Text,ground_truth,id,source
"has sent you an assessment. --While precipitated by the need to defend their position there, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was motivated by wider strategic objectives in the region. :: noted in this connection that the more elite Afghan army units now guarding the cities may be released to fight the insurgents. This would provide forces with better morale which are less likely to desert and turn over their weapons to the insurgents. This, in turn, makes our aid all the more important. Mr. :: 1. It is unlikely that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan constitutes the preplanned first step in the implementation of a highly articulated grand design for the rapid establishment of hegemonic control over all of Southwest Asia. Rather than signaling the carefully timed beginning of a premeditated strategic offensive, the occupation may have been a reluctantly authorized response to what was perceived by the Kremlin as an imminent and otherwise irreversible deterioration of its already established position in a country which fell well within the Soviet Union'92s legitimate sphere of influence. However, there is no reason to doubt that the Soviets covet a larger sphere of influence in Southwest Asia or to suppose that their decision to occupy Afghanistan was made without reference to broader regional objectives. On the contrary, their willingness to incur what they almost certainly anticipated would be serious costs strongly suggests a belief that their occupation of Afghanistan would improve their access to a number of extremely lucrative targets of opportunity and might eventually lead to a highly favorable and enduring shift in the regional and perhaps even global balance of power. 2. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was probably predicated on a belief that Afghan resistance would prove relatively short lived. Among other things, their historical experience in their own Central Asian republics may have persuaded the Soviets that a strategy combining military intimidation, political conciliation, and economic enticement would quickly reduce resistance and enable their puppet regime to acquire at least a modicum of grassroots political authority and administrative control. If this turns out to be a miscalculation and Afghan resistance becomes or remains persistent and widespread, the soviets could become so bogged down in guerrilla warfare that they abandon any hopes of further near-term expansion. However, they are unlikely to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan and might well try to alleviate their problems there by intensifying pressure on or expanding the conflict to Pakistan. 3. In the face of intractable Afghan resistance, the Soviets are likely to attribute much of the blame to direct or indirect Pakistani involvement and to take what they deem to be essential deterrent and retaliatory measures. These measures could include not only cross-border raids by loyal Afghan and /or Soviet forces, but also extensive Soviet support for anti-Pakistani tribal insurgents and intimidating demarches on Islamabad by the Soviets'92 Indian allies. In extremis, moreover, the Soviets might press a not-too-reluctant India to join them in an all-out campaign of political subversion or even in a concerted invasion. Although the inevitable costs of such a drastic action might give the Soviets pause, their behavior in Afghanistan (as well as the earlier escalatory behavior of the United States in Vietnam - Laos- Cambodia) suggests that they might be undeterred by anything short of a credible threat of direct US military retaliation. 7. Although the possibility cannot be excluded, it does not seem likely that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan will turn out to have been a dress rehearsal for an impending gala performance in Iran. Unlike Afghanistan, Iran is clearly too important to the West to make the risk of a counter intervention seem negligible, and the exercised American reaction to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has probably convinced even the Kremlin'92s most unreconstructed hawks that a frontal attack on Iran could lead to a full-fledged military showdown with the United States. However, fear of such a showdown will not lead the Kremlin to forsake its ambitions or prevent it from pursuing them by more circuitous means. At the margin, apprehension that any important Soviet breakthrough in Iran would elicit a determined US military reaction may exercise a restraining influence, but the Soviets will probably still have extensive room for maneuver in a situation in which American options are severely circumscribed and Iranian vulnerabilities are very large. } :: -- Collapse of the Afghan resistance. There is little probability that the Afghan resistance will collapse soon. The Soviets would require at least double their present strength to make a serious effort to crush the insurgency altogether. A collapse of the resistance would, of course, cause serious problems for Pakistan, including a large influx of refugees and pressure from Moscow to normalize relations and downgrade ties to the U.S. (S) -- Increased insurgency in Afghanistan. Soviet pressure will probably prevent any rapid increase in insurgent activity. Although an announcement of a free Afghan government could occur at any time, the groups involved would be the essentially unrepresentative organizations in Pakistan rather than the insurgents. (S) -- Soviet military moves against or into Pakistan. Soviet aid to dissident elements in Pakistan or raids on refugee camps in Pakistan are unlikely in the near future. As Moscow becomes more involved in counterinsurgency efforts, hot pursuit of rebel troops across the Pakistani border become a more viable possibility. Strikes at Pakistani installations, however, would damage the image the Soviets probably wish to project and would run an unnecessary risk of unwanted escalation. Over the long run, Moscow, in order to gain a foothold on the Indian Ocean, might, promote an independent Baluchistan to help force the collapse of Pakistan and the dissolution of Iran. (S) }",political,bureaucracies_0,bureaucracies
"This isa more sophisticated piece than we usually get from our intelligence analysts. But it does not examine the possibility that the Soviets may move from forcefully with their military power against Iran, and possibly Pakistan, in the near future. The Soviets might well construct an argument for moving on Iran sooner rather than later if the tide there turns away from them. Should the hostage problem be settled, there is a reasonable chance Iran will move in an anti-Soviet direction. Moreover, the Soviets perceives clearly that US military power in the area is increasing over time and may well be tempted to move while the balance is more in their favor. We are therefore closely examining the threat of near-term Soviet military moves, and how to deter and respond to them. (S) } :: pointed out that we are now going to be assisting rebel forces; when that becomes known it could put in jeopardy our people in Kabul. Mr. :: said that a break in relations would make more sense if it were done by many countries. The situation in Afghanistan is very unstable. We do not know what may happen next, and we could prematurely cut ourselves off. Mr. SPLIT said we should strongly condemn the Soviet actions, but we should recognize that there is not much we can do about it except to build international opposition. } :: Coherence and Sense of Direction It is not Afghanistan -- Soviet domination of Middle East oil. It is not Afghanistan per se which is as strategically important but that aggressive Soviet behavior there, against the backdrop of constantly growing Soviet military power, betokens a grave and imminent threat to the entire world to which it must respond. Afghanistan Our policy of making the Soviet Union may a price for its aggression and of using the invasion to solidify our own relationships with the Islamic world requires maintaining the Afghan resistance to the Soviets. Although the Soviets are likely to be able to control the major cities and roads in the next two months and bring insurgency within tolerable levels in four to six months, the absence of a credible, loyal Afghan army will require Soviet military forces to stay on in considerable numbers indefinitely. But, politically, there is a danger that the Soviets could be seen as prevailing within a matter of months. As it becomes apparent to the Soviets that they are in for a long occupation and may not be able to create an acceptable indigenous regime, they may be more willing to look for a negotiated solution. In the interim, neutralization schemes should be considered primarily in terms of their usefulness in restoring US/European solidarity. In short, the Soviets will not play in the foreseeable future. } :: The Soviets in Afghanistan According to the NSC staff, recent developments in Soviet policy and propaganda demonstrate that Moscow -- is now actively preparing for the contingency of sending Soviet Central Asian troops to Afghanistan if nothing less will save the Khalq regime in Kabul; and -- has considered and decided to disregard the costs elsewhere of such a move to them. In the light of the above, we will review with other agencies the following possible steps to deter Soviet troop intervention: -- The Constellation could be moved somewhere between the Iranian border and Karachi. We could propose to Pakistan that we deploy one AWACS over Pakistan, thus enabling Pakistani (and US.) air reconnaissance and fighter vectoring up to the Afghan border. -- The Soviets could be told that we would consider Soviet troop entry into Afghanistan a move gravely endangering Soviet-U.S., relations, with implications for U.S. relations with its allies and other powers; that we are bound and intend, by the 1959 Treaty, to come to Pakistan'92s aid if it is threatened militarily; and that we call upon the Soviets not to intervene in Afghanistan, just as we will not. The question will be discussed at a full SCC Cabinet-level meeting. Preliminary indications from this meeting indicate that State, Defense and CIA all believe that the insurgency is in our interest and should be encouraged depending on the costs and risks involved.(S) } :: Moscow'92s Afghan Options The continuing insurgency in Afghanistan has apparently forced the Soviets to reassess their position. The :: Soviet Military Intervention in Afghanistan. General Pavlovskii, Chief of Soviet Ground Forces, apparently remains in Afghanistan where he arrived about a month ago. His long stay seems to indicate that the Soviets are reinforcing their advisory apparatus throughout the Afghan military and government. Pavlovskii'92s presence suggests we are unlikely to see a sudden Soviet military intervention, instead, the intervention is now in progress with a slow buildup of advisers and security forces. By the time the Pavlovskii mission is complete, a de facto Soviet military intervention may well be the case. (S) } :: argued that it was important for the message to be given wider dissemination through the papers here. Mr. :: agreed that the briefer should be cognizant of the risk of crying wolf, but the very fact of getting the story out was the best pressure available to us to prevent the Soviets from going ahead. We know they are positioning themselves so they could intervene with military force in Afghanistan. We do not yet know whether in fact they will engage. Wider recognition that Soviet activities constitute a danger to Islamic nationalism helps deflect the impression of a U.S. -- Islamic confrontation. } :: asked if there were any possibility the rebels could take over the government. Secretary SPLIT asked what our ultimate aim was in the Afghan situation. The SPLIT noted that this, however, was not likely to be successful. The :: said that the new group installed by the Soviets may be as unpopular or even more so than the former one. The Secretary of Defense noted, however, that if only isolated pockets of resistance remain, they way be successful. Dr. SPLIT suggested the Soviets were trying to hurt the President'92s reelection chances with this move. General :: said the key variables in the success of the Afghan resistance is Pakistani support and our attitude. The SPLIT said he had a different view. If we do nothing to help the rebels, then the psychological impact -- both on the Pakistanis and on the Afghans -- of isolation could be quite adverse and dry up support for their insurgency. Moreover, the Soviets are likely to try to garrison the cities and free the regular Afghan armies to pursue the rebels in the field and that might be more effective. The SPLIT noted that the Soviet Union had been reasonably successful at counter-insurgency efforts. They had had success in Latvia, Lithuania and the Ukraine, with their strategy being primarily the holding of the cities. Admiral SPLIT said it was to make it as costly as possible for the Soviets. Secretary :: The main issue is whether we are providing assistance to the insurgents. If this can become effective enough, the Soviet cost calculus could be significantly altered. The introduction of anti-helicopter weapons will be particularly important and review the status of the programs, the effectiveness of the insurgents and the possibility of sharply increased assistance and whether this could pay dividends. The limiting factors are the disorganization of the insurgents. This latter point should lead you to whether the Soviets will be able to substantially crush the insurgency by the end of the year, no matter what we do. This, in turn, raises a serious question: How will a Soviet success affect our regional and global position? How can we avoid having this look like a U.S. defeat? (S) (f) considerable success on the ground in Afghanistan itself, where the Soviets have: (1) sized the major population centers; (2) controlled the major lines of communications; (3) begun to control the major passes or block them from insurgent usage; In sum, the next nine months are going to be the most critical test we have faced with the Soviets since the Korean war. During this period Moscow will be trying to nail down what it already possesses and to open up new advantage in Europe, in Southwest Asia, in Southeast Asia, and perhaps in the Caribbean as well. By November 1980 they will hope to confront our newly elected President with a set of political configurations to which Washington will have no choice other than to accommodate. We are in real trouble. In the short term, our hope is to keep the Soviets beleaguered in Afghanistan itself and too off-balance to take advantage of the grave weakness of our present position. The key issue is how we approach the issue of neutrality for Afghanistan. We have three options: -- We can vigorously pursue the proposal with a view toward trying to engage the Soviets in a serious dialogue to resolve the issue and secure Soviet withdrawal. I think this is a fruitless approach and will only undermine our position with the rest of the world. }",political,bureaucracies_1,bureaucracies
"Dealing with the Soviet Leadership An important factor in deciding onus behavior in terms of planning our future military capability, and more immediately in terms of our rhetoric and actions in responding to or preempting Soviet actions elsewhere in the world, is what one believes the motivation of the Soviet leadership to be. You have now had interactions with Brezhnev and three of his Politburo colleagues, and will have drawn some conclusions of your own from those meetings. Both before and since, some of your statements suggest that you think Soviet political leaders are motivated towards ends similar to those sought by those in democratic countries. I urge caution about that conclusion. But from what I have been able to see of those who reach the top levels of the Soviet system, they are motivated by a drive, for themselves and for their country respectively, to be in a position to tell people around them and other nations what to do. They insist on a clear hierarchy, and find it very difficult to think in terms of accepting diversity. The higher up in the system one goes, the more pronounced is this attitude. '93Who'85. Whom,'94 Lenin'92s description of the world as a place of those who act to command and those who are acted upon, continues to underlie Soviet motivations. This is not to say that the Soviet leaders do not desire peace, or even that they will insist that it can exist only on precisely their terms. But it does mean that theirs is not a live and let live approach. They will not be persuaded, or much influenced, by appeals for equity or by the charms of reduction of conflict; they consider conflict, generally at some level of violence, inevitable between their system and all the rest. Whether in Cuba or Afghanistan, in Eastern Europe or Southeast Asia, they are willing to apply military strength, and are likely to be dissuaded from exercising it only by a conviction that the consequence will be very negative for them, and in the short run. The people who have risen to the top in such a system, however many similarities they have to democratic political leaders, will surely have great differences from them. In most cases they will see compromise as a sign of weakness, and conciliation as a sign of poor judgment. } :: said that we were all agreed that greater support to the Afghan rebels makes sense. His only question was whether it was enough. Mr. SPLIT said they would not have any prospect of being able to take over the government. Secretary SPLIT added that we want to use the issue as a rallying point for our policies in the area. The SPLIT said, on the other hand, the Soviets were faced with a hostile Islamic state on their border. Secretary",political,bureaucracies_2,bureaucracies
"noted that we could withdraw our people but not formally break relations. (S) Dr. :: pointed out that the Soviets may be there a long time. If we break relations, what excuse would we use to go back in? Mr. :: Department comments that present Soviet actions seem aimed at keeping the Afghan regime afloat and finding acceptable replacements for Taraki and Amin. Moscow would probably only consider direct intervention as a last resort and in response to a massive foreign intervention on behalf of the rebels. } :: analysis, Amin'92s position as the new ruler of Afghanistan is still very shaky. The immediate threat comes from the military who have been further alienated. With support from the Soviets, Amin might be able to head off a military revolt. But the events of last weekend may catalyze a military crisis, which the present Soviet presence would be unable to contain. The high level of current tension is indicated by press reports of Amin'92s replacement already of four provincial governors believed to be senior military officers. If the recent events precipitate a further crisis and if Soviet military personnel already in the Kabul area prove inadequate in a deteriorating situation, Moscow will be faced with the decision it probably prefers to avoid; whether or not to escalate the level of intervention } :: cautioned that we do not yet know what the Soviets are up to. :: said they can hang on and make it costly for the Soviet Union. Dr. SPLIT agreed with that view. He said that the Soviets were unwilling to face the political damage if Afghanistan went down the drain. } :: Department analysis, there are no indications that the Soviets now intend to cross into Pakistan or have yet made any decision on this question. At this stage, Moscow probably hopes that Pakistan will avoid the risks of confrontation inherent in its support of Afghan rebels and will accommodate to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The department adds, however, that there is a greater risk that eventual Soviet counterinsurgency operations along the Pakistani frontier could soon lead to border or air clashes - inadvertent or intentional. (S) } :: Growing Soviet Role in Afghanistan Soviet involvement in the war in Afghanistan military operations continues to increase. Soviet officers appear now to command, as well as advise Afghan units and operations; Soviet enlisted personnel may now be participating directly in combat operations against the insurgents, besides performing technical tasks. The Soviets, however, still do not seem to have committed units of their own into the Afghan conflict. Evidence persists of tension between Amin and Moscow. The intensified Soviet role probably reflects recommendations made by the military mission led by Soviet ground forces commander, General Pavlovskiy. The prolonged stay of his mission from mid-August until late October attests to the importance the Soviets attach to Afghanistan'92s acute security problems. Increased Soviet involvement, however, has not as yet resulted in a decline of insurgent activity. } :: 1. Afghanistan. The security situation in Kabul is deteriorating. Following the general strike yesterday, the Soviets this morning moved additional forces into the city and there was firing throughout the day. Soviet helicopter gunships and MIGs buzzed the city continuously, in an apparent effort to intimidate the population. We are recommending evacuation to the private American community, preferably on commercial flights when available. If none are, we are prepared to charter an aircraft if necessary. About 60 private and 20 official Americans remain in Afghanistan. Warren reported to me your comment at breakfast today about the possible desirability of closing or further cutting back on our embassy, and we are urgently reviewing this question. }",political,bureaucracies_3,bureaucracies
"said that Afghanistan itself is a loss and of no particular help to the Soviets strategically. In this judgment, they were obviously looking beyond it and to cause perceptions of their willingness to use power and are seeking a stepping stone. Secretary :: a presentation at this point in which he pointed out that Soviet military deployments into Afghanistan will fundamentally change the military threat to our allies on the Persian Gulf -- Soviet fighter aircraft based in Afghanistan will be able to reach the Gulf of Hormuz, a wholly new development. -- Soviet armored ground forces could reach the waters of the Arabian Sea through Baluchistan in 10 to 12 days if unopposed. -- Preferred Soviet land routes to Tehran probably still remain those from the Caucasus. Soviet heavy military ground forces on this route could reach the oil field regions in the vicinity of Kuwait in 10 to 12 days. -- Using sealift from the Black Sea, the Soviets could project forces through the Suez Canal to the Persian Gulf in about 21 days. -- One Soviet airborne division, about 8,000 troops, with organic armor vehicles, could land anywhere in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf in two to three days if all Soviet airlift is employed. General Jones outlined our options for rapid short-term measures to meet this changed Soviet threat by early spring this year; 1. Our naval presence in the Arabian Sea will eventually have to be reduced to one aircraft carrier battle group. We do not have sustaining power for the two there at present. }",military,bureaucracies_4,bureaucracies
"Mr. President, until the coup, the Portuguese had no intention of leaving their territories in Africa and didn'92t organize them for independence. Secretary SPLIT Mr. President, I will be reasonably brief. This is an area where no one can be sure of the judgments. I do question the judgment that control of the capital is not of importance. The history of Africa has shown that a nation'92s only focal point is the capital, and whoever has the capital has a claim on international support. In the Congo civil war, the reason we came out on top is because we never lost Leopoldville. If Neto can get Luanda, and drive the others out, he will have a power base, and gradually gain support of other Africans. Mr. SPLIT Soviet arms shipments have reversed the situation. Sheldon Vance has just come back from talking with Mobutu, 2 who has stressed the change in the balance of power. Portugal is tilting toward Neto, and the Soviets are putting important equipment, such as armed personnel carriers, into Neto'92s hands. Our understanding from Vance is that this is one reason Mobutu is moving away from Roberto and wants a coalition. An interagency effort has developed options, 3 none of which I am in wild agreement with. The first is neutrality'97stay out and let nature take its course. This would enable us to avoid a costly involvement in a situation that may be beyond our control; protect us from some international criticism; avoid tying us to any group; and avoid further antagonizing the MPLA. The probable outcome would be that Neto would establish a dominant position. Mobutu might try to go with Savimbi, or adjust to reality; Angola would go in a leftward direction; and Zaire would conclude we have disinterested ourselves in that part of the world and move towards anti-Americanism. As for the second course, my Department agrees, but I don'92t. It is recommended that we launch a diplomatic offensive to get the Soviets, the Yugoslavs, and others, to lessen arms shipments to the MPLA, get Portugal to exert its authority, and encourage cooperation among the groups. We could have direct dealings with the Soviets or get African states to do it. If we appeal to the Soviets not to be active, it will be a sign of weakness; for us to police it is next to impossible, and we would be bound to do nothing. If we try to affect events, we could support Roberto and Savimbi with arms and money. If we move to arms supplies, it would be best to do so through Mobutu, but we could give some money directly to Roberto and Savimbi. Mr. SPLIT There is need for money to increase the discipline of his organizations. The agency has weapons that it could get [ less than 1 line not declassified ] into Zaire to control the situation with Mobutu as the front man. I am not against diplomacy, but you can do that only if you know where you go if you fail. To launch a campaign against arms supply and not know where you'92re going afterward is an impotent policy. We would be the first victims of failure. The SPLIT The Forty Committee has met twice to discuss the situation. The first meeting involved only money, 4 but the second included some arms package. 5 I recommend a working group make a more systematic study of this option and return to you. Mr. SPLIT [ 1'bd lines not declassified ] The SPLIT [ less than 1 line not declassified ] The SPLIT Kaunda was giving the President a lesson in political science. [Laughter.] Mr. SPLIT But the reverse of that is that if we don'92t do something they would be suppressed. The SPLIT In the first instance we could activate Mobutu and inform Kaunda. The SPLIT With Savimbi and Mobutu. The :: On Angola. I favor action. If the U.S. does nothing when the Soviet-supported group gains dominance, I think all the movements will draw the conclusions that they must accommodate to the Soviet Union and China. I think reluctantly we must do something. But you must know that we have massive problems within the State Department. They are passionately opposed and it will leak. SPLIT He will resign and take some with him. SPLIT I also have a problem with the Ambassador to Tanzania. 2 He participated in giving the ransom for the students. I would like to recall and retire him. But you have to know there would be a major blow-up'97mostly blamed on me. Has Colby gone to Kaunda? SPLIT That is a disgrace. [Describes the State paper of objections.] 3 There isn'92t one African leader who doesn'92t govern by physical domination, except maybe Nigeria. SPLIT We should send Vance with [ dollar amount not declassified ] Then we should have Mobutu and Kaunda get together and work it out. Without us, Neto will win. And the argument is, it doesn'92t matter. SPLIT We will know better when we see the Mobutu plan. I will send you the Nat Davis paper. 4 You have a Zaire economic aid package from Lynn. We would like to give a $20 million economic package for Zaire. Lynn objects because there is no economic justification. He is right, but the political considerations override. This won'92t hurt us, but the covert action will. SPLIT But those who rant against the Soviets won'92t follow through on it. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.] 1 'a0 :: You will have to certify it. SPLIT We'92ll send Vance to Mobutu [ 1 line not declassified ] and more if needed, and ask him to come up with a program. It may be too late because Luanda is lost. Unless we can seize it back, it is pretty hopeless. We'92ll have a resignation from Davis, then I'92ll clean out the AF bureau. SPLIT In six years I have been on the tough side. But I push d'e9tente in order to be able to be tough. If we were publicly tough, the Soviet Union would have no incentive. Now, so long as they think we are pushing d'e9tente, they will keep their heads down. Call the Agencies and give them the decision. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.] 1 'a0",political,bureaucracies_5,bureaucracies
"Yes, sir. [Briefed'97as attached.] The SPLIT Yes, sir. The SPLIT These are essentially tribal, not military areas. These are additional tribes and I just chose [pointing on the chart] to mention those three. They have different languages and are different socially. The SPLIT The Portuguese were not forceful in this area. The literacy rate is between 10'9615 percent. Secretary SPLIT Three to four hundred thousand. The SPLIT About 5.7 million. The SPLIT Yes. The SPLIT I agree, except to note the importance of the (Benguella) railway and Zaire and Zambia'92s need for it. The SPLIT Lobito. There is, of course, always the possibility for fragmentation. Secretary SPLIT We have had a relationship with Roberto [ 1'bd lines not declassified ] The SPLIT For him and his activities. Savimbi has had a [ less than 1 line not declassified ] and we could up that. The SPLIT Some. Mobutu knows about our relationship. Secretary SPLIT [ 1 line not declassified ] give Mobutu money for the purchase of arms; [ less than 1 line not declassified ] Mr. SPLIT [ less than 1 line not declassified ] The SPLIT [ 1 line not declassified ] The SPLIT [ 2 lines not declassified ] Secretary SPLIT [ 2 lines not declassified ] Secretary SPLIT There is great value to aiding Roberto through Mobutu. The first is the effect on Angola, and the effect on Mobutu himself. Assistance to Savimbi could come in cooperation with Kaunda. The SPLIT While it would be useful to give assistance, it would be matched by the Soviets and there could be increased fighting and there would be no happy ending. I don'92t think we can put up a large enough sum to wrap it up quickly, and, with CIA'92s own present exposure, to get away without a great deal of criticism. The SPLIT What I'92m worried about is leakage and scandal in the present situation. The SPLIT In answer, I doubt we could have an immediate strategic effect. Secretary SPLIT We could have that next week. South Africa would like us to join with them in an effort, but we can avoid the problems that would create and deal with the blacks. Some would be encouraged for the US to take a role, and that would activate them. Mr. SPLIT By mid-week. Secretary SPLIT 8 June 27, 1975. ANGOLA I. The current situation in Angola is highly unstable. Rivalry between contending nationalist groups has featured increasing violence, with each group trying to stake out territory and gain military superiority before independence on November 11 and final Portuguese withdrawal by next February. A. The fighting over the past few months has been between the two largest groups, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, led by Agostinho Neto, and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola led by Holden Roberto. A third group in the picture is the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, led by Jonas Savimbi. 1. In action early this month Neto'92s Popular Movement pushed the National Front out of some areas north and east of Luanda, thus blocking the Front'92s supply lines into the capital. 2. Although there were some clashes in Luanda this month, the two remain essentially in a standoff there. a. Military control of Luanda by either group would necessarily not determine control of or influence over the rest of Angola, particularly in the rich agricultural areas or along all the main transportation routes. 3. Roberto'92s National Front still remains strongly entrenched in large areas of northern Angola where it has substantial tribal support. B. New fighting can erupt at any time: '97There is a continuing buildup of the military forces of all three nationalist groups; '97Heavier weapons'97mortars and bazookas'97are being introduced into Angola by the USSR and Zaire; '97Armed and undisciplined civilians are in Luanda on behalf of the Popular Movement; '97Neither major group is able or willing to exercise effective control over its own forces; '97All three groups are initiating military operations in parts of Angola yet untouched by the fighting where no single group has an edge; and '97Politicking for the October elections for a constituent assembly will increase tensions. C. The oil-rich enclave of Cabinda remains a tinderbox. The Popular Movement has a slight military edge there, but both other groups also have forces active. 1. All three want the enclave to remain a part of an independent Angola. 2. The picture is complicated by the presence of a factionalized separatist movement supported by both Zaire and Congo. 3. Both countries have endorsed Cabindan independence , and any intensification of the fighting there could bring outside intervention either directly or in support of the separatists. II. The transitional government installed last January has proved unworkable. A. It is constructed on a system of checks and balances, but in the current climate members of the three liberation groups, as government officials, concentrate on the competition between them. 1. Portuguese officials are not effective'97they are caught in the middle. 2. The liberation groups have not honored their commitment to establish an integrated national army as called for in the independence accord. B. The 24,000 Portuguese troops are mostly kept in Luanda. They will intervene in the fighting only to protect the whites. 1. The Portuguese have in effect abandoned most of the countryside to the nationalists, and are already crating some of their heavy equipment for shipment to Lisbon. 2. Portuguese forces are scheduled to begin withdrawal in October and are to be totally removed by next February. 3. There is nothing in the independence accord to prevent the Portuguese from withdrawing as fast as possible after October. C. Lisbon'92s policy insofar as it has one, is neutrality among the factions. 1. Portugal wants to protect its important agricultural and mining interests. 2. The Portuguese also want to be on good terms with whoever ends up in charge after independence, but their ability to affect events is diminishing. 3. At this point, the Portuguese leaders'92 major concern is to prevent civil war, which could have serious political repercussions in Lisbon. They hope to avoid, for example, an increase in the number of white refugees returning to Portugal who would add to the turbulence there. 4. Thus, Lisbon can be expected to expend considerable diplomatic effort to reduce tension in Angola, and would certainly welcome similar efforts by interested third countries. III. The role of outside powers in supplying military assistance to the nationalist groups remains a key factor. A. The Soviet Union has been a long time supporter of Neto'92s Popular Movement, providing both arms and cash during the years of the insurgency against the Portuguese. 1. We are unable to determine how much Soviet military aid is now reaching the Movement, but it helped the Movement score some of its recent gains. 2. Most of the aid is being channeled through Congo. 3. Soviet long-range goals in Angola are unclear, but in the short run Moscow supports the Popular Movement in a situation where all three nationalist groups are viable contenders for power. B. Peking has had some association with all of the liberation movements in the past, but the Chinese are most closely associated with Roberto'92s National Front. 1. They have supplied military equipment as well as some training. Some 100 Chinese advisers may now be in Zaire working with the Front. 2. Chinese assistance has helped the Front to establish its forces firmly in northern Angola. C. Roberto has had little success in finding assistance elsewhere. 1. Zaire'92s President Mobutu has loose family ties with Roberto and has long supported him and the Front with funds, arms, and training. He has also allowed Roberto to maintain his headquarters in Zaire. a. Recently, however, Mobutu has cut back his assistance to the Front, in part because of his government'92s serious financial problems and because he is cooling toward Roberto. b. Mobutu is alarmed over the Front'92s recent setbacks and feels Roberto'92s position has been damaged because he refuses to leave Zaire and go to Luanda. c. Mobutu now believes Jonas Savimbi of the National Union should be the primary figure in an independent Angolan government. 2. Mobutu, of course, has some serious concerns of his own. a. Zaire is experiencing a severe foreign exchange shortage because of the low price of copper on the international market. b. He has now privately acknowledged that the US was not involved in a recent coup plot, as he alleged, but may remain suspicious for some time. IV. The prospects for Angola between now and November are poor. Further violence could take place and edge the territory closer to civil war. At best, Angola will lurch along and become independent without a strong leader. A. The constituent assembly scheduled to be elected in October is supposed to select a head of government of an independent Angola, but new violence could force a postponement. B. At a meeting in Kenya last week Savimbi, Roberto, and Neto reached what amounts to an uncertain truce that merely postpones a confrontation. 1. They '93agreed'94 to a number of measures, such as disarming civilians, designed to prevent new fighting. Similar agreements in the past have failed, however. 2. All three contenders seem to recognize the inconclusiveness of the pact. They state that they will meet again to try another form for the transfer of power if the elections are not held. V. After independence, it now appears that no single liberation group in Angola will have the power to impose its own ideology as national policy. A. If civil war is averted and the three liberation groups establish some kind of coalition, the government'92s policies probably will be a delicate mix of the philosophies of the two major groups. B. Both major groups want a non-aligned foreign policy and will seek to maintain some balance between East and West. 1. The Popular Movement, if dominant, would establish a highly-centralized and authoritarian one-party regime with a pronounced socialist orientation and close ties to the communist world, with US ties kept to a minimum. 2. The National Front would probably seek to establish a highly nationalistic and personalized regime. Because of the Front'92s rather narrow political base, an FNLA state might be highly coercive. The Front would likely accept development and/or military aid from the West as well as the East. C. Both groups can be expected to nationalize Angola'92s major productive enterprises, but the Front probably would be more hospitable toward selective Western investment than the Popular Movement. D. As long as an independent Angola does not restrict access to its transportation facilities, good relations with its neighbors Zaire and Zambia probably can be maintained. 1. An independent Angola will give moral and political support to black nationalists in Rhodesia and South Africa. It would probably not become immediately involved in supporting insurgencies there, however, because of distance and the dominant role now being played by Zambia, Tanzania, and Mozambique in seeking a settlement with the Smith regime. VI. If, on the other hand, protracted civil war develops, Congo and Zaire could be brought into the conflict. A. Civil war could also convince either one, or both to move into Cabinda in an attempt to annex or neutralize the enclave. B. Continued fighting in Angola would exacerbate the confrontation between black and white Africa. It would intensify the fears of Rhodesia and South Africa concerning black majority rule. 1. South Africa is particularly concerned that a communist or unfriendly regime in Angola might support guerrilla activity in Namibia. 2. A hostile or unstable Angola would increase South African pressure on us to support its domestic and international policies. This would complicate our efforts to promote peaceful solutions to Southern Africa'92s racial problems. 3. South Africa does not seem to be planning any action to counter this threat. 1 'a0",political,bureaucracies_6,bureaucracies
"Mr. President, I was just checking ours and just talking to the Israelis to find out what was going on. The Israelis are still advancing into Syria, although they are now getting heavy counter-attacks and the Iraqi armor division is beginning to fight them. SPLIT That'92s right. But they claim to be advancing and they claim to be reaching their objective. Of course it is obvious that all the fighting is tougher for the Israelis than it has ever been before. SPLIT We had a call from Heath yesterday, 2 transferring a request from Jordan which we received already directly that if he is forced to move an armored unit into Syria, whether he could get an assurance from the Israelis that they wouldn'92t attack him. SPLIT That was a hell of a question to ask. SPLIT Well, I asked, I put it to the Israelis and they said they are not trying to add to the divisions facing them from Syria, but they'92re not looking for an excuse to attack Jordan. 3 SPLIT Oh, yeah, we'92ve had an appeal from Sadat to prevent Israeli attacks on civilian targets and we'92re sending a reply back saying we'92ve made that appeal to the Israelis. 4 Then we'92ve had an appeal from King Hussein. Today diplomacy is going to begin moving. I'92m seeing the press at noon, to see whether they can put up a simple cease-fire. 5 SPLIT That'92s right. That would still pass it. SPLIT Well, they just, because right now there'92s a sort of a balance in the sense that the Israelis gained in Syria and lost in Egypt. SPLIT I can'92t get a clear report of that. SPLIT Well, last night we finally told Schlesinger just to charter some of these civilian air lines, airplanes from civilian air lines for the Defense Department and then turn them over to the Israelis. SPLIT We'92ve tried everything else and these civilian airlines just wouldn'92t charter to the Israelis directly. SPLIT So that'92s going to start moving later today. SPLIT No. And of course the most important assurance you gave them was that you'92d replace the equipment. SPLIT Right. So that they can expend what they'92ve got, knowing they'92ll get more. SPLIT I'92m giving a press conference today. SPLIT No, we'92ve always said that we . . . SPLIT I'92m giving a press conference today. I'92ve got to navigate that one. SPLIT There'92s nothing else to be done, Mr. President. After all . . . SPLIT Impossible. SPLIT And it wouldn'92t change the situation in the next two or three days, which is what we'92re talking about. SPLIT In two or three weeks the international pressures will become unmanageable. SPLIT That'92s right. 1 'a0",military,bureaucracies_7,bureaucracies
"briefly outlined to the Council the type of military contingency plans that had been prepared. One group of plans provides for military support of an effort to re-establish a Cuban Government friendly to the U.S. A second group provides for protection of U.S. lives and interests, including evacuation if necessary. A final group of plans was designed to re-establish peace in the event of armed attack on Guantanamo. These last-named plans covered a wide range of possibilities. He recognized that the nature of our response could not be decided in advance. Marion W. Boggs} :: offered a personal opinion that in view of the strong forces Castro now had that the Cubans would have very little chance of success. As opposed to this, SPLIT also pointed out that whereas they might be able to take a small beach head that after a relatively short time Castro would be able to mount heavy forces against them. The problem would then be one of who would come to their assistance.'94 (Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials) 1 }",military,bureaucracies_8,bureaucracies
"explained why he had placed U.S. Policy toward Cuba on the Council agenda. He asked whether, in what now appeared to be the unlikely event of a military move by Castro against Guantanamo, the U.S. was wholly prepared with respect to policy and with respect to the coordination of political and military planning. He cited two extremes of possible U.S. reactions in the event of an attack on Guantanamo'93(a) use of only such military forces as might be necessary to protect the Guantanamo Base itself, and (b) a decision that such an attack was an act of war by the Castro Government against the U.S. and that military power should be applied accordingly.'94 In the latter case the obligations of the military would be different from what they would be in the former case. He assumed that in the latter case, we would pursue hostilities to a successful conclusion. He went on to say it was not clear whether military contingency planning was being done in close coordination with political planning and took full account of the actions that we might take in the UN or in the OAS. He concluded by stating that his reason for raising the issue was to make sure that the responsible departments had the benefit of the President'92s views so that, in the event an attack did occur, at least their planning would be complete. Secretary SPLIT asked what our reaction would be in a situation in which an overt move against the Base was accompanied by harassment of American citizens. This would be more than an attack on the Base. The :: From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy Source Washington, February 11, 1961. As you know, there is great pressure within the government in favor of a drastic decision with regard to Cuba. There is, it seems to me, a plausible argument for this decision if one excludes everything but Cuba itself and looks only at the pace of military consolidation within Cuba and the mounting impatience of the armed exiles. However, as soon as one begins to broaden the focus beyond Cuba to include the hemisphere and the rest of the world, the arguments against this decision begin to gain force. However well disguised any action might be, it will be ascribed to the United States. The result would be a wave of massive protest, agitation and sabotage throughout Latin America, Europe, Asia and Africa (not to speak of Canada and of certain quarters in the United States). Worst of all, this would be your first dramatic foreign policy initiative. At one stroke, it would dissipate all the extraordinary good will which has been rising toward the new Administration through the world. It would fix a malevolent image of the new Administration in the minds of millions. It may be that on balance the drastic decision may have to be made. If so, every care must be taken to protect ourselves against the inevitable political and diplomatic fall-out. 1. Would it not be possible to induce Castro to take offensive action first? He has already launched expeditions against Panama and against the Dominican Republic. One can conceive a black operation in, say, Haiti which might in time lure Castro into sending a few boatloads of men on to a Haitian beach in what could be portrayed as an effort to overthrow the Haitian regime. If only Castro could be induced to commit an offensive act, then the moral issue would be clouded, and the anti-US campaign would be hobbled from the start. 2. Should you not consider at some point addressing a speech to the whole hemisphere setting forth in eloquent terms your own conception of inter-American progress toward individual freedom and social justice? Such a speech would identify our Latin American policy with the aspirations of the plain people of the hemisphere. As part of this speech, you could point out the threats raised against the inter-American system by dictatorial states, and especially by dictatorial states under the control of non-hemisphere governments or ideologies. If this were done properly, action against Castro could be seen as in the interests of the hemisphere and not just of American corporations. 3. Could we not bring down Castro and Trujillo at the same time? If the fall of the Castro regime could be accompanied or preceded by the fall of the Trujillo regime, it would show that we have a principled concern for human freedom and do not object only to left-wing dictators. If the drastic decision proves necessary in the end, I hope that steps of this sort can do something to mitigate the effects. And, if we do take the drastic decision, it must be made clear that we have done so, not lightly, but only after we had exhausted every conceivable alternative. Arthur Schlesinger, jr. 1} :: I think the gloomier parts of both papers are right. Diplomatic and public opinion are surely not ready for an invasion, but Castro's internal strength continues to grow. The battalion's dispersal would be a blow to U.S. prestige, but we should today have a hard time at the U.N. if it goes in. The one hope I see is in an early'97even if thin'97recognition of a rival regime. I think if a Government-in-Exile can be surfaced promptly we could and should follow Mann's suggestion of working toward its recognition fairly soon. (We could also put in a full trade embargo against Castro, and you could sorrowfully read him out of the liberal family in a strong and factual speech about his outrages.) Then, conceivably, we could hold back Bissell's battalion for about three months and even build it up somewhat. And when it did go in, the color of civil war would be quite a lot stronger. McG. B.} :: Meeting on Cuba, 4:00 PM, March 15, 1961 CIA will present a revised plan for the Cuban operation. 1 They have done a remarkable job of reframing the landing plan so as to make it unspectacular and quiet, and plausibly Cuban in its essentials. The one major problem which remains is the air battle. I think there is unanimous agreement that at some stage the Castro Air Force must be removed. It is a very sketchy force, in very poor shape at the present, and Colonel Hawkins (Bissell's military brain) thinks it can be removed by six to eight simultaneous sorties of B-26s. These will be undertaken by Cuban pilots in planes with Cuban Air Force markings. This is the only really noisy enterprise that remains. My own belief is that this air battle has to come sooner or later, and that the longer we put it off, the harder it will be. Castro's Air Force is currently his Achilles' heel, but he is making drastic efforts to strengthen it with Russian planes and Russian-trained pilots. Even the revised landing plan depends strongly upon prompt action against Castro's air. The question in my mind is whether we cannot solve this problem by having the air strike come some little time before the invasion. A group of patriotic airplanes flying from Nicaraguan bases might knock out Castro's Air Force in a single day without anyone knowing (for some time) where they came from, and with nothing to prove that it was not an interior rebellion by the Cuban Air Force, which has been of very doubtful loyalty in the past; the pilots will in fact be members of the Cuban Air Force who went into the opposition some time ago. Then the invasion could come as a separate enterprise, and neither the air strike nor the quiet landing of patriots would in itself give Castro anything to take to the United Nations. I have been a skeptic about Bissell's operation, but now I think we are on the edge of a good answer. I also think that Bissell and Hawkins have done an honorable job of meeting the proper criticisms and cautions of the Department of State. McGeorge Bundy 2} :: Cuba 2. My brief answer is that I am in favor of a continuation and expansion of the present approach to Cuba'97i.e., quiet infiltration of anti-Castro exiles into Cuba and subsequent support through air drops. The beachhead operation, with the landing and recognition of the provisional government, would represent, however, a change of phase in our Cuban policy. If entirely successful, it would have the highly beneficial result of getting rid of the Castro regime. If we could achieve this by a swift, surgical stroke, I would be for it. But in present circumstances the operation seems to me to involve many hazards; and on balance'97and despite the intelligence and responsibility with which the case for the action has been presented'97I am against it. 3. The following considerations concerning the beachhead operation seem to me vital: a) No matter how '93Cuban'94 the equipment and personnel, the US will be held accountable for the operation, and our prestige will be committed to its success. b) Since the Castro regime is presumably too strong to be toppled by a single landing, the operation will turn into a protracted civil conflict. 4. If these assumptions are true, it seems to me that the operation involves the following hazards: a) The protraction of the struggle and the commitment of American prestige (especially if we proceed to recognize and supply a provisional government) will create increasing pressure on us to guarantee the success of the operation through ever more intense and overt involvement. It will seem increasingly intolerable to subject ourselves to the humiliation of a defeat in Cuba. If the landing fails to trigger uprisings behind the lines and defections in the Militia (and the evidence that it would do so is inconclusive), the logic of the situation could well lead us, step by step, to the point where the last step would be to dispatch the Marines. b) The protraction of the struggle will give the Soviet Union a magnificent opportunity to wage political warfare. Cuba will become our Hungary; and, since our pretensions to international good behavior have been greater than those of the Russians, we would be more damaged by Hungary than they were (and they were considerably damaged). The situation is made to order for the Communist agitprop apparatus. Jose Marti Brigades and no doubt Abraham Lincoln Brigades will be recruited to support Castro, not just from beyond the Iron Curtain, but in Western Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America. There will be demonstrations and riots around the world on the model of the movement for Loyalist Spain in the late Thirties. There will be resolutions in the United Nations, with testimony by prisoners or Castro agents about the US preparation of and responsibility for the action. (I must say, however, that I question the view that this operation would have serious substantive effect on Soviet policy, in Laos or elsewhere. My guess is that the Soviet Union regards Cuba as in our domain and is rather surprised that we have not taken action before this to rid ourselves of Castro. (I also think that the operation would be more easily accepted in Latin America, where there is spreading knowledge about the nature of the Castro regime, than in Western Europe, Africa or Asia, where it will seem gross, unprovoked and bullying imperialism.) c) As the struggle protracts itself and as the political campaign mounts against the US, our government'97and you'97will have to meet penetrating questions about our role in the affair. We will have either to evade the questions and thereby tacitly plead guilty; or deny involvement; or declare ignorance. Each course presents obvious difficulties. If we admit involvement, we admit action taken in violation of the basic characters of the hemisphere and of the United Nations. If we justify such violation by pleading a higher law, we place ourselves thereafter on the same moral plane as the Soviet Union. If we deny involvement, few will believe us; and we invite a repetition of the U-2 episode, which made us look absurd before the world. Whatever we do, the effect will be to spoil the new US image'97the image of intelligence, reasonableness and honest firmness which has already had such an extraordinary effect in changing world opinion about the US and increasing world confidence in US methods and purposes. d) And there is the Fulbright point: our responsibility for the post-Castro regime. The eyes of the world will be upon us, and we cannot afford a post-Castro mess. On the basis of the documents 2 they have submitted to us containing their ideas for the future, I rather share his doubts as to the competence of the exile leaders. 5. These hazards would be outweighed, in my judgment, by the advantage of getting rid of Castro a) if the operation could be swift and surgical b) if support were forthcoming from our allies, both in Latin America and in Europe c) if the danger to the US were visible and overwhelming. Conditions (a) and (b) seem doubtful. Of (c), it can only be said that it is not self-evident to many people (including the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee). The counter argument would be: why not wait? Every month Castro is making himself more unpopular both through the hemisphere and in his own country. Every month more people through the world are coming to understand the nature of his regime. Opinion has changed tremendously in the last six months; it will change even more in the next six months, if Castro is not made a martyr. The combination of internal discontent and external isolation will doom his regime. The counter argument to this, of course, is that time will permit a military build-up and a perfection of internal control which will make Castro invulnerable to anything but a major invasion. In the meantime, he will prosecute his campaign against the hemisphere. The counter argument to that is that the measures which increase his invulnerability will also increase his unpopularity; that the more he tries to totalitarianize and terrorize Cuba, the more he makes Communism an object of hatred through the hemisphere; and, if he uses his military strength against any other state, he gives us the excuse we need for collective intervention. I am not sure that this debate permits a categorical judgment on the question whether time would run for or against us in Cuba. 6. The consequences of abandonment remain to be considered. Abandonment would conceivably suggest a US failure of nerve. It might seem to place a premium on the defiance of Castro; it would certainly dishearten those in Latin America who have exposed themselves by demanding action against Castro; it would certainly disillusion the brave men we have gathered in Guatemala; it would confront us with the problem of demobilizing and resettling these men. The fact that the expedition was conceived, prepared and then called off at the last moment would increase Castro's prestige and power. These are all powerful points. They weigh very heavily in my mind on the side of going ahead. However, I hesitate to say that we should do something simply because we have seemed to commit ourselves to doing it which, if we were starting fresh, we would not do. On balance, I think that the risks of the operation slightly outweigh the risks of abandonment. These latter risks would be mitigated somewhat if we could manage a partial rather than a total abandonment (i.e., if we could put the men into Cuba quietly). We might also be able to make some diplomatic capital out of the abandonment. We might have Thompson say to Khrushchev, for example, that we have discouraged an invasion of Cuba; that this shows our genuine desire to compose differences; but that K. should tell his friend to behave, because our patience is not inexhaustible and we cannot hope to restrain the Cuban patriots indefinitely. Conceivably we might be able to turn abandonment to some diplomatic advantage within the hemisphere too. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.}",political,bureaucracies_9,bureaucracies
". The judgment expressed without dissent was that Cuba is now for practical purposes a Communist-controlled state. The two basic elements in the present situation are a rapid and continuing build-up of Castro's military power, and a great increase also in popular opposition to his regime. The United States has undertaken a number of covert measures against Castro, including propaganda, sabotage, political action, and direct assistance to anti-Castro Cubans in military training. A particularly urgent question is the use to be made of a group of such Cubans now in training in Guatemala, who cannot remain indefinitely where they are. The present estimate of the SPLIT took a very optimistic view of the force's ability to land and hold a beach head. The :: of the current plan for launching the troops from Guatemala. He reported that the JCS, after careful study, believed that this plan had a fair chance of success'97'93success'94 meaning ability to survive, hold ground, and attract growing support from Cubans. At the worst, the invaders should be able to fight their way to the Escambray and go into guerrilla action. If the troops are to land in top form, the operation should not be delayed, at the longest, beyond March 31, and the decision to land for it must be made before D minus 21. Secretary",military,bureaucracies_10,bureaucracies
"agreed. General :: remarked that we are risking the same thing with an unsuccessful small convoy. At this point General :: , at the president'92s request, then pointed out some of the military actions which are being taken. He emphasized that much planning is being conducted, both in the Pentagon and in General Norstad'92s headquarters, on a contingency basis. He pointed out that any effort to bull our way into Berlin with ground forces alone requires more strength than we have available; therefore, no substantial reinforcement of our land forces in Europe is contemplated. For psychological reasons, however, some small reinforcements are being sent primarily to round out units and bring them up to strength. Secretary SPLIT emphasized the improbability of moving into Germany without entailing hostilities directly with Russia. Therefore, since we cannot fight this battle on the ground, we are studying the matter of airlift as a fallback action. We are preparing our crews by way of familiarizing them with Tempelhof airfield and we are making electronic jamming studies. The Secretary emphasized that what we are making are normal preparations. He feels that the Congressmen present should know about them, but he requests that talk be avoided to enable us to bring our allies along with us. We are playing on the basis of '93not much noise but carry a big stick.'94 We must realize that the Russians will carry their threats '93up to the line.'94 We are therefore planning as if we will be required to carry out our contingency plans. We think, however, the country will be better served if we avoid saber rattling. Secretary :: Berlin Contingency Planning 1. You asked recently to be brought up to date on Berlin contingency planning. 2. Berlin contingency planning has proceeded on the basis of guidance which you approved at a meeting on January 29, 1959, 1 with Secretary Dulles, Secretary McElroy and General Twining (Tab A). 2 3. In order to obtain full understanding of the access control question, a joint State'96Defense team of officials acquainted with current contingency planning will proceed promptly to Germany to make first-hand observations of current Soviet practice concerning access. 4. The following steps are now recommended for your approval: -720 (a) At an appropriate time before May 27, test flights should be made in and out of Berlin above 10,000 feet. The Soviets have denied that we have a right to fly above that ceiling. We have maintained that we do have such a right, but have never in fact exercised it. (b) Present contingency planning provides that after the attempted or announced substitution of GDR for USSR, the first unit to go through would be a truck or trucks accompanied by a scout car or some other vehicle with a capability for shooting. We recommend that this concept be changed, and that the first unit to attempt passage in such circumstances should be a routine convoy to emphasize our intention to continue past practices. If this unit is blocked, we recommend that the next unit should be accompanied by a scout car or similar vehicle. Its purpose would be to establish the existence of forcible blockage. 3 (c) We recommend that you ask the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CIA to prepare for you on an urgent basis an analysis of the political and military implications of the four alternative courses of action with respect to the use of force, discussed in paragraph 7 below. We suggest a deadline of April 7. You may recall that a similar study proved useful in connection with the Korean War (NSC 147 of April 2, 1953). 4 [ 1 paragraph ( 2'961/2 lines of source text ) not declassified ] Open Questions 5. Concessions for the sake of unity. At the meeting in your office on March 5 5 after the NSC meeting, it was agreed that continued Allied unity on Berlin was essential That leaves open the question whether and, if so, to what extent we should modify our basic position if that turns out to be necessary in order to get Allied agreement. 6. Substitution. The doctrine that we will allow '93no substitution'94 of GDR for Soviet personnel (at least unless there is an acknowledged agency relation between the two) is being questioned in various quarters'97both foreign and domestic. Attention is focusing on the '93no stamping'94 application of the '93no substitution'94 doctrine, i.e., the proposition that we will refuse to allow paper stamping as a means of identifying allied military traffic to GDR personnel since this would imply acceptance of control. [ 4 paragraphs (17 lines of source text) not declassified ] 7. Alternative uses of force. -720 (a) Recent discussions between State and Defense officials confirmed agreement that we should be prepared to resort to force if necessary to maintain access to Berlin'97even at the risk of general war. (b) Four alternative uses of force, in the event of failure of political negotiations, have been discussed: -1440 (i) A substantial effort to reopen ground access by local action. (ii) A substantial effort to reopen air access, if blocked. (iii) Reprisals against the communists in other areas, e.g., Western naval controls on bloc shipping. (iv) General war measures. -720 (c) In paragraph 4 (c) above, we recommended that you direct preparation of an analysis of the implications of these alternative courses of action on an urgent basis. 8. Timing of force. It may be difficult to maintain a state of high military readiness over a long period. On the other hand, there would be political difficulties in breaking off negotiations, or a debate in the United Nations, and resorting to force, especially if civilian traffic to Berlin was still moving freely. If political negotiations prove prolonged, at what point should we be prepared to resort to one of the four alternative uses of forces described above? The answer to this question will, of course, hinge in considerable measure on your decision after the completion of the study recommended in paragraph 4 (c). Neil McElroy Christian A. Herter [ Tab B (2 pages of source text) not declassified ]} :: added that while there is a chance of a protest, there is a good chance that this flight might go unnoticed. Polish transports come in at 25,000 feet. The use of a jet or turboprop aircraft would give us a legitimate reason for this reversal of procedures. He added the operating factor that the Soviets are not particularly alert in their four-power airway control center. As a matter of fact, the Soviet member is normally either intoxicated or violently hung over. This factor might well permit the filing of a flight plan about [ above ] 10,000 feet without Soviet protest. The :: expressed agreement with this view of Secretary Herter. Mr. SPLIT inquired whether we should omit Alternative Three in any material which we transmit to our Allies. The :: suggested that the key to the '93token force'94 idea is to avoid letting the situation slip to the point that the force must become a major invasion. Our position must be to meet the first indications resolutely. The",military,bureaucracies_11,bureaucracies
"defined the difference between his approach and that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The SPLIT would prefer to execute this operation in two stages, allowing a lapse of time between the first probe and the use of appreciable force. To this Secretary SPLIT expressed his agreement that we are risking defeat and humiliation by the use of one division. Mr. SPLIT reaffirmed his own history of willingness to risk war when necessary. He stressed, however, that in a situation of this type it is essential to give peace forces a chance to work. The first obstruction, in his view, is insufficient reason to precipitate a war. For this reason he regards extensive military preparations as the '93second barrel.'94 There is plenty of time in his view to send a division after due contemplation. A discussion then followed regarding our ground capabilities vis-'e0-vis those of the Soviets in Europe. General :: Berlin Contingency Planning When Secretary Dulles and others discussed Berlin contingency planning with you on January 29, 1 the application of additional military force was reserved for governmental decision in the event that an initial probe followed by other measures proved unsuccessful. Though decision is reserved, the need for advance planning is evident, and the Department of State has been examining alternative possibilities. Short of general war, these appear to be two. One is the use of substantial force to attempt to reopen passage to Berlin. The other, a pacific counter-blockade, supplemented perhaps by other forms of naval reprisal, seems on preliminary examination to merit careful study also. There is attached a memorandum on this subject prepared in the State Department. Pacific blockade is considered an act of reprisal rather than an act of war. By applying this concept to Berlin situation, we might frame a strategy which would counter interference with Western access not by invading East Germany, where we would be at a disadvantage, but by action at sea where the USSR would be at a disadvantage. We might, for example, control Soviet and East German shipping at the entrances to the Baltic and the Black Sea. The control could assume various degrees of stringency, in case the USSR should use gradual tactics over Berlin. It could be extended to other principal ports in the North and Far East if desired, and it could be supplemented by seizing ships on the high seas. While such a course of action, like its alternative, raises serious problems, it has such apparent advantages that I believe it worth very careful study. I therefore suggest that you direct that the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff report urgently on United States capabilities for naval reprisals, including counter-blockade, in connection with Berlin contingency planning. Christian A. Herter [Attachment] 2 Paper Prepared by George A. Morganof the Policy Planning Staff :: Washington, March 3, 1959. BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING: PACIFIC COUNTER-BLOCKADE Introduction 1. There are two basic issues which confront us in contingency planning for Berlin (a) at what stage and over what issue to threaten and, if necessary, use force; (b) what type of force to use. 2. This memorandum addresses the second of these issues. It proposes in particular the study of a type of force which could be used as an alternative to substantial ground action in East Germany or immediate initiation of general war. It does not address the question of defining the point at which the proposed type of force should be used, but it does suggest that the threat to use it would decrease the likelihood of such a point being reached. 3. In challenging the West on Berlin, the USSR is relying on two circumstances in particular: first, the only way the West can maintain access is by crossing territory under effective communist control and, second, it is far easier to deny than to maintain such access by localized military action. It is thus clear that local use of force by Western powers cannot of itself be an effective counter to the proposed Soviet line of action, hence that its significance would consist wholly in the implied threat of imminent general war. Yet it is precisely the immense psychological gap between pinpoint Berlin situation and global reaction that has made it difficult to win Allied commitment to this step, makes Allied unanimity uncertain when faced with the ultimate decision, and therefore encourages Soviet intransigeance. 4. We need accordingly to look beyond Berlin to see if there is not some other way in which we can more effectively deter or counter Soviet interference with Western access. One way might be the application of seapower which served us so well over Lebanon and Quemoy. In seapower the balance of general military advantage is with us, not with the USSR, and by its use we should be able to pick situations where the balance of local advantage would also be in our favor. The Concept of Graduated Pacific Counter-Blockade 5. Some form of counter-blockade would seem to be the most logical use of seapower in relation to Berlin, since what is threatened against us in Berlin amounts to a blockade. It should be considered a pacific counter-blockade since it would be intended as a reprisal rather than an act of war. As Soviet or East German interference with our access might begin gradually, it would be desirable to plan wide flexibility in both degree and scope. Suitable points at which to control shipping might be at the entrances to the Baltic and the Black Sea, and the degree of control might vary with the degree of interference with our access to Berlin. The blockade could be extended to the principal ports in the north and far east if desired. It might be applied to all Soviet and East German shipping, or to vessels to and from one or more specific ports. It could also be supplemented by seizing ships on the high seas by way of reprisal, or by other measures such as a trade embargo. 6. If in the end any new agreements or implicit understandings were reached concerning Berlin, the continuing possibility and perhaps explicit threat of pacific counter-blockade might provide useful insurance against further Soviet bad faith or East German nibbling at our position. Advantages as a Deterrent 7. The USSR would know counter-blockade to be a course of action well within our capabilities, on terms relatively advantageous to us and therefore not suspect of bluffing. The recent incident when we boarded a Soviet trawler believed to have cut cables 3 illustrates for their benefit the decisiveness of US action in this sphere. 8. A strategy of counter-blockade would be a rational and symmetrical response to wrongful use of force against us, thereby appealing to the poplar sense of justice, and it would tend to place on the USSR the chief onus for extending the conflict into open hostilities if that occurred. It should therefore be more acceptable to NATO and to Western public opinion than using substantial force to try to open a passage to Berlin. It would be a course of action in which the French and British could fully participate, and their efforts could be supplemented by some or all other NATO powers as a token of solidarity. Moreover it would be capable of adoption at an early date, at least for purposes of planning and preparation. To enhance its deterrent value we should probably wish to let the USSR know our intentions, privately if not publicly, well in advance. It should thus confront the USSR with the prospect of full and continuing Allied unanimity on a vital aspect of the question of using force over Berlin. 9. Counter-blockade would help to bridge the psychological gap between Berlin and our global deterrent. It would involve operations on an extensive scale, from which the transition to a global strike would be credible alike to friend and foe if it appeared to be in the US interest. Advantages if Implemented 10. In addition to several advantages already mentioned, counterblockade if implemented would inflict serious psychological and political damage on the USSR, and it could not be broken without grave risk of general war, for which the USSR would bear the main onus. It would therefore give the USSR substantial inducement to come to terms. The psychological and political inducement would be supplemented by significant economic losses, the probable amount of which should be the subject of further study. 11. Counter-blockade would afford time and a sound basis for further negotiations, rather than precipitating a rapid showdown. We would be under no compulsion to make concessions without counter-concessions. We would be in a relatively favorable position with world opinion, which would be drawn away from confusing details about Berlin traffic control and focussed on the big picture. 12. Counter-blockade would wear well in case of UN intervention. The UN could hardly ask one side to back down more than the other, and any foot-dragging by the USSR could be matched by us. Possible Objections 13. While the present memorandum is only an initial not a definitive study, some objections which readily arise may be considered briefly. 14. Counter-blockade might be considered unduly provocative, especially since blockade is traditionally considered an act of war and the concept of pacific blockade is not familiar to the general public. But our actual interference with communist shipping would be proportionate to the interference with Western access to Berlin, hence a just response rather than a provocation. In any case in the light of Khrushchev'92s flat statements it would probably seem less provocative than invasion of East Germany'97the only alternative resort to force so far proposed. 15. The communists might extend the Berlin blockade to civilian traffic, or even seize West Berlin. But we would have at our disposal appropriate counter-measures, including seizing all communist shipping and extending our counter-blockade, or deciding this meant general war. If Western troops were captured and held as hostages, we could likewise imprison all personnel of ships we seized. 16. West Berlin could not hold out indefinitely, and the USSR might simply sit tight until Berlin collapsed. It is true that the USSR could physically stand our counter-blockade indefinitely. But whatever the economic losses involved, the USSR would doubtless find the situation very humiliating to its prestige. Meanwhile the pressure of world opinion, both direct and through the UN, would mount strongly in favor of a settlement. As for Berlin, the stockpiles should enable the city to hold out physically for some months, which should be adequate. The key question would be morale, but that also should respond on the whole favorably to a vigorous stand by the West like counter-blockade. Something might also be done about morale on the other side, as the tense situation could easily bring anti-communist feelings in East Germany to the boiling point. 17. The USSR might well react with mine sweeping if our blockade used mines, with submarine attacks on our shipping, or plane and submarine attacks on our blockading vessels, conduct mine warfare against them, or try to force the blockade by naval escort of merchant ships. But in that event they would bear the responsibility of taking additional military measures, and we would retain the option of fighting back in a type of hostilities which would be more advantageous to us than local ground fighting and less dangerous than immediate resort to general war. Conclusion The possibility of naval reprisals, particularly in the form of pacific counter-blockade, has enough apparent promise to justify careful study.} :: said we planned to keep moving until the other side shoots at us. The SPLIT remarked that this is the determination we have to make. The SPLIT said it might be necessary to postpone the decision until after the NATO meeting. The :: agreed in the light of coordination difficulties that we must not talk unilaterally. Senator :: then outlined the one problem in contingency planning which concerns the group, namely, provision for flying over 10,000 feet in the corridors. If we would deliberately fly above this altitude, a measure to which we have previously claimed the right but not exercised, the fact of maintaining a fighter alert for protection of the aircraft might well result in an undesired opening of hostilities. General SPLIT stated that he just wanted the president to know of the potential difficulty.} :: was quite sure that the Soviets would deduce the meaning of such an action. Secretary :: stressed the very great importance of the Intelligence Estimates in the paper. He added that it was his personal view that if we carried out the First Alternative now under discussion, the Soviets were likely to fight unless they were really prepared to let our military forces, either of battalion or division size, move down the Autobahn into Berlin. General SPLIT called attention to the footnote on Page 26 reading as follows: '93There is a serious question as to whether one or more of such actions would constitute retaliation, which is regarded as belligerent action'94. Secretary SPLIT said that he himself believed that some of the suggested actions under this Alternative might be called aggressive and belligerent. Secretary SPLIT commented that of course the military courses of action must be dove-tailed with the political courses of action. He felt reasonably sure, he said, that our Allies would go along with our proposed military actions if they are convinced that we had exhausted all the other possibilities. Mr. SPLIT thought this was a useful idea but of reprisals in general, under Alternative Three, he pointed out that the three Allied Governments had definite legal rights with respect to access to Berlin. On the other hand, if we held up Soviet shipping on the high seas, we could not do so on the basis of any clear legal right. The :: , still referring to the question of Khrushchev'92s motives, stated the view that Khrushchev had felt a need to bolster East Germany. Many people were making their escape from East Germany through Berlin. A high percentage of these people comprised intellectuals. :: '92s answer to this was that the key issue is a willingness to use limited force to maintain our rights. The attitude of the Germans if we let the GDR officials stamp our papers would be bad. If we accept any signs of jurisdiction by the GDR in the first instance, we have no firm line on which to stand if later provocations follow. He repeated that we must use limited force at the first instance, and that will be the greatest deterrent. General",military,bureaucracies_12,bureaucracies
"have recommended preparation for a large-scale use of force on May 27, to include meeting resistance with a large force, rebuilding of bridges, obstructions, etc. This force can comprise strength up to a division. Secretary SPLIT then spoke up in defense of the Joint Chiefs of Staff point of view. They recommend that we make up our minds now as to our sequence of action rather than attempt to address the problem only after we are stopped. (The SPLIT forcefully injected the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff fear that the United States will go half way and then quit. They feel that if we do not carry through with our resolution to risk general war we might as well get out of Europe. To this viewpoint the SPLIT pointed out that our policies forbid a limited war in Europe, that we cannot fight the USSR on the ground conventionally, and that if we make up our minds to go through we must be prepared to fight a general nuclear war. To this the :: then gave a report on the small military actions being taken which Soviet intelligence might pick up. 8 General SPLIT also reported that a Communications Plan in support of Berlin was being prepared. He also said that the Joint Chiefs felt that we can handle a garrison airlift to Berlin with only a small augmentation, even in the face of, efforts to jam our communications. The SPLIT said that as regards Air Force and Navy plans, no decisions were needed now. However, if Norstad had to move large forces from southern to northern Europe, it might be necessary to supply up to 1 additional division from the United States. The :: added further explanation that our normal procedure is to fly at 6,000 and 8,000 feet. We always have fighters ready for scrambling to protect our air traffic. Therefore, should difficulties result from this venture, we could possibly have an incident. He further stated that action on the part of the Communists of a minor nature, such as buzzing or flying alongside our aircraft, happens continually and it creates no problem for us. We do not regard any Communist action short of firing across the bow as a hostile act. Mr. :: wondered whether it would not be possible to express the Majority view and the Dissent in rather generalized terms. Mr. SPLIT said that of course CINCEUR was well aware of the points that the SPLIT observed that the main thing was to stir up the Tripartite Group in Norstad'92s Headquarters in Paris to get down to work. Secretary SPLIT pointed out that the paper under consideration required us to confine our military action to the Corridor if possible. Mr. :: proceeded to outline the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to wit, that it is difficult to tell how far we will go ultimately in our use of force. The important thing, in the view of the JCS, is to verify that we have been stopped, not by our own backing down, but by actual use of force on the part of the Soviets. From there we may have to proceed to an airlift as the next step; but this is the least desirable course of action and is regarded as a form of defeat. In short, an attempt on the part of an armed convoy may be regarded as a '93reconnaissance in force.'94 Its failure would leave us facing two choices: the use of more force, or the use of an airlift. The",military,bureaucracies_13,bureaucracies
"then briefed the Members of Congress by use of a map of East Germany. This indicated Soviet and GDR armed forces. (See summary of Mr. Dulles'92 briefing, attached.) 1 At the end of this presentation there were brief questions. To Mr. Halleck'92s question regarding the reliability of GDR troops, SPLIT gave the opinion that these troops are not overly reliable, but the Soviets would not depend on them in any serious action. From this Mr. :: thought that General Twining'92s suggestion was a good one but advised against identifying the source of Dissents in the Intelligence Estimates. He suggested that the paper just provide the Minority view as one which differed from the Majority Intelligence Estimate. If the paper were to be given to the French, Mr. SPLIT urged that it be '93sanitized'94 first. There being no further discussion of Alternative One, Mr. SPLIT commented that this time the Dissent came from the State Department rather than from the Military Intelligence Agencies. At this point the SPLIT again came back to the problem of reprisals. He pointed out that there was one type of naval reprisal which we might well consider and which might not seem too belligerent. If the Soviets held up one of our Berlin convoys we could retaliate by holding one Soviet merchant vessel, on one pretext or another, in an Allied port. Mr. :: ventured that Khrushchev is probably looking for a way out at this time. His first motive had been to point up Europe since things in the world had been going rather well for the U.S. (Lebanon and Quemoy). Mr. SPLIT agreed with Mr. Herter, stating that if a free election were held in East Germany, only 10% would vote Communist.}",political,bureaucracies_14,bureaucracies
"opened by explaining to the president that the State and Defense Departments were coordinating on a couple of subjects, such as reunification of Germany, European security, and contingency planning. The purpose of requesting this meeting is to obtain additional guidance in preparation for the foreign ministers talks to begin on March 31st. Secretary :: '93General War Measures'94. Here again he pointed out that there was a difference of opinion as to the Intelligence Estimate on the reaction to be expected from the NATO Governments if the Fourth Alternative were undertaken (Page 34). Mr. :: pointed out that the discussion had now reached the First of the Four Alternative Courses of Action; namely, '93A Substantial Effort to Re-Open Ground Access by Local Action.'94 Mr. SPLIT pointed out on Page 15 a difference in the Intelligence Estimate of the response which we might expect from the Soviets if we undertook this First Alternative. Air Force Intelligence (A'962) believed that this course of action would convince the Soviets that the Western Allies were prepared if necessary to proceed to General War, and that the Soviets would therefore find ways to ease the crisis. Mr. SPLIT pointed out that this difference of view was one factor to be considered if this paper were to be transmitted to other Allied Governments. In such a case, he asked, should these splits in Intelligence Estimates be reflected at all? If they were to be reflected, should the identity of those who held the differing views be made clear or alternatively should just the Majority Estimate be provided to the other Governments? Secretary SPLIT directed the Council'92s attention to the Second Alternative; namely, '93A Substantial Effort to Re-Open Air Access, if Blocked.'94 As in the case of the First Alternative, he noted that this Alternative also involved a difference in the Intelligence Estimate of the reaction which we might expect from the Soviets if this Alternative were attempted (Page 21). He suggested that the same considerations should apply in the case of this split as applied in the case of the split Estimate as to the First Alternative. Mr. SPLIT then referred to the Third Alternative, that is, '93Reprisals Against the Communists in Other Areas, e.g., Western Naval Controls on Bloc Shipping.'94 Initially Mr. SPLIT pointed out that the same problem of timing existed with respect to this Alternative as with the first two Alternatives. Secretary SPLIT proceeded to the Fourth SPLIT next inquired whether the same considerations would not apply to Alternative Two as applied to Alternative One with respect to General Norstad'92s planning. In reply the SPLIT then invited the Council'92s attention to the final section of the paper: '93Reactions within Germany to the Four Courses of Action.'94 There being no comment or discussion on this section, Mr. SPLIT turned to the :: then posed the question of what Khrushchev is after. Mr. SPLIT considers it improbable that Khrushchev is seeking a fight but believes that Khrushchev may be seeking a conference. On this, SPLIT pointed out the parallel between this situation and the Quemoy situation in that the Soviets had stirred up trouble as a device to lure us into a conference. He then asked if the U.S. is willing at this time to have a conference. Mr.",political,bureaucracies_15,bureaucracies
"proposed two actions: a. Reinforcement of the West Berlin garrison. 2. The :: trouble will break out in other areas. SPLIT asked if the supplies will permit approx 30 days. :: if our air access stopped, we would stop Soviet civil air traffic; 80% goes in Eur. Most to Germany. They want to break link of civilian traffic between WG and West Berlin. :: pointed out that the first side to use nuclear weapons will carry a very grave responsibility and endure heavy consequences before the rest of the world. McGeorge Bundy 4 1 'a0 :: see considerable merit in General Clay's proposed course. 1. It would demonstrate that we consider our right of access to and circulation in East Berlin still valid. 2. It would probably make the Soviets pause before taking further encroaching action as well as affect the nature of their subsequent actions. 3. Moreover, unlike other proposals for a military response to a Soviet/GDR closing action, General Clay's proposal does not involve a serious problem of disengaging our forces for General SPLIT view, however, the absence of any response on our part to a Soviet/GDR move at Friedrichstrasse would be unnecessarily supine. To take no action against Soviet personnel, for example, would hardly be understood. To take the obvious retaliatory measures might not regain much of our lost prestige, but not to take them would cost us further prestige. Recommendations The alternatives posed therefore are: (a) The",military,bureaucracies_16,bureaucracies
"suggested that (i) this Bloc action might portend a speed-up of Khrushchev's schedule; (ii) our own military preparations should be hastened accordingly. There was some disagreement with his diagnosis, but none with his prescription. 1 'a0 :: yes. SPLIT Yes'97as long as they can fight with. SPLIT our purpose is to insure that K knows we will use nuc. :: air access may be first blocked total. Described possible action'97Schonfeld. Discussed escalation. Discussed ground target attacks. SPLIT explained part I naval blockade table; part II acts of war. SPLIT with 30 divs you can man the whole line. :: presented opposite views on this point. The SPLIT believed that with such a strike, we could in some real sense be victorious in the series of nuclear exchanges, while we might well lose if we allowed the Soviets to strike first in the strategic battle. Mr. :: and Mr. SPLIT argued that the consequences of IV. C. were so very grave that IV A. and B. should be undertaken first even though they might indeed lead very quickly to IV C. Mr. Nitze, on the other hand, believed that since IV A. and B. would greatly increase the temptation to the Soviets to initiate a strategic strike of their own, it would be best for us, in moving toward the use of nuclear weapons, to consider most seriously the option of an initial strategic strike of our own. Mr. SPLIT felt that neither side could be sure of winning by striking first and that the consequences to both sides of a strategic exchange would be so devastating that both sides had a very high interest in avoiding such a result. On the whole of Paragraph IV, the",military,bureaucracies_17,bureaucracies
"UPON GDR RESTRICTIONS ON ALLIED CIRCULATION BETWEEN THE WEST AND EAST SECTORS OF BERLIN 1. It appears to me that the new measures of restraint imposed by the GDR on Allied circulation between the sectors in Berlin are more serious than seem to be generally regarded. For the first time the East Germans have aimed restrictions specifically and publicly at the occupying powers. This new measure has nothing to do with the restraint of refugees, the primary excuse for the sealing off of the East Sector. Its target is the Western Allies who are to be humiliated publicly before all of Germany. It is a measure aimed at further depressing the morale of West Berlin, at destroying the confidence of West Berlin in the Western Powers, and at offsetting the effects of the Johnson-Clay visit. 2. If we allow this provocation to pass unchallenged, it is difficult to see how we can resist restrictions by the GDR on Allied movements on the autobahn, the railway and perhaps in the air. 3. A minimum action to take is for the Western Powers to announce that they will disregard these restrictions and cross into the East Sector wherever and whenever they see fit. What they would do subsequently in living up to this bold language would depend upon circumstances. 4. A second course which recommends itself to me (if supported by our representatives in Berlin) would be for the Western Commandants (or at least the U.S. Commandant) to call up the Soviet Commandant, in Karlshorst, informing him that they are calling on him in a body, crossing at X (a place other than Friedrichstrasse). They would further inform him that they will hold the USSR responsible for any incidents in transiting this Sector border. After waiting a reasonable time to permit the word to get about, they would then proceed to X prepared to cross by force if resisted. 5. While such a course of action is fraught with some hazard and the outcome cannot be clearly predicted, I have the feeling that it would break the rhythm of mounting Communist provocation and prevent later and more hazardous incidents. M.D.T. 2 1 'a0 :: Recent events provide pretty clear evidence that Khrushchev intends using military force, or the threat thereof, to gain his ends in Berlin. He has raised his ante by progressively isolating West Berlin, by retaining in service several hundred thousand men due for discharge, and by reverting to atomic testing. Thus far our own defense efforts have been deliberately kept in a low key and at a comparatively normal tempo. I have a strong feeling that the moment has come to shift into a higher gear. On August 31 you sent a memorandum to Secretary McNamara 2 asking him for recommendations on expansion of our military forces in the light of the events noted above. The decision which you take will be an extremely important one, and it seems to me that you will, therefore, want to touch all the bases and establish a clear record. You might consider some such scenario as follows: Maxwell D. :: could be the reverse. 1 'a0 :: would support program's rec. Looks like Sov accel. schedule probably as result of refugee prob. We must accelerate. Other purposes'97restore morale of European allies to stand up to prospective military action. Be prepared for action. Not have onus of failure. Picking up pieces if we have a war. Rec to date does not add divs. SPLIT we must respond with force. SPLIT if we had no troops in E & if we would not use nuc he would do as he pleases. We must establish credibility of our det to use nuc. There are not enough div in Eur to retake B. We must show K & others we are not going to sacrifice 5 or more divs without use of nuc. We will be more ready to use nuc with more divs. If we don't, we go from meg [ reg? ] to nuc war. SPLIT this is only chance of making nuc war unnecessary. :: summary of the discussion, he stressed the need for the Departments of State and Defense to submit a paper to the president stating what the best courses of action would be '93in response to broad contingencies of harassment within Berlin, interference with ground access, interference with air access, and any other broad contingencies which could arise'94 from the derogation of vital U.S. interests in Berlin. (Talking Paper, October 4; ibid., :: suggests that if the Friedrichstrasse crossing point is closed, we should force the barrier even in the face of desultory fire, with a small number of tanks. These tanks would then take a defensive position in East Berlin immediately inside the entry point. If, however, our tanks were attacked by East German forces or confronted by substantial Soviet forces, our tanks would withdraw to defensive positions in West Berlin. General SPLIT believes such action would probably result in the entry point being kept open and he sees as additional advantages the fact that the Soviets would again be forced to participate in a Berlin problem; we, in turn, would have demonstrated our insistence upon our right of access to and circulation in East Berlin; Soviet intentions and determination might be more clearly revealed; and Berlin opinion would be less disillusioned than if a weaker course of action had been taken. SPLIT apparently accepts the fact that the operation might be limited to running tanks a few yards into East Berlin without attempting to use the access thus gained. On the other hand we question General Clay's assertion that such action on our part is likely to keep the access point open. In our view it is unlikely that such a gesture would cause the Soviets to leave the entrance open if they had once decided to close it. As for Soviet participation in Berlin problems, this would not seem to be any longer of major significance once the Communists decided finally to split the city. Soviet responsibility within the city would be of little practical importance once the boundary was closed. And the appearance of their forces to drive out our tanks, if they in fact appeared, would be the last gasp of Soviet responsibility. Whether this action would be less damaging to Berlin morale than present plans is also moot. The sight of our tanks plunging through the barrier to remain in the East Sector might raise hopes that the wall at last was coming down or at the very least, indicate that we intended to keep the access point open. And then if our tanks simply stopped, and subsequently had to withdraw, the let-down following in the wake of our demonstrated inability to follow through might be greater than if we had implied no bold determination. A final and major difficulty for us is this proposed course of action, even though it might reduce the problem of follow-up and disengaging forces, still is essentially open-ended, and does not clearly forestall an uncontrollable and unpredictable situation. However, in considering General Clay's proposals, it seems to us that the purposes of his recommendations might probably be achieved, and at the same time some of its apparent disadvantages avoided, through the following course of action: If the Friedrichstrasse crossing point is closed either by unacceptable demands for documentation by the GDR or by the erection of a barrier, we might run two or three tanks up to the checkpoint to demolish whatever was barring our entry (even if only a customs-type gate), and then have them withdraw and stationed nearby inside the Western Sector. The Commandant in the Kommandatura chair for the month, or alternatively the US Commandant (Friedrichstrasse is in the US Sector), would then immediately call Karlshorst to protest the situation and demand an urgent meeting with the Soviet Commandant as well as assurances of safe conduct through the sector boundary for purposes of such meeting. He would immediately release a statement, explaining that the Allied forces had destroyed a barrier which the East Germans illegally erected to bar Allied passage, and that the matter was being protested to the Soviet Commandant. He also would make it clear that, following our initial action, this was a problem to be resolved with the Soviets, who continue to bear full responsibility for the situation. If, as is likely, access continued to be denied us, we would take the further position that the Soviets had violated existing agreements and that we would take appropriate countering measures. It is to be noted that neither this proposal nor that of General clay is really a plan for reopening access. Both must be considered on their merits as gestures demonstrating Western readiness to react in a forceful manner, and bring home to the Soviets the point that they must expect increasingly vigorous countermeasures to moves against us. The advantage of this alternative to General Clay's proposal is that it would present no problem of disengaging our forces. It would be sufficiently abrupt so that it would not unduly raise the hopes of the Berliners. It also would be so limited so that the danger of escalation and the possibility of setting off uncontrolled popular demonstrations would be reduced to an absolute minimum. In essence it would have the desirable effects of General Clay's proposed course without leaving us in a vulnerable position, open to unpredictable and uncontrolled developments. In his message on the Friedrichstrasse problem, General SPLIT says he believes no response is preferable to a weak response. Presumably the General means we should not even take the measures now proposed (attempt to drive through the crossing point, remove any barrier that can be removed by hand, protest, take retaliatory action against Soviet personnel in Berlin, take countermeasures outside Berlin, move additional forces to the sector boundary, expel Czech and Polish Mission personnel from West Berlin). It might perhaps be argued that since we could not take measures adequate to restore access, lesser measures would simply demonstrate weakness. In SPLIT proposals, (b) The State Department's variant of those proposals, (c) Adherence to the September 14, 1961 decision, (d) A decision to take no action at all. General :: Enclosure 3 Washington, October20, 1961. U.S. POLICY ON MILITARY ACTIONS IN A BERLIN CONFLICT In the event military force is applied in the Berlin situation, it is United States policy that the nature and sequence of such use should preferably be: I If Soviet/GDR administrative or other action interferes with Berlin access by ground or air but is short of definitive blockage, then the tripartite powers should execute Berlin contingency plans, to include tripartitely agreed probes of Soviet intentions by a platoon or smaller force on the ground and by fighter escort in the air; they should continue to use fully any unblocked mode of access. ( Comment Through this point, risks of major war, unless Soviets wish to start one, are not materially raised by any tripartite action, and therefore, decision on execution is tripartite rather than NATO responsibility.) II If, despite the above tripartite actions, Soviet/GDR action indicates a determination to maintain significant blockage of our access to Berlin, then the NATO Allies should undertake such non-combatant activity as economic embargo, maritime harassment, and UN action. Simultaneously, they should mobilize and reinforce rapidly to improve capability for taking actions listed below. Meanwhile, they should use fully any unblocked access to Berlin. (If, however, the situation has so developed that NATO forces have been substantially reinforced, after appropriate non-combatant measures undertake without delay one or more of the courses of military action shown below.) (Without a build-up by the Allies, the range of options for early military action by us is limited. Undue delay could weaken nuclear credibility, threaten the viability of West Berlin, and erode Alliance resolve, but these potential disadvantages may be out-weighed by the higher risk of nuclear escalation if early non-nuclear action were taken with no more than the currently available forces. To the extent that Alliance forces in Europe are raised above present levels, the delays in initiating military action can be reduced or the military action can be tailored to the existing force levels.) III If, despite the above Allied actions, our Berlin access is not restored, the Allies should take appropriate further action to clarify whether the Soviets/GDR intend to maintain blockage of air or ground access, or both, while making clear our intention to obtain re-opened access. Then embark on one or more of the following expanded military courses of action: A. European Theatre 1. Expanding non-nuclear air action, against a background of expanded ground defensive strength, to gain local air superiority. Extend size and scope as necessary. ( comment: This is a politically oriented military operation aiming to display to the Soviets the approaching danger of possibly irreversible escalation. Military overpowering of determined Soviet resistance is not feasible. The risks rise, as do the military pressures on the Soviets.) B. World Wide Maritime control, naval blockade, or other world-wide measures, both for reprisal and to add to general pressure on the Soviets. ( Comment This action, by itself, is not apt to be effective and might lead to Soviet initiation of action on the European central front in any case. It lacks direct relation to Berlin and may entail political liabilities. It exploits pronounced Allied naval superiority. It would have a delayed impact on nuclear risks. It is the view of the JCS and the principal unified commanders that a naval blockade should be accompanied by other military action in Central Europe. IV If, despite Allied use of substantial non-nuclear forces, the Soviets continue to encroach upon our vital interests, then the Allies should use nuclear weapons, starting with one of the following courses of action but continuing through C below if necessary: A. Selective nuclear attacks for the primary purpose of demonstrating the will to use nuclear weapons. B. Limited tactical employment of nuclear weapons to achieve in addition significant tactical advantage such as preservation of the integrity of Allied forces committed, or to extend pressure toward the objective. C. General Nuclear war. ( Comment The Allies only partially control the timing and scale of nuclear weapons use. Such use might be initiated by the Soviets, at any time after the opening of small-scale hostilities. Allied initiation of limited nuclear action may elicit a reply in kind; it may also prompt unrestrained pre-emptive attack.) 1 'a0",military,bureaucracies_18,bureaucracies
