201cdiffers from intentional murder in that it results not from a specific, conscious intent to cause the death\n\nTo establish assault, the following elements must be proved: (1) the defendant acted either with the intent of making a contact with the person of the plaintiff or with the intent of putting the plaintiff in apprehension of such a contact; (2) the plaintiff was placed in apprehension of an imminent contact with his or her person by the conduct of the defendant; and (3) such contact was or appeared to be harmful or offensive.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nAt a party for coworkers at Defendant's home, Victim accused Defendant of making advances toward his wife. Victim and his wife left the party. The next day at work, Defendant saw Victim and struck him on the head with a softdrink bottle. Victim fell into a coma and died two weeks after the incident. This jurisdiction defines aggravated assault as an assault with any weapon or dangerous implement and punishes it as a felony. It defines murder as the unlawful killing of a person with malice aforethought or in the course of an independent felony. Defendant may be found guilty of murder\n\n (A) only if the jury finds that Defendant intended to kill Victim.\n (B) only if the jury finds that Defendant did not act in a rage provoked by Victim's accusations.\n (C) if the jury finds that Defendant intended either to kill or to inflict serious bodily harm.\n (D) if the jury finds that the killing occurred in the course of an aggravated assault.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "if the jury finds that Defendant intended either to kill or to inflict serious bodily harm."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_653",
+    "retrieved_docs": "Involuntary manslaughter is defined as (1) the unintentional killing of another without malice, but while engaged in an unlawful activity not naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm; or (2) the unintentional killing of another without malice, while engaged in a lawful activity with reckless disregard for the safety of others. State v. Crosby, 355 S.C. 47, 51-52, 584 S.E.2d 110, 112 (2003). \u201cTo constitute involuntary manslaughter, there must be a finding of criminal negligence, statutorily defined as a reckless disregard of the safety of others.\u201d Id. at 52, 584 S.E.2d at 112. Further, \u201ca person can be\n\nelements of both offenses because no element of either offense negates an element of the other. Even though reckless murder involves a situation in which the defendant does not intend to kill or injure another person, it does not require that none of his actions be intentional. For example, it does not exclude the possibility that he committed another intentional act, such as setting a fire. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the appellant acted with extreme indifference to human life but did not intend to kill or injure the victim when he threw gasoline around the den;\n\nAn essential element of first-degree murder is malice aforethought. See State v. Lee, 494 N.W.2d 706, 707 (Iowa 1993); see also Iowa Code \u00a7 707.1 (\u201cA person who kills another person with malice aforethought either express or implied commits murder.\u201d). \u201cMalice aforethought\u201d is defined as \u201c \u2018a fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to another that exists before the act is committed.\u2019 \u201d Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d at 49 (citation omitted).\n\nD.D.A. v. State, 650 So.2d 571, 578 (Ala.Cr.App.1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also McLaughlin v. State, 586 So.2d 267, 270 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (the element of \u201cextreme indifference to human life\u201d by definition does not apply to the life of the victim, but to human life in general); Gholston v. State, 494 So.2d 876, 883 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (to be reckless, a crime must be directed toward the general public, not toward a particular person); King v. State, 505 So.2d 403, 405 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (reckless murder \u201cdiffers from intentional murder in that it results not from a specific, conscious intent to cause the death\n\nTo establish assault, the following elements must be proved: (1) the defendant acted either with the intent of making a contact with the person of the plaintiff or with the intent of putting the plaintiff in apprehension of such a contact; (2) the plaintiff was placed in apprehension of an imminent contact with his or her person by the conduct of the defendant; and (3) such contact was or appeared to be harmful or offensive."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "On cross-examination of Miller, the prosecutor asks Miller whether he was convicted the previous year of tax fraud. This question is",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\ncourt is given the discretion to determine when circumstantial evidence should be admitted. This may require the court to evaluate the evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to determine whether its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. One court provided this observation about a court's discretion to allow circumstantial evidence: As has been frequently said, great latitude is allowed in the reception of circumstantial evidence, the aid of which is constantly required, and therefore, where direct evidence of the fact is wanting, the more the jury can see of the surrounding facts and circumstances, the more correct their\n\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nAs articulated by the Federal Advisory Committee in its Note to Rule 403, the \u201cunfair prejudice\u201d language contained in Rule 403 refers to an undue tendency on the part of admissible evidence to suggest a decision made on an improper basis. \u201cUnfair prejudice refers to the tendency of the proposed evidence to adversely affect the objecting party's position by injecting considerations extraneous to the merits of the lawsuit, such as the jury's bias, sympathy, anger or shock.\u201d People v. Goree, 132 Mich.App. 693, 349 N.W.2d 220 (1984). \u201cUnfair prejudice as used in Rule 403 does not mean the damage to\n\n\u201cAlthough relevant, evidence may be excluded by the trial court if the court determines that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value.... Of course, [a]ll adverse evidence is damaging to one's case, but it is inadmissible only if it creates undue prejudice so that it threatens an injustice were it to be admitted.... The test for determining whether evidence is unduly prejudicial is not whether it is damaging to the defendant but whether it will improperly arouse the emotions of the jury.... Reversal is required only whe[n] an abuse of discretion is manifest or whe[n] injustice appears\n\n\u201cAdmissibility depends on relevance and probative value. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact.\u201d Smith v. Morrison, 47 A.3d 131, 137 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). Evidence, even if relevant, may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the potential prejudice. Unfair prejudice supporting exclusion of relevant evidence means a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or divert the jury's attention away from its duty of\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nMiller is tried for armed robbery of the First Bank of City.\nOn cross-examination of Miller, the prosecutor asks Miller whether he was convicted the previous year of tax fraud. This question is\n\n (A) proper to show that Miller is inclined to lie\n (B) proper to show that Miller is inclined to steal money\n (C) improper, because the conviction has insufficient similarity to the crime charged\n (D) improper, because the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "A",
+      "proper to show that Miller is inclined to lie"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_282",
+    "retrieved_docs": "court is given the discretion to determine when circumstantial evidence should be admitted. This may require the court to evaluate the evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to determine whether its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. One court provided this observation about a court's discretion to allow circumstantial evidence: As has been frequently said, great latitude is allowed in the reception of circumstantial evidence, the aid of which is constantly required, and therefore, where direct evidence of the fact is wanting, the more the jury can see of the surrounding facts and circumstances, the more correct their\n\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nAs articulated by the Federal Advisory Committee in its Note to Rule 403, the \u201cunfair prejudice\u201d language contained in Rule 403 refers to an undue tendency on the part of admissible evidence to suggest a decision made on an improper basis. \u201cUnfair prejudice refers to the tendency of the proposed evidence to adversely affect the objecting party's position by injecting considerations extraneous to the merits of the lawsuit, such as the jury's bias, sympathy, anger or shock.\u201d People v. Goree, 132 Mich.App. 693, 349 N.W.2d 220 (1984). \u201cUnfair prejudice as used in Rule 403 does not mean the damage to\n\n\u201cAlthough relevant, evidence may be excluded by the trial court if the court determines that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value.... Of course, [a]ll adverse evidence is damaging to one's case, but it is inadmissible only if it creates undue prejudice so that it threatens an injustice were it to be admitted.... The test for determining whether evidence is unduly prejudicial is not whether it is damaging to the defendant but whether it will improperly arouse the emotions of the jury.... Reversal is required only whe[n] an abuse of discretion is manifest or whe[n] injustice appears\n\n\u201cAdmissibility depends on relevance and probative value. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact.\u201d Smith v. Morrison, 47 A.3d 131, 137 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). Evidence, even if relevant, may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the potential prejudice. Unfair prejudice supporting exclusion of relevant evidence means a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or divert the jury's attention away from its duty of"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "At the request of police, the teller who was robbed prepared a sketch bearing a strong likeness to Miller, but the teller died in an automobile accident before Miller was arrested. At trial the prosecution offers the sketch. The sketch is",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nHearsay is generally defined as an out-of-court statement made by a declarant and offered for the truth of the matter asserted (see Nucci v. Proper, 95 N.Y.2d 597, 602, 721 N.Y.S.2d 593, 744 N.E.2d 128 [2001]; People v. Buie, 86 N.Y.2d 501, 505, 634 N.Y.S.2d 415, 658 N.E.2d 192 [1995];\n\nAxiomatically, and by its unambiguous terms, the exception renders admissible only those statements that reflect the \u201cdeclarant's then-existing state of mind ... or condition,\u201d Pa.R.E. 803(3), not someone else's state of mind or condition. Nothing in the plain terms of the exception would allow, for instance, a party to introduce an out-of-court statement of one person to prove the intent, motive, feelings, pain, or health of another person. The bounds of the exception are limited to the then-existing state of mind of the declarant only.\n\nA statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant's will. Pa.R.E. 803(3). \u201cPursuant to the state of mind hearsay exception, where a declarant's out-of-court statements demonstrate her state of mind, are made in a natural manner, and are material and relevant, they are admissible pursuant to the exception.\u201d Laich, 777 A.2d at 1060-61.\n\nHowever, prior consistent statements are admissible as non-hearsay if: (1) the individual who made the prior consistent statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; and (2) the statement is offered in an effort to rebut an express or implied accusation of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication. See Chandler, 702 So.2d at 197\u201398; see also \u00a7 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Both conditions must be met for admission of a prior consistent statement as nonhearsay. Harris v. State, 843 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.2003).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nMiller is tried for armed robbery of the First Bank of City.\nAt the request of police, the teller who was robbed prepared a sketch bearing a strong likeness to Miller, but the teller died in an automobile accident before Miller was arrested. At trial the prosecution offers the sketch. The sketch is\n\n (A) admissible as an identification of a person after perceiving him\n (B) admissible as past recollection recorded\n (C) inadmissible as hearsay not within any exception\n (D) inadmissible as an opinion of the teller\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "inadmissible as hearsay not within any exception"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_280",
+    "retrieved_docs": "The Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nHearsay is generally defined as an out-of-court statement made by a declarant and offered for the truth of the matter asserted (see Nucci v. Proper, 95 N.Y.2d 597, 602, 721 N.Y.S.2d 593, 744 N.E.2d 128 [2001]; People v. Buie, 86 N.Y.2d 501, 505, 634 N.Y.S.2d 415, 658 N.E.2d 192 [1995];\n\nAxiomatically, and by its unambiguous terms, the exception renders admissible only those statements that reflect the \u201cdeclarant's then-existing state of mind ... or condition,\u201d Pa.R.E. 803(3), not someone else's state of mind or condition. Nothing in the plain terms of the exception would allow, for instance, a party to introduce an out-of-court statement of one person to prove the intent, motive, feelings, pain, or health of another person. The bounds of the exception are limited to the then-existing state of mind of the declarant only.\n\nA statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant's will. Pa.R.E. 803(3). \u201cPursuant to the state of mind hearsay exception, where a declarant's out-of-court statements demonstrate her state of mind, are made in a natural manner, and are material and relevant, they are admissible pursuant to the exception.\u201d Laich, 777 A.2d at 1060-61.\n\nHowever, prior consistent statements are admissible as non-hearsay if: (1) the individual who made the prior consistent statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; and (2) the statement is offered in an effort to rebut an express or implied accusation of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication. See Chandler, 702 So.2d at 197\u201398; see also \u00a7 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Both conditions must be met for admission of a prior consistent statement as nonhearsay. Harris v. State, 843 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.2003)."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Plaintiff sued Defendant Auto Manufacturing for his wife's death, claiming that a defective steering mechanism on the family car caused it to veer off the road and hit a tree when his wife was driving. Defendant claims that the steering mechanism was damaged in the collision and offers testimony that the deceased wife was intoxicated at the time of the accident. Testimony concerning the wife's intoxication is",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nSimilarly, proximate cause may be proved by circumstantial evidence even though there is no eyewitness evidence. The law does not require every fact and circumstance which make up a case of negligence to be proved by direct and positive testimony or by the testimony of eyewitnesses. Negligence and freedom from contributory negligence may be shown by circumstantial, as well as the conditions and circumstances leading up to and surrounding the incident causing the plaintiff's injury. Similarly, the terms of an oral contract, and the assent of the parties to it, may be shown by the actions of the parties and\n\npolicy, as well as the relevancy and materiality of the testimony. In the absence of a statute or a valid and binding contractual provision to the contrary, circumstantial evidence is regarded by law as competent to prove any given fact in issue in a civil case and is sometimes as cogent and valuable as direct and positive testimony. Upon the issue of reasonableness of conduct, all the surrounding circumstances become facts material to the case. Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish liability where it negates other reasonable causes for injury. Tort claims may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence.\n\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\ncourt is given the discretion to determine when circumstantial evidence should be admitted. This may require the court to evaluate the evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to determine whether its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. One court provided this observation about a court's discretion to allow circumstantial evidence: As has been frequently said, great latitude is allowed in the reception of circumstantial evidence, the aid of which is constantly required, and therefore, where direct evidence of the fact is wanting, the more the jury can see of the surrounding facts and circumstances, the more correct their\n\n\u201cAdmissibility depends on relevance and probative value. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact.\u201d Smith v. Morrison, 47 A.3d 131, 137 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). Evidence, even if relevant, may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the potential prejudice. Unfair prejudice supporting exclusion of relevant evidence means a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or divert the jury's attention away from its duty of\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nPlaintiff sued Defendant Auto Manufacturing for his wife's death, claiming that a defective steering mechanism on the family car caused it to veer off the road and hit a tree when his wife was driving. Defendant claims that the steering mechanism was damaged in the collision and offers testimony that the deceased wife was intoxicated at the time of the accident. Testimony concerning the wife's intoxication is\n\n (A) admissible to provide an alternate explanation of the accident's cause.\n (B) admissible as proper evidence of the wife's character.\n (C) inadmissible, because it is improper to prove character evidence by specific conduct.\n (D) inadmissible, because it is substantially more prejudicial than probative.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "A",
+      "admissible to provide an alternate explanation of the accident's cause."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_1069",
+    "retrieved_docs": "Similarly, proximate cause may be proved by circumstantial evidence even though there is no eyewitness evidence. The law does not require every fact and circumstance which make up a case of negligence to be proved by direct and positive testimony or by the testimony of eyewitnesses. Negligence and freedom from contributory negligence may be shown by circumstantial, as well as the conditions and circumstances leading up to and surrounding the incident causing the plaintiff's injury. Similarly, the terms of an oral contract, and the assent of the parties to it, may be shown by the actions of the parties and\n\npolicy, as well as the relevancy and materiality of the testimony. In the absence of a statute or a valid and binding contractual provision to the contrary, circumstantial evidence is regarded by law as competent to prove any given fact in issue in a civil case and is sometimes as cogent and valuable as direct and positive testimony. Upon the issue of reasonableness of conduct, all the surrounding circumstances become facts material to the case. Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish liability where it negates other reasonable causes for injury. Tort claims may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence.\n\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\ncourt is given the discretion to determine when circumstantial evidence should be admitted. This may require the court to evaluate the evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to determine whether its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. One court provided this observation about a court's discretion to allow circumstantial evidence: As has been frequently said, great latitude is allowed in the reception of circumstantial evidence, the aid of which is constantly required, and therefore, where direct evidence of the fact is wanting, the more the jury can see of the surrounding facts and circumstances, the more correct their\n\n\u201cAdmissibility depends on relevance and probative value. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact.\u201d Smith v. Morrison, 47 A.3d 131, 137 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). Evidence, even if relevant, may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the potential prejudice. Unfair prejudice supporting exclusion of relevant evidence means a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or divert the jury's attention away from its duty of"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "A city owns and operates a large public auditorium. It leases the auditorium to any group that wishes to use it for a meeting, lecture, concert, or contest. Each user must post a damage deposit and pay rent, which is calculated only for the actual time the building is used by the lessee. Reservations are made on a first-come, first-served basis. A private organization that permits only males to serve in its highest offices rented the auditorium for its national convention. The organization planned to install its new officers at that convention. It broadly publicized the event, inviting members of the general public to attend the installation ceremony at the city auditorium. No statute or administrative rule prohibits the organization from restricting its highest offices to men. An appropriate plaintiff sues the private organization seeking to enjoin it from using the city auditorium for the installation of its new officers. The sole claim of the plaintiff is that the use of this auditorium by the organization for the installation ceremony is unconstitutional because the organization disqualifies women from serving in its highest offices. Will the plaintiff prevail?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nIf we determine that a statute treats similarly situated individuals differently, we then evaluate the statute under an equal protection analysis. To determine whether a statute violates equal protection, we will either apply strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review. State v. Hirschfelder, 170 Wash.2d 536, 550, 242 P.3d 876 (2010). Which test applies depends on the classification and rights involved: Suspect classifications, such as race, alienage, and national origin, are subject to strict scrutiny. \u201cStrict scrutiny also applies to laws burdening fundamental rights or liberties.\u201d Intermediate scrutiny applies only if the statute implicates both an important right and\n\nTo prove intentional vote dilution under the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs must show both discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect. York v. City of St. Gabriel, 89 F.Supp.3d 843, 850, 864 (M.D. La. 2015); Backus v. S. Carolina, 857 F.Supp.2d 553, 567 (D.S.C.), summ. aff'd, \u2013\u2013\u2013 U.S. \u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013, 133 S.Ct. 156, 184 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012).\n\nSince the decision of this Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 1883, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835, the principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.\n\nIn analyzing a contract clause claim, a court must consider the following four factors: whether a contractual obligation exists; whether governmental action has impaired that obligation; whether the impairment of the contract is substantial; and whether the government action serves an important public purpose. Kaufman, Litwin & Feinstein v. Edgar, 301 Ill.App.3d 826, 837, 235 Ill.Dec. 183, 704 N.E.2d 756 (1998). The contract clauses notwithstanding, contractual rights remain subject to the police power of the state. Lincoln Towers Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Boozell, 291 Ill.App.3d 965, 968\u201369, 225 Ill.Dec. 909, 684 N.E.2d 900 (1997). The state always retains the authority\n\n291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. But neither the Fourth Amendment nor \u00a7 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights expressly prohibits the use of evidence obtained in violation of their respective protections. 291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. Exclusion is not a personal constitutional right; rather, its purpose is to deter future violations by the State. Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2426; Daniel, 291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. Accordingly, exceptions to the exclusionary rule exist. See 291 Kan. at 492, 242 P.3d 1186.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nA city owns and operates a large public auditorium. It leases the auditorium to any group that wishes to use it for a meeting, lecture, concert, or contest. Each user must post a damage deposit and pay rent, which is calculated only for the actual time the building is used by the lessee. Reservations are made on a first-come, first-served basis. A private organization that permits only males to serve in its highest offices rented the auditorium for its national convention. The organization planned to install its new officers at that convention. It broadly publicized the event, inviting members of the general public to attend the installation ceremony at the city auditorium. No statute or administrative rule prohibits the organization from restricting its highest offices to men. An appropriate plaintiff sues the private organization seeking to enjoin it from using the city auditorium for the installation of its new officers. The sole claim of the plaintiff is that the use of this auditorium by the organization for the installation ceremony is unconstitutional because the organization disqualifies women from serving in its highest offices. Will the plaintiff prevail?\n\n (A) Yes, because the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits such an organization from discriminating against women in any of its activities to which it has invited members of the general public.\n (B) Yes, because the organization's use of the city auditorium for this purpose subjects its conduct to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.\n (C) No, because the freedom of association protected by the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the city from interfering in any way with the organization's use of city facilities.\n (D) No, because this organization is not a state actor and, therefore, its activities are not subject to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "D",
+      "No, because this organization is not a state actor and, therefore, its activities are not subject to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_1167",
+    "retrieved_docs": "If we determine that a statute treats similarly situated individuals differently, we then evaluate the statute under an equal protection analysis. To determine whether a statute violates equal protection, we will either apply strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review. State v. Hirschfelder, 170 Wash.2d 536, 550, 242 P.3d 876 (2010). Which test applies depends on the classification and rights involved: Suspect classifications, such as race, alienage, and national origin, are subject to strict scrutiny. \u201cStrict scrutiny also applies to laws burdening fundamental rights or liberties.\u201d Intermediate scrutiny applies only if the statute implicates both an important right and\n\nTo prove intentional vote dilution under the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs must show both discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect. York v. City of St. Gabriel, 89 F.Supp.3d 843, 850, 864 (M.D. La. 2015); Backus v. S. Carolina, 857 F.Supp.2d 553, 567 (D.S.C.), summ. aff'd, \u2013\u2013\u2013 U.S. \u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013, 133 S.Ct. 156, 184 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012).\n\nSince the decision of this Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 1883, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835, the principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.\n\nIn analyzing a contract clause claim, a court must consider the following four factors: whether a contractual obligation exists; whether governmental action has impaired that obligation; whether the impairment of the contract is substantial; and whether the government action serves an important public purpose. Kaufman, Litwin & Feinstein v. Edgar, 301 Ill.App.3d 826, 837, 235 Ill.Dec. 183, 704 N.E.2d 756 (1998). The contract clauses notwithstanding, contractual rights remain subject to the police power of the state. Lincoln Towers Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Boozell, 291 Ill.App.3d 965, 968\u201369, 225 Ill.Dec. 909, 684 N.E.2d 900 (1997). The state always retains the authority\n\n291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. But neither the Fourth Amendment nor \u00a7 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights expressly prohibits the use of evidence obtained in violation of their respective protections. 291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. Exclusion is not a personal constitutional right; rather, its purpose is to deter future violations by the State. Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2426; Daniel, 291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. Accordingly, exceptions to the exclusionary rule exist. See 291 Kan. at 492, 242 P.3d 1186."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Dexter, a physician, and Caroline, his patient, had sexual intercourse in his office. Caroline is a married woman and if charged with the crime of adultery, her best defense would be which of the following?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nDefenses An individual who has been charged with committing adultery may have a valid legal defense, such as the failure or physical incapacity to consummate the sex act.\n\nintent, knowledge, fraud, or illicit sexual relations. Circumstantial evidence must do more than raise a suspicion. It must amount to proof. There must be some reasonable connection between the facts proved and the fact at issue. A fact cannot be established by circumstantial evidence where there is direct, uncontradicted, reasonable, and unimpeached evidence that the fact does not exist. In some instances, circumstantial evidence may outweigh or be more satisfactory or convincing than direct or positive testimony. Circumstantial evidence cannot be based on mere speculation, guess, or conjecture; it must justify an inference of probability as distinguished from possibility. The\n\npolicy, as well as the relevancy and materiality of the testimony. In the absence of a statute or a valid and binding contractual provision to the contrary, circumstantial evidence is regarded by law as competent to prove any given fact in issue in a civil case and is sometimes as cogent and valuable as direct and positive testimony. Upon the issue of reasonableness of conduct, all the surrounding circumstances become facts material to the case. Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish liability where it negates other reasonable causes for injury. Tort claims may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence.\n\nCircumstantial evidence is evidence that relies on an inference to connect it to a conclusion of fact. Direct evidence, by contrast, supports the truth of a fact without the need for additional evidence or inference. Circumstantial evidence is legal evidence and the jury must consider it when it is sufficient to sustain or negate a party's burden of proof.1 Circumstantial evidence has probative value equal to that of testimonial direct evidence. Many forms of circumstantial evidence have a logical tendency to prove or disprove some fact in issue. They may or may not be admissible depending upon considerations of public\n\ninitiate a criminal prosecution. If a congressional investigation uncovers evidence of criminal activity, however, Congress may refer the matter to the Department of Justice for investigation and, potentially, prosecution. Sometimes, the DOJ investigation predates the congressional investigation. No matter which branch of government moves first to investigate, however, the end result is that a congressional investigation often will run parallel to a criminal investigation. As a result, evidence developed in a congressional investigation might be used by the DOJ in its criminal investigation or in a prosecution. Ultimately, nearly any matter can be anchored in some fashion to Congress\u2019s legislative\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nDexter, a physician, and Caroline, his patient, had sexual intercourse in his office. Caroline is a married woman and if charged with the crime of adultery, her best defense would be which of the following?\n\n (A) She promptly reported the incident to her husband, who condoned her conduct\n (B) Dexter induced her to believe that a natural cure through sexual intercourse was best for her condition.\n (C) Dexter induced her to believe that was pregnant, that childbirth would dangerous to her life, and that he c( abort the pregnancy by sexual in course.\n (D) Dexter induced her to believe he using a medical instrument.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "D",
+      "Dexter induced her to believe he using a medical instrument."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_66",