"Mr. President. SPLIT I just wanted to bring you up to date. All the passengers were off the plane when they blew it up. SPLIT They are holding 40 hostages. 23 with dual citizenship, 6 Swiss, 6 German and 5 British. SPLIT They are demanding that the Swiss release 3 fedayeen, the British the woman, the Germans 3 fedayeen. SPLIT The 23. The 23 in return for an unspecified number of fedayeen. I doubt that the Israelis will agree. Pressure is not so bad on us. SPLIT Some claim that they have dual citizenship. If they have an American fighting in the Israeli army we would have a tough case. Nationalized '85 We are now trying to determine [citizenship questions]. SPLIT Ideal would be '85 not releasing prisoners '85 Germans have caved in. Swiss are willing to hold out. SPLIT Probably will cave. Germans are '85 Brandt sent someone independently to Amman. He is very weak '85 SPLIT Definitely I do. In terms of time. The Sixth Fleet began to move'97 first they were hysterical and then they started releasing prisoners. SPLIT There are quite a few people who do not think it is a good idea. Only for evacuation purposes would be best for us to go in. Sisco feels that the King would not stand after we left if we went in and then pulled out. SPLIT Yes. Israelis go in. If there is a war'85 SPLIT If it comes out this way. SPLIT We should get a plan started to start boycotting countries where planes are taken. SPLIT '85 encourage King to move against Fedayeen. Helms '85 SPLIT It would strap us militarily. Use all our available military reserve. The JCS is not anxious to do this. SPLIT This is not the problem anyway. SPLIT We can urge Hussain to move against Fedayeen and we would militarily support it'97with air support. SPLIT Ideal would be if the King could clean up the Fedayeen with our air support. SPLIT We have a brigade in Europe that we have put on maneuvers. The 82nd from the US to follow behind it. SPLIT Most of the Americans out. Otherwise it is between '85 problem for Fedayeen because Israelis may move. Ideal for them would have been . .. SPLIT General Haig reached the exact same conclusion I did quite independently'97that the Sixth Fleet had a tremendous impact on the releasing of prisoners. 1 'a0 :: Options in Jordan As you continue to think about the decisions we may face in Jordan, you may wish to consider some of the broader issues raised. The Broader Situation and U.S. Interests Two issues are now being contested in Jordan (1) Who is to control the Palestinian movement? (2) What balance of political forces is to control Jordan? The Three Principal Contingencies A situation now exists in Jordan which may cause King Hussein to seek U.S. or other assistance in an all-out showdown with the fedayeen. These seem to be the main contingencies that will be faced: 1. The King and army vs. the fedayeen alone . It seems generally agreed in the intelligence community and in the U.S. Embassy in Amman that the Jordanian army can manage the situation as long as only the fedayeen'97and not outside troops'97are ranged against the regime. It is possible in this situation that Jordanian forces might need some materiel support. It has been our assumption that there would be no strong argument against supplying any reasonable support. Such assistance could be airlifted both as a demonstration and for prompt delivery. The main issue to be considered in connection with this contingency is: If the regime unexpectedly turns out to be too weak to win this battle with its own forces, should there be intervention to support it? A key judgment to be made is how much difference outside intervention might make in such a situation. The principal arguments for such intervention are: It would prevent'97at least as long as U.S. troops are present'97dominance by a group that would offer almost no hope of a Palestine settlement. It might still be possible that stability could be rescued with the help of the army. It is also important for the U.S. to demonstrate its support for responsible regimes. In short, a risky intervention would be preferable to the certainty of radical control over the situation. The argument against such intervention is that if Hussein is too weak to stand up against domestic opposition, outside intervention can only save his regime for a limited period of time. Attempting to bolster it in the absence of sufficient internal strength could put whoever intervenes into a position of supporting a minority cause against effective majority guerrilla opposition in a country without access to the Mediterranean where the U.S. would have a difficult time supporting sustained military operations. Intervention could cause a fedayeen reaction against U.S. installations elsewhere in the Mid-East. In any case, there may not be much of a real choice since if the King appears about to fall, the Israelis may very well intervene on their own or at least seize the heights from which the fedayeen have been shelling Israeli settlements. 2. The second contingency: King Hussein and the army vs. the fedayeen and Iraqi troops . Even if one judged that Hussein should not be supported if he cannot control the fedayeen alone, one might judge intervention quite justified if the 17,000 Iraqi troops in Jordan stepped in. Before considering the question of armed intervention, it would be prudent to look at the possibilities for non-military action that might precede armed intervention or perhaps even make it unnecessary. A request from Hussein for Soviet restraint on Iraq might help. Intelligence indicates that Nasser is prepared to give diplomatic and possibly military support in the event of Iraqi intervention. The Shah might mount a show of force on Iraq'92s border. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait might threaten to cut off financial support for the fedayeen. Finally, the greatest political assist to Hussein might well be the capacity to demonstrate hope for progress in peace negotiations. If political actions fail, then a judgment must be made whether armed intervention seems in the U.S. interest . The argument for is that'97in addition to the basic objective of trying to save a regime that offers some hope of the stability necessary for peace'97the U.S. would be supporting a responsible government against a threat from foreign forces. Such a stand is a necessary part of the U.S. posture. It would be possible to justify this as an in-and-out operation. The main arguments against are the operational difficulty of sustaining such an operation and the possibility of a general Arab reaction. This operation would have to be sustained entirely by air (unless we used an overland route across Israel). It would require dipping into the reserve of strategic forces in the U.S.'97leaving us little for other contingencies. Sustaining such an operation by air would be extremely difficult without a staging base in the eastern Mediterranean, and there is good reason to doubt their availability under these circumstances. If political actions fail and if armed intervention of some sort in support of Hussein seems desirable, then there are two related questions : a. Would air attacks against Iraqi forces be sufficient ? Pro . Iraqi forces are 60 miles northeast of Amman and, to be militarily effective would have to travel on an open road and would be vulnerable to air attacks which could presumably prevent their arrival in Amman. Also, air strikes are not likely to produce the same reactions either by other Arabs or by the Soviets as a major ground action would. Even Israeli air strikes would avoid the connotation of invasion and takeover. Con . Air strikes are not operationally useful against the fedayeen. They are dispersed among the population and their concentrations and the fighting around them will be in such small areas as to make air targeting very difficult. If intervention had to reach beyond the Iraqis, air strikes would probably be inadequate. 3. The third contingency: armed intervention for evacuation. If there is complete chaos in Amman and Jordanian forces lose control, it is probable that armed intervention could not with assurance save either the American community or the hijacking hostages. If, however, the army remains in control of parts of the city and Americans can collect there, armed intervention could save them. Even in this situation, it seems unlikely that the hijacking hostages could be saved. There is one other important aspect of this option: It is possible that an intervention primarily for evacuation could temporarily bolster Hussein'92s regime. It could, if well timed, amount to a U.S. show of force without the political onus of sustained intervention. It seems most likely that if intervention comes it would come this way. 1 'a0 :: Mr. President, I wanted to bring you up to date on the number of things that have developed since I last spoke to you. 2 First of all, Bill decided to put out the statement in his own name which was very good'97it made it tougher. 3 SPLIT The second thing is I don'92t know whether I have said this to you but they have come back in. They withdrew and now they are back in with tanks. The King has appealed to us again for immediate help but it is night there now. He has also asked us for reconnaissance. [ 4 lines not declassified ] SPLIT We have put that unit in Germany on alert. It was on near alert anyway, and I just wanted to warn you that if this thing keeps up within the next 24 hours I would guess by tomorrow morning we may reach the decision point as between U.S. and Israeli action'97that is if the King loses the tank battle. And there is nothing we can do now, except the things we are doing which are all pretty strong. SPLIT We are prepared for our air action, Mr. President. We can run two hundred sorties a day from the carriers. The land-based planes'97 we have had a full study made that looks pretty grim. The only fields we could use are in Turkey and the Turks almost certainly won'92t give us permission. The only other fields would be in Greece or Crete and for that we would have to use air refueling and it would take us 8 days to get them ready. SPLIT But the third carrier is on the way and within 8 days that can add to it and that would increase it by '85 SPLIT That is in SHAPE. SPLIT Well, they could do a good job on them. Their handicap is that if that fails they can'92t follow it up with very much unless we want to get ground forces fighting the Syrians which is a rough decision to make. SPLIT The Syrians would fear it. Of course, there'92s a third problem that we may not have any choice about'97I don'92t think the Israelis would hold still for very long if the Syrians seem to be winning. They seem already to have mobilized a bit, which is a good deterrent. SPLIT Incidentally, we picked up an intelligence report this morning'97 not very reliable'97but interesting that the Russians gave the Syrians a carte blanche which proves when you told me Friday night they may be playing us, your instinct about the Russians is usually remarkable. 6 SPLIT Just to keep us quiet. SPLIT No, it was absolutely right that we don'92t get anywhere near the situation where we seem to be egging on the Israelis, because they don'92t need any encouragement, and it should be at the '85 SPLIT Yeah, but that'92s tough to work against the Syrians. SPLIT But that'92s another that can work both ways, if we go in and then they get killed. And then I don'92t know what the Congressional reaction would be if we got involved. If we did it in a two or three-day operation, I think we'92ll be all right'97or even a week. SPLIT To save Jordan and to prevent a general Mid-East war. But it'92s tougher if we do it. SPLIT And curiously enough, we might get more support if the Israelis do it. My major worry is if it doesn'92t work and another little country '85 It will work if we are determined enough, but these Syrians are the craziest of the lot. SPLIT Nobody has any question about that. SPLIT Well, and they'92ve beat them to a pulp once before and they haven'92t improved that much. Of course, it may still be that the Jordanian armor can defeat the Syrians. The original estimate of CIA was that the King could handle the Syrians and the Fedayeen simultaneously. 8 The situation in Amman from the health point of view is very bad; many people killed and there seems to be a cholera epidemic. SPLIT So, it'92s a miserable situation. It is night now, so nothing is going to be happening now for another 12 hours anyway. There isn'92t any decision needed. I only took the liberty of calling you to alert you that this may be coming up. SPLIT That'92s right. SPLIT Right, but the '85 SPLIT I didn'92t ask Rogers to make that statement. What we had recommended to them was just to send the note. But I have to say in their defense that the acts we undertook last week pretty much put us in that posture where it would have been hard not to do something. SPLIT Oh, I don'92t think they will give you any trouble. SPLIT I agree with you. SPLIT Well, our action would have to be overwhelming. SPLIT We can'92t have another even three-months'92 war'97trouble against these God-damned Syrians. SPLIT Right, Mr. President. :: to review the situation as it had developed over the past 24 hours with the reported entry of Syrian forces into Jordan and the decisions made during the night. Dr. SPLIT stated that at 5:15 that morning Ambassador Rabin had called and reported that Irbid had fallen to the Syrian forces, that the Israeli Government did not believe their intervention should be limited to air action alone, and that they had posed a series of questions and conditions on which they would like a response within three hours. Later, at about 6:45 a.m. Ambassador Rabin had called again and stated that Israeli reconnaissance had observed Syrian units south of Irbid but they were not sure whether the units represented security forces or were the vanguard for a move south. The Israelis stated that the King could maintain his position for at least another day or more. The Israelis had no territorial ambitions vis-'e0-vis Jordan, however, they did believe that an attack in support of the King must have some '93political cause'94 and that some adjustment of a technical nature would have to be made as a result of their attack to preclude future technical difficulties. Among Israeli conditions were assurances that the U.S. would protect Israel against Soviet counteraction. 2 Following this call, Dr. SPLIT then called the SPLIT pointed out, that they have no territorial designs in Jordan, although this certainly remains to be seen. Secretary SPLIT agreed but noted it might not be sufficient to do the job. The SPLIT stated that those conditions established yesterday by Israel occurred before the exchange with the Israelis the previous night. Assistant Secretary SPLIT stated that the only thing the British know at this point is that we have conveyed the message they received from the King requesting intervention. 8 The SPLIT how he thought the situation should be played. Dr. SPLIT stated that it would be most difficult to specifically inform the Congress that we were working in collaboration with the Israelis. On the other hand, we might keep our consultation in the most general terms with some emphasis on the fact that it might be necessary to use U.S. military forces short of intervention and that before using these forces we would consult. The SPLIT commented that the Israelis will not want us to inform the Soviets for purely military reasons and they certainly would not want us to go to the Soviets in the role of negotiating Israeli military action. The SPLIT then commented that he believed the first thing that must be done is to provide them with a military briefing, as Mr. SPLIT was correct and that he saw this point. He added that Ziegler should say nothing beyond the fact that we have stated our position, that the Secretary of State'92s statement of yesterday 11 stands on its own, and that we are watching the situation most carefully. It is important that we do consult with the Congress before the Israelis move so that we achieve their cooperation. Dr. SPLIT confirmed that he favored the action as outlined by Secretary SPLIT replied that there would be a meeting of the WSAG at noon. 12 Secretary SPLIT added that it was very important that no one suspect that we have been moving jointly with the Israelis on this issue. The SPLIT suggested late in the afternoon. The",political,bureaucracies_19,bureaucracies
"confirmed that military intelligence suggested that the spearhead was on a route which led to Amman. SPLIT stated: '93At this point, my main concern before any intervention by Israel or the United States is the Congressional attitude and the lack of public understanding of this problem. Whatever we do we should make it clear that Jordan has been attacked and that the survival of the King is crucial from the U.S. interest, especially the long-term perspective. Finally, if there is to be intervention, it must be done quickly with intervening forces moving in rapidly and pulling out rapidly.'94 The SPLIT stated that we should not give the Israelis a go-ahead at this time, but that we should tell them to be prepared to move. The SPLIT added that they might strike Syrian air fields. Secretary SPLIT stated that they have personnel also in Jordan and should certainly feel an obligation. Assistant Secretary SPLIT commented that we should make our contacts now in the event of a possible need to intervene by U.S. forces for the evacuation of U.S. citizens. The SPLIT suggested that we also consider giving to the Congressional leadership the military facts of life right now, perhaps through a military briefing. We could tell them that we have prepared evacuation contingency plans but that nothing has been decided. The SPLIT commented that he did not think that the Congressmen would press us that hard. The SPLIT '92s idea of a briefing was preferable. Secretary SPLIT has suggested. Secondly, we can tell the leaders that we will not intervene without consultation but we must be careful not to deflate the balloon. One of the operative pressures on the other side is their fear of a unilateral U.S. move. The SPLIT and elaborated further in the conversation. The SPLIT asked about Senator Mansfield. The",political,bureaucracies_20,bureaucracies
"stated that it appeared the Israelis had determined that air action alone would not be adequate in view of the deteriorating military situation. SPLIT added that we could not assess the time of possible Israeli intervention, that we would not know the hour and that we would probably not have advance notice, although he did not believe that the Israelis could launch attacks prior to Tuesday morning. 4 The question at hand was at what point our coordinating with the Israelis would make their action irreversible. This morning, he stated, it would be necessary to arrive at a new decision on the issue posed by Israel to combine both ground and air action in any intervention which they might undertake. Secretary SPLIT then stated that before the Israelis move one of the conditions listed by them early that morning was the requirement that the King know what they were doing and be in full agreement with it. For this reason, State had sent a message to Embassy Amman to confirm that the King in fact does wish to have Israeli air and ground support. 5 A second issue which must be resolved rapidly is the fact that the Israeli Government apparently insists on establishing liaison with the Jordanian Government before taking any military action. Finally, they have made it clear, as Dr. SPLIT suggested we might again consider the United Nations. SPLIT cautioned that another twenty-four hour delay might be too much for the King'92s morale. Perhaps it would be better, he suggested, to inform the King and the Israelis that we agreed in principle to air and ground intervention, subject to final review sometime later that day. It was obvious that the King would agree with Israeli air strikes and perhaps we might urge them to initiate at least the air strikes that day. Secretary SPLIT then stated that while there would be no further diplomatic move toward the Soviets, he hoped that the SPLIT stated that he would suggest air action today and if that proved to be defective, we would have bought at least some time before having to decide on full intervention. At the same time, we could tell the Israelis that we agree to both actions in principle. The SPLIT commented that in any event, the Israeli communication of early Monday morning would be a good vehicle for inquiring again as to the King'92s view. 6 The SPLIT whether or not we had coordinated possible action with the British and what the British plans were. SPLIT replied that they have no forces that could assist and that Mr. Hume had suggested that they would do nothing. Secretary SPLIT stated that we have not really put it to the British in these terms. Secretary SPLIT said that if we say '93yes, we have consulted with the Israelis'94, this is tantamount to collusion. Maybe we would be much better off just suggesting benevolent acquiescence. The :: then stated that the important issue was whether or not the Syrians were actually moving south with the view toward taking Amman or whether they intended merely to carve out an enclave in northern Jordan. Admiral SPLIT stated that he agreed with the overall assessment of the situation and was relieved to learn, as the Israeli Ambassador pointed out, that we have some additional time. Secretary SPLIT added that although the King thought that the Syrians were moving on Amman, this was not the case in his view. Therefore, it was necessary to find out again what the King'92s feelings were with respect to Israeli intervention. In light of the possibility that the Syrians were not moving on Amman, obviously, SPLIT stated, Israel was playing it cool. They wanted liaison with the Jordanians, perhaps even a common staff for the conduct of their operations in Jordan. On balance, SPLIT insisted, it would be far better if the King could do the job himself. If he had to call on Israel, it was likely that he would be doomed in any event. Secretary SPLIT also raised the question of U.S. motivations for encouraging Israeli intervention and asked whether this was not really benefitting the Israelis more than anyone else. He judged that Israel had probably not made up its own mind yet with respect to intervention. Finally, he cautioned, it was most important that we know exactly what course of action the U.S. should pursue with respect to the Soviets. He stated: '93I am relaxed about the situation, but for God'92s sake, let'92s know what we are going to do. I am relieved to learn that we have a little more time.'94 Secretary SPLIT interjected that he was not asking for a delay but rather extreme caution before moving so that we do not get into an inflexible position. The SPLIT again made the point that previous requests for assistance from the King were based on his assumption that Syrian tanks were moving on Amman. The SPLIT commented that in his view militarily Syria was the best target, but politically Jordan was preferable. Assistant Secretary SPLIT then said that he had some severe reservations about telling Israel how to conduct their operation. It would be difficult for the United States to dictate to the Israelis in this regard. Perhaps all we should do was tell them to go ahead in principle, get an answer from the King with respect to his desires, and then suggest to Israel that they do it in such a way as to achieve maximum results and a quick solution. In any event, it would be a terrible diplomatic mess. The SPLIT asked if Israeli action against Syria was the only alternative. The SPLIT then recalled that Allon had stated Sunday that action against Egypt was not necessary. The SPLIT asked if it might not be possible to start close air reconnaissance that day. Assistant Secretary SPLIT then asked, if the King falls, what will the Israelis have achieved? Admiral SPLIT referred to the message received on Sunday from the Israelis in which they expressed a desire to establish liaison with the Jordanians. Dr. SPLIT stated that this would be difficult to judge since we would have some difficulty on the ground in Amman communicating with the King and that we had used a combination of radio and telephone. The SPLIT asked whether or not we should tell the United Kingdom about our plans if we decide to support Israeli intervention. Dr. SPLIT asked how we should play Israeli intervention. Should we suggest that the Israelis initiated this action on their own with U.S. knowledge or in fact with U.S. encouragement? The SPLIT stated that what we are really talking about, however, is Israeli intervention. This could lead to a new Middle East war. If we are to give the Israelis a go-ahead, the results could be most serious. Congress, Secretary SPLIT stated, must know the consequences of these actions. The Soviets also must know. The Soviets have to be aware of what is being done and why, if we are to avoid another confrontation with the Soviet Union. We also have the problem, Secretary SPLIT stated, that everyone will suspect that we plotted with the Israelis for the action. Thus, we will need very careful and detailed Congressional coordination if we are to acquiesce in Israeli intervention. The SPLIT stated that this was well and good but that with respect to Israeli intervention, we cannot lie to the Hill. Would it not be possible to just inform the leaders that we have discussed this with the Israeli Government but have made no decision? Secretary SPLIT then asked what we would tell Congress if we decided to go ahead with Israeli intervention. Certainly it would become public quite soon and if it comes out in the newspapers that we have worked in collaboration with the Israelis, then what. For all these reasons, Secretary SPLIT strongly suggested that we should consult with the Congress specifically about Israeli intervention. The SPLIT then stated that certainly the Soviets should know where we stand on this issue. Dr. SPLIT stated that we will need Congressional support if the going gets rough, and certainly it is necessary that we consider notifying key members of the Congress. The SPLIT said that he was talking about the situation that would come next after the Israelis move in. It was likely, he stated, that Senator Russell 10 would insist that the U.S. not intervene if and when the Israelis decide to move. Then we could say that we would move only if the super powers get involved. The SPLIT again stated that he believed we should tell the Congressmen what we know about Israeli actions and that we have been in consultation with them. We should tell them that while we will not intervene, we won'92t discourage Israel from doing so, and that if they move, it is with the King'92s blessing. Dr. SPLIT then commented that on the question of the use of U.S. forces, we need merely tell the leaders that we are making preparations in the event it is necessary to evacuate U.S. personnel. The SPLIT suggested that the group meet again before the day ended. The",political,bureaucracies_21,bureaucracies
". I have been informed by Henry Kissinger and his staff that you have approved the course of action associated with enemy positions in the vicinity of the Fish-hook in the III Corps Tactical Zone. 2 Planning for B'9652 strikes is proceeding. I have discussed the matter in detail with General Wheeler, and, following those discussions, I have some observations to make. Military Execution . There is no doubt in my mind, nor in General Wheeler's mind, that the proposed strikes can be executed effectively. In accordance with the instructions provided to me by Henry Kissinger, I have asked General Wheeler to put the operational machinery in motion that is necessary if the mission is to be carried out on the currently outlined schedule. This operational planning carries minimal security risks. The order can be countermanded at any time up to 1200 GMT, Thursday, 27 February. Political Considerations . There are some facets of the matter which continue to bother me, however. This is that a number of people in other departments and agencies are aware of the possibility of this mission, simply by virtue of Ambassador Bunker's February 12 message (Saigon 2830). 3 It is reasonable to assume some of the people who saw the Bunker message would not look with favor upon this mission. It is also reasonable to believe they would then create, or attempt to create, difficulty for you and for all of us through contacts in the Congress and in the press who would likewise look with disfavor on this proposed action. By virtue of the presumed widespread knowledge of this possible mission, it would be difficult to claim, and make credible, an operational error. Equally difficult, in view of the moderate scale thus far and the currently diminishing level of enemy activity, would be the forthright approach of admitting an attack against an alleged enemy headquarters in a neutral nation. Alternative . As you can see, I have reservations about conducting the mission under current circumstances. General Wheeler shares my concern. I believe it would be better to hold this attack for a period in which the scope, intensity, and duration of enemy-initiated activity are at more pronounced levels. 4 If the enemy were to commit his main force units in major ground attacks in III Corps, that might present the backdrop behind which we could execute the mission and not be confronted with such marked risks vis-'e0-vis Congress and the press. While I submit this alternative for your consideration, I want to assure you we are proceeding as instructed previously and will continue to do so through execution unless informed otherwise. All best wishes. Melvin R. Laird 1 'a0",military,bureaucracies_22,bureaucracies
". -720 SUBJECT Breakfast Plan I. Major Political/Psychological Reasons for Action A. Failure to take action in response to Saigon/Hue shellings'97especially after repeated Presidential warnings'97would appear to Hanoi as a demonstration of weakness. B. Failure to act would encourage Hanoi to use shellings and other military pressures in an effort to force major concessions at the Paris negotiations. C. The GVN will be more willing to agree to private talks, and less suspicious about our statements on the conditions for a bombing halt. Indeed, the Thieu/Bunker conversation is likely to be sticky if we respond to the latest shelling of Saigon with a request to initiate private talks. D. Retaliatory action, if combined with a proposal for private talks, will serve as a signal to the Soviets of the Administration's determination to end the war. It would be a signal that things may get out of hand. II. Arguments Against A. Domestic critics of the Vietnam war could seize on this to renew attacks on war and pressure for quick U.S. withdrawal. B. Hanoi could try to buttress domestic critics with attacks aimed at gaining large U.S. casualties. C. Could start escalatory cycle. III. Some Possible Consequences of Breakfast Plan A. Minimum Possible Consequences 1. Pro-forma Cambodian protest. B. Larger Possible Consequences 1. If attack on COSVN is formally announced as '93appropriate response'94 major protest by Cambodia is probable, cutting off prospect of resuming diplomatic relations for the present. (NVN will probably try to pressure Sihanouk on this point.) 2. Soviets could feel compelled, probably under Hanoi pressure, to register strong protest which might affect our other talks with them. 3. Hanoi will feel compelled to retaliate, should our public statements indicate action is retaliatory. IV. Scenario A. Basic Plan of Action 1. NVN military concentrations in the DMZ will be attacked 12 hours prior to Breakfast Plan. This attack, in response to currently well publicized NVN buildup in the DMZ, will be acknowledged as the '93appropriate response'94 to the shelling of Saigon and Hue. This would have the following advantages: (a) it would indicate a response; (b) it would divert public attention; (c) it would therefore enable Cambodia to play down the Breakfast Plan and; (d) it would still show restraint. 2. Breakfast Plan will be treated as a routine military operation within the framework of our current military actions in Cambodian territory and not publicly or in any messages identified as a retaliatory action against the shelling of Saigon and Hue. Hanoi is likely to recognize the action as our response, without a public statement. Any public statement identifying it as a retaliatory action, on the other hand, would be more likely to induce retaliatory actions by Hanoi, a major protest by Cambodia, a Soviet protest, and major domestic criticism in the press. 3. The military action will be combined with an effort in Paris to initiate private talks. B. Press Scenario 1. The attacks on the DMZ will be publicly announced with no additional comment. If the press asks whether these attacks are the '93appropriate response'94 mentioned by the President, the spokesman will state that the press can draw its own conclusions. 2. Breakfast Plan would be announced routinely by Saigon as a normal B'9652 operation against targets along the Cambodian border. The targets would not be specifically identified. 3. Press briefing and backgrounders would in no way directly identify the action as the '93appropriate response'94 to the Saigon/Hue shellings. 4. All press queries should be referred to the Saigon spokesman who will neither affirm nor deny reports of attacks on Cambodia but state that this is under investigation. With respect to any attacks against Cambodia, we will take the same public position of '93no comment'94 as in the case of bombing attacks on Laos, with the additional statement that reports of such attacks are under investigation. 5. If the Cambodians protest publicly, we will state publicly that we are investigating the Cambodian protest. 6. At no point will attacks against Cambodia be officially denied. When we reply to a Cambodian protest, we will state that we have apologized and have offered compensation. C. Diplomatic Scenario 1. On March 18, Ambassador Bunker will inform President Thieu privately about DMZ strike and Breakfast Plan and seek Thieu's immediate agreement to the initiation of private talks on this basis. 2. On March 18, following Thieu's agreement, Ambassador Lodge will be authorized to initiate a request immediately for private talks with the North Vietnamese. 3. If Cambodia makes it normal routine protest, we will agree to investigate and subsequently confirm that the raid took place in Cambodian territory, apologize, and offer compensation. 4. If Cambodia makes a major protest, we will acknowledge responsibility, offer compensation, explain that incidents along the Cambodian border occur due to the extensive VC use of military exploitation of Cambodian territory in this area, and request an ICC investigation of the area. 5. If the Soviet Union privately makes a major protest against our action, we will point out the military reasons for the action, the fact that both Saigon and Hue were shelled after full warning, that more provocative options were available but not undertaken, and that we would now like to get down to serious negotiations and have initiated a request for private talks as suggested by them. 1 'a0",political,bureaucracies_23,bureaucracies
". -720 SUBJECT Possible CIA Courses of Action in Cambodia You asked that I explore in the 303 Committee two possible CIA courses of action with respect to Cambodia (a) CIA potential for creating covert paramilitary harassing operations directed against North Vietnamese Regular Forces in the sanctuary areas just over the Cambodian border (b) CIA capability for eliminating or reducing the arms traffic through Cambodia to communist forces in South Vietnam. CIA can develop the operations described in (a) above at some sacrifice to high priority operations now directed against the Viet Cong infrastructure in South Vietnam. CIA recommends against initiating such operations on the grounds of high cost versus expected low effectiveness against the large concentrations of regular NVN forces there. 2 The Committee members endorsed the CIA recommendation. With respect to (b) above, CIA has identified a number of Cambodian army officers who are actively involved in supporting the movement of arms and ammunition through Cambodia to communist forces in South Vietnam. CIA does not now have direct, secure and controlled access to any of these officers but is continuing to explore vigorously opportunities in this direction. CIA is skeptical that any of the officers involved in the arms traffic would be now susceptible to bribery both because of the profits accruing to them from such operations as well as the personal political risks entailed in a relationship involving the United States. 3 CIA has pointed out that if recent U.S. diplomatic approaches to Cambodia result in the formal resumption of full diplomatic relations, CIA will gain an operating base for improved intelligence collection and covert action in support of U.S. diplomatic measures aimed at attempting to convince Prince Sihanouk that it is in his best interest to make an honest effort to reduce or halt the arms traffic. 4 I recommend that: 5 (a) you approve the 303 Committee's judgment that the probable effectiveness of mounting a CIA paramilitary effort against the NVN regulars in Cambodia would not be worth the expense, and (b) that as diplomatic relationships develop with Cambodia, I monitor those diplomatic and CIA steps which can be taken in an effort to eliminate or reduce the arms traffic from Cambodia to the communist forces in South Vietnam. 1 'a0",military,bureaucracies_24,bureaucracies
"Cambodia Options The Situation Cambodia's President Lon Nol has written asking immediate U.S. aid in arming Cambodian forces to a total of 410,000 (Tab A). 2 North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces are nearing Phnom Penh. They have moved with surprising ease against the poorly organized, ill-equipped and ill-trained Cambodian forces. It is not certain that they intend to take over the country but they may soon be in a position to do so. The Cambodian forces of 35,000 Army and 40,000 Paramilitary is being expanded rapidly'97addition of 30,000 is now underway, but it will take time for them to become effective. Fuller background was covered in my memorandum of April 22. 3 Our Charg'e9 in Phnom Penh, though perhaps excessively alarmist, reflects the concern of other foreign embassies in recommending we be prepared to evacuate American personnel from the city. 4 The Consequences of Cambodia's Fall to the Communists Cambodia's fall to the Communists would have the following seriously adverse consequences: '97In the immediate aftermath of a Communist takeover in Cambodia there would be a profound psychological shock in South Vietnam. '97Over the longer run, South Vietnam would be completely surrounded by hostile territory. '97The heretofore limited covert operations of Communist forces from Cambodia into Vietnam will become overt and much larger. '97The Communists could send in North Vietnamese units and units formed of Vietnamese residents of Cambodia. They could also form a Guerrilla movement of Cambodian ethnics in South Vietnam. The new situation might not have immediate military consequences, but would certainly begin to tell in six months or a year. '97Communist forces in South Vietnam, particularly in the Delta area, could count on obtaining all the food and military supplies they need, whereas now they suffer some shortages. '97Vietnamization would be impossible to carry out. The South Vietnamese government and army could not preserve itself against pressure from all sides without a very large continuing presence of U.S. forces. 5 '97Our negotiating position would be complicated. '97In the rest of Asia, there would be a feeling that Communism was on the march and we were powerless to stop it. Thailand in particular would be subject to greater pressure. What We Are Doing The following measures have been undertaken or are planned: '97The ARVN has undertaken several ground operations against Communist forces in Cambodia since the change of Government. Those have been fairly extensive, and have included South Vietnamese air support. One such operation which was just completed involved 2,500 men and lasted for two days. Penetration was 3 or 4 kilometers. '97An operation on a larger scale is pending, however. This will involve a multi-division effort in Svay Rieng with full air and artillery support. The initial thrust will be 7'968 kilometers, but will be joined by other forces moving to cut off the entire Parrot's Beak. It is hoped that this particular operation will cause the Communists to draw off the combat units which they are now employing against Phnom Penh in order to defend their base camps. The operation has received general approval from both the ARVN and MACV drafters, but still needs final approval from the ARVN joint general staff. '97U.S. operations have been essentially B'9652 strikes. (Tactical air operations on a small scale have been permitted for some time in the extraction of special forces teams from missions in Cambodia.) Strikes have been conducted at a rate of one or more per week against Communist base camps just opposite the Vietnamese border, mainly in III and IV Corps. '97This week strikes are planned for targets opposite the Central Highlands in II Corps, the Angel's Wing area of III Corps, and in the zone between III Corps and IV Corps southwest of the Parrot's Beak. '97These raids have been effective in destroying supplies and dislocating troop concentrations, but have not seriously interfered with Communist military plans. If continued during the major ARVN operation mentioned above, or during similar operations of this scale, the disruptive effectives could be much greater. '97One U.S. tactical air operation is now planned: Operation Patio, which will cover an area 20 miles deep into Cambodia from the Vietnamese border, about 60 miles south of the tri-border area. It will consist of tactical aircraft and forward air controllers for artillery fire, and will be backed up with teams on the ground. '97U.S. arms shipments to Cambodia have consisted of 1,500 AK'9647s, which were airlifted into Phnom Penh as of 12 noon Washington time April 22. 1,300 more will be sent in the same way tomorrow. A 1,000-man pack of U.S. arms and equipment will also go into Cambodia shortly. '97Several thousand more AK'9647s will be readied and shipped over the next week. Our Immediate Options The Lon Nol government is better than any alternative at this point. Given the likely consequences of its fall, it is in our interest to give it the moral support it needs by evidencing willingness to help and to help its struggle by giving what material assistance we can. '97 Military Assistance The Cambodians have asked for quantities of equipment far in excess of what they could use effectively or what could be delivered in time to be of help in the present situation. They now primarily need light weapons, ammunition and radios. '97Delivery of even small quantities quickly will have an important psychological effect and bolster Cambodian morale though they will not necessarily change the unfavorable military balance. '97There are two ways we can help: '97Open delivery'97this would enable us to move large quantities in quickly. But the risks are not worth it. '97Use CIA 1000-man packs'97These are available now and each fully equips a unit. They could be moved rapidly to equip three new regiments the Cambodians are forming and be delivered without directly showing our hand. If it is disclosed we would have the excuse that we had wanted to limit our commitment. I recommend that for now we stick to the CIA packs. 6 It will not meet all of the Cambodian's requests but will do enough to have some military impact in the Phnom Penh area and give a morale boost. Approve CIA Packs Prefer Open Delivery Military Operations in the Border Region Attacks against North Vietnamese/VC sanctuaries near the South Vietnam border will tie down enemy forces needed for their protection, disrupt his logistics support and take some pressure off the Cambodians. Attacks can be made by cross-border operations, tactical air, or B'9652s or a combination of these. Cross-border operations '97There are three levels. '97Shallow'972'963 miles in depth of the type now conducted by ARVN forces of brigade size supported by their own artillery and tactical area. These attacks harass the enemy and tie down some of his forces but have been insufficient to limit his offensive operations in Cambodia. '97Deeper Penetrations'97These would extend up to ten miles into Cambodia and would require forces numbering up to a division supported by tactical air and artillery. They would attack bases and headquarters now beyond reach disrupting enemy logistical support and sowing confusion which would take some pressure off Cambodia. Such attacks limited in depth or duration would be responsive to Lon Nol's desire that they go no deeper. '97Massive operations'97of multi-divisional size supported by artillery, tactical air and B'9652s seeking to permanently deny the sanctuaries to the enemy. This would seriously disrupt enemy logistical support and capability to operate either in Cambodia or against South Vietnam. Lon Nol would at least publicly criticize such attacks, however, and international repercussions could be serious. It would involve greater U.S. involvement and could provoke North Vietnamese reaction against Phnom Penh. '97 Air Attacks '97either by tactical air or B'9652's could damage enemy bases and concentrations which could not otherwise be reached. They could be independent of or in support of cross-border operations. They would have disruptive effects on enemy operations in Cambodia and Vietnam but would have their maximum effort in conjunction with ground operations. They risk disclosure, however, with potential adverse international and domestic reaction. I recommend, in the present situation, deeper penetrations of division size but not permanent investiture of the sanctuaries. The penetrations would be conducted by ARVN divisions supported by their own artillery and tactical air and by U.S. cross-border artillery, tactical and B'9652 strikes on specific targets. To further assist the ARVN forces, I recommend U.S. forces be deployed in the border area to relieve ARVN forces needed for these attacks. I recommend you approve deeper ARVN penetrations with U.S. cross-border artillery support, tactical air and B'9652 strikes. Khmer Krom and Khmer Serai Deployment '97There are 3,500 Cambodian ethnics forces now in South Vietnam equipped and trained. They are part of the Special Forces. Lon Nol asked for them and Ambassador Bunker recommends that four battalions of them be airlifted to Phnom Penh with their equipment. They would strengthen Cambodian forces at Phnom Penh and have an important desirable psychological effect in Cambodia. They lack logistical support, however, and we will have to arrange to provide it. This can be done through the South Vietnamese. I recommend we approve airlift of the Cambodian Forces to Phnom Penh as soon as possible. I have enclosed summaries of the recommendations of Ambassador Bunker (Tab B) 7 and the JCS (Tab C). 8 1 'a0 :: Meeting on Cambodia, Sunday, April 26, 1970 at 4:30 p.m. in the President's EOB Office 2 -720 PARTICIPANTS Secretary Rogers Secretary Laird The Attorney General Director Helms General Earle Wheeler Henry A. Kissinger Purpose of Meeting The purpose of today's meeting should be to consider the ramifications of authorizing the combined U.S.'96 ARVN operation into Base Area 352/353 (Fish Hook area of Cambodia containing COSVN Headquarters). Conceptually, this operation would constitute a second punch when combined with the already approved ARVN operation into the Parrot's Beak scheduled for the early morning hours of April 28th Saigon time. The combined U.S.'96 ARVN operation into Base Area 352/353 has been under preparation by MACV for several weeks but up until now, Secretary Laird has not been aware of the likelihood of its being approved and opposition can be anticipated from him as well as from the Secretary of State. The Joint Staff and MACV, however, have been proceeding with the view towards early implementation of the plan in the event you decided in favor of it. Care should be exercised at today's meeting not to surface the fact that General Wheeler has been conducting intensified planning to implement the attacks on Base Area 352/353 without the full knowledge of the Secretary of Defense. General Outlines of Plan for Attack on Base Area 352/353 '97The immediate military objective of the plan would be to destroy a main enemy headquarters area (COSVN) and troop and logistics facilities. '97The area contains the headquarters, as well as a large complex of troop logistics facilities, ammunition storage areas, hospitals, POW camps and Command and Control Headquarters for one division and six regiments. It is a primary staging area for enemy units operating in South Vietnam. The estimated enemy strength is approximately 4,000 men, with a reserve of up to 8,000 others who could be sent to the area in the event of attack. Intelligence indicates that enemy forces have been directed to defend this base area in the event of attack. '97General Wheeler will be prepared to brief the broad outlines of the plans which would involve elements of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division and a brigade of the ARVN Airborne Division, together with elements of the U.S. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Total forces would consist of approximately 16,000 U.S. and 2,000 to 3,000 ARVN. It is estimated that the operation will require three to four weeks to complete and can be executed within 72 hours of receipt of orders to do so. '97 Timing . It would appear important to execute this operation in coordination with the ARVN operation in the Parrot's Beak. Assuming the ARVN operation kicks off as scheduled on the morning of the 28th, we can anticipate that knowledge of the operation will surface within two days or as early as Wednesday or Thursday Washington time. In order to obtain maximum psychological impact on the enemy and minimize the period of domestic turbulence, it would appear desirable to kick off the combined U.S.'96 ARVN operation as early as Wednesday or Thursday of this week. Furthermore, the rainy season normally commences in this part of Southeast Asia by approximately mid-May. Therefore, if you decide to approve this operation, a decision should be made to do so not later than Monday afternoon Washington time. This would enable us to get maximum benefit of the one-two punch, reduce the heat through conducting both operations simultaneously and achieve the maximum span of favorable weather. '97 Ancillary Operation . All factors considered'97troop reductions, approaching rainy season, the critical situation in Cambodia, continuing intransigence in Hanoi'97this one-two punch may constitute a major watershed in the outcome of events in Southeast Asia. For this reason, you may also wish to consider extending blanket authorization to General Abrams to conduct ground operations into the entire complex of identified enemy base areas along the Cambodian border. This authority would constitute prima facie evidence of your determination to take whatever steps are necessary to protect U.S. forces in South Vietnam as Vietnamization proceeds. It would also constitute a major threat to the continuation of enemy offensive operations against Phnom Penh. In addition to this broad authority, you may also wish to authorize additional military strikes against selected targets in North Vietnam which are directly linked to the current enemy offensive in Cambodia. These might include tactical air strikes against supplies and logistics installations adjacent to the Laotian border in North Vietnam (Ban Karai, Mu Gia and Nape Pass complexes). These actions, and those you have previously approved, when combined with a strong public announcement by you, would constitute positive evidence of your determination to take whatever steps are necessary to achieve a prompt settlement of events in Southeast Asia or at least serve to seriously disrupt the enemy's campaign against Phnom Penh. 1 'a0 :: Ground Attacks on Base Camps in Cambodia Attached at Tab A 2 is a brief summary of the two options for ground attacks on enemy base camps in Cambodia submitted by General Abrams on March 30. In developing plans for potential operations against enemy base areas, General Abrams was asked to consider two possibilities: '97An attack against targets of high military priority which could involve the use of US forces if necessary. '97Any other operation which would reduce the necessity of the involvement of US forces. With respect to military priority, MACV considered an attack on Base Area 352/353 (COSVN Hq) to be the most lucrative. He made the following significant points about this base",military,bureaucracies_25,bureaucracies
"cited the security surrounding Chinese Communist military movements in the Korean War and asked if we didn't think that the Chinese were being more '93open'94 in this case. :: asked if there was anybody in this Intelligence [community?] and USIB who was taking the line that it was possible for it to be a surprise attack; was it potential Pearl Harbor and Mr. :: am not at all sure that this kind of deliberately phased attack is the most likely or the most dangerous to the defense of the Offshore Islands. Because of the shallow depth of the water around Chinmen, it will be impossible to get heavy weapons ashore during the assault phase. The attack will inevitably depend on masses of lightly armed infantrymen, supported by air and artillery from the mainland. The pattern of the assault is likely to resemble that of the ChiComs in 1949 rather than any American amphibious landings of World War II. The amphibious shipping will probably consist largely of rafts, sampans and junks employed in large numbers and with little order. It seems likely that the ChiComs would make every effort to exploit surprise in making their attack. Under the cover of the very bad weather which is common during this season of the year, and utilizing small craft always in the area, it is entirely possible for the ChiComs to make a quick jump across the narrow water passage separating Chinmen from the mainland and establish a substantial beachhead in the course of a single night. SPLIT This or any other major attack will be extremely costly to the ChiComs and, if they have sensible leadership, the adventure should not prove attractive. However, we probably do not think like Chinese and their eventual decision may run counter to what seems sensible to us. The prize to them would be the elimination of a large part of Chiang's best troops, a serious blow to ChiNat and U.S. prestige worldwide, and a great lift to the ChiCom home front. On the other hand, a reverse for the ChiComs would greatly increase the already serious internal situation and would exact a heavy price in military assets. Maxwell D.",military,bureaucracies_26,bureaucracies
"charged in with all guns blazing, and charged in hard and with contempt in his voice for the intelligence community and he said this was pretty silly, and of course SPLIT understands the facts and figures business, this is his business; so he said there were 300 motorized junks, and 1300 sailing vessels, take 50 men each; this means that the most you can do is 100,000; you'd have to go back, and couldn't move heavy equipment; with LST's and he thinks this is for the birds; SPLIT said he had several recommendations to make; he wanted to bring two more SAC U-2s into Formosa; we gotta have intelligence; have no intelligence; implications that CIA has been doing a lousy job, make judgments on the wrong facts; SPLIT recommended keeping the 4th Carrier in the Pacific which it was due to come back apparently moving a couple of carriers into the Straits, bringing two more U-2s to Formosa; :: '93What would be the likely pattern of the attack and what the outcome?'94 We will continue to explore this subject. General SPLIT , too, share their views, with one exception. I believe that with full U.S. support the Islands can be effectively defended without tactical nuclear weapons; in any event, I am not ready to recommend their use for that purpose. RMcN * 'a0 :: considers that the landing craft required for an attack on the Chinmens or Matsu could be marshalled within 24 or 48 hours, and that the ChiComs could launch an attack on the Offshore Islands with little or no warning.",military,bureaucracies_27,bureaucracies
"plan which was developed followed your guidance with only some minor shift in the scheduling of certain targets between categories 1 and 2 which had the purpose of concentrating on areas such as Hanoi, Haiphong rather than just specific types of targets. The entire plan would be completed in seven days, weather permitting, and then continuing action would be repetitive strikes on those targets and shifts to other possible targets. Mining would be accomplished in all the deep water ports. The plan includes new targets not previously attacked and is designed to accomplish the maximum psychological shock. B'9652s are scheduled on a continuing basis, principally against targets in the Hanoi area. The docks were selected for a visual attack using guidance bombs. The SPLIT confirmed that they could be. He said that the commercial field could be done in a way which would avoid damaging the commercial aircraft that might be there. Admiral SPLIT pointed out the unfortunate truth that this is a very bad weather period ahead in which only one-third of the time could we expect a six hour window in a given day. So a heavy concentration of targets has been selected for all weather attack by B'9652s, F'96111s and A'966s. The plan would call for a minimum of 825 strike sorties for the initial attack phase. These would be drawn from four attack carriers, land based tactical air and B'9652 resources. The SPLIT pointed out that a significant number of the targets had never previously been attacked. I added that we also had a number of other operations for which we had plans. Admiral SPLIT confirmed this. The SPLIT said he would continue to refine the plans and the SPLIT on possible courses of action emerging out of the talks. Both believe that we should try to get an agreement even if it appears Thieu won'92t go along. If we do not, they believe we would have serious difficulty and likely fund cut-off for both assistance and military activity by June 30. Both believe that because of what we have done for South Vietnam up to now, especially May 8, our national honor will be preserved and that the October agreement with improvements meets all of the President'92s May 8 requirements. 3 Warm regards. 1 'a0",military,bureaucracies_28,bureaucracies
"Ceasefire Agreement I have had long and detailed discussions with Ken Rush and Tom Moorer on what must appear to you as a critical dilemma in the current negotiations being conducted by Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho. On one hand, the North Vietnamese appear to be stiffening by re-opening issues once considered settled and prompting their forces in South Vietnam to prepare for action that would violate the terms of the proposed agreement. If the test proves that the North Vietnamese have deceived us, then is the time to take action to help the GVN in the South, if such help proves necessary. I am of the strong belief that little US help would be required to permit the South Vietnamese to handle any attempts of the North Vietnamese and/or Viet Cong to challenge the security of South Vietnam. Vietnamization has been successful. It was designed to give the South Vietnamese the capability to defend themselves against a North Vietnamese threat twice the size of the present NVA force in South Vietnam. We should not be surprised nor alarmed to read intelligence reports indicating that the NVA/VC goals in South Vietnam have not changed. We should expect that they will try to gain their objectives in new ways following a ceasefire. But that should not dissuade us from signing the agreement because South Vietnam is capable now of satisfactorily defending themselves against whatever attempts are made by North Vietnam. President Thieu may take exception to this reasoning. But I am convinced that he will always find reasons for demanding the continued direct military involvement of the US until you finally say no. Therefore, Ken Rush, Tom Moorer and I strongly recommend: a. Avoiding any increased US military action at this time. b. Signing the agreement now. c. Pressing for the immediate return of our POW'92s and the accounting for our MIA'92s. d. Putting the onus on the North Vietnamese to honor a ceasefire agreement. e. Reacting strongly to any North Vietnamese violations after our POW'92s are returned'97thereby gaining support from Congress and the rest of the world. 3 Melvin R. Laird}",political,bureaucracies_29,bureaucracies
"There is, I think, these are basically wanting to settle. We had an intelligence report today in which a very senior Chinese official said that they were pressing Hanoi to settle, that they thought the decision was already made. But these guys are just a bloody bunch of bastards. Dobrynin told me yesterday that they told the Russians that you would have to settle just before Inauguration so you can see their strategy. SPLIT They were going to meet me again early in January'97 SPLIT Well, make us go back to the October 26 draft. SPLIT We could have easily lived with it in October, but if we accept now after all this arguing for changes would make us look impotent. With this blow they are going to get, they'92re going to scream for a few weeks, but with blow they'92re going to'97 SPLIT It'92s going to make the agreement enforceable, Mr. President, they are going to be very careful. SPLIT That'92s right. SPLIT I doubt it. SPLIT It'92s been known to happen but if they thought they had that option they would have done it already. They don'92t react to our moves that way they react to their analysis of the situation. If they felt confident in being able to face us down they would have broken off the talks. SPLIT If the whole bloody country is again covered with clouds, so they have to do it with B'9652s. SPLIT No question. SPLIT You can'92t take out the power plant in the center of Hanoi, and you know if we had had 72 hours of good weather, we could have done the whole bloody thing in one blow. SPLIT The thing is going to last until the 20th now. We have had to cancel 65% of our strikes'97 SPLIT Exactly. SPLIT He'92s right on both counts. We have, Mr. President, to cancel over 50% of our targets during the dry season, and now they only have three or four days of what they consider flying weather in months. Now that just means they'92ve got the wrong airplane. SPLIT Yes. They are double loaded. That'92s like a 4,000 plane raid in World War II. SPLIT Yeah. SPLIT 30 planes are like a thousand and they are flying 127 double loaded, that'92s like 250, so it'92s really between 4 and 8 thousand planes, if they got them all over there. It'92s going to break every window in Hanoi. SPLIT Yeah. SPLIT Oh, yeah. SPLIT I don'92t know whether you'92ve been in Saigon when they hit 30 or 40 miles away, how the ground shakes. SPLIT Well, this one is going to be two miles outside, and there are going to be about 50 of them. I don'92t think there are going to be too many windows in Hanoi tomorrow. But it would have been good if we could have taken all power plants simultaneously. SPLIT Well we are going to get the ship yards in Haiphong, we are going to get the marshalling yards, the rail yards, Radio Hanoi, we'92ll get the transmitters at the outskirts of town. SPLIT It'92s in the center of town. SPLIT Absolutely. SPLIT But it is a lousy set of airplanes. I think they are going give them quite a shock tomorrow, we'92re going to have a little screaming here. SPLIT Absolutely. SPLIT That'92s right. They are building up. SPLIT Oh, no question about it. SPLIT Yeah. SPLIT Well, Le Duc Tho asked that we send him a message as soon as he returns. He'92s returning tomorrow. SPLIT Yeah. He'92ll be back within 6 hours'976 hours after he returns he'92ll get it. SPLIT That'92s what I mean. SPLIT Well, we are sending him another one too which he'92ll get about four hours before it hits. 3 SPLIT It'92s just going to say your talks were conducted in bad faith and the only way to settle is to go back to November 23rd. That'92s taking out the word '93administrative structure'94 which they had agreed to last week, and'97 SPLIT We are ready to do that immediately. SPLIT Well, when you really come down to it, even the Vice President caved in on us because the sum total of his recommendation was to do nothing. 4 If Congress'97when you'92ve got to go wailing to Thieu and you can'92t do anything because Congress will cut you off, you are paralyzed. SPLIT For all your reasons, I'92ve been very hesitant about it, but'97well, I myself think that, either the North Vietnamese are going to dig in, which I don'92t really believe, or they are going to cave quickly. And I think that'92s more likely. SPLIT Yeah, but they'92ve seen that'97 SPLIT That'92s right. They just cannot be sure enough of getting you. They'92ve tried it for four years and I just don'92t think they have enough self-confidence in order to do it and I think that the Chinese, actually I think the Chinese are pushing them harder than the Russians. SPLIT Oh yeah. We sent this note to the Chinese on Friday, midnight, saying the allies are a bunch of liars and they are tricking you, if you'92d like to hear our story we'92ll be glad to tell you. 6 Within 8 hours we get a phone call saying come on up and tell us why our allies are liars. And it fits in with all the intelligence reporting. SPLIT No, the bastards on their Radio today put out another insane statement about my press conference in which they said in effect this means the talks have collapsed completely, that we will never resume them unless the other side changes its approach completely, and '85 (end of tape) 1 'a0",political,bureaucracies_30,bureaucracies
"Recent Soviet Naval Activity in Cuba Analysis of reconnaissance flight photography over Cuba has this morning confirmed the construction of a probable submarine deployment base in Cien Fuegos Bay. Specifically '97A Soviet submarine tender is anchored next to four buoys which the Soviets have placed in the Bay. '97[ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] submarine nets have been emplaced across the approach to the deep water basin in which the mooring buoys and the tender are located. '97A Soviet LST is anchored at a fuel pier and a Soviet tanker is anchored in the northern bay. '97Two special purpose barges are also located in the area. '97Special construction on Alcatraz Island, an island in the Bay, appears to have been completed. This includes an administrative area, two single-story barracks, a soccer field, basketball court and probably handball, volleyball or tennis courts. An offshore wharf and swimming area are on the east side of the island and a platform tower has been constructed just south of the administrative area. Today's photography readout confirms that despite the exchange between Vorontsov and myself the Soviets have moved precipitously to establish an installation in Cien Fuegos Bay which is probably designed to serve as a submarine staging base in the Caribbean. Because of the seriousness of this situation I have asked CIA to provide me with a briefing at 12:30 today at which time we will carefully evaluate the full range of photographic evidence now held in an effort to determine more precisely the full scope of Soviet activity in Cuba. I am also initiating, on an urgent basis, a detailed analysis of the strategic implications of this development. 6 1 'a0 :: Soviet Naval Facility in Cuba I. The Current Situation A. The Soviet Facilities Photographic intelligence indicates the USSR is constructing a naval support base, apparently for submarines, in Cienfuegos Bay, Cuba. Definite identification of this activity was first made from U'962 photography [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. 2 The facilities at present consist of a Soviet submarine tender moored to four heavy buoys in the bay. Two Soviet submarine support barges, a landing ship, a heavy salvage vessel, and a rescue vessel are in the harbor. Other ships that had been there'97a tanker and two missile anti-submarine warfare (ASW) ships'97have departed. Construction on Cayo Alcatraz, an island in the bay, consists of two single story barracks, sports area (soccer field, basketball and tennis courts), an offshore wharf and a swimming area. Three AAA sites and a communications antenna array are also in the harbor area. None of this construction or naval activity was in the area on [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] the last prior date on which U'962 photography of the bay was available. All of this was thus accomplished in the intervening four-week period, suggesting that it was done on a crash basis. The installation is similar to what we have in Holy Loch, and is of semi-permanent nature. It would appear at this point to have the capability of servicing submarines, including nuclear subs, and of providing rest and recreation facilities for naval crews as well as permanent support personnel. No other naval support capabilities are evident at this point. II. Military Significance There is a wide spectrum of views regarding the military significance of this development. The JCS believe that the military impact would be significant equating, in the case of submarines, because of increased on-station time, to approximately one-third of the size of the Soviet Ballistic Missile Submarine (SLBM) force. Additional advantages they cite include: '97The establishment of SLBM patrol stations in the Gulf of Mexico; '97The option of keeping all missile submarines (SSBN) in port at Cienfuegos and either launch from port or deploy rapidly as the situation dictates; '97The lessening of personnel hardship and the concommitant increase of SSBN crew effectiveness by significantly decreasing at-sea time. The JCS further believe that this action fits into an overall Soviet pattern which indicates increasing Soviet hostility toward the U.S. and a willingness to take greater risks in pursuing their objectives. In support of this contention they note, among other Soviet actions, the following: '97the continued construction of strategic missiles and SSBNs during SALT; '97dramatic increases in Soviet naval forces and operations in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean; '97virtual Soviet control of UAR on defense and the challenge to the U.S. peace initiative by violation of the standstill provision with a massive buildup of missiles along the Suez Canal; '97the Soviet fleet visits and flights of TU'9695/Bear D reconnaissance aircraft to Cuba; and '97improvements in Soviet military capabilities across-the-board while ostensibly cooperating in a number of diplomatic moves. I share the JCS's concern with Soviet intentions. I also share their concern over the increasing Soviet military capabilities vis-'e0-vis the U.S. and this is a matter which we are carefully analyzing. However, I believe the development of the port of Cienfuegos into a base capable of supporting nuclear submarines would add only marginally to the total Soviet capability for attacking the U.S. with nuclear weapons. The fact of the matter is that there are always some Soviet subs off our East Coast with the capability to launch missiles against most targets in the U.S. If they want, the Soviets can increase this number at any time by simply increasing their force levels. Having a base at Cienfuegos makes it easier to achieve such an objective but at considerably higher risks considering past U.S. reactions to Soviet military activities in Cuba. Unlike 1962, the Soviets have a massive land base missile capability which continues to grow. If my view that the increase in military capabilities of the Cienfuegos base would be only marginal is correct, then the Soviet action becomes even more puzzling. Why run such high risks for such low returns in increased military capability? This strongly suggests that this Soviet move is perhaps more politically-motivated than militarily. III. Soviet Intentions There are several basic questions: '97Why, at this time, have the Soviets embarked on a venture that they should know has a low flashpoint in terms of American sensitivity? '97Why, beforehand, did the Soviets seek to reaffirm the 1962 post missile crisis understanding on the flimsy pretext of the threat to Cuba? '97Having reaffirmed the essentials of the 1962 understanding, why did the Soviets almost immediately proceed to violate the spirit if not the precise letter of that understanding? '97Finally, how does the move into Cuba relate, if at all, to the larger posture of Soviet behavior, especially in the Middle East? There are several possible explanations: 1. It could be that this move in Cuba is simply to show the flag, perhaps to impress Latin America generally; having done that, the venture will be terminated; in other words, there would be no longer-term implications or consequences intended. The main problem with this interpretation is that establishing a semipermanent facility goes well beyond showing the flag. No Soviet leader could imagine that such a move could be passed over by an American administration. 2. It could be a move in the SALT context, to establish a presence to be bargained away for the removal of U.S. forward bases which the Soviets have pressed for in SALT. The problem with this argument is that the prospective SALT agreement currently on the table is one that, in itself, is quite attractive to the USSR. To raise the sensitive issues of Cuba risks upsetting SALT; at a minimum, it would establish a far more belligerent atmosphere for negotiations. If the Soviets did accept a trade-off in the end, it would once again demonstrate to Castro and Latin Americans generally, that the Soviets exploited Cuba for their own strategic purposes. 3. A deliberate confrontation . If the above two explanations are implausible, we must assume that the Soviets are well aware of the crisis potential of their action. It is possible that the Soviets some time ago looked ahead and saw the Middle East escalating to a dangerous point. They could have reasoned that it was to their strategic advantage to widen the arena of potential conflict with the U.S., in part to put pressures on us from at least two points. '97They could foresee that these two crises would come to a head in a pre-election period, when the U.S. might be under some internal constraints. '97They lied to us as in 1962 to create an '93understanding'94 for the record beforehand, later to be used against us in some distorted fashion. '97In this scenario, the Soviets, typically, have not thought through their tactics of a double crisis, but in their arrogance, will brazen it through. '97It could be argued that for some years, now, as their strategic power has grown, the Soviet leaders have wanted to even the score from the humiliation of 1962. A double crisis of this magnitude, however, has always been an intriguing theory but a dangerous strategy. No one can foresee the consequences of inter-actions between two areas of contention. There is not only the danger of uncalculated escalation but the significant risk of a double defeat. Moreover, Cuba would seem the last place the Soviets would want to invoke in a Middle East crisis. Cuba is, after all, still an area where we have immense tactical advantage. 4. Soviet expansionism . This interpretation fits the Cuba move into the pattern of the projection of Soviet power to various points around the globe, and expansionism symbolized primarily by a naval presence. Under this theory the Soviets have been in the process of testing us for a reaction, and having estimated that we were relatively complacent, have decided to take a further step , following their earlier naval visits to Cuba and flights of bomber-reconnaissance aircraft. '97The primary purpose of the Cuban move is not to create another confrontation, but to establish step-by-step the Soviet right to establish a naval presence in the area, much as they have done in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf (not to mention the now-regular on-station patrolling of Y Class submarines within range of the East Coast). '97The Soviet actions are demonstrative and political for their own, not Cuban objectives, to show that the balance of power is now such that we can no longer effectively block Soviet power even in our own sphere of influence. '97The Soviets may have reasoned that it would be prudent to reaffirm the basic 1962 understanding, as a test of the limit of our permissiveness. '97The Soviets may have concluded that the Middle East crisis inhibited any forceful U.S. reaction, especially in a pre-election period. '97In this interpretation, however, there is room for tactical retreats when the Soviets judge that the temperature is rising above that of tolerable level. My own view is that this explanation, a test of expansionism, is probably the right one. In the last six months the Soviets could have concluded they could move forward without major risks as long as they did it piecemeal . If they are successful, however, as the news leaks out, the Soviets can demonstrate to much of the world that the correlation of forces has shifted significantly since their defeat in Cuba almost exactly eight years ago. In short, this is a calculated but highly significant political challenge . The fact that on two separate occasions the Soviets have deliberately deceived us may be an important symptom of the mood of the Soviet leaders, and an index of their assessment of us. It suggests an ominous contempt and a judgment that we are not likely to react quickly or vigorously to Soviet challenges. Why they should hold such a view, if they do, is never easy to understand. It could relate to what they may perceive as our excessive eagerness in SALT and MBFR or perhaps their view of the domestic effects of Vietnam, or their distorted views of our social-economic '93crisis.'94 In any case, the Soviets have been moving aggressively, first in the Middle East, and now in Cuba. They are likely to continue to do so until they receive clear and unmistakable warning signals. IV. The Cuban Angle Why did Cuba agree to lend its territory for this purpose? What does Castro get out of it? Conceivably Castro may have asked for such a facility to obtain a more demonstrative show of support, or the base decision could have been the result of mutual initiative based on mutually perceived advantages. However, a more plausible thesis is that this was a Soviet initiative. The Soviets clearly have the leverage to obtain Cuban cooperation'97either by blackmail in threatening to stop essential economic support or by bribes in the form of more economic and military aid. This would explain a number of otherwise puzzling reports we have received over the past year or so. For example, there have been increasing reports of Soviet attempts to increase their control and influence within the Cuban regime. There have been reports of Castro's uneasiness at this, and of his alleged comments about Soviet '93coldbloodedness and ruthlessness.'94 Failure of Castro's highly touted effort to harvest ten million tons of sugar is a heavy blow which damaged his charisma and control. The Soviets could well have felt that they could pressure him without being as concerned about his sensitivity as they have been in the past. In any event, they appear to have more influence and authority in Cuba now than at any time in recent years. Whatever the case, the Cubans do receive'97in return for use of their territory'97Soviet military presence with its implicit promise of Soviet support and protection. They could conceivably use an expanded Soviet naval presence in the area to cover their clandestine subversive movements. They presumably have received expanded economic and military aid. V. Meaning in Latin America Existence of a Soviet base and Soviet naval power in the Caribbean is likely to be seen by Latin America as a sign of U.S. weakness, especially if seen in conjunction with the recent Chilean elections. 3 It would strengthen Soviet efforts to increase their influence in the region. It would encourage indigenous radical left elements while discouraging their opponents. It may tempt many of these American nations to become neutral vis-'e0-vis U.S. or to turn to the Soviets to hedge their bets. VI. The View of the World Most of our allies have little taste for a major confrontation with the USSR, especially in an area quite remote from Europe, and over a situation that they may not perceive as a serious strategic threat. We could expect, as in 1962, little support and considerable advice to restrain our responses. In the longer term, however, the Europeans and our other Allies could conclude that Soviet success in Cuba was an important index of the balance of power. They would assess a Soviet base as clear evidence of the decline in our power and will. Much of the world, contrasting the result with that of 1962, would see it the same way. The main Europeans have a vested interest in the beginnings of d'e9tente. At the same time, the Soviets also have a vested interest in the new German treaty and may also be inhibited from a deliberate confrontation with us. VII. Options If as I have suggested this is a serious political challenge, then we have no choice but to respond. In my view, our major options are: 1. Pursue a purely diplomatic effort to get the Soviets out . We would tell them that we know of their activity and remind them of our 1962 understandings which we expect them to respect and wait for their reply. '97The advantages of this course are that the chance of immediate confrontation is minimized and we might be able to strike a bargain which would get them to leave, thus solving the immediate problem. If this strategy succeeds and the Russians leave in response to an offset to which we agree, Castro may even see himself as a pawn in the USSR game and be less likely to play in the future. '97The disadvantages are that if we bargain to get their withdrawal the Soviets may see this kind of action as an easy route to follow for other concessions they want in the future. If they are testing us they may be willing to bargain yet engage in prolonged bargaining. Moreover, our low-key reaction may prompt them to go ahead on this project and even to make further waves in the Hemisphere or elsewhere. With the passage of time during our talks, we may end up facing Soviet submarines and weapons in Cuba'97a result similar to that in 1962. 2. Pursue a diplomatic course with Castro . We would tell him that we cannot permit this kind of Soviet base in Cuba and that we expect him to get it out. '97The advantages would be similar to those above but would include also the avoidance of the need to strike a bargain with the Russians and delay further the time of confrontation. If Castro believes we are serious he may be more willing to concede than the Russians. It is Russian interests which are primarily at stake. '97The disadvantages are that we might have to strike some bargain with Castro which would be no less easy for us than striking one with the Soviets. Moreover, if the Soviets induced or pressured Castro into standing firm, the chances of a fait accompli would be great and we would face it without yet having made our position clear to the Soviets. They could take our delay in approaching them as a sign that we are unwilling to push them hard. 3. Move decisively diplomatically, making clear at the outset we are prepared to move to confrontation . We would tell the Russians directly and at a high level that we consider their action intolerable, that we expect them to remove the facility without delay and that we expect a prompt reply. If a satisfactory reply is not forthcoming we consider the entire 1962 understanding invalid. As a follow-up, we could call off SALT and go to the OAS'97as we did in 1962'97either before or simultaneously with our approach to the Soviets. Some military steps'97e.g., increased surveillance, sea patrols off shore, deployment of additional tactical air to the Southeast U.S.'97would signal our resolve and willingness to move to confrontation. '97The advantages of this course are that our resolve would be clear to the Soviets from the outset, but they could still move out without losing face (if we had not gone to the OAS). We would have made clear that we would not bargain for their withdrawal. '97The disadvantages are that if they are testing us, they may still not believe our determination short of an ultimatum. We will have taken more time and will still have to confront them. If they really want a base, as if they are seeking some concession from us, they may be willing to sacrifice SALT and accept confrontation as a means of getting a concession for withdrawal. If we went to the OAS and were unsuccessful in getting Soviet withdrawal we would be losing twice. 4. Confront the Soviets immediately . We would give them an ultimatum and take immediate military measures to emphasize our intention to prevent their use or retention of the facility. If they did not respond we would publicly demand their withdrawal and within a short time, if they did not do so, take military action against the base. '97The advantages of this course of action are that our intentions would be unambiguous and the consequences clear to the Soviets from the outset. It would minimize the likelihood that the base would become operational and heavily defended. It would be easier for the Soviets to withdraw now when their investment is relatively small than it might be later with a more developed facility. '97The disadvantages are that a crisis could be precipitated early during a period when our forces are heavily oriented toward the Middle East. A public ultimatum gives the Soviets no graceful way out and we will have played our last card and foreclosed other options. In my view the slow diplomatic approach has serious risks. It may seem safer but most likely it would result in a gradually escalating crisis leading ultimately to confrontation. At the same time, moving immediately to military confrontation may be needlessly risky until we have probed to see what the Soviets intentions really are. But whatever our initial course, we must be prepared to move toward confrontation if this is the price of Soviet withdrawal. I recommend that you hear out all of the views on this subject but that you do not make a decision at today's meeting. 4 1 'a0 :: stated that there was no agreement as such but merely a series of parallel statements. He stated that the U.S. conditions were open-ended and provided that we would not invade if adequate inspection were established whereby the removal of offensive weapons could be verified. The Soviets, in turn, never delivered on the inspection issue. Therefore, in effect, there is no binding agreement and we never gave any additional pledges. The SPLIT stated that on August 4 [5], there was a scare report of a Cuban exile attack against a Soviet trawler 4 and that he, Kissinger, had assured Vorontsov that we were taking protective action in behalf of the Soviet vessel traveling to Cuba. Vorontsov, in turn, had told SPLIT that the Soviets wished to use the occasion to reaffirm the understandings of 1962. The SPLIT then commented that the U.S. also had to consider the international political implications of the Soviet action. Why, for example, had they chosen this point to install a base? Why also would the Soviets try to reaffirm the 1962 understandings and then 11 days later move precipitously to install strategic weapons in Cuba? What is the relationship with this action and the situation in Chile and what are its implications should Chile go Marxist? Mr. SPLIT stated that the political consequences of the Soviet action present a most serious dilemma and transcend the purely military strategic implications of the Soviet action. The real question, he stated, was why have the Soviets undertaken this move directly against the spirit, if not the letter, of the 1962 understandings? Secretary SPLIT stated that he regretted the necessity of playing the role of a villain on this issue. The SPLIT stated that the important aspect of our public line is not to permit the Soviets to think that what they have done is acceptable. The SPLIT stated that the WSAG, which was in effect the same group as in this room, would work out a careful scenario for Presidential decision. The",political,bureaucracies_31,bureaucracies
"commented that the only limitation on the [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] adding that the experience in Cuba confirmed the importance of providing for the [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. The SPLIT replied, '93Yes, providing it had been scheduled properly.'94 He also pointed out that the Real-Time-Readout camera would be of great benefit [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. The :: stated that it was important that we proceed with the [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] Corona. Deputy Secretary SPLIT confirmed that, indeed, these would be important technological assets for us. The SPLIT said that the construction had moved extremely rapidly and SPLIT confirmed this. Secretary SPLIT commented that we must now consider whether we want to reaffirm our position with respect to Cuba. The SPLIT stated that the whole issue will surface very shortly. He pointed out that it had come up in conference on the military authorization bill and was discussed openly. The issue added more effect to the conference, adding $25 million more for U.S. ships. He stated that the issue will surface just the same as it did in 1962 and the timing is important. The U.S. must consider and be prepared on how it will handle this issue very quickly. Mr. SPLIT reported that they have three Y-class submarines now targeted on the U.S. and that this would increase that capability. Secretary SPLIT then stated again that the whole situation was soon to break and that it was important that the Soviets know our stand before it breaks publicly'97not after. Secretary SPLIT stated that we might consider moving strategic bombers into Turkey. Secretary SPLIT replied that we need more ships in the area and more surveillance. Secretary SPLIT added that he did not visualize our being able to do anything in Guantanamo. The SPLIT stated he would implement this immediately. Secretary SPLIT then stated again that it would be difficult to hold this any longer. He reiterated that he had been asked three times on the Hill about Cuban intelligence. Secretary",political,bureaucracies_32,bureaucracies
"] suggested that the group now turn from the Jordanian problem to the problem of Cuba. The SPLIT asked when the construction in Cienfuegos and Alcatraz Island actually started. Director SPLIT asked if we have positive evidence that they have or intend to have nuclear weapons stored on shore in Cuba. The SPLIT agreed that this would be a violation. The SPLIT stated that his understanding of the so-called agreement was that we agreed not to invade Cuba in return for the removal of offensive missiles from Cuba. Mr. SPLIT stated that, in any event, it was a very fuzzy understanding. Secretary SPLIT stated that he hoped that the United States would not pull any alarm bells until after the Congressional election. He suggested that if the Soviet action leaks, then it will be necessary to low-key our response. It would be disastrous to have this break between now and elections. Therefore, it is essential that this group react very carefully to the intelligence presented. The SPLIT reiterated that it was necessary to keep all discussions and information within this particular group. The SPLIT asked what the United States would do if the Soviets were to ignore our warning. What action could the United States take to show that it is serious? It is important that the U.S. is able to back up its words with deeds. Secretary SPLIT said, '93What about Cuba, itself, if we take naval action around Cuba?'94 Secretary SPLIT said the important thing is how it is all done. Mr. SPLIT suggested that we prepare a scenario without anyone knowing. Admiral",military,bureaucracies_33,bureaucracies
"commented that all of the work had been done within 30 days from the period August 15 to September 15. SPLIT then commented that if the Soviets increased their SLBN levels to 41 and put a portion of them in Cuba that the Cienfuegos facility would give them what would amount to 10'9612 additional submarines. The facility would also enable them to penetrate more deeply into the Gulf of Mexico and therefore enhance their targeting capabilities within the central United States. SPLIT concluded that if the Cienfuegos base is, in fact, a permanent submarine support facility, it will have the effect of increasing Soviet force levels. SPLIT next stated that we are watching the situation very carefully through U'962 flights at a minimum of one every three days. He reported that the JCS are developing an attack plan and a plan for trailing Soviet submarines as well. He remarked that the Soviets themselves maintain surveillance trawlers adjacent to all U.S. bases. SPLIT then asked Mr. helms to comment on the [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] which were picked up from one of the Soviet vessels. Mr. SPLIT responded that the Navy has a destroyer right in international waters close by and stated that the Soviets are aware of its presence. Secretary SPLIT replied that they have built a dock and have established permanent buoys, and that storage can be effected afloat or on shore. Secretary SPLIT stated that current Soviet tactics we have observed permit the Soviets to transfer missiles from Soviet tenders to the submarines at sea, so that storage on the tenders alone constitutes an important military asset for the Soviets. The SPLIT interjected that this action should be tied into the Soviets world-wide naval expansion. The SPLIT confirmed that this was possible. The SPLIT added that we should initiate a trailing program with respect to Soviet ships traveling to and from Cuba. Secretary SPLIT commented that he could prepare one himself. The",military,bureaucracies_34,bureaucracies
"Congo Situation Report Last week Tshombe'92s Belgian-led (Van der Walle) mercenary force took Kindu, the most important rebel city short of Stanleyville. Within two or three weeks it will take Stanleyville, 250 miles away, and the present rebellion will be ended. Our biggest immediate problem is how to protect the foreign hostages in Stanleyville (5 official and 20 unofficial Americans, 6'96800 Europeans) both during this several weeks and when the mercenaries attack. We have gotten Tshombe to agree and to announce publicly that his airplanes will not hit towns, in order to minimize the risk that the rebels will kill the Stanleyville hostages in retaliation for air attacks. However, the hostages are in acute danger'97first, because there is a squadron of T'966 aircraft, flown by mercenaries, which we do not control and which is a real threat to attack Stanleyville in the next several weeks; second, because the rebels may well slaughter hostages at the time Van der Walle actually attacks Stanleyville. The military move on Stanleyville is a calculated risk and a real one. To minimize it, we are trying to compel Tshombe to withdraw the mercenary T'966s and may need a tough Presidential message to Tshombe for this purpose. We are working with the Belgians on a contingency plan to drop Belgian paratroops in Stanleyville on short notice, to evacuate foreigners, if the situation gets out of control. And we are working with the Belgians on a program of political pressures and covert negotiations to try to get the rebels to capitulate and surrender Stanleyville without a fight. Realistically, however, this will be a dangerous two or three weeks, it will probably end in the military conquest of Stanleyville, and there is a real chance that some Americans and Europeans will be killed. B 1 'a0 :: Congo Situation 1. The question: Do we concur in the Belgians'92 desire to pre-position Belgian paratroopers at British Ascension Island in the South Atlantic, 22 hours from Stanleyville? 2. Recommendation State, Defense, and Bundy recommend concurrence. 2 3. The situation: Mercenary advance on Stanleyville begins tomorrow and should drive rebels out within 3 or 4 days. In this period the safety of 30 Americans and 800 other foreigners, mostly Belgian, will be endangered. Spaak and Prime Minister LeFevre wish to reduce our reaction time from three days to one. 4. As we agreed at the Ranch, it seems best to let Belgians take the lead on this and to be guided by their judgment. They know the Congolese better, and their nationals outnumber ours by 30 to 1. Nevertheless, it is our officials who have been directly threatened, and all the transport will be U.S. Air Force. So it is an important decision. 5. We can still hope that the rescue operation will not be necessary, because any action of this kind will have real political costs in the Congo and may involve the death of innocent Americans by panicky rebel reaction. Nevertheless, the possible cost of opposing the Belgian recommendation seems clearly greater than the cost of concurrence. 6. The requirement for your consent to further movement of this force will remain. It is probable that the next recommendation will be to move the paratroops to Kamina in the Katanga Province of the Congo. This will put them only 4 hours from Stanleyville, and while it increases risk of rebel panic, it will also increase the warning signal that we are ready to act if necessary. This decision may come tomorrow, and Secretary Rusk will bring it to you directly if necessary. McG. B. 1 'a0 :: Our only very hot spot at the moment is the Congo. Here is where we are: 1. Van der Walle mercenary column is on its way with little opposition so far and could reach Stanleyville in two or three days with luck. 2. Rebels have broadcast another threat to American hostages using the name of U.S. Consul Hoyt who is held in Stanleyville. 3. At the same time rebels have agreed to discuss with a U.S. representative in Nairobi. We are publicly accepting this offer and proposing talks at noon tomorrow (3 a.m. Washington time) with Ambassador Attwood speaking for us. 2 4. The Belgians are resistant to any concessions that Tshombe and Co. might find unacceptable, and accordingly Attwood'92s instructions will be quite general and directed at maintaining the palaver while warning strongly of consequences of any hostile act. Attwood is a skillful negotiator and we hope very much that these talks will help protect hostages while the Van der Walle column advances. 5. Very weak security has now forced the Belgian Government to announce that the troops with air support are at Ascension Island as a precautionary measure. We have confirmed this announcement. 3 6. Tomorrow, Saturday, we shall need to consider whether it is wise to advance paratroopers to Kamina or to execute against Stanleyville. George Ball and I are both very cautious at this point and would probably recommend against action when what we face is threat, not open act of violence. Harriman may be marginally more activist. 4 All of us will be much affected by Spaak'92s judgment at the time. Belgium Government alarm appears to be increasing. 1 'a0 :: In military terms either force can win a battle in Stanleyville. The Kamina'96Stanleyville distance we have checked is 2 hours in the air. The theory is to get them in Tuesday morning early. That has an advantage of putting the paratroopers in. We have some ease on the scene as to what is going on. In military terms, to do the two things at once seems very clear. This is the Belgian military in Brussels concurring with their own advisors in the field. There is no reason to think that the hostages may be in great danger for one more day.",political,bureaucracies_35,bureaucracies
"It'92ll be dangerous if the paradrop is carried out, but it'92ll be dangerous if it isn'92t and under the circumstances, the danger of carrying it out is less than the danger of not carrying it out. SPLIT Well I thought'97 SPLIT Well I noticed the leaks and I saw some cables referring to them today. I don'92t think it does. It'92s just terribly hard to evaluate the psychology of these rebels. I don'92t know whether you noticed a cable that came in here about a week ago but it told of one of the rebel leaders in Stanleyville going up to the former mayor of the city and taking a knife out and slitting him down the front, reaching in and picking out his kidney and eating it when the man was alive. Now, I don'92t know how you deal with people like that. I don'92t know how you interpret what they'92ll do if we fly an airplane over there or if we drop some paratroopers. I talked to General [Tecuma (sp?)], who is currently head of the Standing Group here in Washington and who was formerly General Wheeler'92s counterpart in the Belgian army, and he personally has carried out operations in the Belgian Congo. And he says he thinks the rebels are more affected by a show of power such as a drop of Belgian paratroopers and would be less likely to kill the Americans under those circumstances than they will be if we appear weak. And so I'92m taking his view plus Dean Rusk'92s, but I can'92t guarantee it'92s a proper interpretation of their psychology. [Omitted here is discussion of another subject.] 1 'a0 :: He'92s been here. He'92s been in budget meetings at the Pentagon.",political,bureaucracies_36,bureaucracies