+    "retrieved_docs": "Defenses An individual who has been charged with committing adultery may have a valid legal defense, such as the failure or physical incapacity to consummate the sex act.\n\nintent, knowledge, fraud, or illicit sexual relations. Circumstantial evidence must do more than raise a suspicion. It must amount to proof. There must be some reasonable connection between the facts proved and the fact at issue. A fact cannot be established by circumstantial evidence where there is direct, uncontradicted, reasonable, and unimpeached evidence that the fact does not exist. In some instances, circumstantial evidence may outweigh or be more satisfactory or convincing than direct or positive testimony. Circumstantial evidence cannot be based on mere speculation, guess, or conjecture; it must justify an inference of probability as distinguished from possibility. The\n\npolicy, as well as the relevancy and materiality of the testimony. In the absence of a statute or a valid and binding contractual provision to the contrary, circumstantial evidence is regarded by law as competent to prove any given fact in issue in a civil case and is sometimes as cogent and valuable as direct and positive testimony. Upon the issue of reasonableness of conduct, all the surrounding circumstances become facts material to the case. Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish liability where it negates other reasonable causes for injury. Tort claims may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence.\n\nCircumstantial evidence is evidence that relies on an inference to connect it to a conclusion of fact. Direct evidence, by contrast, supports the truth of a fact without the need for additional evidence or inference. Circumstantial evidence is legal evidence and the jury must consider it when it is sufficient to sustain or negate a party's burden of proof.1 Circumstantial evidence has probative value equal to that of testimonial direct evidence. Many forms of circumstantial evidence have a logical tendency to prove or disprove some fact in issue. They may or may not be admissible depending upon considerations of public\n\ninitiate a criminal prosecution. If a congressional investigation uncovers evidence of criminal activity, however, Congress may refer the matter to the Department of Justice for investigation and, potentially, prosecution. Sometimes, the DOJ investigation predates the congressional investigation. No matter which branch of government moves first to investigate, however, the end result is that a congressional investigation often will run parallel to a criminal investigation. As a result, evidence developed in a congressional investigation might be used by the DOJ in its criminal investigation or in a prosecution. Ultimately, nearly any matter can be anchored in some fashion to Congress\u2019s legislative"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Anna entered a hospital to undergo surgery and feared that she might not survive. She instructed her lawyer by telephone to prepare a deed conveying Blackacre, a large tract of undeveloped land, as a gift to her nephew, Bernard, who lived in a distant state. Her instructions were followed, and, prior to her surgery, she executed a document in a form sufficient to constitute a deed of conveyance. The deed was recorded by the lawyer promptly and properly as she instructed him to do. The recorded deed was returned to the lawyer by the land record office, Anna, in fact, recovered from her surgery and the lawyer returned the recorded deed to her. Before Anna or the lawyer thought to inform Bernard of the conveyance, Bernard was killed in an auto accident. Bernard's will left all of his estate to a satanic religious cult. Anna was very upset at the prospect of the cult's acquiring Blackacre. The local taxing authority assessed the next real property tax bill on Blackacre to Bernard's estate. Anna brought an appropriate action against Bernard's estate and the cult to set aside the conveyance to Bernard. If Anna loses, it will be because",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nA deed is not legally effective until it has been delivered. While there is no prescribed method for an effective delivery of a deed, manual transfer of the instrument into the hand of the grantee is neither required to effectuate a valid delivery, nor dispositive of the issue. The term delivery in this regard refers to \u201cnot so much a manual act but the intention of the maker ... existing at the time of the transaction ... and not subject to later change of mind.\u201d \u201cDelivery of a deed includes, not only an act by which the grantor evinces a\n\nThus, the party claiming ownership by adverse possession must prove that the following five elements existed concurrently for 20 years: \u201c(1) continuous, (2) hostile or adverse, (3) actual, (4) open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the premises, (5) under claim of title inconsistent with that of the true owner.\u201d Joiner, 85 Ill.2d at 81, 51 Ill.Dec. 662, 421 N.E.2d at 174.\n\nYet the established rule, followed in Maryland, is that proof of color of title is not necessary to establish adverse possession. Color of title is not an element of adverse possession unless made so by statute, as under provisions prescribing a shorter period of limitation than would otherwise be required. While there are a few isolated judicial statements broadly to the effect that color of title, or color of right, is essential to adverse possession, the general rule is well established that, in the absence of contrary statute, color of title is not an essential element of adverse possession and\n\npurpose to part with the control of the instrument, but a concurring intent thereby to vest the title in the grantee.\" \u201cThe controlling question of delivery in all cases is one of intention.\u201d\n\nA life tenant can sell his or her life estate in property. See generally Reeside v. Annex Bldg. Ass'n of Balt. City, 165 Md. 200, 167 A. 72 (1933). The estate as sold becomes an estate pur autre vie (for the life of the original life tenant). Devecmon v. Devecmon, 43 Md. 335, 348 (1875). A life tenant who does not have the power to dispose of the property cannot convey the remainderman's interest, however. Reeside, supra, 165 Md. 200, 167 A. 72. A remainderman likewise can sell his remainder interest in the property, but cannot convey the life tenant's\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nAnna entered a hospital to undergo surgery and feared that she might not survive. She instructed her lawyer by telephone to prepare a deed conveying Blackacre, a large tract of undeveloped land, as a gift to her nephew, Bernard, who lived in a distant state. Her instructions were followed, and, prior to her surgery, she executed a document in a form sufficient to constitute a deed of conveyance. The deed was recorded by the lawyer promptly and properly as she instructed him to do. The recorded deed was returned to the lawyer by the land record office, Anna, in fact, recovered from her surgery and the lawyer returned the recorded deed to her. Before Anna or the lawyer thought to inform Bernard of the conveyance, Bernard was killed in an auto accident. Bernard's will left all of his estate to a satanic religious cult. Anna was very upset at the prospect of the cult's acquiring Blackacre. The local taxing authority assessed the next real property tax bill on Blackacre to Bernard's estate. Anna brought an appropriate action against Bernard's estate and the cult to set aside the conveyance to Bernard. If Anna loses, it will be because\n\n (A) the gift of Blackacre was inter vivos rather than causa mortis.\n (B) the showing of Bernard's estate as the owner of Blackacre on the tax rolls supplied what otherwise would be a missing essential element for a valid conveyance.\n (C) disappointing Bernard's devisee would violate the religious freedom provisions of the First Amendment to the Constitution.\n (D) delivery of the deed is presumed from the recording of the deed.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "D",
+      "delivery of the deed is presumed from the recording of the deed."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_557",
+    "retrieved_docs": "A deed is not legally effective until it has been delivered. While there is no prescribed method for an effective delivery of a deed, manual transfer of the instrument into the hand of the grantee is neither required to effectuate a valid delivery, nor dispositive of the issue. The term delivery in this regard refers to \u201cnot so much a manual act but the intention of the maker ... existing at the time of the transaction ... and not subject to later change of mind.\u201d \u201cDelivery of a deed includes, not only an act by which the grantor evinces a\n\nThus, the party claiming ownership by adverse possession must prove that the following five elements existed concurrently for 20 years: \u201c(1) continuous, (2) hostile or adverse, (3) actual, (4) open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the premises, (5) under claim of title inconsistent with that of the true owner.\u201d Joiner, 85 Ill.2d at 81, 51 Ill.Dec. 662, 421 N.E.2d at 174.\n\nYet the established rule, followed in Maryland, is that proof of color of title is not necessary to establish adverse possession. Color of title is not an element of adverse possession unless made so by statute, as under provisions prescribing a shorter period of limitation than would otherwise be required. While there are a few isolated judicial statements broadly to the effect that color of title, or color of right, is essential to adverse possession, the general rule is well established that, in the absence of contrary statute, color of title is not an essential element of adverse possession and\n\npurpose to part with the control of the instrument, but a concurring intent thereby to vest the title in the grantee.\" \u201cThe controlling question of delivery in all cases is one of intention.\u201d\n\nA life tenant can sell his or her life estate in property. See generally Reeside v. Annex Bldg. Ass'n of Balt. City, 165 Md. 200, 167 A. 72 (1933). The estate as sold becomes an estate pur autre vie (for the life of the original life tenant). Devecmon v. Devecmon, 43 Md. 335, 348 (1875). A life tenant who does not have the power to dispose of the property cannot convey the remainderman's interest, however. Reeside, supra, 165 Md. 200, 167 A. 72. A remainderman likewise can sell his remainder interest in the property, but cannot convey the life tenant's"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "The Sports Championship Revenue Enhancement Act is a federal statute that was enacted as part of a comprehensive program to eliminate the federal budget deficit. That act imposed, for a period of five years, a 50% excise tax on the price of tickets to championship sporting events. Such events included the World Series, the Super Bowl, major college bowl games, and similar championship sports events. This federal tax is probably",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nIt is conceded that a federal excise tax does not cease to be valid merely because it discourages or deters the activities taxed. Nor is the tax invalid because the revenue obtained its negligible. Appellee, however, argues that the sole purpose of the statute is to penalize only illegal gambling in the states through the guise of a tax measure. As with the above excise taxes which we have held to be valid, the instant tax has a regulatory effect. But regardless of its regulatory effect, the wagering tax produces revenue. As such it surpasses both the narcotics and firearms\n\nthat the fact that other motives may impel the exercise of federal taxing power does not authorize the courts to inquire into that subject. If the legislation enacted has some reasonable relation to the exercise of the taxing authority conferred by the Constitution, it cannot be invalidated because of the supposed motives which induced it. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 541, 19 L. Ed. 482, in which case this court sustained a tax on a state bank issue of circulating notes. McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 24 Sup. Ct. 769, 49 L. Ed. 78, 1\n\nThe only limitation upon the power of Congress to levy excise taxes of the character now under consideration is geographical uniformity throughout the United States. This court has often declared it cannot add others. Subject to such limitation Congress may select the subjects of taxation, and may exercise the power conferred at its discretion. License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 471, 18 L. Ed. 497. Of course Congress may not in the exercise of federal power exert authority wholly reserved to the states. Many decisions of this court have so declared. And from an early day the court has held\n\nof deciding whether legislation is appropriate, to information gathering on matters of national importance, to oversight of federal departments and executive agencies. As a result, a congressional committee has broad discretion regarding both the scope of its investigation and the relevance of the information it requests. Although congressional authority to investigate is broad, it is not unlimited. Because Congress\u2019s authority to investigate is tied to its authority to legislate, limits on congressional investigations are necessarily linked to the limits on Congress\u2019s constitutional authority. For example, Congress has no general authority to investigate the purely private affair of an ordinary citizen.\n\nFederal Preemption When state law and federal law conflict, federal law displaces, or preempts, state law, due to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. VI., \u00a7 2. Preemption applies regardless of whether the conflicting laws come from legislatures, courts, administrative agencies, or constitutions. For example, the Voting Rights Act, an act of Congress, preempts state constitutions, and FDA regulations may preempt state court judgments in cases involving prescription drugs. Congress has preempted state regulation in many areas. In some cases, such as medical devices, Congress preempted all state regulation. In others, such as labels on prescription drugs,\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nThe Sports Championship Revenue Enhancement Act is a federal statute that was enacted as part of a comprehensive program to eliminate the federal budget deficit. That act imposed, for a period of five years, a 50% excise tax on the price of tickets to championship sporting events. Such events included the World Series, the Super Bowl, major college bowl games, and similar championship sports events. This federal tax is probably\n\n (A) constitutional, because the compelling national interest in reducing the federal budget deficit justifies this tax as a temporary emergency measure.\n (B) constitutional, because an act of Congress that appears to be a revenue raising measure on its face is not rendered invalid because it may have adverse economic consequences for the activity taxed.\n (C) unconstitutional, because a 50% tax is likely to reduce attendance at championship sporting events and, therefore, is not rationally related to the legitimate interest of Congress in eliminating the budget deficit.\n (D) unconstitutional, because Congress violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment by singling out championship sporting events for this tax while failing to tax other major sporting, artistic, or entertainment events to which tickets are sold.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "B",
+      "constitutional, because an act of Congress that appears to be a revenue raising measure on its face is not rendered invalid because it may have adverse economic consequences for the activity taxed."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_782",
+    "retrieved_docs": "It is conceded that a federal excise tax does not cease to be valid merely because it discourages or deters the activities taxed. Nor is the tax invalid because the revenue obtained its negligible. Appellee, however, argues that the sole purpose of the statute is to penalize only illegal gambling in the states through the guise of a tax measure. As with the above excise taxes which we have held to be valid, the instant tax has a regulatory effect. But regardless of its regulatory effect, the wagering tax produces revenue. As such it surpasses both the narcotics and firearms\n\nthat the fact that other motives may impel the exercise of federal taxing power does not authorize the courts to inquire into that subject. If the legislation enacted has some reasonable relation to the exercise of the taxing authority conferred by the Constitution, it cannot be invalidated because of the supposed motives which induced it. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 541, 19 L. Ed. 482, in which case this court sustained a tax on a state bank issue of circulating notes. McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 24 Sup. Ct. 769, 49 L. Ed. 78, 1\n\nThe only limitation upon the power of Congress to levy excise taxes of the character now under consideration is geographical uniformity throughout the United States. This court has often declared it cannot add others. Subject to such limitation Congress may select the subjects of taxation, and may exercise the power conferred at its discretion. License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 471, 18 L. Ed. 497. Of course Congress may not in the exercise of federal power exert authority wholly reserved to the states. Many decisions of this court have so declared. And from an early day the court has held\n\nof deciding whether legislation is appropriate, to information gathering on matters of national importance, to oversight of federal departments and executive agencies. As a result, a congressional committee has broad discretion regarding both the scope of its investigation and the relevance of the information it requests. Although congressional authority to investigate is broad, it is not unlimited. Because Congress\u2019s authority to investigate is tied to its authority to legislate, limits on congressional investigations are necessarily linked to the limits on Congress\u2019s constitutional authority. For example, Congress has no general authority to investigate the purely private affair of an ordinary citizen.\n\nFederal Preemption When state law and federal law conflict, federal law displaces, or preempts, state law, due to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. VI., \u00a7 2. Preemption applies regardless of whether the conflicting laws come from legislatures, courts, administrative agencies, or constitutions. For example, the Voting Rights Act, an act of Congress, preempts state constitutions, and FDA regulations may preempt state court judgments in cases involving prescription drugs. Congress has preempted state regulation in many areas. In some cases, such as medical devices, Congress preempted all state regulation. In others, such as labels on prescription drugs,"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Alpha's removal of the shed from the parking area of the apartment house is",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nA condition precedent is a condition or an event that must occur before a right, claim, duty, or interests arises. Compare condition subsequent. In a contract, a condition precedent is an event that must occur before the parties are obligated to perform. For example, an insurance contract may require the insurer to pay to rebuild the customer\u2019s home if it is destroyed by fire during the policy period. The fire is a condition precedent. The fire must occur before the insurer is obligated to pay.\n\nA condition subsequent is something that may occur after a promise is made, which will excuse the obligation of a party. An example of such a condition is that the obligation of a buyer to complete a purchase may be excused if a property is damaged by a natural disaster or fire before the close of escrow. That a condition, as opposed to a covenant, exists can often be seen by the use of words such as \u201cif,\u201d \u201cwhen,\u201d \u201cunless,\u201d \u201csubject to,\u201d or \u201cconditional upon.\u201d\n\n\u201c \u2018Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the obligation impossible or highly impracticable.\u2019 \u201d Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, \u00b6 12, 232 P.3d 1081 (emphases omitted) (quoting Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 261 (1981) (\u201cWhere, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which\n\nIf a contract provision's meaning is uncertain or is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations after analyzing the language and considering extrinsic evidence (if appropriate), the provision is ambiguous. See Jensen v. Lake Jane Estates, 165 Wash.App. 100, 105, 267 P.3d 435 (2011).\n\n[A]n implied contract can arise from the acts and conduct of the parties. Such a contract exists when the facts and circumstances surrounding the parties' relationship imply a mutual intention to contract. Every contract requires a meeting of the minds, but the meeting can be implied from and evidenced by the parties' conduct and course of dealing.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nAlpha and Beta made a written contract pursuant to which Alpha promised to convey a specified apartment house to Beta in return for Beta's promise (1) to convey a 100-acre farm to Alpha and (2) to pay Alpha $1,000 in cash six months after the exchange of the apartment house and the farm. The contract contained the following provision: \"It is understood and agreed that Beta's obligation to pay the $1,000 six months after the exchangeof the apartment house and the farm shall be voided if Alpha has not, within three months after the aforesaid exchange, removed the existing shed in the parking area in the rear of the said apartment house.\"\nAlpha's removal of the shed from the parking area of the apartment house is\n\n (A) a condition subsequent in form but precedent in substance to Beta's duty to pay the $1,000\n (B) a condition precedent in form but subsequent in substance to Beta's duty to pay the 1,000\n (C) a condition subsequent to Beta's duty to pay the $1,000\n (D) not a condition, either precedent or subsequent, to Beta's duty to pay the $1,000\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "A",
+      "a condition subsequent in form but precedent in substance to Beta's duty to pay the $1,000"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_138",
+    "retrieved_docs": "A condition precedent is a condition or an event that must occur before a right, claim, duty, or interests arises. Compare condition subsequent. In a contract, a condition precedent is an event that must occur before the parties are obligated to perform. For example, an insurance contract may require the insurer to pay to rebuild the customer\u2019s home if it is destroyed by fire during the policy period. The fire is a condition precedent. The fire must occur before the insurer is obligated to pay.\n\nA condition subsequent is something that may occur after a promise is made, which will excuse the obligation of a party. An example of such a condition is that the obligation of a buyer to complete a purchase may be excused if a property is damaged by a natural disaster or fire before the close of escrow. That a condition, as opposed to a covenant, exists can often be seen by the use of words such as \u201cif,\u201d \u201cwhen,\u201d \u201cunless,\u201d \u201csubject to,\u201d or \u201cconditional upon.\u201d\n\n\u201c \u2018Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the obligation impossible or highly impracticable.\u2019 \u201d Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, \u00b6 12, 232 P.3d 1081 (emphases omitted) (quoting Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 261 (1981) (\u201cWhere, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which\n\nIf a contract provision's meaning is uncertain or is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations after analyzing the language and considering extrinsic evidence (if appropriate), the provision is ambiguous. See Jensen v. Lake Jane Estates, 165 Wash.App. 100, 105, 267 P.3d 435 (2011).\n\n[A]n implied contract can arise from the acts and conduct of the parties. Such a contract exists when the facts and circumstances surrounding the parties' relationship imply a mutual intention to contract. Every contract requires a meeting of the minds, but the meeting can be implied from and evidenced by the parties' conduct and course of dealing."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Denn is on trial for arson. In its case in chief, the prosecution offers evidence that Denn had secretly obtained duplicate insurance from two companies on the property that burned and that Denn had threatened to kill his ex-wife if she testified for the prosecution. The court should admit evidence of",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nGeneral admissibility. Except as provided in par. (b) 2., evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. This subsection does not exclude the evidence when offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.\n\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nAs articulated by the Federal Advisory Committee in its Note to Rule 403, the \u201cunfair prejudice\u201d language contained in Rule 403 refers to an undue tendency on the part of admissible evidence to suggest a decision made on an improper basis. \u201cUnfair prejudice refers to the tendency of the proposed evidence to adversely affect the objecting party's position by injecting considerations extraneous to the merits of the lawsuit, such as the jury's bias, sympathy, anger or shock.\u201d People v. Goree, 132 Mich.App. 693, 349 N.W.2d 220 (1984). \u201cUnfair prejudice as used in Rule 403 does not mean the damage to\n\n\u201cAdmissibility depends on relevance and probative value. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact.\u201d Smith v. Morrison, 47 A.3d 131, 137 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). Evidence, even if relevant, may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the potential prejudice. Unfair prejudice supporting exclusion of relevant evidence means a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or divert the jury's attention away from its duty of\n\n(a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible \u2014 on behalf of any party \u2014 either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction: (1) furnishing, promising, or offering \u2014 or accepting, promising to accept, or offering to accept \u2014 a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and (2) conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim \u2014 except when offered in a criminal case and when the negotiations related to a claim by a public\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nDenn is on trial for arson. In its case in chief, the prosecution offers evidence that Denn had secretly obtained duplicate insurance from two companies on the property that burned and that Denn had threatened to kill his ex-wife if she testified for the prosecution. The court should admit evidence of\n\n (A) Denn's obtaining duplicate insurance only.\n (B) Denn's threatening to kill his ex-wife only.\n (C) both Denn's obtaining duplicate insurance and threatening to kill his ex-wife.\n (D) neither Denn's obtaining duplicate insurance nor threatening to kill his ex-wife.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "both Denn's obtaining duplicate insurance and threatening to kill his ex-wife."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_734",
+    "retrieved_docs": "General admissibility. Except as provided in par. (b) 2., evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. This subsection does not exclude the evidence when offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.\n\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nAs articulated by the Federal Advisory Committee in its Note to Rule 403, the \u201cunfair prejudice\u201d language contained in Rule 403 refers to an undue tendency on the part of admissible evidence to suggest a decision made on an improper basis. \u201cUnfair prejudice refers to the tendency of the proposed evidence to adversely affect the objecting party's position by injecting considerations extraneous to the merits of the lawsuit, such as the jury's bias, sympathy, anger or shock.\u201d People v. Goree, 132 Mich.App. 693, 349 N.W.2d 220 (1984). \u201cUnfair prejudice as used in Rule 403 does not mean the damage to\n\n\u201cAdmissibility depends on relevance and probative value. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact.\u201d Smith v. Morrison, 47 A.3d 131, 137 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). Evidence, even if relevant, may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the potential prejudice. Unfair prejudice supporting exclusion of relevant evidence means a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or divert the jury's attention away from its duty of\n\n(a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible \u2014 on behalf of any party \u2014 either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction: (1) furnishing, promising, or offering \u2014 or accepting, promising to accept, or offering to accept \u2014 a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and (2) conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim \u2014 except when offered in a criminal case and when the negotiations related to a claim by a public"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Grace, while baby-sitting one night, noticed that Sam, who lived next door, had left his house but that the door did not close completely behind him. Grace said to Roy, the 11-year-old boy she was baby-sitting with, \"Let's play a game. You go next door and see if you can find my portable television set, which I lent to Sam, and bring it over here.\" Grace knew that Sam had a portable television set and Grace planned to keep the set for herself. Roy thought the set belonged to Grace, went next door, found the television set, and carried it out the front door. At that moment, Sam returned home and discovered Roy in his front yard with the television set. Roy explained the \"game\" he and Grace were playing. Sam took back his television set and called the police. Grace is",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nLarceny is an element of robbery, and \u201c \u2018there can be no robbery without a larcenous intent....\u2019 \u201d Hook v. State, 315 Md. 25, 30, 553 A.2d 233 (1989) (citation omitted). Therefore, the elements of larceny are important to an understanding of robbery. Larceny is defined as \u201c \u2018the fraudulent taking and carrying away of a thing without claim of right with the intention of converting it to a use other than that of the owner without his consent.\u2019 \u201d Metheny, 359 Md. at 605, 755 A.2d 1088 (quoting Hook, 315 Md. at 31, 553 A.2d 233)(emphasis in Hook ).\n\nLarceny is the fraudulent and wrongful taking and carrying away the property of another with intent to convert such property to the taker's use without the consent of the owner. Lucero v. Montes, 177 B.R. 325, 331 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1994). ; \u2018[A]n accomplice is one who aids or promotes the perpetrator's crime with knowledge of the perpetrator's unlawful purpose and an intent to assist in the commission of the target crime....\u2019 [Citation.] \u2018In order to be an accomplice, the witness must be chargeable with the crime as a principal (\u00a7 31) and not merely as an accessory after the fact (\u00a7\u00a7 32,\n\nConversion is the unauthorized and unlawful assumption and exercise of dominion and control over the personal property of another to the exclusion of, or inconsistent with, the owner's rights. Waisath v. Lack's Stores, Inc., 474 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex.1971). The elements of conversion are: (1) the plaintiff owned, had legal possession of, or was entitled to possession of the property; (2) the defendant assumed and exercised dominion and control *387 over the property in an unlawful and unauthorized manner, to the exclusion of and inconsistent with the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the defendant refused the plaintiff's demand for return of\n\nFor these reasons, we reaffirm today that damages measured by diminution in value are an adequate and appropriate remedy for negligent harm to real or personal property, and that mental anguish based solely on negligent property damage is not compensable as a matter of law. The proper measure of Likes's damages\u2014although she cannot recover on those claims for which the City has sovereign immunity from suit for property damages\u2014is (1) the loss in market value of her property caused by the defendant's negligence and (2) for those items of small or no market value that \u201chave their primary value in\n\nThus, the party claiming ownership by adverse possession must prove that the following five elements existed concurrently for 20 years: \u201c(1) continuous, (2) hostile or adverse, (3) actual, (4) open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the premises, (5) under claim of title inconsistent with that of the true owner.\u201d Joiner, 85 Ill.2d at 81, 51 Ill.Dec. 662, 421 N.E.2d at 174.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nGrace, while baby-sitting one night, noticed that Sam, who lived next door, had left his house but that the door did not close completely behind him. Grace said to Roy, the 11-year-old boy she was baby-sitting with, \"Let's play a game. You go next door and see if you can find my portable television set, which I lent to Sam, and bring it over here.\" Grace knew that Sam had a portable television set and Grace planned to keep the set for herself. Roy thought the set belonged to Grace, went next door, found the television set, and carried it out the front door. At that moment, Sam returned home and discovered Roy in his front yard with the television set. Roy explained the \"game\" he and Grace were playing. Sam took back his television set and called the police. Grace is\n\n (A) not guilty of larceny or attempted larceny, because Roy did not commit any crime.\n (B) not guilty of larceny but guilty of attempted larceny, because she never acquired possession of the television set.\n (C) guilty of larceny as an accessory to Roy.\n (D) guilty of larceny by the use of an innocent agent.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "D",
+      "guilty of larceny by the use of an innocent agent."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_1101",