"This is Dean Rusk. I have here on my end a conference call with Cy Vance, General Wheeler, John McCone, George Ball, Averell Harriman, and myself. We want to talk a moment about the Congo situation. I think you were informed earlier today that the situation in Stanleyville apparently deteriorated somewhat further. The leadership that we'92ve been trying to bicker with apparently is not in the city. The venue apparently is over on the border of Uganda. The military man Olenga is apparently up on the border of Sudan, and the elements in Stanleyville appear to be the most irresponsible group there, the so-called jeunesse , the rebel private personnel, that is the troops. We have had a thorough discussion here. The Chiefs of Staff are fully on board with this line of action. So is Cy Vance. There is one'97. SPLIT He is in town but I talked to him before I came over here, sir. SPLIT Yes sir. SPLIT There'92s some differences down the line in CIA that I think John McCone ought to mention to you. John, would you speak to that point? SPLIT Mr. President, I think that all of us feel that we should say to you that we can'92t think of any line of action here that would be sure to pick up live hostages throughout, and if we don'92t do anything, we'92ll find corpses and some corpses if we take an action of this sort by execution order tomorrow, that we'92re likely to find some corpses. But we don'92t have any feeling at all that there'92s any responsible authority in Stanleyville that can give anybody any protection. Now our Embassy in Brussels will be talking with Spaak tomorrow to get his final judgment before we recommend whether to push the button for an actual move. But this will get us in a position to move quickly if we have to move with the least possible warning and to get them thoroughly prepared to move at first light on Monday. SPLIT Well, all this does is to give them in effect an alert time for the most probable hour of commitment, but it does not'97, it specifically says do not execute unless directed by JCS. SPLIT It doesn'92t move them from where we'92ve already ordered them, that is in Kamina. SPLIT That'92s right. SPLIT Well, I do think we ought to give as much weight as we can to the Belgian [predominance]. And they have several hundred hostages, and they'92re putting in the paratroopers and are going to take casualties, and Spaak seems to feel that it'92s important to move. I think the Belgians'97. SPLIT Approximately a thousand, sir. SPLIT That'92s right, sir, and 200 American military aircrews on those planes. In other words, we'92re running some risk ourselves. SPLIT It'92ll be about 200 American air crews on those planes, but no combat troops. SPLIT Well, we could lose some Americans if they shot the planes down. That'92s right, sir. But these will be given cover with T'9628s and B'9626s that are already in the Congo, and they will use these planes to go ahead of the drop and also to help them deliver suppressive fire if anything comes out of the ground at them. SPLIT We'92re not absolutely certain what is at Stanleyville at this point. They had some. Some of the anti-aircraft that they had at Stanleyville turned up in Bukavu, so we know that some of it was moved away, but we don'92t know what is there or who'92s there to man it. But these planes should be'97, these T'9628s and B'9626s should be able to find that out before the paratroop-carrying planes actually arrive on the scene. SPLIT That'92s right, sir. Now this is a highly trained elite group that is actually the palace guard in Belgium. This is the best outfit they'92ve got. The Belgians are very confident that if they get down and if they get there, that they will not run into serious problems. They'92ve had a lot of experience in the Congo and they feel certain that if it is necessary to commit these troops that the troops will take care of themselves. SPLIT He'92s sitting right here. SPLIT Yes, he agrees very much. SPLIT All right, sir. SPLIT We'92ll call you tomorrow. 2 1 'a0 :: Mac Bundy is on the line with me. We have had a report now from the meeting that took place at Kamina. The military has recommended that the operation be held up one more night to coordinate with the column. SPLIT 3 hours. SPLIT About 1,000. SPLIT It is at Labutto. It then, by moving all night, can reach there Tuesday morning. It would reach there at the same time that the drop would occur. SPLIT 600. SPLIT 800 to be dropped and 600 in the column. There is enough force there to take care of the situation. Wheeler is clear on this. SPLIT It is hard to tell. SPLIT They are finding that the forces have largely left. It has been the experience of coming in and finding the troops on the run when they encounter the column or any kind of air cover. On the basis of all the experiences there would seem to be no likelihood of meeting resistance, and there is no indication that they are likely to meet much. The expectation is, and it seems to be agreed by all, military on both sides, that they will have an easy time of it. M. SPLIT The only new element that will increase the danger is that there has been a leak through London that the planes have left Ascension. We will have to use the fall-back release that we had worked out with the Belgians, confirming the fact that the planes have left Ascension but simply say they have moved up to a point closer to Stanleyville and are not presently en route to Stanleyville. I think this is not a very serious matter but there is always risk in one more day, but there is ability of mobility and seeking out the hostages because the column will have wheels and transport. SPLIT We had thought that might be done and we decided on their recommendation to put the two together. There is an advantage in not having this look like a military operation but a humanitarian operation. We were motivated by the fact that the situation in Stanleyville was deteriorating so rapidly that we wanted to get the quickest force in. During the day there has been no evidence that the situation is falling apart any more. There have been no radio intercepts. There is a meeting later tonight between Attwood and Kanza. We may have some further light on the situation when that meeting takes place. I think there is a good deal for arguing for accepting the Belgian view. This is a unanimous consent here by Wheeler, McNamara, Rusk. :: explained Spaak feels strongly there ought to be another drop at a place called Paulis, where there is a big concentration of refugees. There are only 7 Americans but 450 other Europeans, mostly Belgians. What would be involved would be half the force used at Stanleyville'97270 paras, 40'9650 Americans, air crews for 7 planes. The final decision doesn'92t have to be made until this afternoon. The inclination here (McNamara, Rusk, McCone, Wheeler) is to do it because the Belgians do feel there is a great obligation to their lives. SPLIT told him he was in the White House at the moment at a meeting on sugar. SPLIT said he had conditioned this on an immediate evacuation and getting the planes and paratroops out. All we intended to do was an evacuation. The military was afraid this morning to take them out until we were certain the airport was secured. In any event, the idea would be, this force would go to Paulis only to evacuate the people'97in and out in 24 hours. SPLIT replied there was a risk'97that can'92t be denied. SPLIT replied as far as he was aware they had no nationals in the Congo. SPLIT said we had given warnings they were there at their own risks. SPLIT replied none to do this operation. Unless it is done quickly, it should not be done. If we let it go for a week, the people will be lost. SPLIT said on the question of the other matter, we will have to decide this afternoon. We will have further talks here and either Rusk or he will call the President. SPLIT said there were no French there. There may be some Greeks and Turks and other Europeans in very small numbers.",military,bureaucracies_37,bureaucracies
"believed that under the Castro regime, Cuba was now virtually a member of the Communist Bloc. [ 1 sentence (2'bd lines) not declassified ] On September 10 the first major Soviet Bloc arms shipment reached Cuba. This shipment included ten tanks, 100 anti-aircraft guns, and a large number of machine guns plus ammunition and electronic equipment. Additional armaments shipments were probably on the way from the Bloc to Cuba. A number of Cubans had been under military training in Czechoslovakia for some months. Mr. Dulles thought these Cubans were receiving jet flying training. Apparently the Castro regime had now decided to undertake an all-out propaganda campaign against the Guantanamo Naval Base. Mr. Dulles did not believe a direct attack against the Base would be mounted but felt the propaganda campaign would probably include a large number of incidents, including possibly cutting off the water supply of the Base. Despite these developments, the Castro government was facing growing unrest throughout the country and active guerrilla operations in the Escambray area. The U.S. engineers working in that area had reported that travel on the roads was now hazardous and that gun fire continued through the night. However, the guerrilla groups in this area are not cooperating effectively. Cuban waterfront workers are dissatisfied. 1 'a0 :: introduced Council discussion of the situation in Cuba by presenting that part of his intelligence briefing which dealt with this subject. He said that we believe that active opposition to Castro continues among scattered groups inside Cuba despite fear caused by executions and increasing repression. There are about 1000 guerrillas in the Escambray Mountains. These are poorly armed and have inadequate provisions, but their worst problem is their lack of unity and of effective popular leaders. Most of the potential leaders are either in jail or have left the country. Some could be sent in, however. Most of the guerrillas who were captured and exhibited in trials last week were seized in the lowlands and were seized some weeks ago. [ less than 1 line not declassified ] indicate that there have been further defections from the military within Cuba and isolated acts of sabotage. A new decree is ready for issuance which will impose compulsory military training on all males and females between the ages of 14 and 40. SPLIT noted that Soviet military aid continued; that three shipments have arrived and that a fourth is aboard a Soviet vessel enroute to Cuba. We have recent indications that these shipments have included anti-aircraft artillery, machine guns, jeeps and possibly tanks. We have no definite word on whether they included MIGs. [ less than 1 line not declassified ] indicates that Cuban pilots and maintenance personnel are being trained in Czechoslovakia. Guevara is expected to leave for Moscow today as Castro'92s representative to the 7th of November celebrations. Reportedly, he will also sign a new economic agreement with the USSR, [ less than 1 line not declassified ] indicates that Guevara may visit Communist China and hopes also to visit Yugoslavia and Japan. It will be of interest to see, SPLIT suggested, whether a further arrangement on sugar is concluded. The possibility of a sensational Soviet offer has been reported. The Soviets do not need sugar and purchase of Cuban sugar could be a very costly operation for them. The Cuban Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs has indicated that Cuba intends to recognize East Germany. A Cuban sugar magnate, Julio Lobo, who recently left Cuba after his holdings were seized by the government, has said that Guevara had stated to him that while Khrushchev may admit the possibility of coexistence between capitalism and socialism, such co-existence was not possible in Cuba. Cuba was likely to react strongly to the new U.S. export controls. It may press charges of new U.S. aggression. What it will do was, however, difficult to guess. A few American companies which had not so far been seized'97Sears Roebuck, Woolworth, and Coca Cola'97may now be intervened and taken over. Castro may make a personal appearance before the UN to present the Cuban case.",political,bureaucracies_38,bureaucracies
"said he did not think this would bring the downfall of the Castro regime, but that it should create major pressures on that government. It will have a very good effect in making the United States position clear, including an encouraging effect on the dissident groups now becoming active in Cuba. Mr. SPLIT said he and other State Department officials had talked with Latin American leaders. Reactions will be mixed. The anti-Communist governments will support us. Leftist governments and groups will criticize us. For example, we must expect criticism from Mexico. The SPLIT said we could not at this time get multilateral action of this type against Cuba. He hoped, however, we might later get an agreement at least to stop the flow of arms to Cuba. The :: described foreign reaction to the U.S. export embargo. He stated that prior to the action, U.S. missions in Latin America had been asked to get the reaction of the Foreign Offices. On the whole, the reaction had been good, in fact, suprisingly good. None of the countries considered it to be an act of external aggression and Chile was the only country that had expressed doubts. An interesting aspect of the reaction was the fact that a number of the countries did not think we had gone far enough. SPLIT stated that the Latin American countries were worried about the possibility that Cuba was obtaining equipment for the latter purpose. In the discussion which followed, it was indicated that Cuba might be getting some tanks which could be used in an external attack. It is also possible that Cuba will have two squadrons of MIGs by the first of the year. Secretary SPLIT noted that there is a sensitivity in Cuba to the possibility of a fake U.S. attack on Guantanamo to justify military action by the U.S. against Cuba. :: stated that Moa Bay was shut down and we had given thirty days'92 notice that we would shut down Nicaro on the 4th of November. The Nicaro plant has been locally, but not publicly, intervened. Local labor has taken it over and the few Americans still there are gradually leaving. The Cubans may attempt to run the Nicaro plant and pile up the nickel. The nickel cannot be used by the Soviet Union or elsewhere. Until the thirty days are up, the plant continues to run and we are paying for its operation. SPLIT went on to say that the Canadians had had what he could only call the presumption to tell us that one reason they were worried about the U.S. action was the fact that they had received reports from their diplomatic sources which did not agee with ours, indicating that the U.S. action would cause a serious loss of good feeling toward the U.S. in Latin America. When we had asked them about the reaction they had got in Central America, the Canadians had had to admit that they had no representative in that area. SPLIT pointed out that there were indications that Cuban aircraft on Cuban airfields had been recently painted with U.S. insignia. Our Ambassador was asking about these aircraft in a note 4 which would state that it was well-known that there were no U.S. aircraft in Cuba and which would suggest that the Cubans might be preparing a provocative military action. 1 'a0 :: pointed out it was questionable whether the OAS would support a naval blockade of Cuba. Secretary",political,bureaucracies_39,bureaucracies
"presented to the President (on about October 8th) the Defense recommendation for flights over Cuba by U'962 aircraft under SAC command. I reported the inquiry made by Gordon Gray and myself into the necessity for such operations, both for information of value to the conduct of clandestine operations, and for information as to any missile sites being prepared there. I also told him that, as to the question of such flights being conducted by military as against civilian agencies, my inquiry had disclosed that either would be capable of doing it. I recommended to him against military auspices. G. Brigadier General, USA 1 'a0 :: inquired as to whether the Moa Bay and Nicaro operations had been closed down. :: asked if we knew whether the military support being provided by the Bloc was for internal security purposes only or also included equipment that could be used in an attack on other nations. :: observed that we could not predict the results in Cuba of our action on U.S. exports. The reaction could range upward to an effort to take Guantanamo. He noted that Mr. dulles suggested to him the day before that Castro might cut off Cuban sugar exports to the U.S. :: explained why he had placed U.S. Policy toward Cuba on the Council agenda. He asked whether, in what now appeared to be the unlikely event of a military move by Castro against Guantanamo, the U.S. was wholly prepared with respect to policy and with respect to the coordination of political and military planning. He cited two extremes of possible U.S. reactions in the event of an attack on Guantanamo '93(a) use of only such military forces as might be necessary to protect the Guantanamo Base itself, and (b) a decision that such an attack was an act of war by the Castro Government against the U.S. and that military power should be applied accordingly.'94 In the latter case the obligations of the military would be different from what they would be in the former case. He assumed that in the latter case, we would pursue hostilities to a successful conclusion. He went on to say it was not clear whether military contingency planning was being done in close coordination with political planning and took full account of the actions that we might take in the UN or in the OAS. He concluded by stating that his reason for raising the issue was to make sure that the responsible departments had the benefit of the President'92s views so that, in the event an attack did occur, at least their planning would be complete.",military,bureaucracies_40,bureaucracies
"Safeguarding of Freedom of Navigation in the Caribbean for Third Country Flag Vessels Engaged in Commercial Pursuits F. It is assumed that Soviet armed forces in the general area will not take actions in support of Cuba or otherwise become involved. Castro has long taken a most serious view of exile activities directed against Cuba, and the regime generally also has played on exile-related incidents to bolster pro-government support at home and divert popular attention from domestic problems. Cuba'92s seizure of the Layla Express on December 5 and the Johnny Express on December 15 will suit Castro'92s propaganda exploitation pattern and will probably garner considerable domestic, foreign Communist, and third world support and sympathy for Cuba'92s actions against '93pirate ships'94 sent by '93the imperialists.'94 This same sort of sympathy, it can be anticipated, would also be forthcoming if Cuba were to seize similar vessels under similar circumstances. Several logical restraints that would appear to be operative in any Cuban decision to employ force in seizing such vessels are: (a) Cuba would be restricted by the need to use her rather limited naval strength primarily to guard a long coastline and several key port areas (i.e., Havana, Mariel, Cienfuegos, Santiago); (b) many of Cuba'92s naval combatant ships are limited in both mechanical and range capabilities -- mechanical breakdowns on gunboats like those used in the recent incidents have occurred fairly frequently; (c) it seems unlikely that Cuba would attack US-flag vessels. Cuban efforts to intercept and seize foreign vessels probably will be concentrated in the shipping lanes in and near the Windward Passage and the seas between eastern Cuba and the Bahamas. Cuban naval and aerial reconnaissance activities and patrols are traditionally the heaviest in these areas, and the many islands and cays in these regions afford good natural cover to Cuban gunboats lying in wait for their targets. It seems very doubtful, however, that Cuban naval units would enter Dominican or other foreign ports or waters to attempt to seize other vessels. The Cubans probably will continue, however, to maintain close surveillance of other foreign ports and waters -- especially those of the Dominican Republic -- in an attempt to locate those vessels that they suspect to be involved in Cuban exile activities. On several recent occasions Cuban non-military aircraft have openly reconnoitered Dominican ports and airfields, and it seems likely that Babun family vessels and possibly other signs of Cuban exile activity were the prime targets of their searches. IV. Courses of Action A. Intelligence Collection 3. Monitor closely and continuously the whereabouts of Cuban patrol vessels and aircraft. 4. Maintain close and continuous surveillance of militant exile groups who may be planning infiltration raids against Cuba. (Long range intelligence requirements are presently being developed by the intelligence community.) c) Consider the feasibility of providing air/or ship escort for potentially threatened vessels. 1 'a0 :: 2. Prospective Situation Although Castro in his December 22 broadcast stated that any vessels which are suspected of having been engaged in raids against Cuba will be subject to Cuban seizure, we are inclined to believe that Castro feels he has achieved his objectives of retaliating for the October 12 exile raid and of reducing the likelihood of future exile raids for the time being. This Cuban attitude combined with the actions described above make it appear that Castro probably will not engage in further attempts to seize ships unless the '93Express'94 vessels sail near Cuba within range of his patrol craft or unless Cuban exile groups attempt subsequent infiltration raids against Cuba. To insure that these two important provisos remain in effect, we will continue to urge the '93Express'94 vessels to continue the present routings away from Cuba and reiterate our warning to Cuban exile groups that U.S. law enforcement agencies will enforce vigorously U.S. laws prohibiting the use of U.S. territory as a base for any military actions against a foreign country. RECOMMENDATIONS: We believe that if the collective measures described above are maintained, further Cuban attacks on or harassment of third country flag vessels engaged in commercial pursuits in the Caribbean appear unlikely. Moreover, we are reasonably assured that with the continuation of these measures, the forces currently assigned could intervene in time to prevent, if so authorized, a Cuban seizure of any of the four '93Express'94 vessels. In our judgement, further additional deterrent or protective measures such as escorting specific vessels that may be vulnerable to Cuban attack are not warranted at this time. Accordingly, we recommend that the U.S. continue: the present sea and air monitoring of the sailings of the Babun vessels; surveillance of Cuban naval activity; and the maintenance of its naval presence in the area as a deterrent. 1 'a0",military,bureaucracies_41,bureaucracies
"A gradual but steady toughening up in our policy is therefore the preferable alternative. It will require telling the country quite frankly that we cannot get the bridge out, short of a head-on military confrontation. Instead, there are other things that you are prepared to do in order to confront the Soviet Union with the face that d'e9tente must be a two-way street. Assertive Soviet behavior, different to our interests, will henceforth not be cost free. Much of the foregoing should be communicated to the Soviets in advance as the likely consequence of Soviet unwillingness to adopt a position compatible with outcome number (1). I believe that this should be told to them directly, firmly, and unambiguously. They will probably reject us, in part because of their sense of confidence and in part because they simply do not take our warnings seriously any more. } :: Soviet Brigade in Cuba This is a very difficult problem and there are no easy answers or ready solutions to it. If we give exaggerated public significance to this latest disclosure: -- It would impact unfavorably on SALT ratification. -- It would make it even more doubtful that the Soviets would freeze, reduce or withdraw the brigade, than is the case already. -- It would give the wrong signal both domestically and to our Allies, since this latest disclosure does not logically warrant a sudden escalation because the brigade has in fact been there for a least three years. What we have uncovered is an intelligence failure, not a new Soviet strategic move to challenge our interests in the Caribbean. It is obvious to me that at some point we will have to draw a line with the Soviets and that we ought to be using this occasion, at the very least, to start building our case. Otherwise, we will have damaged our credibility severely when we are faced with the predicted crisis. Our problem, then, is not to allow a rather low-key public response to convince the Soviets that we are in a situation which we find uncomfortable but bearable. Since there is little or no possibility that the Soviets would react favorably to mere oral expressions of concern on our part, they must be convinced that there is teeth in what we say to them. As suggested above and elsewhere, there is no adequate way we can handle the Soviet buildup of the Cuban armed forces strictly in the Cuban or the Caribbean context. The only really effective means at our disposal to make Moscow sit up and take notice is to explain to the Soviets that if they insist on messing around in our backyard, we will have much less compunction than has been the case until now about messing around in theirs. a) As per Tab B, ask Defense to prepare an assessment of the strategic implications of Soviet and Cuban military capabilities in the Caribbean for our NATO and other military contingency plans. b) Explore at an interagency level the ramifications of various military options available to us in the Caribbean itself, e.g., the introduction of further US ground forces into Guantanamo, military / naval maneuvers in the waters off Cuba, reconnaissance flights over Cuba, shadowing Soviet vessels in the Caribbean, US ship visits, etc. } :: They agreed that we need to go forward with Secretary Vance'92s proposal to the Soviets, but we should add to the list a request for information about any additional Soviet combat units which we may not as yet have identified, and that we should include the option of separating the Soviet troops from their equipment in Cuba. This approach is most likely to fail, and if it does, we must not confine our response to Cuba alone. That limitation carries a number of dangers. First, it is a very weak response to Soviet '93messing around in our backyard'94 which the public will see as nothing more than cosmetics and will not accept. Second, reinforcing our presence in Guantanamo runs the risk of merely legitimizing the Soviet combat ground force presence in Cuba, and perhaps provoking a Soviet reaction of increasing that presence. Third, it leaves wholly unaddressed the larger geostrategic problem of the Soviet-Cuban military relationship in other parts of the world. Finally, the worst outcome for this Administration is it be caught somewhere between the two positions, with what is seen as a cosmetic solution and therefore picked apart not only by the public and the Congress, but also within the Democratic Party. A number of broader responses are essential, such as an increase in the Defense budget and an improvement of our Indian Ocean military presence. We need actions, not just more expressions of concern through demarches to the Soviet government. In fact, judging by the recent transfer of a patrol boat to Cuba, the Soviets are showing increasing disregard for our demarches. A brief discussion followed on the advisability of renewing the SR-71 flights. Harold :: It is unclear whether or not such training continued into the early 1970s. Since 1976, however, the evidence strongly indicates that Soviet ground force units have engaged in exclusively Soviet combat training -- without Cuban participation. The overall situation today is that the U.S. Government concluded publicly in 1963 that there were no Soviet combat troops remaining in Cuba, only Soviet troops for other purposes. That announcement was based on a high-level of intelligence surveillance at the time which was discontinued in the mid-1960s. Surveillance since 1976 indicates unmistakably that Soviet ground combat forces are stationed in Cuba and that they train exclusively as such. Although it is not clear when and how the change in training activity took place, it is clear that the nature of the Soviet ground force presence has changed since 1963 even if the number of Soviet troops has not changed significantly. It was also pointed out that there is some evidence of additional Soviet combat units beyond those we have confirmed at present. The intelligence community has low confidence in that evidence. If that fails, then we must change the unacceptable status quo in Cuba by our own unilateral actions. They would include first, a significant increase of our intelligence surveillance of Cuba and second, reinforcement with U.S. ground troops of our naval base in Guantanamo. Once that is done, we would be able to argue convincingly to the Senate that we have redressed the situation in Cuba and that we can proceed with SALT. In the event we cannot get a negotiated agreement with the Soviets, we will have to work closely with Senator Byrd and others on the Hill to learn what is acceptable as a firm U.S. response. The proponents of this position agreed that there may be broader geopolitical implications in the Soviet-Cuban military relationship which will require U.S. action outside of Cuba. A decision on such actions, however, is of enormous significance and should be debated and taken separately from the handling of this phase of dealing with the Soviets. It was suggested that we have already tilted excessively toward China in this regard. :: Options Regarding Soviet Brigade in Cuba Finally, the way this has developed, despite assurances of the Intelligence Community to the contrary, I have no real confidence that our ultimate verdict will not be (a) that the unit has been there since 1962 at roughly its present size and (b) that it has all along performed some sort of training function. :: Yet the situation is really not analogous; we face a political challenge, and we cannot fully undo the reality we don'92t like, whereas in 1962 we faced a direct military challenge, and we could -- through direct military pressure -- undo it. Yet if the outcome in the end appears to be inadequate, most people will declare you as having been '93defeated'94 and perhaps even blame you for both generating the problem (note what Javits said at the meeting) and then for being timid in responding to it. In fact, you are facing a situation much more like that faced by Kennedy in 1961, when the Soviets suddenly put up the Berlin wall. That situation was '93unacceptable,'94 but we had no choice except to live with it. Kennedy was not prepared to knock it down. Neither are we prepared to create a military confrontation in order to get the Soviets to remove their troops from Cuba. But Kennedy did something else also, and hence the foregoing argument is not an unexpected plea from me for acquiescence. Kennedy responded to this '93unacceptable'94 situation, with which he had to live, by taking a number of steps designed to indicate to the public that he would assert U.S. interests, and if necessary, be prepared to use force. I personally do not favor sending more troops to Guantanamo, because Guantanamo to most Latin Americans looks like an imperialist outpost form days gone by -- and it tends to reinforce the legitimacy of the Soviet troop presence in Cuba. I do favor the other steps, which I have incorporated in your speech outline: more defense, more intelligence, some limited steps regarding China (because that actually does concern the Soviets and we have to do at least one thing that genuinely bothers them), and a more generally tough line on Soviet adventurism and disregard for our interests. We should do all of these things, even if the Soviets give us something on Cuba. The fact is that they will not give us enough to enable us to proclaim a victory, and, much more important, even if we did, I have not the slightest doubt that the public will not accept some cosmetic arrangement of relocation within Cuba as a Carter '93victory.'94 }",political,bureaucracies_42,bureaucracies
"Dealing with the Soviet Leadership An important factor in deciding onus behavior in terms of planning our future military capability, and more immediately in terms of our rhetoric and actions in responding to or preempting Soviet actions elsewhere in the world, is what one believes the motivation of the Soviet leadership to be. You have now had interactions with Brezhnev and three of his Politburo colleagues, and will have drawn some conclusions of your own from those meetings. Both before and since, some of your statements suggest that you think Soviet political leaders are motivated towards ends similar to those sought by those in democratic countries. I urge caution about that conclusion. But from what I have been able to see of those who reach the top levels of the Soviet system, they are motivated by a drive, for themselves and for their country respectively, to be in a position to tell people around them and other nations what to do. They insist on a clear hierarchy, and find it very difficult to think in terms of accepting diversity. The higher up in the system one goes, the more pronounced is this attitude. '93Who'85. Whom,'94 Lenin'92s description of the world as a place of those who act to command and those who are acted upon, continues to underlie Soviet motivations. This is not to say that the Soviet leaders do not desire peace, or even that they will insist that it can exist only on precisely their terms. But it does mean that theirs is not a live and let live approach. They will not be persuaded, or much influenced, by appeals for equity or by the charms of reduction of conflict; they consider conflict, generally at some level of violence, inevitable between their system and all the rest. Whether in Cuba or Afghanistan, in Eastern Europe or Southeast Asia, they are willing to apply military strength, and are likely to be dissuaded from exercising it only by a conviction that the consequence will be very negative for them, and in the short run. The people who have risen to the top in such a system, however many similarities they have to democratic political leaders, will surely have great differences from them. In most cases they will see compromise as a sign of weakness, and conciliation as a sign of poor judgment. } :: and General Allen favored renewal as a strong gesture. The",political,bureaucracies_43,bureaucracies
"Are you absolutely clear of your premise that an air strike must go to the whole air complex? SPLIT Now that seems to me that's '85 . It's perfectly possible that this, that they are in that sense a bluff. That doesn't make them any less offensive to us '85 SPLIT '85 because we can't have proof about it. SPLIT Yeah. SPLIT They're now talking about taking out the air force as well'85 . SPLIT I do raise again the question whether, uh, whether we [words unintelligible] the problem, military problem, but there is, I would think, a substantial political advantage in limiting the strike in surgical terms to the thing that is in fact the cause of action. :: I agree with Mac that that ought to be done. I think that, uh, we're committed at any time that we feel that there's a build up that in any way endangers to take whatever action we must take to assure our security. I would think the Secretary's evaluation of this thing being around all over the lot is a pretty accurate one, I would think it'd take a week to do it. Maybe a little before then. I would, uh, like to hear what the responsible commanders have to say this afternoon. I think the question with the base is whether we take it out or whether we talk about it, and, uh, both, either alternative is a very distressing one, but of the two, I would take it out. SPLIT [Take a large?] [words unintelligible] [to?] stop the planes, stop the ships, stop the submarines and everything else from [sending?]. Just not going to permit it. And then stop them from coming in. :: How much do we know, uh, [Pat?]? I don't mean to go behind your judgment here, except that there's one thing that would be really catastrophic would be to make a judgment here on, on a bad guess as to whether these things are. We mustn't do that. SPLIT How do we really know what these missiles are and what their range is? SPLIT What [made?] the verification? That's really my question. How do we know what a given Soviet missile will do? SPLIT I know that we have accepted them '85 SPLIT '85 and I know that we've had these things in charts for years, but I don't know how we know. SPLIT Attack who? SPLIT May I ask a question in that context? SPLIT [Words unintelligible] that we've been wrong. SPLIT Yeah. Except John McCone. SPLIT But, the, uh, question that I would like to ask is, quite aside from what we've said'97and we're very hard-locked onto it, I know'97What is the strategic impact on the position of the United States of MRBMs in Cuba? How gravely does this change the strategic balance? SPLIT Not so much. SPLIT That's what they said themselves'85 . SPLIT Yeah. SPLIT Doesn't prove anything in the strategic balance [overall?]. SPLIT No question, if this thing goes on, an attack on Cuba becomes general war. And that's really the question whether '85 SPLIT Their bombers take off against us, then they have made a general war against Cuba of it, which is a, it then becomes much more their decision. We move this way'85 . The political advantages are, are very strong, it seems to me, of the small strike. Uh, it corresponds to the, the punishment fits the crime in political terms, that we are doing only what we warned repeatedly and publicly we would have to do. Uh, we are not generalizing the attack. The things that we've already recognized and said that we have not found it necessary to attack and said we would not find it necessary to attack '85 SPLIT I would think one thing that I would still cling to is that he's not likely to give Fidel Castro nuclear warheads. I don't believe that has happened or is likely to happen. SPLIT Soviet-controlled nuclear warheads [of the kind?] '85 SPLIT Our principal problem is to try and imaginatively to think '85 SPLIT '85 what the world would be like if we do this '85 SPLIT '85 and what it will be like if we don't '85 SPLIT '85 if we fail if we do. SPLIT We have a list of the sabotage options, Mr. President, and I'85 . It's not a very loud noise to raise at a meeting of this sort, but I think it would need your approval. I take it you are in favor of sabotage. The one question which rises is whether we wish to do this in, uh, naval area, [getting in?] international waters, or in positions which may'85 . Mining international waters or mining Cuban waters, may hit'85 . Mines are very indiscriminate. Uh'85 . SPLIT That's one of the items. There are, uh, there'85 . Most of them relate to infiltration of raiders, and will simply be deniable internal Cuban activities. The question that we need guidance from you on is whether you now wish to authorize sabotage which might have its impact on neutrals or even friendly ships. SPLIT They're not really going to be realistic, even, but they give us [words unintelligible] '85 SPLIT I'd like to throw one in of a military kind, and what'85 . Shall we get them in order and, uh, you move'85 . Well, we'll all [words unintelligible]. I would like to throw one in that I do not think the army and the Chiefs would normally consider, and that is, uh, the possibility of genuinely making a quite large-scale, uh, strike, followed by a drop, followed by a recovery of the people dropped to get these things and not simply to increase the chance that we've hit most of them. There's always unc-, incompleteness in a military opera-, in an air operation. But if these things are what the pictures show, you could drop a batallion of paratroopers and get 'em. Now what you do with a batallion, I grant you, is a hell of a problem. SPLIT Supplementary to an air attack. I mean, how're you gonna know that you've got 'em? And if you haven't got 'em, what've you done? SPLIT Proving a negative is a hell of a job. SPLIT I ag-, I think the [words unintelligible] is probably a bad idea, but it '85 SPLIT Well '85 SPLIT That's right, it's a minor '85 SPLIT '85 variant of one plan. SPLIT That's my honest [judgment?]. SPLIT How do we do that? SPLIT Are they all working on powerful reaction in your [word unintelligible]? :: then expressed his views as follows: We should proceed at once with the necessary military actions and should do no talking. The Soviets will react some place. We must expect this; take the consequences and manage the situations as they evolve. :: warned against any action against Cuba, particularly an air strike without warning, stating such would be divisive with all allies and subject us to criticism throughout the world. He advocated writing both Khrushchev and Castro; if their response was negative or unsatisfactory then we should plan action; advise our principal allies, seek a two-thirds vote from the OAS and then act. Secretary :: stated that limited quick military action was an illusion and that any military action would rapidly escalate into an invasion. :: said he did not agree with the Attorney general or with General taylor that this was our last chance. He said a missile buildup would end if, as everyone seemed to agree, the Russians would not use force to penetrate the United States blockade. General :: pointed out that there was a risk that we would act in such a way as to get Khrushchev to commit himself fully to the support of Castro. Director McCone stated his opposition to an air strike, but admitted that in his view a blockade was not enough. He argued that we should institute the blockade and tell the Russians that if the missiles were not dismantled within seventy-two hours, the United States would destroy the missiles by air attack. He called attention to the risk involved in a long drawn-out period during which the Cubans could, at will, launch the missiles against the United States. Secretary :: In my opinion one should add all the consequences of inva- sion at that time. Yes, I saw these. SPLIT Wouldn'92t it depend, how much information? SPLIT How about the suspected tenth [missile site] that was in the papers this morning? SPLIT To think ahead to wider problems here. [Unclear exchange with Taylor and Bundy.] SPLIT That'92s it. SPLIT I'92m really thinking in the range of things that this group isn'92t going to pay much attention to. SPLIT That would be ideal. That would be ideal. SPLIT I also think that without regard to department, there'92s a problem of temperament and style as to who should run this. I have not hit upon the right person yet. I'92m not sure that Paul [Nitze] might not be the man to beat. Well, if you give me individual suggestions on that, I'92ll try to have it worked out at the end of the afternoon. All right, but not until tomorrow. Because if we can get organized in the course of the day, we will have done a good job. } :: Very unlikely. It'92s possible. SPLIT Well, we expect to know reasonably well where the sub- marines are. Am I not right? SPLIT That'92s what I think. Steuart :: And have a pistol at your hip, tomorrow. :: I'92m not sure it'92s as sharp as you make it, but this is the range of choices. :: The work'92s going on. While you were out of the room, Mr. President, we reached an infor- mal consensus that'97I don'92t know whether Tommy agrees'97that this last night'92s message was Khrushchev. And this one is his own hard- nosed people overruling him, this public one. That they didn'92t like what he said to you last night. Nor would I, if I were a Soviet hardnose. :: What'92s our military plan? SPLIT Well I would say it gets awfully close, Bob. SPLIT You can go against one [SAM site], can you? Now? Tonight? SPLIT If you take one out, you'92ve got to '97 SPLIT Or a general war. SPLIT We know about where it was shot down. SPLIT The Cubans have command of the ground, but they'92ve proba- bly shifted, if I understand it. . . . SPLIT We can'92t get any more evidence than that. That'92s what the intercepts say. } :: Bob, if you'92re willing to give up your mis- siles in Turkey, you think you ought to defuse them, why don'92t you say that to him and say we'92re cutting a trade, make the trade then. Save all the invasion, lives, and everything else? SPLIT You just ask yourself what made the great- est impression on you today, whether it was his letter last night, or whether it was his letter this morning, or whether it was that U-2 boy going down. SPLIT That'92s exactly right; that'92s what did it. That'92s when everybody started to change, and that [attacking a SAM site] is what'92s going to make an impression on him'97not all these signals that each one of us write. He [Khrushchev] is an expert at that palaver.",military,bureaucracies_44,bureaucracies
"Uh, we're impressed, Mr. President, with the great importance of getting a, a strike with all the benefit of surprise, uh, which would mean ideally that we would have all the missiles that are in Cuba above ground where we can take them out. Uh, that, that desire runs counter to the strong point the Secretary made if the other optimum would be to get every missile before it could, becomes operational. Uh, practically, I think the, our knowledge of the timing of the readiness is going to be so, so, uh, difficult that we'll never have the, the exact permanent, uh, the perfect timing. What we'd like to do is to look at this new photography, I think'97and take any additional'97and try to get the, the layout of the targets in as near an optimum, uh, position as possible, and then take 'em out without any warning whatsoever. That does not preclude, I don't think, Mr. Secretary, some of the things you've been talking about. It's a little hard to say in terms of time how much I'm discussing. But we must do a good job the first time we go in there, uh, pushing a 100 percent just as far, as closely as we can with our, with our strike. I would also mention among the, the military actions we should take that once we have destroyed as many of these offensive weapons as possible, we should, should prevent any more coming in, which means a naval blockade. So I suppose that all '85 . And also a reinforcement of Guantanamo and evacuation of dependents. So, really, the, in point of time, I'm, I'm thinking in terms of three phases. One, a, an initial pause of some sort while we get completely ready and get, get the right posture on the part of the target, so we can do the best job. Then, virtually concurrently, an air strike against, as the Secretary said, missiles, airfields, uh, unclear sites that we know of. At the same time, naval blockade. At the same time, reinforce Guantanamo and evacuate the dependents. I'd then start this continuous reconnaissance, the list that you had, continue over Cuba. Then, then the decision can be made as we, as we're mobilizing, uh, with the air strike as to whether we invade or not. I think that's the hardest question militarily in the whole business'97one which we should look at very closely before we get our feet in that deep mud in Cuba. SPLIT What it'd give 'em is primary, it makes the launching base, uh, for short range missiles against the United States to supplement their rather [deceptive?]ICBM system, for example. There's one reason. SPLIT Well, I think that that thing is all over '85 SPLIT Well, I would think we would have, should be in a position to invade at any time if we so desired. Hence that, uh, in this preliminary, we should be, uh, it's all bonus if we are indeed taking out weapons [word unintelligible] '85 SPLIT I suspect, Mr. President, we'd have to take out the surface-to-air missiles in order to get in, to get in, take some of them out. Maybe [words unintelligible]. :: This is a point target, Mr. , uh, President. You're never sure of having, absolutely of getting everything down there. We intend to do a great deal of damage because we can [words unintelligible]. But, as the Secretary says here, there was unanimity among all the commanders involved in the Joint Chiefs, uh, that in our judgment, it would be a mistake to take this very narrow, selective target because it invited reprisal attacks and it may be detrimental. Now if the, uh, Soviets have been willing to give, uh, nuclear warheads to these missiles, there is every, just as good reason for them to give nuclear capability to these bases. We don't think we'd ever have a chance to take 'em again, so that we lose this, the first strike surprise capability. Our recommendation would be to get complete intelligence, get all the photography we need, the next two or three days, no, no hurry in our book. Then look at this target system. If it really threatens the United States, then take it right out with one hard crack. SPLIT Fighters, the bombers, uh, IL-28s may turn up in this photography. It's not that all unlikely there're some there. SPLIT Uh, we think that the first strike, we'd get a great majority of this. We'll never get it all, Mr. President. But we then have to come back day after day for several days'97we said, uh, five days perhaps'97to do the complete job. Uh, meanwhile, we could then be making up our mind as to whether or not to go on and invade the island. I'm very much impressed with the need for a time something like five to seven days for this air purpose because of the parachute aspect of the in-, proposed invasion. You can't take parachute formations, close formations of, uh, troop carrier planes in in the face of any air opposition really. So the first job, before the, any land, uh, attack, including [parachutes or paratroops?], is really cleaning out the, the MIGs and the, uh, the accompanying aircraft. SPLIT I'd like to stress this last point, Mr. President. We are very vulnerable to conventional bombing attack, low-level bombing attacks in the Florida area. Our whole, uh, air defense has been oriented in other directions. We've never had low-level defenses prepared for this country. So it would be entirely possible for MIGs to come through with conventional weapons and do some amount, some damage. SPLIT No, but it certainly is fair to '85 SPLIT [Words unintelligible] I think we would expect some conventional weapon. SPLIT '85 point of view, Mr. President. You're quite right in saying that these, these are just a few more missiles, uh, targeted on the United States. Uh, however, they can become a, a very, a rather important adjunct and reinforcement to the, to the strike capability of the Soviet Union. We have no idea how far they will go. But more than that, these are, uh, uh, to our nation it means, it means a great deal more. You all are aware of that, in Cuba and not over in the Soviet Union. SPLIT We'd have to target them with our missiles and have the same kind of, of pistol-pointed-at-the-head situation as we have in the Soviet Union at the present time. SPLIT I'm [a pessimist,?] Mr. President. We have a war plan over there for you, calls for a, uh, for a quarter of a million Americans'97soldiers, marines and airmen'97to take an island we launched eighteen hundred Cubans against a year and a half ago. [Faint laughter] SPLIT [We've changed?] our evaluations well. SPLIT About a forty-minute countdown, something like that's been estimated. Ball?: So you would say that, uh, the strike should precede any public discussion? SPLIT We're not sure yet. SPLIT '85 and that's gonna be, have to be cranked into the, any strike plans we're preparing, so there is that factor of time. The Secretary has given you the, the time, the minimum time is to make a decision, uh, now to, so that we can brief the pilots and then crank in the new intelligence. I would point out that, well '85 SPLIT And you'll miss some. SPLIT Uh, Mr. President, I should say that the, the Chiefs and the commanders feel so strongly about the, the dangers inherent in the limited strike, that they would prefer taking no military action rather than to take [that limited?] strike. They feel that the, it's opening up the United States to attacks which they can't prevent if we don't take advantage of '85 SPLIT Well, I would be'85 . First thing, Mr. President, my, my inclination all against, against the invasion, but none the less trying to eliminate as effectively as possible every weapon that can strike the United States. SPLIT I would not at this moment [words unintelligible]. SPLIT This includes [related?] defenses, all sorts of things. SPLIT More in the order of two hundred, I'd say. SPLIT Noth-, nothing permanent about it. SPLIT We think, Mr. President, that under any of these plans we will probably get an attack on, on Guantanamo, at least by, by fire. They have artillery and mortars in the, easily within range, and, uh, any of these actions we take we'll have to give air support to Guantanamo and probably reinforce the garrison. SPLIT I might say that air defense measures we're going to, we're started to take already. We moved more fighters into the southeastern United States and gradually improving some of our, our patrol procedures, uh, under the general guise of, uh, of preparations for that part of the country. We don't think there'd be any, any leaks there that might react against our military targets. I, I'd repeat that our defenses have always been weak in that part of the country. SPLIT There're two kinds of, of blockade: a blockade which stops ships from coming in and, and simply a seizure, I mean a, simply a search. :: supported this view in the early parts of the discussion, but in the later meetings expressed increasing concern over the importance of the missile threat from Cuba. SPLIT at this point spoke in favor of a military strike taking out the MRBMs and the planes as well * 'a0 :: generally reviewed the situation stating that the Chiefs looked upon Cuba as a forward base of serious proportions, that it cannot be taken out totally by air; that the military operation would be sizeable, nevertheless necessary. :: reported that the Joint Chiefs of Staff favor an air strike on Tuesday when United States forces could be in a state of readiness. He said he did not share Secretary mcNamara's fear that if we used nuclear weapons in Cuba, nuclear weapons would be used against us. General SPLIT responded that the risk of these missiles being used against us was less than if we permitted the missiles to remain there. The SPLIT said that the principal argument he wished to make was that now was the time to act because this would be the last chance we would have to destroy these missiles. If we did not act now, the missiles would be camouflaged in such a way as to make it impossible for us to find them. Therefore, if they were not destroyed, we would have to live with them with all the consequent problems for the defense of the United States. The SPLIT indicated his doubt that it would be possible to prevent the Russians from deploying warheads to Cuba by means of a blockade because of the great difficulty of setting up an effective air blockade. Secretary SPLIT emphasized the opportunity available now to take out not only all the missiles, but all the Soviet medium bombers (IL-28) which were neatly lined up in the open on airbases in Cuba. Mr. SPLIT said he was unable to explain why the IL-28 medium bombers had been left completely exposed on two airfields. The only way to explain this, he concluded, was on the ground that the Cubans and the Russians did not anticipate United States air strike. Secretary SPLIT returned to the point he had made earlier, namely, that if we do not destroy the missiles and the bombers, we will have to change our entire military way of dealing with external threats. The SPLIT argued that a blockade would not solve our problem or end the Cuban missile threat. He said that eventually we would have to use military force and, if we waited, the use of military force would be much more costly. Secretary :: stated, '93The best we can offer you is to destroy 90% of the known missiles.'94 7. :: said we had a capability to protect United States ships in the Caribbean. If the Komar ships took any hostile action, they could be destroyed, thereby creating a new situation. If a MIG plane takes hostile action, he would like to be in a position to shoot it down, thereby creating again a new situation. He estimated that the Soviets could not get naval surface ships to the area in less than ten days and Soviet submarines could not get to the area in less than ten to fourteen days. Secretary :: This is a part of the overall strike plan. We'92d have to pull out that portion and execute it. SPLIT We have only collateral information about it [unclear]. SPLIT It'92ll take a long . . . [unclear] necessary thing. :: Oh yes. We think we can keep tabs on the submarines. :: Well, we won'92t get to that unless the submarine is really in a position to attack our ship in the course of an intercept. This is not pur- suing [unclear] on the high seas. SPLIT He can maneuver anyway he wants to. :: Well, we [the Chiefs] have just had a chance to talk around the table. We have not taken a formal position on it. I would say, first, skepticism that it would be effective, but we realize that we'92re not in a position to judge that. You'92re [unclear]. :: Meanwhile the Joint Chiefs of Staff (absent Taylor) had decided, mindful of their previous views and that morning'92s intelligence, to draft a formal, written recommendation to the President urging him promptly to order a massive air strike against Cuba to begin the next day, Sunday, October 28, or Monday, October 29, and also to prepare to invade the island. :: Mr. President, the Chiefs have been in session during the afternoon on studying the same issues we have over here. The recom- mendation they give is as follows: That the big [air] strike, that is Oplan [Operations Plan] 312, be executed no later than Monday morning, the 29th, unless there is irrefutable evidence in the meantime that offensive weapons are being dismantled and rendered inoperable. That the execution of this strike plan be followed by the execution of 316, the invasion plan, seven days later. SPLIT They feel they must respond now. The whole world knows where we'92re flying. That raises the question of retaliation against the SAM sites. We think we'97we have various other reasons to believe that we know the SAM sites [that shot down the U-2]. Two days ago'97 SPLIT It will be very dangerous, I would say, Mr. Secretary, unless we can reconnoiter each day'97reconnoiter each day, having difficulty with reconnaissance. SPLIT We certainly shouldn'92t do it until we retaliate and say that if they fire again on one of our planes that we will come back with great force. SPLIT Next time, we go in'97 SPLIT Oh, I am. :: Quite a bit. The planes are turning back. Got overused at the first of the missile sites and then, at the second, turned back and cut out. We have some photography. So I would say by tonight, by the end of the day, we probably have seen some of the [antiaircraft] dispositions around these sites. However, the kind of 20-millimeter flak that'92s involved is very hard to pick up. It'92s very hard to know exactly where it is. So that by tomorrow, I would say we'92re not ready to go back with armed reconnaissance preceding the actual photographic missions, with any hope of cleaning out these little air sites. We think, however, the Chiefs would recommend, that we still go back with about six planes tomorrow, picking out targets which we don'92t know have this kind of flak around, and verify the work [on the missile sites] is still going ahead, and also prove we'92re still on the job. But we'92re approaching the point I think, Mr. President, where low- level reconnaissance will be entirely impossible. And if we reach that point, and if we'92re going to continue reconnaissance, without actually taking out the whole works, we'92re faced with taking out a number of the SAM sites that'97say ten'97to get a squad coming in again at medium- and high-level reconnaissance. But low-level reconnaissance probably is on its way out, as I think we'92ll learn at the end of tomorrow.",military,bureaucracies_45,bureaucracies
"Yes. [Well?], 1 Mr. President, this is a, of course, a [widely?] serious development. It's one that we, all of us, had not really believed the Soviets could, uh, carry this far. Uh, they, uh, seemed to be denying that they were going to establish bases of their own [in the same?] [words unintelligible] with a Soviet base, thus making it [essential to or essentially?] Cuban point of view. The Cubans couldn't [word unintelligible] with it anyhow, so'85 . Now, um, I do think we have to set in motion a chain of events that will eliminate this base. I don't think we [can?] sit still. The questioning becomes whether we do it by sudden, unannounced strike of some sort, or we, uh, build up the crisis to the point where the other side has to consider very seriously about giving in, or, or even the Cubans themselves, uh, take some, take some action on this. The thing that I'm, of course, very conscious of is that there is no such thing, I think, as unilateral action by the United States. It's so [eminently or heavily?] involved with 42 allies and confrontation in many places, that any action that we take, uh, will greatly increase the risks of direct action involving, uh, our other alliances and our other forces in other parts of the world. Um, so I think we, we have to think very hard about two major, uh, courses of action as alternatives. One is the quick strike. The point where we [make or think?], that is the, uh, overwhelming, overriding necessity to take all the risks that are involved doing that. I don't think this in itself would require an invasion of Cuba. I think that with or without such an invasion, in other words if we make it clear that, uh, what we're doing is eliminating this particular base or any other such base that is established. We ourselves are not moved to general war, we're simply doing what we said we would do if they took certain action. Uh, or we're going to decide that this is the time to eliminate the Cuban problem by actually eliminating the island. The other would be, if we have a few days'97from the military point of view, if we have the whole time'97uh, then I would think that, uh, there would be another course of action, a combination of things that, uh, we might wish to consider. We reinforce our forces in the southeastern part of the United States'97whatever is necessary from the military point of view to be able to give, to deliver an overwhelming strike at any of these installations, including the SAM sites. And, uh, also to take care of any, uh, MIGs or bombers that might make a pass at Miami or at the United States. Build up heavy forces, uh, if those are not already in position. That, uh, we then would move openly and vigorously into the, into the guerrilla field, and, uh, create maximum confusion on the island. [You know?] won't be too squeemish at this point about the overtness, covert [counter?] [word unintelligible] of what is being done. But I think that, by and large, there are, there are these two broad alternatives: one, the quick strike; the other, to alert our allies and Mr. Khrushchev that there is utterly serious crisis in the making here, and that, uh '85 Mr. Khrushchev may not himself really understand that or believe that at this point. I think we'll be facing a situation that could well lead to general war; that we have an obligation to do what has to be done but do it in a way that gives, uh, everybody a chance to, uh, put the [word unintelligible] down before it gets too hard. SPLIT Secondly, I don't believe, myself, that the critical question is whether you get a particular missile before it goes off because if they shoot those missiles we are in general nuclear war. In other words, the Soviet Union has got quite a different decision to make. If they, if they shoot those missiles, want to shoot 'em off before they get knocked out by aircraft'85 . So, I'm not sure that this is, uh, necessarily the precise [critical?] element, Bob. SPLIT Still, about why the Soviets are doing this, um, Mr. McCone suggested some weeks ago that one thing Mr. Khrushchev may have in mind is that, uh, uh, he knows that we have a substantial nuclear superiority, but he also knows that we don't really live under fear of his nuclear weapons to the extent that, uh, he has to live under fear of ours. Also we have nuclear weapons nearby, in Turkey and places like that. Um'85 . SPLIT But then there are also delivery vehicles that are, could easily '85 SPLIT '85 be moved through the air, aircraft and so forth. Speaker?: Route 'em through Turkey. SPLIT Um, and that Mr. McCone expresses the view that Khrushchev may feel that it's important for us to learn about living under medium-range missiles, and he's doing that to sort of balance that, uh, that political, psychological [plank?]. I think also that, uh, Berlin is, uh, very much involved in this. Um, for the first time, I'm beginning really to wonder whether maybe Mr. Khrushchev is entirely rational about Berlin. We've [hardly?] talked about his obsession with it. And I think we have to, uh, keep our eye on that element. But, uh, they may be thinking that they can either bargain Berlin and Cuba against each other, or that they could provoke us into a kind of action in Cuba which would give an umbrella for them to take action with respect to Berlin. In other words like the Suez-Hungary combination. If they could provoke us into taking the first overt action, then the world would be confused and they would have, uh, what they would consider to be justification for making a move somewhere else. But, uh, I must say I don't really see the rationality of, uh, the Soviets pushing it this far unless they grossly misunderstand the importance of Cuba to this country. :: It seems to me a limited strike plus planning for invasion five days afterwards, to be taken unless something untoward occurs, makes much more sense. SPLIT [Well?] in this morning's discussion we went into this, talked to some of your people, I believe, a little bit, and we felt an air strike, even of several days, against any military targets primarily, would not result in any substantial unrest. People would just stay home and try to keep out of trouble. :: With '85 SPLIT '85 at any place in the world. SPLIT Now, one of the things we look at is whether any, the actual operation of a blockade doesn't, isn't a greater involvement almost than a '85 SPLIT '85 military action. SPLIT It's a series of single, unrelated acts, not by surprise. This, uh, come in there on Pearl Harbor just frightens the hell out of me as to what's going beyond. [Yeah, well, anyway?] the Board of National Estimates have been working on this ever since '85 SPLIT What happens beyond that. You go in there with a surprise attack. You put out all the missiles. This isn't the end. This is the beginning, I think. There's a whole hell of a lot of things '85 :: You've seen actual missiles themselves and not just the boxes have you? SPLIT Yeah. Sure there is. SPLIT Pat, we don't know of any sixty-five-foot Soviet missile that has a range of, say, fifteen miles, do we? SPLIT In other words, if they are missiles this size, they are missiles of considerable range, I think. SPLIT The disadvantage in that is, of course, the, uh, the advance notice if he judges that we, we would not in this, in such approach here say exactly what we would do, but, uh, it might, of course, lead him to bring up mobile anti-aircraft weapons around these, uh, missiles themselves, uh, or, uh, take some other action that will make the strike that more difficult. Um, but there is that, there is that [move that?]. There are two other problems that we are concerned about. Uh, if we strike these missiles, we would expect, I think, uh, maximum Communist reaction in Latin America. In the case of about six of those governments, unless the heads of government had some intimation, uh, requiring some preparatory steps from the security point of view, uh, one or another of those governments could easi-, uh, could easily be over thrown'97they, Venezuela for example or Guatemala, Bolivia, Chile, possibly even Mexico'97uh, and therefore, uh, uh, the question will arise as to whether we should not somehow, uh, indicate to them in some way the seriousness of the situation so they can take precautionary steps, whether we tell them exactly what we have in mind or, or not. The other is the NATO problem. Um, we, uh, we would estimate that the Soviets, uh, would almost certainly take, uh, some kind of action somewhere. Um, for us to, to take an action of this sort without letting, uh, our closer allies know of a matter which could subject them to very great, uh, danger, uh, is a very, uh, far-reaching decision to make. And, uh, we could find ourselves, uh, isolated and the alliance crumbling, very much as it did for a period during the Suez affair, but at a moment of much greater danger over an issue of much greater danger than the Suez affair, for the alliance. I think that these are matters that we'll be working on very hard this evening, but I think I ought to mention them because it's, uh, necessarily a part of this problem. SPLIT I would not think that they would use a nuclear weapon unless they're prepared to [join?] a nuclear war, I don't think. I just don't s-, don't, don't see that possibility. Bundy?: I agree. SPLIT That would mean that, uh, we could be just utterly wrong, but, uh, we've never really believed that, that Khrushchev would take on a general nuclear war over Cuba. :: emphasized the importance of time, stating that if action was over quickly, the repercussions would not be too serious. Secretary :: Becausean attack would very likely result in Soviet reprisals somewhere'97Turkey, Berlin, etc.'97it is most important that we have as much of the world with us as possible. To start or risk starting a nuclear war is bound to be divisive at best and the judgments of history seldom coincide with the tempers of the moment. If war comes, in the long run our case must rest on stopping while there was still time the Soviet drive to world domination, our obligations under the Inter-American system, etc. We must be prepared for the widespread reaction that if we have a missile base in Turkey and other places around the Soviet Union surely they have a right to one in Cuba. If we attack Cuba, an ally of the USSR, isn't an attack on NATO bases equally justified. One could go on and on. I know your dilemma is to strike before the Cuban sites are operational or to risk waiting until a proper groundwork of justification can be prepared. The national security must come first. But the means adopted have such incalculable consequences that I feel you should have made it clear that the existence of nuclear missile bases anywhere is negotiable 1 before we start anything. Adlai S. Stevenson 2 * 'a0 :: pointed out to the president that action would involve risks. We could expect counter action and the cost may be heavy. The president must expect action in Berlin, Korea and possibly against the United States itself. SPLIT felt a quick strike would minimize the risk of counter action. SPLIT stated that if we enter upon positive action, we can not say for sure what the final Soviet response will be and therefore what the final outcome will be. However he felt that the American people will accept danger and suffering if they are convinced doing so is necessary and that they have a clear conscience. The Secretary reviewed the circumstances surrounding the outbreak of World War I, World War II, and the Korean war. These factors militated in favor of consulting with Khrushchev and depending on the Rio pact. This, he indicated, might have the possibility of prevention of action and settlement by political means. The other course open was the declaration of war. Ambassador :: said that if an effective blockade was established, it was possible that our photographic intelligence would reveal that there were no nuclear warheads in Cuba; hence, none of the missiles now there could be made operational. General :: stated his flat opposition to a surprise air strike, which he felt would ultimately lead to a United States invasion of Cuba. He supported the institution of the blockade and predicted that such action would reduce the chance of Soviet retaliation of a nature which would inevitably escalate. * 'a0 :: said that a blockade would seriously affect the Cuban missile capability in that the Soviets would be unable to deploy to Cuba any missiles in addition to those now there. Under Secretary SPLIT said he hesitated to ask the question but he wondered whether these planes were decoys. He also wondered whether the Russians were trying to entice us into a trap. Secretary SPLIT referred to an air strike as chapter two. He did not think we should initiate such a strike because of the risk of escalating actions leading to general war. He doubted that we should act without consultation of our allies. He said a sudden air strike had no support in the law or morality, and, therefore, must be ruled out. Director McCone acknowledged that we did not know positively that nuclear warheads for the missiles deployed had actually arrived in Cuba. Although we had evidence of the construction of storage places for nuclear weapons, such weapons may not yet have been sent to Cuba. Ambassador :: Mr. President, I would like to make a comment very briefly on . . . [State Department intelligence director] Roger Hilsman'92s group has been watching this thing very closely, of course, trying to . . . Moscow'92s reaction. And there has been, all the way through, an element of caution and [no] freedom of action from Moscow. I'92ll just read the final paragraph [of the State intelligence analysis]: Moscow, in spite of their threatened resistance to U.S. [unclear], has [unclear]. His [Khrushchev'92s] public line seems designed to leave him with some option to back off, if he chooses. Giving the impression of a pure U.S.-Cuban fracas will be hard to maintain once there'92s a U.S.-Soviet incident at sea. On balance we think it probable that Soviets will risk such an incident, in the expectation that the resulting further rise in tension will stimulate pressures on the U.S. to end the quarantine. And here lies the various kinds of compromise proposals. This will gain time for the Soviets to determine whether the U.S. has made a powerful case on the issue of the missiles, and whether the Soviet line that the Communist weapons are defensive can be sus- tained, whether a formula is available whereby the missiles can be withdrawn gracefully, or to risk escalation and the countermeasures that the U.S. [unclear]. SPLIT Can you interpose the Soviet merchant vessel between the sub- marine and yourself? Or does he have torpedoes that can go around and come in from the other side? SPLIT I know. But I mean, suppose that you have air observation, you keep the Soviet ship'97 :: I think we escalate to the'97 } :: The actual removal of these things from Cuba is something to be worked out in the two to three weeks [negotiating period after a veri- fied standstill]. :: Without clearance there, yes. :: And sent out without clearance. :: The Politburo intended this one. :: They might then take some other action in Berlin. SPLIT It builds up, though, on a somewhat different track than the all-out attack track. :: It'92s a very different thing. You could have an undis- ciplined antiaircraft, Cuban antiaircraft outfit, fire. But to have a SAM site, with a Russian crew, fire is not any accident. :: Isn'92t it possible that this . . . You know, the fact that one [low-level reconnaissance] plane was fired on and the others weren'92t. This doesn'92t indicate necessarily that they'92re generally going to fire on our reconnaissance. :: I would say that is in the assumption that if you defuse the Turkish missiles, this saves you from a reprisal. It may mean a reprisal elsewhere. SPLIT It doesn'92t save you from a reprisal. In Berlin or somewhere. SPLIT Then you'92re in a position where you'92ve gotten rid of your mis- siles for nothing. SPLIT But what good does that do you if you get action against Berlin or somewhere else? SPLIT And we don'92t want it. And we'92re talking about a course of action which involves military action with enormous casualties and a great, grave risk of escalation. Now I really don'92t think this is . . . we ought to shift this one. :: Why fire back at some missiles on the ground on the basis that you'92re firing back at the antiaircraft [guns]?",military,bureaucracies_46,bureaucracies
"Mr. President, there are a number of unknowns in this situation I want to comment upon, and, in relation to them, I would like to outline very briefly some possible military alternatives and ask General Taylor to expand upon them. But before commenting on either the unknowns or outlining some military alternatives, there are two propositions I would suggest that we ought to accept as, uh, foundations for our further thinking. My first is that if we are to conduct an air strike against these installations, or against any part of Cuba, we must agree now that we will schedule that prior to the time these missile sites become operational. I'm not prepared to say when that will be, but I think it is extremely important that our talk and our discussion be founded on this premise: that any air strike will be planned to take place prior to the time they become operational. Because, if they become operational before the air strike, I do not believe we can state we can knock them out before they can be launched; and if they're launched there is almost certain to be, uh, chaos in part of the east coast or the area, uh, in a radius of six hundred to a thousand miles from Cuba. Uh, secondly, I, I would submit the proposition that any air strike must be directed not solely against the missile sites, but against the missile sites plus the airfields plus the aircraft which may not be on the airfields but hidden by that time plus all potential nuclear storage sites. Now, this is a fairly extensive air strike. It is not just a strike against the missile sites; and there would be associated with it potential casualties of Cubans, not of U.S. citizens, but potential casualties of Cubans in, at least in the hundreds, more likely in the low thousands, say two or three thousand. It seems to me these two propositions, uh, should underlie our, our discussion. Now, what kinds of military action are we capable of carrying out and what may be some of the consequences? Uh, we could carry out an air strike within a matter of days. We would be ready for the start of such an air strike within, within a matter of days. If it were absolutely essential, it could be done almost literally within a matter of hours. I believe the chiefs would prefer that it be deferred for a matter of days, but we are prepared for that quickly. The air strike could continue for a matter of days following the initial day, if necessary. Uh, presumably there would be some political discussions taking place either just before the air strike or both before and during. In any event, we would be prepared, following the air strike, for an air, invasion, both by air and by sea. Approximately seven days after the start of the air strike, that would be possible if the political environment made it desirable or necessary at that time. [Fine?] Associated with this air strike undoubtedly should be some degree of mobilization. Uh, I would think of the mobilization coming not before the air strike but either concurrently with or somewhat following, say possibly five days afterwards, depending upon the possible invasion requirements. The character of the mobilization would be such that it could be carried out in its first phase at least within the limits of the authority granted by Congress. There might have to be a second phase, and then it would require a declaration of a national emergency. Now, this is very sketchily the military, uh, capabilities, and I think you may wish to hear General Taylor, uh, outline his choice. SPLIT Well, I would strongly emphasize that I think our time should be based on the assumption it is, Dean. We don't know what kinds of communications the Soviets have with those sites. We don't know what kinds of control they have over the warheads. SPLIT If we saw a warhead on the site and we knew that that launcher was capable of launching that warhead, I would '85 . Frankly, I would strongly urge against the air attack, to be quite frank about it, because I think the danger to this country in relation to the gain that would accrue with the excessive [time?]'85 . This is why I suggest that if we're talking about an air attack, I believe we should consider it only on the assumption that we can carry if off before these become operational. SPLIT Well, I think the only way to prevent them coming in, quite frankly, is to say you'll take them out the moment they come in. You'll take them out and you'll carry on open surveillance and you'll have a policy to take them out if they come in. I think it's really rather unrealistic to think that we could carry out an air attack of the kind we're talking about. We're talking about an air attack of several hundred sorties because we don't know where these airplanes are. SPLIT Well, we are, Mac '85 SPLIT '85 because we are fearful of these MIG 21s. We don't know where they are. We don't know what they're capable of. If there are nuclear warheads associated with the launchers, you must assume there will be nuclear warheads associated with aircraft. Even if there are not nuclear warheads associated with aircraft, you must assume that those aircraft have high explosive potential. We have a serious air defense problem. We're not prepared to report to you exactly, uh, what the Cuban air force is capable of; but I think we must assume that the Cuban air force is definitely capable of penetrating, in small numbers, our coastal air defense by coming in low over the water. And I would think that we would not dare go in against the missile sites, knock those out leaving intact Castro's air force, and run the risk that he would use part or all of that air force against our coastal areas'97either with or without nuclear weapons. It would be a, a very heavy price to pay in U.S. lives for the, the damage we did to Cuba. SPLIT Aircraft. SPLIT It's not likely, but it's conceivable the nuclear warheads for these launchers are not yet on Cuban soil. SPLIT No. SPLIT No, but it does possibly indicate a different course of action '85 SPLIT '85 and therefore, while I'm not suggesting how we should handle this, I think this is one of the most important actions we should take: to ascertain the location of the nuclear warheads for these missiles. Later in the discussion we can revert back to this. There are several alternative ways of approaching it. SPLIT I suggest, Mr. President, that if you're involved in several hundred strikes, this is what you would'97and against airfields'97this is what you would do, pre-invade. And, uh, it would be very difficult to convince anybody that this was not a pre-invasion strike. I think also once you get this volume of attack that public opinion reaction, uh, to this, as distinct from the reaction to an invasion, uh, there's [word unintelligible] little difference. And, uh, from both standpoints, it would seem to me that if you're talking about a, a general air attack program, you might as well think about whether we can eradicate the whole problem by an invasion just as simply with as little chance of reaction. SPLIT '85 that, that you have stated we will, we'll act to take out any offensive weapons. In order to be certain as to whether there are or are not offensive weapons, we are scheduling U-2 flights or other surveillance '85 :: Well, isn't there a question whether any of the SAM sites are operational? :: I tried to prove today'97I am, I'm satisfied'97that these were not MRBMs. And I worked long on it. I got our experts out, and I could not find evidence that would support any conclusion other than that they are MRBMs. Now, whether they're eleven-hundred miles, six-hundred mile, nine-hundred mile is still a guess in my opinion. But that they are MRBMs seems the most probable assumption at the moment. SPLIT Yes, Mr. President. Uh, General Taylor has just been with the Chiefs, and the unified commanders went through this, uh, in detail. Uh, to take out only the missiles, uh, or to take out the missiles and the MIG aircraft and the associated nuclear storage facilities if we locate them, uh, could be done in twenty-four-hours' warning. That is to say, twenty-four hours between the time of decision and the time of strike, uh, starting with a decision no later than, no earlier than this coming Friday and with the strike therefore on Saturday, 3 or anytime thereafter with twenty-four hours between the decision and time of strike. Uh, General Taylor will wish to comment on this, but the Chiefs are strong in their recommendation against that kind of an attack, believing that it would leave, uh, too great a capability in Cuba undestroyed. The specific number of sorties required to, to accomplish this end has not been worked out in detail. The capability is for something in excess of seven hundred sorties per day. Uh, it seems highly unlikely that that number would be required to carry out that limited an objective, but at least that capability is available in the air force alone, and the navy sorties would rise on top of that number. The Chiefs have also considered other alternatives extending into the full invasion, uh, you may wish to discuss later. But that's the answer to your first question. SPLIT Well, you can go from the three missile sites to the three missile sites plus the MIGs, to the three missile sites plus MIGs plus nuclear storage plus airfields and so on up through the offensive, potential offensive [words unintelligible] '85 SPLIT Could be done with twenty-four-hours' notice and would require, uh, a relatively small number of sorties, less than a day's air attack, in other words. SPLIT You'd get the launchers '85 SPLIT '85 the launchers and the missiles on the [words unintelligible] '85 SPLIT No, they're simply a mobile launchers, uh, device. SPLIT Mr. President, could I outline three courses '85 JFK?: [Yes?]. SPLIT '85 of action we have considered and speak very briefly on each one? The first is what I would call the political course of action, Because the danger of starting military action after they acquire a nuclear capability is so great I believe we would decide against it, particularly if that nuclear capability included aircraft as well as, as, uh, uh, missiles, as it well might at that point. A second course of action we haven't discussed but lies in between the military course we began discussing a moment ago and the political course of action is a course of action that would involve declaration of open surveillance; a statement that we would immediately impose an, uh, a blockade against offensive weapons entering Cuba in the future; and an indication that with our open-surveillance reconnaissance, which we would plan to maintain indefinitely for the future, we would be prepared to immediately attack the Soviet Union in the event that Cuba made any offensive move against this country '85 SPLIT The Soviet Union. In the event that Cuba made any offensive move against this country. Now this lies short of military action against Cuba, direct military action against Cuba. It has some, some major defects. But the third course of action is any one of these variants of military action directed against Cuba, starting with an air attack against the missiles. The Chiefs are strongly opposed to so limited an air attack. But even so limited an air attack is a very extensive air attack. It's not twenty sorties or fifty sorties or a hundred sorties, but probably several hundred sorties. Uh, we haven't worked out the details. It's very difficult to do so when we lack certain intelligence that we hope to have tomorrow or the next day. But it's a substantial air attack. And to move from that into the more extensive air attacks against the MIGs, against the airfields, against the potential nuclear storage sites, against the radar installations, against the SAM sites means, as, as Max suggested, possibly seven hundred to a thousand sorties per day for five days. This is the very, very rough plan that the Chiefs have outlined, and it is their judgment that that is the type of air attack that should be carried out. To move beyond that into an invasion following the air attack means the application of tens of thousands, between ninety and, and, uh, over a hundred and fifty thousand men to the invasion forces. It seems to me almost certain that any one of these forms of direct military action will lead to a Soviet military response of some type some place in the world. It may well be worth the price. Perhaps we should pay that. But I think we should recognize that possibility, and, moreover, we must recognize it in a variety of ways. We must recognize it by trying to deter it, which means we probably should alert SAC, probably put on an airborne alert, perhaps take other s-, alert measures. These bring risks of their own, associated with them. It means we should recognize that by mobilization. Almost certainly, we should accompany the initial air strike with at least a partial mobilization. We should accompany an, an invasion following an air strike with a large-scale mobilization, a very large-scale mobilization, certainly exceeding the limits of the authority we have from Congress requiring a declaration therefore of a national emergency. We should be prepared, in the event of even a small air strike and certainly in the event of a larger air strike, for the possibility of a Cuban uprising, which would force our hand in some way. Either force u-, us to accept a, a, uh, an unsatisfactory uprising, with all of the adverse comment that result; or would, would force an invasion to support the uprising. SPLIT '85 Cuba. Is a great possibility they can place them in operational condition quickly. Unless, as General Carter said, the system may have a, a normal reaction time, set-up time of six hours. Whether it has six hours or two weeks, we don't know how much time has started, nor do we know what air-launch capabilities they have for warheads. We don't know what air-launch capability they have for high explosives. It's almost certainly, uh, a, a substantial high-explosive capability in the sense that they could drop one or two or ten high-explosive bombs some place along the East Coast. And that's the minimum risk to this country we run as a result of advance warning, too. SPLIT Mac, I asked the Chiefs that this afternoon, in effect. And they said, substantially. My own personal view is, not at all. SPLIT And, and I think this is an important element here. But it's all very '85 SPLIT That's what they said themselves '85 SPLIT '85 in TASS statement. SPLIT And they can also be readied, perhaps, between the time we, in effect, say we're going to come in and the time we do come in. This, this is a very, very great danger to this, this coast. I don't know exactly how to appraise it because '85 SPLIT '85 of the readiness period, but it is possible that these are field missiles, and then in that case they can be readied very promptly if they choose to do so. SPLIT I believe so, yes, if you're going to strike. I think before you make any announcements, you should decide whether you're going to strike. If you are going to strike, you shouldn't make an announcement. SPLIT [The main fact?], to answer the question you asked, we don't have to decide how we're gonna do it. All we have to decide is if we want '85 SPLIT Mission folders have already been prepared on all the known targets. The problem is that we don't have the unknown targets, specifically these, these, uh, missile-launchers and the nuclear storage, and we won't have that until tomorrow night at the earliest, and it'll be processed photographically on Thursday, interpreted Thursday night, turned into target folders on Friday, and the mission could go Saturday. This is Sweeney's estimate of the earliest possible time for a spare strike against the missiles. Decision by the President on Friday, strike on Saturday. As General Taylor pointed out, if, if we could have either another day of preparation, which means no strike till Saturday, or al-, and/or alternatively '85 SPLIT '85 but I think we ought to estimate the minimum number of sorties. Since you've indicated some interest in that possibility, we ought to provide you that option. We haven't done this. SPLIT But that's an easy job to do. The second thing we ought to do, it seems to me as a government, is to consider the consequences. I don't believe we have considered the consequences '85 SPLIT '85 of any of these actions satisfactorily, and because we haven't considered the consequences, I'm not sure we're taking all the action we ought to take now to minimize those. I, I don't know quite what kind of a world we live in after we've struck Cuba, and we, we've started it. We've put let's say a hundred sorties in, just for purposes of illustration, I don't think you dare start with less than a hundred. You have, you have, uh, uh, twenty-four objects. Well, you have twenty-four, you have twenty-four, uh, laun-, uh, vehicles, plus, uh, sixteen launchers, plus a possible nuclear storage site, but there's the absolute minimum that you would wish to kill. And you couldn't possibly go in after those with less than, I would think, uh, fifty to a hundred sorties. SPLIT And you'll miss some. That's right. Now after we've launched fifty to a hundred sorties, what kind of a world do we live in? How, how do we stop at that point? I don't know the answer to this. I think tonight State and we ought to work on the consequences of any one of these courses of actions, consequences which I don't believe are entirely clear '85 SPLIT '85 to any of us. SPLIT At any place in the world, George. That's right. I agree with you. SPLIT This is why I say I, I think we have to think of the consequences here. I, I would think an, a forced invasion, uh, associated with assisting an uprising, following an extensive air strike, is, is a highly probable set of circumstances. I don't know whether you could carry out an extensive air strike of, let's say, the kind we were talking about a moment ago'97seven hundred sorties a day for five days'97without an uprising in Cuba. I, I just don't '85 SPLIT Well, when you're talking about military targets, we have seven hundred targets here we're talking about. It, this is a very '85 SPLIT '85 radar, radar sites, uh, SAM sites, and so on. But whether it's seven hundred or two hundred, uh, and it's at least two hundred, I think '85 SPLIT It's at least two hundred. You can't carry that out without the danger of an uprising. SPLIT You have to put a blockade in following any '85 SPLIT '85 limited action. SPLIT Mr. President, this is why I think tonight we ought to put on paper the alternative plans and the probable, possible consequences thereof in a way that State and Defense could agree on, even if we, uh, disagree and put in both views. Because the consequences of these actions have not been thought through clearly. The one that the Attorney General just mentioned is illustrative of that. SPLIT No, sir, I believe that the military planning has been carried on for a considerable period of time, is well under way. And I believe that all the preparations that we could take without the risk of preparations causing discussion and knowledge of this, either among our public or in Cuba, have been taken and are authorized; all the necessary reconnaissance measures are being taken and are authorized. The only thing we haven't done, really, is to consider fully these alternatives. SPLIT Yes. SPLIT That's exactly right. SPLIT We ought to work on that tonight. SPLIT '85 I would suggest that we, uh, divide the, the, uh, series of targets up by, in effect, numbers of DGZs and, uh, and, uh, numbers of sorties required to take those out for a series of alternatives starting only with the missiles and working up through the nuclear storage sites and the MIGs and the, er, and the SAMs and so on. So we can say, This target system would take so many points, eighty points and so many objects would take so many sorties to knock out. The, the'85 . Not because I think that these are reasonable alternatives '85 SPLIT '85 but they give an order [words unintelligible] to the President to get some idea of this. And this we can do, and this can be done very easily. But the most important thing we need to do is this appraisal of the world after any one of these situations '85 SPLIT Could I suggest that tonight we actually draft a paper and it start this way'97just a paragraph or two of, of the knowns. Uh, we have to'85 . The knowns are that the SAMs that are here. Let's say the, the probable knowns, because we're not certain of any of them. The probabilities are the SAM system isn't working today. This is important. The probabilities are that these missiles are not operational today. The probabilities are that they won't be operational in less than X days, although we can't be certain. Pat said two weeks. I'm not so sure I'd put it that far. But I'85 . There's just two or three of these knowns. I would put in there, by the way '85 SPLIT Uh, they're unprotected. Another known I'd put in is that they have about fifty X, uh, MIGs,-15,-17 and-19s; that they have certain crated, uh, I've forgotten, say, ten, er, X crated MIG-21s, only one of which we believe to have been assembled. They have X crated IL-28s, none of which we believe to have been assembled. These, this is, in a sense, the problem we, we face there. SPLIT '85 statement I think. But then I would follow that by the, the alternatives of, not all of them but the more likely alternatives that we consider open to us. SPLIT '85 I, let me answer Mac's question first. How do we know we've got them? We will have photo recon [militarily?] with the strike. Sweeney specifically plans this, and '85 SPLIT Terrible risk to put them in there, uh'85 . SPLIT I think the risk troubles me, it's too great in relation to the risk of not knowing whether we get them. SPLIT But, in any case, this is a small variant of one '85 SPLIT '85 of the plans. SPLIT It seems to me that there are some major alternatives here that I don't think we discussed them fully enough today, and I'd like to see them laid on the paper, if State agrees. The first is what I, I still call it the political approach. Uh, let me say it's a nonmilitary action. SPLIT Now, the second alternative, I, I'd like to discuss just a second, because we haven't discussed it fully today, and I alluded it to, to it a moment ago. I, I, I'll be quite frank. I don't think there is a military problem here. This is my answer to Mac's question '85 SPLIT '85 and therefore, and I've gone through this today, and I asked myself, Well, what is it then if it isn't a military problem? Well, it's just exactly this problem, that, that, uh, if Cuba should possess a capacity to carry out offensive actions against the U.S., the U.S. would act. SPLIT '85 the act. Now, how do we pre-, act to prevent their use? Well, first place, we carry out open surveillance, so we know what they're doing. All times. Twenty-four hours a day from now and forever, in a sense indefinitely. What else do we do? We prevent any further offensive weapons coming in. In other words we blockade offensive weapons. SPLIT We search every ship. SPLIT Well, we have a blockade. Search and, uh, removal of, of offensive weapons entering Cuba. Uh, [word unintelligible] again, I don't want to argue for this '85 SPLIT '85 you have to divide category three into subcategories by intensity and probable effect on the world thereafter. And I think there is, at least in the sense of the Cuban uprising, which I happen to believe is a most important element of category three, it applies to some elements in categ-, some categories of category three, but not all. But, in any event, what, what kind of a world do we live in? In Cuba what action do we take? What do we expect Castro will be doing after, uh, you attack these missiles? Does he survive as a, as a political leader? Is he overthrown? Uh, is he stronger, weaker? Uh, how will he react? How will the Soviets react? What can'85 . How, how could Khrushchev afford to accept this action without some kind of rebuttal? I don't think, he can't accept it without some rebuttal. It may not be a substantial rebuttal, but it's, gonna have to be some. Where? How do we react in relation to it? What happens when we do mobilize? How does this affect our allies' support of us in relation to Berlin? Well, you know far better than I the problems, uh, but it would seem to me if we could lay this out tonight and then meet at a reasonable time in the morning to go over a tentative draft, discuss it, and then have another draft for some time in the afternoon '85 * 'a0 :: made the point that missiles in Cuba had no great military consequence because of the stalemate mentioned in my October 18th memorandum. General SPLIT took issue claiming that the military equation would not be changed by the appearance of these missiles. Dean SPLIT raised innumerable questions concerning military operations; the manner in which the strike could be properly covered with protective air and how it might be restricted and also the advisability of case one, as contrasted with case one, two and/or three. General :: at this point presented the alternatives referred to the previous day, stating that alternatives one and two were not conclusive and that we would have to resort to alternative 3 and in fact this would lead us ultimately into an invasion. 5 General SPLIT discussed in some detail the effects of a strike indicating that we could expect several hundred Soviet citizens to be killed; he pointed out that all of the SAM sites were manned exclusively by Soviets and a great many Soviet technicians were working on the MRBMs and at the air fields. At this point SPLIT seemed to be reconsidering his prior position of advocating military action and laid special emphasis on the fact that the price of Soviet retaliation, whether in Berlin or elsewhere, would be very high and we would not be able to control it. :: saw the choice as involving the use of limited force or of unlimited force. He was prepared to face the prospect of an air strike against Cuba later, but he opposed the initial use of all-out military force such as a surprise air attack. He defined a blockade as being the application of the limited use of force and doubted that such limited use could be combined with an air strike. General :: described his view as the '93blockade route.'94 This route is aimed at preventing any addition to the strategic missiles already deployed to Cuba and eventually to eliminate these missiles. He said to do this we should institute a blockade of Cuba and be prepared to take armed action in specified instances. Secretary SPLIT concluded by explaining that following the blockade, the United States would negotiate for the removal of the strategic missiles from Cuba. He said we would have to be prepared to accept the withdrawal of United States strategic missiles from Turkey and Italy and possibly agreement to limit our use of Guantanamo to a specified limited time. He added that we could obtain the removal of the missiles from Cuba only if we were prepared to offer something in return during negotiations. He opposed as too risky the suggestion that we should issue an ultimatum to the effect that we would order an air attack on Cuba if the missiles were not removed. Secretary SPLIT pointed out that SNIE 11-19-62, dated October 20, 1962, 4 estimates that the Russians will not use force to push their ships through our blockade. Secretary SPLIT listed the disadvantages of the blockade route as follows: 1. It would take a long time to achieve the objective of eliminating strategic missiles from Cuba. 2. It would result in serious political trouble in the United States. 3. The world position of the United States might appear to be weakening. The advantages which Secretary SPLIT cited are: 1. It would cause us the least trouble with our allies. 