+    "retrieved_docs": "Larceny is an element of robbery, and \u201c \u2018there can be no robbery without a larcenous intent....\u2019 \u201d Hook v. State, 315 Md. 25, 30, 553 A.2d 233 (1989) (citation omitted). Therefore, the elements of larceny are important to an understanding of robbery. Larceny is defined as \u201c \u2018the fraudulent taking and carrying away of a thing without claim of right with the intention of converting it to a use other than that of the owner without his consent.\u2019 \u201d Metheny, 359 Md. at 605, 755 A.2d 1088 (quoting Hook, 315 Md. at 31, 553 A.2d 233)(emphasis in Hook ).\n\nLarceny is the fraudulent and wrongful taking and carrying away the property of another with intent to convert such property to the taker's use without the consent of the owner. Lucero v. Montes, 177 B.R. 325, 331 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1994). ; \u2018[A]n accomplice is one who aids or promotes the perpetrator's crime with knowledge of the perpetrator's unlawful purpose and an intent to assist in the commission of the target crime....\u2019 [Citation.] \u2018In order to be an accomplice, the witness must be chargeable with the crime as a principal (\u00a7 31) and not merely as an accessory after the fact (\u00a7\u00a7 32,\n\nConversion is the unauthorized and unlawful assumption and exercise of dominion and control over the personal property of another to the exclusion of, or inconsistent with, the owner's rights. Waisath v. Lack's Stores, Inc., 474 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex.1971). The elements of conversion are: (1) the plaintiff owned, had legal possession of, or was entitled to possession of the property; (2) the defendant assumed and exercised dominion and control *387 over the property in an unlawful and unauthorized manner, to the exclusion of and inconsistent with the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the defendant refused the plaintiff's demand for return of\n\nFor these reasons, we reaffirm today that damages measured by diminution in value are an adequate and appropriate remedy for negligent harm to real or personal property, and that mental anguish based solely on negligent property damage is not compensable as a matter of law. The proper measure of Likes's damages\u2014although she cannot recover on those claims for which the City has sovereign immunity from suit for property damages\u2014is (1) the loss in market value of her property caused by the defendant's negligence and (2) for those items of small or no market value that \u201chave their primary value in\n\nThus, the party claiming ownership by adverse possession must prove that the following five elements existed concurrently for 20 years: \u201c(1) continuous, (2) hostile or adverse, (3) actual, (4) open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the premises, (5) under claim of title inconsistent with that of the true owner.\u201d Joiner, 85 Ill.2d at 81, 51 Ill.Dec. 662, 421 N.E.2d at 174."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Sam told Horace, his neighbor, that he was going away for two weeks and asked Horace to keep an eye on his house. Horace agreed. Sam gave Horace a key to use to check on the house. Horace decided to have a party in Sam's house. He invited a number of friends. One friend, Lewis, went into Sam's bedroom, took some of Sam's rings, and put them in his pocket. Which of the following is true?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nConversion is the unauthorized and unlawful assumption and exercise of dominion and control over the personal property of another to the exclusion of, or inconsistent with, the owner's rights. Waisath v. Lack's Stores, Inc., 474 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex.1971). The elements of conversion are: (1) the plaintiff owned, had legal possession of, or was entitled to possession of the property; (2) the defendant assumed and exercised dominion and control *387 over the property in an unlawful and unauthorized manner, to the exclusion of and inconsistent with the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the defendant refused the plaintiff's demand for return of\n\nLarceny is an element of robbery, and \u201c \u2018there can be no robbery without a larcenous intent....\u2019 \u201d Hook v. State, 315 Md. 25, 30, 553 A.2d 233 (1989) (citation omitted). Therefore, the elements of larceny are important to an understanding of robbery. Larceny is defined as \u201c \u2018the fraudulent taking and carrying away of a thing without claim of right with the intention of converting it to a use other than that of the owner without his consent.\u2019 \u201d Metheny, 359 Md. at 605, 755 A.2d 1088 (quoting Hook, 315 Md. at 31, 553 A.2d 233)(emphasis in Hook ).\n\nLarceny is the fraudulent and wrongful taking and carrying away the property of another with intent to convert such property to the taker's use without the consent of the owner. Lucero v. Montes, 177 B.R. 325, 331 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1994). ; \u2018[A]n accomplice is one who aids or promotes the perpetrator's crime with knowledge of the perpetrator's unlawful purpose and an intent to assist in the commission of the target crime....\u2019 [Citation.] \u2018In order to be an accomplice, the witness must be chargeable with the crime as a principal (\u00a7 31) and not merely as an accessory after the fact (\u00a7\u00a7 32,\n\nthat the appellant acted intentionally when he started the fire; and that the victim died as a result of both of the appellant's actions. Therefore, the verdicts were not mutually exclusive. Cf. Martinez v. State, [Ms. CR-05-1669, March 2, 2007] --- So.2d ----, ---- (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (opinion on return to remand) (applying Heard and holding that the jury's verdicts were mutually exclusive because a single act cannot be both negligent and reckless). Accordingly, the appellant's argument is without merit, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.\n\nsentiment,\u201d Brown v. Frontier Theatres, 369 S.W.2d at 305, the loss in value to her. Because the injury to Likes's property was not intentional or malicious, or even grossly negligent, we need not decide whether mental anguish arising out of property damage may be legally compensable when a heightened degree of misconduct is found. Compare Luna, 667 S.W.2d at 117 (stating in dicta that mental anguish is recoverable for \u201cwillful tort, willful and wanton disregard, or gross negligence\u201d), with Reinhardt Motors, Inc. v. Boston, 516 So.2d 509, 511 (Ala.1986) (limiting mental anguish for property damage to cases in which the\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nSam told Horace, his neighbor, that he was going away for two weeks and asked Horace to keep an eye on his house. Horace agreed. Sam gave Horace a key to use to check on the house. Horace decided to have a party in Sam's house. He invited a number of friends. One friend, Lewis, went into Sam's bedroom, took some of Sam's rings, and put them in his pocket. Which of the following is true?\n\n (A) Horace and Lewis are guilty of burglary.\n (B) Horace is guilty of burglary and Lewis is guilty of larceny.\n (C) Horace is guilty of trespass and Lewis is guilty of larceny.\n (D) Lewis is guilty of larceny and Horace is not guilty of any crime.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "D",
+      "Lewis is guilty of larceny and Horace is not guilty of any crime."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_850",
+    "retrieved_docs": "Conversion is the unauthorized and unlawful assumption and exercise of dominion and control over the personal property of another to the exclusion of, or inconsistent with, the owner's rights. Waisath v. Lack's Stores, Inc., 474 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex.1971). The elements of conversion are: (1) the plaintiff owned, had legal possession of, or was entitled to possession of the property; (2) the defendant assumed and exercised dominion and control *387 over the property in an unlawful and unauthorized manner, to the exclusion of and inconsistent with the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the defendant refused the plaintiff's demand for return of\n\nLarceny is an element of robbery, and \u201c \u2018there can be no robbery without a larcenous intent....\u2019 \u201d Hook v. State, 315 Md. 25, 30, 553 A.2d 233 (1989) (citation omitted). Therefore, the elements of larceny are important to an understanding of robbery. Larceny is defined as \u201c \u2018the fraudulent taking and carrying away of a thing without claim of right with the intention of converting it to a use other than that of the owner without his consent.\u2019 \u201d Metheny, 359 Md. at 605, 755 A.2d 1088 (quoting Hook, 315 Md. at 31, 553 A.2d 233)(emphasis in Hook ).\n\nLarceny is the fraudulent and wrongful taking and carrying away the property of another with intent to convert such property to the taker's use without the consent of the owner. Lucero v. Montes, 177 B.R. 325, 331 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1994). ; \u2018[A]n accomplice is one who aids or promotes the perpetrator's crime with knowledge of the perpetrator's unlawful purpose and an intent to assist in the commission of the target crime....\u2019 [Citation.] \u2018In order to be an accomplice, the witness must be chargeable with the crime as a principal (\u00a7 31) and not merely as an accessory after the fact (\u00a7\u00a7 32,\n\nthat the appellant acted intentionally when he started the fire; and that the victim died as a result of both of the appellant's actions. Therefore, the verdicts were not mutually exclusive. Cf. Martinez v. State, [Ms. CR-05-1669, March 2, 2007] --- So.2d ----, ---- (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (opinion on return to remand) (applying Heard and holding that the jury's verdicts were mutually exclusive because a single act cannot be both negligent and reckless). Accordingly, the appellant's argument is without merit, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.\n\nsentiment,\u201d Brown v. Frontier Theatres, 369 S.W.2d at 305, the loss in value to her. Because the injury to Likes's property was not intentional or malicious, or even grossly negligent, we need not decide whether mental anguish arising out of property damage may be legally compensable when a heightened degree of misconduct is found. Compare Luna, 667 S.W.2d at 117 (stating in dicta that mental anguish is recoverable for \u201cwillful tort, willful and wanton disregard, or gross negligence\u201d), with Reinhardt Motors, Inc. v. Boston, 516 So.2d 509, 511 (Ala.1986) (limiting mental anguish for property damage to cases in which the"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "After cashing the check, Ames sued Bell for $200. Ames probably will",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nIt is also well settled that even if the owner proves the existence of the defects or omissions and the cost of repairing them, he is nevertheless barred from recovering the cost thereof if he accepted the work despite the patent defects or imperfections discoverable upon reasonable inspection. Acceptance, however, does not bar the owner from recovering for defects not readily discoverable by ordinary inspection, or for defects which manifest themselves subsequent to the acceptance, or for defects which are explicitly excluded from the terms of the acceptance.\n\nIn an action for breach of contract, the injured party is entitled to the benefit of the bargain, and the recovery may include the profits which he would have derived from performance of the contract. See Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 116 (2d Cir.1976). New York law, which controls here, permits recovery of lost future profits as damages, but only under rigorous rules: First, it must be demonstrated with certainty that such damages have been caused by the breach and, second, the alleged loss must be capable of proof with reasonable certainty. In other words,\n\nTo qualify as a third-party beneficiary, a party must show that it is either a \u201cdonee\u201d or \u201ccreditor\u201d beneficiary of the contract. Id. at 651. A party is a donee beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract, when rendered, is a \u201cpure donation\u201d to that party. Id. On the other hand, a party is a creditor beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract is rendered in satisfaction of a legal duty owed to that party. Id. The legal duty may be an indebtedness, contractual obligation, or other legally enforceable commitment owed to the third party. Id. Based on\n\n(a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible \u2014 on behalf of any party \u2014 either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction: (1) furnishing, promising, or offering \u2014 or accepting, promising to accept, or offering to accept \u2014 a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and (2) conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim \u2014 except when offered in a criminal case and when the negotiations related to a claim by a public\n\nAccordingly, breach of contract remedies are available to a buyer when the seller fails to make any delivery. S.W. Bell, 811 S.W.2d at 576. In contrast, breach of warranty remedies are available to a buyer who has received and accepted goods, but discovers they are defective in some manner. Id. In other words, when a party fails to deliver the goods as promised, a breach of contract occurs. See Chilton Ins. Co. v. Pate & Pate Enter., Inc., 930 S.W.2d 877, 890 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied). Conversely, when a seller delivers nonconforming goods, it is a breach of warranty.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nAmes had painted Bell's house under a contract which called for payment of $2,000. Bell, contending in good faith that the porch had not been painted properly, refused to pay anything. On June 15, Ames mailed a letter to Bell stating, \"I am in serious need of money. Please send the $2,000 to me before July 1.\" On June 18, Bell replied, \"I will settle for $1,800 provided you agree to repaint the porch.\" Ames did not reply to this letter. Thereafter Bell mailed a check for $1,800 marked \"Payment in full on the Ames-Bell painting contract as per letter dated June 18.\" Ames received the check on June 30. Because he was badly in need of money, Ames cashed the check without objection and spent the proceeds but has refused to repaint the porch.\nAfter cashing the check, Ames sued Bell for $200. Ames probably will\n\n (A) succeed if he can prove that he had painted the porch according to specifications\n (B) succeed, because he cashed the check under economic duress\n (C) not succeed, because he cashed the check without objection\n (D) not succeed, because he is entitled to recover only the reasonable value of his services\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "not succeed, because he cashed the check without objection"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_157",
+    "retrieved_docs": "It is also well settled that even if the owner proves the existence of the defects or omissions and the cost of repairing them, he is nevertheless barred from recovering the cost thereof if he accepted the work despite the patent defects or imperfections discoverable upon reasonable inspection. Acceptance, however, does not bar the owner from recovering for defects not readily discoverable by ordinary inspection, or for defects which manifest themselves subsequent to the acceptance, or for defects which are explicitly excluded from the terms of the acceptance.\n\nIn an action for breach of contract, the injured party is entitled to the benefit of the bargain, and the recovery may include the profits which he would have derived from performance of the contract. See Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 116 (2d Cir.1976). New York law, which controls here, permits recovery of lost future profits as damages, but only under rigorous rules: First, it must be demonstrated with certainty that such damages have been caused by the breach and, second, the alleged loss must be capable of proof with reasonable certainty. In other words,\n\nTo qualify as a third-party beneficiary, a party must show that it is either a \u201cdonee\u201d or \u201ccreditor\u201d beneficiary of the contract. Id. at 651. A party is a donee beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract, when rendered, is a \u201cpure donation\u201d to that party. Id. On the other hand, a party is a creditor beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract is rendered in satisfaction of a legal duty owed to that party. Id. The legal duty may be an indebtedness, contractual obligation, or other legally enforceable commitment owed to the third party. Id. Based on\n\n(a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible \u2014 on behalf of any party \u2014 either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction: (1) furnishing, promising, or offering \u2014 or accepting, promising to accept, or offering to accept \u2014 a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and (2) conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim \u2014 except when offered in a criminal case and when the negotiations related to a claim by a public\n\nAccordingly, breach of contract remedies are available to a buyer when the seller fails to make any delivery. S.W. Bell, 811 S.W.2d at 576. In contrast, breach of warranty remedies are available to a buyer who has received and accepted goods, but discovers they are defective in some manner. Id. In other words, when a party fails to deliver the goods as promised, a breach of contract occurs. See Chilton Ins. Co. v. Pate & Pate Enter., Inc., 930 S.W.2d 877, 890 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied). Conversely, when a seller delivers nonconforming goods, it is a breach of warranty."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "In exchange for a valid and sufficient consideration, Goodbar orally promised Walker, who had no car and wanted a minivan, \"to pay to anyone from whom you buy a minivan within the next six months the full purchase-price thereof.\" Two months later, Walker bought a used minivan on credit from Minivanity Fair, Inc., for $8,000. At the time, Minivanity Fair was unaware of Goodbar's earlier promise to Walker, but learned of it shortly after the sale. Can Minivanity Fair enforce Goodbar's promise to Walker?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nunder the doctrine of \u201cpart performance,\u201d which may take an agreement outside of the statute of frauds, **178 there must be an oral agreement that has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and that agreement must be \u201cclear, certain, and unambiguous\u201d in its terms. Rafferty & Towner, Inc. v. NJS Enterprises, LLC, 224 Or.App. 51, 55, 197 P.3d 55 (2008), rev. den., 347 Or. 42, 217 P.3d 688 (2009). Emmert argued that the alleged agreements did not meet that standard. Furthermore, Emmert asserted, any qualifying \u201cpart performance\u201d must be clearly referable to the contract, and Kazlauskas's\n\nUnder the preexisting duty rule, it is well settled that doing what one is legally bound to do is not consideration for a new promise. Puett v. Walker, 332 Mich. 117, 122, 50 N.W.2d 740 (1952). This rule bars the modification of an existing contractual relationship when the purported consideration for the modification consists of the performance or promise to perform that which one party was already required to do under the terms of the existing agreement. Borg\u2013Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Dep't of State, 433 Mich. 16, 22, n. 3, 444 N.W.2d 786 (1989).