2. It avoids any surprise air attack on Cuba, which is contrary to our tradition. 3. It is the only military course of action compatible with our position as a leader of the free world. 4. It avoids a sudden military move which might provoke a response from the USSR which could result in escalating actions leading to general war. The SPLIT stated that if we knew that a plane was flying nuclear warheads to Cuba, we should immediately shoot it down. Parenthetically, he pointed out there are now 6000 to 8000 Soviet personnel in Cuba. Mr. SPLIT cautioned that an air strike would not destroy all the missiles and launchers in Cuba, and, at best, we could knock out two-thirds of these missiles. Those missiles not destroyed could be fired from mobile launchers not destroyed. General SPLIT stated his strong doubt that these planes were decoys. Director McCone added that the Russians would not have sent one hundred shiploads of equipment to Cuba solely to play a '93trick'94. General SPLIT noted that the air strike planned by the Joint Chiefs involved 800 sorties. Such a strike would result in several thousand Russians being killed, chaos in Cuba, and efforts to overthrow the Castro government. In his view the probability was high that an air strike would lead inevitably to an invasion. He doubted that the Soviets would take an air strike on Cuba without resorting to a very major response. In such an event, the United States would lose control of the situation which could escalate to general war. The :: stated that following the start of an air attack, the initial units of the landing force could invade Cuba within 7 days. 3. The SPLIT reported that, based on information which became available during the night, it now appears that there is equipment in Cuba for approximately 40 MRBM or IRBM launchers. The location of the sites for 36 of these launchers is known. 32 of the 36 known sites appear to have sufficient equipment on them to be included in any air strike directed against Cuba's missile capability. 4. :: stated his view that in order to achieve such a result we would have to invade Cuba. The :: reported that the Defense Department was working on how we would prevent the introduction into Cuba of nuclear weapons by airplanes. He said some planes could fly non-stop from the Soviet Union if refueled en route. Present arrangements provided that we would be informed of any plane flying to Cuba and we would then decide what action to take against it. The :: Well, I think so. And we would like to have the first ship either turned around or stopped and found to have offensive weapons, one or the other. SPLIT Well, I doubt that they'92ve turned around yet. We have no indication they have, which will be checked today. But it would seem to me it'92s likely they'92ll turn around when they'92re halted'97or requested to halt'97in which case our first intercept has been successful. If they don'92t turn around, and we search and find offensive weapons on board, it'92s successful. What we wish to avoid is intercepting one of the other ships that may not have offensive weapons on it. SPLIT Well, it'92s not so much that it'92s burdensome as it is uncer- tain. And we think that the best way to handle it is through the SAC report. SPLIT We would launch it on information received from the airplane. SPLIT The next contingency is an air intercept. We don'92t know, and we'92re not prepared to recommend to you action relating to air inter- cept. We will maintain, with the help of CIA and our own resources, the careful watch on the movement of Soviet aircraft to Cuba. We'92ll inform you immediately upon receiving any information indicating such aircraft is moving in there. The Navy and the Joint Chiefs are considering how we might intercept and what the rules of engagement will be, and we will be prepared to talk about that later. You asked about the aircraft on alert against the nine missile sites. They are on alert. They will be prepared to move against those sites. We do believe we should have warning the night before, in preparation for a dawn strike, however. In an emergency, it could be done with less warn- ing, but we would recommend against it, except in an emergency. SPLIT The next subject: invasion preparations and the action we'92re taking to be prepared for an invasion. SPLIT Well, we don'92t know where the tenth is. We looked very carefully last night for it. SPLIT This is the part we have to handle very precisely. It is very dangerous, and I don'92t think that we ought to stay over that terri- tory any longer than . . . SPLIT I think they know we know, Bobby. They'97 SPLIT Well, the one we don'92t know about is'97at the moment we think'97not started. It looks as though the crew that will construct the tenth site is working on the ninth. SPLIT We can stay away from . . . SPLIT It'92s terribly dangerous. SPLIT . . . contingencies and reactions thereto. SPLIT Yeah, I think we need one from [unclear], one member from the Joint Staff plus Paul Nitze. SPLIT So, you can count on that. Max is [unclear]. :: Isn'92t there one problem in this, and that is that they might come back in reply, saying: '93We will not send our ships in. But we would expect from you comparable observance in the criterion you'92ve set, and you won'92t attack anything in Cuba or extend the blockade.'94 In other words, set up a situation in which they freeze the status quo with the missiles there. :: I think there'92s some problem with submarines, Mr. President. If there are submarines in the area or are moving in the area, we ought to board it, and inspect it, and get out of there if necessary, towing the ship or leaving the ship there. If the [Soviet] submarines are really moving in, we have some serious problems. This is one of the diffi- culties we face here. [Chief of Naval Operations] Admiral [George] Anderson is somewhat concerned about the possibility that they'92ll try to sink one of our major vessels, such as a [aircraft] carrier. :: . . . from Cuba, or the possibility of using nuclear weapons, [unclear] casualties [unclear] defense. [Unclear] miles from Cuba they are somewhat . . . if it'92s limited to conventional weapons, I'92m not sure I'92d [unclear]. The local civil defense organizations have been preparing for that kind of event through the years. And most of our efforts in the last years have been to redirect their attention to the problems of nuclear warfare, and Florida is particularly strong in civil defense. They have more train- ing than anyplace in the country and more organization, especially work training police and firefighting, mass casualty care, and so on. They'92re imperfect, but there'92s something there in the cities and in the rural areas. If nuclear weapons are used, we can draw an arc and try and assess the civil defense capabilities at [a possible missile strike radius of] around 1,100 nautical miles [from Cuba], and make a little allowance for [radioactive] fallout on the outer fringe. That takes in 92 million people [in the United States], 58 cities of over 100,000 population. A light, rel- atively light, nuclear attack of this type, we would lower the protection factors we'92d use in deciding whether existing buildings would serve as adequate protection [against blast, heat, and direct exposure to radiation from the nuclear detonation]. We'92d be going against, going down to a 40 protection factor. We now set a limit of a 100 protection factor. That would be [buildings that are] cutting the radiation by 40 times instead of a 100 times. To do this, we'92d have the information in hand, and in the hands of local civil-defense directors of states, in buildings that will take care of 40 million people of the 92 million in this area. The spaces now are stocked, and in the process of being stocked, for the 100-protection fac- tor or above. But sometimes it'92s bound to be a lower-protection-factor space. The [unclear] spaces had intended to be stocked by now. But, in fact, we can do a little accelerated [unclear].46 SPLIT Well, if we knew that there would be no nuclear response, it might make some sense. If there will be fallout, the only protection that exists today is in the cities, and there'92s little or no protection in the rural areas. :: I think it would be extremely dangerous, Mr. President, to try to defer attack on this submarine in the situation we'92re in. We could easily lose an American ship by that means. The range of our sonar in relation to the range of his torpedo, and the inaccuracy, as you well know, of antisubmarine warfare is such that I don'92t have any'97 SPLIT '97great confidence that we can push him away from our ships and make the intercept securely. Particularly, I don'92t have confi- dence we could do that if we restrict the commander on the site in any way. I'92ve looked into this in great detail last night because of your inter- est in the question. SPLIT What the plan is, Dean, is to send antisubmarine heli- copters out to harass the submarine. And they have weapons and devices that can damage the submarine. And the plan, therefore, is to put pres- sure on the submarine, move it out of the area by that pressure, by the pressure of potential destruction, and then make the intercept. But this is only a plan and there are many, many uncertainties. :: Or, alternatively, we could go further than the barrier on Friday daylight and intercept it. But that'92s the only Soviet ship moving in at the moment that we think is attractive. There are some other actions I think we can take that relate to this, however, Mr. President, that I'92d like to mention now. I believe that we should establish a low-level surveillance pattern that is consistent with an air attack. There is much evidence that the Soviets have instructed the Cubans to act very cautiously. I'92d like to run down that because it relates to this low-level surveillance and possible further escalation of our military force. It appears that they'92ve given instructions to Cuban MiGs not to fire on U.S. aircraft. And more than that, it appears that, in a separate instruction, they gave orders to Cuban MiGs not to take off from the air- fields. I'92m not certain of this, but there'92s some evidence to believe that. It'92s quite clear they have camouflaged the SAM sites, surface-to-air missile sites, thereby reducing their readiness, because they have to pull these covers off in order to fire effectively. SPLIT If the photographs demonstrate '97 SPLIT Exactly. SPLIT . . . and therefore, I think that we can conduct low-level surveillance with very little risk of an incident that we did not wish to incite ourselves. SPLIT Two advantages. Three advantages, really. One, it will give us some intelligence we can use, benefit from. Two, it will establish a pattern of operation that is consistent with an attack, and cannot be differentiated from an attack, and therefore reduces the warning of an attack, and may make it possible to attack with lesser forces because we reduced the warning. And this, I think, is an extremely important point we can discuss later. And three, it demonstrates to the public and the world that we are not only interested in stopping the flow of offensive weapons to Cuba, but also definitely have as our objective the removal of the weapons that are there. Why are we justified in conducting low-level surveillance under these circumstances? We'92re justified doing so because there'92s evidence that the Soviets are camouflaging their sites. There is tremendous evi- dence of this. You can see the camouflage nets drying on the ground. It'92s been raining and it'92s wet and they'92re drying them out. They'92re under instructions to camouflage immediately. And they'92ll camouflage not just the weapons, but various buildings, trucks'97 SPLIT I beg your pardon, Ros. Exactly the nuclear storage areas, which they are working on with great speed and effort. I think we can do this safely. I think it will give us valuable informa- tion that we would need and benefit from if we subsequently decide to carry out an attack. And I think it will establish a pattern of operations consistent with an attack, and therefore it will camouflage an attack. SPLIT '97the missile sites. This as a prelude to a possible subse- quent attack on those sites. There is some possibility that we'92re moving to the position now, where we could attack those missiles and have a fair chance of destroy- ing them with very few aircraft. I don'92t wish to emphasize this. Well, this is exactly the kind of situation we visualized and hoped we could move to here. And I say there'92s a possibility of that because '97and Max doesn'92t completely agree with me on this yet with certainty'97but you have to watch the situation develop hour by hour. If we get this low-level surveillance in here, we can have interpreta- tion of it within three to four hours, I hope, from now. And if it shows that every single missile site is eight hours from launch, which the pic- tures I looked at this morning indicated, then we have very little risk of going in within that eight-hour period. And, secondly, if at the same time that that condition exists, all the Cuban forces, to the best of our knowledge, are under orders not to attack, we know at the very least there will be confusion if we come over there with a few aircraft and shoot it up. And thirdly, if we have been going in with low-level surveillance for a day or two and that'92s the pattern of our operation, we send in the same number of ships, but now they'92re armed instead of unarmed. And if the Security Council has turned down by veto our proposal'97 that we send in U.N. inspectors'97this might set up the circumstances in which we can go in and take those missiles out. SPLIT Possibly, Bobby, I don'92t know. SPLIT I'92d like to assume that that'92s the case. I think our prob- lem of the minute is to look ahead at least 24 hours here. For the minute, let'92s make these assumptions, that: (a) The Security Council does not accept our proposal or the United Nations does not; (b) That we have no Soviet ship to intercept tomorrow, or that if we do intercept one it carries no prohibited weapons and submits to what- ever action we apply to it; (c) That the development of offensive missiles continues in Cuba, and we have evidence of that today from our low-level surveillance. What do we do? :: Nor am I. I don'92t believe . . . There are alternative courses. Let me go to another subject then. We conducted daylight surveillance yesterday with approximately ten aircraft of missile sites and the IL-28 airfield. There'92s no question but what'97construction work is con- tinuing. We can measure it. And we can show it. SPLIT I think you might like to hear General Taylor'92s com- ments on the Chiefs'92 views, and then I'92d like to make some comments. :: What would be the reaction if the Soviet Union was to reply that they were going to maintain three atomic [missile] submarines off the United States coast? SPLIT I think there are alternatives. One of them is to plan that we'92re going to make this 500 sorties which I think is going to result in an attack by them someplace, even if you do this about Turkey. In some- place or other. The other alternative is to make the blockade total [including POL and everything else], and live with the missiles. They'92re not going to let you conduct reconnaissance over them. You'92re going to have planes that are shot down. [Unclear], same as the 500 attack. SPLIT I think you'92ve just got to take out that SAM site. You can'92t continue surveillance. :: Mr. President, may I say in relation to that, I think that if we haven'92t announced already, and I know we haven'92t, we shouldn'92t do it now. One of our afternoon [low-level reconnaissance] aircraft was hit by a 37-millimeter shell. It'92s coming back. It'92s all right but it simply indi- cates that there'92s quite a change in the character of the orders given to the Cuban defenders. I don'92t think we ought to confuse the issue by issu- ing a White House'97 SPLIT Well, the military plan now is very clear. A limited strike is out. We can'92t go on a limited strike without the reconnaissance aircraft. So the military plan now is basically invasion, because we'92ve set a large strike to lead to invasion. We might try a large strike without starting the invasion, or without any plan to get started with the inva- sion at the time of the strike, because we can'92t carry it out anyhow for a period of x days. So we have time to cancel invasion plans. But they should be put on. We should start the strike; call up the reserves. We need the air units for the invasion in any case. We need the army units in reserve and our strategic reserve in relation to actions elsewhere in the world. But we shouldn'92t start this until we do two things: One, until we minimize the Soviet response against NATO, and there is a possible way to do that. And two, until we know how we are going to respond to a Soviet response against NATO. I would suggest that to minimize the Soviet response against NATO following a U.S. attack on Cuba, we get those Jupiters out of Turkey before the Cuban attack. I say out of Turkey; I mean inoperable. And let the Soviets know that before the Cuban attack. Now, on that basis, I don'92t believe the Soviets would strike Turkey. They might take other actions but I don'92t think they'92d take that action. Then we have'97 SPLIT They might. SPLIT I am not prepared at this moment to recommend air attacks on Cuba. I'92m just saying that I think we must now begin to look at it more realistically than we have before. SPLIT Mr. President, I wonder if we should not take certain actions with respect to the Jupiters in Turkey and Italy before we act in Cuba. And if we decided to take that action with respect to the Jupiters in Turkey and Italy before we acted in Cuba, then we could tell NATO that, at the time we talked to them about this proposal from Khrushchev and our response to it. If we act in Cuba, the only way we can act now is with a full attack. I don'92t think we can take any of these limited attacks when they are shoot- ing at our reconnaissance aircraft because we would'97we would not dare go in with the kind of limited attack that we'92ve been thinking about the last 24 hours without taking out their SAM sites. The moment we take out the SAM sites and the MiG airfields we'92re up to the 500-sortie program. If we send 500 sorties in against Cuba we must be prepared to follow up with an invasion in about seven days. If we start out on that kind of a program, it seems to me that the Soviets are very likely to feel forced to reply with military action someplace, par- ticularly if these missiles'97Jupiter missiles'97are still in Turkey. We might be able to either shift the area in which they would apply their military force, or give them no excuse to apply military force, by taking out the Turkish Jupiters and the Italian Jupiters before we attack Cuba. One way to take them out would be to simply develop a program with bilateral negotiations between Turkey, Italy, and the U.S. saying that we are today defusing the Jupiters in those two countries and replacing them with Polaris submarines stationed off the shores of those nations to carry the same targets the Jupiters were directed to, in order to reduce the risk to those two nations but maintain the full defense of NATO. Now, if we were willing to undertake . . . In the first place, I think that kind of action is desirable prior to an invasion of Cuba. In the sec- ond place, if we are willing to decide to do that, we'92re in a much better position to present this whole thing to NATO. SPLIT Before we attack Cuba I think we'92ve got to decide how we'92ll respond to Soviet military pressure on NATO. And I'92m not pre- pared to answer that question. SPLIT Well, I don'92t know. What we'92d do would be to work this out with Turkey first, then we announce it to the world, and then say to the Soviets '93Now we accept, well yeah, now we accept your deal of last night [only trading for a pledge not to invade Cuba].'94 SPLIT Yes, exactly. And this, this relates to the timing. I think we can defer an air attack on Cuba until Wednesday [October 31] or Thursday [November 1] but only if we continue our surveillance, and fire against anything that fires against a surveillance aircraft, and only if we maintain a tight blockade in this interim period. If we'92re will- ing to do those two things, I think we can defer the air attack until Wednesday or Thursday and take time to go to NATO. SPLIT How do we interpret this? I don'92t know how to interpret it. SPLIT This is exactly the problem. I don'92t think we can. SPLIT No, it'92s too late. This is why it gets into tomorrow, and I . . . Without thinking about retaliation today, what are we going to do if we want to defer the air attack until Wednesday or Thursday, given the situation? SPLIT And if we'92re going to reconnaissance, carry out surveil- lance each day, we must be prepared to fire each day. SPLIT I think we can forget the U-2 for the moment. SPLIT Yeah. We can carry out low-altitude surveillance tomor- row, take out this SAM site, and take out more SAM sites tomorrow and MiG aircraft if the low-altitude '97 SPLIT I think . . . well I think I'92d say it was shot down. Because the probabilities are that it was shot down, and we want an excuse to go in tomorrow and shoot up that SAM site and send in around'97 SPLIT Well, it might have had mechanical failure problems. Alexis SPLIT Let me start my proposition over again. We must be in a position to attack quickly. We'92ve been fired on today. We'92re going to send surveillance aircraft in tomorrow. Those are going to be fired on without question. We'92re going to respond. You can'92t do this very long. We'92re going to lose airplanes. We'92ll be shooting up Cuba bit by bit, but we'92re going to lose airplanes every day. You just can'92t maintain this position very long. So we must be prepared to attack Cuba quickly. That'92s the first proposition. Now, the second proposition. When we attack Cuba, we are going to have to attack with an all-out attack, and that means 500 sorties at a minimum the first day, and it means sorties every day thereafter, and I personally believe that this is almost certain to lead to an invasion. I won'92t say certain to, but almost certain to, lead to an invasion. SPLIT That'92s the second proposition. SPLIT The third proposition is that if we do this and leave those missiles in Turkey, the Soviet Union may, and I think probably will, attack the Turkish missiles. Now the fourth proposition is, if the Soviet Union attacks the Turkish missiles, we must respond. We cannot allow a Soviet attack on the Jupiter missiles in Turkey without a military response by NATO. SPLIT Why don'92t I get through. Then let'92s go back and attack each one of my propositions. Now, the minimum military response by NATO to a Soviet attack on the Turkish Jupiter missiles would be a response with conventional weapons by NATO forces in Turkey. That is to say, Turkish and U.S. air- craft against Soviet warships and/or naval bases in the Black Sea area. Now that to me is the absolute minimum. And I would say that it is damn dangerous to have had a Soviet attack on Turkey and a NATO response on the Soviet Union. This is extremely dangerous. Now, I'92m not sure we can avoid anything like that if we attack Cuba. But I think we should make every effort to avoid it. And one way to avoid it is to defuse the Turkish missiles before we attack Cuba. Now, this is the sequence of thought. SPLIT Oh'97 SPLIT No, no! [Other voices raised.] SPLIT Well, wait a minute. Now, I didn'92t say it saves you from a reprisal. I simply said it reduces the chances of military action against Turkey. SPLIT Well in the meantime . . . Wait a minute, you have to go back to my proposition and say: '93If there aren'92t Jupiter missiles in Turkey to attack, they'92re going to apply military force elsewhere.'94 I'92m not at all certain of that. SPLIT Well, why don'92t we look at two courses of action? SPLIT Well let'92s wait. Don'92t have to worry . . . eating is the least of my worries. We probably ought to think about the course of action in the next two or three days. What alternatives we have here. Max is going back to work out the surveillance plan for tomorrow with the Chiefs, as to how much cover we need and so on. But we'92re just going to get shot up, sure as hell. There'92s just no question about it. Then we'92re going to have to go in and shoot. Now we can carry this on, I would think, a couple of days, maybe three days, possibly four, but we'92re going to lose planes. We had eight [low-level reconnaissance] planes that went out today. Two aborted for mechanical reasons. Two went through safely and returned, and four ran into fire'97 :: I think that the point is, that if our planes are fired on tomorrow, we ought to fire back. That'92s what I'92d have the [unclear], we fire back at the best indication of the antiaircraft sites that we have, [which] is around the missile sites'97 SPLIT You can'92t just throw more of what we'92re now doing, because . . . And then we need to have two things ready: A government for Cuba, because we'92re going to need one after we go in with bomber aircraft. And, secondly, plans for how to respond to the Soviet Union in Europe because sure as hell they'92re going to do something there. }",military,bureaucracies_47,bureaucracies
"Nothing on the additional film, sir. We have a much better read-out on what we had initially. There's good evidence of their back-up missiles for each of the four launchers at each of the three sites, so that there would be twice the number for a total of eight which could eventually be erected. This would mean a capability of from sixteen or possibly twenty-four missiles. We feel, on the basis of information that we presently have, that these are solid propellant, inertial guidance missiles with eleven-hundred-mile range rather than the oxygen propellant, uh, radar-controlled. Primarily because we have no indication of any radar or any indication of any oxygen equipment. And it would appear to be logical from an intelligence estimate viewpoint that if they are going to this much trouble that they would go ahead and put in the eleven hundred miles because of the tremendously increased threat coverage. Let me see that [words unintelligible]. 1 SPLIT It would appear that with this type of missile, with the solid propellant and inertial guidance system, that they could well be operational within two weeks as we look at the pictures now. And once operational, uh, they could fire on very little notice. They'll have a refire rate of from four to six hours over each launcher. SPLIT Uh, they're vulnerable. They're not nearly as vulnerable as the oxygen propellant, but they are vulnerable to ordinary rifle fire. We have no evidence whatsoever of any nuclear warhead storage near the field launchers. However, ever since last February we have been observing an unusual facility which now has automatic anti-aircraft weapon protection. This is at [Bahu?]. There are some similarities, but also many points of dissim-, similarity between this particular facility and the national storage sites in the Soviet Union. It's the best candidate for a site, and we have that marked for further surveillance. However, there is really totally inadequate evidence to say that there is a nuclear storage capability now. These are field-type launchers. They have mobile support, erection and check-out equipment. And they have a four-in-line deployment pattern in launchers which is identical'97complexes about five miles apart'97representative of the deployments that we note in the Soviet Union for similar missiles. SPLIT Well, our people estimate that these could be fully operational within two weeks. Uh, this would be the total complex. If they're the oxygen type, uh, we have no'85 . It would be considerably longer since we don't have any indication of, uh, oxygen refueling there nor any radars. SPLIT [Well, or No?], one of 'em, uh, one of them could be operational much sooner. Our people feel that this has been, being put in since probably early September. We have had two visits of a Soviet ship that has an eight-foot-hold capacity sideways. And this about, so far, is the only delivery vehicle that we would have any suspicion that they came in on. And that came in late August, and one in early September. [Uh'85 .] SPLIT This is a field-type missile, and from collateral evidence, not direct, that we have with the Soviet Union, it's designed to be fielded, placed and fired in six hours. Uh, it would appear that we have caught this in a very early stage of deployment. It would also appear that there does not seem to be the degree of urgency in getting them immediately into position. This could be because they have not been surveyed. Or it could be because it is the shorter-range missile and the radars and the oxygen has not yet arrived. SPLIT No, there's no question in our minds at all. These are '85 SPLIT No, we've seen'85 . In the picture there is an actual missile. SPLIT Yes. There's no question in our mind, sir. And they are genuine. They are not, uh, a camouflage or covert attempt to fool us. SPLIT Well '85 SPLIT Only that from the read-out that we have now and in the judgment of our analysts and of the guided missile and astronautics committee, which has been convening all afternoon, these signatures are identical with those that we have clearly earmarked in the Soviet Union, and have fully verified. SPLIT We, uh, know something from the range firings that we have vetted for the past two years. And we know also from comparison with the characteristics of our own missiles as to size and length and diameter. Uh, as to these particular missiles, we have a family of Soviet missiles for which we have all accepted the, uh, specifications. SPLIT This is '85 SPLIT Well, we know from a number of sources, including our Ironbark sources, as well as from range firings, which we have been vetting for several years, as to the capabilities. But, uh, I would have to get the analysts in here to give you the play-by-play account. SPLIT Fifteen miles? No, we certainly don't. SPLIT Mr. McCone. SPLIT The reason our estimators didn't think that they'd put them in there because of '85 SPLIT But then, going behind that '85 SPLIT Doesn't prove anything. That was what the estimators felt, and that the Soviets would not take the risk. Mr. McCone's reasoning, however, was if this is so, then what possible reason have they got for going into Cuba in the manner in which they are with surface-to-air, uh, missiles and cruise-type missiles. He just couldn't understand while their, why the Soviets were so heavily bol-, bolstering Cuba's defensive posture. There must be something behind it, which led him then to the belief that they must be coming in with MRBMs. SPLIT These are field missiles, sir. They are mobile-support-type missiles. :: Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President) Ambassador SPLIT felt that a complex of MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba would have very important military significance. SPLIT gave an intelligence estimate on the effects of a blockade, indicating its seriousness would depend upon how '93hard'94 a blockade it turned out to be, and finally stated that the main objective of taking Cuba away from Castro had been lost and we have been overly consumed with the missile problem. :: The Cuban Situation 1. The establishment of medium range strike capability in Cuba by the Soviets was predicted by me in at least a dozen reports since the Soviet buildup was noted in early August. 2. Purposes are to: (a) Provide Cuba with an offensive or retaliatory power for use if attacked. (b) Enhance Soviet strike capability against the United States. 3. The MRBM capability we have witnessed will expand and the defensive establishments to protect this capability likewise will be expanded. There appears to me to be no other explanation for the extensive and elaborate air defense establishment. 4. In my opinion the missiles are Soviet, they will remain under Soviet operational control as do ours, they will be equipped with nuclear warheads under Soviet control (because conventional warheads would be absolutely ineffective), Cubans will supply most of the manpower needs with the Soviets permanently exercising operational command and control. Nevertheless, there will be a substantial number of Soviets on site at all times. 5. Soviet political objectives appears to me to be: (a) The establishment of a '93trading position'94 to force removal of U.S. overseas bases and Berlin. (b) To satisfy their ambitions in Latin America by this show of determination and courage against the American Imperialist. 6. Consequences of action by the United States will be the inevitable '93spilling of blood'94 of Soviet military personnel. This will increase tension everywhere and undoubtedly bring retaliation against U.S. foreign military installations, where substantial U.S. casualties would result, i.e., Tule, Spanish bases, Moroccan bases, and possibly SAC bases in Britain or Okinawa. Jupiter installations in Southern Italy, Turkey, and our facilities [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] do not provide enough '93American blood.'94 7. The situation cannot be tolerated. However, the United States should not act without warning and thus be forced to live with a '93Pearl Harbor indictment'94 for the indefinite future. I would therefore: (d) If Khrushchev and Castro fail to act at once, we should make a massive surprise strike at air fields, MRBM sites and SAM sites concurrently. Director John A. McCone 1 * 'a0 :: Severalalternatives indicated below were posed for consideration at the close of meeting covered by memorandum dated October 17th. 1 All dealt with the specific actions U.S. Government should take against Cuba at this time. The discussions centered around: (a) Whether military action should be taken prior to a warning to, or discussions with, Khrushchev and Castro. (d) Effect on the '93balance of nuclear power equation'94 of the MRBM installations in Cuba. Three principal courses of action are open to us, and of course there are variations of each. (1) Do nothing and live with the situation. It was pointed out clearly that Western Europe, Greece, Turkey, and other countries had lived under the Soviet MRBMs for years; therefore, why should the United States be so concerned. (2) Resort to an all-out blockade which would probably require a declaration of war and to be effective would mean the interruption of all incoming shipping. This was discussed as a slow strangulation process, but it was stated that '93intelligence reports'94 indicated that a blockade would bring Castro down in four months. (Note I have seen no such estimate.) (3) Military action which was considered at several levels. The following alternatives are: (a) Strafing identified MRBM installations. (b) Strafing MRBM installations and air fields with MIGs. (c) (a) and (b) plus all SAM sites and coastal missile sites. (d) (a), (b), and (c) above plus all other significant military installations, none of which were identified. Discussions of all of the above were inconclusive and it was asked that the group reassemble, and develop their views on the advantages and disadvantages and the effects of the following: (1) Warning to Khrushchev and Castro. (a) If the response is unsatisfactory, pursuing a course of military action. (b) If the response is unsatisfactory, referring to the OAS and the United Nations prior to taking military action. (2) Warning to Khrushchev and Castro and if the response is unsatisfactory, convening Congress, seeking a declaration of war, and proceeding with an all-out blockade. (3) Strike militarily with no warning, the level of the military effort being dependent upon evolving circumstances. In all probability this type of action would escalate into invasion and occupation, although the meeting was not agreed on this point. (4) Blockade with no warning and no advance notice such as a declaration of war, with the President depending upon existing Congressional resolutions for authority. Director John A. McCone 2 * 'a0 :: In summary, the Council was informed that sixteen SS-4 missiles, with a range of 1020 nautical miles were now operational in Cuba and could be fired approximately eighteen hours after a decision to fire was taken. The bearing of these launchers was 315 degrees, i.e. toward the central area of the United States. The :: representatives, who joined the discussion at this point, stated that it is probable the missiles which are operational (it is estimated there are now between 8 and 12 operational missiles on the Island) can hold indefinitely a capability for firing with from 2-1/2 to 4 hours' notice. 9. a. The :: believe that 40 launchers would normally be equipped with 80 missiles. John SPLIT reported yesterday that a Soviet ship believed to be the vessel in which the Soviets have been sending missiles to Cuba has made a sufficient number of trips to that island within recent weeks to offload approximately 48 missiles. Therefore, we assume there are approximately that number on the Island today, although we have only located approximately 30 of these. 6. General :: summarized the latest intelligence information and read from the attached document. 2 He added that we have a report of a fleet of Soviet submarines which are in a position to reach Cuba in about a week. Two questions were raised which the :: Missiles up there, the MRBMs. You'92ll recall four of them. There'92s three of them here. The coverage of yesterday. SPLIT Yesterday, sir. So the four of them were back there; there'92s only one of them at the forward position, so two of them have gone. SPLIT And where they might have gone, we don'92t know at the present time. They could have been right back there in the trees. They could have been [unclear] to another locale. SPLIT Ninety-seven percent. :: This shows our coverage now. Everything in the island is covered except the [unclear] at this time. SPLIT We have covered 97 percent. So that'92s rather [unclear]. We'92ll have three [low-level reconnaissance] missions out today. SPLIT A question that we do . . . Would you launch an attack on information received from the plane? Or would you wait until it has returned, so you'92ve got verification on it? SPLIT Why don'92t we take one flight either over Havana harbor or Mariel and'97 :: This [photo] is one of the old favorites, sir. This is not a low-level flight, but it gives some orientation for the new flight. This is an MRBM launch site, number 5, and right back there to accompany it is the low-level flight which was consummated yesterday. SPLIT This is a ready building, sir. There'92s nothing but light framing, and canvas stretched over these missiles. They'92re all covered over, as you can see. The support buildings, I think you can see person- nel walking around on the ground down there. A couple more. This is an old [unclear], an MR-4 site, and actually we can show you one of the low-level shots which ties to that one. This is an IRBM site that is clearly [unclear] construction. You can see the troops standing around. That is one launch pad there; it'92s a kind of a pup tent over the hole in the ground. The conduiting goes back through this blast wall here. Here are the cables that come out of the control bunker in here. This is the cable track that goes into the pro- tected vehicle positioned here. This is the other launch pad over here. Usually there is [unclear] concrete [unclear] for the bearing structures. And here is where we think is probably one of the nuclear storage bunkers. It'92s the [unclear]. I think that'92s all I'92ve got to say for this morn- ing. [Unclear exchange with President Kennedy, culminating in laughter.] :: . . . The Intelligence Community does not believe the measures to achieve a higher degree of action readiness for Soviet and bloc forces are being taken on a crash basis. Communist reaction to the U.S. quarantine against Cuba has not gone beyond the highly critical but [unclear] yesterday by the Soviet government. Surveillance of Cuba indicates the continued rapid progress in com- pletion of the IRBM and MRBM sites. No new sites have been discov- ered. On the U-2 flight yesterday, where apparently [unclear] one of them had 40 percent cloud coverage. Another had only 15 percent cloud coverage. [Unclear.] Buildings believed to afford nuclear storage are being assembled with great rapidity. Cuban naval vessels have been ordered to blocking positions at Banes and Santiago Bays. A survey of Soviet shipping shows 19 [16?] dry-cargo and 6 tanker ships en route to arrive in Cuba. Of these 22, 9 are in position to begin arrival by the end of October. Three ships have hatches suitable for car- rying missiles, and two of these are among the ships that have been receiving urgent coded traffic from Moscow. [Unclear] substantially is coded traffic. The situation is this: At 1:00 A.M. Moscow time, yesterday, there were seven ships, that received urgent messages, including the Poltava but not the Kimovsk. Then at 2:30 A.M. this morning, all ships, including the Kimovsk, received urgent messages. Then, shortly after- wards, those came out of Odessa control [station for Soviet shipping]. Shortly after that, the Odessa control station notified all ships that, here- after, all orders would come from Moscow. There are no indications of any Soviet aircraft [unclear] Cuba. Additional information reported a [Soviet] submarine is tracking the Kimovsk. However, the latest position report indicates they'92re about 200 miles from [unclear]. There are three, or possibly four, [Soviet] sub- marines in the Atlantic, [unclear]. A Cuban airliner left Goose Bay this morning, from Dakar, bound for Havana, and had aboard 75 people and 9,000 pounds of cargo. SPLIT I would like to have more of these today'97[Unclear exchange with President Kennedy about more low-level photography.] :: Mr. President, according to our reports, there'92s been no change that'92s been noted in the scope or pace of the construction of the IRBMs and MRBM missile sites in Cuba. The recent construction is continuing as has been denoted for the last several days. Cuban armed forces continue their alert, with military aircraft on standdowns since the morning of 23d of October. There are indications that known and suspected dissidents are being rounded up in Cuba at the present time. SPLIT [Thirty-seven seconds excised as classified information, probably a reference to the Belovodsk, a dry-cargo ship still on course that did have mil- itary cargo.]'97carrying 12 MI-4 armed helicopters. We still see no signs of any crash procedure in measures to increase the readiness of the Soviet armed forces. The Watch Committee concludes in their report this morning as follows: '93We conclude that Soviet bloc armed forces are continuing to increase their state of readiness and some units are on alert. We have, however, noted no significant redeployments. So that [unclear] crash program, although there is a high level of alert.'94 Bloc media are playing up Khrushchev'92s 24 October statement that he would consider a top-level meeting as '93useful.'94 There is, as yet, no reaction to the widely known turnaround of Soviet shipping, which had not become known to the public at the time of the issuance of this report except through this morning'92s article that appeared in some of the papers. Attention remains centered on the neu- tralist efforts in the United Nations to find machinery for easing tension, as well as the efforts of U Thant. SPLIT There'92s no question about that. SPLIT The photographs demonstrate that'97 :: Surveillance of 25 October shows that the construction of IRBM and MRBM bases in Cuba is proceeding largely on schedule; low- level photography confirms that the MRBM bases will use the 1,020- nautical-mile SS-4 missile. No additional sites, launchers, or missiles have been located, but there is road construction around Remedios which suggests the fourth IRBM site we have been expecting there. We estimate that it would cost the U.S.S.R. more than twice as much and take considerably longer to add to its ICBM strike capability from the U.S.S.R. as great an increment as the potential salvo from Cuban launching sites. Douglas SPLIT I don'92t believe, I don'92t agree with that, Mr. President. I feel very strongly about it. And I think that the real crux of this matter is the fact that he'92s got these pointed, for all you know, right now at our hearts. And this is going to produce I think, it may produce, a situation when we get to [the promised confrontation on] Berlin after the [congressional] elections, which changes the entire balance of world power. It puts us under a very great handicap in carrying out our obliga- tions, not only to our western European allies, but to the hemisphere. And I think that we'92ve got the momentum now. We'92ve got the feeling that these things are serious and that they must be . . . That threat must be removed before we can drop the quarantine. If we drop that quarantine once, we'92re never going to be able to put it in effect again. And I feel that we must say that the quarantine goes on until we are satisfied that these are inoperable. [He hits the table.] SPLIT I say that we have to send inspections down there to see at what stage they are. I feel that if we lose that . . . But this is the security of the United States! I believe the strategic situation has greatly changed with the presence of these weapons in Cuba. :: Based on the latest low-level reconnaissance mission, 3 of the 4 MRBM sites at San Cristobal and the 2 sites at Sagua La Grande appear to be fully operational. No further sites or missiles have been identified.3 The mobilization of Cuban military forces continues at a high rate. However, they remain under orders not to take any hostile action unless attacked. Steps toward establishing an integrated air defense system are under way. :: We don'92t know it. SPLIT I don'92t see why we don'92t make the trade then. [Mixed voices.]",military,bureaucracies_48,bureaucracies
"2 any bad news from any other part of the world, but the situation in Cyprus has been getting worse in the last few days. SPLIT No. Getting a NATO force to go in or going to the UN. The UN would be very bad because it would'97 SPLIT Well. SPLIT Well, I've, they're'97we put it to them very strong as to whether this was on the basis that they were spread too thin in which case we might relieve some of their forces from, even from Germany. But the'97what Ormsby Gore says'97and this checks with our own advice'97is that putting additional British forces in is probably just going to make the situation worse rather than better. Now, I'm meeting with Bob McNamara at five o'clock. 4 In the meantime, we're having this thing looked at by the Joint Chiefs'97 SPLIT We'll have a recommendation'97 SPLIT Right. Well, this is'97what we're taking a hard look at'97 SPLIT Well, we'll have a recommendation for you. Bob and I are getting together at five and [unintelligible]. [Here follows discussion of the situation in Panama.] 1 'a0 :: reviewed the current situation in Cyprus and the British request that we send U.S. troops as part of an allied force to Cyprus. 3 Mr. SPLIT recommended that we ask the British government to send a ranking military officer to Washington tomorrow in order to obtain more information about their proposed allied intervention force. He said the group would postpone until tomorrow at least making a recommendation on whether or not we should join the U.K. in seeking to establish a military force composed of troops from NATO countries. He suggested that the SPLIT discussed whether General Lemnitzer should go to Ankara and later to Athens. He said the Turkish military may move in the next two or three days. The Turks have promised us that they will consult before they intervene in Cyprus. But if there were a massacre involving a large number of Turkish Cypriots, the Turkish military might jump off immediately. The civil government in Turkey is very weak and the military may force its hand. Mr. SPLIT replied that the Greek Government had favored the intervention of allied forces. The SPLIT acknowledged that there was no good solution to the problem. He said that if it were necessary to reenforce the original U.S. complement, all participants would contribute to the reenforcement in the same percentage. Secretary SPLIT responded by saying that Makarios wants a neutral such as Nasser or a UN group with neutrals because he is convinced that the neutrals will favor him over the Turks in Cyprus. The SPLIT suggested that General Lemnitzer also talk to the military directly because Inonu may not be in full control of the Turkish military. The SPLIT replied that the situation might blow up with the result that two NATO allies would be fighting each other. It was also possible that Makarios would ask the UN to come in and a UN peacekeeping force would have Communist elements in it. Secretary SPLIT replied that the London tripartite conference had blown up. The U.S. had no status in that conference because it was composed of the three guarantor powers. It is difficult to talk to the Greeks and the Turks because of the weakness of these governments. The views of the Greeks and the Turks are more crystallized and farther apart as the result of the conference in London than before. The SPLIT said that both the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers were in London and it would be possible for Ambassador Bruce to talk to them there. 5 The",political,bureaucracies_49,bureaucracies
"Yeah. They are apparently bombing Nicosia and firing on another town and we haven't had a Greek reaction yet. SPLIT Yeah. That's all right, Mr. President, that's what they pay under-secretaries for. SPLIT We haven't had anything from Athens yet'97not one word. SPLIT Not yet, but if the Greeks attack the Turks, Mr. President, then I think you should go back to Washington. If it leads to a major war. SPLIT Not much but I think'85 SPLIT But let's see how the Greeks react, Mr. President. There is still a 10% chance that this thing will be settled by Monday. 2 SPLIT Well, if the Greeks accept Clerides as a solution and if they'97and if the Greeks and Turks then meet in London, I think we could get a ceasefire. SPLIT [ 1 line not declassified ] SPLIT [ 1'bd lines not declassified ] SPLIT And a great opportunity'97the Greek government '85 and the'97and isolated itself; the Cypriot government can get no international support being headed by a professional gunman and so the Turks did what they have been wanting to do for 15 years'97establish a predominant position on Cyprus. SPLIT No, but the only place the Greeks can fight them is not in Cyprus but some other place. SPLIT The Greeks have only about 9,000 men on the island and the Turks and the Turks have probably '85 over about 3,000 or 4,000, 2,000 seaborne and about 2,000 airborne, but the Turks are much better equipped and they can reinforce much faster. SPLIT Yeah. SPLIT Well, the Greeks will either negotiate or they will attack the Turks in Thrace. SPLIT Exactly. No, it is a mess. It is two totally irresponsible governments going at each other. SPLIT Who Makarios? :: I think it did. I calmed them down. The situation is now the Greeks have accepted our proposal. The proposals are placed for a ceasefire and the Turks to go into enclaves that they have there and the Turks are gaining a strong bargaining power. Their National Guard has been effectively defeated. SPLIT There hasn't been much fighting. SPLIT The Turks fight well. They are tough. If the Greeks don't go to war in the a.m., I think we are all right. SPLIT They are waiting for the answer and they may get antsy. [ 1 line not declassified ] We are playing the hard line and are in step with all our allies. SPLIT And we would cut off all aid SPLIT They can't fight long then. SPLIT I will call you immediately of further developments. 1 'a0 :: The Turks want a quick result leading to partition of the Island into Greek and Turkish parts with sort of a general federal government which would however be very weak. They have about 15 percent of the island and want 30 percent. They might try to grab it. I have talked to the Prime Minister of Turkey. 3 He was a student of mine and I have told him that we could not'97really in the first 48 hours of your term of office'97be very relaxed about unilateral military action. SPLIT If that happens we might have to disassociate from that which we have tried to avoid. Our danger in Turkey and why we must maneuver carefully. They might turn very nationalistic and the Russians have been trying to exploit that but we cannot let them act unilaterally. I am writing a letter to Ecevit. 4 He has promised to hold off for 24 hours. I am writing to Ecevit on my behalf outlining where I see the negotiations stand. The Turks propose two areas'97one Turkish & one Greek. I think the Greeks we can push into a position where they would be willing to accept two or three autonomous Turkish areas but not one contiguous area. That would avoid a population transfer. SPLIT Right. The British are all out backing the Greeks right now and are even threatening military action against the Turks which is one of the stupidest things I have heard. All they have there on Cyprus are a few Phantoms and 1,000 troops. It is purely a political thing. They could not pull it off. They want to get a crisis started and we would then have to settle it and they would claim credit. :: The problem in Geneva is that the Turks see that the more the negotiations are protracted the more difficult the unilateral military move becomes. The Greeks are procrastinating'97they want to go home for 36 hours and then resume discussions. The Turks so far have refused to grant a 36-hour extension because it would make it that much harder to take unilateral action. SPLIT We would have to vote against them in the Security Council. We would have our hands full to keep the Greeks from going to war. The Turks right now are extremely nationalistic. For a few years ago, the Turkish tactics are right'97grab what they want and then negotiate on the basis of possession. But if the Turks run loose on Cyprus, the Greeks could come unglued. We certainly do not want a war between the two, but if it came to that, Turkey is more important to us and they have a political structure which could produce a Qadhafi. SPLIT If the Turks move to take what they want, they will be condemned in the Security Council and the Soviet Union will beat them over the head with it. Some of my colleagues want to cut off assistance to Turkey'97that would be a disaster. There is no American reason why the Turks should not have one-third of Cyprus. 1 'a0 :: Briefly about the development of the Cyprus situation and where we are. It started when the Greek junta used the Greek officers in Cyprus to overthrow Makarios and put in a government with support of the EOKA, as an attempt to bring about enosis. In 1960 the Constitution was set up; in 1964 Makarios overthrew it. In 1967 there was another one and since then the Turkish people had been living in ghettos and the Turks thought the U.S. had kept them from getting their rights. The Makarios overthrow and the junta's unpopularity gave the Turks an opportunity to rectify the situation. They moved in. Initially we were under heavy pressure to overthrow the Greek government. We tried to keep the crisis from being internationalized and to prevent the change of the constitutional government in Cyprus. The junta fell, Karamanlis came in, and the British got the talks started. We kept in the background so as not to look like we were the policemen for every civil war. Clerides we think is a good man. We support the Greek government, but since it had replaced the junta it didn't feel it could make concessions. It was afraid of being caught between the left and the right. The Greek Cypriots are willing to make concessions. Also the British got mad at the Turks and put pressure on them, thus relieving the pressure on the Turks for concessions. The solution was to be greater autonomy for the Turkish Cypriots and restoration of the 1960 Constitution. But the negotiations stalemated. The Turks then attacked and now hold 55 percent of the good land and the best part. Greek emotions are high, but the U.S. could have prevented it only by putting forces around the island sufficient to balance the Turkish forces. The cut-off of aid would not have affected the battle and would have forced the Turks either to the Soviet Union or to a Qaddafi-type regime. It also would have gotten us embroiled in all the details of the negotiations. We threatened if they went to war with each other that it would be a very serious move. We now must get them to the conference table. We said yesterday that we insist that Turkey maintain the ceasefire line and negotiation is essential. I made a statement on this. I read this position to Ecevit and he agreed, and he agreed also to give up some territory and reduce his forces. The reaction to our statement has been positive. The Greek tempers seem to be cooling. Clerides gave a good statement'97he is willing to negotiate without severe preconditions. We have encouraged the British to put forward a federal solution giving more autonomy. After it is discussed more, we will offer to play a more active role. So, A war was stopped; the Turks will give up some of their gains; and the Turks will reduce some of their forces. The pressures on the Greek government were severe. They couldn't go to war and so they kicked at us a bit. :: The problem in Cyprus is the Europeans have taken a united position that Makarios ought to be brought back and they want us to bring pressure on the Greeks. My worry is that Makarios now has to lean on the Communists and Eastern bloc. All our evidence is that the opposition is in total control of the Island. SPLIT No, but they know we are dragging our feet, but they don't know exactly what we want. SPLIT The danger is this, if everyone runs to Makarios embracing him as the legitimate head'85 and if the Soviets are the only ones to offer to help restore him, we have no basis for resisting it. SPLIT We can not openly oppose Makarios but we can try to slow it down enough so that perhaps we can crystalize enough support for an internal solution. The Europeans are talking a tough game, but we have to defend their position. SPLIT Exactly. SPLIT If the Greeks collapse, then the left wing could take over or a bunch of Greek colonels who could throw in with the Quadafi group. SPLIT That's is what I would propose, with your permission, to do. SPLIT And if it fails, we can join the consensus. SPLIT My analysis is if Makarios is brought back this way, he will have to kick the Greek officers off the island and then the Communists will be the dominant force and to balance the Turks he will have to rely on the Eastern bloc. So the coup will have shifted the balance to the left.",political,bureaucracies_50,bureaucracies
"They have been concerned about the internal structure of the Warsaw Pact and about not destroying the relationship with the United States. This occurred just before the Democratic convention, just as Hungarian invasion occurred before election. We can't be idle in the United Nations about this. General :: This surprises me. Secretary SPLIT First, I am surprised by the timing of this action. I am disappointed, particularly in light of their favorable messages on (1) nuclear explosion (2) strategic missile talks (3) your meeting. 3 This shows they hold the USA in contempt. Walt SPLIT We do not know yet if the Czechs will raise a voice. There is not a great deal we can do if they don't. We could support the Czechs in the United Nations and through USIA. If we do they can put pressure on the West, particularly Berlin. Khrushchev called Berlin the testicles of the West and when he wanted to create pressure he squeezed there. Secretary SPLIT Draft reply to Dobrynin read. 5 We have a public problem as well. We must decide what moral force and political force we should bring to bear. The big question is what the Czech reaction will be. I would not move ahead in next day or so. The SPLIT For the press to know I call him in to give him our views it will be good to position ourselves publicly. Walt SPLIT Czechoslovakia is 3rd arms supplier to Vietnam. General",political,bureaucracies_51,bureaucracies
"inquired whether the present operation did not constitute the biggest military commitment that the Vietminh had made to date in the Indochina war. Mr. :: suggested that the logical first step in UN action to save Indochina would be the prompt dispatch of UN observation teams to Indochina. (At this point, Admiral SPLIT expressed the belief that the best way to proceed to give the Associated States the necessary outside assistance would be to call for an economic conference of the Asian nations and thereafter gradually introduce the military security factor. That, in essence, was how NATO got started. After further discussion of the governments and nations who might be approached to assist the Associated States, the :: replied that the Planning Board would undertake the study at once, but inquired whether it should envisage U.S. intervention with military forces. He reminded the Council that this subject had been studied in a Special Annex to the recently adopted policy on Southeast Asia, 3 but that the Special Annex had not met with a favorable response from the Council and that all copies of it had been withdrawn for destruction. The SPLIT by stating that what he was asking was the extent to which we should go in employing ground forces to save Indochina from the Communists. The SPLIT answered that the existing policy paper on Southeast Asia was quite clear on this point. If the Chinese Communists flew aircraft into Indochina they would be guilty of overt aggression, and our response to such aggression had been clearly set forth in NSC 5405. Secretary SPLIT prod the Attorney General, and suggested that this might be the moment to begin to explore with the Congress what support could be anticipated in the event that it seemed desirable to intervene in Indochina. Secretary :: pointed out that the situation in Indochina had arisen not from outside aggression but from civil war. This was what posed the problem of intervention in all its difficulties from the point of view of Congress. The proposed regional defense organization might prove very useful as a means of resisting overt Communist aggression, but would it be effective in meeting the possible increase in internal Communist subversion, especially if Indochina fell? What do we do if a Communist revolt breaks out in Indonesia or Thailand or Burma? What do we do if the Communists send several thousands of their men to subvert Malaya? Accordingly, concluded the SPLIT at some point or other the United States must decide whether it is prepared to take action which will be effective in saving free governments from internal Communist subversion. This was the real problem, and it was quite different from Korea, where the aggressors had had to cross a national boundary. Secretary SPLIT had said, you start a chain reaction if you lose Indochina. Governor :: asked Secretary SPLIT argued that it was nevertheless better to lose part of Southeast Asia and to strengthen what was left, which Admiral SPLIT pointed up the question which he had asked of the military at the outset of the discussion. Did they believe that Indochina was actually going to be lost? Did they believe that the loss of Dien Bien Phu would be the beginning of the end ? Secretary SPLIT observed that if one considered the alternatives it was doubtful whether the request should be rejected. These planes might actually save Dien Bien Phu. Admiral Radford, however, expressed very great doubt as to whether the French could actually make effective use of B'9629'92s, with which they had had little experience, a view that was reinforced by General Twining. Nevertheless, replied Governor Stassen, he would throw everything we had in to help the French, short of combat forces. Admiral SPLIT replied that whatever might be said of the French, they were putting up a most gallant fight at Dien Bien Phu. There followed a lively exchange of views between Governor SPLIT and Admiral Radford. Dr. SPLIT again expressed his view of doing everything for the French short of armed intervention. The :: briefed the Council very thoroughly on the content of this report dealing with the question of whether or not the United States should intervene with armed forces in Indochina in the event that there was no other means of saving the area from Communist control. After having read the first eight pages of the paper, which were a statement of the problem, Mr. SPLIT summarized the principal points in the Annex, which described the various alternate courses of action from which the United States could choose if it decided to intervene in Indochina. At the conclusion of his briefing, Mr. SPLIT called the Council'92s attention to the split view in the Intelligence Advisory Committee with respect to the Chinese Communist reaction to U.S. intervention. He then called upon the SPLIT said that in order to point up the issue for the National Security Council, he wished to call attention to the estimate of the French military situation which was provided in paragraph 3 of the Planning Board'92s paper. This read as follows: '93There is not, however, any certainty that the French have as yet reached the point of being willing to accept a settlement which is unacceptable to U.S. interests or to cease their military efforts. Moreover, regardless of the outcome of the fight at Dien Bien Phu, there is no indication that a military decision in Indochina is imminent.'94 If this estimate remained accurate, the Council would not be obliged to decide at the present meeting whether to intervene in Indochina at once, but only whether it would be necessary to intervene at some future time if the French faced defeat. Secretary SPLIT indicated that the exchange of views between Admiral SPLIT summarized the discussion to this point by stating that if the Council adopted Secretary Dulles'92 recommendation it would make no decision now with respect to intervening or not intervening at some future time in Indochina. Beyond that, he inquired whether the military thought that there were any additional steps we could take to assist the French, in view of the possible new military judgment as to the disastrous effect of the loss of Dien Bien Phu. Secretary :: called attention to the position of the British Chiefs of Staff that the introduction of additional outside ground forces would be essential and that the commitment of air forces alone would not save the situation. Was not this, he asked, also the view of our own Chiefs of Staff? Admiral :: noted the invariable tendency to thinking of armed intervention only in terms of ground forces. Nevertheless, there were more than enough ground forces potentially available in Indochina. The effect of U.S. air strikes on current battles in Indochina, such as Dien Bien Phu, might not be decisive, but the effect of such air strikes on the climate of opinion throughout the free world might well prove decisive. It would amount to the United States saying to the Communists, '93This is as far as you go, and no further.'94 Secondly, continued the SPLIT he thought that we would put ourselves in the worst possible position if we decided to stay precisely where we now are. To do no more than we have done would be tantamount to giving Britain a veto on U.S. action in Southeast Asia. The French have asked us for help. They have asked no one else. But if the French are made to realize that we cannot give them the desired help unless some other nations join with us, they might be brought to agree to the intervention of a coalition of nations including the United States. Certainly Thailand and the Philippines would join such a coalition. So probably would Australia after the national elections are completed. What he kept getting back to, said the SPLIT was his unwillingness to let the British have a veto over our freedom of action. He thought that we should soberly consider what we should do in Southeast Asia. We should then do this with the British if they will come along, but without them if they won'92t. Our chief assets in this area are the Associated States themselves, and the SPLIT said he would even follow this course if Australia failed to join us. The truth of the matter was that, at least in the Far East, our close tie-up with the British was a painful liability. The SPLIT if he could be sure that the SPLIT was correct in assuming that the French would stay and fight in Indochina. If they proved willing to do so, the SPLIT said that we should get all of our associates in this enterprise to join with us in guaranteeing the complete independence of the Associated States. The :: said that he wished to express his views. It seemed to him that the time was now at hand when the Council should make its ultimate decision as to the U.S. course of action. In his view, if the French folded, and even if the British refused to go along with us, the United States should intervene alone in the southern areas of Indochina in order to save the situation. Governor SPLIT said that he realized that this would require Congressional permission, but he was convinced that if we managed to keep a portion of Indochina from Communist domination, and exhibited strength and determination, this course of action would enable us to save the rest of Southeast Asia. Governor SPLIT said that, recognizing the appalling weakness of both the British and the French positions, he felt that we should not allow this weakness to render the United States inactive and impotent. Everything, therefore, counselled that the United States at this time determine the ultimate lengths to which it would be willing to go to save Southeast Asia. Even though it might prove unnecessary to go to the ultimate limits, a determination to do so if necessary would greatly strengthen the SPLIT expressed confidence that the Congress and the people of the United States would support direct intervention in Indochina by the United States if the Commander-in-Chief made it clear to them that such a move was necessary to save Southeast Asia from Communism. The SPLIT of making assumptions which leaped over situations of the gravest difficulty. It was all well and good to state that if the French collapsed the United States must move in to save Southeast Asia, but if the French indeed collapsed and the United States moved in, we would in the eyes of many Asiatic peoples merely replace French colonialism with American colonialism. The SPLIT insisted that the obvious fact that the Vietnamese did not trust the French was no reason to argue that they did not trust us. He perceived no insurmountable difficulty in this respect if the United States were to take over from France. He was confident that the Associated States would be glad to invite U.S. intervention, and he furthermore believed that if the French did decide to get out of Indochina, circumstances would compel them to phase their withdrawal in such fashion as to permit the orderly introduction of U.S. forces. The SPLIT replied that he very much doubted if the French would agree with the Communists at Geneva to get out of Indochina unconditionally and thus close the door to the United States. In any case, Governor SPLIT said he certainly did not think that the United States should go into Indochina in any sense as partners of the French with a view to bolstering the French position. We should take command of the situation in such a way as to enlist the loyalty and support of the indigenous forces as the French had failed to do. He reiterated his conviction that an orderly transition from French to U.S. responsibility could be carried out unless the French actually dropped their arms and ran from the field, which he thought was quite unlikely. The SPLIT expressed the opinion that the Chinese Communists were unlikely to intervene if the United States contented itself merely with occupying and holding the southern areas of Indochina and did not attempt to roll back the Vietminh beyond the border between China and Indochina. The SPLIT took issue with the President'92s argument and pointed out that the peoples of the Philippines and of South Korea certainly did not consider us to be imperialists. Where we were so considered was precisely in those areas of the world where we were found supporting British and French positions. We plainly had thrust upon us the leadership responsibility for the free world, and, said Governor Stassen, we should determine to meet this responsibility. The SPLIT said that there was no need to despair of associates. We could almost certainly count on Thailand, Australia and New Zealand to go along with us. If, however, we lacked the courage to make the assault, we would presently find that we lacked any followers in the free world. On the other hand, if we do manifest our leadership, there will be plenty of others who will gradually return to our fold. Dr. SPLIT suggested that it would be possible to take some of the U.S. forces out of Korea for use in Indochina, but the SPLIT observed that he thought that the ultimate sanction of an all-out attack on Communist China if they renewed their aggression against South Korea, was sufficient to prevent a Communist Chinese attack on South Korea in the event more of our own forces were withdrawn. The SPLIT replied that in any event it would be impossible to let the Communists take over Indochina and then try to save the rest of the free world from a similar fate. This was the time and the place to take our stand and make our decision. The SPLIT replied that it was perfectly possible to prevent dissipating our military power in local wars. We could do this by the threat of general war if the Communists crossed any national boundary. The situation in Indochina, however, was different, since the Communists had already got into Indochina before",political,bureaucracies_52,bureaucracies
"Intelligence, referring to a detailed map of the battle area at Dien Bien Phu, indicated that as of March 13 the Vietminh had lost the equivalent of five battalions in battle, the French of two battalions, which, however, had been largely replaced. It was impossible to predict the eventual outcome, since the French Union forces were still outnumbered by more than two to one. The latest information from G'962 was that the French had about a 50'9650 chance of holding out. The :: Intelligence described the situation at Dien Bien Phu as relatively quiet. The Vietminh still appeared short of ammunition and supplies for their next attack. The French position had improved somewhat, as had the French chances of holding their position. The French Union forces were making effective use of napalm, but there had been no further replacements over and beyond the two battalions previously air-dropped and which brought French Union strength approximately to the level prior to the attack. Mr. :: Intelligence to brief the Council on the latest intelligence regarding the situation at Dien Bien Phu. Before beginning his intelligence briefing, Mr. [Allen] SPLIT of opinion in the Intelligence Advisory Committee regarding Chinese Communist overt intervention was perhaps not as wide as it seemed at first glance. 3 All the members of the Committee recognized that if the United States intervened in such force as to contrive the defeat of the Vietminh, there would be very great danger of overt Chinese Communist intervention. The only issue, therefore, was one of degree. Some members of the IAC felt that there was a better than fifty percent chance that the Chinese Communists would intervene. Mr. SPLIT added that he also thought that the statement in the Planning Board draft was now rather too optimistic. Admiral SPLIT commented that the situation in the Tonkin Delta worried him almost more than the situation at Dien Bien Phu. The :: Intelligence stated that the intelligence community had just completed a National Intelligence Estimate on the consequences of the loss of Dien Bien Phu. 2 Its conclusions, some of which SPLIT read to the Council, added up to the belief that from the military point of view the fall of the strong point would be very serious but not catastrophic. The political repercussions of the loss of the fortress would be more grave than the strictly military repercussions. Even so, the fall of Dien Bien Phu would not signal the immediate collapse of the French Union position in Indochina. In conclusion, SPLIT pointed out that the intelligence report had had unanimous acceptance by all the agencies. Admiral SPLIT stated that G'962 had actually wished to present more optimistic conclusions than those reached in the Estimate, and added that he himself had a feeling that, thanks to the way Dien Bien Phu had been played up in the press, we had all become a little panicky on the results of its fall. SPLIT admitted, however, that anything could happen if the fall of Dien Bien Phu caused a psychological collapse. Admiral",political,bureaucracies_53,bureaucracies
"suggested that the pessimistic French reports from Saigon might be designed as a build-up to exaggerate the extent of their final victory. Governor SPLIT replied in the affirmative, and said that the whole operation was obviously a Vietminh preparation for the Geneva Conference. Secretary SPLIT added that while he was at Berlin he had warned Bidault, on the basis of American experience in Korea, that if Indochina were put on the agenda for the Geneva Conference it would be the signal for violent Vietminh attacks on the French Union forces in Indochina. This was precisely what had happened.} :: further commented on the heavy psychological blow which would be dealt the French if Dien Bien Phu were lost. The SPLIT said that he did not know why the French had permitted this division to retrace its steps. General SPLIT whether General Navarre actually had a free hand in prosecuting the war in Indochina or whether in fact his freedom of action was circumscribed by the Paris politicians. Mr. SPLIT offered the opinion that it was likely that General Navarre had freedom of action within the limits of the Navarre Plan itself but not outside of it. Dien Bien Phu, of course, was not included in the Navarre Plan. 2. U.S. Policies With Respect to Certain Contingencies in Indochina Secretary SPLIT referred to a memorandum which set forth the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to what the United States might do in the event of a French withdrawal or defeat in Indochina. 2 He read paragraph 11 of the JCS memo, which read: '93The National Security Council consider now the extent to which the United States would be willing to commit its resources in support of the Associated States in the effort to prevent the loss of Indochina to the Communists either: a . In concert with the French; or b. In the event the French elect to withdraw, in concert with other allies or, if necessary, unilaterally.'94 Secretary SPLIT recommended that the Council instruct the Planning Board to prepare the desired report, and explained that Secretary SPLIT expressed the belief that while it might not be impossible to get a two-thirds UN vote in favor of intervention in Indochina, it would be far from easy, since we could count on the opposition of the Asian-Arab bloc, among others. The SPLIT agreed with Mr. Cutler'92s response to Secretary Wilson'92s question, but pointed out that even so, the Executive would still have to go to Congress before intervening in the Indochina war. He then reminded the Council that the Attorney General was presumably preparing an opinion with respect to the prerogatives of the SPLIT expressed the opinion that a lot more work needed to be done by the NSC on this problem before we were ready to take it up with Congress. He pointed out that the fighting season in Indochina would end soon, and he believed would end without a clear military decision. Furthermore, he thought it quite unlikely that the Chinese Communists would engage their MIGs in battle over Indochina prior to the Geneva Conference. The Communists were seeking a political rather than a military victory at this stage, and we could therefore safely discount overt Chinese intervention in Indochina. Nevertheless, the United States would certainly have to reach a clear-cut decision vis-'e0-vis the French. We were witnessing, said Secretary Dulles, the collapse or evaporation of France as a great power in most areas of the world. The great question was, who should fill the void left by the collapse of French power, particularly in the colonial areas. Would it be the Communists, or must it be the U.S.? In its consideration of the problem of U.S. intervention in Indochina, the Planning Board should give consideration to the fact that the United States could not move into the position abandoned by France in Indochina without estimating the repercussions in other parts of the world. Secretary SPLIT expressed the belief that the French had actually reached a point where they would rather abandon Indochina than save it through United States intervention and assumption of French responsibilities. All this constituted primarily a political rather than a military problem. Accordingly, it could be settled after the end of the fighting season in May. In any event, Secretary SPLIT did not believe that there was any need for the Council to proceed on the assumption of an imminent French military withdrawal. There was, accordingly, time allowed us to work out some kind of suitable UN action. Governor SPLIT commented that of course the real problem which one immediately encountered in trying to decide on procedure, was France. Either it would be necessary for the United States to beat the French into line, or else to accept a split with France. Both courses of action involved the gravest difficulty, particularly in relation to EDC. The :: asked whether there was anything we could do in time to save the French at Dien Bien Phu. Admiral :: said that he personally felt that there was less than a fifty percent chance. At any rate, the contingency of Chinese Communist intervention was very significant and should be taken into consideration in the Council'92s deliberations. Turning to the latest intelligence on the situation at Dien Bien Phu, Mr. SPLIT indicated that it had not greatly changed in the last few days. Action had slackened off as the Vietminh forces were reconstituted after their extremely heavy losses. After indicating in detail the changes in the positions at Dien Bien Phu, Mr. SPLIT commented on the French reports that 20,000 additional Vietminh troops were on their way to reinforce the Vietminh at Dien Bien Phu. If true, it would take these forces several days to reach the fortress from the Tonkin Delta or other distant points. The French expected the Vietminh to renew their mass attacks in the next few days, certainly within ten days. The French losses to date in this action amounted to approximately four battalions, three of which had been replaced. The wounded presented a very severe problem, because accurate enemy anti-aircraft fire prevented evacuation of French casualties. This fire also made it extremely hazardous to airdrop supplies and replacements. Ground haze and frequent storms added to the difficulties of the French Union Air Forces. The Vietminh losses were estimated as between ten and twenty thousand. To date there had been replacement of only three thousand, and Colonel de Castries had stated that the enemy was short of ammunition. Mr. SPLIT then turned to the question of Chinese Communist support of the Vietminh rebels. There was no confirmation of recent sensational reports that the Chinese Communists were providing Chinese personnel as well as military mat'e9riel to the rebels at Dien Bien Phu. Doubtless they had stepped up the provision of supplies, and there were probably two thousand Chinese advisers who had been with the Vietminh forces for a long time. There was, however, no confirmation of the report that a Chinese General was participating in the attack at Dien Bien Phu, or that the Chinese had provided the Vietminh with radar-controlled 37-millimetre guns. (Admiral SPLIT then commented on forces available to the Chinese Communists if they did undertake to intervene overtly. For this purpose there were five Chinese Communist divisions deployed along the border of Indochina, though there had been no change in their deployment in recent weeks. Within some 300 miles of the border there were in addition seven Chinese armies, numbering in all about 200,000 men, which could be sent into Indochina along the four available roads. With respect to Chinese Communist aircraft, no MIG'9615'92s were currently concentrated on airfields in China sufficiently close to Dien Bien Phu to enable Chinese pilots to fly to Dien Bien Phu and return. At the conclusion of Mr. Dulles'92 briefing, Admiral SPLIT reminded the Council of his speech of last Monday on the peril in Southeast Asia, which he said had been very well analyzed by the Vice President. The danger was indirect rather than direct aggression, and this was a very mixed up situation. Secretary SPLIT and said, '93Yes, indeed; you point out that it'92s a very great danger, but still you do not know what to do about it, and we have the same problem to face in Italy, France, and other areas outside of Asia.'94 Secretary SPLIT replied to Secretary SPLIT if it was not possible to state the alternatives open to the United States in a somewhat different form. As he saw it, there were three possible courses of action. We could let Indochina fall, but if we did so the chances for the creation of a coalition to defend the rest of Southeast Asia would be very slim indeed. Secondly, we ourselves could intervene and drive right up to the borders of Communist China. But in that event the Chinese Communists were very likely to intervene. In between these two extremes there was a third possibility, which was to try to hold the southern part of Indochina and form our regional grouping to assure the defense of the remaining states of the area. The SPLIT said that his worry was that if the battle at Dien Bien Phu were lost the French might lose the will for further resistance. Admiral SPLIT stated that he continued to agree with the JCS view on this issue, namely, that we can no longer accept further Communist take-overs, whether accomplished by external or internal measures. We could no longer afford to put too fine a point on the methods. Secretary SPLIT insisted that there was no intention of having the United States police the governments of the entire world. The United States Government certainly did not particularly like the Franco Government in Spain; on the other hand, it was making no effort to destroy it. The SPLIT answered that this, of course, was primarily a political matter'97a loss of will to continue the struggle in Paris rather than a military defeat as such in Indochina. With respect to Mr. Cutler'92s inquiry about additional steps to assist the French in the emergency, Secretary SPLIT suggested that Corsairs, light Navy bombers, might be offered in place of the B'9629'92s, which idea the :: with his interpretation. Dillon felt that the leaders of the French Government had never informed the full Cabinet of their request for U.S. armed intervention which had been made by the stronger individuals who were willing to take responsibility for the request on the basis that everything possible must be done to save Dien Bien Phu. Dillon felt that if such aid were given the French they would continue to fight in Indochina regardless of the outcome. If such aid were not rendered, it would become public knowledge and involve a very adverse reaction from French public opinion. This, in Dillon'92s view, would result in the overthrow of the Laniel government and its replacement by a government which would pledge to withdraw from Indochina. Admiral SPLIT in conducting the negotiations at Geneva, and might produce a much better settlement at Geneva than we could otherwise anticipate. Of course, if the French remained in the fight and did not fold, there would be many additional possibilities of building real strength for the free world side in Southeast Asia. Failure of the United States to determine at this time to take a strong ultimate position would not only critically endanger its interests in Southeast Asia, but would have the gravest repercussions on the United States position throughout the free world. Difficult as this decision was, Governor SPLIT in Geneva on Saturday and secured the Secretary'92s reaction to this plan as well as his latest appraisal of the situation at Geneva. Meanwhile, we could give hints to the French that we have not made a final decision as to our intervention in Indochina. This would help to keep the French going, and Secretary SPLIT would be back next week, at which time a decision might be made in the National Security Council. The :: said he believed that there might be an alternative to doing too much on the one hand or doing nothing on the other. The Congress had rejected the idea of the United States providing combat assistance to Indochina unless we were assured of support by our allies for this course of action. Since the Congress took that position regarding an air strike to save Dien Bien Phu, we have come to recognize that the fall of Dien Bien Phu need not necessarily amount to a military disaster or involve the complete failure of the Navarre Plan for victory in Indochina. The French are now pressing for U.S. assistance in the air even if Dien Bien Phu should fall. They argue that such air strikes by U.S. planes would enable them to continue the fight in Indochina. If they really mean this we might well avoid having to commit any U.S. ground forces in Indochina. After all, there were plenty of ground forces available now if they could be properly trained and used. Would it be possible, therefore, that even without Britain the United States could induce some of the Asiatic states to join with us in intervening in Indochina? If so, we would meet the basic condition set by the Congress (concerted action) and would be able promptly to give the French what they were asking for'97air strikes by U.S. planes. The SPLIT then continued. If, as a result of a Congressional resolution permitting U.S. armed intervention in concert with willing states, the French were prevailed upon to continue the struggle, they might even permit the United States to send in a considerable military mission which would take over responsibility for the training of the native forces. Thus it might be possible to carry out the objectives of the Navarre Plan. All this, said Secretary Smith, represented a possible course of action which we should investigate without waiting to see what happens at the Geneva Conference. Secretary SPLIT concluded by expressing agreement with the SPLIT reminded the Council that it had agreed to underwrite the Navarre Plan chiefly in order to increase the indigenous forces. He still thought the Navarre Plan fundamentally sound if it was carried out right. At the present time the success of the Navarre Plan was threatened not so much by a military disaster as by a psychological collapse. If it were possible to prevent a collapse of the French will, and to keep the training plan for the indigenous forces alive by means of a U.S. training mission and by U.S. air strikes, we might ultimately save the situation in Indochina without being obliged to commit U.S. ground forces. General Navarre, however, would have to go. He had proved incompetent. We should also have to have absolute assurances from France for the complete independence of the Associated States. Certainly we could not, repeated Secretary Smith, go into Indochina with the French alone. At any rate, something like this seemed to him the only possible kind of formula. The SPLIT pointed out that the Cambodians had wanted to raise the issue of the Communist invasion in the UN, but that we ourselves had counselled against such a move. Secretary SPLIT then said that he had two concrete suggestions for action by the National Security Council. He pointed out that he was leaving for Geneva tomorrow afternoon. He suggested that he invite the ANZUS deputies to meet with him this evening. At this time he would discreetly indicate that although the British had turned down our invitation to join in a regional grouping, we were by no means sure that we would abandon the effort because of this refusal and would not go on to make our declaration with such other nations as would join us. Secretary SPLIT would say no more to the deputies, but let them think this point over. 12 The second step, continued Secretary Smith, would be taken when he conferred with Secretary",political,bureaucracies_54,bureaucracies
"stated that the French explanation was that there was too much guerrilla resistance to enable them to prevent the division from returning. The :: entered the meeting.) The SPLIT agreed that we might well reach the point where it would be necessary to consider something like the President'92s proposals, although he had, up to now, been very reluctant to expand the membership of the ANZUS Treaty powers. Governor :: announced that he had invited Lieutenant Everhart, USNR, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to provide the Council with a briefing on the military situation at Dien Bien Phu. At the conclusion of his presentation, Lieutenant SPLIT pointed out that in the last two days many airdrops of French supplies had fallen into the hands of the Vietminh, which presented a serious problem for the garrison at Dien Bien Phu. Unless this garrison were reinforced, Admiral SPLIT saw no way to save the situation. The SPLIT replied that this was the case, and the SPLIT replied that some help could be got to them by U.S. forces as early as tomorrow morning if the decision were made. The :: also doubted the existence of guns of this calibre.) Finally, said Mr. Dulles, there was yet no proof of the further French report that Chinese soldiers were manning some of the anti-aircraft artillery positions around Dien Bien Phu. General Cogny suspects this to be the case because the fire has been so accurate. Mr. SPLIT pointed out that according to his advices [advisers] the Dien Bien Phu garrison had sufficient food to last for three days and sufficient ammunition to last perhaps four or five days. The French were, of course, in very bad shape. They could not evacuate their wounded, and the airdrop of supplies was becoming very difficult. Precise details were lacking since the radio at Dien Bien Phu had been out of operation since Sunday afternoon, April 4, our time. Mr. SPLIT supported the view of Secretary SPLIT confirmed and said that the Tonkin Delta was actually the key to the military defense of all of Southeast Asia. As the SPLIT described as '93a very temporary solution at best'94. Mr. SPLIT and Governor SPLIT then reminded the Council of the views of Laniel and Bidault that the fate of Indochina rested on the outcome of the battle at Dien Bien Phu. Secretary SPLIT cautioned that this was not a unanimous military assessment, but it was his personal view that the French stood a very good chance of losing the battle at Dien Bien Phu and that the consequences were very hard to predict. If the battle were lost, the French might well not hold the line at Geneva. It was not merely the military repercussions, but the heavy psychological blow of losing Dien Bien Phu. This would not only be a blow to French prestige; the French would lose the flower of their own forces and would probably be deserted by the Vietnamese troops. Secretary SPLIT insisted that we have done just that, but that the French could never get B'9629'92s into operation in time to change the situation at Dien Bien Phu. Admiral SPLIT then went on to list the various responses we had made to French requests for assistance, and stated that this amounted to agreeing to every feasible French request. The French were, even so, unable to operate efficiently the B'9626 planes already in their hands. They can only use these planes on an average of 25 hours a month, whereas we average 100 hours of use each month. The trouble was the painful inefficiency of the French. The :: while admitting that the situation described in the Estimate was highly speculative, said the conclusions appeared to him overly optimistic. General Ely, for example, felt strongly that if Dien Bien Phu fell the whole Vietnamese army would melt away. In reply, SPLIT pointed out that General Cogny, who in the Admiral'92s opinion was an abler officer than General Navarre, was convinced that the Vietminh forces would infiltrate into the delta area very promptly after the fall of Dien Bien Phu. The French were likewise very fearful of Communist-inspired riots in the large towns of Indochina, as occurred in 1946. 8. Reports on the Geneva Conference and the Indochina Situation (NSC Action No. 1086) 3 At the urgent request of General Ely, the Chairman of the French Chiefs of Staff, Admiral SPLIT met with him on Saturday night. 8 Ely stated that he came to SPLIT as a representative of the French Government as a consequence of a Cabinet meeting just ended. Apparently, said Admiral SPLIT Ely had been sent to talk to him by Bidault and Pleven as one military man to another. Ely said that he came to ask for American intervention, realizing that such intervention could have no direct bearing on Dien Bien Phu. The point he wanted to stress was that American aid should be given before Dien Bien Phu fell, for the psychological effect in France and in Indochina, and to prevent deterioration. He added a personal opinion that the French Cabinet included a few strong members'97Laniel, Bidault and Pleven. The balance of the Cabinet was weak. He was not optimistic as to the number of days Dien Bien Phu could hold out. He therefore urged prompt action by the U.S., and inferred that refusal of the United States to render aid at this critical time could have severe implications for future relations between France and the United States. Admiral SPLIT said he reported this conversation to Ambassador Dillon, who passed it on to Secretary SPLIT said he had discussed this conversation with General Ely and with General Gruenther, who stated that he had never observed the morale in high French governmental circles to be so low as at the present time. At the conclusion of the reading of this summary statement, Admiral SPLIT went on to brief the Council on the military situation in Indochina, with the aid of maps and charts. He first spoke of '93Operation Atlante'94 in the southern part of Indochina. This operation had not only come to a standstill; the French were actually on the defensive and in some trouble. Two Vietminh battalions had made an incursion into Cambodia ten days ago and had caused consternation. Vietminh action in the delta area had been concentrated against communications, especially those linking Hanoi and Haiphong. One whole Vietminh division had recently infiltrated the delta. With respect to the situation at Dien Bien Phu, Admiral SPLIT pointed out that the area now held by the French had shrunk to about 1500 yards in diameter, making it very difficult to drop supplies to the garrison. He estimated the garrison'92s minimum requirements for supplies at about 200 tons a day. He estimated the total French casualties to be about 5500. There were nearly 1000 litter cases being cared for in underground dispensaries. There were 2000 walking wounded who were able to make some contribution to the defense of the position. The French forces were now estimated to total about 8500 infantrymen and 1200 artillerymen. Against this force the Vietminh had marshalled an estimated 40,000. General Navarre feels that the Vietminh will succeed in taking Dien Bien Phu by asphyxiation, and Admiral SPLIT was inclined to believe that this was true. Accordingly, there was less likelihood of another mass assault by the Vietminh. The relief column, of which there had been so much notice in the press lately, consisted of about 3000 indigenous troops officered by Frenchmen. In their progress north they had now about reached the beginning of the relatively good road which led to Dien Bien Phu, a distance of 29 miles. The column, said Admiral SPLIT was not strong enough to affect significantly the outcome at Dien Bien Phu unless it were reinforced by the airdrop of additional troops. Admiral SPLIT expressed the belief that such reinforcement was feasible. The French were continuing to drop paratroopers into Dien Bien Phu, though in recent days the number of men dropped into the fortress did not equal the casualties, which amounted to between 120 and 150 a day. A brief interval of silence followed Admiral Radford'92s briefing, after which Governor SPLIT replied that this was not quite the case, since our objective was to hold in a given situation rather than to achieve a victory at once. Secretary",military,bureaucracies_55,bureaucracies
"also favored this proposal. Mr. SPLIT raised the question of what our reaction should be in the event that the Chinese Communists sent in MIG aircraft for operations over Indochina. Mr. SPLIT asked whether it would be sensible to forget about Indochina for a while and concentrate on the effort to get the remaining free nations of Southeast Asia in some sort of condition to resist Communist aggression against themselves. The :: answered various questions, and Admiral :: inquired as to the timing in carrying out the proposed Council action suggested by Mr. Cutler. As he understood it, the initial effort would be to work out the coalition, after which the problem would be taken up to Congress to find out their attitude toward U.S. participation. The SPLIT returned to the question of the timing. Would this course of action consume a matter of days, or weeks, or months? The :: said that there had developed quite a difference of opinion in the Defense Department on the question whether a military decision in Indochina was actually imminent. Mr. SPLIT and Mr. Dulles. The SPLIT replied that certainly the Pentagon had become very concerned in recent days that the military situation in Indochina seemed to be moving with great rapidity in the wrong direction. The SPLIT turned to Secretary SPLIT by pointing out that he had used almost the same language in describing the peril in Southeast Asia as the Joint Chiefs of Staff had earlier used in their comment on the Italian paper, to the effect that we had about reached the point where we could not afford to permit the Communists to take over by any means further parts of the free world'92s territory. Governor SPLIT pointed out that of course unfortunately the northern part of Indochina was the most valuable part of the country, which view Admiral SPLIT said that it was this opinion which had done so much to modify the previous military assessment of the likelihood of imminent French defeat or withdrawal in Indochina. Admiral SPLIT informed the Council that he had just received a request from the French for from ten to twenty B'9629 aircraft together with the necessary U.S. maintenance personnel. The French, said Secretary Wilson, insist that they have the crews to keep ten of these B'9629 planes in continuous operation, and had suggested that they should be based on U.S. facilities in the Philippines. The United States would, of course, be expected to supply the bombs and ammunition. At first glance, said Secretary Wilson, we in the Pentagon were inclined to regard this proposal as pretty fantastic, and we have been on the point of refusing it. Governor :: inquired of the :: said with great emphasis that the",military,bureaucracies_56,bureaucracies