\n\nTo qualify as a third-party beneficiary, a party must show that it is either a \u201cdonee\u201d or \u201ccreditor\u201d beneficiary of the contract. Id. at 651. A party is a donee beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract, when rendered, is a \u201cpure donation\u201d to that party. Id. On the other hand, a party is a creditor beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract is rendered in satisfaction of a legal duty owed to that party. Id. The legal duty may be an indebtedness, contractual obligation, or other legally enforceable commitment owed to the third party. Id. Based on\n\n\u201c \u2018Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the obligation impossible or highly impracticable.\u2019 \u201d Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, \u00b6 12, 232 P.3d 1081 (emphases omitted) (quoting Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 261 (1981) (\u201cWhere, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which\n\nFor a third-party beneficiary to succeed on a breach of contract claim under New York law, \u201ca non-party must be the intended beneficiary of the contract, not an incidental beneficiary to whom no duty is owed.\u201d Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 251 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 728 F.2d 52, 63 (2d Cir. 1984)). The non-party \u201cmust establish (1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for his or her benefit, and (3) that the benefit to him or\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nIn exchange for a valid and sufficient consideration, Goodbar orally promised Walker, who had no car and wanted a minivan, \"to pay to anyone from whom you buy a minivan within the next six months the full purchase-price thereof.\" Two months later, Walker bought a used minivan on credit from Minivanity Fair, Inc., for $8,000. At the time, Minivanity Fair was unaware of Goodbar's earlier promise to Walker, but learned of it shortly after the sale. Can Minivanity Fair enforce Goodbar's promise to Walker?\n\n (A) Yes, under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.\n (B) Yes, because Minivanity Fair is an intended beneficiary of the Goodbar- Walker contract.\n (C) No, because Goodbar's promise to Walker is unenforceable under the suretyship clause of the statute of frauds.\n (D) No, because Minivanity Fair was neither identified when Goodbar's promise was made nor aware of it when the minivan- sale was made.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "B",
+      "Yes, because Minivanity Fair is an intended beneficiary of the Goodbar- Walker contract."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_1165",
+    "retrieved_docs": "under the doctrine of \u201cpart performance,\u201d which may take an agreement outside of the statute of frauds, **178 there must be an oral agreement that has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and that agreement must be \u201cclear, certain, and unambiguous\u201d in its terms. Rafferty & Towner, Inc. v. NJS Enterprises, LLC, 224 Or.App. 51, 55, 197 P.3d 55 (2008), rev. den., 347 Or. 42, 217 P.3d 688 (2009). Emmert argued that the alleged agreements did not meet that standard. Furthermore, Emmert asserted, any qualifying \u201cpart performance\u201d must be clearly referable to the contract, and Kazlauskas's\n\nUnder the preexisting duty rule, it is well settled that doing what one is legally bound to do is not consideration for a new promise. Puett v. Walker, 332 Mich. 117, 122, 50 N.W.2d 740 (1952). This rule bars the modification of an existing contractual relationship when the purported consideration for the modification consists of the performance or promise to perform that which one party was already required to do under the terms of the existing agreement. Borg\u2013Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Dep't of State, 433 Mich. 16, 22, n. 3, 444 N.W.2d 786 (1989).\n\nTo qualify as a third-party beneficiary, a party must show that it is either a \u201cdonee\u201d or \u201ccreditor\u201d beneficiary of the contract. Id. at 651. A party is a donee beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract, when rendered, is a \u201cpure donation\u201d to that party. Id. On the other hand, a party is a creditor beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract is rendered in satisfaction of a legal duty owed to that party. Id. The legal duty may be an indebtedness, contractual obligation, or other legally enforceable commitment owed to the third party. Id. Based on\n\n\u201c \u2018Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the obligation impossible or highly impracticable.\u2019 \u201d Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, \u00b6 12, 232 P.3d 1081 (emphases omitted) (quoting Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 261 (1981) (\u201cWhere, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which\n\nFor a third-party beneficiary to succeed on a breach of contract claim under New York law, \u201ca non-party must be the intended beneficiary of the contract, not an incidental beneficiary to whom no duty is owed.\u201d Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 251 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 728 F.2d 52, 63 (2d Cir. 1984)). The non-party \u201cmust establish (1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for his or her benefit, and (3) that the benefit to him or"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "In a collision case, Plaintiff offers in evidence a photograph showing the scene of the accident while the cars were still in place. A proper foundation must include, as a minimum, testimony by which of the following?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nHowever, before an exhibit can be offered into evidence, you must prove to the court that it is authentic, which is known as laying the foundation. This simply means that you must demonstrate to the court that you have the knowledge sufficient to prove that the exhibit is authentic.\n\nSimilarly, proximate cause may be proved by circumstantial evidence even though there is no eyewitness evidence. The law does not require every fact and circumstance which make up a case of negligence to be proved by direct and positive testimony or by the testimony of eyewitnesses. Negligence and freedom from contributory negligence may be shown by circumstantial, as well as the conditions and circumstances leading up to and surrounding the incident causing the plaintiff's injury. Similarly, the terms of an oral contract, and the assent of the parties to it, may be shown by the actions of the parties and\n\nGeneral admissibility. Except as provided in par. (b) 2., evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. This subsection does not exclude the evidence when offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.\n\npolicy, as well as the relevancy and materiality of the testimony. In the absence of a statute or a valid and binding contractual provision to the contrary, circumstantial evidence is regarded by law as competent to prove any given fact in issue in a civil case and is sometimes as cogent and valuable as direct and positive testimony. Upon the issue of reasonableness of conduct, all the surrounding circumstances become facts material to the case. Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish liability where it negates other reasonable causes for injury. Tort claims may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence.\n\nafter verification of its accuracy. Even if admitted, \u2018the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.\u2019 \u201d If a party's notes do refresh the party's recollection, \u201cthere is no need to admit the recording into evidence, because the witness will be able to testify from his or her refreshed memory.\u201d\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nIn a collision case, Plaintiff offers in evidence a photograph showing the scene of the accident while the cars were still in place. A proper foundation must include, as a minimum, testimony by which of the following?\n\n (A) The photographer\n (B) A person who was present at the time the photograph was taken\n (C) A person who observed the cars while they were still in place\n (D) A person in whose custody the photograph has been since it was developed\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "A person who observed the cars while they were still in place"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_215",
+    "retrieved_docs": "However, before an exhibit can be offered into evidence, you must prove to the court that it is authentic, which is known as laying the foundation. This simply means that you must demonstrate to the court that you have the knowledge sufficient to prove that the exhibit is authentic.\n\nSimilarly, proximate cause may be proved by circumstantial evidence even though there is no eyewitness evidence. The law does not require every fact and circumstance which make up a case of negligence to be proved by direct and positive testimony or by the testimony of eyewitnesses. Negligence and freedom from contributory negligence may be shown by circumstantial, as well as the conditions and circumstances leading up to and surrounding the incident causing the plaintiff's injury. Similarly, the terms of an oral contract, and the assent of the parties to it, may be shown by the actions of the parties and\n\nGeneral admissibility. Except as provided in par. (b) 2., evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. This subsection does not exclude the evidence when offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.\n\npolicy, as well as the relevancy and materiality of the testimony. In the absence of a statute or a valid and binding contractual provision to the contrary, circumstantial evidence is regarded by law as competent to prove any given fact in issue in a civil case and is sometimes as cogent and valuable as direct and positive testimony. Upon the issue of reasonableness of conduct, all the surrounding circumstances become facts material to the case. Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish liability where it negates other reasonable causes for injury. Tort claims may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence.\n\nafter verification of its accuracy. Even if admitted, \u2018the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.\u2019 \u201d If a party's notes do refresh the party's recollection, \u201cthere is no need to admit the recording into evidence, because the witness will be able to testify from his or her refreshed memory.\u201d"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Miller testified on direct examination that he had never been in the First Bank of City. His counsel asks, \"What, if anything, did you tell the police when you were arrested?\" If his answer would be, \"I told them I had never been in the bank,\" this answer would be",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nHowever, prior consistent statements are admissible as non-hearsay if: (1) the individual who made the prior consistent statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; and (2) the statement is offered in an effort to rebut an express or implied accusation of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication. See Chandler, 702 So.2d at 197\u201398; see also \u00a7 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Both conditions must be met for admission of a prior consistent statement as nonhearsay. Harris v. State, 843 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.2003).\n\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nHearsay is generally defined as an out-of-court statement made by a declarant and offered for the truth of the matter asserted (see Nucci v. Proper, 95 N.Y.2d 597, 602, 721 N.Y.S.2d 593, 744 N.E.2d 128 [2001]; People v. Buie, 86 N.Y.2d 501, 505, 634 N.Y.S.2d 415, 658 N.E.2d 192 [1995];\n\nA statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant's will. Pa.R.E. 803(3). \u201cPursuant to the state of mind hearsay exception, where a declarant's out-of-court statements demonstrate her state of mind, are made in a natural manner, and are material and relevant, they are admissible pursuant to the exception.\u201d Laich, 777 A.2d at 1060-61.\n\n804(b)(3). Statements that are not inculpatory are not admissible pursuant to this rule even if they are part of a generally inculpatory statement or narrative. United States v. Ricardo, 472 F.3d 277, 287 (5th Cir.2006) (citing Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600\u201301). However, these rules cannot be applied except in the context of specific evidence.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nMiller is tried for armed robbery of the First Bank of City.\nMiller testified on direct examination that he had never been in the First Bank of City. His counsel asks, \"What, if anything, did you tell the police when you were arrested?\" If his answer would be, \"I told them I had never been in the bank,\" this answer would be\n\n (A) admissible to prove Miller had never been in the bank\n (B) admissible as a prior consistent statement\n (C) inadmissible as hearsay not within any exception\n (D) inadmissible, because it was a self-serving statement by a person with a substantial motive to fabricate\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "inadmissible as hearsay not within any exception"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_281",
+    "retrieved_docs": "However, prior consistent statements are admissible as non-hearsay if: (1) the individual who made the prior consistent statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; and (2) the statement is offered in an effort to rebut an express or implied accusation of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication. See Chandler, 702 So.2d at 197\u201398; see also \u00a7 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Both conditions must be met for admission of a prior consistent statement as nonhearsay. Harris v. State, 843 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.2003).\n\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nHearsay is generally defined as an out-of-court statement made by a declarant and offered for the truth of the matter asserted (see Nucci v. Proper, 95 N.Y.2d 597, 602, 721 N.Y.S.2d 593, 744 N.E.2d 128 [2001]; People v. Buie, 86 N.Y.2d 501, 505, 634 N.Y.S.2d 415, 658 N.E.2d 192 [1995];\n\nA statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant's will. Pa.R.E. 803(3). \u201cPursuant to the state of mind hearsay exception, where a declarant's out-of-court statements demonstrate her state of mind, are made in a natural manner, and are material and relevant, they are admissible pursuant to the exception.\u201d Laich, 777 A.2d at 1060-61.\n\n804(b)(3). Statements that are not inculpatory are not admissible pursuant to this rule even if they are part of a generally inculpatory statement or narrative. United States v. Ricardo, 472 F.3d 277, 287 (5th Cir.2006) (citing Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600\u201301). However, these rules cannot be applied except in the context of specific evidence."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Lester, the owner in fee simple of a small farm consisting of thirty acres of land improved with a house and several outbuildings, leased the same to Tanner for a ten-year period. After two years had expired, the government condemned twenty acres of the property and allocated the compensation award to Lester and Tanner according to their respective interest so taken. It so happened, how. ever, that the twenty acres taken embraced all of the farm's tillable land, leaving only the house, outbuildings, and a small woodlot. There is no applicable statute in the jurisdiction where the property is located nor any provision in the lease relating to condemnation. Tanner quit possession, and Lester brought suit against him to recover rent, Lester will",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nIt ripened into an incorporeal hereditament when the licensee entered into enjoyment thereof and made expenditures and improvements. Other jurisdictions hold that revocation will not be allowed in such a case unless the licensee be compensated for his improvements. This language supports a conclusion that the holder of an incorporeal hereditament would be considered the holder of a form of property interest entitling it to compensation under Utah law.\n\nYet the established rule, followed in Maryland, is that proof of color of title is not necessary to establish adverse possession. Color of title is not an element of adverse possession unless made so by statute, as under provisions prescribing a shorter period of limitation than would otherwise be required. While there are a few isolated judicial statements broadly to the effect that color of title, or color of right, is essential to adverse possession, the general rule is well established that, in the absence of contrary statute, color of title is not an essential element of adverse possession and\n\n\u201c[a] covenant for quiet enjoyment of the premises is necessarily implied in every lease and goes to the extent of [representing] that the landlord has a good title and can give a free and unencumbered lease of the premises for the term stipulated.\u201d\n\nthe property. Hunt, 68 S.W.3d at 131. A plaintiff can recover for the conversion of rental income. Hoenig v. Tex. Commerce Bank, N.A., 939 S.W.2d 656, 664 (Tex.App.\u2013San Antonio 1996, no writ).\n\nIn analyzing a contract clause claim, a court must consider the following four factors: whether a contractual obligation exists; whether governmental action has impaired that obligation; whether the impairment of the contract is substantial; and whether the government action serves an important public purpose. Kaufman, Litwin & Feinstein v. Edgar, 301 Ill.App.3d 826, 837, 235 Ill.Dec. 183, 704 N.E.2d 756 (1998). The contract clauses notwithstanding, contractual rights remain subject to the police power of the state. Lincoln Towers Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Boozell, 291 Ill.App.3d 965, 968\u201369, 225 Ill.Dec. 909, 684 N.E.2d 900 (1997). The state always retains the authority\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nLester, the owner in fee simple of a small farm consisting of thirty acres of land improved with a house and several outbuildings, leased the same to Tanner for a ten-year period. After two years had expired, the government condemned twenty acres of the property and allocated the compensation award to Lester and Tanner according to their respective interest so taken. It so happened, how. ever, that the twenty acres taken embraced all of the farm's tillable land, leaving only the house, outbuildings, and a small woodlot. There is no applicable statute in the jurisdiction where the property is located nor any provision in the lease relating to condemnation. Tanner quit possession, and Lester brought suit against him to recover rent, Lester will\n\n (A) lose, because there has been a frustration of purpose which excuses Tanner from further performance of his contract to pay rent\n (B) lose, because there has been a breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment by Lester 's inability to provide Tanner with possession of the whole of the property for the entire term\n (C) win, because of the implied warranty on the part of the tenant to return the demised premises in the same condition at the end of the term as they were at the beginning\n (D) win, because the relationship of landlord and tenant was unaffected by the condemnation, thus leaving Tanner still obligated to pay rent\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "D",