"Well, it isn't good this morning. We were hoping last night that the Army would be able to get together but they are split. The Wessin group and the Air Force are in one camp; a large part of the Army that is in Santo Domingo, the capital itself, is supporting the rebel government and the loyalties of the troops outside the capital are still uncertain. They have not gone over to the rebels yet and presumably they will split too. The Wessin forces are separated from the center of town by a river which is commanded by the rebels'97the bridge over the river'97there is only one. The guns controlling the bridge are being strafed by the Air Force and Wessin has not yet tried to move across the bridge with his main troops. Looting is going on in the city and a lot of chaos. They have got about 1400 Marines on board these ships standing offshore. I just asked if we might alert Defense, we might have to airlift in case things got very bad, some people out of the southern part of the U.S. assuming the Marines could get control of. SPLIT Well, by air. SPLIT We've alerted Defense against the possibility of having to airlift some additional people down in case the 1400 are needed and are not enough. I do not think that there is anything that we can do right now except wait it out. I do not know how it will go. They are not likely to do too much shooting'97at least they never have in the past. Either the troops on one side or the other are likely to cave. We heard last night late that they were moving over to Wessin's side and it apparently stiffened during the night and early this morning. SPLIT I don't think he could get in right now. I don't think anybody can get in right now. :: said that he thought Mr. mann should consider giving an alternative to the Hotel Ambassador if, as a matter of fact, they cannot get in without serious losses. He said he thought the military commander should have some discretion. Mr. :: said there is a possibility that the mere landing of Marines will serve to strengthen the will of the Wessin side. The first thing is to go in and say we are there to evacuate. The second thing is to let them come and negotiate. The SPLIT said that was correct. The SPLIT said we could not be sure because the Ambassador is saying that the loyal troops cannot guarantee the route from the Hotel to Haina. Mr. SPLIT agreed. 1 'a0 :: Mr. Rusk reviewed developments of the past several days in the Dominican Republic. He explained that the PRD moved to overthrow Donald Reid Cabral, successfully ousted him quickly. However, some elements of the Army were determined not to allow ex- :: said he thought we would know tomorrow. He said it seems that we have two or three possibilities. He said that the consensus was that the presence of the Marines would calm everyone down. He added that this would have been true before the commies came but what we don't know is what difference the commies will make. He said if it all quiets down the anti-communist forces will get control and we can guide it. If, on the other hand, we have to fight or go in and clean up it is possible that we will be in trouble, in terms of international organizations. He said we had been giving thought to which one of the various routes we should take if we go get in trouble. He explained about the Rio Treaty 3 and a confrontation between two countries vs the situation if someone else invokes it. He said we therefore had to balance off the advantage of taking the initiative against the advantage of winning the battle. He said we do not know if they will attack US in the UN but they could. He said we are losing a little bit by not taking the initiative in the OAS because we could say that they had already '93seized'94 but if we take the initiative we lose a lot of our freedom of action. The SPLIT said he did not know whether they would be able to carry on in the dark. He said he assumed that since the number is up to 4,000 now it is going on during the dark and he would say they have evacuated 700 to a thousand. He said we were not sure. Mr. SPLIT said that the real trouble would come when we are finished with the evacuation'97when we have to find a reason to stay on and he thought we would probably have to say that there are 2,000 Americans in the country'97outside of Santo Domingo, and begin to stall a bit some time tomorrow. Mr. SPLIT said we would have a lot of decisions to make tomorrow. The SPLIT said he did not know what had happened between noon yesterday and noon today because when he talked to the Ambassador last night around 10:30 or 11:00, 4 the Ambassador thought it would be all over within five hours. Mr. SPLIT said the only thing he could figure was that the troops themselves must have become fed up with the shooting at Dominicans and just sort of refused to carry out orders'97maybe there have even been mass defections. The SPLIT said that the figures he had seen were closer to 7 or 8,000. He said AP had an item saying 10,000'97and this was composed of all the rag-tags, scum, riff-raff and commies, everybody they could fool. He said he would not be surprised if he had 2,000 but he would be surprised if he had 10. The SPLIT said he would guess around 4 million. Mr. SPLIT said he was a little worried. He said the Ambassador had asked that the Marines be landed and Mr. SPLIT felt that perhaps the anti-communist troops were not as weak as the Ambassador thought. However, the Ambassador had said they were necessary and we had no alternative. Mr. SPLIT said it was one of those situations where you have to rely on the people in the field. He said it was not only the Ambassador's recommendation'97the Country Team recommended it and that includes the three military attach'e9s, political section chief, economic section chief, agriculture, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ], etc. Mr. SPLIT mentioned that [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] were ahead of US on this all the way. They were sending in memos predicting doom if we did not send in the Marines. The SPLIT said it was true, even when things appeared to be going pretty good. Mr. SPLIT told the president that all of Bosch's people went into asylum today'97they thought it was all over. The SPLIT said he thought it was the commies. He said he thought they had been building up strong points in the poorer sections of town. He said however that we do not know because no one can circulate around without getting shot. 1 'a0 :: Danger of junta renouncing US because they sense anti-Communist sentiment. '93 SPLIT But we have done considerable; we have put men ashore without real angry response. '93 :: Has doubts about the Communists in charge'97CIA has no doubts. Rebels are not all of the same stripe. With [American] troops in the country it is difficult to talk with the rebels. '93",military,bureaucracies_57,bureaucracies
"asked if we wanted to take on the role of peace maker. Mr. SPLIT asked who was holding the Hotel Ambassador now, and added that he assumed it was the friendlies. 2 Mr. SPLIT said in any event the recommendation was clear: we give the order and then we begin to draft the statements. The :: There is no real news. It's perfectly clear that the rebels have dug in down in the city with in-town guerrilla techniques'97bazookas and mortars. There is going to be a very tough fight unless they are starved out. We don't know very much about the tactical situation. Our own people are all right. Bennett doesn't want more than the 400 he has got at the moment. We are backed up with good strong forces that are available at intervals of up to about 8 hours now for more battalions from outside the area. We have got another 1,000 men right offshore if we want them, and 2,000 more 8 hours away and another 2,000 at one day intervals from there on. We are not going to need that force unless Buzz Wheeler is very much surprised. But the political front is the one that is hotting up. There will be a meeting in the OAS this morning. Leoni has pitched in pretty hard with the clear implication that we are against dictatorships on both sides. If there is this kind of violence by Castro-types in the city, I think we can expect very good support in the OAS because it is just what about two thirds of those governments are afraid of. The Castro people have taken out after US pretty hard on the radio and the Soviets are beginning to do so, although they haven't yet zeroed in very hard. We have a problem with a request for asylum from Reid and Caceres, who are two of the triumvirs who have been thrown out. We are trying to get them taken care of either by the Papal Nuncio or by some other Embassy so we won't be in the particular position of protecting unpopular people but they would get stabbed in the back by the Commies if they were caught so we have a certain obligation there. We will simply be dependent upon information from there as the day goes forward. My guess is that we now have a sufficient force on the ground. We will have to wait and see if the Dominicans can handle it for themselves with this moral support. But we'll have to keep a sharp eye to be ready to take stronger action if it looks as if the Communists were beginning to win. Our own people of course have only perimeter defense and evacuation orders. They have taken 2 or 3 hundred people out as of last night. That still means, if my figures are right, 800 odd Americans who aren't ready to leave or who haven't asked to leave or who are not in an area where they can be removed. We have enclaves at the Embassy, Hotel Ambassador, polo field. The Task Force Commander is sending a senior officer ashore, probably has him there now, to be in touch both with the military authorities, the friendly ones and with the Embassy. Our situation in terms of our own position is strong, but the situation on the other side is simply indeterminate. That at least is the way it reads to me after talking to people around town this morning. SPLIT But one of his tanks got knocked out, and they aren't in a hurry to go through the town as I understand it now. I think that we're in a situation where the rebels are pretty well into pockets. But if the police lose their courage or if the rebels extend their holdings in the city, you could have yourself a very tough cleaning up operation. And it wouldn't be a happy decision to have to ask the Marines to do that, but I don't think it will come to that in the course of the day. I'll be surprised if it does. SPLIT This is all inside as I understand it so far. And I'm quite sure I think we ought to make sure the Navy is watching. But I will be very surprised if the Cubans try anything in the way of an invasion. We certainly ought to watch for it because it's not a surprise we want to have get away on us. SPLIT Bennett and the Agency; we have a double check. Now the Agency was extremely slow in informing US yesterday and we climbed up and down their back. It's not Raborn's fault but some of his technical people were protecting their goddamn codewords and it took one of their very important messages 5 hours to get here. Bennett, fortunately, was not interrupted; it was very, very good work by Bromley Smith who was feeding that stuff into US yesterday afternoon that allowed US to take those decisions so the troops were in before nightfall. It would have been damn hard to have put them in if we hadn't done it that fast. So we just made it yesterday and we've got all those wires who have been skinned and bruised during the night. SPLIT I'll have to do a check, but I'll have to say that there was nothing in it that gave me any sense of alarm. SPLIT I really think we've got the contingencies taped here so that it is a matter of picking off the order. The only tough part is how to be sure which is the right order. But we can't be absolutely sure. We'll never be sure that they wouldn't have won without the United States. We only know that we could not take that chance. That will be the same shape of the decision from now on out. SPLIT Our problem is to have our force operate as potential and not as operational. That's the exact shape of the problem. And, therefore, there ought to be plenty on the scene and visible so the moral effect will be decisive. SPLIT I guess he feels that's enough at the moment. I honestly haven't seen the detail of his report. 3 SPLIT '85 if you want it perfectly clear who's strong '85, SPLIT The politics of 400 and of 1,500 are identical it seems to me. :: We ought to wait a day. By that time we can have some legitimate cover. '93 SPLIT We have done a great deal. We are talking about a division going in and we couldn't do that several days ago. '93 SPLIT Here are some thoughts that may or may not be helpful to you. One thing is clear: a Castro victory in the D.R. would [be] the worst domestic political disaster we could possibly suffer. But in order to quash Castro in D.R. we need above all else to get hemispheric public opinion on our side.",political,bureaucracies_58,bureaucracies
"Admiral Raborn reported that there had been positive identification of three ringleaders of the Rebels as Castro-trained agents. The Secretary of :: Well, the news is about the same as it was last night. We have about 500 Marines ashore. The rebels have heavy weapons and are holed up and barricading themselves in the center of the city. And the police force are relatively ineffective against these people because they can't deal with these heavier weapons. They found a tank which was promptly knocked out by a bazooka. There was no report of any contact or any fighting by our Marines. That's in Santo Domingo. [Omitted here is a situation report on Vietnam.] SPLIT Yes, we do. We have identified 8 hard-core, Castro-trained guerrillas that are'97they came in, they pushed aside the Bosch people and took command of the forces. The Bosch people well, they might be slightly pink, but were not the kind of terrorists that the Castroites were. Now they took over the situation rapidly. They raided the police station, took their arms, took their uniforms, and are sort of in command of the city in spots. The regular army, their tank units and so forth just sat on their bitty box over there and haven't done a darned thing about moving in. I think he's afraid of the gasoline bombs and the bazookas in the hands of the rebels. The army officers are holed up inside the city in one or two places and seem to have lost their nerve against the hard-core and hard-nosed guerrillas. I think they lined up a bunch of people and shot them and this sort of terrorized the other folks. In my opinion this is a real struggle mounted by Mr. Castro. SPLIT I think it's clear we have got to take more positive action to clean these people out. Otherwise it's liable to drag on and on, and eventually these other folks, Castro types, will get the top hand and then we'll have a mess on our hands. Then we will restore order and turn things back over to the Junta. We had a member of the junta who begged US to do this. SPLIT It could sir, and I notice the OAS is meeting this morning. 2 But there is no question in my mind that this is the start of Castro's expansion. SPLIT Well, we have positively identified 8 of them. And I sent a list over to the White House about 6 o'clock. It should be in the situation room'97who they are, what they are doing and what their training has been. 3 SPLIT From my review of the material I think we have been pretty much on top of this. Forces are being pre-positioned and all that and ready to move in was part of the deal. I think there are some deficiencies in our ability to get a regular broadcast-sized radio aboard ship. We probably should have some aboard ship so we can reassure the population and all that sort of thing. The local radio station went off the air and the only thing they heard was from Puerto Rico. It looks to me like we ought to equip ourselves with regular household radio transmitters so the house radio could broadcast information directly to the people if we so wished. [Omitted here is the remainder of the conversation with Raborn confirming that walkie-talkies had been distributed the day before.] 1 'a0 :: No. 1496/65 SITUATION AND OUTLOOK IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 1. Military Position The rebel forces continue to dominate the military situation and are apparently using the tenuous cease fire to strengthen their positions. Numbering between two and five thousand, they are concentrated in the southeastern area of the city. The rebels appear to be well armed, adequately supplied and determined to continue the fight. 2. Loyalist Forces The loyalist forces are completely inadequate even to police the cease fire. Most of the troops under Brigadier General Wessin y Wessin, numbering about 1,250 men, have withdrawn to the east side of the Duarte Bridge for their own safety. Brigadier General Salvador Montas Guerrero with about 200 men has apparently abandoned the National Palace leaving the entire southeastern area under rebel control. Army Chief Rivera Cuesta is commanding about 400 troops in the northwestern part of the city and 1,200 naval combat troops are deployed around the fair grounds. Approximately 2,400 police are defending their headquarters and the police radio station. There are no other loyalist troops in the city. 3. US Forces As of 0430 EDT US military forces in the Dominican Republic totalled 7,874'97including 2,955 Marines and 4,919 Army troops. Marine casualties are two killed and 20 wounded; Army casualties are one killed, another probably killed and 16 wounded. A large gap still remains between the 82nd Airborne and the Marine phase line in the western part of the city. Many of the Army casualties occurred early last night when a patrol was sent from the Army beachhead at the Duarte Bridge to the Marine phase line. 4. The Interior Various reports show that the interior generally remains calm and this may indicate a lack of sympathy for the rebel cause. The longer the present situation exists, however, the greater is the chance that the countryside will grow more restive. A report via ham radio last night from the US Consul in Santiago, the country's second largest city, stated that while all communications are out, conditions in the consular district are generally good, with Dominican military and police units in effective control. The highway to Santiago remains closed since rebels reportedly overran a police post at Villa Altagracia yesterday. 5. General Political Situation Neither the rebels nor the loyalists now appear to have the ability or the means to form an effective instrument of national political control. The rebels, aside from their insistence that the '93constitutionalist forces'94 take over the government, are believed to be thoroughly divided over how this should properly be done and who should play what role. This fragmentation serves only the purposes of the Communists and extremists who now dominate the rebel movement. Bosch himself to return and take over the government. [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] yesterday found more enthusiasm for '93constitutionality'94 per se than for Bosch during their talks with Dominicans in Santo Domingo hospitals. In addition, the loyalist force and its Junta have no one in whom the public has any confidence. 6. Latin American Reactions Reaction thus far has generally been fairly restrained, except in the case of Castro's Cuba, but an increasingly active role by US military forces now present in the Dominican Republic would probably result in an almost universal condemnation of the US and in a flurry of violent attacks on US installations around the hemisphere. Most informed Latin American officials at the moment probably have little or no sympathy for the Communists and extremists whom they have learned are dominating the Dominican rebel forces. By the same token, however, neither do they have any sympathy for the military forces such as General Wessin and other officers leading the loyalist forces. Any sudden change for the better in the loyalists' fortunes would be viewed with deep suspicion by most other Latin American countries. 7. Conclusions (a) Neither of the contending forces in the capital is now capable of imposing its will on the other. The loyalists are weak, disorganized, and lack popular support. The rebels, although strongly ribbed by well-trained extremist leaders and in command of the most populous parts of the capital, cannot significantly expand their position in the city as long as US troops remain. (b) The rebels probably have two immediate goals: (1) to use the present lull to consolidate their positions in the capital and to stimulate provincial areas to declare for them; and (2) to insure themselves a '93large piece'94 of whatever arrangement the OAS authorities are finally able to put together. (c) As the present situation becomes more fixed, we believe the status of the rebel forces will receive increasing if grudging support from other Latin Americans. Certainly the international repugnance to any effort to '93clean out'94 the rebel area will grow as each day passes. This could, of course, be reversed if the rebels should become aggressive and persistently violate the truce. 1 'a0",military,bureaucracies_59,bureaucracies
"said that we took a very serious view of the arms shipments from Soviet-controlled territory to Guatemala. I said that it might require a revision of U.S. planning. In view of the gravity of the situation, :: raised the question of what should be done to prevent further shipments of war munitions from the Soviets to Guatemala. He pointed out that a Swedish ship had already landed two thousand tons of munitions in Guatemala. (The US erroneously took to Puerto Rico and unloaded a decoy ship, and missed the munitions carrier.) The Secretary thought that we should act promptly, in order to avoid the importation of such a great amount of arms that a major military effort would be required by the US to handle the developing situation. The basic request made by State was that the Navy be authorized to halt suspicious vessels on the high seas off the Guatemalan coast, voluntarily if possible, but by force, if necessary, and if such vessels refused permission to inspect their cargoes, to take them to Panama for inspection; the US being prepared to pay any damage or demurrage. In answer to the :: -720 2. Since May 1, a strike situation has developed in Honduras in which the entire north coast area has been paralyzed. There is reason to believe that the strike may have had inspiration and support from the Guatemalan side of the Honduran boundary. The situation has prompted the Honduran government to send much of the weakly organized and poorly equipped Honduran army to the strike area and to stand guard on the Guatemalan border, thus stripping the capital at Tegucigalpa of military forces. 3. In these circumstances an armed attack by Guatemala could, perhaps, in a matter of hours, bring about the fall of the Honduran government. 2 (If Guatemalan aggression took some form other than an '93armed attack'94, Article 3 would not apply and other provisions of the Rio Treaty would have to be invoked.) 4. Any successor government which arose in Honduras as the result of a successful Guatemalan attack might well have the same leaning toward Communism that distinguishes the present government of Guatemala. This would pose a most serious threat to the ability of the other governments of Central America to withstand Communist penetration or control. It would thus constitute a serious threat to the security of the area and, correspondingly, to United States security interests there. :: suggested one slight amendment in the Presidential statement, and said that he had little else to say except that the State Department has commenced its informal conversations with those countries which were likely to have vessels in the area near Guatemala. He predicted that these various countries would not accord formal recognition of our right to detain and search their vessels on the high seas, but that they would be willing to look the other way while we did this. Secretary SPLIT also expressed the opinion that action taken thus far by the United States had probably scared away other vessels carrying arms to Guatemala. Accordingly, the immediate danger of shipments of arms to Guatemala had been allayed. The point that had been hard to get other people to appreciate was the relative magnitude of the first shipment of arms to Guatemala. While not in itself large, the shipment really had produced a serious shift in the balance of military power in Central America in favor of Guatemala. Mr. SPLIT replied that part, at least, of these arms was apparently being set aside for subversive activity both in Honduras and Nicaragua. Mr. SPLIT commented that of course the essence of the matter was not the place of origin but the fact of a hostile government in Guatemala. If this government succeeds in procuring arms next time from elsewhere than the Soviet bloc, we should, of course, do all we can to prevent the shipment from reaching its destination. Secretary SPLIT pointed out that Guatemala'92s military establishment was three times as large as the military establishments of all its neighbors put together. This completely denied Guatemala'92s allegation that the arms it had imported were for its own self-defense. With regard to the problem of military assistance to the Latin American republics, the",military,bureaucracies_60,bureaucracies
"then pointed out that the forthcoming arms shipments to Guatemala might well come from other countries than those behind the Iron Curtain, and wondered whether the phrasing of the President'92s statement should be changed to recognize this fact and to take account of the importance of the use to which the arms were put rather than the place of origin of the shipment. Secretary :: 1. As of 20 June the outcome of the efforts to overthrow the regime of President Arbenz of Guatemala remains very much in doubt. The controlling factor in the situation is still considered to be the position of the Guatemalan armed forces, and thus far this group has not given any clear indication of whether it will move, and if so, in which way. If the Guatemalan army should move within the next few days against the Arbenz regime, it is considered to have the capacity to overthrow it. On the other hand if it remains loyal and if most of the military elements commit themselves to vigorous action against the forces of Castillo Armas the latter will be defeated and a probability of uprisings from among other elements of the population is considered highly unlikely. 2. The position of the top-ranking military officers is constantly shifting with daily rises and falls in their attitudes. This group has long proclaimed its strong anti-Communist feelings and its ultimate intention of doing something to rid the government of Communist influences. Various officers have declared themselves as willing to take action against the regime given just a little more time or just a little more justification. It is probable that the rising pressure of events will compel this group to declare its position, one way or the other, at any time from now on'97although the possible result could be a split in the ranks. [There are unconfirmed rumors as of Saturday night to the effect that Colonel Diaz, the Chief of the Armed Forces, and some 40 officers had applied for asylum in various foreign embassies in Guatemala City, but these embassies have not yet confirmed this report.] 1 3. The Guatemalan Airforce has thus far failed to produce any interception effort against the overflights by the Castillo Armas planes. However very heavy anti-aircraft fire is reported. 4. There is thus far no evidence to confirm the charges and propaganda of the Guatemalan regime of bombing attacks upon Guatemala. On the contrary there are eyewitness accounts of clumsy efforts to fabricate evidence of aerial bombardment (the home of Colonel Mendoza'97one of the defecting airforce officers, was set on fire by the police). It is probable that some of the damage to oil storage facilities and other installations, attributed by the Guatemalan Government as well as by Castillo Armas, to bombing attacks is in fact the result of sabotage efforts on the part of Castillo Armas agents or other resistance elements. 5. There is considerable evidence of a determination on the part of the Guatemalan Government to mobilize and arm Communist-controlled student youth and labor (agriculture) organizations. At the same time there is evidence of a hasty attempt to mobilize additional strength for the army. 6. There are strong indications of mounting tension between the army and the Guardia Civil '97the Communist influenced police organization. 7. We cannot confirm that either Puerto Barrios or San Jose has fallen to the Castillo Armas forces, but its is clear that there have been uprisings in these and other cities. A bridge on the key railroad line between Guatemala City and Puerto Barrios is reliably reported to have been damaged near Gualan. Description of the Castillo Armas Movement 8. The action of Colonel Castillo Armas is not in any sense a conventional military operation. He is dependent for his success not upon the size and strength of the military forces at his disposal but rather upon the possibility that his entry into action will touch off a general uprising against the Guatemalan regime. The forces of Castillo Armas entering Guatemala from Honduras are estimated to number about 300 men. These have now been joined by others from inside the country to make a total in excess of 600 armed men. (The majority of this number is equipped with rifles, sub-machine guns and 50 mm mortars. These weapons are non-U.S. manufacture.) Castillo Armas himself is expected to leave his command post in Honduras today and join one element of his forces near Jutiapa by plane, but thus far there is no word that an airfield has become available. From the command post which he proposes to establish at this location, he will endeavor to coordinate the activities of his other scattered groups throughout the country. 9. The entire effort is thus more dependent upon psychological impact rather than actual military strength, although it is upon the ability of the Castillo Armas effort to create and maintain for a short time the impression of very substantial military strength that the success of this particular effort primarily depends. The use of a small number of airplanes and the massive use of radio broadcasting are designed to build up and give main support to the impression of Castillo Armas'92 strength as well as to spread the impression of the regime'92s weakness. 10. From the foregoing description of the effort it will be seen how important are the aspects of deception and timing. If the effort does not succeed in arousing the other latent forces of resistance within the next period of approximately twenty-four hours, it will probably begin to lose strength.",military,bureaucracies_61,bureaucracies
"said our Ambassador in Haiti did not recommend that Marine forces be kept aboard ship just over the horizon. This matter is to be followed closely because of the uncertain situation in Haiti. :: It concluded that Duvalier was precariously threatened by opposition groups inside and outside Haiti. These groups were nonetheless ill-equipped to gain effective control of the government should Duvalier be eliminated. Anarchy was the most likely result; and Castro and Haitian Communists would profit most. There were few options open to the United States direct U.S. intervention would be strongly protested in Latin America, and the Dominican Republic's intervention would raise as many problems as it would solve. OAS intervention would be difficult to sell to the other members, but it was the best option. An OAS mission would have to take responsibility for a remedial economic program and establishing law and order conducive to formation of a successor regime. [Here follows discussion of other Latin American topics (see {{*{HYPERLINK ""https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d56""}}{ Document 56}}) and further discussion on Cuba (see {{*{HYPERLINK ""https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11""}}{ Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, volume XI}}).] 1 'a0 :: commented that Bosch was collecting a good many of the exiled military in the Dominican Republic, and we and the Dominicans were maintaining them. The SPLIT pointed out that the Dominican military stopped Bosch first, that they were not capable of acting. Ambassador :: replied that he felt we still had a strong interest in changing the regime and that, if we did not do so within two to three years, the dangers of communist activity were substantial. He did not think the communists wanted to move in now but would prefer to wait in order to establish relations with a more popular and secure regime than that of Duvalier. SPLIT said that the problem of making a change was becoming increasingly difficult as most of the good leaders were leaving Haiti. It would be desirable to keep in close touch with them, maintain their interest and promote cooperation among them. At the same time we should keep the economic pressure on the Duvalier regime. He mentioned that they were under considerable pressure and were seeking aid from France, Germany and Italy, though he thought it unlikely that any of them would be willing to provide much help. He mentioned the French were thinking of moving slowly on a few technicians. SPLIT said that he as well as the experts concerned in the State Department doubted that Soviet bloc was greatly interested in Haiti at this time. SPLIT pointed out that it was better for the Haitians with United States support to act than that the Dominicans be publicly involved in view of the long hatred between the Haitians and the Dominicans. Mr. SPLIT thought 500 well-trained Haitians would do it with not more than a battalion of United States forces off shore as back up just in case. 1 'a0",political,bureaucracies_62,bureaucracies
". 2 2. Fleet units now positioned off the island of Gonaive may be withdrawn after May 23 if there have been no untoward developments before then indicating reconsideration of this decision. There will continue to be an increased patrol of the Windward Passage to insure against illicit traffic between Cuba and Haiti. (Action Department of Defense) 3. Involvement in any program to unseat Duvalier should be limited, for the present at least, to encouraging and helping fund an effort by Haitians. Further consideration of the commitment of U.S. prestige or U.S. forces should be deferred until we have fully explored this approach. [ 1 line of source text not declassified ] (a) Great care should be taken to insure that we control the time frame of any revolutionary action that might involve the United States in any way. (b) [ 4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] 4. A determined effort should be made during the course of the next few months to encourage the development of an exile force that might challenge Duvalier. (The manner in which this decision was reached did not preclude intensified efforts to achieve the same goal by working with oppositionists within Haiti.) [ 1 line of source text not declassified ] McGeorge Bundy 1 'a0 :: raised the problem of creating the momentum by supporting a Haitian exile build-up which might be difficult to control. While this danger was recognized, it was agreed that we should move ahead by assuring control of any decision to initiate action. He did not want an abortive action. He asked how many people were required to upset the regime. Ambassador",political,bureaucracies_63,bureaucracies
"first discussed the question of whether or not the United States should be tolerant of U.S. nationals acting on a purely private and '93soldier-of-fortune'94 basis (e.g. CAT) in performing services for the patriots in Sumatra. The SPLIT then discussed the future, pointing out that it did not seem likely that the patriots could gain a victory or in the long run sustain themselves without overt support from outside. On the other hand it seemed as though their willingness to fight needed to be better demonstrated before they would be entitled to overt support. This willingness to fight might, however, in turn be promoted if they knew that if they fought vigorously and well and accepted some casualties, there was some future ahead. SPLIT suggested [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] a communication to the leadership of the patriots on a highly confidential basis that our feeling is if they put up a stubborn resistance to the imminent attack by the Central Government threatened on the West Coast off Padang, the United States would be disposed to consider some form of recognition which might permit of overt support from the U.S. or Asian countries which might join in that recognition. On the other hand, if they did not show a real will to fight and dedication to their cause, they could not expect such support. SPLIT discussed various alternatives which recognition might take. One was the recognition of belligerency against the Central Government. Another was recognition of the government of the Sumatran State on the assumption, however, that that state would be part of an Indonesian federation as soon as an appropriate constitution was adopted. A third step was merely to recognize them as the de facto government of the area they controlled. A fourth measure that might be considered was for the United States to land forces for the protection of American life and property on Sumatra, notably at the oil fields. SPLIT recommended against this latter course on the ground that the use of the U.S. military to protect oil interests in that part of the world would receive a very adverse reaction. The",political,bureaucracies_64,bureaucracies
"The answer to the first question turns on the judgment of whether Bani-Sadr and his associates will be able to deliver more in the future than in the past, and whether he would be helped or hurt by increased U.S. pressure. Any increase in pressure will have to be unilateral action by the U.S. Bani-Sadr is living on hope, and he will attempt to string out negotiations in the chance that something will turn up. Realistically, the odds appear very slim. Unless we take some firm measures which convince all parties that we will not stand still indefinitely, we can anticipate that the hostages will remain captive well into the summer. (S) Limited military actions are likely to be most effective in persuading the Iranians and our friends that a political solution is urgently required. By dramatizing the risks of continued procrastination, it could strengthen the hand of those working for a solution. There are obviously risks involved in such a course. However, a carefully orchestrated program of increasing pressure is the only apparent alternative to simply leaving the hostages to the fate of internal Iranian politics for the foreseeable future. (S) The longer-term issue of countering a leftist buildup in Iran is directly related to the hostage situation. Again our options are limited, and the natural obstacles we could expect to face in a militant revolutionary environment are compounded by our concern for the welfare of the hostages. Nevertheless, this is a problem which cannot be ignored. We would begin immediately building our relationships with nationalist elements inside and outside Iran. This will not go unnoticed by the leadership in Iran. However, we are accused of doing this in any case, and the investment in human resources at this stage will be one of the primary levers we will have to influence events over the longer term. } :: Energy.If the Iranians reduce production significantly, this will pose a problem for us. If oil is only redirected away from the U.S., we could compensate. 4. Military Options. Thus far, the press has speculated on military options but has been unable to get any official sources to talk. It was agreed that no U.S. forces would be moved while the emissaries are conducting their talks. The principal weakness of the possible rescue operation is intelligence on exactly where the hostages are being held, how their captors are armed, etc. This is being worked on, but :: thought.this would be a good step to take since it could be a useful and necessary prior step for seizing the assets or dismantling the freeze we have imposed. The signal could be played either way. However, this action by itself would probably not be effective in pressuring Iran, and the timing should be left open until we have decided on an overall approach. (C) Dr. :: suspected that we are increasingly perceived as ineffective and indecisive. The convening of the new Parliament, which will probably not occur until May, will probably make the situation worse, not better. He wondered if the situation was not turning into farce. He proposed that we keep the UN Commission alive, but that we deliver a private, credible ultimate to the Iranians and to the allies that if the situation has not been resolved peaceably and with dignity by April 15 we will take unilateral actions which will be highly disruptive to Iranian society. We would not specify precisely what we would do. This would break the present impasses in which the Iranians have every incentive to do nothing. Mr. Aaron agreed, but added that we need to take some action which will make our threat credible, since it is doubtful that the Iranians would believe us today. Mr. SPLIT said he did not believe that this situation was comparable to the Pueblo incident which had involved a U.S. Navy ship on an admitted spy mission. He was not convinced that the Islamic countries would necessarily respond negatively. He felt that our continued lack of action was losing us prestige and respect. He recognized the validity of the possible Soviet reaction, citing Groymko'92s speech this morning in which he had identified himself with the Iranians. At every point, Khomeini had taken extreme steps to assure his own personal security, and the Iranians had backed down quickly in the face of our warning on November 20. Khomeini wanted more than anything else to insure the success of the Islamic Revolution and he was not anxious to become a martyr. Secretary :: Impact of the Rescue Attempt on Iran The failure of the rescue effort will strengthen enormously the Iranian resolve to resist '93imperialism'94 and virtually guarantees that no Iranian politician can support a negotiated settlement when (and if) the hostage issue is debated in the legislature. State believes the militants will not be inclined to kill the hostages since they would lose their leverage on the domestic political scene and their ability to continue to humiliate us. (C) While the raid may provide further impetus for cementing Iranian-Soviet commercial ties, the Iranian leadership will still be very reluctant to rush into a security relationship with Moscow. It is also unlikely that any Iranian leader will be willing to enter into negotiations with the U.S. for some time to come. Instead, the Iranians will sit tight with what they have and await our next move, at least until the parliament considers the hostage issue. (C). } :: The planners were faced with a continually changing set of circumstances influenced mainly by the uncertain intentions of the hostages'92 captors and the vacillating positions of the evolving Iranian leadership. (U) The operation was feasible. It probably represented the plan with the best chance of success under the circumstances, and the decision to execute was justified. (U) The rescue mission was a high-risk operation. People and equipment were called on to perform at the upper limits of human capacity and equipment capability. } :: commented that Iran would probably cut off oil, which would raise the level of hostility in the U.S. and elsewhere; that in turn would draw criticism on those nations which were helping Iran avoid the full effects of a blockade. (TS). Mr. :: suggested that we should make it clear from the outset that this was a unilateral U.S. action limited to maritime commerce, that it was not intended to interfere with other commerce, and that we believed that the naval interruption was sufficient to make the political point and to significantly affect Iran'92s economy. Henry :: asked whether it was the judgment of the group that to be effective, Iranian exports of oil would have to be blocked, or would it be enough to block imports into Iran? Secondly, if oil exports should be terminated either by blockade or Iranian retaliation, what would be the effect? Admiral SPLIT noted that there could be a political problem if Turkey and Pakistan actively helped Iran evade a boycott at the same time we are trying to get large sums of assistance for them. Mr. SPLIT wondered what the effects would be if the threat had to be carried out. Mr. :: Coherence and Sense of Direction -- What really ties our hands about acting forcefully to retrieve our hostages is the risk of driving Iran toward the Soviets or creating chaos which the USSR can exploit. Parliament, we are reaching the point where no one in Iran may have an adequate incentive to take the significant political risk required for a resolution of the hostage crisis. Frustration on the part of the American people is eroding support for our foreign policy across the board and having a deleterious effect on our capacity to solve other problems which confront us. Although many nations praise our '93restraint'94 (out of fear of the alternatives), inactivity and drift in our efforts to resolve the hostage crisis is undermining respect for the United States in the region and worldwide. At the same time, it is essential to emerge from this crisis without driving Iran into the arms of the Soviet Union. We must recognize that resolving the hostage crisis will not in itself put us on the road to supporting Iran against leftists and Soviet pressures. Our policy options must take into account the impact they will have in the longer run. The following factors should be considered: -- The longer the delay in resolving the hostage situation, the more opportunity there will be for the left to establish itself in position to take advantage of the economic and political chaos inside Iran. -- There are no signs that any government of Iran dominated by Khomeini and the clerics will be able to bring order and economic sanity out of the present chaos. Hence, the--outlook for stability and survival under Khomeinis direction is poor. -- A propitious political situation for the hostages is not likely to develop in the short run. The election of a mullah-dominated majles will mean only that a new center of power has been created to compete with the existing three (militants, Bani-Sadr plus moderates and Khomeini). The majles will likely dominate Bani-Sadr and then seek to use its mandate from Khomeini to get control of the hostages, thus eclipsing the militants. The hard-line anti-U.S. mullahs backed by Khomeini will not be easy to bargain with. Our actions could start off with the few remaining economic sanctions and move to a break in diplomatic relations, declaration of a state of war, maritime quarantine and ultimately military action, including severe damage to the Iranian economy and society. The impact on the Islamic world would be adverse and profound, particularly if we end up spilling Islamic blood. There are, however, non-lethal options that could do major damage to the Iranian economy. Moreover, if, in the course of escalation, we find it is counterproductive, we might consider a rescue operation (see blow) even before our military operations begin. (3) Take some military action (e.g., the interrogation of vessels, maritime quarantines, mining) to underscore our seriousness as we continue to negotiate without a deadline. The lower-level action, such as interrogation, could underscore our determination to take more drastic action if necessary or could be seen as weakness. Actions such as a maritime quarantine by missing run the risk of driving the Iranians into the arms of the Soviets and could have important consequences for our Allies should it result in an oil cutoff. Our analyses of a maritime quarantine indicate that only blocking Iranian imports will have a major economic impact on Iran in a matter of weeks. At the same time it could drive Iran toward the Soviets, complicate our efforts to secure facilities in the region, and provoke condemnation of us at the Islamabad Conference. Thus the consequences of military actions of this sort and in (2) above are unpredictable and could in the worst case open Iran to Soviet penetration. (4) Rescue efforts -- the whole world would be surprised if we made such an attempt at this stage. If it would be successful, that, of course, would serve to provide a quick and honorable end to the crisis and might even be welcomed by more sensible people in Tehran. Even a moderate success would indicate a willingness to the powers that would prove helpful more generally. The consequences of failure would be enormous. The consequences of an unclear outcome possibly leading to the death of many hostages, of many of the rescuers, and possibly the incarceration of some of the rescuers would only prolong the crisis further and severely damage American prestige. Timing of such an effort, therefore, would be a critical factor in any decision. } :: (1) Rescue. The SCC saw no way for us to intervene militarily to rescue the hostages without seriously risking their lives. We would expect the Iranian military to oppose any such intervention. The most likely means would be to secure an airfield and conduct a helicopter raid into the embassy compound. } :: Iran What Next? The other alternative is to increase pressure on Iran and on the international community, once we have had recourse to all the peaceful options. The best means to do so would be to blockade Iranian ports while announcing. 1. They will stay closed until our people have been released; 2. That massive and instant retaliation will follow any harm to any one of the hostages. The above will involve a high-risk strategy. It could result in the forfeiture of the lives of the hostages. Nonetheless, such an action would be understandable to much of the international community, especially if the UN/International Court options were exhausted. I suspect that it would also prompt a less hostile reaction from the Arab world than a punitive post-release strike, since Moslems generally respect firm action based on clear legal / moral principle. Such an action could also contribute to Khomeini'92s eventual fall. If he were to back down and release our hostages, he will have been humiliated. If he did not, the cumulative effects of the blockade as well as the punitive strike would encourage Iranian internal opposition, especially if we were to couple such action with more direct appeals to Iranians to overthrow his regime. Many Iranians are concerned that Khomeini is jeopardizing their chances to enter the 20th century as an independent and viable nation. Finally, I believe that this course of action, though inevitably risky, would be politically more appealing. The public senses that our position is 100% correct on grounds of principle and that a strong reaction is justified. It would support it. 3. The application of military pressure, which involves very high risks but which historically and politically is a preferable course to $2 above. } :: opened the discussion by noting that we may be facing a situation where Iran will continue to defy all of our diplomatic and international moves while gradually undercutting international and domestic U.S. support by focusing on U.S. intelligence activities. Secretary :: favored taking some action to reverse this situation. However, such action would not only put our people in danger but it was unlikely Khomeini would respond positively in the near future. We should know what we intend to do if any of the hostages are harmed. A rescue operation -- even if unlikely to succeed -- might be desirable. Mr. :: said that as long as we know our people are safe, the public will stay with us. If they pull people out of the compound, there will be rumors that they are being killed one at a time. We should not take drastic actions as long as we are fairly sure they are there. If that vanishes, it becomes very difficult. He was unsure about the Soviets. Cutting off supplies might do the job, but if Iranians kill someone, we must kill someone. Khomeini was the only one he wanted to hit. } :: Ratcheting Strategy or Inoculation Strategy? Both Johnson and McNamara were rational and decent men. They used force because they felt it was necessary, but they used it reluctantly. Moreover, they tried to use it very rationally They deliberately designed a strategy of gradually increasing pressure on North Vietnam, in the hope that eventually Hanoi would see the error of its ways and would relent. Accordingly, air strikes at first were limited to certain zones below a certain parallel. When these strikes escalated they did so very gradually and with special focus on highly limited military targets. At no point was North Vietnam dealt a sudden, violent blow, which might have had a jolting effect. That was judged as too risky and probably counterproductive. The result was that the North Vietnamese became gradually inoculated against the application of American power. Each successive step was somehow tolerable and absorbable; the North Vietnamese thereby became increasingly confident that they could stick it out and eventually prevail. They proved to be right. Since we are dealing with a fanatic, I wonder whether a strategy of graduated pressure would work. He will not be influenced by it, and he might be in a position to carry his supporters with him -- since at no point will the challenge to Khomeini be severe enough to make other Iranians wonder whether supporting him might not plunge Iran into some unpredictable abyss. In contrast, a sudden and dramatic move might have that effect. The question is: what could that move be? Since I do not believe that we should initiate hostilities while all our hostages are alive, the only combination of dramatic moves that could have a jolting effect might be as follows: a speech by you to the UN, combined with mining, combined perhaps with a bold '93taking into custody'94 strike at Qom. I put the above before you since it seems to me that we should consider something unconventional, in addition to the more logical and rational options that we are considering. Paradoxically, if past history is any guide, it is the very gradual escalation of measures that in the end may prove to be more dangerous and produce a wider and even a more bloody conflict. In addition to the factors that I mentioned earlier, gradual escalation can also at some point tempt some neighboring powers to start making adversary noises and thus become eventually also engaged. I am not at all certain that the combination of moves mentioned above is the right one, but then Khomeini has us in a box by a series of rather unconventional moves himself. } :: Factions and Institutions in Iran'92s Leadership The capture of our embassy has led to a major realignment of Iranian leadership and a concentration of institutional power. Despite the emergence of radical clerics as the dominant political force, the",political,bureaucracies_65,bureaucracies
"briefed the group on the expected arrival of the two emissaries in Tehran tonight. In general, he detected a lowering of rhetoric from Tehran and considered the situation somewhat better than the day before. 2. :: said that this was a good point but he did not agree. If we issue a warning, we must be able to carry it out. He did not see this situation as unprecedented. In the case of the Pueblo, we had waited far longer than this, and the risks associated with escalation at that time where less than they are today in the Gulf region. Perhaps the Pueblo affair was not one of the high points of American diplomacy, but we have to consider the problem we have today with the Islamic nations and their possible reaction to a blockade or similar use of military force. Secretary :: and Mr. Saunders reviewed for the SCC the various initiatives which are currently underway with Iran. They cautioned against over-reacting to various optimistic reports which have recently emerged or are likely to emerge in the course of this process. There is evidence that some of the hostages have been transferred to the U.S. compounds in Tabriz and Shiraz, although identification and numbers are not available. Intelligence reports continue to indicate that many, if not most, of the hostages may remain in Tehran at the Embassy. The first letters from three hostages after the rescue operation suggest they had been moved to different locations within the Embassy. We will continue efforts. } :: Until we have a clearer idea of how the power structure shakes down over the next days and how the Iranians intend to proceed to handle the hostage issue, it would be advisable not to commit ourselves to decisive actions for release. It is highly probable that no US action, whether pressure or persuasion, will have a strong positive influence on Iranian decisions. Rather, it is likely that the Iranian decision will be made essentially on the basis of interests of the leadership group. If we are not able to force a decision on the Iranians, we should take care not to make any move at this stage which could set back a decision. -- Dissent is growing in Iran among key elements of society; the middle class, professionals, government workers, and probably within the military. -- Nevertheless, the mass of the people, many of whom are armed revere Khomeini and, as long as he lives, will give strong support to him and to the clerics. -- The strongest armed military groups in Iran are probably the Revolutionary Guards which may number as many as 80,000 men. -- Thus, while this option deserves serious consideration for the longer term, there do not appear to be any groups at the moment inside or outside of Iran able to bring about a change of government -- with or without our support -- in time to have have any early effect on release of the hostages. Iranian fears that this is our immediate purpose lead some of them to believe they should keep at least some of the hostages as guarantees against U.S. intervention. 2. A blockade or mining of Iranian ports and efforts to block air transport links -- possibly preceded by a warning that these actions would be taken by a stated deadline if the hostages were not released. -- Some such step may be necessary if all other efforts to persuade the Iranians fail or if hostages are harmed. It would be a move of last recourse because it would rely on Iranian fear rather than on specific U.S. action to release the hostages. -- The potential dangers are substantial. Loss of Iranian life through accident or intentional clashes with our forces or with mines could spark an emotional response that would endanger the hostages. -- It could have serious regional implications, possibly including riots and attacks on American installations. It would put us at odds with our allies. Despite these serious problems a cutoff in Iranian oil sales would be the most effective form of pressure we could place on the country. We might be able to engineer that without taking military measures, but we lack the legal authority to be helpful on alternate supplies, which European and Japanese purchasers would expect in return for a tight boycott. --Iranians are unlikely to be persuaded by even the most cogent and compelling arguments alone until they have their own reasons for releasing the hostages. However, we would make the effort to coordinate our actions, e.g., public statements, or other initiatives, with Iranian plans for dealing with the hostage issue. } :: Possible Responses to Iranian Decision to Put the Hostages on Trial. 1. Military Action. Reducing Iran'92s trade through military action short of overt attacks on Iranian forces and facilities could have one of two objectives. (1) Such actions could cut off Iran'92s oil exports, thereby depriving the country of its foreign exchange earnings. A major disadvantage would be the possibly adverse effect on the world oil market of eliminating current Iranian supplies of from 700,000 to 800,000 b/d. (2) It might be possible to close off Iran'92s access to imports while leaving oil terminals free to export. Warning steps might include multiple aircraft flights along the Iranian coast of the Persian Gulf or deployment of added naval ships into the Gulf. Three types of naval blockade to achieve the goal of reducing Iran'92s trade would be possible: -- surface ship blockade at Iran'92s ports; -- surface ship blockade at the Strait of Hormuz and along the Gulf of Oman; -- mining Iran'92s ports. Earlier this year, when we considered blockading Iran'92s ports to interrupt imports and exports, we would have needed resources sufficient to close four major facilities plus smaller ports and the offshore oil loading points at Kharg, Shirri and Lavan Islands. Today, because of the Iran-Iraq war, two of the four larger ports are closed and one of the remainder is in a war zone. A blockade now would require a substantially smaller commitment of forces. We recognize that for trade to be totally cut off, Iran'92s land borders with other countries would have to be closed, a far more risky and costly operation, if it were feasible at all. On the other hand, overland trade could not soon replace what comes by sea (more than 50%). These different blockades would share certain benefits and risks. They would increase Iran'92s trade with her immediate neighbors (e.g., the USSR). They would increase the risk of conflict with Iran or with a third country who wished to break the blockade. U.S. ships would have to operate within closer range of Iranian aircraft and possibly beyond the protection of U.S. carrier-based air. This approach would also increase the risk that Iran could lash out in desperation and either threaten to execute the hostages or attack Arabian Peninsula oil facilities and third-country tankers in the Persian Gulf (which could stop the flow of oil and lead to pressures for U.S. retaliation against Iran'92s mainland). Regulating ship traffic at the Strait would probably require fewer ships than monitoring ports directly, but it could be difficult to monitor the actual destination of incoming ships. Mining would pose lower risks of direct engagement of U.S. forces with Iran'92s or with those of a third country, although pressures could still grow for Iran to lash out against countries like Saudi Arabia. (Iran could claim justification for attacking Saudi Arabia because of Saudi Arabia'92s serving as a conduit for shipment of arms to Iraq-- a clear violation of Saudi neutral duties.) Mining operations would probably also be easier for us to execute, harder for Iran to counter, and tie down far fewer U.S. ships. Casualties among fisherman or blockade runners could lead to demarches in Iran for the hostages'92 execution in reprisal. We would have to recognize that any military action would seriously endanger the hostages, threatened the oil flow, and risk a widening conflict. The use of military means for interruption of Iran'92s commerce to prevent trials would be a sharp escalation and could quickly lead to further military steps -- to protect our own forces or critical oil facilities of other Gulf producers, or to retaliate further against Iran. If Iran threatened or carried out execution (a risk that is increased by mining or a blockade), we would be obliged to escalate our response -- possibly with air strikes against critical facilities in Iran. In considering a blockade or mining in the context of trials, consideration should be given to possible escalation and the desirability of putting Iran on notice of new steps if the hostages are harmed. Possible reactions of other Gulf states and of the Soviet Union to military steps against Iran also need to be weighed. Any U.S. military action against Iran could give the USSR a pretext for moving into Iran, although the situation in Poland would make any Soviet military response more difficult. The Soviets might well content themselves with exploiting for long term advantage the greatly intensified anti-American sentiment in Iran which U.S. military measures would entail. Gulf States would almost certainly publicly condemn U.S. military moves against Iran, although they might privately welcome steps with would weaken Iran vis-'e0-vis Iraq. The U.S. could face a Saudi request to remove AWACs as a demonstration that the Saudis were not supporting the U.S. against Iran. U.S. military involvement against a Gulf littoral could over time jeopardize U.S. security arrangement with Gulf states such as Bahrain (MIDESTATFOR) and Saudi Arabia. Any United States armed action taken against Iran would have to be justified as an exercise of our right of self-defense against armed attack. We have previously concluded that the Iranian seizure and holding of our Embassy personnel hostage constitutes an armed attack upon the United States and, accordingly, the United States notified the Security Council, pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter, following the April rescue mission. We have provided notifications to the Security Council under Article 51 in other cases as well, such as the Mayaguez rescue, notified to the Council on May 14, 1975; and the mining of North Vietnamese ports, notified on May 8, 1972. Failure to notify the Council of military action taken in self-defense against Iran in our efforts to deal with the hostage situation would violate Article 51 and lend support to attacks on the action'92s legality. } :: said that, if the action was taken suddenly and without advance indication, it would have an adverse effect on the moderates in Iran. It would create a strong public reaction and inspire a new round of anti-Americanism which the hardliners would use to their advantage. However, if this could be relayed in secret in advance to the moderates, it might give them leverage to use in the in-fighting. If handled very carefully, a case could be made that this would improve the chances of getting the hostages out. We would have to be prepared to follow through, however. (S). Mr. SPLIT said that there would be a very strong reaction in Iran which, in the worse case, could lead the militants to start killing hostages. There would be massive demonstrations and a hellish month or so for us to get through. In the end, however, it could go either way. It could succeed, although it was a high risk. Admiral :: said it will take at least a month to exhaust available diplomatic remedies. He did not believe we would get the support even of many of our close allies on a blockade noting that not one country was willing to join us in 1967 opening of the Strait of Tiran. General SPLIT said that before mining we should get vitally all Americans out of the Moslem world. Jody :: Department believes that over the long run those currently not included in the Iranian decision making apparatus are likely to play an important role. (S) Power in Iran has been increasingly concentrated in the hands of the more radical leaders -- Khomeini, Behesthi, Montazeri, Bani-Sadr-- who see the world in moral terms and are uncompromisingly dedicated to '93Islamic'94 goals above all else. The present elite also includes, however, a group of moderates who are pragmatic and flexible and believe Islam and modernity can work together. They have lost much power in recent weeks, but remain on the fringes of the ruling circle. } :: I received a call from Waldheim this afternoon who said he wanted to report to me a conversation he had with Foreign Minister Hameed of Sri Lanka, who had just been in Tehran on the Secretary General'92s behalf. Second, he said that he had been told by the Foreign Minister that the Iranians will release the greater part of the hostages before Christmas. Third, he was told by the Foreign Minister that a decision had not yet been made as to whether the remaining hostages might appear before the so-called '93grand jury'94. He said further that he was told if they did, they would not be harmed but would be expelled from the country. I have some doubts on the weight that should be given to this message. }",political,bureaucracies_66,bureaucracies
"continues to be very pessimistic at the odds of a successful operation. The SCC recommended approval. The SPLIT will continue with planning on the possible rescue and punitive measures. We will not for the moment expand our contacts with former Iranian military and intelligence figures, although we have received strong indications on the part of some of them to launch a counterattack through Kurdistan. A meeting will be held tomorrow to examine the military and intelligence issues in greater detail. } :: Military Contingencies. Further study has been given to the rescue option. The JCS does not believe it is viable. There would be a very high risk of failure, even with very good intelligence on the location of the hostage and other operational detail (TS). A number of punitive options have been examined in more detail. An attack on the refinery at Abadan would potentially destroy a larger proportion of domestic fuel stocks and reduce refinery capacity for kerosene, heating oil and gasoline by more than half. There are three specific targets; the power plant, the refinery and the catalytic converter. The power plant could be repaired relatively quickly, although it would be very disruptive. The refinery would take about six months to replace, and the catalytic converter would take several years. The operation could be conducted by carrier-based aircraft from the Midway (4-5 days way), a Seal team to be put ashore (could be organized in 203 days), or by an AC-130 gunship (3-4 days lead time). On balance, Defense and JCs favor the gunship since it is extremely accurate, very effective, and involves no likely problem of extracting personnel. Air defenses in the area are extremely light. The AC-130 could make an attack from Diego Garcia with refueling. Use of Diego Garcia would require coordination with the British. :: aid that the key was to keep world opinion and the Moslem world with us. Strong action could work either way depending on whether it was perceived as justified or not. He noted that his French counterpart recommended against the use of force as counterproductive in this situation. The French would probably not join with us in an economic embargo. If we mine harbors and some hostages are killed, we may be seen as guilty. We might consider mining only imports to start. Secretary",military,bureaucracies_67,bureaucracies
"noted the dangers of a Soviet reaction or of pushing the Iranians closer to the Soviets by our acts. Our evidence indicates that the Soviets are making gains inside Iran through the Tudeh Party. He observed that our problem remained what it had been all along; how to influence Khomeini. He felt that Khomeini would not respond to this kind of pressure. (S) Dr. SPLIT cited a psychiatrist friend who observed that a man with a martyr complex seldom lives to become 79 years old. (S) } :: said it would create hell in the Islamic world. Mr. :: will examine further the possibility of such on attack without coordination with any other nation. Three Iranian harbors could be mined to close off 65 percent of Iran'92s imports without affecting the oil export facilities. The most appropriate mines would be active for a minimum of 58 days. An attack on the F-14s could not expect to get more than about half the Iranian inventory. Defense believes it would be an error to strike at the Iranian military, since they may be helpful later. Also, a disruptive attack on the military might tempt the Soviets to move in. SPLIT will examine the best means of conducting reconnaissance flight of F-14 bases and provide a recommendation tomorrow. } :: said the key was whether or note the hostages were directly threatened. If so, we should be ready to carry out severe actions. He agreed the ta decision to mine would put the hostages under more serious danger. There was a 50-50 chance that some might be killed in response. The question is how long we can wait. Over time the chances of harm coming to the hostages increases and our ability to act declines. Items 1-3 could be done quickly. Secretary",political,bureaucracies_68,bureaucracies
"replied to the first question that, if all imports, including food, were blocked, it would have a significant impact on Iran'92s economy within two weeks. Blocking oil exports, however, would take nearly a year to have a major impact since Iran has sufficient monetary reserves to do without the revenue. It would be reasonable to expect Iran to cut off oil exports as retaliation for any U.S. blockade. About 80% of Iran'92s exports come in by sea, and the land and rail routes through Turkey and the USSR could not make up the difference. It would not be necessary to block ground and air traffic to have the desired impact. There were no real alternatives to seaborne trade. Mr. SPLIT said it was his judgment that the militants would be very angry but would not kill the hostages. Khomeini would use it as an opportunity to rouse the masses behind him. It could also strengthen the position of Bani-Sadr and the moderates. However, it is not clear that the moderates would succeed in the resulting power play. We might be pressurizing the weakest political element. (S). } :: The operational capability of Iran'92s Navy* has declined steadily during 1979 because of poor maintenance and a lack of military discipline. The Iranians appear incapable of maintaining the ships on their own and our reports indicate that a general shortage of parts has adversely affected the operational readiness of the ships. In addition, political interference, and the attendant confusion in lines of authority at the local bases, has hampered the Navy'92s effectiveness. The Iranian Navy'92s nine guided-missile patrol boats, which were purchased from France, probably are in the best condition of all Iranian ships. The Iranian Air Force has remained intact since the fall of the Shah, but its ability to operate effectively has been severely impaired. Maintenance and supply problems have reduced the number of serviceable aircraft and curtailed pilot training. Even though the F-4s and F-5s have been in Iran'92s inventory for about 10 years, we are uncertain how many the Air Force could effectively put in the air in an emergency situation. The Iranians apparently are experiencing shortages of spare parts for and maintenance difficulties with both aircraft. Another factor limiting the use of Iran'92s F-14s is that only a few Iranians have received extensive training on the plane. When the Shah was overthrown, less than 100 pilots and instructor pilots had been trained to fly the F-14. The Iranian Air Force has only marginal capability to destroy opposing aircraft with Phoenix missiles. Air Defense Radar Network. Many of Iran'92s radars probably are partially or completely inoperative, but coverage is still active in some areas. The Iranians probably have comprehensive coverage at all altitudes of the Soviet border area. Coverage of the borders with Turkey and Iraq is comprehensive, but the mountains mask some radars at low altitudes; levels at which aircraft are difficult to fly in mountainous terrain. The Iranians have comprehensive radar coverage of the Gulf area in theory; temperature inversions over the Gulf and coastal areas (called ducting) causes multiple targets or false targets to appear on radar screens. The military would be hard pressed to defend against a full-scale Iraqi or Soviet attack. In the northwest, the Army'92s position would deteriorate quickly should the Kurds press their attacks. The ground forces appear capable of suppressing Arab opposition in the southwest oil fields as long as Iraq does not increase its aid to the dissidents. Ground Forces. The regular Army numbers about 150,000 men, down from approximately 300,000 prior to the revolution. Although the Army is well equipped. The army had been severely weakened by poor maintenance and a lack of spare parts. We expect this situation to deteriorate further with the cut off of US supplies. Morale is low among many Army units. This is particularly true for those units fighting in the northwest against the Kurds. Two paramilitary forces the Gendarmerie and the Revolutionary Guards, supplement the Army. Both groups are lightly armed. The Gendarmerie, approximately 75,000 strong before the revolution, are responsible mainly for border and rural security. Their ranks have been reduced by desertions, however, particularly in Kurdish areas. The Revolutionary Guard is composed mainly of ethnic Persians fiercely loyal to Khomeini. The guard reportedly has about 20,000 full-time members and has assumed the bulk of the security duties in Tehran, in Kurdish provinces, and in the southwest. } :: Longer-term Outlook for Iran What and how strong is Khomeini'92s control? Prevailing assumptions tend to portray Khomeini as a demi-God whose will is absolute. But any oracle on a pedestal of mass popularity cannot always translate his charisma into concrete or specific action. While Khomeini'92s inchoate power and prestige may prevent others from coming to power, can it become a positive instrument of government? Military Action Overt U.S. military action in the oil fields becomes tempting as a situation grows hopeless. But the consequences could be serious. It could provoke another Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan. A division of Iran into a Russian-occupied north and a U.S. - occupied south might have appealed to Lord Curzan in another age. Can we risk it today? Are there alternatives? } :: said he did not believe that sanctions would get the hostages back. There are three groups we are working with; the Revolutionary Council; the kidnapers; and Khomeini. We had had some success in getting our message through to the Revolutionary Council. There is no way to get through to the kidnappers. He still thought that Khomeini could work his will on the students, so the question was how to impact on him. He wondered if the correct approach would not be a combination, playing off the Afghan theme and offering some kind of concession at the same time. The Pres said that the concessions we had drafted previously were still available. He thought ZB was right-Khomeini would like to see all Western influence in Iran ended. Any military action by us would simply play into his hands. He would say, '93We would have a great situation here in Iran if it were not for the American mining, or bombing or whatever.'94 He guessed that Shariat-Madari and Behesti and perhaps others have influence on Khomeini as potential alternatives to his rule. Khomeini is not so solidly in power as to be able to ignore the Revolutionary Council entirely. As far as he knew, Bani Sadr was the only officially announced candidate for President of Iran. } :: After the Hostage Crisis Many Iranians believe the hostage crisis has dragged on too long and are eager for the country to address its domestic problems and curb its revolutionary excesses without the tensions of the confrontation with the US. We doubt, however, that Bani-Sadr will succeed in the near term in ending the chaos that has plagued Iranian politics since the fall of the Shah in early 1979. The numerous competing power centers that bedeviled the Bazargan government are likely to continue to hamper Bani-Sadr for sometime and he lacks the means to compel them to accept his authority. The local revolutionary committees that have emerged in the provinces and in most government agencies (including the military) are not likely to surrender power easily. Nor are the clerical leaders like Ayatollah Beheshti willing to give up their influence in government. The power of the clerics is also institutionalized in the constitution in the Council of Guardians which reviews all legislation. Most importantly, Ayatollah Khomeini - as long as he remains alive and fit-- will continue to interfere in the government. He will continue to be the single most influential figure in Iran and will set the broad guidelines of policy within which Bani-Sadr will have to function. Khomeini could dismiss Bani-Sadr at any moment if he feels the president is disputing the Ayatollah'92s authority. } :: said he did not think it was that clear. Although that was a good line to take publicly -- and it could be defended -- it was not entirely clear that the militants would in fact have let the hostages go if ordered to do so by the Revolutionary Council. The :: I believe that the present detailed negotiations with Iran over the hostages offer little prospect of success and accordingly, urge that we carefully reexamine whether we should continue the current '93haggling'94 with the Iranians if Deputy Secretary Christopher'92s current trip does not result in a quick resolution to the impasse. (S/NF) On 6 November I sent to Secretary Muskie our intelligence judgment that a detailed response to the Majlis'92 four points would likely be unproductive because: -- It would require a protracted time to work out, during which developments in Iran could undermine the current fragile consensus that led to the Majlis'92 decision. -- The US would be subjected to the possibility of the piecemeal release of the hostages. -- A detailed approach would bog us down in a '93bazaar'94 type negotiation, largely on their terms. -- A detailed legalistic approach would inevitably fail to satisfy the Iranians and would clearly identify areas where we could not meet the Majlis'92 terms. An abrupt change of the US posture will no doubt cause some confusion in Tehran. We believe it will not, however, cause the hostages any harm. }",political,bureaucracies_69,bureaucracies
"Iran. The precarious position of the Shah has been underscored by the two days of huge, well-disciplined demonstrations in Tehran, the major violence today in Isfahan (we do not yet know how many were killed), the renewed shutdown in the oil fields (production from 5.9 to 1.3 million barrels), and the continuing strikes of bank and government employees. If no compromise solution can be worked out, there will be an increased likelihood of violent confrontations between crowds and troops, attacks against Americans, and severe political damage from a rapidly deteriorating economy. There is room for serious doubt whether the security forces can withstand the present strain and maintain firm unity for much longer. } :: Iran. The two leading US academic experts on Iran, James Bill and Marvin Zonis, recently were debriefed in the Department following their separate visits to Iran at the end of November. In a wide range of Iranian contacts, both men found intense rage against the Shah personally. This is a marked change from the past when Iranians were content to blame their troubles on '93the Government'94 and the Shah'92s advisers. Both professors see a slim chance that the Shah might retain a minimal role as constitutional monarch, but only if he moves quickly to negotiate a political compromise. They assess the opposition as very strong and extremely well-organized. Everywhere they found an eagerness for the US to play a decisive role in promoting a political solution to Iran'92s crisis. } :: SUBJ Thinking the unthinkable In the meantime, it might be useful to engage in some fundamental examinations of the situation in Iran and the future of u.s.-iran relations. In doing this, it is probably healthy to examine some options we have never before considered relevant. First, the authority of the shah has considerably shrunk, his support among the general public has become almost invisible these days. The only tangible evidence of iranian support for the monarchy comes from the armed forces, it has therefore become commonplace to refer to the monarchy as the ""Shah--supported by the military."" However even within that relationship, events of the recent days may have produced a subtle change. it may be more correct at this time to speak of the monarchy pillar as being constituted essentially of the military-which (currently) supports the shah. In consequence, the two elements that need our examination are the military and the religious. At the moment, these two elements are ostensibly in confrontation. If the military can get these areas of the economy back in full production peaceable, they will probably be able to prevail over the religious, but the relationship between the two pillars will be tinged with tension, and the probability of terrorism, sabotage and xenophobia. On the other hand, if the military fail to restore production and to break the tide of passive resistance they will reach the point of making a fateful decision--either to enforce production by a bloodbath or to reach an accommodation with the religious. Since the latter are dominated by ayatollah khomeini, it must be assumed that a pre-condition for an accommodation would be the acceptance of his insistence that the she must leave and the monarch be dis-established in favor of an islamic republic. it is rather difficult to imagine a man like prime minister general azhari willing plunging his country in a blood bath. it is equally difficult to imagine hime, or most military officers of his vintage, inviting the shah to abdicate. However, if the shaw and the military both shy away from the bloodbath, it may eventuate that both the shaw and the more senior military would abdicate, leaving the armed forces under the leadership of younger officers who would be prepared to reach an accommodation with the religious. If such a turn of events should transpire, it would be important for the U.s. to have done a careful evaluation of its consequences Both the iranian armed forces and the khomeini muslims are strongly anti-communist and anti-soviet. We say this despite reports of alleged communist infiltration of khomeini's circle of advisers. The younger military officers have a genuine pro-west orientation. As consequence of any military-mullah accommodation, khomeini could be expected return to iran in triumph and hold a gandhi-like position in the political constellation. He has said that, at such time, he would ""reveal"" the name of his candidate for political leadership. However, it would presumably be have to be someone acceptable to the military rather than a nasser-quadhafi type that might be the ayatollah's preferred candidate. If elections are held in any atmosphere other than one of frenzy, such assembly ought to contain a strong presence of non-communists, non-islamic-fanatics, and pro-western moderates would would have considerable influence in developing a responsible constitutional document. while it is difficult to predict the sort of government which might emerge from the subsequent general elections, there would be reasons to hope that it would maintain iran's general international orientation except that it would cease its ties with israel associate itself with the arabs, probably closer to the rejectionist front than to saudi arabia. it would probably be a kuwait writ large in its general orientation. Although U.S. involvement would be less intimate than with the Shah, it could be an essential satisfactory one, particularly if the military preserves both its integrity, and its status as one of the ""pillars"" of the nation. There would presumably be fewer americans here and they would have a reduced status. both they could probably stay if they chose. All this rather pollyannish scenario could come about only if every step along the way turned out well. Any single misstep anywhere could destroy it and lead to unpredictable consequences. Therefore, it should not, repeat, not be interpreted as the this embassy's prediction of future events. Our current posture of trusting that the Shah, together with the military, will be able to face down the khomeini threat is obviously the only safe course to pursue at this junction. however, it is should fail and the shah should abdicate, we need to think the unthinkable at this time in order to give our thoughts some precision should the unthinkable contingency arise. } :: mentioned the presence of leftist gangs. Armed gangs in Tehran had taken over police stations. We need to get something to stop these non-Khomeini groups. May be it would be best for the Khomeini forces to join with the military. Mr. SPLIT noted that the long-term outcome is directly relevant to what emerges in Iran. If the military reverses the situation, this will be seen as a U.S. move and will require U.S. support. If such a move by the military to take matters into its own hands did not work, the chance of the U.S. developing viable relations with the Bazarghan-Khomeini group would be seriously impaired. Dr. SPLIT noted that the alert of the 82nd Airborne would seen as a takeover attempt by the United States. Mr. :: said in retrospect he now finds Huyser'92s report of the military situation slightly optimistic. The army had not in fact stayed with Bakhtiar and was not ready to confront the people. Dr. SPLIT said he thought that is what should be worked out. Bazarghan was not the first choice of the military. However, he was better than what existed to the left of him. He noted that the military was not willing or able to stand behind Bakhtiar; how could they stand by themselves now that Bakhtiar is apparently gone. Dr. SPLIT noted that in fact the military did not retain its cohesion behind Bakhtiar and that suggested that it does not have enough cohesion to stand on its own. Dr. SPLIT said we would have to tell them to go out and fight all the people. Mr. SPLIT said that if the military attempted a takeover, it would lead to street fighting and U.S. citizens would be shot. Mr. SPLIT said that Bazarghan'92s government could not control the situation without the cooperation of the army. Dr. SPLIT summarized Sullivan'92s views as follows: We were now very close to Option 1. General Gharabaghi was talking to Bazarghan on his own. The military was too beleaguered to undertake Option 3. Dr. :: 1. Iran '96 We understand from our Embassy in Tehran that, after a day of scattered small demonstrations throughout the city, with some shooting, crowds this evening poured out of the mosques and immediately confronted the troops. Firing was heavier in the northern quarter where the major hotels and the radio/ television stations are located. Anti-American sentiment is high, and there have been a number of incidents in Tehran and Isfahan against Americans. At least two American homes have been bombed in the past few days. Last night five American-owned vehicles were burned in Isfahan. Several mullahs there have urged their followers to destroy American property. There have, however, been no injuries to Americans reported. I have again asked Bill Sullivan for his views on thinning out the American population, particularly dependents. We should have his answer tomorrow. }",political,bureaucracies_70,bureaucracies
"continued that in his view the options that we had were very limited. We will have to place the security of U.S. citizens in the hands of the Bazarghan government. How can we do that, if Bazarghan is not supported by the army? Even if the army tries to act, large elements of leftists, Communists, and PLO constitute an armed danger to U.S. citizens. We seem to be predicating our security on assurances of the Bazarghan government . He was concerned that if security gets out of hand it would be unfortunate if we had no 82nd Airborne ready. Mr. SPLIT said that in his view Option 3 was not visible. We should confirm that fact with General Gast, Ambassador Sullivan, and General SPLIT said that if it was viable and could be executed then it should be considered. Dr. SPLIT noted that Option 3 would create great danger to Americans and would also risk very heavy U.S. military involvement. He also wondered about the Soviet reaction. Dr. SPLIT said that it needs to be checked out. Among other things Dr. :: has suggested we move the carrier Eisenhower to the eastern mediterranean. This move would have little or no operational utility and might well be seen as an empty gesture underscoring our lack of options. It also threatens to cause an adverse reaction from both the Tehran mobs and the government with which we are trying to develop more positive relations. }",political,bureaucracies_71,bureaucracies
"said that if the military has the will and the capacity to take over control of the situation, that would be one thing. If they do not, then it would be necessary to accommodate. If the military is ready and able to act with our encouragement, we should be prepared to act like a major power and support them. Mr. SPLIT wondered what the long-term outcome of this situation would be. He said the military cannot play in a political contest. They are not particularly sophisticated. They would be better off acting directly to restore law and order. We said we would '93consider'94 this. He wondered if we should not ask General Gast and General SPLIT said that was a very telling argument. Could we influence that situation? Mr. SPLIT said that was true, but also the military joining up with Khomeini would eventually lead to a general deterioration as well. Mr. SPLIT agreed that in the short run accommodation between the Army and Bazarghan would lead to the safety of U.S. citizens. However, he was not sure that we really have much influence on the situation. They do not appear to be listening. Dr. SPLIT summarized the strategy options available to us and they were elaborated in the course of discussions as follows: 1. Urge the military to accommodate with the Bazarghan government on the assumption that the Bakhtiar Government was out. This would imply that the United States would use its own contacts with the military and good offices to try to make a deal and if possible to extract the maximum concessions from the new government. 2. The army would simply acquiesce in the political situation and remain united. This would mean the military stay in the barracks, except to protect key installations and U.S. citizens, while letting the political situation run its course. There would be no U.S. action on the civilian political side. 3. Would be what we have been calling Option C, that is direct action by the military to take events into their own hands to restore law and order. This, of course, assumes that the military has both the will and the power to conduct such an operation. Were there other options? Mr. SPLIT said what if we were told that it was viable. Mr. SPLIT said we are considering it now. He felt that if it was viable we should do Option 3. We should act like a big power. Mr. SPLIT agreed that Option 3 would be a major and a very risky action. It would create some intensification of international tensions. However, if it was successful, it would reinforce the United States'92 position in the region. It would demonstrate that the United States was capable and willing to use power. General SPLIT noted in his summary that if it is not in fact viable, Option C would be stupid. But if it is a viable option, we should do it. The stakes are enormous. General SPLIT wondered whether the Iranians would be unwilling to carryout Option C without someone like General SPLIT noted that there would be a hard time politically getting U.S. public and logistics support of the magnitude required without more evidence of a slide to the left. Mr. SPLIT noted that this analysis indicated very limited options for the United States. However, he wondered if we were not taking refuge in wishful thinking. He was personally very pessimistic about the outcome. He saw no way to move toward Option 3. If the situation deteriorates in a day or two, we can still do it, but only if the military themselves are willing to do so. } :: A friend of mine, Bill Griffith, recently travelled to India, Iran, and the Middle East. He has sent me his capsulated impressions. Bill is a keen observer of political and social trends and, in my view, extraordinarily perceptive. His views are sometimes at variance with the conventional wisdom of the bureaucracy. I find them valuable and provocative. Here is Bill's report: Iran, On balance, I should think the domestic situation is serious and the future of the dynasty is in question. This is not the view of the Embassy, and I saw no opposition leaders, but i am still of this view. The Shah began the liberalization and is continuing it; the demonstrations are primarily fundamental Moslem (of which more below); the new Prime Minister, Amouzegar, whom I saw, is impressive and committed to continue the liberalization; but the shaw (whom I also saw) seemed to be less so, and I fear that the intelligentsia is largely alienated. } :: had noted that there were suggestions the Shah might abdicate and leave a military government behind or that he might remain with a military government in place, and requested official guidance as to how he should reply in the event the Shah raised such a choice with him. Questions were raised regarding the Soviet role in Iran and the need to explain the organization and apparent nation-wide coordination which was appearing in the handling of the demonstrations, strikes and political demands in a variety of different industries and in various, separated parts of the country. Admiral :: do not believe we can afford to go down the slippery slope of one civilian government followed by another somewhat more to the left. The armed forces will be demoralized and we will have no more leverage. If Bakhtiar fails, we must make a decisive choice and (Huyser's) ""C"" will have to be implemented with U.S. backing. Eyes only for Secdef Brown and CJCS Gen Jone from Gen :: My most important impression is that our embassy is essentially under house arrest without effective capability either to assess the current situation or have much impact on it. I am also deeply concerned about the role of the Soviets in this situation. Reports that they are purchasing large quantities of Iranian currency and the intense propaganda campaign they are conducting against the U.S. lead me to believe we must focus international attention on their actions. We need to make clear that it s the Soviets who are acting contrary to Iranian nationalism and independence. There is also strong concern about the impression that the U.S. is passive in the face of these turbulent developments. In fact, our real options are not great. By and large there is some prospect we can work out tolerable relationship with the government including Bazargan, Sanjabi, Entezam and Yazdi; our present careful course may best serve that purpose. There is a view, however, that we should make some broader gesture. In particular Charles :: The situationin Iran. Tehran was described by all parties as highly chaotic with increasing uncertainties about the safety for Americans. The attitude of several key Khomeini/Bazargan officials is passively pro-American. They have been wiling to secure the release of many detained Americans, but they have not been willing to speak out in a pro-American fashion. The future of the Khomeini/Bazargan government. Lambrakis expressed cautious optimism that the government will survive based not eh cohesion provided by the Islamic fanaticism of Khomeini's followers. the government fate hangs on its ability to establish ties with the military but he is very dubious that it will build a connect to the military. We have little leverage with the military. Moverover, there was disagreement on the degree of the military's present cohesion. }",political,bureaucracies_72,bureaucracies
"suggested setting up a '93black Iraqi'94 radio in Turkey. Mr. :: said we are studying the airlift of packaged POL, but are unsure whether we will get Saudi Arabian clearance to fly it in from that direction. We will plan to use the Aqaba base, but this will be slow in developing. The suggestion was made of obtaining POL for Jordan from Israel; he said this would be very dangerous, and would have to be approached most carefully. Mr. SPLIT thought a short-wave station could be opened in Jordan, and that it might be possible to move the USIA radio ship up to Beirut. The :: to look into the matter. He stressed that he feels the Voice of America should be used to put out our official story. SPLIT informed the group that Selwyn Lloyd would be arriving the following day; the question was whether the situation in Jordan would hold until his arrival. [Here follows discussion of support for Iran and Turkey.] General SPLIT said this intelligence came from the British who gave a digest of it to Hussein. He said he assumed the British would go in by air, and Mr. SPLIT said he had no enthusiasm for British forces going in. Lebanon has not been swept by pan-Arabism, but in Jordan and Iraq, pan-Arabism could sweep the country very quickly. To his question as to whether Jordan would welcome the British, SPLIT next took up the point as to whether we should press Hussein to make a call for the British to come in. Mr. SPLIT believed that if any troops were sent in they should be British, although we might provide air logistical support. Mr. SPLIT said that if Iraq were to drop out of the Baghdad Pact, he thought there would be good reason for our joining. It would be premature to do this today, but the action should be considered soon. [Here follows discussion of the pending Mutual Security appropriation and the broad implications of the Middle East crisis.] G Brigadier General, USA}",political,bureaucracies_73,bureaucracies
"said he was sure it could be done. SPLIT said that is the problem. SPLIT said except to pay damages. SPLIT said on the other hand there is not much going in or out either so it may be an empty gesture. SPLIT said they could unload elsewhere and ship down by rail. SPLIT said he would have it looked into. SPLIT said if they wanted to play it nastily, we could get hit with it every day'97harassing us, etc. SPLIT said he would look at it and give the SPLIT said he has some more information on ship 3 '97it is in the area of Capetown and supposed to reach Hong Kong on April 23 and go on to Korea. Told SPLIT said we do not think it has passed, it is still a Dutch ship. SPLIT said we would have to compensate the Dutch Government 5-1/2 million dollars. SPLIT said we have assigned State to come up with legal opinion supporting SPLIT said o.k.'97all of this will be discussed at 3:00 meeting tomorrow. 4 SPLIT said the Cuban blockade worked because they thought we were heading for an invasion. SPLIT said he told them to make a plan and give the SPLIT said we will throw blockade into it too. SPLIT agreed. 6 1 'a0 :: I see no uncertainty. We know where it was hit and the Soviets picked up here. SPLIT We always take the other guy'92s position. :: Pyongyang claims we shot first. SPLIT Their statement implies a straight drop on this. The SPLIT No. The only thing is that we considered the diplomatic scenario depends on the retaliation decided on. Both must be consistent. SPLIT With respect to the treaty, North Korea is the only country with defense treaties with USSR and the Chinese. Also there is an escape clause in Article I. The :: thought it would most certainly be read as an end to it. The SPLIT said maybe some of the SPLIT agreed. The SPLIT had any problems with that. SPLIT said no but in that case he posed two additional questions. If the question is asked whether this same flight has been flown since the incident the answer would be no since they will not fly another pattern of this kind for another two weeks. On the other hand, we do have another plane standing by. The SPLIT was worried that the headline would be '93 SPLIT suggested he play that one low key until we see what we are going to do on the other thing. He added that this is going to make the Soviets look particularly repressive and we would look good because of our restraint. The SPLIT '92s plan for today should be to get the plan ready and recheck with Mel and Helms. SPLIT said he would have a session with Rogers too. The SPLIT said we have had a cable from the North (South?) Korean",political,bureaucracies_74,bureaucracies
"The ROK press reaction says we should retaliate strongly. The :: What will the Soviets say about their own? SPLIT Mr. President, provision of Article I of the Treaty. 8 The USSR and North Korea are bound. What is the South Korean reaction? :: Diplomatic options: The Panmunjom talks are a forum. The North would talk first and would make their claims. They could talk and walk. We would look silly. They have already stated their case. I want to reject. The UN is a possibility. We would present our case in letter form, but ask for no action. If we do ask, we will get none. Most won'92t support us. They will ask why the flight is necessary. We can use diplomatic contacts with friends and allies. We could use a combination of all these: diplomatic, UN and Panmunjon. We would be able to help generate domestic support in the event of military action. But all of these are marginal. Maybe we don'92t have to move immediately. Watch for a change. Don'92t fall into trap about where it happened'97when we say we should say so but not if . . . The SPLIT Unusual tracking. As the General pointed out. The SPLIT This is what they will say. I don'92t agree. The SPLIT They can'92t lie. SPLIT Also, we shouldn'92t threaten the other side. It ties our hands.",political,bureaucracies_75,bureaucracies
"This is helpful but they have control of the '97'97. 6 They can deny. SPLIT Mileage is correct'97yesterday'97no problem. SPLIT The Marker thing hasn'92t helped. :: . -720 SUBJECT Alternatives Incident to EC'96121 Shootdown Military Options If I understand correctly, the alternative military responses being considered against North Korea as retaliation for the EC'96121 shoot-down have boiled down to airstrikes against two airfields: '95 [ less than 1 line not declassified ] '95 [ less than 1 line not declassified ] I believe discarding the other military options was appropriate. If a military step is to be taken, an airstrike is the best bet for a number of reasons: '95 It can be related to the act taken against the U.S., i.e., it comes closest to being an eye-for-an-eye. '95 It is a one-time operation, i.e., it does not carry the disadvantages of having to be sustained over a period of time, as would mining a harbor or establishing a blockade. '95 It would be directed against a North Korean military installation, and would not involve, or would minimize, civilian casualties or the impression of a random measure directed against the entire North Korean populace. '95 It could be launched from U.S. bases, land or sea, thereby avoiding the implication of other nations. '95 North Korean airfields are more accessible than other potential targets. If an attack is carried out, I believe the carrier-based attack strike is preferable for a number of reasons . Among those reasons are that: '95 B'9652 strikes are synonymous'97rightly or wrongly'97with massive, indiscriminate bombing. At 30 tons of bombs per B'9652, there is some justification for the '93massive'94 impression. A strike involving B'9652s could well be less acceptable in the eyes of world opinion, and even possibly U.S. public opinion, than one involving smaller ordnance loads and destruction impact. '95 If U.S. losses occur in the strike (and I believe there is more chance they may than the JCS papers indicate), 2 the loss of smaller attack aircraft will be more palatable (in terms of lives and dollars) than the loss of B'9652s. '95 Attack aircraft (such as the A'966) can combine surprise (low-level, night attacks) with accuracy (the A'966 avionics are among the best available). '95 Attack aircraft are more maneuverable than bomber aircraft, thereby providing an advantage in minimizing losses. '95 A'966 aircraft can be refueled in flight, I have been advised, thereby providing the option of carrying out the strikes within roughly the same time frame as potential B'9652 strikes. Is Military Retaliation Desirable? Again, if a military option is desired, the carrier-based attack option appears to be the best. I believe, however, it would be better not to use military options now for the following reasons: '95 Despite the merits of conducting reconnaissance against North Korea and the clear claim we have to operating on the open seas and in the air away from claimed territorial airspace, it is not clear yet that we: -720 '97need the volume of reconnaissance conducted. '97could not have conducted, and cannot conduct in the future, the requisite level of reconnaissance with adequate armed escort. '97therefore, took all the precautionary measures from a command standpoint that should have been taken. The resultant charge could easily arise that: -1440 '95 we have unnecessarily exposed ship and air crews to risks near North Korea. '95 we have not provided adequate protection for the crews. '95 we are now taking added risks (to the immediate crews on the airfield strikes and to the U.S. and ROK generally in terms of sustained combat involvement) to retaliate for a situation which evolved from poor planning in the first place, i.e., we are compounding our errors. '95 There are alternatives available which would be palatable to the U.S. people, and which demonstrate our resolve, e.g., -720 '97an explanation of reasons for maintaining recce flights . '97the vow to provide adequate armed escort and a virtual challenge to North Korea to stop us . '97 instructions to our military to engage and destroy any North Korean aircraft or vessels approaching our vehicles outside North Korean territorial air space or waters . '97declaring the option of conducting strikes against North Korean bases if the North Koreans persist in interfering with our aircraft or surface vessels. 3 '95 I believe the public is supporting and even applauding the Administration'92s present reasoned, calm posture . The newspaper, TV, and radio editorials indicate as much. The contacts I have made among the members of Congress, on both sides of the aisle, point to similar acceptance of our current posture. From my sampling, it appears those on the Hill calling for military retaliation are a minority . I believe they will support, on the other hand, a program like that outlined above, which puts our reconnaissance back on station, provides armed escort, and serves notice we will thwart any attempts by North Korea to interfere with such activity. One of the major risks, therefore, in a military strike against North Korea is that of eroding support we need in: -720 '97pursuing our Vietnam policies. '97the ABM debate. '97the increasing dialogue on the so-called '93military-industrial complex.'94 '97the involvement of the military in foreign policy matters. '97resolution of campus disorders, which stem in part from the ROTC programs. '97trying to stem the tide of general disenchantment with matters of a military nature. '95 The immediate implications of a strike against North Korea go even further. It is not clear we have the capability now to handle a major confrontation in Korea, if the North Koreans should react with a major assault of any duration against South Korea . The Joint Staff informs me: -720 '97sufficient ground force stocks exist for about 1 week of hostilities, after which ammunition and equipment would have to be diverted from Southeast Asia . '97sufficient naval and air force stocks are on hand for 30 to 45 days activity, after which diversions from Southeast Asia would have to be made. '97any military involvement in Korea would involve a deferral of the RVNAF modernization program . '97initial combat in Korea would include expenditure controls of combat supplies for U.S. forces. '97the capability to receive and move combat supplies into Korea, at least for 30 days after the initiation of any combat will be extremely limited . '97 increased production of major combat items, especially ammunition should be initiated, and budget adjustments made, as soon as possible if military action in Korea is contemplated . '95 I believe a tie of this incident to Paris 4 and military activity in Southeast Asia is possible, but it is not clear what the impact of a strike against North Korea would be. The enemy knows full well what kinds of presence we have in SEA, what kinds of pressure we have been maintaining, and what kinds of losses he (the enemy) is taking. I do not believe a failure to act militarily would be interpreted by the North Vietnamese leadership as an act of vacillation or irresolution on our part. A military strike against North Korea carries risks vis 'e0 vis our efforts in Paris and SEA, for the following reasons: -720 '97 We currently have the initiative in Paris, as being forthcoming, reasoned, and willing to de-escalate . A military venture against North Korea could be touted by the enemy'97and the world press'97as an example of the aggression and unreasonableness of the U.S. (however false such charges may be). The result could be the loss of some advantages we now have. '97 The North Vietnamese and VC are trying to elicit a U.S. withdrawal . The risks of our involvement in another major conflict could give the NVA/VC encouragement that we would have to withdraw, either sooner or in less effective way, or divert major resources from the Southeast Asia effort. '97 Our ability to contend the RVNAF is being given more and better equipment is improving, and is taking over more of the fighting, could be jeopardized . '97The strikes we are conducting'97or planning to conduct'97in 3d nations such as Cambodia and Laos would probably meet with general public approval now. Cast against the background of a raid against North Korea, which may touch off expansion of the military conflict there, such strikes in SEA could meet with strong public disapproval'97on the grounds they risk still wider U.S. military involvement. Therefore, rather than helping in our Paris and SEA efforts, a North Korean strike could damage such efforts. '95 I have the feeling a U.S. attack which would be interpreted as mainly for the purpose of punishing the North Koreans, could be akin to incidents which plagued the last two Administrations, i.e., the episode that didn'92t have to be, that carried far more risks than the potential pay-off would seem to dictate, and that led to general public disenchantment across a broad range of affairs. If, for example, we take losses during the strike, the question will be raised about losing more life to vindicate original losses. If, for example, we become involved in a more extended fracas at a time when the public is not heavily in favor of things military, the impact against the Administration on a wide front could be damaging to a high degree. If, for example, the Soviets decide not to proceed with strategic talks'97as we postponed such talks in the wake of Czechoslovakia'97the U.S. public clamor could be likewise damaging. I wonder if we should take the chance. I believe the carrier-based strike against North Korean airfields is least risky among the military options. But I believe the risks even there outweigh the potential benefits by a substantial margin. 1 'a0",military,bureaucracies_76,bureaucracies
"Route of mission'97inconsistencies; speeds. The closest point was 38 nautical miles. Not consistent that it went in. Maybe exploratory signal. North Korean fighters went airborne. Advisory warning signal went to aircraft. Condition 3'97fighters airborne'97heads up. Three minutes later, second track picked up on conversion tracks. Condition 5 alert'97plane turned. Third message sent but probably after shootdown. Fix of shootdown has remained consistent. Soviet track consistent with our track. Mission flown nine times since November. [Reviewed typical mission.] Soviet tracking normal. Seldom done by North Koreans. The SPLIT It was not unusual, in the sense of its past pattern'97only in sense of its scheduled pattern. The SPLIT Yes. :: Review of military options: '97The drone option. '97Escort reconnaissance flights in the future with combat aircraft. '97Show of air and naval force'9748 hours'97with coordinated diplomatic efforts. Had no effect after the Pueblo (got mixed up afterwards with the Soviet). Air strikes against North Korean air defenses. Could cause insecurity. Might cause attack and result in loss. '97We could blockade North Korean ports'97within 48 hours. Act of war'97little effect. They have no sea-going shipping. We could commandeer some North Korean ships. There is one now at sea with Dutch flag and crew. '97Attempt to destroy a North Korean aircraft off North Korea. Chances slim of getting one. Same little effect. '97Sea to shore bombardment. 48 hours. We would need air cover, however. West coast ports offer little'97East coast better. Inchon area is best but it'92s in too far. '97Attack targets adjacent to the DMZ, with Honest John or conventional artillery. But the Honest John is inaccurate at extreme range. Violation of the Armistice Agreement would trigger retaliation. '97Ground raid across the DMZ. Violation of the Armistice. It could trigger the ROKs to do the same. It would need very heavy fire support'97they have some. '97We have the capability of an infinite permutation of air attacks'97one, two or many airfields. Air defense targets. We'92ll need between 24 and 250 US aircraft. We would use Guam, Okinawa, or carriers. The chances of success are excellent. The loss rate would vary with the tactics'972% to 8% losses. Probably between both of these ranges. This is the menu of military options. Some would have effect; some no effect. SPLIT We have photographed with their okay. It picks up even a wheel. SPLIT I imagine an air-to-air missile. It would probably have to be a missile. SPLIT Bonesteel says they are very concerned. It is typical of their past actions. They are apprehensive we won'92t do anything.",military,bureaucracies_77,bureaucracies
"suggested that the best solution for the time being was to drag our feet and go on as we had been going, since it was still important to try to secure additional forces, and it would be little less than catastrophic if any nation withdrew its forces from Korea because of our insistence on reimbursement for U.S. services performed. With respect to the alternative courses of action in Korea, Mr. SPLIT how it had happened that the armistice agreement had been worded in such a way as to carry the implication of permanence. General SPLIT was unable to answer, and the :: briefed the Council first on the military situation in Korea and subsequently on developments in the armistice negotiations, concluding with a summary of General Harrison'92s latest report to the effect that the Communists had begun to propagandize in favor of settling the prisoner-of-war problem and the armistice by means of a political conference. General SPLIT pointed out the very great danger of a political conference prior to the conclusion of an armistice. This would permit the Communists to build up their forces while stringing out the political conference, thus placing the UN forces in a trap. With this judgment Secretary SPLIT to speak to this point. General SPLIT replied that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were convinced that we would not succeed in fooling the Communists by any kind of fake build-up of strength in Korea. The Chiefs were very skeptical of invoking psychological pressures if we were not actually prepared to resume the offensive if and when the armistice negotiations broke down. General SPLIT outlined what forces and materiel would be available to commence such a build-up in Korea if the Council did decide to authorize such a build-up. But General SPLIT also warned that the sending of additional men and materiel to Korea would seriously affect our commitments in other vital areas and would require more funds and higher force levels. In summary, said General Bradley, it was the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that we should not only not move any new units to Korea, but not even alert such units for movement unless and until we had made a prior decision to step up the pace of our operations in the event that the armistice negotiations collapsed. Mr. SPLIT informed the Council that the Joint Chiefs, in their recent paper setting forth several alternative courses of action in Korea, 7 had deliberately and by design avoided making any choice among these alternatives. They believed that it was inappropriate for them to fix on any military course of action until the Council itself had decided on what our national objective was. The Joint Chiefs, said General Bradley, are all too frequently accused of interference in the political decisions of the Government. Secretary SPLIT to plan his briefing in conjunction with the State Department in order that the military courses of action could be accompanied by a clear statement of their foreign policy implications. The SPLIT in the course of his briefing on the military situation in Korea. General SPLIT had pointed out that the Communists seemed to be attempting to put planes in back on four airfields in North Korea, and the Air Force had been making these fields targets for recent attacks. With regard to this, the SPLIT expressed some doubts as to the usefulness of any of these fields as a target for an atomic bomb. There ensued, in conclusion, a discussion of the time when the military and the State Department should present their briefings on the alternatives open to the United States in Korea. It was first thought that the briefing should be scheduled in two weeks time. Secretary Smith, however, said it was quite possible that the armistice negotiations would break down during that interval, and the :: briefed the Council on the military implications of the six possible alternative courses of action in Korea. In the course of his briefing, General Slayton SPLIT stated that none of the courses of action which involved operations outside of Korea could really be effectively carried out without the use of atomic weapons. '93 . . .In the event that atomic weapons were used, General :: also warned the Council that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were convinced that they must be used in considerable numbers in order to be truly effective. ... While there were no good strategic targets within the confines of Korea itself, the military were most anxious to make use of atomic weapons in any of the courses of action which involved operations outside of Korea. Their use would be highly advantageous from the strictly military point of view. The SPLIT said that the test of a penetration bomb at Bikini had been abandoned, but that tests of such weapons had been made at the Nevada Proving Grounds. The effect had been as of an earthquake, but there was some doubt as to whether use of such weapons could really be justified in terms of the large-scale destruction of enemy personnel and materiel. The :: about the means of protecting our own units from low-flying Chinese Communist planes after the action had been begun. It was to obviate this danger, replied General Twining, that the plan chosen by the Joint Chiefs contemplated initially the complete destruction of the Communist air force. After further discussion of various military aspects of the problem, the :: took over from General SPLIT replied that there was no clear answer to the President'92s anxiety, and added that for that matter, our own position in such places as Pusan and Inchon offered a very favorable target to the Soviets if they intervened with their Air Force. The SPLIT said that the Marine division whose use was contemplated was ready to go. So also was the regimental combat team which would have to be made up from the 82nd Airborne Division. In a matter of three months from the time of decision to mount this operation, we should have to begin the selection and the movement of the American forces which would have to go to augment our strength in Korea. The :: briefed the Council with respect to the choice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the most desirable course of action in Korea, among those set forth in NSC 147, from the point of view of all considerations, military and otherwise. (The record of General Bradley'92s statement which he read to the Council is filed with the Minutes of this meeting. 7 ) General Bradley'92s statement indicated the necessity of expanding the war beyond Korea. General SPLIT indicated that if a national decision were made to expand the effort in Korea, it would be necessary to conduct military operations outside Korea to achieve success. General SPLIT and briefed the Council on the several phases of the course of action which General SPLIT had outlined. The SPLIT said that we would have to begin at once to bring the ROK forces up to 20 divisions. We would also have at once to take steps to assure additional supplies of ammunition. This would involve cutbacks of ammunition programmed now for NATO. General SPLIT confirmed that the Joint Chiefs were themselves convinced of the necessity of carrying out the proposed operation with great speed if it were to be done successfully. There ensued a discussion of the disinclination of our allies to go along with any such proposal as this. It was the President'92s view that we ought at once to begin to infiltrate these ideas into the minds of our allies. If the ground were prepared and the seeds planted in a quiet and informal way, there was much better chance of acceptance than if we suddenly confronted the allied governments with a full-fledged plan to end the war in Korea by military decision. There was general agreement with the President'92s point, and Secretary",military,bureaucracies_78,bureaucracies
"then turned to the paper on Korea, and requested a discussion in the first place of page 44, 3 which dealt with the problem of reimbursement of the United States by nations having forces in Korea, for logistic and other support afforded these forces by the United States. After a brief discussion, General SPLIT suggested that it would be premature for the Council to make a choice now, in view of the new possibility that the Communists were really prepared to enter into an armistice in Korea. He suggested, however, that the Council should now hear from the Secretary of State the latest information on the new armistice proposals and the views of the State Department on them. In the first place, said Secretary SPLIT suggested likewise that our people be instructed to state that we reserved our right to void the armistice if it turned out to be a fraud and led to no settlement. While there was rather strong reaction in the Council against this suggestion, the :: reminded the Council that they would be considering at next week'92s meeting a paper from the Planning Board setting forth the various alternatives open to the United States with regard to the situation in Korea. At the very least, Mr. :: added, the United States could well publicize the fact that we are about to set up the 15th and 16th Republic of Korea divisions. [Here follows a brief discussion of the transfer of finished atomic weapons from the Atomic Energy Commission to the Department of Defense] S. Everett Gleason} :: then reminded the Council that at its last meeting it had requested the Department of Defense to appraise the desirability of an actual or simulated build-up of our forces in Korea. 5 He then asked Secretary Wilson or General SPLIT interposed to explain that the NSC staff had attempted to present in tabular form the six possible alternative courses of action open to the United States in Korea in this contingency. 6 While, said Mr. Cutler, it was not his intention to propose a discussion of these alternatives by the Council until we knew the probable outcome of the armistice negotiations, he hoped that this chart of the alternatives would prove helpful later. The :: again reverted to the view he had expressed at last week'92s Council meeting, that the decision which the Council must presently take, with respect to alternative courses of action in Korea in the event of a breakdown of the armistice negotiations, should be taken only in the context of the longer-term problem which would confront us when the Soviet Union had amassed a sufficient stockpile of atomic weapons to deal us a critical blow and to rob us of the initiative in the area of foreign policy. The :: noted that the Director, Bureau of the Budget, had questioned the accuracy of the course figures for the several alternative courses of action in Korea. Mr. SPLIT said he merely wanted to state that these figures were not intended to be precise, but rather to provide a general idea of the costs which these several courses of action would entail. Mr. SPLIT also briefly informed the Council as to the nature of Project Solarium and the proposed study of general alternatives open to the Administration with respect to the basic decisions confronting it in view of the Communist menace and the world situation. 8 Thereafter, General Slayton [Sladen]",political,bureaucracies_79,bureaucracies
", he desired to emphasize a point which had not, in his opinion, been adequately covered in the present report on alternatives open to us in Korea. The fact of the matter was that the United States had inherited an armistice agreement which had been complete except for the one point of the disposal of prisoners of war. In view of the changed situation and the possible desire of the Communists for an armistice, it seemed to Secretary SPLIT questionable whether we should feel bound now by the other provisions in the armistice to which we had agreed earlier. The particular point that disturbed him was that in effect this armistice would be perpetual unless one side or the other deliberately broke it or unless it was agreed by both sides to break it. This situation, if continued, would enable the Communists to sit it out indefinitely on the line which they now occupied, and refuse to go forward to any satisfactory political settlement in Korea. Secretary SPLIT stated his belief that it was now quite possible to secure a much more satisfactory settlement in Korea than a mere armistice at the 38th parallel, which would leave a divided Korea not economically viable nor politically acceptable to the South Koreans. He would himself have much preferred at the outset an armistice agreement which would have required in its wake a political settlement, in the absence of which the United States would have been permitted to call off the armistice. The SPLIT said that this would be very hard to do. Our allies were desperately anxious to see the fighting stopped. Nevertheless, he affirmed that we should certainly be able to secure a better armistice in view of our much greater power and the Soviet Union'92s much greater weakness currently. The SPLIT , our current trading position is a great deal better, and he personally would like to be able to say to the Communists that unless we could divide Korea at the waist rather than at the 38th parallel, we would call off the armistice. Certainly, thought Secretary SPLIT , in all likelihood global war would follow. What we really want, he continued, is a satisfactory settlement of the Korean problem, and we should be in a position to call off any armistice if it proves impossible to achieve such a permanent settlement. This must be done adroitly, however, in order not to offend our allies. [Here follows a statement of action on item 3. '93United States Policies in the Far East.'94] Action on Item 4: 4 The National Security :: observed that it was certainly clear to him that we were much more likely to get a suitable armistice out of the Communists in Korea if they did not calculate that we were desperately eager to obtain one. The :: expressed complete agreement, the more so, he added, since if we agreed to a political conference it would be quite likely his misfortune to be the chief U.S. representative at it. Mr. SPLIT first, and then other members of the Council, expressed warm approval of the President'92s proposal for a military briefing. Secretary SPLIT stated that most of the possible military courses of action in Korea involved difficulties from the point of view of foreign policy. As set forth in NSC 147, these foreign policy difficulties became increasingly more severe as the military courses of action became more drastic. Nevertheless, said Secretary Smith, he thought it quite possible that if we were to adopt the sixth and most drastic of these military courses of action and were able thereby to secure a victory in a short time, our allies might welcome our choice. If, on the other hand, victory eluded us and the struggle was protracted, we must anticipate grave difficulties. In view of Secretary Smith'92s remarks, the :: then briefed the Council on the political results and implications to be anticipated from the six courses of military action which had been outlined. 9 He dismissed Course A as having no significant implications, since it was a continuation of the status quo . Allied reaction to Courses B and C, thought Secretary Smith, would be determined in large part by whether the United States took the initiative in embracing these courses, or whether the decision to enter into them were forced on us by the enemy. The reaction of our allies and the effect on the neutrals would also depend on the achievement of success in a short period of time. Much would be forgiven us if we were quickly successful and ended the war. In summary, Secretary SPLIT stated that he was personally not very much worried about the reactions of our allies and of the neutral powers to these courses of action, which did not involve the lifting of current restrictions or expanding the war outside of Korea. On the other hand, said Secretary Smith, Courses D, E and F were all fraught with danger for us from the point of view of the reaction of our allies. If we chose any one of these three courses on our own initiative, our allies might well refuse to go along with us in them and indeed might actually withdraw their contingents from the UN Command. Again, however, Secretary SPLIT estimated that if we achieved a rapid success with any of these three courses, and especially with the most drastic of them, Course F, many of our friends who had fallen away at the outset would climb back on the victorious bandwagon. The criterion again would be quick success. We should not, however, underestimate the severe Chinese Communist reaction to any of these three courses. We must count on a probable Soviet intervention and on the real possibility of general war. While it was not, strictly speaking, germane to the present discussion, said Secretary Smith, he could not but recall Dr. Sonntag'92s remarks apropos of Chinese Communist success in the present operations. History, Dr. Sonntag had predicted, would probably record this success as the turning point in the long history of relations between the East and the West. For the first time in a thousand years the East has successfully stood up to the West and secured a stalemate. For this reason, concluded Secretary Smith, the boldest line of action is probably the one which will leave us in the best position. The SPLIT replied that in all probability NATO and our European system of alliances would all fall to pieces temporarily. If, however, we were successful in our bold line of action, and if global war were avoided, our system of alliances could be rebuilt. The SPLIT replied that one must confess that our relations with Great Britain were now '93not good.'94 The SPLIT agreed with the Vice President'92s exposition of the long-term problems which were confronting the Administration, but also noted that if, as seemed very likely, we obtained an armistice in Korea, the Administration would also face a serious short-term problem. The first reaction of the American Congress and people to an armistice in Korea would be relief and rejoicing at the end of the bloodshed. Presently, however, Congress and the people would begin to tot up the net results of two years of savage fighting, and there would be bitter criticism of the small result which could be attributable to this long and costly effort. The :: warned the :: said that in a sense he had already begun to plant these seeds. He has just called in the British and Dominion Ambassadors and made clear to them that the United States could not contemplate an indefinite continuation of the present stalemate if the armistice negotiations were broken off. 8 He also re-emphasized his views expressed to the Council earlier, that a quick victory would go far to sell our allies on even the most drastic course of action in Korea. The SPLIT informed the Council that he would prepare a report to the Council setting forth the foreign policy implications of the military course of action which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had selected. The",political,bureaucracies_80,bureaucracies
"responded that this was confirmed, SPLIT said no; I believed the object of the Saudi move was to defend Kuwait'92s independence against the Iraqi threat. SPLIT said that Sir Humphrey Trevelyan had advised London that the U.K. should be prepared to move troops in the direction of Kuwait to defend it, indicating Sir Humphrey'92s fear that the Iraqi Government might make a quick military move. The SPLIT said yes, the U.A.R. had come out flatfooted for Kuwait'92s independence. To his question whether there were any Arab countries that might support Iraq in its claims, I said that I could think of none likely to do so. SPLIT said that it had not expressed itself. I was not quite so sure about the position of Iran'97possibly Ambassador Wailes might have a comment'97inasmuch as Iran had claims on Bahrain; and if Persian Gulf shaikhdoms were going to break loose from their traditional association with the U.K., in a sense it became '93open season'94 for larger neighboring powers to assert such claims that they might have. 1 'a0 :: '93Your thinking coincides with ours. we agree that the independence of Kuwait must not be destroyed by force and we are prepared to render the full political support you request. While Qasim is, to say the least, unpredictable, we are hopeful that given time to work political forces among the Arabs will dissuade Qasim from committing himself to an unfortunate course of action with unpredictable consequences.",political,bureaucracies_81,bureaucracies
"requested that the group remain for a general review of the problem. It was pointed out that the balance of forces in Laos generally favored the Pathet Lao with their Viet Minh cadres but General :: you asked for my advice regarding further action in Laos. I believe we should accept Bill Bundy's recommendations and continue to endeavor to force the junta leaders into support of a government formed in accordance with the Geneva Accords. To do otherwise would not only be a violation of an agreement to which we are a party, but might very well lead to a situation in which we face the loss of Laos to the Communists, or alternatively the introduction of U.S. ground combat forces into that country. It seems quite clear the Pathet Lao will refuse to accept a government which either excludes or substantially reduces the influence of their representatives. If such a government is formed, almost certainly the Pathet Lao would move against it militarily. We know they have the military power to substantially expand the territory under their control. I see only two ways to prevent an expansion of the influence of the Pathet Lao in Laos either we must support the Geneva Accords or we must be prepared to introduce U.S. forces into that country. Of the two I much prefer the first. Robert S. McNamara 1 'a0 :: also requested twenty-four hours to secure JCS comments on the patrol idea. It was thus agreed that these matters would be processed through these channels and taken up at a later meeting. (It was later set for Saturday.) 5 General :: said the Viet Cong is increasing its pressure in the areas north of South Vietnam. He cited a significant communications buildup which might mean that a major effort was being undertaken by the North Vietnamese to increase their military buildup for use either in Laos or in South Vietnam. He agreed we should wait for a week to see what developments take place in Laos. Our capability to undertake low-level reconnaissance will be brought to a 24- to 48-hour readiness status. Bromley Smith 2 1 'a0 :: insisted, throughout the evening, that any action against North Vietnam must anticipate the commitment of at least seven Divisions in Southeast Asia. That while he did not intend to commit them, he felt that they should be pre-positioned and alerted. In fact, he said, they were already alerted. I took issue with this point, stating that in my opinion, (which was strictly non-professional and not supported by any studies) air attacks would be more decisive than this indicated and possibly conclusive. I furthermore said that if any action involved the commitment of troops to combat in South Vietnam, we had better forget it because the American people and the Congress would not support such action under any condition. I said that, in my opinion, the American public are fed up with adventures such as the Korean War and would not stand for another one. 8. Throughout the evening the :: , 1964. LAOS The enemy has two choices in Laos, each with a number of shadings. First, he can at any time initiate substantial military action on the ground aiming toward the Mekong Valley. Second, he can try to keep what he has for the present and leave any military initiative to us. This is our major problem. I. Action if the enemy moves strongly toward the Mekong. While we rate its likelihood very low (less than one in ten) we must obviously be prepared for this first case'97substantial enemy pressure toward the Mekong. In this case we believe that it would be necessary to be prepared to move U.S. and other forces into Thailand at once and to be prepared, with the Thais, to occupy selected Laotian cities on the left bank of the Mekong. This of course would imply a still sharper de facto partition of Laos, but since it would by definition be a response to clear-cut Communist military aggression, we believe it would be internationally and nationally acceptable'97and indeed almost inevitable. Recommendation 1 Our recommendation is that contingency planning against this possibility should be undertaken at once with Thailand, and we believe that military discussions of this contingency will have a useful diplomatic effect in Thailand, Laos and North Vietnam. II. Politico-Military Scenario if there is no further major Communist movement in Laos. The second enemy choice poses us a more complicated problem. In essence our objectives are three: (1) not to let the situation develop so rapidly that we are faced with a choice of humiliation or major military action before we are ready to take decisions in the context of SEA and especially SVN. Our belief is that the following politico-military scenario is the best available for these purposes. By a minimum of force, and an absence of direct hostile action unless they shoot first, it aims to show Recommendation 5 We recommend further that if such planes are downed either over Laos or North Vietnam, fighter escort should be provided with instructions to return ground fire and attack anti-aircraft installations. 3. Impasse in the Polish meetings . The actions recommended to this point are those which would occur before an impasse in the Polish discussions. When such an impasse has been reached, we expect to recommend selections from the following additional actions to strengthen our general position. No specific decisions are recommended at present, but such actions might include the following: (1) The expansion of T'9628 operations in Laos, including the use of third country pilots, but not Americans. (2) The introduction of harassing action by South Vietnamese forces into the Laotian Corridor (with U.S. advisors). (3) The authorization of South Vietnamese air strikes against North Vietnamese activities in the Laotian corridor. III. The Special Problem of the Laotian Right One continuing danger, in all our Laotian efforts, is the Right Wing. Both the relatively skillful Phoumi and the quite unpredictable Siho are capable of acting to overthrow Souvanna and take power at Vientiane at any time. De facto, they have much power there now. Any Right Wing takeover would be most destructive to our whole position. 1 'a0 :: then recommended that a reconnaissance mission of two planes be sent out tomorrow, that it be accompanied by 8 fighter bombers, with orders to return fire if the reconnaissance planes were attacked. 2. The :: stated that the Chiefs thought there was a very small chance and he placed the chance of losses for missions at 5%. We have run 138 missions with only 2 losses and this more or less verified his estimate. With respect to this particular operation, which was planned so the planes would go in on the safest route, take out the target and then exit by the safest possible route, he estimated the chances of a loss to be '93only 1 in 500'94. The SPLIT and William Bundy challenged this, stating there was a scenario carefully worked out and that it was set forth in papers which had been approved and that the courses of action were designed to apply increasing pressure on Laos. :: agreed. Mr. SPLIT said he disagreed with Ambassador Unger who had proposed that T'9628s be used to take out the antiaircraft battery. He said that T'9628s flown by Vietnamese would not be able to destroy the target. In his view, if another U.S. plane were knocked down, we would have to respond by some military action, not necessarily an air strike. Secretary SPLIT noted that he was not satisfied with the way the reconnaissance flights had been carried out by the Navy. He had asked the task force, for example, why the U.S. planes had expended only seven rockets. General SPLIT disagreed sharply, saying that Director McCone had told him flatly at 1:30 PM on Sunday 5 that he was for an air strike in Laos. General SPLIT said we do not have to recommend the air attack but that no other action we can take to convey a message to Hanoi is comparable to an air attack. The possibility of some of our planes being shot down was a real one but the possibility that there would be a catastrophe was one chance in a million. The risk of not doing anything is greater than doing what is proposed. We must put additional pressure on Hanoi now. Secretary SPLIT said a perfect attack would consist of hitting the antiaircraft battery and losing no U.S. planes. If the fighters miss the antiaircraft battery but no planes are lost, we can consider the attack successful. If the antiaircraft battery is hit and a plane is lost, we can consider the attack satisfactory. In the event of any of the above results, no further reconnaissance measures will be flown for the time being and no further retaliation would be undertaken. With respect to public information, we would announce only that a reconnaissance mission had taken place. If the Communists say our planes fired, we would say that the Communists fired on our planes and we merely returned the fire. Mr. William SPLIT said they had been very useful, but that we could do without them, as we had during the past two years. He emphasized again we had one, not separate problems, in Vietnam and in Laos. Aerial photographs of the specific target and the surrounding area were circulated and examined by the group. It was pointed out that the antiaircraft battery to be attacked was 7/10 of a mile from a village. Mr. SPLIT noted that we had already reduced our reconnaissance flights from ten to one. In reference to Ambassador Unger's opposition to suppressive attacks on antiaircraft batteries, he said that we were not doing this except in the one specific case now being recommended. He repeated his flat statement that the antiaircraft battery could not be destroyed by Vietnamese pilots using T'9628 airplanes, as Ambassador Unger believed. The T'9628s would be lost to ground fire if they tried to attack an antiaircraft battery and the Vietnamese pilots had insufficient inability to deal with the targets. The SPLIT said we have to take some military action. He doubted that we could push the Pathet Lao back to where they were before their recent attack, but we must take some military action, such as the air strike, if we are to prevent further deterioration in our position in the area. The",military,bureaucracies_82,bureaucracies
"stated that he did not expect any immediate full scale move which would involve Viet Minh units. The FAR was believed by General SPLIT not to be much better than it ever was, despite some reports of improvement we have heard in the past. Kong Le offers more a political than a military force. The chances of substantial support to the non-communists from Thailand or South Vietnam were not considered great. Among the actions considered were the possibility of reinforcing the Thais with a U.S. unit (which it was agreed was complicated as the Thais would exact some assurances on our policy in Laos), and the movement of U.S. naval units off North Vietnam. 7. Mr. :: was the center of an animated discussion in which he took the position that only battalion size operations had any change of success. 6 He finally settled on the position of being given the mission of conducting intelligence probes within this area with the limitation that his forces could not exceed 50 to 100 man patrols. In the course of this discussion General SPLIT commented that CIA's crossborder operations to his knowledge had never produced any real information and that these must be run on a more substantial military basis. His primary target in this discussion was the State Department as he expressed some impatience over the need for detailed information south of Tchepone beyond what was available unless it was proposed to do something about these areas. WE Colby Chief, Far East Division 1 'a0 :: recommended strongly that the air attack be authorized. He opposed any delay and said that we had no other plan to respond to the shoot-down. Secretary SPLIT said the North Vietnamese had no air force, and, therefore, whether we attack from the sea or from Saigon made no difference insofar as retaliation by the North Vietnamese was concerned. Any Communist aircraft which could attack South Vietnam would have to come from Communist China. Communist retaliation is very unlikely. General",military,bureaucracies_83,bureaucracies
"summarized the actions required as determining: a. Whether and how we reestablish the neutral solution (i.e. '93put Humpty Dumpty together again'94). In this context the position of Kong Le is important. b. The degree of South Vietnamese involvement, encouragement or potential in the Lao situation. e. The effects of a formal North-South partition on the situation in Vietnam, i.e. whether this would substantially improve the North Vietnamese capabilities of supporting the Viet Cong. f. Alerting various intelligence activities to any indications of early action by the Communist side. In this context the Department of Defense will ensure a full coverage by high level reconnaissance on Southeast Laos and NSA will be altered to follow the traffic analysis in Laos and Vietnam. WE Colby Chief, Far East Division 1 'a0 :: and recognized by the President. 6. SPLIT pointed out that the most important paper before the president was the estimate prepared by the Board of National Estimates 3 which in effect said a limited strike against North Vietnam might cause a hesitation on the part of the North Vietnamese in their direction to the Pathet Lao and the Viet Cong, causing them to stand down their operations temporarily while events developed. On the other hand, the estimate pointed out that a large-scale attack might have just the opposite effect, i.e., intensification of action by the PL and VC and also intervention by the North Vietnamese and very possibly the Chinese Communists. 7. :: 1. He feels we have not been figuring the odds of accidents over the Plain of Jars very carefully. 2. We should not feel rushed into counter-action by the strong desire to hit back. We should instead calculate very carefully and very professionally just when and how to make a strike that will really take out one of the offending anti-aircraft batteries. If that takes a day or two'97O.K. We know we have the will to do it, so we don't have to prove our determination to ourselves. The enemy will be more impressed by an effective strike than by one that is not reasonably sure of success. Mike 1 'a0 :: described the attack as providing only a bump in the upward curve of the military actions proposed in the scenario. With respect to whether the reconnaissance pictures we had obtained had been worthwhile, Secretary",military,bureaucracies_84,bureaucracies
"then commented that we do not have a clear idea of the implications of the Plaines de Jarres action, that we are pressing the Communists to abstain from actions against the neutralists and rightists 3 and are prepared to move to pressure Siho and the rightists to support Souvanna's neutralist government. With respect to the area around Tchepone he said that we have some indications of a step-up in North Vietnamese logistic capabilities and that patrols will be authorized in the Tchepone area for intelligence purposes under certain policy restrictions. Also a limited number of low level air photographic reconnaissance missions will be run into this area. Secretary :: said he agreed that we should postpone for a week low-level reconnaissance, but he did not wish to delay much longer. The need to know more about what is going on in Laos as regards the infiltration of men and equipment is so great that a decision needs to be taken soon if our information is to be augmented. Secretary :: then was asked his views. He said that he felt the reconnaissance flights had been a deterrent to PL operations, that they should be continued to the extent '93necessary and essential in developing photographic reconnaissance required by the situation'94. He opposed excessive flights and he opposed '93loitering'94 to gain visual observation of villages, encampments, etc. With this restriction, SPLIT agreed to the reconnaissance flight tomorrow with fighter-bomber accompaniment and orders to return fire. 4. The :: noted that Rusk was concerned over the practicality of our position as anti-aircraft and machine guns were scattered over the entire PDJ. In answer to a question from the President, :: said the purpose of the strike would be to convey a message to Hanoi. Unless we take some action to convince Hanoi that we are serious, negotiations with Ho Chi Minh will not be productive. Secretary SPLIT said he did not think the strike would be as harmful to our relations with Souvanna as Ambassador Unger thought. If we attack a specific target we won't lose Souvanna by his giving up his position. Secretary SPLIT said the State Department, including Secretary Rusk, agreed that the air attack should be made although the decision was a close one. The risks involved in the attack were offset by the absolute requirement to send a firm signal to Hanoi. Secretary SPLIT referred to a list of nineteen military actions from which we could choose. 8 One such action was the movement of an additional carrier to the seas off South Vietnam. The SPLIT responded that it might, but if we took no military action now, we would obtain no concession from the Communists at the Poles' meeting. The SPLIT said the air attack was the only way that we could signal Hanoi. If we don't send this signal, the situation will deteriorate in Southeast Asia. Souvanna may object publicly to our action but he will not be too unhappy in private. One day later we will know little more than we know now. There are fewer risks in going forward than in not acting. The",military,bureaucracies_85,bureaucracies
"stated that I felt we must be extremely careful about action in North Vietnam. I observed that the Chiefs (at least General LeMay) advocated a strike deep into North Vietnam. I pointed out that if this were done it might unleash forces which could readily overcome the friendly forces in both Laos and South Vietnam, with the result that we would '93lose our base'94 in Southeast Asia. This view was supported by :: stated that it was probably true that the reconnaissance flights had caused the Pathet Lao North Vietnamese to act with restraint. However I noted their limited time for military actions which involved going forward aggressively for a short period, pausing and then withdrawing was typical of PL operations and probably due more to logistic and support problems, ammunition shortages, etc., than to such considerations as our overflights. With respect to the mcNamara recommendations, I supported them without hesitation or reservation. SPLIT therefore viewed with great concern the consequences of the actions which we were '93drifting into'94 and I wished Bundy to express this view to the President. 1 'a0 :: stated that I felt there was grave danger of us '93sliding down the slippery slope'94 on day-to-day decisions and that we did not have a full scenario of actions in view of the military effort that was now being made. Both SPLIT let the discussion drop at this point, but I wish to return to this issue as the papers referred to which were those considered on June 4th, specifically did not anticipate actual combat operations by U.S. air either in support of regular flights or in advance of regular flights. What is happening is that a scenario designed to bring pressure on Laos during the period of negotiations under Article 4, ICC discussion on Polish proposal, are now being considered as adequate under active military operation of a type which has taken place in the last 2 days and is anticipated for June 9th. Check with Cooper and Colby. [Here follows a brief discussion unrelated to Laos.] 1 'a0 :: recommended that the air strike be stood down on the grounds that it is a precipitous action based on the normal desire to retaliate against the shoot-down of two U.S. planes. He did not see it as part of a scenario which was aimed at seeking to improve the situation in Laos and South Vietnam. He stated this was Director McCone's view. Secretary SPLIT said he was not at the Sunday meeting but that he had been told that the Director disapproved of the attack because it was not part of a longer range plan to deal with the existing situation but rather an action taken out of sequence. General SPLIT said he had earlier recommended strongly against the air attack. He added, however, that this was his judgment and CIA did not have an agency view on the policy decision. He recommended that the air strike be delayed for 24'9648 hours if for no other reason than to acquaint Ambassador Unger with the reasons why the attack was being launched. He said his personal view was that the air strike was motivated by a desire to retaliate against the loss of our planes and did not fit into a plan aimed at improving our situation in Southeast Asia. He repeated, however, that this was a question of judgment and acknowledged that he had no alternative proposal to suggest which would have the effect of letting Hanoi know that we were serious about our position in Southeast Asia. The",military,bureaucracies_86,bureaucracies
". -720 SUBJECT CIA Analysis of Probable Reactions of Various Concerned Parties to Operations in Laos Attached is a comprehensive assessment prepared by CIA on the Tchepone operation. 2 Some of its more significant findings are: '97Tchepone is a significant logistics target which encompasses the major enemy Base Area 604 and houses Binh Tram 33, 3 the principal logistics command for the war effort in Cambodia and South Vietnam. '97Tchepone is a difficult target because of high density of enemy security forces and it is probable that enemy caches in the area are widely dispersed. '97Maximum effects from the operation are influenced by timing in that the bulk of supplies in the Tchepone area will move south in the latter parts of the dry season. The optimum time for ground attacks in the Tchepone area appears to be in mid and late February. Benefits increase in proportion to the duration of time friendly forces remain in Laos. Probable North Vietnamese Reactions '97The enemy probably expects an attack on their logistics complexes and has postured his troops accordingly. '97The enemy will probably stand and fight once they accept that a sustained operation in the Tchepone area is underway. '97Enemy counteractions could also include attacks against the DMZ, Northern Laos or seizure of the Mekong River towns in Laos. '97Political reactions might include a cessation of the Paris Talks. Soviet and Chinese Reactions '97The operation would be a matter of deep concern to both the Soviets and Chinese who would recognize it as a major threat to the Communist structure and organizations essential to the conduct of Communist operations in Cambodia and South Vietnam. '97Soviet reactions would probably be largely in the propaganda area. '97Chicom reactions would be more threatening and include stepped up shipments of arms, food, etc.; however, CIA doubts that Peking would intervene. Lao Reactions '97Souvanna would be faced with his most serious political problem since 1962. If he supported the operation, probably he would risk losing the acquiescence of the Soviets, the North Vietnamese and even the Chinese Communists. If he opposed the ARVN operation, he would jeopardize his position with us and run the risk of setting off a coup by southern rightist leaders who are already pressing for closer military cooperation with South Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand. '97On balance, with proper timing and consultation, CIA believes that Souvanna can be brought along. Thailand Reaction '97Positive. Longer Term Communist Reaction '97CIA concludes that if the ARVN operation is marginally effective, it will encourage the Communists to continue their present course. If on the other hand the ARVN is highly successful, Hanoi will be faced with its most serious dilemma so far and may be encouraged to lash out in an escalatory fashion across the DMZ or in Northern Laos in an effort to incite strong domestic pressures in the U.S. 1 'a0 :: commented that this operation has long been under consideration but was considered one that could not be safely accomplished. SPLIT stated that the Laotians would probably complain just as a pro forma action. SPLIT added that even Senator Fulbright agreed with the need to prevent that. :: described the enemy supply system as a rock passing through a sock and indicated that the Tchepone operation would take place just at the time that the rock had reached Tchepone.",military,bureaucracies_87,bureaucracies
"Because they couldn'92t get a large number of troops that far south, they'92re not'97the North Vietnamese are not limited by troops, by manpower. They'92re limited by the, by the difficulty of access. SPLIT And'97and they'97that problem is solved by putting the Chinese in there. If we went north, if we landed in Haiphong, or if we landed in Vinh or some place like that, then it'92s conceivable. But I don'92t think under present circumstances'97they cannot. SPLIT Yeah. SPLIT Oh, yeah. But they are practically committing their entire strategic reserve force'97 SPLIT Now, they'92re pretty'97 SPLIT No. Well, now, they'92re pretty sure of what it is, and they'92re moving in whenever they can. SPLIT Well, they'92re fool'97still fooling them some. They'92re holding some, but they'92re not moving anyone from the coast. [unclear] But, again, they'97 SPLIT They tried one, and they'92re trying another one tonight. They did one; they'92re doing another one tonight. SPLIT Now, some people scream that that'92s a violation of the understanding. 3 '93'97Hanoi has agreed in a secret minute, and in our discussions to begin serious talks toward peace in Vietnam'97talks which would include representatives of the Government of South Vietnam. '93'97We have made it clear to them that a continuation of the bombing cessation was dependent, first, on respect for the DMZ, and second, upon there being no attacks on the [South Vietnamese] cities.'94 ( Foreign Relations , 1964'961968, volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968'96January 1969, Document 140 ) SPLIT Yeah, because they are technically part of the'97but, I think you should just state that he'97they violated the understanding on it they had with us. [pause] SPLIT Yeah, but all attacks would stop on North Vietnam. SPLIT We think that this'97 SPLIT '97they'92ve actually claimed they sank eight ships last time. I don'92t know whether that'92s true. Well, they'92ve got one more scheduled. It'92s probably already over today, and that'92s all that'92s authorized [unclear]. SPLIT They'92re feeling fine. SPLIT Well, Laird is a little bit jumpy, but I had breakfast with him this morning. SPLIT Yeah, I had breakfast with him, and he'92s all right. SPLIT Yes. Laird is a funny guy; he'97he maneuvers like a maniac, but when the chips are really down, he'92s amazing, and he'92s also loyal to you'97 SPLIT So I'97 SPLIT I rather like Mel. SPLIT That'92s right. SPLIT In Laos'97 SPLIT No, Mr. President'97 SPLIT I agree, Mr. President'97 SPLIT That'92s right. SPLIT I thought the weather has been off and on, but for the next three days, it'92s expected to be perfect. It'92s perfect now, and they'92re pounding them. They'92re putting every B'9652 they'92ve got in there. They'92re putting [unclear]. They are pounding them around the clock. SPLIT They'92ve'97they'92ve set up special radars on the ground, things they can bomb within, I think, 150 yards of these'97of the frontline troops. And'97 SPLIT '97[unclear] the South Vietnamese. SPLIT Then, it'92s going to be awfully tough for them to take this pounding. They'97they took a direct pounding in Khe Sanh three years ago. SPLIT That worked out all right. We chewed up a lot of their troops. I'92ve got a feeling, if things build up, I don'92t doubt that the press is going to try to, to cut us up. Now, the major work should be over. And they should stay out if they keep the roads cut. They already determined the Chup operation 5 is going extremely well. SPLIT Well, and Laos'97we expected Laos to be much tougher. If they would roll over and play dead ten miles from their border, then they'92d be completely through. On the other hand, all of the of the units they'92re going to lose up there [unclear] will not be ready for an offensive next year, or later this year. SPLIT That'92s right. SPLIT And more equipment. SPLIT North Vietnam will be at the end of their supply lines. The geography will work against it. And in the meantime, in Cambodia, for example, what they have done in the Chup plantation area is to introduce Cambodian troops behind the Vietnamese troops, so that they'92re beginning to take over some of the territory. And'97 SPLIT No, no. No. That'92s gone very smoothly. And also, it'92s interesting'97of course, now, they don'92t report it any more'97there haven'92t been any road cuts'97roads cut since the Chup Plantation operation started. SPLIT Oh, yeah. We are occupying them all. They can'92t move around the country now. SPLIT Yeah. I understand there'92s another division he'92s got in reserve, too. We'92ve just got to stay cool now and, and shove in whatever reserves are needed. It'92s going to be tough, and we'92ll need strong will the next few weeks; there'92ll be panicky moments. But I think, having made strides, we ought to stay in there now through the rainy season'97until the rainy season starts, and just chew them up. SPLIT And Moorer gave me some statistics today on helicopter losses, that, actually, they, they lost only six more helicopters last week than in a normal operating week for all of Southeast Asia, and less than they did in a comparable week last year. That, even with the Laos operation, and even with all these horror stories, they lost fewer helicopters last week than they did in the comparable period'97 SPLIT What I'92m beginning to think'97 SPLIT '97is that those who are, who are subject to Communist influence are all going nuts. SPLIT And'97 SPLIT Yeah, I'92m afraid so. And he'92s got this bastard, [Morton] Halperin, 8 who used to be on my staff for three months. He was'97He'92s become'97 SPLIT Yeah, who'92s his chief aide, apparently'97 SPLIT Yes. But, at some moment, I'92m going to surface some memos that Halperin wrote for me when he was trying to butter me up. SPLIT Well, I fired Halperin in July of '9269'97 SPLIT He'92s'97 SPLIT I haven'92t seen him. Well, he'92s certainly not as sharp with policy research, which is what he said'97he thought he was going to be. And, I don'92t think Lake is'97 SPLIT a) He isn'92t that heavy; b) His knowledge is out'97very out of date. Halperin doesn'92t have any insight on this, anyway, because he was across the street writing think papers for me; he didn'92t even see any documents. In fact, as I said, I got rid of him in July '9269. And'97But, Halperin is probably very much on the list in influence. SPLIT And, I think those are the guys'97 SPLIT And those are the guys that are going now. SPLIT Well, it'92s a tragedy. At one stage, I thought Gardner had pot'97potential Presidential caliber. SPLIT Yeah. But, you know, to say your policy is a policy that leads to more war'97what is their alternative? If they had the guts to say, '93Just get out,'94 but that they don'92t have the guts to say. I may have to ask John Dutton for lunch some time because he'92s an old'97he used to be an old friend'97and just ask him, as a friend, '93Now, what the hell would you do if you'92d been in this whole thing?'94 It'92s a pity to see a man of his caliber go to hell. SPLIT Yeah. Howard Stein'97 SPLIT Yes'97 SPLIT Well, but what you should see'97Mr. President, you'92ve changed the political landscape. I'92m'97 SPLIT I am absolutely convinced that you [unclear] Vietnam, as you are now 80 percent of the way to doing, no matter what happens'97 SPLIT Yeah, but we won'92t get knocked out of Laos. [unclear]'97 SPLIT Oh, yeah. So far, they have. They are, right now, moving cautiously to reconnect, so that they can cover each other with artillery. That'92s fine. We don'92t care, as long as they'92ve got the roads cut. And, the'97But I think we can win in '9272. These guys won'92t be able to stand 4 years in the wilderness. More, you can fight them off cheap. SPLIT I know, but I'97 SPLIT You can create your new establishment. [Omitted here is discussion of Italian Premier Emilio Colombo and the President'92s schedule.] SPLIT Agnew would like to go to Asia again to visit some of our friends. SPLIT I think it'92s not. I think we don'92t need any additional covenants on paper, now. SPLIT That'92s what I think. It would just'97 SPLIT Well, I just wanted to'97 SPLIT [unclear] SPLIT Well, it'92s partly human. He likes to be in places where he gets a nice human reception. SPLIT No way'97 SPLIT Mr. President, I, I told [John] Chancellor this. I said, '93I love Hubert.'94 And, I said, '93But, can you really feel that if there was a Democrat here, this country wouldn'92t be torn to pieces?'94 He asked me what your'97I said, '93The'97the thing you never get credit for is you'92ve kept the Right in this country related to this, to the government, where, in all normal situations, if anyone else had had to do this difficult thing, and'97so, you'92ll still turn out to be the best protection of the students who are rioting against you, even though they'92ll never thank you for it, because the alternative to you in 1968 was not a liberal Democrat, but a [George C.] Wallace or a [Ronald] Reagan. And, I think that if this country is radicalized, it will not be from the Left. The Left will start it, but the Right will take it over. SPLIT No, that'92s against their national'97 [unclear exchange] SPLIT I mean, Duc called them their '93hereditary enemy.'94 What I think we can do, what I would recommend, Mr. President, in our game plan is if we get through this [unclear] bomb September, close to the election, I ask for a meeting with Le Duc Tho. Then have it October 15th, and tell him, '93Look, we'92re willing to give you a fixed deadline of total withdrawal next year for the release of all prisoners and a ceasefire.'94 What we can then tell the South Vietnamese, '93You'92ve had a year without war to build up.'94 And, I think, then, we can settle. We may have a fifty-fifty chance to get it. SPLIT I think they may take it. But it'92s too early, because it would panic the South Vietnamese. But, after Thieu'92s election, I think we may able to do that. :: stated that if the enemy stood and fought, it would be to our advantage, adding that the enemy might be set back in its timetable as much as a year. SPLIT said that when the rains start in May or June, the enemy has normally shut down the trail until the next October or November. Therefore, this operation will buy us at least six months and maybe more. stated that all of these considerations convinced him that we must move as soon as possible. SPLIT stated that, most importantly, it would take the enemy a long time to recover. SPLIT said that we should not do this too early because he may prefer not to know. SPLIT noted that we only gave Lon Nol24-hours notice last spring. :: cautioned that in his view and from the historic perspective, commanders in seeing an advantage coming normally piddle away their assets. We should be careful on the air to be sure that we do not step it up until the enemy masses and until we have hard intelligence. :: -108 -108 2. Effect on Vietnamization -108 Vietnamization may work but failure to carry out operation will increase risks at precise time that withdrawals are accelerating substantially. Operation will lessen our long term requirements for supporting South Vietnamese forces for next 3 or 4 years. Vietnamization will work without this operation. 3. Risks of Failure -108 Military Commanders are confident of success. Enemy has avoided standing and fighting in past. If they fight, our fire power advantage will be most effective and enemy losses substantially increased. Failure could be totally demoralizing for SVN and topple Thieu in election. -108 Enemy aware of possibility of operation and has concentrated forces in area. Can inflict heavy casualties. We have turned down operation in past due to insufficient strength. ARVN may not have the capability to successfully accomplish this difficult operation. 4. Timing -108 Important to do now. This is last opportunity when U.S. will be able to give backup support. In next dry season, U.S. will not have forces available to free ARVN for major operations outside of SVN. -108 Enemy supplies are stacked up at Tchepone at this time. Will move South in near future. -108 Doing simultaneously with Chup creates possibility of disrupting Communist base structure and plans for at least a year. 5. Sufficiency of Military/Political Gains -108 Tchepone is a vital enemy supply hub. Enemy preparations to defend it are indicative of its strategic importance. Caches are strung out and will be difficult to locate. -108 Will give South Vietnamese much greater chance for survival over the long term. Enemy may choose to move to West rather than fight, reducing military gain and increasing pressure on Souvanna. -108 Enemy has been denied sea supply route; to deny land supply route from North Vietnam will have major consequences for enemy forces in SVN, Southern Laos and Cambodia. -108 ARVN confidence and pride will be greatly increased by success of operation conducted solely by their ground forces. Thieu'92s position for election will be enhanced. 6. U.S. Casualties -108 Although there will be some helo losses, it is estimated that casualties will not be increased measurably. It will guarantee less casualties over long term. U.S. casualties might be increased substantially because of air support operations in heavily defended area, especially by anti-aircraft weapons. -108 If enemy crossed DMZ, U.S. defenders in blocking positions would suffer increased casualties. 7. Another Location -108 Military assessment has been made and operation in this location will have greatest impact on enemy. Operations further south would be less risky since further from North Vietnamese reinforcements. -108 9. Effect on Political/Military Situation in Laos -108 Souvanna expressed some initial reservations but after talking to King now in favor. Souvanna can call for withdrawal of all foreign forces, and may even state publicly that operation is necessary in light of NVN moves against Laos. Might put Souvanna in untenable political position. Would risk losing acquiescence of Soviets, North Vietnamese and Chinese. -108 Souvanna feels it will tip balance in right direction. Enemy is already moving in Northern Laos. Enemy may not react in other locations. Rightists who favor grouping of SVN, Cambodia, and Laos would be strengthened at Souvanna'92s expense. -108 Souvanna will have to call for withdrawal of U.S. forces. -108 Could unsettle whole fragile balance in Laos. Enemy might move in Northern Laos or move to the West. 10. Relations with Other Countries -108 Will increase credibility of U.S. strength and resolve. Might set back our relations with Soviets and Chinese. -108 CIA believes Soviet reactions would be largely propaganda. Chinese would be more threatening and give more supplies but it is doubtful they would intervene. Operation would be of deep concern to both Chinese and Soviets who would recognize it as major threat to Communist operations in Cambodia and South Vietnam. -108 Our friends are anxious to have us out of Vietnam. This will increase the probability of a successful withdrawal. Thai reaction will probably be positive. Chinese might move into Laos. -108 Our allies, particularly outside Asia, will be critical and this will add to domestic criticism. 11. Paris Negotiations -108 Negotiations are not moving at this time and U.S. public is not optimistic about them. Setback will probably be temporary. North Vietnamese will probably boycott for some period of time. Increases domestic pressure in U.S. -108 On the other hand, NVN may be a little more convinced it is in its interests to seek a negotiated settlement. 12. Thieu'92s Political Position -108 Success will strengthen Thieu'92s popularity and SVN confidence in him. Failure of the operation or a standoff with heavy casualties could completely demoralize SVN and undermine Thieu'92s chances politically. -108 Souvanna may indicate operation is necessary, even though he was not consulted, in light of NVN activities. Souvanna may have to denounce operation publicly, whether it is a success or failure, and this will make Thieu and U.S. seem irresponsible in eyes of the world. He will at least not be able to admit to consultations prior to operation. 13. Enemy Reactions -108 President has warned publicly that U.S. would bomb North if they moved across DMZ in violation of understanding. It is not likely they will incur this risk. North Vietnamese might increase activities in South Vietnam, cross DMZ, move in Laos, or intensify activities in Cambodia. -108 Operation will strengthen friendly capability to squeeze enemy in Cambodia and South Vietnam. Enemy has tended to concentrate forces in Laos. Therefore, ARVN success will have significant impact. }",military,bureaucracies_88,bureaucracies
"then turned to an explanation of the Tchepone operation in southern Laos. He stated that the operation was scheduled to start in early February, although phase one, which included establishing a departure base at Khe Sanh air base, setting up blocking positions south of the DMZ, and emplacing U.S. heavy artillery along the Laotian border, would commence as early as January 29. The plan was designed to provide for the capture of the logistics control center at Tchepone through a combined air mobile operation to seize the field and a ground linkup along Route 9. The ARVN airborne division would execute the air mobile operation and the 1st ARVN Division would be in overall command of the ground linkup. U.S. air and heavy artillery support would be extensive. Helicopter troop and logistics lift, gunship support and B'9652 operations in Laos would also be involved. he had asked General Abrams to delete two facets of the plan which involved the use of B'9652'92s in the southern area of North Vietnam and provided for the establishment of U.S. logistical bases along Route 9. SPLIT stated that SPLIT added that we would also be involved in medical evacuation and would provide heavy artillery support from South Vietnam. SPLIT stated that, nevertheless, we should anticipate that the enemy expected us to launch the operation into Laos since they have obviously held the bulk of their forces there for some reason. SPLIT agreed, adding that this was the crucial supply hub for the North Vietnamese. The SPLIT agreed with the President'92s assessment stating that this was our last opportunity to free the ARVN forces from major operations in Cambodia. By May 1, the U.S. forces would be depleted to 45,000 first-line combat units. Therefore, this was the time to move. SPLIT answered that phase two should begin on the 8th or 9th of February, with phase one beginning at the end of January or at least by the 2nd of February. SPLIT responded negatively. SPLIT commented that SPLIT said that he agreed fully and that we could not get into a situation of piecemeal exchanges on the prisoner issue. SPLIT asserted that he was convinced the plan would work. He again noted that General Abrams had wanted to use B'9652'92s in North Vietnam but that he had overruled this. The SPLIT said that he was thinking in terms of 24- or 48-hours notice. :: if we should proceed. SPLIT had confirmed that he favored the operation provided full U.S. support was assured. SPLIT had confirmed that the operation could not be executed without U.S. support. had also made the point that if the duration of the operation were brief then it would not be worth doing. If this were the case, would propose not to move the ARVN forces into I Corps. SPLIT was getting goosey because of Souvanna'92s reaction. :: stated The Vietnamization program was not linked to the operation in Laos. On the other hand, Laos might lessen our long-term requirements for supporting ARVN forces for the next three or four years. At the same time Vietnamization would work in South Vietnam without this operation. So it should be decided whether or not the U.S. could support such a large ARVN force over three or four years. SPLIT continued that if I Corps was reinforced the enemy would concentrate to defend the Tchepone area and the enemy'92s uncertainty would be of benefit even if phase 2 was not implemented. In the meantime we should keep our option open on phase 2. The SPLIT stated that 40% of the war was now in I Corps. SPLIT commented that we could do a lot of damage even in phase 1. The",military,bureaucracies_89,bureaucracies
"continued the discussion of the operation by indicating that the 5th Mechanized Brigade would be the U.S. force involved along the Laotian border. He added that since we have frequently opened Route 9 westward to the Laotian border and the A Shau Valley, the preliminary measures would not provide too definitive a signal to the enemy. Khe Sanh Airfield would be reopened to provide the logistical airhead and old U.S. code names characteristic of A Shau Valley operations would be used in conjunction with phase one of the plan. SPLIT commented that the Vietnamese would move the airborne division north from III to I Corps. The airborne division which normally serves as the strategic reserve would be replaced by the Vietnamese marines who were now involved in the Highway 4 operation. The SPLIT estimated that our casualties would not increase measurably. The SPLIT agreed and said there would also possibly be some helicopter casualties but that it would be nothing like those suffered last spring in Cambodia by our ground forces. SPLIT agreed that this was so, but added that it would probably be the enemy'92s last gasp. SPLIT stated that we were forcing the enemy to fight on our terms. They will have to react. SPLIT replied that the main problem has always been political restraints, the Geneva Convention, and the neutrality of Laos. SPLIT stated that this was precisely what Japanese Prime Minister Sato had told him his report The :: described the four-phased operation. He pointed out that we had received intercepts yesterday which confirmed that Hanoi was aware of the general plan but not the timing. He stated that the intercepts were picked up by the Binh Tram logistics units and they were being carefully analyzed. In view of the enemy'92s knowledge of the operation SPLIT had asked SPLIT stated that from the North Vietnamese reaction it was obvious they considered Tchepone to be a vital area. He stated that we had not had a set-piece battle since Tet in 1968. Since that time we had generally reacted to enemy attacks. This would probably be the first total defense effort we had seen since Tet. Mr. SPLIT stated that he in turn recommended that we avoid a decision now, proceed with moving the forces and see what happened next. The movement would affect North Vietnamese tactics. If they intended to fight it was obvious that Tchepone was crucial to them. he also was confident that the South Vietnamese, with our support, could do the job, especially since in recent contacts with the North Vietnamese the ARVN had been victorious. The SPLIT answered that in his view with U.S. support, ARVN mobility and U.S. fire power the ARVN could handle the situation from a military point of view. this was general abrams'92 view. The fact that there would be fighting was desirable. The enemy had put all of its acorns in Laos. If they fought enmasse our fire power would trip them sharply. SPLIT remarked that we should lay on more B'9652'92s and hit the enemy hard if they concentrated. SPLIT replied that he did not think so. SPLIT stated that it was necessary that Bunker talk to Thieu about the Tchepone operation. }",military,bureaucracies_90,bureaucracies
"asked when this would be. SPLIT stated that he was aware of no legislative inhibitions since they only involved the use of U.S. ground forces. Also, the new legislation made great emphasis on providing authorities to prevent rebuilding of the sanctuaries. SPLIT continued that, in his view, the real problem involved U.S. casualties and whether or not they might go up, either because of the air operations in Laos or as a result of the thinning of ARVN forces in I Corps. SPLIT stated that if U.S. casualties did not escalate, the political problem should be manageable. The SPLIT said the whole concept was consistent with the Nixon Doctrine. The main difficulty would be whether or not it fails or succeeds. The U.S. attitude had to be one of confidence and assurance once the operation got under way. SPLIT agreed. He said that we should be proud of the ARVN'92s capability to conduct such an operation, for it would raise doubts in the enemy'92s mind as to whether or not the ARVN would attack north. SPLIT commented that an ARVN defeat would be very costly to us. The SPLIT then stated that this was known as a very difficult area. SPLIT stated that he visualized no problem on the residual force issue'97that it had been discussed on the Hill and had caused no problem. The SPLIT said it was urgent now that we decide on when and how to approach Souvanna. SPLIT said whether or not we do it late or early, we must be sure to bring him abroad. } :: then remarked that the whole issue in his view hinged on whether or not the operation could succeed. If it succeeded completely then it might be worth it. The Chup operation posed no problem but Laos was another question. If we come out of the operation without a clear success then we would have a serious problem. Another problem involved public support which was essential. stressed that he did not agree with the connotation that the Laos operation was merely a raid. The public would want to know why we were disturbing the balance in Southeast Asia and we should inform them that it was a massive attack for extended duration. pointed out that our truck kills were way up and that they have increased from 100 a month to over 1000 a month. We have made the point of this success. We have also made the point that we are interdicting the rivers and that infiltration is down this month. SPLIT went on to explain his reason for stating that the risks appear very high. The enemy had intelligence on our plans and we were now asking the South Vietnamese to conduct an operation that we refused to do in the past because we were not strong enough. If they were set back in the operation we would be giving up everything we had achieved. Thieu'92s future would be in doubt. Furthermore, the idea that the U.S. could rescue the operation was shakey and therefore it would serve as a defeat for both Vietnamization and for Thieu. The operation could unsettle the whole situation in Laos. The Thais would be uneasy and it would involve our SEATO units. Souvanna had expressed great doubts and would be unable even to talk to the King about the operation until January 31. 12 In the meantime, he would see the troop movements and assume that we were going despite his objections. He would have his own internal problems with the rightists in the south and might have to resign. Thieu in turn would have equal problems. Congress believed that we would not ever enter Laos and obtaining their support would be difficult. In Cambodia we at least had the support of the leaders. Souvanna'92s problem was a sharp one and he might not survive his tightly balanced position at home. In sum, what was the advantage? If there were no doubt that it would succeed, that would be one thing, but the risks were very great in this operation and could have the effect of totally demoralizing the South Vietnamese and toppling Thieu in the election. SPLIT then recommended that we continue with phase 1 since most of the enemy threat was in I Corps anyway and its reinforcement would be of some value. The SPLIT then asked whether or not all of phase 1 operations involved only South Vietnamese totally. The SPLIT then asked whether proceeding with phase 1 and then deciding to cancel phase 2 would weaken our overall posture. SPLIT remarked that it was obvious that surprise was no longer an element.",military,bureaucracies_91,bureaucracies
"said we would not find much enthusiasm among the Democratic Congressional leaders. The SPLIT acknowledged this. Secretary :: commented that there has been no report regarding Iraqi forces outside of Baghdad. SPLIT then gave a political analysis. The situation must be judged in a most serious way, going back to what is fundamental'97 what will the Russians do. If we go in we must expect very threatening gestures, particularly affecting Turkey and Iran. What the Russians will do depends upon what they judge to be the balance of power for a general war. We are better off now, according to General Twining, than three or four years from now. At the present time the Soviets do not have long-range missiles, at least in any quantity. Nor do they have a substantial long-range air capability. If we do not accept the risk now, they will probably decide that we will never accept risk and will push harder than ever, and border countries will submit to them. If we do not respond to the call from Chamoun, we will suffer the decline and indeed the elimination of our influence'97from Indonesia to Morocco. Pakistan may stand with us because of India; Iran would gradually go down; Turkey would probably stand firm but with increasing anxieties. In Africa Nasser is already making gains in Sudan; Libya is in the balance; and Tunis and Morocco are already unfriendly. If, on the other hand, we do respond to the request, we must expect a very bad reaction through most of the Arab countries'97a cutting off of the pipeline, stoppage of transit through the Suez, and hostile activity throughout the area. The British will have to move into Kuwait. Saud seems to want us to move in, but it is questionable if we can control the situation in his country. It must be noted that there is an appreciable chance that Nasser may have overplayed his hand and that if we are firm, he may withdraw from what he is doing if the Soviets do not come in. If we were to move in we would have to take simultaneous moves in the United Nations and in other international forums. The difficulty is that we do not have hard evidence in this case as in the case of Lebanon. It must be noted that a meeting of the Baghdad Pact powers at Istanbul has been called off, with the representatives other than Iraq going on to meet in Ankara. There is good chance that, whatever we do, the Turks will move. On balance, the Secretary was inclined to feel that the losses from doing nothing would be worse than the losses from action'97and that consequently we should send our troops into Lebanon. Regarding Iraq, he was not certain as to what we should do. This is primarily a UK responsibility. He made the further point that if we do not act quickly, we are unlikely to act at all'97if we don'92t act today, we never will and the situation will be lost to us. In this connection, the world expects that, if we have a strong case we will act promptly, rather than delay. In his opinion, by acting we make general war less likely than if we don'92t, because in the latter case we will lose our allies. What we must decide upon is the lesser of two great evils. We thought we had a third way out in Lebanon but with the events in Iraq, that is no longer available to us. The SPLIT thought that, if we go in, Israel will probably stay out. In Saudi Arabia, Secretary SPLIT felt that the world will divide on this question, not on intellectual grounds but according to instinctive lines. Western Europe will support us, although the Scandinavians will be reserved. Most of the Latin American countries will probably do so, given persuasion. Most of Asia will be against us, including India, Ceylon and probably Burma and most of Africa wherever it is vocal will also. In many areas the leaders will privately applaud. Mr. SPLIT said he thought it was clear that we should act immediately to call an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council. General SPLIT said it is preferable for us to go to Lebanon, and for the UK to go into Iraq and Kuwait. The SPLIT said this is a situation where it will be easy to get ourselves involved, and very hard to get out. However, there exists in Lebanon a very strong community having an interest in stability, commerce and ties with the West. The SPLIT said it would be to protect American lives and property at the request of Lebanon. The SPLIT commented many will say we are simply doing what we stopped the British and the French from doing at the time of the Suez crisis. Although there are differences, they will be hard to put across. The SPLIT commented that we should bring out that we can never foresee what will happen beyond the initial line of action, but that action is required. The :: agreed, and said he had discussed the matter with the British who shared this view. The SPLIT and the SPLIT agreed, and said he had been giving thought to the mission of any forces which might be sent in. Perhaps our dispatch should be on the basis of protecting, at the request of the Lebanese Government, lives and property of United States citizens, and of assisting the Lebanese Government in connection with its military program. In outlining the implications of the introduction of American forces, the SPLIT mentioned the following: once our forces were in, it would not be easy to establish a basis upon which they could retire and leave behind an acceptable situation; the move might create a wave of anti-Western feeling in the Arab world comparable to that associated with the British and French military operation against Egypt, even though the circumstances were quite different; it was probable that oil pipelines would be cut in Syria; action by Egypt in connection with the Suez Canal was not predictable, but at least there was a strong possibility that the Canal would be closed to American and British shipping; the action might result in a new and major oil crisis. Another important consideration, the SPLIT said, was that while we might get support initially from the Iraqi and Jordanian Governments, such support might lead to pressure upon them which could result in their collapse. The SPLIT said that most of the Arab governments to which such representation might be [made?] had in fact asked us to give all necessary support to Chamoun. However, there was a problem in this case, that often arose in such matters, that the governments were prepared to say helpful things privately but not publicly. The SPLIT expressed the view that any communication to Chamoun informing him of our willingness to intervene should make it clear that our purpose was not to back him for a second term as President. The :: first outlined the situation, which the SPLIT recalled that Malik called him about noon Saturday, June 14, saying he had heard from Chamoun that the situation was critical with fighting around the palace, and was close to being out of hand. Malik did not request United States intervention, but put us on notice that such a request might be imminent. Later Saturday, our own information from Beirut indicated that the immediate situation was somewhat improved, but the long-term prospects remained gloomy. Sunday morning at 7:30 o'92clock, Washington time, Malik again called SPLIT and asked for an urgent meeting. At this meeting he said that he had heard from Chamoun that the situation had again worsened, with parachutists from Syria being reported in Lebanon, some 500 Egyptian-trained Palestinians fighting in Beirut, etc. Chamoun wished to have an immediate answer, to give to the Cabinet Sunday afternoon, to the question whether the U.S. would intervene militarily at once if asked. Mr. SPLIT said Malik asked later Sunday if he could call Chamoun with our approval and merely say '93hold firm'97do not yield'94. Mr. SPLIT had replied that he could not, since this was subject to various interpretations. For example, we would agree that he should not yield on any matter fundamental to the independence of Lebanon, but we would not agree that any reasonable compromise should be excluded. Mr. SPLIT then reported that the French Charge had told the Department a few hours earlier this afternoon that a French warship was moving to the area solely for the purpose of protecting French lives in the area. The French had stressed that this action was not being taken under the Tripartite (1950) Declaration, since French help had not been requested, but was solely to protect French interests. The Admiral in command had been ordered to get in touch with U.S. and U.K. commanders in the area upon arrival in the area. The SPLIT said we should have no illusions that if we move in militarily we must move firmly and promptly to help establish a regime which could survive our withdrawal. This would mean in all probability a pro-Western dictatorship, since there is not sufficient popular support in Lebanon for Western intervention. The SPLIT pointed out that the critical time for the Lebanese Government would be after it had requested outside assistance and had so reported to the Security Council, and before the military assistance arrived. Internal discontent with this move would then place the government in great jeopardy. Therefore, we must be prepared to move most promptly when the request became public. The :: and Mr. SPLIT noted had been clarified somewhat as a result of his talk with Malik about fifteen minutes previously. 2 Mr. SPLIT remarked that there was much plotting going on in Lebanon, and probably there were well-advanced plans for a military coup to place Chehab in the Presidency. This effort by Chamoun to replace Chehab as army commander might bring such plans to a head. The SPLIT also noted that the U.N. is moving rapidly and vigorously to implement the Security Council resolution. Cordier is already in Beirut, and the SPLIT read from USUN'92s 1490 6 containing Cordier'92s report. The SPLIT noted that the SPLIT General plans rapidly to recruit several hundred observers from Italy, the Netherlands, Ceylon, and Burma. The SPLIT then reported on Malik'92s call at 4:30 Sunday afternoon at which time (speaking from an outline) Malik had said that any Middle East country inviting armed intervention by Western Powers would be the subject of '93shame and reproach"" for generations. Therefore, three prerequisities to such a request were essential: 1. That the request be made only '93in extremis'94, 2. That there be some Arab participation in, or support of, the intervention, even if token. In this regard, he was thinking particularly of Iraq and Jordan. 3. The action must have the moral support of some organ of the U.N., either the Security Council or the General Assembly. The SPLIT had told Malik this was a statesmanlike approach, and coincided with our own thinking. If we were to intervene without such conditions being met, the intervention would not succeed and actually would not help the government that had called on us for help. The SPLIT then pointed out to the SPLIT felt that the thinking was sound, and corresponded substantially to our own original conditions for intervention, possibly somewhat up-dated. The SPLIT pointed out that any intervention at this moment would be looked upon as undermining and causing to fail what some might feel is a vigorous and promising U.N. initiative, which in itself had been taken at Lebanon'92s request and with which Lebanon had professed satisfaction. The SPLIT felt it would be catastrophic to lay ourselves open to such a charge. Therefore, he felt that we probably ought not to make an immediate military response before exploring further with Iraq and Jordan what they were willing to do, and before taking certain further actions in the U.N. In this connection he mentioned a cable which Lord Hood of the British Embassy had just read to him from Selwyn Lloyd saying that we ought not to act until there had been at least one more round at the U.N. 7 Mr. SPLIT commented that the French will undoubtedly intervene if we and the British do. There was some general discussion about the internal effect in Lebanon of intervention, and Chehab'92s gloomy predictions of the response of the Lebanese army; and our own intelligence estimates of the army'92s reaction, which were not quite so gloomy. Nonetheless, it was apparent that a substantial part of the population would undoubtedly oppose our intervention, actively or passively. The SPLIT commented that Turkey, Iran and Iraq would undoubtedly favor our intervening. Mr. SPLIT noted that if there were a '93Korea-type'94 intervention involving many countries under the U.N. aegis, it would be a quite different situation, and probably all right. There seemed, however, little likelihood of this. At this point, the SPLIT noted the unstable and weak situation in Iraq, and Nuri'92s recent intemperate statements to the U.S. and U.K. Ambassadors about the poor condition of the Arab Union. The SPLIT noted that this general weakness of pro-Western governments in the area must be considered in any action we take'97 we must have the proper conditions before we can take any action. The SPLIT said that Chamoun has a good case about UAR intervention, and Malik made it quite well in the Security Council. However, Chamoun has not made it well publicly. He has not appealed to his own people, or to his parliament, or made a loud and effective public case. Mr. SPLIT then pointed out that if Chamoun calls on us and we do not respond, that will be the end of every pro-Western government in the area. This leaves us with little or no choice, even though every alternative is '93wrong'94. The SPLIT said that it would be unthinkable to move until some U.N. action had taken place, even though this might mean a certain delay and danger. It was agreed that the possible U.N. actions should be urgently studied.}",political,bureaucracies_92,bureaucracies
"the plans and preparations we have made are enough to protect American lives and property. Two battalions of Marines and two Army battle groups from Germany are ready to go. When these go into Lebanon, we would load up two divisions in the United States. General :: said that the landing operations in Lebanon have gone well. The second Marine battalion will land beginning at dawn tomorrow, and the third one will begin landing by nightfall. The two battle groups in Germany can land within twelve hours, on call from Admiral Holloway. This will give us a very respectable force in the area. The SPLIT said that he and the Chiefs are strongly of the view that going into Lebanon was the right thing to do'97otherwise we would lose our whole position. The SPLIT next said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff think that they should put SAC on increased alert. He was in agreement on all measures except the one of deploying our tanker aircraft into forward positions. This would be a very major operation, and could well occasion a good deal of alarm. The SPLIT asked whether this could be limited to the continental United States, but the SPLIT said they also consider that the Air Defense Command should be put on increased readiness. This would not attract so much attention. The SPLIT next referred to the two divisions (one Army and one Marines) which have been placed on alert in the United States for movement to Europe or the Mediterranean area. To proceed with loading them out would call for the Navy to charter vessels, and this again would give notice of an operation of major scope. Part of the Marine Division could be loaded on the Navy'92s own transportation, but the remainder of it and all of the Army division (the 101st) would require chartered vessels. In addition, a part of the 82nd Division is ready for quick airlift to Europe if directed. The SPLIT said that, if orders are given now, the Marines could be loaded and ready to move within ten days without substantial disruption. The SPLIT not to charter vessels for the 101st Division as yet'97but rather to plan such an operation. He agreed that all of these units could be placed on alert, leaves cancelled, etc. In response to a question by the President, General SPLIT said that some 400 transport aircraft could be pulled off MATS activity in order to move elements of the 82nd Division if so directed. (In checking over the foregoing with me, after leaving the President'92s office, General SPLIT indicated that he would defer any chartering of ships at least until tomorrow, so as to avoid adding any impact from that action to the situation created by the initial landings.) G Brigadier General, USA}",military,bureaucracies_93,bureaucracies
"opened with a summary on the situation in Iraq. According to reports received thus far (mostly from the rebel-seized Baghdad radio), the Crown Prince has been killed, and perhaps Nurialso. The King'92s situation is unknown. A Leftist government has taken over. SPLIT continued that Hussein'92s situation is extremely critical in Jordan. Hussein has assumed power as head of the Arab Union and supreme commander of the Arab Union armed forces. The Israelis will be extremely alarmed; they are likely to take over Transjordan if disorder occurs in Jordan. Chamoun has asked for U.S. intervention within forty-eight hours, and has indicated he has already asked for U.K. intervention and will ask for French. The fate of Kuwait is presently in the balance. Two messages have come from Saudi-Arabia. 2 King Saud demands action at once, stating that if the United States and United Kingdom do not act now they are finished as powers in the Mid-East. The :: then handed an intelligence estimate 5 to the President, and also referred to a telegram [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] that Chamoun had prepared a memorandum containing a 24-hour ultimatum to Chehab to take effective command of the Lebanese forces or relinquish his command. Chamoun presumably intended to discuss this with his Cabinet Sunday afternoon. The SPLIT commented that Chehab probably wants Chamoun to fail, since he probably wants his job. The SPLIT commented that the Soviets have not entered the Lebanese situation at all except by radio. The",political,bureaucracies_94,bureaucracies
"Escorted Reconnaissance Flight off Libya . Defense and the JCS propose to provide armed fighter escorts for a [less than 1 line not declassified] reconnaissance aircraft which would fly a mission similar to that of 21 March except that it would proceed point- to-point without any orbits en route and would be manned by a reduced crew. The escort would be provided by an aircraft carrier in the area. The closest point of approach to Libya would be 75 nautical miles. The arguments for this proposal include: '97To establish our right to operate in international airspace. '97To confirm our refusal to accept Libya'92s (or any other) unilateral, illegal declaration of a '93restricted area'94 that includes international space. '97To resume collection of intelligence information on the Middle East, including Soviet involvement in the area. '97To provide some degree of protection to our aircraft as it conducts reconnaissance. '97To prevent Libya from claiming that this is the way to deal with the United States. The arguments against this proposal include: '97We may be accused of resorting to military means to assert our rights. '97Arabs will exploit any incident as '93proof'94 of our collusion with Israel, specifically in the recent Beirut raid, but generally as well. '97Libya'92s reaction might be to seek ways to retaliate rather than be subdued by our show of force. '97Libya'92s planes are on '93strip alert'94 and are equipped with air-to- air missiles. They are '93prepared'94 for Israeli air attacks and might mistake our mission and attack. There are also indications Libya is looking for an opportunity to create an incident as an excuse for a total break with the U.S. In any event, our planes could be threatened. Even with an escort, there is a risk our reconnaissance aircraft could be lost. '97Middle East anti-U.S. emotions are being inflamed as an after- math of Israel'92s raid on Lebanon and a U.S.-Libya incident would add fuel to the fire, possibly endangering the 3,000 Americans in Libya and the major oil investments there. There are risks involved, but I believe we should not delay much longer the assertion of our right to operate in international airspace. To do so would only invite similar challenges elsewhere and even bolder challenges by Libya. Recommendation That you approve armed escort of a reconnaissance flight off Libya on 17 April, with the Libyan Government to be notified in advance. }",military,bureaucracies_95,bureaucracies