+      "win, because the relationship of landlord and tenant was unaffected by the condemnation, thus leaving Tanner still obligated to pay rent"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_313",
+    "retrieved_docs": "It ripened into an incorporeal hereditament when the licensee entered into enjoyment thereof and made expenditures and improvements. Other jurisdictions hold that revocation will not be allowed in such a case unless the licensee be compensated for his improvements. This language supports a conclusion that the holder of an incorporeal hereditament would be considered the holder of a form of property interest entitling it to compensation under Utah law.\n\nYet the established rule, followed in Maryland, is that proof of color of title is not necessary to establish adverse possession. Color of title is not an element of adverse possession unless made so by statute, as under provisions prescribing a shorter period of limitation than would otherwise be required. While there are a few isolated judicial statements broadly to the effect that color of title, or color of right, is essential to adverse possession, the general rule is well established that, in the absence of contrary statute, color of title is not an essential element of adverse possession and\n\n\u201c[a] covenant for quiet enjoyment of the premises is necessarily implied in every lease and goes to the extent of [representing] that the landlord has a good title and can give a free and unencumbered lease of the premises for the term stipulated.\u201d\n\nthe property. Hunt, 68 S.W.3d at 131. A plaintiff can recover for the conversion of rental income. Hoenig v. Tex. Commerce Bank, N.A., 939 S.W.2d 656, 664 (Tex.App.\u2013San Antonio 1996, no writ).\n\nIn analyzing a contract clause claim, a court must consider the following four factors: whether a contractual obligation exists; whether governmental action has impaired that obligation; whether the impairment of the contract is substantial; and whether the government action serves an important public purpose. Kaufman, Litwin & Feinstein v. Edgar, 301 Ill.App.3d 826, 837, 235 Ill.Dec. 183, 704 N.E.2d 756 (1998). The contract clauses notwithstanding, contractual rights remain subject to the police power of the state. Lincoln Towers Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Boozell, 291 Ill.App.3d 965, 968\u201369, 225 Ill.Dec. 909, 684 N.E.2d 900 (1997). The state always retains the authority"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Pedersen's counsel wants to have Sheriff testify to the following statement made to him by Walter Passenger, out of the presence of Carr: \"We were returning from a party at which we had all been drinking.\" The trial judge should rule this testimony",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nA statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant's will. Pa.R.E. 803(3). \u201cPursuant to the state of mind hearsay exception, where a declarant's out-of-court statements demonstrate her state of mind, are made in a natural manner, and are material and relevant, they are admissible pursuant to the exception.\u201d Laich, 777 A.2d at 1060-61.\n\nAxiomatically, and by its unambiguous terms, the exception renders admissible only those statements that reflect the \u201cdeclarant's then-existing state of mind ... or condition,\u201d Pa.R.E. 803(3), not someone else's state of mind or condition. Nothing in the plain terms of the exception would allow, for instance, a party to introduce an out-of-court statement of one person to prove the intent, motive, feelings, pain, or health of another person. The bounds of the exception are limited to the then-existing state of mind of the declarant only.\n\nHowever, prior consistent statements are admissible as non-hearsay if: (1) the individual who made the prior consistent statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; and (2) the statement is offered in an effort to rebut an express or implied accusation of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication. See Chandler, 702 So.2d at 197\u201398; see also \u00a7 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Both conditions must be met for admission of a prior consistent statement as nonhearsay. Harris v. State, 843 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.2003).\n\n[I]n order for an excited utterance to be admissible, the following requirements must be met: (1) there must have been an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement; (2) the statement must have been made before there was time to contrive or misrepresent; and (3) the statement must have been made while the person was under the stress of excitement caused by the startling event. Stoll v. State, 762 So.2d 870, 873 (Fla. 2000).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nCarr ran into and injured Pedersen, a pedestrian. With Carr in his car were Wanda and Walter Passenger. Passerby saw the accident and called the police department, which sent Sheriff to investigate. All of these people are available as potential witnesses in the case of Pedersen v. Carr. Pedersen alleges that Carr, while drunk, struck Pedersen who was in a duly marked crosswalk.\nPedersen's counsel wants to have Sheriff testify to the following statement made to him by Walter Passenger, out of the presence of Carr: \"We were returning from a party at which we had all been drinking.\" The trial judge should rule this testimony\n\n (A) admissible as an admission of a party\n (B) admissible as a declaration against interest\n (C) inadmissible as hearsay not within any exception\n (D) inadmissible because it would lead the court into nonessential side issues\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "inadmissible as hearsay not within any exception"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_380",
+    "retrieved_docs": "The Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nA statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant's will. Pa.R.E. 803(3). \u201cPursuant to the state of mind hearsay exception, where a declarant's out-of-court statements demonstrate her state of mind, are made in a natural manner, and are material and relevant, they are admissible pursuant to the exception.\u201d Laich, 777 A.2d at 1060-61.\n\nAxiomatically, and by its unambiguous terms, the exception renders admissible only those statements that reflect the \u201cdeclarant's then-existing state of mind ... or condition,\u201d Pa.R.E. 803(3), not someone else's state of mind or condition. Nothing in the plain terms of the exception would allow, for instance, a party to introduce an out-of-court statement of one person to prove the intent, motive, feelings, pain, or health of another person. The bounds of the exception are limited to the then-existing state of mind of the declarant only.\n\nHowever, prior consistent statements are admissible as non-hearsay if: (1) the individual who made the prior consistent statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; and (2) the statement is offered in an effort to rebut an express or implied accusation of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication. See Chandler, 702 So.2d at 197\u201398; see also \u00a7 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Both conditions must be met for admission of a prior consistent statement as nonhearsay. Harris v. State, 843 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.2003).\n\n[I]n order for an excited utterance to be admissible, the following requirements must be met: (1) there must have been an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement; (2) the statement must have been made before there was time to contrive or misrepresent; and (3) the statement must have been made while the person was under the stress of excitement caused by the startling event. Stoll v. State, 762 So.2d 870, 873 (Fla. 2000)."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Purvis purchased a used car from Daley, a used car dealer. Knowing that they were false, Daley made the following statements to Purvis prior to the sale: Statement 1. This car has never been involved in an accident. Statement 2. This car gets 25 miles to the gallon on the open highway. Statement 3. This is as smooth-riding a car as you can get. If Purvis asserts a claim against Daley based on deceit, which of the false statements made by Daley would support Purvis' claim?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nA statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant's will. Pa.R.E. 803(3). \u201cPursuant to the state of mind hearsay exception, where a declarant's out-of-court statements demonstrate her state of mind, are made in a natural manner, and are material and relevant, they are admissible pursuant to the exception.\u201d Laich, 777 A.2d at 1060-61.\n\nDeceit is a statutory cause of action under which \u201c[o]ne who willfully deceives another, with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers.\u201d SDCL 20\u201310\u20131. \u201cA deceit within the meaning of \u00a7 20\u201310\u20131 is either (1) The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true; (2) The assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true; (3) The suppression of\n\ntruth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim, and a defendant may attack the falsity prong of a plaintiff's claim by demonstrating the substantial truth of the allegedly defamatory statement.\n\nHowever, prior consistent statements are admissible as non-hearsay if: (1) the individual who made the prior consistent statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; and (2) the statement is offered in an effort to rebut an express or implied accusation of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication. See Chandler, 702 So.2d at 197\u201398; see also \u00a7 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Both conditions must be met for admission of a prior consistent statement as nonhearsay. Harris v. State, 843 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.2003).\n\n\u201cAdmissibility depends on relevance and probative value. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact.\u201d Smith v. Morrison, 47 A.3d 131, 137 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). Evidence, even if relevant, may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the potential prejudice. Unfair prejudice supporting exclusion of relevant evidence means a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or divert the jury's attention away from its duty of\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nPurvis purchased a used car from Daley, a used car dealer. Knowing that they were false, Daley made the following statements to Purvis prior to the sale: Statement 1. This car has never been involved in an accident. Statement 2. This car gets 25 miles to the gallon on the open highway. Statement 3. This is as smooth-riding a car as you can get. If Purvis asserts a claim against Daley based on deceit, which of the false statements made by Daley would support Purvis' claim?\n\n (A) Statement 1 only.\n (B) Statement 2 only.\n (C) Statements 1 and 2 only.\n (D) Statements 2 and 3 only.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "Statements 1 and 2 only."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_956",
+    "retrieved_docs": "A statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant's will. Pa.R.E. 803(3). \u201cPursuant to the state of mind hearsay exception, where a declarant's out-of-court statements demonstrate her state of mind, are made in a natural manner, and are material and relevant, they are admissible pursuant to the exception.\u201d Laich, 777 A.2d at 1060-61.\n\nDeceit is a statutory cause of action under which \u201c[o]ne who willfully deceives another, with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers.\u201d SDCL 20\u201310\u20131. \u201cA deceit within the meaning of \u00a7 20\u201310\u20131 is either (1) The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true; (2) The assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true; (3) The suppression of\n\ntruth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim, and a defendant may attack the falsity prong of a plaintiff's claim by demonstrating the substantial truth of the allegedly defamatory statement.\n\nHowever, prior consistent statements are admissible as non-hearsay if: (1) the individual who made the prior consistent statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; and (2) the statement is offered in an effort to rebut an express or implied accusation of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication. See Chandler, 702 So.2d at 197\u201398; see also \u00a7 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Both conditions must be met for admission of a prior consistent statement as nonhearsay. Harris v. State, 843 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.2003).\n\n\u201cAdmissibility depends on relevance and probative value. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact.\u201d Smith v. Morrison, 47 A.3d 131, 137 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). Evidence, even if relevant, may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the potential prejudice. Unfair prejudice supporting exclusion of relevant evidence means a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or divert the jury's attention away from its duty of"