"US INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES 2. Objectives A. Political/Strategic Objectives (1) With respect to the Middle East, Libya pursues an extremist policy. Libya opposes the existence of Israel, argues for its liquidation by military means, and seeks to counter a negotiated settlement in any form. Its policy has been one of strong support of the Palestinian guerrillas and terrorists by arms, money and training. No solution to the Arab-Israeli problem based on UN Security Council resolution 242 would be acceptable to Libya under Qadhafi'92s leadership. (3) US interests in the Mediterranean have recently clashed with Libya following Libya'92s declaration of a '93restricted area'94 within a 100-mile radius of Tripoli International Airport. Libya asserts the right to control the entrance of aircraft or ships within this restricted area'97a right which the United States disputes. On 21 March Libyan fighter aircraft fired at an unarmed USAF C'96130 reconnaissance plane flying within the restricted zone. On subsequent flights when a similar USAF aircraft flew in international airspace within the 100-mile zone, Libyan fighters limited their patrol to within the 12 nautical mile sea frontier and did not attack the USAF aircraft. Libya has, however, publicly and repeatedly denounced such reconnaissance flights as provocative incursions of Libyan airspace and territorial waters. The United States has denied any hostile intentions toward Libya, but our attempts to engage Libyan authorities in a meaningful dialogue on the issue of airspace have been fruitless. Complicating the situation is Libyan fear of attack by Israel supported by US intelligence or armed forces in the Mediterranean, as evidenced by the laying of minefields off Tripoli harbor in June. Libya plans to establish a Libyan Flight Information Region (FIR) over the Mediterranean adjacent to Libya, and may eventually seek to interfere with similar reconnaissance flights or other flights by exercising a right to control and restrict aircraft movements within this re- gion. Libyan attempts to enforce unilateral extensions of control over international waters and air space, particularly in the confined area between Libya and the southern coast of Crete, could possibly pose recurring problems for planned NATO and US activities beginning in 1975 at the new air weapons training center and target range based at Tymbakion. IV. IMPACT OF LIBYAN POLICIES ON US INTERESTS 1. Foreign Intervention and Political Activism A. In the Middle East Qadhafi has some popular appeal outside of Libya because of his efforts to restore Arab pride and by his successes in standing up to the big powers. His thinking may be too simplistic for the political or military elites in other Arab countries, but he is respected as a dynamic leader. His Islamic fundamentalism has not struck much of a chord in the urban centers of other Arab states, and it is here that the sources of power rest. Nevertheless, because he has shown himself willing to act against foreign military bases, to challenge the great powers and oil companies and even the use of foreign languages, and because he has his country'92s wealth to support his convictions, other Arab leaders while deploring him privately, are careful not to appear less '93Arab'94 or '93nationalistic.'94 His personal incorruptibility and the austerity of his personal life contrast favorably with that of many other Arab leaders. (1) Arab-Israel Dispute Libya can play a disruptive'97but not a decisive'97role in the Arab- Israeli dispute. Libyan territory offers Egypt some strategic depth in case of new Arab-Israeli hostilities. Libyan-purchased Mirage fighter- bombers transferred to Egypt in the event of a new war would provide Egypt with a possible capability of low-altitude missions against Israel proper. Preparations have already been made for the basing of such aircraft in Egypt, and Libyan Mirages have in fact been present in Egypt in significant numbers (about 20 in recent months). However, the addition of these aircraft either to the Egyptian or their presence in the Libyan inventory does not substantially affect Israel'92s military superiority in the Middle East. 3. Policies towards large Powers Although Libya'92s hostility towards the United States is formidable, its hostility towards the Soviet Union is almost equally so. Qadhafi'92s devotion to Islam and Arab nationalism impels him to keep at arm'92s length the atheistic Soviets, whom he regards as only another imperialist foreign power. Libya purchases Soviet arms, but limits technical assistance and seeks to avoid any longer-term political or military dependence on the Soviet Union. Qadhafi looks to the Third World and to a Western Europe as increasingly independent of the United States and increasingly reliant on Arab oil as sources of political support for Libya and for the Arabs in general. France and Italy particularly have been wooed by attractive commercial and military sales opportunities. Access to their sophisticated military and civilian material is valued by Libya. V. PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE 1. Outlook for the Regime There is no significant internal threat to the Qadhafi regime. Qadhafi retains the personal loyalty of fellow members of the RCC. The leadership is supported by the only power capable of threatening the regime'97the army. Qadhafi'92s security is reinforced by the presence of Egyptian army and security forces. Qadhafi has repeatedly threatened to resign; any likely successor is apt to come from the present ruling group and would probably continue the general lines of Qadhafi'92s policies. one means of registering our displeasure. 3. Whether to Continue Reconnaissance Flights Pro 1. Continuation of the reconnaissance flights shows our determination to exercise our right to fly through international airspace, non-recognition of the Libyan restricted area over the Mediterranean 100 miles from Tripoli, and our determination not to be intimidated by Qadhafi'92s threats and bombast against '93spy flights.'94 2. Acceptance of a Libyan-imposed restricted area could encourage bolder moves of this kind by Qadhafi, posing difficulties for US and NATO activities and operations in the Mediterranean. Con 1. Continuation of the flights could lead Qadhafi to take further action against US oil companies in Libya or to break relations. (Qadhafi probably fears these flights are connected with Israeli plans for at- tacks against Libya and regards them as highly provocative.) 2. The intelligence gathered by these flights is only marginally significant. 3. Qadhafi would not gain a propaganda victory by suspension of the flights since he does not know when or how often they are scheduled. 4. An incident resulting from the reconnaissance flights could be embarrassing in our relations with Greece, where many reconnaissance flights originate. Greece seeks not to antagonize the Arabs, and might restrict our use of Greek airfields for such flights, thus circumscribing the intelligence benefits acquired through almost daily flights to other areas. Confrontation '97highlight Libyan subversive and terrorist actions in public; '97disapprove export of C'96130s, sale of spare parts, and other mili- tary equipment from the US or third countries; '97continue reconnaissance flights; '97severely restrict visa procedures for Libyans; '97initiate break in diplomatic relations. Pro 1. These actions would publicly show our strong disapproval of the Qadhafi Government; might help to isolate it from other, more cautious Arab governments, including Egypt. 2. Several or all such actions would boost the morale of friendly, conservative Arab governments in the Persian Gulf and might reduce Qadhafi'92s influence in other Arab countries and his ability to promote the use of oil as a political weapon against US-Middle East policies. 3. It would also encourage domestic Libyan opponents to Qadhafi. Con 1. These actions would heighten the risk of vindictive Libyan actions against US oil companies and Americans in Libya, including harassment or nationalization. 2. It would further reduce our limited ability to protect US citizens in Libya, and would be a psychological blow to the American community and oil companies. 3. It would not change any of Qadhafi'92s basic policies towards the Middle East problem or terrorism, and might reinforce them. 4. Embassy Tripoli would be eliminated as a useful source of political reporting. 5. Libya could continue to get many of the arms it seeks from countries other than the US. } :: Alternative Strategies Toward Libya C. Option 3: React Under this option the United States would begin a process of measured overt retaliation against Libya for actions inimical to US interests. The decision to invoke this option could result from either of two situations: a) continued Libyan actions adversely affecting US interests in Libya or elsewhere, or b) a subtantial reduction in US interests in Libya which would minimize the Libyan Government'92s opportunity to retaliate against the United States directly. Retaliatory bilateral actions are limited, but could include the following: '97cancel outstanding munitions control licenses and halt the flow of spare parts for American military equipment previously sold to Libya; '97inform Lockheed that the US Givernment will not authorize the export of the eight C'96130'92s which Libya hopes to begin receiving in November 1973, and tell the company that the planes should be sold to an- other buyer since the US decision against Libya was final; '97refuse, as a matter of general policy, authorization for third- country sales of military equipment or technology to Libya; '97refuse to authorize the sale of an air defense-radar system which Libya is interested in purchasing from an American supplier; instruct the interested companies to cease all discussions with the Libyans on this subject; '97terminate Lockheed contract for C'96130 maintenance and training; '97continue U.S. reconnaissance or operational flights through Libya'92s proclaimed '93Restricted'94 area, HLR 22. Under this option the United States would also begin a process through a variety of channels to try to limit Libyan influence. In doing so, it would seek the cooperation of friendly governments, including Exercise of the foregoing option could result in the Libyan closure of the American Embassy in Tripoli; withdrawal of the Libyan Embassy in Washington; and possible nationalization of the remaining US oil company assets in Libya. }",military,bureaucracies_96,bureaucracies
"I agree. That is when I heard of it. :: Isn'92t this piracy? SPLIT Americans? SPLIT When did we get word of this? SPLIT I also. SPLIT Can we notify merchant ships of the danger? General SPLIT I do not see the advantage of announcing the warning. We could make a case on either side. To the extent we want to be forceful, we do not need to make it public. SPLIT They can figure out their own way out. SPLIT That is why I think we should look at other options. SPLIT How about a statement that gives the facts, states that this is an act of piracy, and says that we expect the release. We will not say that we demand the release, because that will activate the Congress. I think you get the same thing without speaking of a demand. Moreover, to demand seems weaker. SPLIT Perhaps not publicly, but privately. :: May I say something? SPLIT I think this will be seen as a test case. I think it will be judged in South Korea. I remember the Pueblo case. 3 I think we need something strong soon. Getting out a message and getting people ready will not do it. I think a violent response is in order. The world should know that we will act and that we will act quickly. We should have an immediate response in terms of action. I do not know if we have any targets that we can strike, but we should certainly consider this. If they get any hostages, this can go on forever. SPLIT Now you can take action before you begin to get protests. I believe the authorities there only understand force. There is an old Chinese saying about a dagger hitting steel and withdrawing when it hits steel, and that is the impression that we should convey. SPLIT Public opinion will be against it in order to save lives. Is there anything we can do now? SPLIT Or we could seize the island. SPLIT What if we had a series of escalating actions? Some we would take now, others later. We have to show that we will not tolerate this kind of thing. It is a pattern. If we do not respond violently, we will get nibbled to death. We can announce these things to make clear what we are doing. SPLIT I do not think turning the carriers around is action. Congress will get into the act. The doves will start talking. But, unless the Cambodians are hurt, this pattern will not be broken. SPLIT Does it make sense to do this if the boat is in it? SPLIT I agree with Rumsfeld. Why should we warn them? There must be planes that we can use, out of Thailand. SPLIT How long does it take to get the carriers there? SPLIT Aren'92t those bases being closed anyway? SPLIT Could we not ask Thai permission to use the bases? :: Also, there is a war powers requirement. :: Do we know why they took off the Americans? :: How do we know these things? How do we know that it was the Mayaguez that your reconnaissance aircraft saw? SPLIT Do we know where the crew, the Americans and the Vietnamese, are? SPLIT That would be this evening, at 6:00 p.m., Washington time. SPLIT Can they get the Americans to the mainland? SPLIT The President wanted it tonight. SPLIT Let'92s put all this on a piece of paper, with the exact times, so that we all know what we are talking about. SPLIT That would be 7:00 p.m. D.C. time. I suggest we stick to one set of times. SPLIT This is a different set of times from what we were given earlier. :: Do we know it is the crew? SPLIT Last night, there were long time lags before we got the information, and there was a lot of confusion about its accuracy. SPLIT This means that the force of 1,000 Americans from Utapao would be for operation to take the island, not the ship. SPLIT Not yet. SPLIT I see two operations. -720 '97The first is against the ship. '97The second is against the island. The urgency of the island operation is to stop the Americans from going to the mainland. On the ship, it is to stop it from going to Kompong Som. The optimum situation with the ship is to get the Holt between that ship and Kompong Som. We cannot do that until tomorrow. If we do not have that time, if they start to move, do we try to take the ship? Or do we wait until the Holt gets there and we have things our way? SPLIT We must recognize that we have a problem with regard to Thailand. They have called in our Charg'e9 and they have told him that they do not want Thai bases used in connection with operations to release our ships. 3 SPLIT So far is has been OK. But if we use force, we may be in jeopardy. SPLIT Let'92s use one time for all this. SPLIT Right. SPLIT I have reservations about landing on the ship. :: Is this the principal port of entry for Cambodia? SPLIT But several years ago it was a principal port of entry. I remember there was some dispute about what was coming in through this port. The CIA said that there was not a great deal, but in fact it turned out that it was a principal port of supply for the Viet Cong. So it must be an important port to them. SPLIT But this is their port of entry. It would be a major contact with the outer world, especially if they do not work with the Vietnamese; it was built originally in order to give them independence of the Mekong River which was patrolled by the Vietnamese. SPLIT There is one thing that was a big mistake yesterday. You got the information that the American ship was already in the harbor in Kompong Som. 2 This denied you one option, which would have been to try to prevent the ship from being taken into the harbor. But you were told that the ship was already in the port. SPLIT I do not want to argue, but you said that it was known that when you left your department it was one hour away from the port and by the time you arrived here, it would already be in the port. SPLIT That would make it the morning of our time, not the evening. SPLIT Even if they are Americans? SPLIT May I say something? SPLIT I do not think the freighter is the issue. The issue is how we respond. Many are watching us, in Korea and elsewhere. The big question is whether or not we look silly. I think we need to respond quickly. The longer we wait, the more time they have to get ready. Why not sink their boats until they move? Once they have got hostages, they can twist our tails for months to come, and if you go ashore, we may lose more Marines trying to land than the Americans who were on the boat originally. Why not just sink their ships until they respond? SPLIT I do not think the Communists respond this way. I remember the story by Mao Tse Tung about sticking a blade in until you hit steel and then you pull out your sword. If you do not meet steel, you go in further. I think you should do everything you can as soon as possible. Later, you can destroy the port as retaliation. SPLIT The longer we take, the worse it gets. If the communists do not think that you will react strong and fast, they will keep on doing this. We must do it as the Israelis do; we need to respond fast. SPLIT I agree with that. SPLIT I think we have some questions about operating on land against the Cambodians. SPLIT I agree. SPLIT We do not want a land war in Cambodia. 1 'a0 :: I see two problems: '97The first is Cooper-Church Amendment. 2 '97The second is international law. SPLIT We have the right of self-defense, but only self-defense. The Cooper-Church Amendment says no actions in Indochina. SPLIT I have to state the problems that we face. SPLIT We have to make a report to the Hill. :: Supposing the boats near the island have Americans on it. Should we send some order to use only riot control agents there? SPLIT This afternoon, we had the NSC prepare a paper saying what we would do. It showed that you would use force in general terms. The reaction from the people we talked to was very favorable. SPLIT Case says we should go in. :: Why? SPLIT At a briefing yesterday, Congressman Zablocki, one of the proponents of the War Powers Act, said that he would tell the press that the U.S. could bomb the hell out of them. SPLIT Everybody wants to know when you are moving. In New York, where I just was, people expect you to be doing things. So any steps you take in preparation will be understood. SPLIT Perhaps it would be good to have it get out. I don'92t think we should cavil. SPLIT In our statement, should we not call them launches? :: With regard to the boat that I told you about, we do not have much time. Our aircraft has used riot control agents twice. That has delayed the boat but it has not stopped it. It is now about six miles from Kompong Som, according to the pilot. The pilot is not at all sure that he can disable the boat without sinking it. SPLIT That is correct. That boat is now six miles from Kompong Som. SPLIT They were tried and they did not work. Now the pilot is not sure what to do next. SPLIT It is not an easy identification. It is very tough. SPLIT The pilot is reluctant to attack if he is under instructions not to sink the boat. SPLIT We have already done it on one. SPLIT I have got to get the word out. What should I tell them? SPLIT No. Their planes can operate at considerable distance. :: How can the pilot tell whether the men are Caucasians? SPLIT I am not an expert on military affairs. I am just an old retired captain in the Reserve. I have been listening in terms of what the American public wants. I think the American public wants to know what you are going to do. This crisis, like the Cuban missile crisis, is the first real test of your leadership. What you decide is not as important as what the public perceives. Nothing, so far as I know, has gone out to the public so far, except that we are taking steps. It may be that we should let the public know something of the steps that you are taking. The public will judge you in accordance with what you do. We should not just think of what is the right thing to do, but of what the public perceives. SPLIT I think we should consider what the people think we are doing. SPLIT Yes. SPLIT Bob Byrd, whom I regard as a good antenna of sentiment, says that we should act. :: I thought the Holt would get in at 8:00 a.m. SPLIT The information this afternoon was that the Hancock would arrive on Friday. SPLIT That is 2200, Friday, the 16th? SPLIT But you have only a few hours left of daylight. SPLIT Can we not use flares for this? SPLIT The P'963'92s should be good at keeping the boat under control. SPLIT When would it start, then? SPLIT But do we have to wait for the Coral Sea actually to arrive? SPLIT Is it not possible that the Coral Sea aircraft could strike Cambodia even when the Coral Sea is still hours away? SPLIT The Coral Sea could be there near that time. SPLIT How are those aircraft equipped? SPLIT But not the ones that carry Americans. SPLIT You would be launching at about 4:00 p.m. tomorrow. SPLIT It should not take long to calculate the answer on the question of using the Coral Sea . SPLIT The delay worries me. SPLIT There would 500. SPLIT Can we be sure there is anybody on the island? We might just take a walk. SPLIT If we look at this tonight, we will know tomorrow. SPLIT I think that is a good issue. :: Are you taking the island to get it or the people? SPLIT By 6:30 p.m. 4 SPLIT I would ask the leadership, such as the Speaker, the Floor leaders, the Whips, and others. I would also get the Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committee leaders and ranking Minority members of both Houses. SPLIT The statute says to consult before initiation of action. SPLIT But we have not yet told them that we are executing. :: I thought they would be on their way by now. SPLIT But they would have time to get all the ships into action. As it stands now, the B'9652'92s would not get there until later. SPLIT Then you won'92t get all the Marines from Thailand? SPLIT Perhaps 10 o'92clock would be better. SPLIT You have already done that. SPLIT What if the group is opposed? What should the President do? SPLIT I was asked today by a business group when you would react. They applauded when I said that you would be firm. SPLIT I think that'92s good. SPLIT They will know about the ship three hours in advance. They can scuttle it. :: I do not agree. If they are not there on the island, you then issue the ultimatum. SPLIT But an ultimatum may be the only way to get the Americans out. SPLIT You have two neutral ships. With an ultimatum, they have a chance to get out. SPLIT But we should avoid the neutral ships. SPLIT You have the requirement for consultation with Congress. If you hit buildings, you might hit Americans. SPLIT I have not understood how Henry (Kissinger) is planning to proceed. SPLIT The law says to consult before the introduction of forces and then to consult regularly. There is also a requirement for a report 48 hours after an action. We have to get that report in tonight. SPLIT When you got the gunships in. SPLIT That is what the Congress really wants. SPLIT I would not. :: Do we have any estimate of American casualties? SPLIT How will the Cambodians know what to do if they decide to let our people go? SPLIT Could a gunboat carry 39 people? SPLIT We should talk a little about Congressional consultation. Last night, we gave the leadership information on your actions. They agreed. They said that they were advised, but not consulted. We reported the attacks to them. Again, they supported you. Today, in the House, people are saying that there was no consultation under the War Powers Act. I have a summary of the Congressional response. I also have a summary of the House and Senate responses to our statements. During the afternoon, it was agreed to provide limited briefings to the House and Senate Foreign Affairs Committees. They want more information. We are sticking to the leadership. We have not expanded on the earlier material. The question now is what notification and consultation should proceed. There is a suggestion that you call Mansfield and Albert, but then others will be mad. We can bring the people over here, or we can call them. SPLIT Perhaps after it'92s over. SPLIT How about other countries? SPLIT Are there any press on board? :: How about the T'9628'92s that are now at Phnom Penh airport? Could they help oppose our operation at Kompong Som? SPLIT I am thinking of the airport. If they could use it, then we would have a stronger argument to hit the airport. SPLIT What is the purpose of having it go 8 hours? SPLIT We will plan to take off from the island in 24 hours. SPLIT Privately, we should say we will not stay long enough so that we would lose face and have to get off too late. SPLIT Regarding the ultimatum, I think there are three ways to do it: -720 '97First, publicly. '97Second, privately or diplomatically. '97Third, you can get into a taffy pull with the people on the scene. I think one and three are bad ideas. The best is the second. It must be specific and must have a diplomatic initiative. SPLIT There are only 80 smart bombs. SPLIT The logic is to protect the operation. SPLIT Did you say that the Marines could be recovered on the Coral Sea ? Is this an option? SPLIT Our preferred option is not to have them return to Thailand. SPLIT We should not announce the termination. SPLIT Did you decide on an ultimatum after the strikes? SPLIT Tomorrow Congress is back in session. SPLIT We need to make plans on press handling between now and midnight. SPLIT As I understand it, consultation means telling them in time so that they can oppose the action. But we cannot worry about it, though they will complain that it is not consultation. SPLIT From the political standpoint, we should get your friends and brief them, so that they can stand up and fight for you. SPLIT I would do Anderson separately, perhaps at 7 o'92clock. SPLIT You do not want to look as if, in being firm, you are being crimped by the Congress. Regarding the B'9652'92s, the Congress would say you should not use them. Then you stand them down, as if in response to Bella Abzug. Should we perhaps stand them down now? SPLIT You should let NATO know, for once. SPLIT The first question will be, will the Marines land on the island. SPLIT No.",political,bureaucracies_97,bureaucracies
"They may want to hold the ship as a hostage to our equipment. SPLIT At 5:15 at the National Military Command Center. :: How far from the islands was the ship when it was picked up? SPLIT As I see it, Mr. President, we have two problems: -720 '97The first problem is how to get the ship back. '97The second problem is how the U.S. appears at this time. Actions that we would take to deal with one of these problems may not help to deal with the other. For example, I think that if they can get us into a negotiation, even if we get the ship back, it is not to our advantage. I think we should make a strong statement and give a note to the Cambodians, via the Chinese, so that we can get some credits if the boat is released. I also suggest some show of force. What do we have in the neighborhood of the incident? SPLIT We may not be able to accomplish much by seizing their assets, since they are already blocked. Perhaps we can seize a Cambodian ship on the high seas. But I think that what we need for the next 48 hours is a strong statement, a strong note and a show of force. SPLIT Can we use any aircraft? SPLIT Can we find out where Cambodian ships are around the world? SPLIT Are there any merchant ships? SPLIT I think we should brief that this is an outrage. Even if they quarrel with each other, they cannot use us. SPLIT Does the Coral Sea have mines aboard? General SPLIT What is the minimum period for which mines can be set? I recall during the bombing of Haiphong mines were set for 30 days. But I wonder if they can be set for shorter periods. SPLIT Can we then have them set for a short time? SPLIT If it is not released by Wednesday, 4 we will mine. SPLIT I agree with the Vice President that we should show a strong position. We should also know what we are doing so that it does not look as though we want to pop somebody. We could mine their harbors. This will not get the ship. Or we could take the ship, or we could scuttle it. SPLIT In Korea, some things might be possible, but with this new group it is very uncertain what will happen. SPLIT We cannot do it from Thailand. SPLIT That we can get away with, but I do not believe we can run military operations from there. SPLIT I was not told until my regular staff meeting this morning, and then it was mentioned as an aside. SPLIT The main purpose of using a statement is that we have no choice. We have to have a reaction. But the statement should be very strong. It should demand the immediate release of the ship, and it should say that the failure to do so could have serious consequences. SPLIT Then we should get our military actions lined up. My expectation is that we should do it on a large scale. We should not look as though we want to pop somebody, but we should give the impression that we are not to be trifled with. If we say that it should be released, then we can state that the release is in response to our statement. I would relate what we do to the ship, rather than to seize an island. SPLIT I see a lot of advantage in taking the island rather than in mining the port. Let us find out what is on the island, how big a battle it would be, and other relevant factors. SPLIT There are three things we need to know: -720 '97First, what force is required to take the island. '97Second, what force is required to take Kompong Som, and to take the ship and the people. On the whole, I would prefer this. '97Third, what it would take to mine the harbor. SPLIT I doubt it. We learned in North Vietnam that mines work better. With a quarantine, you have a confrontation and a crisis regarding every ship. SPLIT If we bomb out of Thailand, we would be out of there within a month. SPLIT We will be pressed this afternoon. SPLIT I would demand. SPLIT If Congress takes us on, I think we have a good case. SPLIT Then we should keep quiet. Let them explain about the three ships. SPLIT I would overfly with reconnaissance. SPLIT That we can get away with, but not bombing. SPLIT Not necessarily. SPLIT No. SPLIT Lee Kuan Yew has asked us to stay in Thailand as long as possible to give him time to work on getting the defenses of Malaysia ready. Bombing from Thailand will get us out quickly. SPLIT To bomb, even from Clark, we would be in trouble. This is a symptom of Vietnam. We can bomb from Guam with B'9652'92s or from the carriers. But we should know what we are doing. I am more in favor of seizing something, be it the island, the ship, or Kompong Som. :: What is the flying time of the B'9652'92s? :: They will hold them for bargaining. SPLIT I have just come back into this problem, having been out of town all day. My instinct would have been as follows: We have two problems: '97First, the problem of the crew and the ship and of how we win their release. '97Second, our general posture which goes beyond the crew and the ship. But that sort of thing comes later. In the immediate situation, I think I agree with Jim. We will take a beating if we kill the Americans. At the same time, we must understand that we cannot negotiate for them once they are on the mainland. If you are willing to take that position, then I think we can let them go. We should not let them become bargaining chips. SPLIT We have a pilot who thinks there may be Caucasians. It would have been a much better position for us to take that we will simply hit anything that leaves the island. SPLIT Now we are debating with the pilot. SPLIT I'92m afraid that if we do a few little steps every few hours, we are in trouble. I think we should go ahead with the island, Kompong Som, and the ship all at once. I think people should have the impression that we are potentially trigger-happy. I think that once we have our destroyer on station, that is ideal. SPLIT In the meantime, I think we should sink the boats that are at the island. SPLIT I think the pilot should sink them. He should destroy the boats and not send situation reports. SPLIT We don'92t need to decide on the cove right now. We have some time. SPLIT Fourteen hours. SPLIT How would the Marines get down? SPLIT But if there are 100 troops on the island, why do we not attack it? SPLIT Does the Coral Sea have helicopters? SPLIT I understand we only have 11 choppers. SPLIT I do not see what we gain by going on with that force tonight. If you sink the boats in the area, and all who approach, it does not matter if we have anybody else on the island. At that point, nothing will be moving. My instinct would be to wait for the Holt and the Coral Sea . You can then work with the Marines from the Coral Sea . Nothing can happen in the meantime. Then I would assemble a force and really move vigorously. SPLIT Later you can do more. It might work with the 270. But it is a risk. It should be decisive and it should look powerful. SPLIT We are talking about 48 hours. SPLIT You also have the Holt . SPLIT The Holt will be there then. SPLIT I am very leery about that operation using ladders. SPLIT But that is not the issue. We should not look as though people can localize an issue. We have to use the opportunity to prove that others will be worse off if they tackle us, and not that they can return to the status quo. It is not just enough to get the ship'92s release. Using one aircraft carrier, one destroyer, and 1,000 Marines to get the ship out is not much. I think we should seize the island, seize the ship, and hit the mainland. I am thinking not of Cambodia, but of Korea and of the Soviet Union and of others. It will not help you with the Congress if they get the wrong impression of the way we will act under such circumstances. As for the 270 Marines, it had several components. There is an advantage in speed. The problem is if anything goes wrong, as often does, I think against 100 KC you would lose more Americans because you do not have overwhelming power. I am assuming we will not negotiate. We must have an unconditional release. On balance, I would like to get a more reliable force. SPLIT What would hell mean in a case like that? SPLIT That is still localizing it. We will not get that many chances. As Jim says, it would exacerbate the Thai problem. SPLIT If you were to give the orders now, Mr. President, there would still be some hours of delay before the messages were received and before the preparations were made. By then we would really only have three more hours of daylight left in order to conduct the operation. SPLIT If you wait 24 more hours, you have the Holt and you also have the fact that you can use 270 Marines. SPLIT I am not sure that I would let the Holt go up against the vessel. It may be best to keep the Holt where it can blockade the island. Then we can seize the island. SPLIT But they can still scuttle the ship, even with the Holt alongside. If we could seize the ship quickly, I would agree. I did not know that the Holt could board. SPLIT My suggestion is to seize the island. We cannot do anything tonight. By tomorrow morning, we can put the Marines on the Holt . They can operate. I would go for the island at daybreak of the 15th. SPLIT The ideal time for what I have in mind is the 16th. That would not just include the island but Kompong Som, the airport and boats. SPLIT The Holt gets there at noon tomorrow. So we can go from first light. We could seize the island and the ship. That, however, would not give us the Coral Sea for such operations as we would wish to run against Kompong Som. SPLIT At 2200 hours tomorrow. I think that when we move, we should hit the mainland as well as the island. We should hit targets at Kompong Som and the airfield and say that we are doing it to suppress any supporting action against our operations to regain the ship and seize the island. If the B'9652'92s can do it, I would like to do it tomorrow night. Forty-eight hours are better militarily. But so much can happen, domestically and internationally. We have to be ready to take the island and the ship and to hit Kompong Som. SPLIT But the Coral Sea would delay us 24 hours. SPLIT What do we have on the Coral Sea ? SPLIT Would they be more accurate than the B'9652'92s? SPLIT I think you can legitimately say that our aircraft are suppressing hostile action against our operation. SPLIT I think the worst stance is to follow Phil'92s concern. If we only respond at the same place at which we are challenged, nobody can lose by challenging us. They can only win. This means, I think, that we have to do more. The Koreans and others would like to look us over and to see how we react. Under certain circumstances, in fact, some domestic cost is to our advantage in demonstrating the seriousness with which we view this kind of challenge. SPLIT The latest intelligence shows that there are several small patrol boats near the island in the cove. I think we should sink them. SPLIT I would hit, and then deal with the legal implications. SPLIT You can decide it then. SPLIT That is when the best forces will be available. But that has to be weighed against other considerations for the extra 24 hours that you lose. I remember 1969, when the EC'96121 was shot down off Korea. We assembled forces like crazy. But in the end, we did not do anything. Maybe we shouldn'92t have. We will never know. SPLIT I think we should do something that will impress the Koreans and the Chinese. I saw Teng Hsiao-Ping'92s comments in Paris. SPLIT How long does it take to load? SPLIT Is the first thing tomorrow still time enough? SPLIT Can you tell the commander to shut up? SPLIT It would say nothing until afterwards. That will speak for itself. Then you can explain what you have been doing. If you say something now, everybody will be kibbitzing. SPLIT If we are going to do an integrated attack, I think we have to go in 22 hours. We should not wait for a later cycle. I cannot judge if there would be a problem in taking the island. We'92re saying that it will be one annihilating blow. I cannot judge if 270 Marines can do it. SPLIT But there will be 270 for four hours. They will have the Holt support. Perhaps they will also have some support from the Coral Sea . SPLIT If the Coral Sea can launch against Kompong Som, it can launch against the island. We have to be sure that the landing has a chance of success. SPLIT Then my instinct is with Rummy. We should go tomorrow night or earlier. SPLIT The ideal time would be Thursday night. But I am worried that in the next 48 hours some diplomatic pressure will occur, or something else. So we have to weigh the optimum military time against the optimum political time. For foreign policy and domestic reasons, tomorrow is better. SPLIT That is correct, but they will also be reassured. SPLIT If the Americans are on the mainland, then we have to rethink. SPLIT About 6 hours. SPLIT What will we say about the boats that have been sunk? SPLIT I think a low-key press statement can be issued, saying what has happened. We should tell the truth. We should say it in a very matter-of-fact way, at a DOD briefing. SPLIT We should say nothing about the riot control agents. We should say that there were Americans possibly being moved, and that lives were at stake. Some Americans are still on the island. In pursuit of these objectives, the following boats were sunk. One other reason is that it is not inconceivable that the Khmer will cave, and they should come in response to something that we had done. SPLIT I am worried about it getting out of hand. We will look sneaky and furtive about something we should be proud of. But the Thai thing does give me trouble. I think the Thai military will love it. But the Thai Government will say that it does not like it. The Liberals on the Hill will put forward a recommendation to withdraw our forces from Thailand. They will match this with some requests from the Thai Government. SPLIT I would urge that the spokesman make a short announcement at noon tomorrow. He should explain why we are doing it. He should say that it was ordered by you, executed by the National Security Council, and then answer no other questions. This would be noon. By 8 o'92clock, we will have decided the other. That will add to your strength. (General concurrence.) End of Meeting 1 'a0 :: Shouldn'92t we remove the Marines out of Thailand once the operation has been launched? SPLIT We will have riots tomorrow. :: How do you know that? SPLIT Why are we not sinking the boats? SPLIT What mission has been given to the Holt and to the Wilson ? SPLIT Is the Holt instructed to stop ship movement to the island? SPLIT How is the weather? Admiral SPLIT How long will the operation continue? SPLIT How many aircraft? SPLIT Would we keep it up while the Marines are on the island? Admiral SPLIT I have a question. You are landing on the island at 6:45 a.m. and on the ship at 8:45 a.m.; could they not sink the ship? SPLIT This helps you with the bombing. SPLIT They are leaving simultaneously. SPLIT I would not answer how long we will stay there. We should say that we will try to find our people. We are not sure how long it may be. SPLIT There is no point in staying on the island after we have searched it for our men. But I think we should not assure anybody ahead of time when we will leave. We will move at our own pace. SPLIT I would keep them. SPLIT We sent a message to the Secretary General today. 3 We could not get a better way to communicate with the Cambodians. That message was delivered at one o'92clock. We thought of giving an ultimatum in Peking, but it is too complicated in terms of the time involved. SPLIT I have no objection. But I do not believe that our action should be dependent on an ultimatum. Fundamentally, the purpose of our strikes is to protect our operations. I could be talked into taking out the 100 aircraft at Phnom Penh, but I do not want to upset people too much. But we should move massively and firmly. We should say that we are going to protect the operation to get out our people. SPLIT The first group cannot search. SPLIT Rather than have an ultimatum, I would advance the strikes. I think it is essential in situations of this kind to make clear that it is we who define the hazards. We can argue that we are doing this to protect our operations. What we have to get across to other countries is that we will not confine ourselves to the areas in which they challenge us. So I think we should do the strikes at the time of the operation. Then, if we have not found our people, we can mine or do other things. We can also issue an ultimatum. We can say that the 100 aircraft was a protective operation. Of course, we would have some difficulties with people on the Hill and with others. SPLIT My recommend is to do it ferociously. We should not just hit mobile targets, but others as well. SPLIT They should not strike at the mainland before the Holt can get to the ship. SPLIT They could go on the Hancock . SPLIT We could use the bullhorns to inform the Cambodians on the island. They should not negotiate. They should just state our demands. I think that once we start we should finish and get out. SPLIT Then we can announce that we have withdrawn them. SPLIT I think it will not work unless we hit. Then we can give an ultimatum that is credible. We have many things we can still do later. We can mine, or we can take out the planes at Phnom Penh. Then we will be in a long test. We will not have gained by not hitting Kompong Som. SPLIT We should not give the impression that we will stop. SPLIT The odds are that the people of the island have no orders and will sit tight. SPLIT They could be. We do not know. SPLIT The problem is that we do not know that they are not there. Taking the island if they are not there is easier to explain than failing to take it if they are. SPLIT We should have one clear line on this. SPLIT When did this action start, from the legal standpoint? SPLIT Maybe you should get the leadership in tonight. SPLIT I think we should give them the history of the diplomatic effort. We should tell them that there was no response and that we had to go ahead. I do not think we should give them details on our strikes. SPLIT But we must ask them to keep quiet. They will be briefed before the operation starts. SPLIT How about 10 o'92clock? SPLIT He would have to go ahead anyway. SPLIT What about informing the public? Should be use national television? SPLIT Let us do the beginning low key, and then go to a fuller description. Perhaps we should just do a brief announcement at first. (To Schlesinger) I thought your statement read well. SPLIT I would ignore Bella and then explain the B'9652'92s. If it works, it will not matter. If not, we will have other things to worry about. You will look implacable and calm and in control. Perhaps you should give a ten-minute speech. SPLIT That is a good idea. SPLIT (To Ingersoll) We should get Sisco to organize messages. We should not use SEATO. SPLIT I think we should have no military men, but just Jim and myself. I could brief on the diplomatic steps. You would say what you have ordered. SPLIT We should tell them about the island, about the ship, and about the related strikes on military targets to make the operation succeed. SPLIT We should not say yet. SPLIT Is it better to wait until 10 o'92clock? Buchen and",military,bureaucracies_98,bureaucracies
"Admiral Holloway says he is not sure there are any. SPLIT We should not forget that there is a real chance that this is an in-house spat. In that area there have been two discovery wells, drilled by Shell and Mobil. One made a significant discovery. We are talking about 600'96700 million barrels and perhaps even 1 or 1'bd million barrels. I think that is what this fuss is all about. SPLIT We could hit the patrol ship. SPLIT We should keep the oil in mind. That is an asset. :: When I left the Pentagon, the ship was already only about 10 miles out. SPLIT We can have a passive stance or we can be active. We can do such things as seizing Cambodian assets. We can assemble forces. We could seize a small island as a hostage. We might also consider a blockade. All these options would have to be scrutinized by the Congress because, while you have inherent rights to protect American citizens, you would soon run into the CRA. We do not have much information on the actual situation. Such information as we have indicates that the main purpose of the Cambodian forces in occupying the islands may have been to keep them from their brethren in South Vietnam. It could be a bureaucratic misjudgment or a by-product of an action against South Vietnam. The Cambodians have already seized three ships: a Panamanian, a Philippine and now an American. They did release the first two ships. We do not know, in handling this sort of thing, how good their communication is. SPLIT In some information we picked up, they appeared to be claiming 30 miles. SPLIT Yes. SPLIT We have the Coral Sea , which is now on its way to Australia for ceremonies. SPLIT About two to three days. SPLIT That would mean turning around the Coral Sea . SPLIT We will have aircraft over the island to see what kind of forces there are. 2 SPLIT We doubt it. SPLIT That was our first thought, before we looked into it further. SPLIT We can get the mines in within 24 hours. SPLIT We can look into that. SPLIT The mines are at Subic; the B'9652'92s are in Thailand. SPLIT They have 39. SPLIT We think so. SPLIT We could sink the Cambodian Navy. SPLIT They will have the ship already. It is like the Pueblo . Once it got to Wonsan it was hard to bring it back. SPLIT You know that the reconnaissance missions are being flown from Thailand. SPLIT The trouble with an announcement of future steps is on the Hill. Anything that we announce, Congress will need to be briefed. SPLIT This is a bureaucratic issue. The NMCC did not become alarmed because it was not a U.S. Navy vessel. SPLIT The actions should put them under pressure. If we mine the harbor, they will simply sit. We have got to do something that embarrasses them. SPLIT We will have a reconnaissance report by this evening. I am sure it would not take a large force. What kind of clarification would you want us to use regarding the authority and your relation with the Congress? SPLIT You can perhaps accomplish the same thing by quarantine as by mining. SPLIT We would have to be tough in such confrontations. SPLIT It is not weak to say that we demand the release. SPLIT About 1'bd days. SPLIT Only reconnaissance is possible, but if we ask, they will refuse everything. :: No. SPLIT A recent photo of ours showed no ships at the dock. There may perhaps have been one vessel around. SPLIT There has been no action at this port for a considerable length of time. It was closed because the route to Phnom Penh was closed. For a long time, U.S. aircraft were delivering everything to Phnom Penh. SPLIT It is not very much used now. SPLIT I did not say that it was already in the port. I said it might be. SPLIT We have reviewed the options. The option to take Kompong Som requires many troops. There are about 1700 KC'92s in the area. So our first objective today is to keep the ship out. If we want to take the ship, there are two options: '97We can use the Marines and the choppers that are at Utapao. We can take off tomorrow. Or, we can wait until the USS Holt arrives, which should be around 8:00 p.m. tomorrow night, or about 12 hours later. SPLIT It will not be in that condition. In any case, the carrier will arrive the following morning and it will be able to refuel. The Navy people are trained in boarding. It might be preferable to wait for the Holt because it will be manned and able to do it. We will then have the dominant force in the area. But, of course, this may give the Cambodians time to change the situation or to try to prepare themselves. Therefore, it may be better to go by first light tomorrow. SPLIT It may be preferable to go in quickly. We have instructions to use gunfire to keep personnel away from the anchor chain on deck. SPLIT I do not think they have Americans on board except for people to man the boiler. I think they have the other Americans on the island. Our force to take the island is now in Okinawa. In twelve hours, we can have the Marines there. SPLIT Twelve hours from your order. We already have 125 Marines at Utapao. SPLIT We asked a Cambodian defector and he told us there were about 60 troops on the island. For the island operation, I think it is preferable to use the Coral Sea . It gives us dominance over the area. Also, we have its forces and helicopters. The danger for the Americans on the island is that we do not know what the Cambodians would do. I think there is less danger if we have the dominant force. We will have Cambodians on the choppers who will be able to say that we can take the island unless they give us the Americans or the foreigners. This message would be bull-horned from the choppers at a time when we are ready to act. SPLIT Right. SPLIT When cornered, they could execute the Americans. SPLIT We have several objectives. First, to stop the boat from being taken into the port. Second, to get our people back. Third, to attack and sink the Cambodian Navy, later, after we have our ship and our people out, in order to maximize the punishment. We do not know their motive. If we sink their vessels, it might precipitate sinking of the freighter and jeopardize getting the Americans out. It seems to me that that is the sequence of priorities. Starting that way, their reaction would be prudent. SPLIT I would prefer for us first to get the ship, and then to proceed against the island. SPLIT There is the possibility of the opposite reaction. If they see us acting, they may change their attitude. Publicly, they may protest, but privately, they may agree. They have done this before. SPLIT Eight o'92clock (p.m.) SPLIT Yes. SPLIT No. SPLIT At 7:00 p.m. tonight, Washington time, we can have some Marines ready. At 8:00 a.m. tomorrow, Washington time, the Holt will be in position. Somewhere between that time, the additional Marines will be in Utapao. SPLIT Landing on the ship is to send them a signal. If we start to hit the boats, they know we are up to something. They could kill the Americans, but I doubt it. We have the element of surprise. :: To assist General Jones, I was with him in the Situation Room when he gave the order even before he left the White House. SPLIT In the time frame that you are talking about, there will not be an island worth taking. All the Americans will be gone. SPLIT Right. I think they will get out. The Holt will protect the ship. But that is not what matters. I doubt that there will be anything on the island. SPLIT The small boats can get through. You cannot get control. SPLIT I would like to take a middle position. Once the Holt gets there, we will have some control. We can do a great deal. SPLIT The Holt can get them, by speaking to them with loudspeakers. It can let them know our position. SPLIT If you want the ship and the Americans, why not let the Holt do it? Let the Holt broadcast that if the Americans are not released, all hell will break loose. SPLIT I hate to have us lose sight of our objectives in this case. Those objectives are to get the Americans and the ship. If we want to punish people, that'92s another thing. I think that dropping a lot of bombs on the mainland will not help us with the release of the Americans. :: It got to the island. SPLIT He is not certain that there are Caucasians on board. SPLIT By a number of signs, such as their size and the color of their skin. SPLIT I would think that avoiding bargaining chips is less of an objective than not being in a position where the Cambodians can say that the F'964'92s killed our own men. SPLIT Let'92s continue to try to stop them with riot control agents. We understand there are 8 to 9 men on board who seem to be Americans. There are others below who may be Americans. The pilot thinks there may be more Americans. SPLIT I recommend we sink the speedboats. I do not think we should sink the other boat but should rather continue to use the riot control agents. SPLIT That is true. He originally thought that he could disable the boat without sinking it. Then he became reluctant. SPLIT There were no Caucasians on it. SPLIT It went out by telephone within half an hour after you gave it. SPLIT I think we should destroy the boats that still remain at the island. SPLIT I agree. It will go in at noon. SPLIT We understand it is doing 21 knots, not 25. SPLIT It is 10:00 o'92clock. SPLIT We are in serious trouble on the mechanical side. One shaft is out on the Hancock . The Okinawa has an oiler out. It is making only 10 knots. There has been a series of mishaps. SPLIT We have 11 choppers at Utapao. We can run operations against the vessel. In addition, we can land on the island with 120 Marines. We can support that with the force from Okinawa. All together, we would have 270 Marines. In all probability, we could take the island. The Marines estimate that there might be about 100 Cambodians on the island. We would prefer to land with 1,000. SPLIT 24 hours. We do not have the Holt there yet. The Holt will arrive at noon tomorrow our time. If it is to do anything, I would prefer to wait until the first light on the 15th. Until the Coral Sea arrives, all we can use are the helicopters at Utapao. SPLIT The helicopters would hover. SPLIT I think that Henry (Kissinger) is thinking of going tomorrow night. SPLIT We need the morning of the 16th for a coordinated assault. SPLIT I think you should wait. SPLIT If there is token resistance on the island, the Marines can handle it. If there is more, they can try to lock in and get more Marines to land the next day, with the Holt for additional support. It is a close call. There are the pressures of time. It is also possible that the Cambodians will decide to execute our men. SPLIT Until the Coral Sea gets there, we have only the aircraft from Thailand. The inhibitions on the use of the aircraft from Thailand are greater. SPLIT I agree with Kissinger. But we have to keep in mind that there are forces on the island. That gives them time to prepare. It also gives them time to scuttle the ship. SPLIT Could any Marines do it? SPLIT The problem with that is that the Coral Sea will not be there. If you want an overwhelming force on the island, you should wait until the 16th. SPLIT You can get 250 Marines in helicopters. SPLIT We will be prepared to go on the morning of the 15th. We will see if we can get the Marines on the Holt . At first light, we will have plans to go to the island. Simultaneously, we will go for the ship. We will have the B'9652'92s at Guam ready to go for Kompong Som. But I think there are political advantages to using the aircraft from the Coral Sea . You will have more problems on the Hill with the B'9652'92s from Guam. SPLIT The B'9652'92s are a red flag on the Hill. Moreover, they bomb a very large box and they are not so accurate. They might generate a lot of casualties outside the exact areas that we would want to hit. SPLIT I'92m not sure it would be close enough. Let me check. SPLIT Let me check. SPLIT Yes, but if you go for the 15th, you do not need its presence so soon if you can use the aircraft from a distance. SPLIT We are not inhibited by the War Powers Act, only by Cooper-Church. SPLIT There are four boats. SPLIT I disagree with Henry in one case. The legal situation in Indochina is unique. We should emphasize that. The restraints on our actions are different from the restraints anywhere else. SPLIT On the 16th. SPLIT But this sort of thing would require the gunships out of Thailand. SPLIT The question is whether you use the B'9652'92s or the carrier aircraft. The B'9652'92s may represent the best image for what Henry is trying to accomplish. But, for Congress and others, other aircraft would be better. SPLIT We'92ll put some T'9628'92s on the base. SPLIT It will get out, no matter how hard you try. SPLIT Can we tanker them out of Guam? SPLIT It may not get out that quickly. SPLIT It will not stay low-key. SPLIT Should we say that they were sunk from aircraft from Thailand? That is your problem. SPLIT The boats are of different sizes. :: That would be just the pilot report. SPLIT On the Holt , let'92s be specific. We are supposed to have real time voice, as well as two-minute interval coded communication. SPLIT Sooner or later you will get a linkage with the 23 already lost at NKP. SPLIT I don'92t think the Americans are there anyway. :: Dave (Jones), please give it. SPLIT No. We just put them in readiness. With a unit of three aircraft, there would be about 125 weapons. The concentration is in the center. They would probably not hit the breakwater. SPLIT That has already slid. SPLIT We cannot. There are 1200 of them. SPLIT Because of the people there. SPLIT What about any prisoners we take? SPLIT How about a local ultimatum? SPLIT The leak regarding the B'9652'92s is not too bad. It shows that the President will use them if necessary. SPLIT We will destroy whatever targets there are. SPLIT I think they would have moved the Americans 20 miles inland as soon as possible. Admiral SPLIT They cannot fracture the runways. SPLIT That is possible. SPLIT We will make a positive identification that they are Cambodian. Admiral SPLIT How soon? SPLIT That would be about 7 o'92clock. SPLIT So we will go with a 2045 time. Admiral SPLIT Is there any change in our estimate regarding the forces on the island? SPLIT It might be 20 to 30. SPLIT We are in position to do the SAR operation. If we hit against Kompong Som, will our people go in over land if they are hit? SPLIT Augmenting the B'9652 picture of being ready is that we are continuing to amass forces. SPLIT It is not necessary. SPLIT We have an obligation to get the Americans or to see if they are there. SPLIT The plans regarding air strikes should be presented to show that the targets will be carefully selected. We should not just talk about '93a few'94 strikes, but about '93selective'94 strikes. I would recommend that the Republican leadership be among the group you are briefing. SPLIT What should we say?",military,bureaucracies_99,bureaucracies
"We have the Hancock and other vessels, but it would take about a day and a half at least to get them down there. SPLIT I do not believe it has any now, but we can make arrangements to get them there. SPLIT I doubt it. Different types of equipment and different types of mines are involved. I suggest that we get our contingency plans together as soon as possible and start assembling a task force to go in that direction. Of course, we have other means. We have the B'9652'92s that could do it. SPLIT We have helicopters in Thailand and we could do it fairly quickly. SPLIT We will see. :: I talked to the commander in Thailand who was in contact with our reconnaissance aircraft. Through this commander, I have the following report from the aircraft. He said that the ship had one anchor up, and one down. We are not sure whether the boiler was up. Infra-red photography showed that the chimney was hot. This could, however, be residual heat. If the chimney heats up further and if smoke comes out, we know that the boiler is being heated up. Our experts tell us that it is very improbable that the Cambodians can run this ship, so that if there is any indication that the ship is moving, it must be the Americans who are running it. SPLIT The aircraft read the name on the vessel. It is a positive identification. As I said, the anchors are up and down. There is no smoke. We think the boiler is not up but we are not sure. Some boats have come alongside. Through fighter runs, we kept them off. Some, however, did get to the boat. We saw some people getting off and going to the island. Then we saw them on the island. They had their heads between their legs. They appeared to be Caucasians. SPLIT This was just before it grew dark over there. Even in the dark, we can still use the infra-red. We can see quite a lot. This is the sort of thing we use with our gunships and we can get a lot of information from it. The instructions we have to our commanders are not to let the ship go to port. They are to take any action not to include sinking. We should know when it moves, when it raises anchor, and when it raises the boiler. We can, if necessary, disable the ship. We can hit it abeam, just off the stern. We will not hit people that way. We can do that with pretty high confidence that we can stop the ship from sailing under its own power. Of course, if it is not sailing under its own power, we would make the tug boat the target. SPLIT The ship is about 500 feet long. The tug boat, of course, is rather small. But it would be moving very slowly. It would be a very vulnerable target. Of course, we cannot guarantee that we could stop it, but we think that there is a good chance that we could keep it from going into the harbor without sinking it. We would use gunships. They are very precise. SPLIT We saw people coming off the ships. They had been on the deck of the ship. We saw them go to the island. SPLIT And with minimum loss of life. We would know in advance, when they are going to move the ship. SPLIT The 7th Air Force Support Group at NKP. We would have a report in minutes. SPLIT Of course, they can do things below the deck that we would not see, but we should know if anything important is going on. One problem, of course, is that if the weather turns bad, this would have some effect on our coverage. SPLIT Quite a few. SPLIT It is arriving at 0530 our time. That is when the Holt will get there. SPLIT They are coming from Okinawa. They could go by 1844 or 1900 or the second light tonight. One day later, we could have the Marines at Utapao. We could use large choppers. SPLIT This would be about 1,000. We do not know what is on the island. SPLIT We have an intercept which indicates the intention to take them off, but we have no indication whether or not they actually did and why they might have done it. SPLIT We have not opened fire on them. We have scared some of them away by making passes at them. One boat is tied alongside the ship. SPLIT We have had reports on boats, sometimes two or more. We hope to have better intelligence soon. SPLIT We can get the information from infra-red. We took a lot of pictures. We are now reading them out in Thailand. We hope to have a better readout after we have finished. SPLIT They are processed there. SPLIT We have ways of stopping them from getting it into Kompong Som. But they can scuttle it. We have to judge this. SPLIT As the Vice President said, if we wish to assure that the Americans are not taken to the mainland, we would have to knock out their boats. SPLIT With gunships. SPLIT Earlier, we had no forces to operate to free the ship. As we discussed yesterday, we had to get our assets into place. We have them. SPLIT Probably. With the infra-red, we have some information as to what they are doing. We also have searchlights and flares. We will want to see if there are any Americans on board. We will need to decide whether to fire across the bow or to sink it. We would have some time. They are slow boats. That is one point. We could, with some confidence, interdict the island. SPLIT This is not an easy operation. On a container ship, we can only land our helicopters one at a time. There is not much space. The containers are aluminum. They would not be strong enough to support the helicopters, so we would have to rope people down. They would come down three at a time and they would have to drop 20 feet to the deck. Of course, we would have helicopters alongside to keep heads down as we land. Still, it would be very tricky. SPLIT They can launch within ten hours after I leave here. They could launch at the second light. SPLIT Right. SPLIT It could be 24 hours later. We would not have the force until then. They were not on alert. It would be some hours before the launch. SPLIT At the second light there? SPLIT We are trying to speed it up. SPLIT So do I. :: It was in range. SPLIT We talked to Burns, the Commander out there, immediately. The confirming order went out later. But our communications are so good that we can get all the information back here immediately to Washington in order to make the decisions from here. SPLIT That was the written order, not the verbal order. SPLIT Suppose we say in our order that they should hit all the boats in the cove, not just two. SPLIT (Raising a chart) I have tried to put all this in a chart, indicating when the key actions would take place. The Holt , we expect, will arrive at 12:30 Washington time tomorrow. The Coral Sea and the Hancock will arrive later. We are not sure of the latter'92s arrival time because it is having trouble with one propeller shaft. The Marines are all airborne. They are on the way to Utapao. That is the 1,000 Marines. The 150, with their helicopters, are already there and on the alert. The 1,000 Marines will arrive around 0300 tomorrow morning. That is the time for the first one. After that the others arrive every few hours. SPLIT It is making 25 knots. The plots are pretty good. It is moving towards the spot. SPLIT That is the best time that they can do. SPLIT The Navy says that that is the best time that they can make. SPLIT This is very tenuous. They are working on one of the shafts. SPLIT No, the 15th. SPLIT On ladders. SPLIT The total lift is 270. Our plan was to seize the ship with 120, and then to use the Marines from Okinawa to try to go on the island. It is hazardous to go onto the island with this first group because you do not have time to recycle. We would have to let them remain there overnight, against a force that we do not know. SPLIT No. It has only two or so that it uses itself. But we could take the Marines on to the Coral Sea , and thus get them close to the island. SPLIT We have nothing to confirm the exact force on that island. SPLIT But it cannot be in 24 hours, only in 48. Once you start cycling, it takes time. SPLIT That would not be enough. SPLIT On Wednesday night, the Coral Sea will help a little with its fighters. But not with Marines. Maybe the Hancock will do it. SPLIT With the Coral Sea , you have other vessels as well. You will have a total of five ships. You would have a good force, but it is very late at night to begin to cycle the Marines. SPLIT The main thing we use at night is infra-red. We can read it at night. The P'963'92s also have searchlights and flares. SPLIT Yes, unless the weather is bad. SPLIT That was before we lost two helicopters on SAR. I would urge against going this daylight. The Marines would just be landing at Utapao. The helicopter pilots would be tired. Nobody would be mated up yet. It would be a difficult operation to be launching at that time, especially since we could not follow up the same day. SPLIT And, in fact, you have 250 more that you can put in. You also have the Coral Sea . SPLIT We could get the Marines on the ship, but then we could not use them for other things. The suggestion is to go with the first light on the 15th, to get the Holt and to hold the island. SPLIT Except, if you use the Coral Sea , it limits some assets. Everybody is now on alert. We can do it when you say. We are ready to go. SPLIT We have fighter aircraft, including F'964'92s and A'967'92s. SPLIT Not necessarily. It depends on the type of target. SPLIT On Guam, if we are to do anything, we have to start pretty soon. But there are lots of press there. SPLIT There are many planes to load and to get ready. SPLIT I'92m not sure. SPLIT Only at Utapao. SPLIT Perhaps 6 or 9. SPLIT I am not sure. About 20 or more. SPLIT There are about 50 reporters on Guam right now, because of the refugees. SPLIT I'92m not sure. SPLIT The probability that the Americans are gone causes the problem. I think we have a high probability. SPLIT Everything is now moving, except the B'9652'92s. SPLIT Maybe longer. SPLIT Yes. :: This is a destroyer. It will be on station by 1750 Eastern Daylight Time. That means we will have two ships on station before we begin our operations. SPLIT Coral Sea aircraft are now within the range of the objective area. So it'92s on station. The Holt is also on station. She stayed out beyond the island because of the plan to put Marines on her. That is why she is over the horizon. The Coral Sea is within the range of tactical air and can put them in. The Hancock could arrive on the scene around noon of the 16th, D.C. time. She is loaded with helicopters. The Wilson will be on station this evening. SPLIT In two hours. SPLIT We have 21 F'964'92s, 24 A'967'92s, and 6 A'966'92s. There are 81 guided munitions on the Coral Sea . They are about halfway split between laser and the Walleyes. SPLIT About 6000. SPLIT It is now suitable. It might be cloudy from time to time, but not for long. SPLIT The operation on the island is being supported from Thailand. We would have, from the Coral Sea , a number of aircraft and targets. You would have, with those aircraft, enough to hit all the targets? SPLIT At first light. SPLIT If we now go to use the Coral Sea it will hit before we take the ship. The first wave will hit targets connected with the operation. Later waves will hit other targets, including the three that we have discussed: the airfield and the ports. SPLIT On the first operation, the fighters will come back and report. First, you can go for the runways; second you can come back with the required strikes. SPLIT Three hours. SPLIT O.K. (Admiral Holloway leaves again to pass on instructions.) :: Yes. The Wilson is there too. SPLIT The report we have did not indicate it. SPLIT The Wilson is just coming on station. We will instruct it. SPLIT The Holt is now about 12 miles out beyond the island. It is not able to stop movement to and from the island. The reason it is that far out is that we did not want to tip our hand to the operation. SPLIT It is night, Mr. President. I do not recall any specific instructions to this regard. SPLIT We got it there because we wanted it to help in the operations we will conduct. SPLIT They are not a real factor. SPLIT Theoretically they could, but they would not have much time on station. SPLIT (Showing a chart) We recommend that we land tonight on the island and on the ship. We can do it with high assurance of success. We have the B'9652'92s on alert but we do not recommend using them. From the targeting standpoint, is represents overkill. We might use them for political or diplomatic reasons, though that would seem mixed. SPLIT Yes. We would send people as follows: The Marines to recapture the boat and to dismantle any explosive agents. The helicopters can go at first light. They can get people onto the Holt . It would take two hours for people to get organized and cross to the Mayaguez . They could start out with riot control agents. This probably would not incapacitate them long, perhaps for about 10 minutes. The Holt would then come alongside and all the Marines would come over and hopefully seize control of the vessel. Our Marines would inspect it, so would an OD team. Then it would be moved out. SPLIT From Utapao. Next, the tactical air. We have tactical air on the scene now. We have gunships, fighters, etc. We can suppress fire. We have instructions to minimize fire in case the Americans are there, but to protect the people who are landing. Eight helicopters with 175 Marines abroad will land on the island around sunrise. There is a four-hour recycle time to Utapao. The next wave of 235 or more would then come to give us over 600 Marines on the island by dark. The 175 can secure themselves, with gunships and tactical air. When the second group arrives, we can cut off the neck of the island and move out. SPLIT It is about 0545. It is around sunrise. Here is a picture of the island. The Marine in charge has reconnoitered it. A close check indicates an open area with trails leading into the woods. This is the preferred landing zone. Also, they might land on the beach. It is wide enough. It is the only opening on the island. Later, we would want to cut the island in two. With somewhat over 600 Marines by nightfall, we should have a good feel for what is there. We can perhaps withdraw the next day. We could bring the Marines out to the Coral Sea . This gets them out of Thailand. Or, of course, we could go back by Thailand. Tactical air based in Thailand would provide most of the cover. It has the gunships and the riot control agents. That is the operation as we recommend it, as a joint recommendation from all the Joint Chiefs. SPLIT There are three targets: -720 '97First, the airfield at Kompong Som. '97Second, the naval port. '97Third, the regular port. There is not much to hit on the airfield. There is not much around the naval port. Greater targeting is around the other port. We have found two ships of unidentified registry, with other craft around also. There are about 10 boats there. Eight of them look like fast patrol craft; one is unknown; one other is a medium landing craft. SPLIT They are along one dock. There are buildings, POL, and other things in the area. If we choose to apply the B'9652'92s, we could put three on one target, three on the other, and six on a third. This would cover the area of the targets. SPLIT We would cover the breakwater in one portion of the target area. But it would be very difficult to damage it. You would have to have a direct hit. The B'9652'92s would take about six hours from Guam. They fly at a high altitude so there is no threat to them. SPLIT As for the Coral Sea , it has about 48 aircraft. About 100 smart bombs are available, such as laser guided or Walleyes. They could be used with great precision. We would first send armed reconnaissance and then go for heavy targets like construction, POL, and warehouses, etc. Admiral SPLIT With the bombs from the carrier you could take out key targets. With the B'9652'92s, you get more bombs, interdiction of the runway and of the port, etc. We would get additional buildings, including collateral damage. The key targets you could get from the Coral Sea . With B'9652'92s, you will get mass. SPLIT The prediction is for patchy areas. With the Coral Sea , we would have a continuous flow shifting from target to target. SPLIT From about 2250 tonight until the end of the day (6:00 a.m. tomorrow). SPLIT About 70 percent of the aircraft. We would use a lot at first, and less later. SPLIT That'92s right. They could recycle. SPLIT To hit all the targets. It could be less. SPLIT Not the breakwater or the runway, but everything else. SPLIT We could start from the Coral Sea earlier. SPLIT As for the island, our timing decision is based on the capacity of the helicopters and on the cycles we need to run. It is already sliding slightly. SPLIT We would need to get the order out as soon as possible. SPLIT That'92s right. But that may be a moot question. We will have good communications in order to be able to follow everything. SPLIT It should be within an hour. SPLIT They should still make it. SPLIT The Holt is first. (At this point, Admiral Holloway leaves the room to communicate instructions.) SPLIT There are various possible times on this. SPLIT With the Coral Sea , one suggestion that has been made is to issue an ultimatum that would say that within so many hours, unless you tell us you are releasing the Americans, there would be air strikes. We could also do that with the B'9652 strikes. SPLIT But we have other armaments. SPLIT I suggest we expedite the Coral Sea as soon as possible. It cannot go before the other operations, but at the same time. It would go after mobile targets at first, and other targets later. SPLIT It is very hard to make a precise estimate. We do not know what there is. Saying that there would be ten people killed would be too precise. SPLIT We will have SAR aircraft. They could go down over land. It is conceivable. SPLIT About 10 miles. SPLIT No plan is yet finalized. SPLIT Yes; also the Coral Sea . The Hancock may be delayed. Even so we will not take the Marines back to Thailand. SPLIT We have 1200 at Utapao. I suggest we undertake an airlift to get them out, once we decide we do not need them. SPLIT We will have a bullhorn. We can tell them what to do. SPLIT We should word our release carefully so we say that we want to remove the Americans and get information on their whereabouts. There may also be value in capturing Cambodians. SPLIT We should say that we wanted to get the Americans. Even if we did not get them, it would be useful to talk to the Cambodians to find out what they know.",military,bureaucracies_100,bureaucracies
"The US Seatrain container ship Mayaguez was seized by the Khmer Communists about 3:15 p.m. local time about seven or eight miles from the Cambodian Island of Poulo Wei in the Gulf of Thailand. The ship was able to transmit at least two messages picked up in Jakarta and Manila after the boarding but communications from the ship were quickly broken off. The ship was enroute to a Thai port from Hong Kong. At last report the ship was being taken to the port of Kompong Son, about sixty miles away, under escort by a Khmer Communist gun boat. The Island of Pulou Wei has been claimed by both Phnom Penh and Saigon although it has long been occupied by the Cambodians. Intercepted messages last week indicated that the Khmer Communists were planning to occupy Cambodian offshore islands, probably to reiterate the Cambodian claim vis-'e0-vis the Vietnamese Communists. The occupation may provide an early test for future relations between the Khmer and Vietnamese Communists. A major factor behind the territorial dispute in the area is the potential of rich oil deposits in this area at the Gulf. The former governments in Saigon and Phnom Penh clashed over oil exploration rights in this area last fall. We have no hard information on why the Khmer Communists seized the ship as it was en route from Hong Kong to Sattahip, Thailand. This ship was some 60 miles southwest of Kompong Som, but within 8 miles of the island of Poulo Wei, claimed by the Khmer Communists. An intercepted Khmer Communist message last week contained instructions to '93keep foreign ships'94 out of Cambodian waters, but gave no indication of how far out from the shore the Khmer intended to implement such instructions. A Panamanian charter vessel was seized by the Khmer Communists last week in roughly the same area, but was subsequently released. SPLIT We are not sure. Another intercepted message also referred to various islands south of Phu Quoc Island in the Gulf of Thailand which Cambodian Communist forces were to investigate. There is evidence that some forces landed on at least one of these islands. SPLIT It was proceeding under its own steam at what we estimate to be about 10 miles an hour. Considering when it was picked up, it would be in or near the port now. SPLIT About 7 to 8 miles. SPLIT They may have some coastal stuff, some small vessels and the like. But that is it. SPLIT I will get a wrap-up of the sequence of notification. SPLIT We may wish to point out that they released other ships. This gives them a way out. :: The Mayaguez is at anchor just off Koh Tang Island, about 30 miles southwest of Kompong Som. Until late yesterday evening, the ship was being held near where it was seized in the vicinity of Poulo Wei Island, about 40 miles further to the southwest. Shortly after midnight, however, an American reconnaissance aircraft observed the ship at Koh Tang Island. At least two U.S. reconnaissance aircraft have reported receiving small arms fire from a gunboat, and from the Mayaguez itself. A Khmer Communist message, intercepted just before midnight, stated that 42 Americans and nine Vietnamese would be taken to Koh Tang. The latest U.S. reconnaissance flights observed the crew being transferred from the ship via a tugboat to Koh Tang and then being led off toward the interior of the island. SPLIT Although the men could be moved to the mainland at any time, the Khmer Communists may intend to keep them on the island until some final decisions are made regarding the crew and vessel. So far, the Khmer Communist government has not made a public statement regarding the Mayaguez , and Prince Sihanouk today in Peking denied any knowledge of the incident. In the event of a U.S. military effort, the Cambodian Communists would have limited means of reacting. They would attempt to resist a recapture of the ship, an attack on the accompanying patrol craft, or a landing on Koh Tang. They presumably have few troops or weapons to meet any such effort, however. The Cambodian Communists have no capability to thwart a mining effort against Kompong Som, and the harbor defenses are not impressive. The port and military camp are exposed and separate from the town. SPLIT There is an island off it. SPLIT We think that the ship is off the island as I pointed out. We understand that people are being off-loaded. We have seen it. SPLIT Of course, we have another source. We can intercept their communications. SPLIT We should realize that the Cambodians are tough fellows. We know that they took a Vietnamese ship and killed seven people without thinking any more about it. :: Couldn'92t the 270 protect themselves against the force on the island? SPLIT Our estimate was that there were 2,000 in Kompong Som. There is not a large force on the island. SPLIT Yes. The KC have just arrived in power. They have probably not had time to man the island more fully. SPLIT The KC may say something soon. SPLIT This is not my business. I do not think you should go tonight. But I worry about what might happen later. If they get locked in, if they take reprisals, it would be very difficult for us. SPLIT I think that with the Marines, you have to go soon. SPLIT Once we take that ship, the clock is ticking. SPLIT My schedule is to land the Marines today. SPLIT If you knock out every boat, you have effectiveness. SPLIT That would mean 500 in two cycles. SPLIT We think there are about three T'9628'92s at Kompong Som airfield. They could use them. So there is a potential threat at Kompong Som against our forces. SPLIT This is from a photograph taken on the 12th. SPLIT With bombs and guns. SPLIT There is one other justifiable target in the Kompong Som area. The old Cambodian Government had 25 patrol boats in the Ream Naval Base. (The President, Kissinger, and Schlesinger almost simultaneously remark along the lines that that might be a worthwhile target.) SPLIT Yes. :: Mr. President, we have some new information on the status of Khmer Communist forces in the Kompong Som'96Koh Tang area. The most recent reconnaissance concerning naval craft indicates that there are 24 armed ships in the vicinity of Kompong Som'9713 coastal patrol boats, 10 riverine patrol boats, and one submarine chaser. In addition, there are 3 utility launching craft (LCUs) at Kompong Som, and one LCM at Ream. As for air strength, our preliminary analysis of 12 May photography showed three T'9628 fighters and a total of six transport aircraft at Kompong Som airfield next to the port. There is also a substantial remaining number of some 100 T'9628 aircraft left at Pochentong Airfield near Phnom Penh when it fell. For air defense, the Communists have apparently deployed anti-aircraft artillery near Kompong Som and Ream. Preliminary analysis of 13 May photography shows that there is one 37-mm antiaircraft position just south of Kompong Som, and two 37-mm positions southeast of Ream. These weapons are some threat to aircraft flying within 3 nautical miles of their location, and under 14,000 feet. In ground strength, KC combat forces at Kompong Som total some 2,000 troops. This force could be quickly augmented by the remaining 14,000 troops scattered throughout southwestern Cambodia. An intercepted KC message from southwestern Cambodia indicated that on 14 May 400 additional troops were to be sent to help the '93mission.'94 We assume this refers to something in the Kompong Som area, though we do not know. Photoreconnaissance of 13'9614 May identified a probable 105-mm howitzer position and a possible coastal artillery position of unidentified caliber just south of Ream. We have now observed one more large landing craft (LCU) at Kompong Som than reported in last night'92s briefing. This ship could transport 800 troops. This gives the KC the ability to move about 2,400 troops simultaneously. These landing craft, if unopposed, could reach Koh Tang Island in a little over 4 hours. The Cambodians have apparently transported at least some of the American crew from Koh Tang Island to the mainland, putting them ashore at Kompong Som port at about 11:00 last night, Washington time. SPLIT From observation. SPLIT There is some more information. According to an intercepted message from an unidentified Cambodian authority, a Cambodian outstation'97probably a boat'97was informed that it would be met by another boat, and was instructed to keep the Americans '93toward the enemy.'94 Bringing at least some of the crew ashore suggests that the Cambodians appreciate the value of the American crew as hostages, offering hope that they will be kept alive by their captors to preserve their usefulness as bargaining chips. The Americans taken ashore may have been transported further inland by the Cambodians, and at present there is no way of telling where they may be. According to another intercepted Cambodian message, the Cambodians anticipate a possible attack against their naval base at Ream, south of Kompong Som, and are alerting the antiaircraft batteries there. Of the five Cambodian gunboats that were deployed as of last night (Washington time) around Koh Tang Island, three have been sunk by American aircraft. At latest report, only one gunboat remained a little over a mile south of the island. We have one KC intercepted message of 13 May which instructs the unidentified recipient '93to successfully solve this problem politically according to the guidelines of the organization'94. This message could relate to the Mayaguez incident, but it seems more likely that it is addressed to a low-level commander dealing with his Vietnamese opposite number in a local dispute over border territory. Around midnight (Washington time), a U.S. tanker enroute to Bangkok reported that a Swedish-registered refrigerator ship near Panjang Island, well south of Koh Tang, had been attacked and shot at by a Cambodian boat. At 5:00 a.m. a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft observed the ship. It showed no sign of distress, and now appears on its normal course to Bangkok. A small boat, not believed to be a gunboat, was sighted 3 miles away, following the ship'92s same course and speed. According to press reports from Thailand, a Panamanian freighter was detained for almost two hours in the same area today. The Thai have reacted sharply to the movement of U.S. Marines to Utapao. Prime Minister Khukrit presented an aide memoire 2 to the U.S. Embassy today stating that unless the Marines are withdrawn immediately, the '93good relations and cooperation existing between Thailand and the U.S. would be exposed to serious and damaging consequences.'94 Khukrit undoubtedly feels he will have to make some public gesture that will take him off the hook with the Cambodian government, and his own population. Army commander Krit Siwara has said in private that he was '93extremely pleased'94 that the U.S. was acting in a decisive manner. In public, however, he has taken a line similar to that of the Prime Minister. Should public pressure build on Khukrit, he has several options open to him: -720 '97to encourage student demonstrations against the U.S., '97to order the closing of Utapao air base, and '97to speed up the timetable for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces in Thailand. SPLIT Yes, but they could not remain in the air for long at that distance from their base. SPLIT Remembering what happened at Son Tay, I would say that we are planning to look for people who might possibly be there. We should not be too positive that they are there. SPLIT The problem is that the KC could put 2,400 people on that island within 4 hours, if they are not blocked. SPLIT No. SPLIT About 15 kilometers. SPLIT The pilot said he saw eight or so. He said there were others in the Holt . He speculated it might be the full 39. SPLIT Yes. SPLIT We need to be braced against that pilot.",military,bureaucracies_101,bureaucracies
"The most recent reports indicate that the situation in Northern Laos is deteriorating rapidly. Ban Houei Sai may already have fallen (Vientiane 1529 attached). 3 This city is on the Mekong River at the Thai border. CAS and Ambassador Brown report that other areas are threatened (see CIA 32201 attached). 4 If such actions are taken, the question arises of what to do if they failed to achieve the desired result of re-establishing a cease fire. I do not believe that you have to make a decision on this point, since the type of action suggested by State does not commit us to a follow up. 5 :: principal subjects upon which you should receive assurance are the following: a. What do we expect henceforth from the Royal Laotian Army, What are we doing about rehabilitating it? b. What are the military contingencies for which we are prepared? What happens if the Pathet Lao attack another important objective as they did at Nam Tha, or infiltrate to the Mekong? c. What sort of U.S./Thai planning is going on for the defense of Thailand? What guidance has been given General Harkins, our chief planner? d. Are we satisfied that no more U.S. forces should be deployed to the Western Pacific at this time? } :: a. Are we sure that it is necessary to put U.S. troops into Laos to accomplish the desired political effect? The strategic build-up in Southeast Asia which Mr. mcNamara is considering, plus an evidence of willingness to intervene in Laos by air, may do the trick without the movement of any troops into the Mekong Valley. At least, this course of action deserves a try as a preliminary to ground intervention. b. If we go into Laos and the desired political effect is not attained, what becomes the military objective of our forces? While we would like to salvage those parties of Laos useful for the defense of Thailand and South Viet-Nam, it is very difficult for me to conceive of any ground military operation to clear and hold any significant area in Laos which does not run the clear risk of bogging down into endless counter-guerrilla fighting. I suspect that, when the returns are in from the military planners, we will be told that we can count on limited help from the FAR and from SEATO, and that we must depend almost exclusively on U.S. forces to establish and hold a partitioned Laos. At that time, we may well conclude that the price of direct intervention on the ground is too high for the uncertain gains, and that we had better shore up the Laotian borders as best we can from the outside, while retaliating against the enemy from the air and sea. This retaliation could extend to strikes against the enemy homeland in North Viet-Nam. c. The rainy season which is beginning now makes it unlikely that the enemy will initiate major military moves for several months; however, he is always capable of a limited breach of the cease-fire like Nam Tha. We should be thinking now how to react to such a breach and how to use the next few months to improve our overall position in Southeast Asia. A pressing question is what to do about improving the FAR. }",military,bureaucracies_102,bureaucracies
"[Attachment] Discussion Paper for White House Meeting, May 10, 1962 -720 SUBJECT Laos We believe that the deliberate violation of the cease-fire in Laos and the continuing military encroachments raise the possibility that the Communists may move on toward a military takeover of most of the country. We believe that fear of US intervention has in the past been the principal factor deterring the Communists from more aggressive military actions in Laos. We also believe recent actions imply a downgrading in their estimate of the risk of US intervention to check them and that a further downgrading is likely unless the United States takes action to reestablish the deterrent. We have prepared for your consideration the following discussion of the current situation in Laos and its implications for US policy. 6 III. THE IMMEDIATE CIRCUMSTANCES A. Phoumi indirectly invited the Nam Tha attack but the Pathet Lao/Viet Minh success means the probable loss of all of Northern Laos. The RLG is losing its best battalions. C. Communist subversion in northeast Thailand through a newly established corridor in northwest Laos may well be begun with increasingly grave effects on Thai security. IV. PROBABLE COMMUNIST ATTITUDES A. The Communist action raises doubts that the communists are still seriously interested in a government of national union. However, we believe the Communists and particularly the Soviets still prefer a negotiated settlement to an all-out military solution. B. However, the success of Nam Tha is being pursued with further encroachments in northern Laos and, in the absence of effective RLG resistance or convincing evidence of US determination to intervene if necessary, it is impossible to say with any assurance where these encroachments will stop. C. The Chinese Communists are undoubtedly pleased at obtaining a Communist-controlled buffer zone along the entire Laos border and will be opposed to any Communist retreat from the Nam Tha area. D. We do not believe the Communists (including the Chinese) want to accept any significant risk of US intervention in defense of the RLG. Nor do we believe that the Communists will be provoked into further escalation by US moves that clearly do not threaten their position in North Vietnam or Northern Laos but point only to a determination to defend that portion of Laos now held by the RLG. Evidence of this level of US determination would, we believe, simply make them more cautious. V. REQUIREMENTS FOR REESTABLISHING A CEASE-FIRE Adoption of courses such as the following would, we believe, result in a new cease-fire and a temporary stabilization of a new de facto partition without precluding the possibility of continuing to seek a government of national union and neutralization of Laos B. This diplomatic approach, to be effective, must be backed by plausible evidence that the US will not tolerate a Communist military takeover. The following moves are proposed: 1. Initiate appropriate 7th Fleet movements toward the Gulf of Siam (including special forces from Okinawa), as in 1961. 2. Send the US battle group now in the Korat area of Thailand (about 1,000 men) to the Thai border opposite Vientiane seeking parallel Thai action. Plan with the Thais for possible future joint action. 4. Begin on longer range improvements in port and transit facilities in Northern South Vietnam which would be needed for access to and support of possible operations in Southern Laos. 1 'a0 :: emphasized the need to take steps to indicate to the Communist side that we would not stand idly by in the face of probes such as Nam Tha. He suggested that the Communists were undoubtedly waiting to see what our reaction would be. The failure to react some way would be interpreted to mean that it was safe for the PL to press forward. He suggested that any move we make be tailored in such a fashion as not to provoke the Viet Minh or the Chinese into large-scale counter-action, but rather to suggest to them that we were prepared to resist encroachments beyond the cease-fire line. The :: stated that the Lao do not have the will nor the capacity to be a military power and if foreign troops are withdrawn, the area should be peaceful. Following the establishment of a Souvanna Phouma government, elections will take place and Secretary SPLIT predicted victory over the Pathet Lao. Secretary SPLIT said it was not clear that Nam Tha meant the breakdown in the cease-fire. Moscow is committed to the Geneva/Vienna arrangements but the extent of Moscow influence on Peiping and Hanoi is not clear. Meanwhile, Secretary SPLIT continued, we are much concerned over Thailand. Thailand has a long common border with Laos, and the sensitive situation in Northeast Thailand combined to create a situation in which the fall of Nam Tha has shaken the confidence of the Thais. But there is a need for some encouragement to the Thais, and it is largely for this reason that we are now recommending some build up in the forces in Thailand. Secretary :: willingness to contemplate a freer use of U.S. air power in Laos and, if necessary, in North Viet-Nam. This to me was good news, as I have long felt that before we put a soldier into Laos to restore and maintain a cease-fire (an impossible military mission), we should consider taking reprisals in the form of air attacks in Laos on fixed targets and on the Communist supply transport.",political,bureaucracies_103,bureaucracies
"reported the overall Laotian military situation, pointing out that Communists held entire eastern section of the country from north to south. RLG held western portion. Referring to the map, Director SPLIT stated that previously deployed Pathet Lao military capability could take over Thakheh, Saravane or Attopeu. The PL controlled the Mekong River in the vicinity Pak Beng and were strengthening their position in Luang Prabang. We therefore conceded to the PL the capability of maintaining actions of Nam Tha intensity in several locations with a probability of success. Nevertheless, we did not expect an all out military move until Communists had assessed U.S. intentions. Director SPLIT answered that RLG forces totaled 76,000, Communist forces numbered 38,000, but the Communists were more effective fighters, better led, and possessed a greater will to fight. General SPLIT replied that there was simply no evidence available to the Americans of any such Chinese Communist battalions, in spite of Thai reports to this effect. We have tried as hard as we know how to pin down the facts here, and there remains no evidence of Chinese Communist participation. Senator :: pointedout that the thrust of these Estimates was to the effect that each increase in our effort in Laos, whether it involved additional support of the RLG or the placement of American troops in Laos, or the committing of American troops to combat in Laos would be met by an escalation in the Communist effort which would undoubtedly also be in stages involving additional North Vietnam combat units and are very probably covert and finally the overt commitment of Chinese Communists troops to action. he personally was convinced that this was a reasonable appraisal of trend of events in Laos and it represented the unanimous view of the Intelligence Community. However, it was pointed out to the president that he, had detected on the part of the military the feeling that the logistics problem of supplying combat forces in Laos would be a very inhibiting factor and because of this there was an attitude that perhaps the Communists would not escalate their effort in Laos to meet the increase in our own effort. he disagreed with this viewpoint and while he recognized all of the logistics problems, he nevertheless felt that the Communists would keep the pressure on and what could not be accomplished one month or in one season would be an objective for the next month or the next season. This has been the history of the Communist effort as it moves southward toward Southeast Asia in the past several years. he therefore would urge the president to recognize that the commitment of troops in Laos must be coupled with the decision to take actions against North Vietnam which at first would involve air strikes against military concentrations, airfields, supply depots, transportation facilities, and communications facilities; all of which were readily identifiable from recent photography. In other words, if we are going to commit our forces in Laos, we must not do as we did in Korea, provide the Communist forces with a sanctuary from which they can direct and supply their operations. }",military,bureaucracies_104,bureaucracies
"described the Nam Tha military action indicating about 6,000 RLG troops involved versus about 5,000 PL. The RLG artillery performed well until ordered destroyed, and RLG forces retired in orderly fashion with their small arms intact. The Secretary pointed out how the Laotian generals had acted against the advice of Generals Boyle and Tucker in a number of respects: they put six or seven battalions in Nam Tha against the two which were recommended by the Americans. These forces occupied the low ground, not the high ground. When the forces were defeated, it was the Laotian generals who were the first to leave. The Laotian soldiers themselves had performed better than on some occasions in the past, but their leadership had been very bad. Now their combat effectiveness was estimated by General Tucker as nil, and they had retreated clear back across the Mekong, far outdistancing any pursuit. Director SPLIT reviewed his meeting with Marshal Sarit 3 and outlined the dangers of the exposed border, and then explained in detail the planned troop deployment in Thailand. He said that this build up of force would lead to a total level of about 8,000 Americans. The SPLIT replied that we have a lever of military support and a threat of withholding of it and that the incident at Nam Tha increases our influence. 1 'a0 :: is raising its estimate of troop requirements for an initial movement into Laos. talked in terms of 40,000 U.S. troops as necessary to provide a force to move into the Mekong Valley, to maintain itself there, and later to be able to undertake initial operations in Southern Laos. There seemed to be general agreement that General Harkins'92 estimate of a four division force to clear and secure the Panhandle was low. At the end of the meeting, were wondering out lout whether there was a military solution for securing the Panhandle which was really feasible and not so costly as to cast doubt on the wisdom of making the attempt. :: Denial of the north-south road system in Southern Laos would not have any effect on the present supply route to South Vietnam, which appears to be adequate for the North Vietnamese to send in men and funds, although it undoubtedly has limitations on equipment. Even Communist control of these roads would still leave them with a major problem getting equipment onward from Attopeu. Most important of all, page 4 fails to make clear that we might confront the '93threshold'94 within a matter of days after we had taken the first move in occupying these areas. The intelligence estimate is that the Communists would almost certainly respond by harassing actions and by seeking to consolidate and gradually expand their hold, particularly in Southern Laos. I cannot visualize our staying at this point long, and believe that as a practical matter we would have to move further to Stage 3 and 4 and possibly 5 and 6. In short, I see Stage 2 as a politically useful opening gambit which might conceivably restore a cease-fire and bring about resumed negotiations, but if it failed to do so would have to lead quickly to further action. For this same reason, I think that if we undertook Stage 2, we should have the 35,000 reserve forces referred to actually stationed in Thailand. It might prove feasible to have airborne units on call from the Philippines or Okinawa, but even these should have their necessary heavy equipment pre-stocked in Thailand so that they could go into action at once. On page 6, the estimate of force requirements is currently 30,000 US forces rather than 45,000 in order to conduct firm offensive action. However, I am not convinced that these forces could do the job of really cleaning up the Panhandle without some additional reinforcement. Moreover, I would underscore the point that even if we defeat organized forces in the Panhandle, we would not have eliminated, although we might sharply reduce, the Communist supply route to South Vietnam. }",military,bureaucracies_105,bureaucracies