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Alex and Sam were arrested for holding up a gas station. They were taken to police headquarters and placed in a room for interrogation. As a police officer addressingboth started to give them the Miranda warnings prior to the questioning, Alex said, \"Look, Sam planned the damned thing and I was dumb enough to go along with it. We robbed the place-what else is there to say?\" Sam said nothing. Sam was escorted into another room and a full written confession was then obtained from Alex. If Sam is brought to trial on an indictment charging him with robbery, the fact that Sam failed to object to Alex's statement and remained silent after Alex had implicated him in the crime should be ruled",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\n804(b)(3). Statements that are not inculpatory are not admissible pursuant to this rule even if they are part of a generally inculpatory statement or narrative. United States v. Ricardo, 472 F.3d 277, 287 (5th Cir.2006) (citing Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600\u201301). However, these rules cannot be applied except in the context of specific evidence.\n\nHowever, prior consistent statements are admissible as non-hearsay if: (1) the individual who made the prior consistent statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; and (2) the statement is offered in an effort to rebut an express or implied accusation of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication. See Chandler, 702 So.2d at 197\u201398; see also \u00a7 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Both conditions must be met for admission of a prior consistent statement as nonhearsay. Harris v. State, 843 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.2003).\n\ne.g., Fed.Rule Evid. 601, and not by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. \u201cThe aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false.\u201d Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, 62 S.Ct. 280, 290, 86 L.Ed. 166 (1941). We hold that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not \u201cvoluntary\u201d within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We also conclude that the taking of respondent's statements, and\n\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nFor an admission by a party-opponent to be admissible: 1) the statement must be a conscious or voluntary acknowledgment by a party-opponent of the existence of certain facts; 2) the matter acknowledged must be relevant to the cause of the party offering the admission; and 3) the matter acknowledged must be unfavorable to or inconsistent with the position now taken by the party-opponent. Bowls v. Scarborough, 950 S.W.2d 691, 702 (Mo.App.W.D.1997).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nAlex and Sam were arrested for holding up a gas station. They were taken to police headquarters and placed in a room for interrogation. As a police officer addressingboth started to give them the Miranda warnings prior to the questioning, Alex said, \"Look, Sam planned the damned thing and I was dumb enough to go along with it. We robbed the place-what else is there to say?\" Sam said nothing. Sam was escorted into another room and a full written confession was then obtained from Alex. If Sam is brought to trial on an indictment charging him with robbery, the fact that Sam failed to object to Alex's statement and remained silent after Alex had implicated him in the crime should be ruled\n\n (A) admissible because his silence was an implied admission by Sam that he had participated in the crime\n (B) admissible because a statement of a participant in a crime is admissible against another participant\n (C) inadmissible because, under the circumstances, there was no duty or responsibility on Sam's part to respond\n (D) inadmissible because whatever Alex may have said has no probative value in a trial against Sam\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "C",
+      "inadmissible because, under the circumstances, there was no duty or responsibility on Sam's part to respond"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_29",
+    "retrieved_docs": "804(b)(3). Statements that are not inculpatory are not admissible pursuant to this rule even if they are part of a generally inculpatory statement or narrative. United States v. Ricardo, 472 F.3d 277, 287 (5th Cir.2006) (citing Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600\u201301). However, these rules cannot be applied except in the context of specific evidence.\n\nHowever, prior consistent statements are admissible as non-hearsay if: (1) the individual who made the prior consistent statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; and (2) the statement is offered in an effort to rebut an express or implied accusation of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication. See Chandler, 702 So.2d at 197\u201398; see also \u00a7 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Both conditions must be met for admission of a prior consistent statement as nonhearsay. Harris v. State, 843 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.2003).\n\ne.g., Fed.Rule Evid. 601, and not by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. \u201cThe aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false.\u201d Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, 62 S.Ct. 280, 290, 86 L.Ed. 166 (1941). We hold that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not \u201cvoluntary\u201d within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We also conclude that the taking of respondent's statements, and\n\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nFor an admission by a party-opponent to be admissible: 1) the statement must be a conscious or voluntary acknowledgment by a party-opponent of the existence of certain facts; 2) the matter acknowledged must be relevant to the cause of the party offering the admission; and 3) the matter acknowledged must be unfavorable to or inconsistent with the position now taken by the party-opponent. Bowls v. Scarborough, 950 S.W.2d 691, 702 (Mo.App.W.D.1997)."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "In an action by Bell against Ames for any provable damages Bell sustained because the porch was not repainted, Bell probably will",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nIt is also well settled that even if the owner proves the existence of the defects or omissions and the cost of repairing them, he is nevertheless barred from recovering the cost thereof if he accepted the work despite the patent defects or imperfections discoverable upon reasonable inspection. Acceptance, however, does not bar the owner from recovering for defects not readily discoverable by ordinary inspection, or for defects which manifest themselves subsequent to the acceptance, or for defects which are explicitly excluded from the terms of the acceptance.\n\nany definite and seasonable expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance even though it is not a mirror image of the offer unless the acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. However that section still requires a definite expression of acceptance and does not change the basic common law requirement that there must be an objective manifestation of mutual assent. (Ore & Chemical Corp. v. Howard Butcher Trading Co. (E.D.Pa.1978), 455 F.Supp. 1150.)\n\nIn an action for breach of contract, the injured party is entitled to the benefit of the bargain, and the recovery may include the profits which he would have derived from performance of the contract. See Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 116 (2d Cir.1976). New York law, which controls here, permits recovery of lost future profits as damages, but only under rigorous rules: First, it must be demonstrated with certainty that such damages have been caused by the breach and, second, the alleged loss must be capable of proof with reasonable certainty. In other words,\n\nAt common law, a breaching party could not obtain restitution for benefits conferred. The common law rule reflected a belief that breach was \u201cmorally unworthy conduct,\u201d and that a breaching party should not benefit from his own wrong, see Lancellotti v. Thomas, 341 Pa.Super. 1, 491 A.2d 117, 118\u201319 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast to the common law rule, the Restatement rule reflects a policy against awarding a windfall to the non-breaching party. See id. at 119\u201320. The court in Lancellotti rejected the view that breach is morally wrong, see id. at 122 (\u201cRules of contract law are\n\nUnder the preexisting duty rule, it is well settled that doing what one is legally bound to do is not consideration for a new promise. Puett v. Walker, 332 Mich. 117, 122, 50 N.W.2d 740 (1952). This rule bars the modification of an existing contractual relationship when the purported consideration for the modification consists of the performance or promise to perform that which one party was already required to do under the terms of the existing agreement. Borg\u2013Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Dep't of State, 433 Mich. 16, 22, n. 3, 444 N.W.2d 786 (1989).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nAmes had painted Bell's house under a contract which called for payment of $2,000. Bell, contending in good faith that the porch had not been painted properly, refused to pay anything. On June 15, Ames mailed a letter to Bell stating, \"I am in serious need of money. Please send the $2,000 to me before July 1.\" On June 18, Bell replied, \"I will settle for $1,800 provided you agree to repaint the porch.\" Ames did not reply to this letter. Thereafter Bell mailed a check for $1,800 marked \"Payment in full on the Ames-Bell painting contract as per letter dated June 18.\" Ames received the check on June 30. Because he was badly in need of money, Ames cashed the check without objection and spent the proceeds but has refused to repaint the porch.\nIn an action by Bell against Ames for any provable damages Bell sustained because the porch was not repainted, Bell probably will\n\n (A) succeed, because by cashing the check Ames impliedly promised to repaint the porch\n (B) succeed, because Ames accepted Bell's offer by not replying to the letter of June 18\n (C) not succeed, because Bell's letter of June 18 was a counter-offer which Ames never accepted\n (D) not succeed, because there is no consideration to support Ames's promise, if any\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "A",
+      "succeed, because by cashing the check Ames impliedly promised to repaint the porch"
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_158",
+    "retrieved_docs": "It is also well settled that even if the owner proves the existence of the defects or omissions and the cost of repairing them, he is nevertheless barred from recovering the cost thereof if he accepted the work despite the patent defects or imperfections discoverable upon reasonable inspection. Acceptance, however, does not bar the owner from recovering for defects not readily discoverable by ordinary inspection, or for defects which manifest themselves subsequent to the acceptance, or for defects which are explicitly excluded from the terms of the acceptance.\n\nany definite and seasonable expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance even though it is not a mirror image of the offer unless the acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. However that section still requires a definite expression of acceptance and does not change the basic common law requirement that there must be an objective manifestation of mutual assent. (Ore & Chemical Corp. v. Howard Butcher Trading Co. (E.D.Pa.1978), 455 F.Supp. 1150.)\n\nIn an action for breach of contract, the injured party is entitled to the benefit of the bargain, and the recovery may include the profits which he would have derived from performance of the contract. See Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 116 (2d Cir.1976). New York law, which controls here, permits recovery of lost future profits as damages, but only under rigorous rules: First, it must be demonstrated with certainty that such damages have been caused by the breach and, second, the alleged loss must be capable of proof with reasonable certainty. In other words,\n\nAt common law, a breaching party could not obtain restitution for benefits conferred. The common law rule reflected a belief that breach was \u201cmorally unworthy conduct,\u201d and that a breaching party should not benefit from his own wrong, see Lancellotti v. Thomas, 341 Pa.Super. 1, 491 A.2d 117, 118\u201319 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast to the common law rule, the Restatement rule reflects a policy against awarding a windfall to the non-breaching party. See id. at 119\u201320. The court in Lancellotti rejected the view that breach is morally wrong, see id. at 122 (\u201cRules of contract law are\n\nUnder the preexisting duty rule, it is well settled that doing what one is legally bound to do is not consideration for a new promise. Puett v. Walker, 332 Mich. 117, 122, 50 N.W.2d 740 (1952). This rule bars the modification of an existing contractual relationship when the purported consideration for the modification consists of the performance or promise to perform that which one party was already required to do under the terms of the existing agreement. Borg\u2013Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Dep't of State, 433 Mich. 16, 22, n. 3, 444 N.W.2d 786 (1989)."
+  },
+  {
+    "question": "Which one of the following scenarios would best support an action by Sherwood, rather than Walker, to rescind the sale?",
+    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nrescission is a proper remedy when the breach of contract is so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in making the agreement\n\nSimilarly, proximate cause may be proved by circumstantial evidence even though there is no eyewitness evidence. The law does not require every fact and circumstance which make up a case of negligence to be proved by direct and positive testimony or by the testimony of eyewitnesses. Negligence and freedom from contributory negligence may be shown by circumstantial, as well as the conditions and circumstances leading up to and surrounding the incident causing the plaintiff's injury. Similarly, the terms of an oral contract, and the assent of the parties to it, may be shown by the actions of the parties and\n\nAt common law, a breaching party could not obtain restitution for benefits conferred. The common law rule reflected a belief that breach was \u201cmorally unworthy conduct,\u201d and that a breaching party should not benefit from his own wrong, see Lancellotti v. Thomas, 341 Pa.Super. 1, 491 A.2d 117, 118\u201319 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast to the common law rule, the Restatement rule reflects a policy against awarding a windfall to the non-breaching party. See id. at 119\u201320. The court in Lancellotti rejected the view that breach is morally wrong, see id. at 122 (\u201cRules of contract law are\n\nTo invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff must establish: \u201c(1) the event [was] of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it [was] caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it [was not] due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff\u201d.\n\n\u201c \u2018Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the obligation impossible or highly impracticable.\u2019 \u201d Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, \u00b6 12, 232 P.3d 1081 (emphases omitted) (quoting Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 261 (1981) (\u201cWhere, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nWalker, who knew nothing about horses, inherited Aberlone, a thoroughbred colt whose disagreeable behavior made him a pest around the barn. Walker sold the colt for $1,500 to Sherwood, an experienced racehorse-trainer who knew of Walker's ignorance about horses. At the time of sale, Walker said to Sherwood, \"I hate to say it, but this horse is bad-tempered and nothing special.\"\nWhich one of the following scenarios would best support an action by Sherwood, rather than Walker, to rescind the sale?\n\n (A) In his first race after the sale, Aberlone galloped to a huge lead but dropped dead 100 yards from the finish line because of a rare congenital heart defect that was undiscoverable except by autopsy.\n (B) Aberlone won $5 million for Sherwood over a three-year racing career but upon being retired was found to be incurably sterile and useless as a breeder.\n (C) After Aberlone had won three races for Sherwood, it was discovered that by clerical error, unknown to either party, Aberlone's official birth registration listed an undistinguished racehorse as the sire rather than the famous racehorse that in fact was the sire.\n (D) A week after the sale, Aberlone went berserk and inflicted injuries upon Sherwood that required his hospitalization for six months and a full year for his recovery.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
+    "output": [
+      "A",
+      "In his first race after the sale, Aberlone galloped to a huge lead but dropped dead 100 yards from the finish line because of a rare congenital heart defect that was undiscoverable except by autopsy."
+    ],
+    "id": "mbe_812",
+    "retrieved_docs": "rescission is a proper remedy when the breach of contract is so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in making the agreement\n\nSimilarly, proximate cause may be proved by circumstantial evidence even though there is no eyewitness evidence. The law does not require every fact and circumstance which make up a case of negligence to be proved by direct and positive testimony or by the testimony of eyewitnesses. Negligence and freedom from contributory negligence may be shown by circumstantial, as well as the conditions and circumstances leading up to and surrounding the incident causing the plaintiff's injury. Similarly, the terms of an oral contract, and the assent of the parties to it, may be shown by the actions of the parties and\n\nAt common law, a breaching party could not obtain restitution for benefits conferred. The common law rule reflected a belief that breach was \u201cmorally unworthy conduct,\u201d and that a breaching party should not benefit from his own wrong, see Lancellotti v. Thomas, 341 Pa.Super. 1, 491 A.2d 117, 118\u201319 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast to the common law rule, the Restatement rule reflects a policy against awarding a windfall to the non-breaching party. See id. at 119\u201320. The court in Lancellotti rejected the view that breach is morally wrong, see id. at 122 (\u201cRules of contract law are\n\nTo invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff must establish: \u201c(1) the event [was] of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it [was] caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it [was not] due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff\u201d.\n\n\u201c \u2018Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the obligation impossible or highly impracticable.\u2019 \u201d Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, \u00b6 12, 232 P.3d 1081 (emphases omitted) (quoting Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 261 (1981) (\u201cWhere, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which"
+  }
+]
\ No newline at end of file