"said one thing we could do promptly would be to reconstitute the Panama Canal Board which is now not attuned to the situation in Panama. Secretary :: wondered whether we should tell Arias. He was thinking of a pro-American, such as Robles, who may have the loyalty of the National Guard, with whom we could work more easily than Chiari. He thought that perhaps we should tell the Guard and Robles. The SPLIT said that he believed Chiari's advisers could make a rational case in support of Chiari's refusal to negotiate with us now. Looking at it from the Panamanian side, Chiari's advisers could say that he should keep pushing against us, thereby building support for Panama's case among members of the OAS and the UN. Even if Panama did not win full support in these two organizations, the difficulties caused to us would prompt us to come closer to meeting the Panamanian demands. Thus, by refusing to talk now, Panama could expect to create a situation which they might think would force us to be more forthcoming on treaty negotiations. Mr. SPLIT said we had exchanged information with the Latin American countries about Castro's activities. Secretary SPLIT made the following points: (1) We cannot be pushed out of Panama because we have overwhelming force there. Some 8000 U.S. troops could easily handle the few thousand National Guardsmen in Panama. The SPLIT said that the Panamanians can make things very difficult for us in the OAS and in the UN. Additionally, there are many who will have sympathy for the Panamanians because they believe we have not been fair to the Panamanians. We must acknowledge that the heavy-handed way in which we have handled treaty matters in the past has led some to lose sympathy with us. Secretary :: reported that there was a possibility of a revolution in Panama tonight. The delegation had learned that Arias might join with the Communists to overthrow Chiari. Several members of the delegation stated that Chiari was in trouble from both the right and the left and agreed that his overthrow was a possibility. Mr. SPLIT stated his view that the U.S. should not intervene with U.S. troops in a Panamanian coup unless it was clear that the revolutionists would be successful. The members of the delegation paused to read a SPLIT recommended that if Chiari requested our assistance, we should intervene in the Panamanian Republic with U.S. troops. If Chiari appears to be losing to a coup led by Arias and the Communists, we should intervene after a request from Chiari. Mr. Mann's view was that Chiari appears to have the support of the people, and, therefore, the chances of Arias and the Communists overthrowing him is not great. He admitted that the loyalty of the Panamanian National Guard would be crucial in a revolutionary situation. The SPLIT said that General SPLIT gave additional information on his talks with president Chiari, who is probably under heavy pressure from National Guard leaders and Panamanian businessmen because of his hostility toward the U.S. Mr. SPLIT believes that Chiari will eventually agree to talk with us even though he refuses to do so now. He recommended that we play our cards very carefully until such time as internal pressure in Panama forces him to accept our basis for discussions. In response to the President's question, Mr. SPLIT said Chiari advisers, several of whom are left-wing Communists, are telling Chiari to hold out because the U.S. will give in to his demands. The SPLIT said that Chiari's actions were irrational and not in the interests of Panama. Secretary SPLIT said that SPLIT said we had received reports of Cuban arms going to Panama, but we had no conclusive proof. 9 Not enough time had elapsed since the riots began for Castro to send armed support to Panama. Secretary SPLIT said we must face the fact that the Panamanian aim is full control of the Zone. If we agree to treaty revisions now, the Panamanians will demand more changes before the ink is even dry on the new treaty. The unsatisfactory situation cannot be solved without major changes in the future. He repeated his belief that we must consider building a sea-level canal. Mr.",political,bureaucracies_106,bureaucracies
"said we could operate the Panama Canal independent of any help from Panama if we had to. Panamanians residing in the Canal Zone could operate it if necessary. Therefore, we can operate the Canal without Panamanian cooperation. This means that we are not obliged to find an immediate solution to the present problems because we face the prospect of not being able to keep the Canal open. Secretary SPLIT said we did, in his opinion, have evidence of Castro's support. Director SPLIT said that while there are many problems, the crucial issue is U.S. sovereignty. If we lose our sovereignty in the Zone, he doubts we can protect the Canal. Mr. :: returned to the room following a second conversation with General o'Meara who reported that the coup information contained in the CIA message had been passed to Chiari in a meeting attended by one of Chiari's advisers who is a known Communist. General SPLIT said it was. (2) U.S. presence in the Canal Zone is so beneficial to Panama that responsible Panamanians realize that the Republic's economic future depends on our remaining in the Zone. (3) The members of the OAS peace commission have indicated that they are fed up with the Panamanian attitude and are not hostile to us. Their attitude will be reflected in the attitude of several Latin American governments. (4) We will be supported in our insistence on conditions which permit us to continue operation of the Canal by those countries which are interested in the unhampered use of and in the security of the Canal. On the other side, Secretary SPLIT said an immediate requirement was the naming of a political chief who would speak for the U.S. Government and be above the Commander-in-Chief, Southern Forces, as well as the Governor of the Canal Zone. Bromley Smith 11 1 'a0",political,bureaucracies_107,bureaucracies
"said the plan would be for our forces to hold the two main cities and leave to the Laotians the protection of the countryside. The SPLIT noted that Loyalist forces are just south of the city of Xieng Khouang. SPLIT said his estimate is that 80'9690% of the forces are composed of Pathet Lao, with a hard core of Viet Minh non-coms and technicians. The SPLIT commented that the B'9626s could be used for this purpose. The SPLIT stated that the parachute battalion is in fact a ranger-type battalion which could be very effective in guerrilla operations.} :: said the JCS had experienced for some time a feeling of frustration about Laos. The :: '93if move into any part of Laos, will very likely draw in the North VN & the Chinese.'94 [19 lines of source text not declassified] 1. Move our naval forces closer into position. OK 2. Alert our forces for air movement. OK 3. Discuss with Sarit potential moves & alerting of Thai forces to save 24 hrs. Save 4. Alert Paks. Save 5. Alert Commonwealth Brigade. 6. Develop a plan to support Thailand & So VN if we lose Laos a. start negotiation with Sarit & Diem now b. draw up a movement plan now c. discuss plan with British. }",military,bureaucracies_108,bureaucracies
"advanced the question as to what should be the political objective of military operations in Laos in case we had to intervene. General SPLIT stated that if the Boun Oum government is ratified by the assembly, the French will find themselves out on a limb. The SPLIT commented that nothing has been confirmed concerning this. General SPLIT said that the Thais have been asked by the Laotians for a parachute battalion. Before they furnish this, however, they want a commitment from us to support them if they are attacked. The SPLIT said we have assured them of this. General :: by pointing out that there were two separate problems in Laos which were quite closely interlocked: the first was the military situation; the second was the political situation and the possibilities of achieving a political settlement of the problems besetting that country. With respect to the military situation, I merely stated that it was one of very real uncertainty as of now, with the factor disturbing us most being the unwillingness of the armed forces of the recognized Government to fight despite the logistical support which we had been able to give them in the supplying of materiel of war. I also said that a political settlement might well be affected in large measure by the military situation as of any given time. C.A.H.} :: Washington, April 13, 1961. RECOMMENDED ACTIONS IN LAOS Watch Committee conclusion of April 13, 1961 summarizes the critical political and military situations developing in Laos. It observes that the apparent collapse of the Government's Muong Kassy offensive will further depress FAL and Vientiane morale and will permit the communists to resume attacks in the Luang Probang and Vang Vieng areas. It notes indications in the Paksane area that the communists are making preparations for military pressure against Government forces which have withdrawn from Tha Thom. It finds increasing indications that communist forces in Central Laos have been strengthened in recent weeks, and that the pattern of military clashes suggests that the communists are preparing to make a relatively strong military effort in the direction of Thakhek. It predicts that in view of the Government's weakened military posture in this area and its general lack of trained reserves, the communists can probably make further extensive military gains. It concludes that the bloc position that the contending elements in Laos should discuss the terms of a cease-fire is probably intended to stall the termination of active hostilities. It observes that if the position which the Asian communists have advanced'97that a cease-fire should be effected simultaneously with a conference'97becomes the official bloc position, it will be further evidence of bloc interest in maximizing, without precipitating SEATO intervention, the communist military and political position in Laos prior to any conference. Thus, while the Russians maintain their airlift and delay their reply to the British note on a cease-fire in Laos, both the political and military situations in Laos continue to deteriorate. We now face the distinct possibility of entering a fourteen-power conference under the pressure of successful communist military activity. We also face the strong possibility that the Royal Lao Government will be drawn into premature negotiation of substantive political questions in the course of long drawn-out cease-fire talks with the Pathet Lao in a manner to prejudice its prospects at the conference. If we are to head off either of these equally disastrous possibilities we must arrest and, if possible, reverse the current adverse trend reflected in yesterday's watch report. Action to this end should be designed markedly to improve the circumstances under which a fourteen-power conference would begin. It should also be designed to exert pressure on the communist bloc by demonstrating in a deliberate and limited manner our readiness to take whatever measures may be appropriate to create for ourselves at least a reasonably strong negotiating position. The first step in so demonstrating our readiness would be to inform our SEATO allies, individually or collectively, of our concern at the dangerous nature of current bloc actions. The Russian failure to respond on the cease-fire question, the continuation of the Russian airlift and evidence of Pathet Lao military preparations against Paksane and Thakhek are significant in this regard. This ominous combination of circumstances would be described as casting doubt on Russian intentions to proceed with the conference in a meaningful manner. We would inform our SEATO allies that we were planning in concert with the Thai, whose security is immediately threatened, certain emergency measures which would support the RLG against bloc pressure and incidentally put some pressure on the Russians to respond on the cease-fire question. These measures would follow logically in the absence of a satisfactory Russian reply to our demarche in Moscow of April _, 1961. We would tell our SEATO allies that the limited measures we proposed might well fail to bolster the Lao Government or to induce the Russians to move towards a cease-fire. That is, the Pathet Lao attempt to take over Laos by force of arms and with formidable bloc assistance might be continued or even intensified. In this event we should at least have obtained confirmation of bloc intentions and should know that SEATO ought promptly to take appropriate action such as implementing Plan 5/61. The emergency measures we would plan to take in the absence of a constructive Russian reply on the cease-fire question by April 15 would include removal of certain restraints we have heretofore placed on the Royal Lao Government and tangible demonstration of friendly support for the Royal Lao Government in its present difficult predicament. Specifically, we should: a) Authorize the operational employment of certain aircraft, which the Royal Lao Government now has available and for which it has obtained qualified pilots, against appropriate military targets in Laos. Some 15 B'9626 aircraft are involved and they would use machine guns, rockets, high explosive munitions or combinations of some or all of these weapons as determined by the characteristics of available targets. b) Send into Laos a small token force of uniformed Americans and Thai (and perhaps Filipino and Pakistani) military specialists and technicians. The American personnel would be produced by ordering LTAG personnel into uniform; that is, by ordering them to add USARMY insignia to their present costumes. PEO personnel would retain their present '93civilian'94 status at least for the time being. c) Authorize and provide logistics, pay and support for seven additional Lao Army battalions and their supporting service troops. (Six of these are already in being, but not receiving US support.) d) Authorize and obtain the approval of the Royal Thai Government for the immediate commitment to Laos of two Thai 105 mm. artillery batteries with personnel and equipment. These recommendations are made in the full knowledge that they may have adverse effect on plans for an international conference. However, the communists' stalling tactics, their continued military buildup, and their political maneuvering (especially their successful buildup of Souvanna Phouma) appear to be conditioning the approach to the conference in a way unacceptable to us. Furthermore, we think it equally likely that the steps recommended above might well bring about a cease-fire and a conference sooner rather than later, and enable us to enter the conference on an acceptable basis. These steps should be taken on the assumption that we may face stepped-up communist retaliation in the area. Under these conditions SEATO elements, in part or in whole, must be ready to act, and immediate precautionary measures must be taken to supply air defense of friendly forces in the area.} :: whatever action we take should not be based on fear of what the enemy will do in retaliation to our moves. 4. Chet :: are likely to face full-scale war with the Chinese in 4 to 5 yrs; should have neutrals with us (India, Burma, etc.); Laos, inclu[ding] the panhandle, is not the place to start. 6. Maxwell",political,bureaucracies_109,bureaucracies
"said he holds the conviction that if we ever resort to force, the thing to do is to clear up the problem completely. We should not allow a running sore like the British had in Egypt or the U.S. had in Korea. He considered that we were very fortunate to have, as an excuse to get out, the fact that we had cleared the southern area back to the 38th parallel. He said he assumed of course we would wait for a SEATO conference before intervening. Mr. SPLIT recalled the gross French mishandling of Indo-China. De Lattre 8 was the only Frenchman who saw the solution there. SPLIT responded sharply stating that he saw no reason why this should not all have been done already, and added that this is what we have an intelligence system for. SPLIT thought that the Western side might gain by pitting the airfield at Plaine des Jarres with medium-size bombers. General SPLIT noted that attacks on airfields can often be most effective through attacking fuel supplies, but observed that the Russians are probably not bringing in much fuel as yet. If we do not somehow stop this build-up, however, they will in all likelihood soon be bringing in fighter aircraft. Mr. SPLIT said this could be given in the form of a confirmation that we stand by the treaty. Mr. :: said that even now we did not know what we could do about Laos because of the attitude of our allies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were correct from the military point of view in stating that it was better to use small forces promptly than to use larger forces later but the question of when small forces can be used involved a political judgment. General SPLIT asked to whom the JCS report was made. Marion W. Boggs} :: Laos The main Pathet Lao effort seems to be an attack from the north toward Luang Prabang. A town called Nam Bac fell on January 7 after an intensive four-hour mortar and recoilless rifle attack. The Pathet Lao numbered about 700. Government forces destroyed some ammunition and apparently saved their weapons in the withdrawal to Muong Sai, 30 miles west. This latter town possesses a 3000-foot sod runway. Possession of Nam Bac makes it possible for the Communists to go down the river toward Luang Prabang. The government forces, meanwhile, reportedly possess the road junction where the Xieng Khouang road forks to Luang Prabang and Vientiane. Furthermore, the troops in Luang Prabang have been reinforced by a battalion (338 men). The King has returned to Luang Prabang after the formalities at Vientiane. The bulk of the Boun Oum forces in the Xieng Khouang area have withdrawn about 40 miles southeast of that town. Many of these are Meo tribesmen. Plans are for a counterattack north from Paksane to retake the Plaine des Jarres. We have authorized use of counterpart funds to provide a bonus of one-month's pay for FAL personnel in the Vientiane combat. 2 A C'9647 with a K'9638 camera is now available. T'966s are now authorized for use within Laos for all operations except bombing, and CINCPAC may now use U.S. military aircraft to move supplies. The RLG has notified its embassy in London to warn the Soviets one day before the first T'966 mission is flown. 3 Despite this fact, the Soviets have not at this time ceased aerial re-supply of the Pathet Lao. The Joint Chiefs have authorized the use of our military aircraft in the Thai festivities for the return of the King and Queen on January 20. As of today, military operations in Laos seem to be a little better. At the very least, Phoumi is getting them to regroup and plan the counterattacks, and reinforcements are being sent to critical areas. [Here follows a section on Cuba.] John S. D. Eisenhower} :: . He stated also that he felt we should intervene. When SPLIT said it was a question as to whether they would be willing to see the war spread. :: Laos Task Force Meeting, Tuesday, February 14, 1961 3. General Phoumi's offensive is going very slowly. It is meeting severe resistance. The level of support through the Soviet airlift has been expanded. They evidently understand, at least as well as we do, the role of controlling the Plaine des Jarres in the inevitable negotiations about the political constitution of the Laos government. There is some anxiety that General Phoumi understand clearly that the launching of our diplomatic initiative should not be an occasion to slacken his efforts. A cable on the relation between the diplomacy and military action in Laos will be dispatched. 3} :: Laos Task Force Meeting, Monday, February 27, 1961 2 4. There is a serious gap in intelligence about the Communist build-up in the Plaine des Jarres. There is a possibility that they may plan an offensive before the rainy season sets in, in about a month. On the whole, the view is that Phoumi's forces can hold even if they are unlikely to advance very far. The Pentagon is undertaking to get better intelligence and also to see whether the dumps the Communists are creating might not be targetable and, conceivably, attacked [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] volunteer pilots. This is staff work exploration, of course; and no decisions have been made.} :: Situation in Laos as of Task Force Meeting, Tuesday, March 7, 1961 1. As we have feared, the Communists launched a probing offensive against Phoumi's men. Without much fight, our boys fell back, apparently beyond the crucial crossroads. It is not yet clear whether Phoumi's forces have the capacity to rally; nor is it yet clear how vigorously the Communists will exploit the initial breakthrough. 2. The Laos Task Force meeting, 2 in addition to considering certain measures to harden our defensive position in Viet-Nam, Thailand, and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, considered a variety of measures which might be taken urgently to maintain morale and to maintain a minimum military position capable of giving us a basis for negotiation of neutralization. None of these seemed promising; but the Pentagon will go to work and we will evidently consider the matter with Admiral Felt.} :: Task Force Meeting on Laos, April 13, 1961 2 1. It is the general appreciation that the Communist tactic in Laos is to delay on the cease-fire while the situation crumbles politically and militarily. The political crumbling may be now under way as Phoumi seeks to retrieve a political situation for himself in a neutral Laos. The military crumbling consists in the positioning of Communist troops in areas which will permit them quickly to collapse FAL forces, protecting Paksane and Takhek. The collapse of these two towns would cut Laos in half, isolating Vientiane and Luang Prabang from the south. 2. The assessment is that the Russians understand the need to avoid a major overt move until it is too late for us to move in and their present objective is a collapse of the morale of the FAL forces and of the present government. It was the consensus of the meeting that you, Mr. Rusk, and Mr. McNamara should urgently consider a SEATO operation of a Lebanon type; that is, the movement of forces into Laos as envisaged under Plan 5/61. 3 This was judged preferable to the four actions on pages 4'965 of the attached memorandum. It was felt the first of these actions'97the use of B'9626s'97would constitute an act of escalation without clear overt occasion; that the other three suggested acts would be inadequate to stabilize the military and political situation and provide us with the necessary bargaining strength during a conference. [Attachment] 4 Paper Prepared by Thomas J. :: Laos Task Force Meeting, Monday, April 17, 1961 2 As of this afternoon the situation, as seen by the Task Force, was as follows: 1. The Pathet Lao approach to Takhek continues. It is not ruled out that Takhek will be taken and the Communist penetration to the Mekong completed in a very few days. 2. The FAL Lao troops in Takhek are trainees; and their commander is of well proven incapacity. 3. General Boyle's efforts to persuade Phoumi to put better troops and a better commander in Takhek are proceeding, but without any clear result. 6. The B'9626s, while capable of shooting up the supplies in the Plaine des Jarres, are unlikely to be able to stop the investiture of Takhek if the Pathet Lao proceed to that point. 9. The situation may be different tomorrow morning; but I thought you might want this interim picture of the situation.} :: opposed to US troops to Laos.",military,bureaucracies_110,bureaucracies
"said he felt they could; that they had conducted a survey and while we might not be able to handle two fronts, they could handle one. He also said that with the use of certain aircraft it would be possible to cut down the time from 17 days to 12 days to move 12,000 men and supplies for these men in the Pacific and the Marines from Okinawa. :: proposed move by SEATO into panhandle, recognizing that if we do we must be prepared to win, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. 2. Allen Dulles said we must anticipate a Chinese response if we move into the panhandle. 3. :: From Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to President Kennedy 1 Washington, May 2, 1961. B. A second course of action (intervention in Laos) would be to set a deadline, say 48 hours, for the conclusion of a satisfactory ceasefire at approximately the present battle lines and, if that deadline passed, move U.S. forces into Laos 2 to protect a number of key communication and population centers, at the request of the Laotian government. The force movements and dispositions that would be involved in such a movement are outlined in the military annex. 3 The purpose of such movements would be: (i) to meet our SEATO commitment, and (ii) to hold intact the present situation in Laos pending an effective ceasefire and the establishment of satisfactory controls. We must be prepared for the worst, however, namely, that no such ceasefire may take place and that the Pathet Lao will continue to press forward; that our forces will become engaged; and that massive support from the North Vietminh, Chinese Communists, and U.S.S.R. will be made available to the Pathet Lao. Under those circumstances we must promptly counter each added element brought against our forces with a more than compensating increment from our side. If the Pathet Lao keep coming, we must take any military action required to meet the threat. If North Viet-Nam attacks, we must strike North Viet-Nam. If Chinese volunteers intervene, we will have to go after South China. [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ] We must certainly stand firm against any and all threats world-wide that the Soviet Union or the Chinese Communists make. 4 Pros and Cons of the Two Courses (2) Risks and Disadvantages of the '93Intervention Course'94. a. The will to resist and the fighting ability of the Laotian forces are low. b. The terrain of the Laotian panhandle is favorable to guerrilla forces and unfavorable to Western forces and the logistical problems are formidable. U.S. casualties from enemy action or disease may be high. c. The dangers of escalation are considerable. d. Even under this course of action, it is doubtful if Laos, in its present form, can long be preserved from Communist take-over. e. The movement of our forces into Laos would be unpopular at home and would be criticized abroad, whereas public opinion might be brought to understand the introduction of U.S. occupation forces to stabilize the situation in Thailand and South Viet-Nam. f. The intervention of U.S. forces in Laos is almost certain to provoke some clash of arms with Communist forces. On the other hand, the presence of our forces in Thailand and South Viet-Nam before the occurrence of direct aggression against those countries might deter such aggression, as has been the case with other areas occupied by U.S. forces. Both courses of action may lead to long-term commitments of U.S. forces to Southeast Asia, with severe drains on our manpower and resources. Defense Recommendation After weighing the pros and cons set forth above, we favor the '93Intervention Course'94. Based on the attached cable, we believe General Lemnitzer supports the '93Intervention Course'94. The views of the Chiefs of Staff differ one from another, and are reflected in the attached memoranda. 5 Robert S. McNamara Roswell Gilpatric}",military,bureaucracies_111,bureaucracies
"From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to the President 1 Washington, September 18, 1961. 1. You asked about the use of the guerrilla infiltration routes through Laos into South Vietnam. These routes have been in use intensively since the end of 1958 when the government of North Viet-Nam in effect declared guerrilla war on South Vietnam. 2. The Viet Cong (Communist guerrilla) strength in South Viet-Nam rose from about 2500 in September 1959 to 5000 in January 1960, and to an estimated 15,000 at the present time. 3. The percentage of these Viet Cong forces which have infiltrated from outside of the country, as compared with those who were recruited locally, is impossible to determine. However, it is known that substantial numbers have been entering South Viet-Nam from the north by way of Laos for a long time. General Craig, who has just returned from a visit to Southeast Asia with a Joint Staff team, 2 considers that, since the cease-fire last May, there has been a very large movement of guerrilla forces into the panhandle of Laos in anticipation of an over-the-border offensive against South Vietnam. 4. Although we hear most about the infiltration by land, there is a lively business in transporting guerrillas by junk along the seacoast from the north into South Vietnam. Although they are occasionally intercepted, this traffic in guerrillas goes on without too much difficulty. Maxwell D. Taylor} :: s 1. Communist strategy aims to gain control of Southeast Asia by methods of subversion and guerrilla war which by-pass conventional U.S. and indigenous strength on the ground. The interim Communist goal-en route to total take-over-appears to be a neutral Southeast Asia, detached from U.S. protection. This strategy is well on the way to success in Vietnam. Recommendations The following constitute my recommendations in response to the letter of The President to me dated 13 October 1961 General That upon request from the Government of Viet-Nam (GVN) to come to its aid in resisting the increasing aggressions of the Viet-Cong and in repairing the ravages of the Delta flood which, in combination threaten the lives of its citizens and the security of the country, the U.S. Government offer to join the GVN in a massive joint effort as a part of a mobilization of GVN resources to cope with both the Viet-Cong (VC) and the ravages of the flood. The U.S. representatives will participate actively in this effort, particularly in the fields of government administration, military plans and operations, intelligence, and flood relief, going beyond the advisory role which they have observed in the past. Specific That in support of the foregoing broad commitment to a joint effort with Diem, the following specific measures be undertaken: 1. The U.S. Government will be prepared to provide individual administrators for insertion into the governmental machinery of South Viet-Nam in types and numbers to be worked out with President Diem. 2. A joint effort will be made to improve the military-political intelligence system beginning at the provincial level and extending upward through the government and armed forces to the Central Intelligence Organization. 3. The U.S. Government will engage in a joint survey of the conditions in the provinces to assess the social, political, intelligence, and military factors bearing on the prosecution of the counterinsurgency in order to reach a common estimate of these factors and a common determination of how to deal with them. As this survey will consume time, it should not hold back the immediate actions which are clearly needed regardless of its outcome. 4. A joint effort will be made to free the Army for mobile, offensive operations. This effort will be based upon improving the training and equipping of the Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Corps, relieving the regular Army of static missions, raising the level of the mobility of Army forces by the provision of considerably more helicopters and light aviation, and organizing a Border Ranger Force for a long-term campaign on the Laotian border against the Viet-Cong infiltrators. The U.S. Government will support this effort with equipment and with military units and personnel to do those tasks which the Armed Forces of Viet-Nam cannot perform in time. Such tasks include air reconnaissance and photography, airlift (beyond the present capacity of SVN forces), special intelligence, and air-ground support techniques. 5. The U.S. Government will assist the GVN in effecting surveillance and control over the coastal waters and inland waterways, furnishing such advisors, operating personnel and small craft as may be necessary for quick and effective operations. 6. The MAAG, Vietnam, will be reorganized and increased in size as may be necessary by the implementation of these recommendations. 7. The U.S. Government will offer to introduce into South Viet-Nam a military Task Force to operate under U.S. control for the following purposes: a. Provide a U.S. military presence capable of raising national morale and of showing to Southeast Asia the seriousness of the U.S. intent to resist a Communist take-over. b. Conduct logistical operations in support of military and flood relief operations. c. Conduct such combat operations as are necessary for self-defense and for the security of the area in which they are stationed. d. Provide an emergency reserve to back up the Armed Forces of the GVN in the case of a heightened military crisis. e. Act as an advance party of such additional forces as may be introduced if CINCPAC or SEATO contingency plans are invoked. 8. The U.S. Government will review its economic aid program to take into account the needs of flood relief and to give priority to those projects in support of the expanded counter-insurgency program. Paper Prepared by the Members of the Taylor Mission 4 EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS Communist Strategy in Southeast Asia At the present time, the Communists are pursuing a clear and systematic strategy in Southeast Asia. It is a strategy of extending Communist power and influence in ways which bypass U.S. nuclear strength, U.S. conventional naval, air, and ground forces, and the conventional strength of indigenous forces in the area. Their strategy is rooted in the fact that international law and practice does not yet recognize the mounting of guerrilla war across borders as aggression justifying counter-attack at the source. The strategy is a variant on Mao's classic three-stage offensive. First, a political base for guerrilla war, subversion, and dissidence is established in each country in the area, exploiting its unique vulnerabilities via trained local or introduced cadres. Second, guerrilla war is begun. Third, a maximum effort is made to translate the Communist position achieved on the ground, plus the weakness and cross-purposes in the non-Communist camp, to induce a neutralist interim solution, blocking the U.S. military presence, as with the proposed renunciation by Laos of SEATO protection. Complete Communist take-over, by whatever means may appear feasible, is the evident ultimate objective. Mao's third stage-overt conventional warfare, with guerrillas in an ancillary role-is apparently now judged too dangerous to pursue, on the grounds that it is likely to trigger U.S. (or SEATO) intervention. This modified Mao strategy is actually underway in Laos and South Vietnam. Cambodia, with Sihanouk's anticipatory collaboration, has already adjusted to the likelihood (in his view) that the Communist strategy will succeed. The strategy is clearly foreshadowed in Thailand. The initial bases for such a program have been laid in Malaya, Indonesia, and Burma; but they will probably not be exploited to the full until the South Viet-Nam struggle is favorably resolved. The Communists undoubtedly believe-and with good reason-that if the strategy succeeds in Laos and South Viet-Nam the enterprise will rapidly gather momentum throughout Southeast Asia. This is not the only possible Communist strategy in Southeast Asia. An overt use of Viet-Minh and ChiCom divisions is conceivable, although the terrain and logistical structure of Southeast Asia sets a relatively low limit on the scale of conventional engagement in that theater. And it is in the range of possible contingencies that such a direct attack might be backed by some Soviet nuclear power. But current strategy is as described. Communist Strategy in South Vietnam In South Viet-Nam the tactical application of this general strategy is now in an advanced stage. An internally organized guerrilla war is being conducted in the South, recently expanded and strengthened with professional cadres. A second front of military pressure has been built up in the Central Plateau, with significant components of infiltration via Laos and the systematic exploitation of Montagnard and sect dissidence. In addition, a pocket of reserve strength is organized above Saigon in Zone D (perhaps 1500 troops), available for a climactic strike in the context of a political crisis. The Viet-Cong command a capability for considerable terroristic activity in and around Saigon. The military strategy being pursued is, evidently, to pin down the ARVN on defensive missions; to create a pervasive sense of insecurity and frustration by hit-and-run raids on self-defense corps and militia units, ambushing the reserve forces if possible as they come up to defend; and to dramatize the inability of the GVN to govern or to build, by the assassination of officials and the sabotage of public works. Meanwhile a reserve force of unknown size and capability is being created in the forests and mountains surrounding the plateau, straddling the Laos (and possibly Cambodian) border which offers a supply base, a relatively secure infiltration route, and safe haven. Depending on its size and capability, this force could be used for a series of demoralizing raids on the cities of the plateau, on the model of the raids on Phouc Thanh. It could attempt to seize and hold the Kontum-Pleiku area, declaring, as in Xieng Khouang, a new government to be recognized by Bloc states. It could by-pass the plateau cities and, by infiltration down to the sea, isolate the coastal cities much as the Mekong cities have been isolated by the Pathet-Lao. One of the most important facts about the situation in Viet-Nam is that the size and capabilities of the Viet-Cong forces in the plateau are not known. Its capabilities could range from a mere capacity to continue to harass, to a capacity, when surfaced, of producing a Dien Bien Phu. On current evidence we lean to a conservative assessment of this force (perhaps 4000); but it justifies a concentrated intelligence effort, and a quick-action contingency plan, as well as the specific action proposed in the appendices. (See, especially, Appendix F, Frontier Force Vietnam.) Despite the considerable guerrilla capabilities of the Viet-Cong, Communist strategy now appears, on balance, to aim at an essentially political denouement rather than the total military capture of the country, as in the case of Mao's campaign in China. A maximum effort is under way to increase political disaffection at every level; among the sects, the minority groups, the trade unions, the students, and the intellectuals. Energetic efforts to dramatize the weaknesses of Diem's regime and to induce discouragement about U.S. policy in Laos and Southeast Asia generally are being pursued. The enemy objective seems to be to produce a political crisis by a combination of military and non-military means out of which would come a South Vietnamese Souvanna Phouma, willing to contemplate unification on terms acceptable to Hanoi, including disengagement from the U.S. Enemy Order of Battle and Level of Engagement On the following page is the best evaluation available of the Viet-Cong Order of Battle in South Viet-Nam and Casualty and Combat Rates for 1961 The relatively modest increase in the scale of the Viet-Cong forces in 1961 in the southern region (NAMBO) was accompanied by a sharp increase in organization in which the infiltration of cadres from the north probably played a significant part. A more substantial increase occurred in 1961 in the northern region (Intersector Five). Appendix A(I) 5 suggests an over-all expansion of Viet-Cong forces from 12,000 in July to 16,500 at the present time. The Casualty and Combat Rate figures, which MAAG believes to be not grossly inaccurate, indicate the peak in Viet-Cong activity in connection with the April election and then the second more radical increase in Viet-Cong attacks in August and September. In September there was a doubling of Vietnamese casualties and a much less than proportionate increase in casualties inflicted on the Viet-Cong. This is a statistical reflection of the situation which helped bring on the present crisis. In October the increased casualty rate persisted. Although the main weight of Viet-Cong attack remains in the well organized southern area (III Corps), there was a sharp rise in incidents and casualties taken in the II Corps Area (Pleiku-Kontum) in August and September. -108 Estimate of Viet-Cong Strength in South Viet-Nam July-October, 1961 REGULAR FORCES July October -108 Nambo Region 8,150 9,000 -108 Interzone 5 0 6 0 6 -108 Total 8,150 9,000 -108 REGIONAL FORCES -108 Nambo Region 0 6 0 6 -108 Interzone 5 6,200 7,000 -108 Total 6,200 7,000 -108 Over-all Total 14,350 16,000 -108 Casualties and Combat Rate Vietnam l961 7 Casualties 8 Viet-Cong Incidents Viet-Cong GVN Attacks Terrorism Sabotage -108 Jan 2449 615 148 180 89 -108 Feb 1569 583 143 147 106 -108 Mar 2429 610 241 354 118 -108 Apr 2212 850 309 382 149 -108 May 1397 671 124 344 86 -108 Jun 1551 500 163 398 89 -108 Jul 2376 746 189 479 216 -108 Aug 1574 676 408 337 124 -108 Sep 1877 1314 440 439 100 -108 Oct 2004 1400 N.E. N.E. N.E. Viet-Cong Weaknesses Although much in Saigon and South Viet-Nam recalls vividly the Indo-China War, the analogy is inexact. The position of the Viet-Cong (and Ho Chi Minh) is substantially different from that of the Viet Minh forces when fighting the French in the early 1950's. '97The Communists no longer carry persuasively the banners of national independence against colonial rule. '97Their guerrilla forces must rely primarily on terror, intimidation, and the notion that U.S. weakness makes the Viet-Cong the local wave of the future. '97The Viet-Cong cannot safely engage their forces against the GVN regulars and North Viet-Nam cannot engage its divisional strength for fear of U.S. action. The Viet-Cong rely primarily on southern recruits and southerners trained in the north and reintroduced. '97The need to conceal Hanoi's directing role imposes important limitations on infiltration and supply routes and on tactics generally. It must be remembered that the 1959 political decision in Hanoi to launch the guerrilla and political campaign of 1960-61 arose because of Diem's increasing success in stabilizing his rule and moving his country forward in the several preceding years. Meanwhile, word has spread throughout Viet-Nam that Hanoi's rule has led to brutality and hunger. Men may believe that Hanoi is the wave of the future and a route to unification; but the Communist performance in the North is not admired. The considerable grandeur of the Viet Minh in the early 1950's has been largely dissipated. By comparison, this is a pretty shabby offensive, both militarily and politically, although potentially lethal. The maximum estimate of voluntary, positive support for the Communists in South Viet-Nam is about 200,000 or 2 per cent of the population. (Appendix I.) 9 This is a Vietnamese estimate. The official U.S. estimate is about half this level. Finally, the Communists now not only have something to gain-the South-but a base to risk-the North-if war should come. The Crisis in South Vietnam It is perfectly evident that South Viet-Nam is now undergoing an acute crisis of confidence, stretching from the top to the bottom of the country. The principal elements involved in this crisis are clear enough: 1. Uncertainty about the seriousness of the American commitment to defend South Viet-Nam induced by the Laos negotiation. Many believe that the U.S. will be prepared to settle for a Souvanna in Saigon. 2. The September successes of the Viet-Cong, indicating an enemy capability of outstripping the build-up of ARVN capabilities. (It should be recalled that the infiltration of one guerrilla imposes the burden of increasing GVN forces by, perhaps, fifteen men to stay even.) The military frustration of the past two months has, in turn, made acute, throughout the administration, a dissatisfaction with Diem's method of rule, with his lack of identification with his people, and with his strategy which has been endemic for some years. 3. The flood, imposing a heavy economic and administrative burden on an already strained government and society. Beneath the surface of this immediate crisis are two vicious circles which have been operating for many months in South Viet-Nam and which the improvement in atmosphere in the months preceding September tended only superficially to conceal. The first vicious circle is military. The lack of firm and well organized operational intelligence has helped produce a defensive disposition of forces to guard against Viet-Cong attack-a stance perhaps inherited to some degree from the French and not effectively corrected by subsequent U.S. training. This defensive stance has drawn 80 to 85 per cent of the ARVN, including the bulk of the specially trained Ranger Force, into essentially static tasks. Thus, initiative has been conceded to the enemy. This, in turn, has made worse a bad system of civil-military relations. The bulk of the military forces remain in control of the Province Chiefs because it is their responsibility to protect the population and installations of their areas; a defensive strategy thus automatically puts the bulk of the military in their hands. When enemy attacks take place, forces are brought up from reserve too slowly to be effective, due to a lack of effective command and control, communications, and mobility. A very high proportion of ARVN casualties (perhaps 90 per cent) results from ambushes which derive directly, in turn, from these operational characteristics. The consequent inability effectively to protect the people leads, in turn, to a drying up of the basic sources of intelligence and limits the government's ability to raise recruits. Thus, poor intelligence, poor command and control arrangements, and poor mobility reinforce each other, leading to a defensive military disposition of resources and a progressive deterioration in the military position of the ARVN. The second vicious circle, interwoven with the first, is political. As is widely understood, Diem's instinctive administrative style is that of an old fashioned Asian ruler, seeking to maintain all the strings of power in his own hands, while fragmenting power beneath him. The inability to mobilize intelligence effectively for operational purposes directly flows from this fact, as do the generally poor relations between the Province Chiefs and the military commanders, the former being Diem's reliable agents, the latter a power base he fears. The consequent frustration of Diem's military commanders-a frustration well known to Diem and heightened by the November 1960 coup-leads him to actions which further complicate his problem; e.g., his unwillingness to delegate military operations clearly to his generals. Beyond the military circle, Diem's operating style and the personal political insecurity it has generated leads him to mistrust excessively many intellectuals and others of the younger generation who are badly needed to give his administration vitality and contact with the people. Many of these men and women are profoundly anti-Communist and capable of constructive use in the national effort; but, on the sidelines (or frustrated within the administration), they spend their efforts in complaints against the regime, while their country sinks towards a Communist take-over they do not want. Behind this concept of a strategy to turn the tide and to assume the offensive lies a general proposition: when an interacting process is yielding a degenerative situation, the wisest course of action is to create a positive thrust at as many points as are accessible. No one action-not even the removal of Diem-is the key to success in Vietnam. Each of the elements listed as essential to this strategy must play its part. The balance of this summary examines individually the specific elements in the proposed general strategy. Limited Partnership Perhaps the most striking aspect of this mission's effort is the unanimity of view-individually arrived at by the specialists involved-that what is now required is a shift from U.S. advice to limited partnership and working collaboration with the Vietnamese. The present war cannot be won by direct U.S. action; it must be won by the Vietnamese. But there is a general conviction among us that the Vietnamese performance in every domain can be substantially improved if Americans are prepared to work side by side with the Vietnamese on the key problems. Moreover, there is evidence that Diem is, in principle, prepared for this step, and that most-not all-elements in his establishment are eagerly awaiting it. There is a second conclusion. We have attempted to answer the political and psychological question: would the more substantial involvement of Americans be counter-productive (see especially Appendix G)? Our conclusion-based on experience and judgment in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand-is the following. If Americans come in and go to work side by side with the Vietnamese, preferably outside Saigon, the net effect will almost certainly be positive. The danger lies in excessive headquarters establishments and a failure to do palpably serious jobs. The record of U.S.-Asian relations in field tasks is excellent. After all, the United States is not operating in Southeast Asia in order to recreate a colonial system doomed by history; it is attempting to permit new nations to find their feet and to make an independent future. Despite Communist propaganda, this is widely understood. When Americans work hard and effectively in this area, they meet friendship. To execute this program of limited partnership requires a change in the charter, the spirit, and the organization of the MAAG in South Vietnam. It must be shifted from an advisory group to something nearer-but not quite-an operational headquarters in a theater of war. The objective of this shift is clear. The U.S. should become a limited partner in the war, avoiding formalized advice on the one hand, trying to run the war, on the other. Such a transition from advice to partnership has been made in recent months, on a smaller scale, by the MAAG in Laos. Among the many consequences of this shift would be the rapid build-up of an intelligence capability both to identify operational targets for the Vietnamese and to assist Washington in making a sensitive and reliable assessment of the progress of the war. The basis for such a unit already exists in Saigon in the Intelligence Evaluation Center. It must be quickly expanded. (Appendix I.) In Washington, as well, intelligence and back-up operations must be put on a quasi-wartime footing. Intelligence The GVN has been, almost literally, fighting blind-awaiting attack before it responded and then responding slowly, awkwardly, and ineffectively. Guerrilla operations are designed to present few and fleeting targets. The successful conduct of guerrilla war requires a highly sophisticated intelligence effort, intimately geared to operations at every level from the villages to the planners. Viet-Nam has been served by a primitive and fragmented intelligence system, only obliquely linked to and focused on the problem of finding and seeking targets. Aside from U.S. encadrement of the intelligence system, and the strengthening of the U.S. Evaluation Center (earlier noted), Appendix A, VII, suggests the following two broad and urgent measures: '97Assign clear national responsibility for intelligence collection and evaluation to the Central Intelligence Organization. '97Create a joint U.S.-RVNAF Intelligence Group. Taking the Offensive The object of these proposals, as a whole, is, of course, to permit the ARVN to assume an effective offensive against the Viet-Cong. An offensive campaign in Viet-Nam involves a number of different elements: '97The widespread development of an offensive initiative at the local level. '97The development of an offensive against infiltration and infiltrators in the plateau area via the Frontier Ranger Force (Appendix F) and the Clandestine Action Service (Appendix I). '97The liquidation of Zone D; the Viet-Cong redoubt on the boundary between I and II Corps; the training areas near the Cambodian frontier, etc. '97The systematic clearing of the Viet-Cong from less firmly held areas; and, above all, learning how to hold an area by a mixture of military and civil measures once it has been swept. The assumption of the offensive will thus be a many-sided process, involving progress in all the various directions set forth in this report. When the conditions for an offensive are established, a concrete offensive plan might be put into operation, with clear-cut priorities for particular missions, designed systematically, by phases, to clear the country of the Viet-Cong. Planning to this end might well now begin. (Appendix A.) Contingencies The U.S. action proposed in this report-involving as it does the overt lifting of the MAAG ceiling, substantial encadrement and the introduction of limited U.S. forces-requires that the United States also prepare for contingencies that might arise from the enemy's reaction. The initiative proposed here should not be undertaken unless we are prepared to deal with any escalation the communists might choose to impose. Specifically we must be prepared to act swiftly under these three circumstances: an attempt to seize and to hold the Pleiku-Kontum area; a political crisis in which the communists might attempt to use their forces around Saigon to capture the city in the midst of local confusion; an undertaking of overt major hostilities by North Vietnam. As noted earlier, the present contingency plans of CINCPAC must embrace the possibility both of a resumption of the communist offensive in Laos and these Vietnamese contingency situations. Taken together, the contingencies in Southeast Asia which we would presently choose to meet without the use of nuclear weapons appear to require somewhat more balanced ground, naval, and air strength in reserve in the U.S. than we now have available, so long as we maintain the allocation of the six divisions for the Berlin crisis. Therefore, one of the major issues raised by this report is the need to develop the reserve strength in the U.S. establishment required to cover action in Southeast Asia up to the nuclear threshold in that area, as it is now envisaged. The call up of additional support forces may be required. In our view, nothing is more calculated to sober the enemy and to discourage escalation in the face of the limited initiatives proposed here than the knowledge that the United States has prepared itself soundly to deal with aggression in Southeast Asia at any level. Appendix A Paper Prepared by the Military Committee of the Taylor Mission 13 MILITARY APPENDIX [Here follow Sections I-General Statement; II-Republic of Viet-Nam Armed Forces; III-Republic of Viet-Nam Army; IV-Republic of Viet-Nam Navy; V-Republic of Viet-Nam Air Force; VI-Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps; VII-Intelligence; and VIII-Logistics.] IX Summary In summary, it is the consensus of the military committee that intervention under SEATO or U.S. plans is the best means of saving SVN and indeed, all of Southeast Asia. Should this prove impossible for non-military reasons we consider there are two general ways in which the combat effectiveness of RVNAF can be increased substantially. The first and most immediate requirement is to assure that GVN makes maximum effective use of its current resources. Its present conduct of military operations leaves much to be desired. By taking certain corrective measures and developing more effective procedures, it is our opinion that the combat effectiveness of RVNAF could be improved by an estimated 25 to 40 percent. The second method involves determining reasonable courses of action within United States resources short of military intervention or direct combat support by air and naval combat elements which can appreciably improve both the immediate and long term fighting capabilities of the RVNAF. } :: From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President 1 Washington, November 11, 1961. Mr. Rusk will table this morning a proposal for action in Viet Nam 2 that stops short of installing U.S. forces now, but commits us-in our minds-to a full scale U.S. effort to save that country. I appreciate, of course, the difficulty of the decision and the reasons for reserving this move; but I should like to set out as clearly as I can the reasons for placing some minimal U.S. ground force in Viet Nam as part of the initial package. This problem has been bedevilled by confusion about the various things a U.S. force could initially accomplish: from fighting in the paddies and jungles (which no one proposes), to guarding engineer units. To simplify the matter, I shall make the case for placing immediately a U.S. (or SEATO) force of (say) 5,000 men on the 17th Parallel. 3 The steps proposed-including those which are now agreed-should, of course, not be taken unless we are deeply prepared for all the possible consequences. But, if the enemy goes to war-in Laos, South Viet Nam, or both-because of our actions on our side of the line, it means he has already decided to take Southeast Asia by whatever means are necessary; and that his actions up to this point simply meant that he was prepared to take South Viet Nam by cheap means and Laos by slow means, if possible. If he goes to war because of what we do on our side of the line, it does not mean that he went to war because of what we did. It means he had already determined to face war rather than forego victory in South Viet Nam, and that only our surrender of South Viet Nam could prevent war.} :: From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President 1 Washington, November 12, 1961. At your request I have read again SNIE 10-4-61, '93Probable Communist Reactions to Certain U.S. Actions in South Vietnam.'94 2 1. By and large-with one major exception-I agree with the estimate. The sentence which I would question is on page 6: '93Nevertheless these developments are not likely to substantially alter (sic) Communist China's attitudes towards military commitments in Southeast Asia.'94 I do not see how a country which is depending on Australia and Canada for a critical margin for feeding its cities, which is probing to see if it can get PL 480 grain, and whose agriculture and industry are disorganized in a crisis which will take several years at best to surmount, would go to war except as a suicidal act. The present Communist leaders have a long view of history and a great faith in the future of China. There is no evidence that they are in a suicidal mood. Mao's basic precept has always been: '93If the enemy attacks, I disappear; if he defends, I harass; and if he retreats, I attack.'94 Under present circumstances I believe that Communist China would be in a mood to postpone its advance into Southeast Asia even at the expense of what they would regard as a temporary stabilization of the Free World's position in South Viet-Nam so long as we did not cross the 17th parallel with forces on the ground and threaten to liberate North VietNam. Then-but only then-do I believe they would go to war with us. 2. Fundamentally the assessment in the SNIE is in accord with this judgment. It suggests that the actions taken by the U.S. would lead to essentially defensive responses. 3 See, for example, the marked passages on pages 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15 and 16. 3. I have marked one passage on page 13 with an '93X'94. This passage suggests the possibility that if it looked as though South Viet-Nam were winning out over the Communists in South VietNam, the Communists would consider sending North Vietnamese regular units into South VietNam, although they would recognize this action would raise the risks of broadening the war. As I said to you in my memorandum of yesterday, 4 whether they would go to war in Southeast Asia depends on their assessment of U.S. strength and determination. Thus far their whole operation has been designed to bypass U.S. military strength, both nuclear and conventional. I do not believe that they would go to war in Southeast Asia merely to save a Communist foothold in South VietNam; and the whole argument of SNIE 10-4-61 tends to bear this out.} :: responded that although the discussion and even some of the draft memoranda were somewhat pessimistic, he returned from Viet Nam with optimism over what could be done if certain clearcut actions were taken. He envisioned two phases: (1) the revival of Viet Nam morale and (2) the initiation of the guerrilla suppression program. Mr.",military,bureaucracies_112,bureaucracies
"From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the President 1 Washington, November 5, 1961. My judgment is as follows: 2 1. The fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism would lead to the fairly rapid extension of Communist control, or complete accommodation to Communism, in the rest of mainland Southeast Asia right down to Indonesia. The strategic implications worldwide would be extremely serious. 2. The chances are against, probably sharply against, preventing that fall by any measures short of the introduction of US forces on a substantial scale. I 3 accept General Taylor's judgment that the various measures proposed by him short of this (what we came to call '93the seven points'94) 4 are useful but will not in themselves do the job of restoring confidence and setting Diem on the way to winning his fight. 3. The introduction of a US force of the magnitude of an initial 8-10.000 men'97whether in a flood relief context or otherwise'97 5 will be of great help to Diem. However, it will not convince the other side (whether the shots are called from Moscow, Peiping, or Hanoi) that we mean business. 6 The response would be an intensified effort that would probably outrun the successive increments of our own effort as it developed. We would thus be almost certain to get increasingly mired down in an inconclusive struggle. 4. The other side can be convinced we mean business only if we accompany the initial force introduction by a clear commitment to the full objective stated above, accompanied by a warning through some channel to Hanoi that continued support of the Viet Cong will lead to punitive retaliation against North Vietnam. 5. If we act in this way, we must proceed at once to increase our military forces available to CINCPAC by about (2) divisions over the next (4) months. The initial force may succeed in turning the situation around; Hanoi, possibly under pressure from Moscow, may decide to cut down its support so that the situation will gradually come under control. However, the chances of this are probably not more than 50-50, and certainly not so good that we can fail to prepare for follow-up action. Above all, we must decide now that we will in fact take that action as and when it is needed. 7 6. The ultimate possible extent of our military commitment must be faced. 8 The struggle may be prolonged and Hanoi and Peiping may intervene overtly. In view of the logistic difficulties faced by the other side, I believe we can assume that the maximum US forces required on the ground will not exceed (6-8) divisions, or about (220,000) men, and that our military posture is, or can be made, adequate to furnish these forces. For the immediate purpose of raising the needed (2) additional divisions we (will/will not) need additional legal authority from the Congress. However, we can do the job without serious interference with our present Berlin plans. 9 7. I return to my central view, that clarity of objective is crucial. 10 To accept the stated objective is of course a most serious decision. Military force is not the only element of what must be a most carefully coordinated set of actions. Success will depend on factors many of which are not within our control-notably the conduct of Diem himself and other leaders in the area. Laos will remain a major problem. The domestic political implications of accepting the objective are also grave, although it is my own feeling that the country will respond better to a firm initial position than to courses of action that lead us in only gradually, and that in the meantime are sure to involve casualties. The over-all effect on Moscow and Peiping will need careful weighing and may well be mixed; however, permitting South Viet-Nam to fall can only strengthen and encourage them greatly. 8. In sum, I 11 recommend an affirmative decision on the issue stated at the start of this memorandum. Robert S. McNamara} :: South Vietnam The basic issue framed by the Taylor Report is whether the U.S. shall a. Commit itself to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism, 2 and b. Support this commitment by necessary immediate military actions and preparations for possible later actions. The Joint Chiefs, Mr. Gilpatric, and I have reached the following conclusions: 1. The fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism would lead to the fairly rapid extension of Communist control, or complete accommodation to Communism, in the rest of mainland Southeast Asia and in Indonesia. The strategic implications worldwide, particularly in the Orient, would be extremely serious. 2. The chances are against, probably sharply against, preventing that fall by any measures short of the introduction of U.S. forces on a substantial scale. We accept General Taylor's judgment that the various measures proposed by him short of this are useful but will not in themselves do the job of restoring confidence and setting Diem on the way to winning his fight. 3. The introduction of a U.S. force of the magnitude of an initial 8,000 men in a flood relief context will be of great help to Diem. However, it will not convince the other side (whether the shots are called from Moscow, Peiping, or Hanoi) that we mean business. Moreover, it probably will not tip the scales decisively. We would be almost certain to get increasingly mired down in an inconclusive struggle. 4. The other side can be convinced we mean business only if we accompany the initial force introduction by a clear commitment to the full objective stated above, accompanied by a warning through some channel to Hanoi that continued support of the Viet Cong will lead to punitive retaliation against North Vietnam. 5. If we act in this way, the ultimate possible extent of our military commitment must be faced. The struggle may be prolonged and Hanoi and Peiping may intervene overtly. In view of the logistic difficulties faced by the other side, I believe we can assume that the maximum U.S. forces required on the ground in Southeast Asia will not exceed 6 divisions, or about 205,000 men (CINCPAC Plan 32-59, 3 Phase IV). Our military posture is, or, with the addition of more National Guard or regular Army divisions, can be made, adequate to furnish these forces without serious interference with our present Berlin plans. 6. To accept the stated objective is of course a most serious decision. Military force is not the only element of what must be a most carefully coordinated set of actions. Success will depend on factors many of which are not within our control-notably the conduct of Diem himself and other leaders in the area. Laos will remain a major problem. The domestic political implications of accepting the objective are also grave, although it is our feeling that the country will respond better to a firm initial position than to courses of action that lead us in only gradually, and that in the meantime are sure to involve casualties. The over-all effect on Moscow and Peiping will need careful weighing and may well be mixed; however, permitting South Viet-Nam to fall can only strengthen and encourage them greatly. 7. In sum: a. We do not believe major units of U.S. forces should be introduced into South Viet-Nam unless we are willing to make an affirmative decision on the issue stated at the start of this memorandum. b. We are inclined to recommend that we do commit the U.S. to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism and that we support this commitment by the necessary military actions. c. If such a commitment is agreed upon, we support the recommendations of General Taylor as the first steps toward its fulfillment. Robert S. McNamara} :: cautioned that the program was in fact complex and that in all probability U.S. troops, planes and resources would have to be supplied in additional quantities at a later date. }",political,bureaucracies_113,bureaucracies
"McNamara-Bundy Position 5 McNamara and Bundy believe that we must pursue a course of increasing military pressure to the point where Hanoi is prepared to agree not only to stop infiltration from the North, but effectively to call off the insurgency in the South and withdraw those elements infiltrated in the past. To achieve this objective, they would accept the risks of substantial escalation, including the acceptance of ground warfare with Red China'97although they believe it likely that we can achieve the desired objective without such a war. This view is shared by Maxwell Taylor. :: This memorandum attempts to describe the situation, the stakes and the measures which I think should now be taken. I. Summary Conclusions The situation in Vietnam is deteriorating, and without new U.S. action defeat appears inevitable'97probably not in a matter of weeks or perhaps even months, but within the next year or so. There is still time to turn it around, but not much. The stakes in Vietnam are extremely high. The American investment is very large, and American responsibility is a fact of life which is palpable in the atmosphere of Asia, and even elsewhere. The international prestige of the United States, and a substantial part of our influence, are directly at risk in Vietnam. There is no way of unloading the burden on the Vietnamese themselves, and there is no way of negotiating ourselves out of Vietnam which offers any serious promise at present. It is possible that at some future time a neutral non-Communist force may emerge, perhaps under Buddhist leadership, but no such force currently exists, and any negotiated U.S. withdrawal today would mean surrender on the installment plan. The policy of graduated and continuing reprisal outlined in Annex A is the most promising course available, in my judgment. That judgment is shared by all who accompanied me from Washington, and I think by all members of the country team. There is much that can and should be done to support and to supplement our present effort, while adding sustained reprisals. But I want to stress one important general conclusion which again is shared by all members of my party: the U.S. mission is composed of outstanding men, and U.S. policy within Vietnam is mainly right and well directed. None of the special solutions or criticisms put forward with zeal by individual reformers in government or in the press is of major importance, and many of them are flatly wrong. No man is perfect, and not every tactical step of recent months has been perfectly chosen, but when you described the Americans in Vietnam as your first team, you were right. II. The General Situation The situation is not all black. The overall military effectiveness of the Vietnamese armed forces in open combat continues to grow. The month of January was one of outstanding and genuine success in offensive military action, showing the highest gross count of Viet Cong dead of any month of the war, and a very high ratio also of enemy to friendly losses. We believe that General Westmoreland is right (and General Alsop wrong) when he says that the Viet Cong do not now plan to expose themselves to large-scale military engagements in which their losses on the average would be high and their gains low. (The operation at Binh Gia 2 is analyzed as a special case, representing the taking of a friendly Catholic village as bait rather than a decision to force pitched battle'97more such cases are expected and the particular military problem posed is difficult.) Moreover, the Vietnamese people, although war weary, are also remarkably tough and resilient, and they do not find the prospect of Communist domination attractive. Their readiness to quit is much lower than the discouraging events of recent months might lead one to expect. It is probable that most Vietnamese think American withdrawal is more likely than an early switch to neutralism or surrender by major elements within Vietnam. Nevertheless the social and political fabric is stretched thin, and extremely unpleasant surprises are increasingly possible'97both political and military. And it remains a stubborn fact that the percentage of the countryside which is dominated or threatened by the Viet Cong continues to grow. Even in areas which are '93cleared,'94 the follow-on pacification is stalled because of widespread belief that the Viet Cong are going to win in the long run. The areas which can be regarded as truly cleared and pacified and safe are few and shrinking. (An important exception to this is the area of Saigon and its immediate surroundings. The Hop Tac program of pacification in this area has not been an unqualified success, but it has not been a failure, and it has certainly prevented any strangling siege of Saigon. We did not have a chance to form an independent judgment on Hop Tac, but we did conclude that whatever its precise measure of success, it is of great importance that this operation be pursued with full vigor. That is the current policy of the mission.) VI. The Basic U.S. Commitment The prospect in Vietnam is grim. The energy and persistence of the Viet Cong are astonishing. They can appear anywhere'97and at almost any time. They have accepted extraordinary losses and they come back for more. They show skill in their sneak attacks and ferocity when cornered. Yet the weary country does not want them to win. There are a host of things the Vietnamese need to do better and areas in which we need to help them. The place where we can help most is in the clarity and firmness of our own commitment to what is in fact as well as in rhetoric a common cause. There is one grave weakness in our posture in Vietnam which is within our own power to fix'97and that is a widespread belief that we do not have the will and force and patience and determination to take the necessary action and stay the course. This is the overriding reason for our present recommendation of a policy of sustained reprisal. Once such a policy is put in force, we shall be able to speak in Vietnam on many topics and in many ways, with growing force and effectiveness. One final word. At its very best the struggle in Vietnam will be long. It seems to us important that this fundamental fact be made clear and our understanding of it be made clear to our own people and to the people of Vietnam. Too often in the past we have conveyed the impression that we expect an early solution when those who live with this war know that no early solution is possible. It is our own belief that the people of the United States have the necessary will to accept and to execute a policy that rests upon the reality that there is no short cut to success in South Vietnam. McG. B. Annex A 3 Paper Prepared by the Members of the Bundy Mission A POLICY OF SUSTAINED REPRISAL I. Introductory We believe that the best available way of increasing our chance of success in Vietnam is the development and execution of a policy of sustained reprisal against North Vietnam'97a policy in which air and naval action against the North is justified by and related to the whole Viet Cong campaign of violence and terror in the South. While we believe that the risks of such a policy are acceptable, we emphasize that its costs are real. It implies significant U.S. air losses even if no full air war is joined, and it seems likely that it would eventually require an extensive and costly effort against the whole air defense system of North Vietnam. U.S. casualties would be higher'97and more visible to American feelings'97than those sustained in the struggle in South Vietnam. Yet measured against the costs of defeat in Vietnam, this program seems cheap. And even if it fails to turn the tide'97as it may'97the value of the effort seems to us to exceed its cost. II. Outline of the Policy 1. In partnership with the Government of Vietnam, we should develop and exercise the option to retaliate against any VC act of violence to persons or property. 2. In practice, we may wish at the outset to relate our reprisals to those acts of relatively high visibility such as the Pleiku incident. Later, we might retaliate against the assassination of a province chief, but not necessarily the murder of a hamlet official; we might retaliate against a grenade thrown into a crowded cafe in Saigon, but not necessarily to a shot fired into a small shop in the countryside. 3. Once a program of reprisals is clearly underway, it should not be necessary to connect each specific act against North Vietnam to a particular outrage in the South. It should be possible, for example, to publish weekly lists of outrages in the South and to have it clearly understood that these outrages are the cause of such action against the North as may be occurring in the current period. Such a more generalized pattern of reprisal would remove much of the difficulty involved in finding precisely matching targets in response to specific atrocities. Even in such a more general pattern, however, it would be important to insure that the general level of reprisal action remained in close correspondence with the level of outrages in the South. We must keep it clear at every stage both to Hanoi and to the world, that our reprisals will be reduced or stopped when outrages in the South are reduced or stopped'97and that we are not attempting to destroy or conquer North Vietnam. 4. In the early stages of such a course, we should take the appropriate occasion to make clear our firm intent to undertake reprisals on any further acts, major or minor, that appear to us and the GVN as indicating Hanoi's support. We would announce that our two governments have been patient and forbearing in the hope that Hanoi would come to its senses without the necessity of our having to take further action; but the outrages continue and now we must react against those who are responsible; we will not provoke; we will not use our force indiscriminately; but we can no longer sit by in the face of repeated acts of terror and violence for which the DRV is responsible. 7. At the same time it should be recognized that in order to maintain the power of reprisal without risk of excessive loss, an '93air war'94 may in fact be necessary. We should therefore be ready to develop a separate justification for energetic flak suppression and if necessary for the destruction of Communist air power. The essence of such an explanation should be that these actions are intended solely to insure the effectiveness of a policy of reprisal, and in no sense represent any intent to wage offensive war against the North. These distinctions should not be difficult to develop. 8. It remains quite possible, however, that this reprisal policy would get us quickly into the level of military activity contemplated in the so-called Phase II of our December planning. It may even get us beyond this level with both Hanoi and Peiping, if there is Communist counter-action. We and the GVN should also be prepared for a spurt of VC terrorism, especially in urban areas, that would dwarf anything yet experienced. These are the risks of any action. They should be carefully reviewed'97but we believe them to be acceptable. 9. We are convinced that the political values of reprisal require a continuous operation. Episodic responses geared on a one-for-one basis to '93spectacular'94 outrages would lack the persuasive force of sustained pressure. More important still, they would leave it open to the Communists to avoid reprisals entirely by giving up only a small element of their own program. The Gulf of Tonkin affair produced a sharp upturn in morale in South Vietnam. When it remained an isolated episode, however, there was a severe relapse. It is the great merit of the proposed scheme that to stop it the Communists would have to stop enough of their activity in the South to permit the probable success of a determined pacification effort. III. Expected Effect of Sustained Reprisal Policy 1. We emphasize that our primary target in advocating a reprisal policy is the improvement of the situation in South Vietnam. Action against the North is usually urged as a means of affecting the will of Hanoi to direct and support the VC. We consider this an important but longer-range purpose. The immediate and critical targets are in the South'97in the minds of the South Vietnamese and in the minds of the Viet Cong cadres. 2. Predictions of the effect of any given course of action upon the states of mind of people are difficult. It seems very clear that if the United States and the Government of Vietnam join in a policy of reprisal, there will be a sharp immediate increase in optimism in the South, among nearly all articulate groups. The Mission believes'97and our own conversations confirm'97that in all sectors of Vietnamese opinion there is a strong belief that the United States could do much more if it would, and that they are suspicious of our failure to use more of our obviously enormous power. At least in the short run, the reaction to reprisal policy would be very favorable. 3. This favorable reaction should offer opportunity for increased American influence in pressing for a more effective government'97at least in the short run. Joint reprisals would imply military planning in which the American role would necessarily be controlling, and this new relation should add to our bargaining power in other military efforts'97and conceivably on a wider plane as well if a more stable government is formed. We have the whip hand in reprisals as we do not in other fields. 4. The Vietnamese increase in hope could well increase the readiness of Vietnamese factions themselves to join together in forming a more effective government. 5. We think it plausible that effective and sustained reprisals, even in a low key, would have a substantial depressing effect upon the morale of Viet Cong cadres in South Vietnam. This is the strong opinion of CIA Saigon. It is based upon reliable reports of the initial Viet Cong reaction to the Gulf of Tonkin episode, and also upon the solid general assessment that the determination of Hanoi and the apparent timidity of the mighty United States are both major items in Viet Cong confidence. 6. The long-run effect of reprisals in the South is far less clear. It may be that like other stimulants, the value of this one would decline over time. Indeed the risk of this result is large enough so that we ourselves believe that a very major effort all along the line should be made in South Vietnam to take full advantage of the immediate stimulus of reprisal policy in its early stages. Our object should be to use this new policy to effect a visible upward turn in pacification, in governmental effectiveness, in operations against the Viet Cong, and in the whole U.S./GVN relationship. It is changes in these areas that can have enduring long-term effects. 7. While emphasizing the importance of reprisals in the South, we do not exclude the impact on Hanoi. We believe, indeed, that it is of great importance that the level of reprisal be adjusted rapidly and visibly to both upward and downward shifts in the level of Viet Cong offenses. We want to keep before Hanoi the carrot of our desisting as well as the stick of continued pressure. We also need to conduct the application of the force so that there is always a prospect of worse to come. 8. We cannot assert that a policy of sustained reprisal will succeed in changing the course of the contest in Vietnam. It may fail, and we cannot estimate the odds of success with any accuracy'97they may be somewhere between 25% and 75%. What we can say is that even if it fails, the policy will be worth it. At a minimum it will damp down the charge that we did not do all that we could have done, and this charge will be important in many countries, including our own. Beyond that, a reprisal policy'97to the extent that it demonstrates U.S. willingness to employ this new norm in counter-insurgency'97will set a higher price for the future upon all adventures of guerrilla warfare, and it should therefore somewhat increase our ability to deter such adventures. We must recognize, however, that that ability will be gravely weakened if there is failure for any reason in Vietnam. 1 'a0 :: generally agreed, indicating that his use of the word reprisal inferred a continuing series of actions, but that they would be '93publicized as reprisals.'94 He said he did not feel that we should just sit back until another Pleiku incident occurred and then start another reprisal. However, it was obvious that SPLIT was shifting his ground somewhat as his paper pretty definitely ties reprisals to specific acts of the VC. SPLIT warned of the danger of lifting the problem off the shoulders of the South Vietnamese and creating a North Vietnamese-U.S. war situation. SPLIT raised the question of whether we should go to the conference table. Secretary SPLIT summarized the sense of the meeting that without dissent, all agreed to act, that we should apply force against the North, that it should be done against targets out of range of the MIG's, that we should use this decision to stimulate Saigon to form a government that was viable, that we should be careful and not announce this decision prior to receiving the signal from the Soviets and that the actions should stay at the low level, i.e., should be directed towards targets in the south rather than Phuc Yen Base. The",political,bureaucracies_114,bureaucracies
"Part I is a discussion of the probable risks inherent in a program of gradually mounting military pressure on the North. In spite of these risks, we are in general agreement on this program. We have taken account of these risks in connection with the military actions already taken. As we move'97step by step'97up the scales of military action you will certainly wish to appraise the level of risk at each point'97although admittedly your ability to control exposure to risk is likely to diminish as the scale and intensity of military pressure increases. Part II of the memorandum is a program of political action. Such a program is an essential accompaniment to the military program. It is needed for several reasons: a. To make clear to the world that our objectives are peace and freedom; b. To minimize the danger of MIG engagement and Chinese and Soviet involvement, giving the Soviets an alternative to support the Chinese militancy; c. To pre-empt a probable peace offensive by the Communists; d. To enable you to opt for a political settlement at any point where you determine that the risks of further military pressure have become prohibitive in the light of our over-all interests. PART I The Risks of Our Military Program A. Nature and Objectives of the Proposed Military Program The course of action we are now proposing to follow (subject to refinement by exchanges with Saigon and further staff work here) envisages continued air attacks, on a joint United States/South Vietnamese basis, against military targets directly related to North Vietnamese infiltration. It also contemplates attacks on targets such as railroad lines, in response to Viet Cong attacks on corresponding targets in the South. We would continue to justify such air attacks as responses to Viet Cong action in the South. Viet Cong attacks on United States personnel and installations would call for practically automatic responses. Other Viet Cong activities would be assessed continuously, and the criteria for response left as flexible as possible. The fundamental objective of this program is to increase United States bargaining power, vis-a-vis Hanoi and Peiping, to the point where a satisfactory political solution becomes possible. Hopefully these attacks should also tend to improve morale and increase stability in Saigon while impairing the infiltration efforts of the North Vietnamese. B. Risks of War with Communist China 1. We cannot long continue air strikes against North Viet-Nam without facing the likelihood of engagement with the 53 Chinese MIGs sent to Hanoi to defend North Viet-Nam. The danger of encountering these MIGs will increase as we strike targets closer and closer to Hanoi. In our air strikes to date, we have hit targets up to sixty miles north of the 17th parallel. At some point'97if we close the remaining gap of 250 miles to Hanoi'97engagement by United States planes with the 53 MIGs sent to Hanoi will become inevitable. We recommend delaying the chances of MIG involvement by continuing for the next eight weeks to confine our strikes to targets below the 19th parallel. Such targets lie outside the effective range of the ground control center of the Hanoi-Haiphong complex. 2. Once our planes have been engaged heavily by MIG aircraft, you will be compelled'97in order to prevent unacceptable losses'97to face the decision to mount an air effort to eliminate the major MIG base at Phuc Yen, near Hanoi. This base is heavily defended. Some parts of the base are near populated areas. Any effective strike against it would require a massive air effort. 2a. If we hit targets in or approaching the Hanoi-Haiphong area, it will be likely at some point to trigger a DRV ground force move South. The DRV can support an invasion of 125,000 troops (20'9650,000 through the DMZ; balance through Laos). There is no current estimate of what US response would be needed to stop this action. It would clearly require substantial increases of US ground, air and naval forces. 3. Last November, the United States intelligence community unanimously agreed that, if the United States attacked above the 19th parallel, '93Chinese Communist aircraft operating from Chinese bases would probably assist in defending North Viet-Nam against the United States attacks'94. 4 Perhaps the involvement by Chinese air would first take the form of '93volunteers,'94 but it might shortly be followed by direct engagement of Chinese planes operating from the sanctuary of Chinese territory. There are now approximately 350 Chinese jet fighters deployed in the Hainan area of South China'97within striking distance of North Vietnam. 4. Once Chinese aircraft entered the conflict you would be under considerable pressure to order United States forces to knock out offending Chinese bases'97and even to strike at Chinese nuclear production installations. 5. If Chinese air bases were hit, some of our intelligence experts believe it likely that China would move massive ground forces into North Viet-Nam, and subsequently into Laos, South Viet-Nam, and possibly Thailand. Other experts assess the chances as being lower. All agree that such a movement would be entirely possible. 6. If Chinese ground forces were to move into Southeast Asia, we would be compelled to make a major effort to stop them. The only way that this could be done through conventional means would be by introducing substantial United States ground combat forces into South Viet-Nam. The magnitude of the required effort would almost certainly mean that you would have to call up reserves. 7. It is estimated that the Chinese have the logistical capacity to support 14 Chinese divisions and 8 North Vietnamese divisions in a movement into Laos, Thailand and South Viet-Nam (without taking account of United States and Allied interdiction operations). In order to counter this movement, we would be required to bring in 5 to 8 United States divisions with a total troop strength (including supporting elements) of 300,000 men. 8. The confrontation of Chinese ground forces by American ground forces would induce debate in the United States as to the need to use nuclear weapons'97although DOD does not believe there would be a military requirement for such weapons. Recalling the Korean experience, some Americans would argue that United States ground forces should not be asked to fight large numbers of Chinese troops without resort to nuclear weapons, in which the United States has a clear advantage. 9. To use nuclear weapons against the Chinese would obviously raise the most profound political problems. Not only would their use generate probably irresistible pressures for a major Soviet involvement, but the United States would be vulnerable to the charge that it was willing to use nuclear weapons against non-whites only. 10. Peiping's decision whether or not to intervene may well turn upon its estimate of the extent to which it can expect Soviet support. Unless we provide the Soviets with a political alternative they can support they will be in a weak position to bring pressure on the Chinese Communists to move toward a settlement. Without such a political option they will also find difficulty in resisting Chinese pressure to provide assistance in the event of a United States-Chinese military conflict. Such a political option is suggested in Part II of this paper. C. Chances of Conflict with the USSR We cannot be certain at this time what the Soviets will do if we continue our air strikes against North Viet-Nam'97particularly if these strikes lead to direct conflict with the Chinese. The Soviets may want the Chinese and us to bloody our noses, but we doubt they would be in a position to exploit this desire. In the last analysis, the Soviet stake is the leadership of the Communist Bloc. Competition for that leadership would probably force the USSR in the direction of increasing its aid and involvement. On balance, we think it highly likely that'97if the war should continue and escalate'97the Soviets would feel compelled to extend an increasing amount of assistance to the North Vietnamese and Chinese. 1. Kosygin's trip has already resulted in a commitment by the Soviets to give increased defense assistance to Hanoi. We do not know what form this increase will take. The United States Intelligence Community thinks '93the chances are about even'94 that ground-air missiles'97probably with Soviet missile crews'97will be included. The likelihood of increased aid commitments will grow as our raids extend northward to Hanoi. 2. If we should become engaged directly with the Chinese, the Soviets would be faced with a painful dilemma. Under the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty (which is fifteen years old on February 14) the Soviets are obligated to come to China's assistance if China is attacked. The Soviet Union could avoid this commitment only by claiming that China's actions had caused the attack. Under existing circumstances, this would be tantamount to denouncing the treaty. 3. Since China is rich in manpower, the Soviets would probably seek to limit their contribution to advanced military equipment. But, again, the contribution to Soviet missile and other personnel or volunteers could not be excluded. 4. Soviet harassment of United States interests elsewhere might well be another step in this sequence of events. Ambassador Kohler pointed out on Thursday that '93'85the Soviets will be intrigued with possibilities inherent [in the] somewhat less enthusiastic support of our policy in Southeast Asia by [the] majority [of] Western European countries and may think that by presenting them with [a] nasty flareup in central Europe and exerting pressure on us to temper actions in Viet-Nam, they have [a] real opportunity of causing serious intra-alliance friction.'94 5. At the very least, progress toward improvement of United States-Soviet relations would be severely set back. Moreover, we could look forward to a substantial deterioration in the evolution of the Bloc toward a reduction of tensions and the development of a system more compatible with that of the West. PART II Outline of a Political Program A. Our Objectives in South Viet-Nam McNamara and Bundy differ from Ball and Thompson as to what the United States should realistically expect to achieve in South Viet-Nam and the degree of risk we should assume. SPLIT Ball-Thompson Position Ball and Thompson believe that'97short of a crushing military defeat'97Hanoi would never abandon the aggressive course it has pursued at great cost for ten years and give up all the progress it has made in the Communization of South Viet-Nam. For North Viet-Nam to call off the insurgency in South Viet-Nam, close the border, and withdraw the elements it had infiltrated into that country would mean that it had accepted unconditional surrender. Ball and Thompson believe that Red China would be extremely reluctant to permit Hanoi to suffer such unconditional surrender since it would mean the collapse of the basic Chinese ideological position which they have been disputing with the Soviets. Peiping would thus be under great pressure to engage the United States on the ground as well as in the air. Ball and Thompson believe that the Chinese decision to intervene on the ground would, in the final analysis, probably depend largely on the extent to which Peiping felt assured of Soviet support. There is no way that we can safely predict whether or not such support would be forthcoming. They are convinced, however, that the risks of Chinese ground intervention would be great and the costs of such intervention tremendous'97particularly since the very taking of this step by Peiping would presumably imply substantial Soviet involvement, perhaps even to the point of a large-scale Soviet-US confrontation. Ball and Thompson have supported the air strikes that have so far taken place and they would support a program of gradually increasing military pressure. They believe that only in this way can the United States achieve a bargaining position that can make possible an international arrangement that will avoid a humiliating defeat to the United States. They do not believe, however, that we can realistically hope for an international arrangement that will effectively stop the insurrection in South Viet-Nam and deliver the entire country south of the Seventeenth Parallel to the government in Saigon free and clear of insurgency. They consider that the most we can realistically expect from any international arrangement are measures to stop the infiltration so that we may be able, over time, to reduce our commitments. Hopefully the military actions preceding such an arrangement would have created a sufficient sense of unity in Saigon to make it possible for the South Vietnamese Government'97with diminishing United States help'97to clean up an insurgency that had become manageable by the shutting of the borders. In all events, Ball and Thompson recommended that you must be prepared and alerted'97whenever it appears that military conflict may have reached the level of intensity where Chinese ground intervention seems likely'97to accept a cease-fire under international auspices short of the achievement of our total political objectives. George W. Ball 1 'a0 :: We are all in accord that action must be taken. General :: pointed out that all agreed that a retaliatory strike was necessary and he suggested that the targets chosen were appropriate. He said that the main problem would be how to handle the publicity and the Kosygin connection. He emphasized the necessity of relating the Pleiku attack and the infiltration directly to Hanoi, and to permit Kosygin the belief that he had been mouse-trapped by the North Vietnamese. 7. The :: We have completed our reprisal action for the North Vietnamese surprise attack. Another attack cannot be called reprisal. The punishment should fit the crime. No additional air strikes should be made now. Secretary :: agreed with my concept. He seemed to argue for positive action. He thought that slow action would be costly and quick action on our part and sustained action might very possibly affect ChiCom and Soviet reactions which would be more favorable to our purpose than otherwise. SPLIT continued with the position that time increases the risk of outside involvement. Also :: issued a word of caution. He thought that further strikes would cause the Soviets to move. He reasoned we should not do anything until the Soviets come in with their response and seemed to be implying that our whole South Vietnamese policy must be governed by what the Soviets say. General SPLIT entered into the discussion and urged that we not do anything for a couple of days until we see what signals come out of Moscow. :: took exception to timing. He and Thompson placed great importance on the presence of Kosygin in the Far East. He felt that action by us during Kosygin's stay would prompt a greater Soviet reaction than would be the case if we waited until Kosygin returned to Moscow. Thompson supported this view; he laid particular emphasis on the visit of Kosygin to North Korea, stating that this would widen the Sino-Soviet schism; furthermore he noted the complications and the competition between the Soviets and the ChiCom over the forthcoming March 1st meeting. 5 Ball, or more particularly Thompson, seemed anxious to tamp down any reaction on our part, deferring it at least until Kosygin's return to Moscow, and very possibly until March 1st. 4. SPLIT than raised the question of what would happen when the MIG's came in. He developed a scenario of MIG opposition, followed by the need to take out the MIG bases in North Vietnam. This then would be followed by ChiComs introducing MIG's from bases across the NVN border; then this would escalate into the necessity to take out those bases. Hence, he could see we were starting on a course that would escalate into all-out conflict with China. 11. The question of China participation was raised.",military,bureaucracies_115,bureaucracies
"I told the President that I was exceedingly worried about the developing situation in South Vietnam and that reports received today indicated the prospect of a more serious and immediate political crisis in Saigon than was earlier anticipated. I then pointed out to the President the composition of the Kosygin mission, indicating that with the Chief of the Soviet Air Force, the Chief negotiator for aid, and the Chief Civilian Aviation Minister included in this party, leads me to the conclusion Kosygin would offer military equipment, at least for air defense such as surface to air missiles, supplies and materiel to continue and intensify insurgency and would provide logistic support. In the final analysis we felt that Kosygin would encourage Hanoi to intensify what they were doing now in the way of subversion, political action and guerrilla activities and to avoid overt military action which would bring a confrontation with the United States. I responded that we must produce a viable Government by breeding acceptable military leadership with the Buddhists and other civilian segments to produce the best possible Government and while this appeared difficult, I did not think it was impossible. I said even with this we could not win the way we were going and therefore we must take military action against North Vietnam. I advocated bombing of selected targets in North Vietnam, starting in the south and working north and carrying the raids on intensively, that is at least one a day. I said that we should gradually work towards the north but should not strike deeply into North Vietnam territory (as advocated by the JCS) at the start. SPLIT I said there was a possibility that they would come in on the ground but they had little capability in the air. I said we had to face this contingency and be prepared to handle any possible development but added that while Chinese Communist ground intervention was a possibility, I did not estimate it as a probability under the course of action advocated. The SPLIT said that it would pave the way toward Communist takeover of all of Southeast Asia. I mentioned current moves in Thailand, the situation in Indonesia, and the probable developments in Malaysia under such circumstances. [Here follows discussion of the Soviet test of January 15 and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.] 1 'a0 :: took the position that more dynamic action was indicated than reprisals. I stated that we should pursue a systematic series of attacks against targets, starting in the south sector of North Vietnam and that we should work toward the north. I emphasized that the capacity for defense by the North Vietnamese would unquestionably increase with the passage of time'97and not very much time at that'97and therefore we should get going. I therefore questioned whether our posture should be one of reprisal. I emphasized that we should implement Phase II of the agreed plan and if any thing, should step it up. I reported that this had been my recommendation to the president a few days ago in a private conversation. 4 (note: I had warned him that some catastrophic event was bound to happen and that he had to take positive actions against the North.) :: expressed and advocated very strongly an immediate U.S./SVN strike of substantial proportions and urged that this be done promptly. I took issue with the arguments that we should defer action because of the Sino-Soviet split, the March 1st meeting and the totality of the political relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. I stated that the Sino-Soviet split, the issues and depths of the quarrel, was not wholly understood by us; that I did not think our actions would necessarily control it or its depth. Moreover, the March 1st meeting was an uncertainty and I did not think our actions would have a great deal of bearing on it. I said we must not lose sight of our purpose, which was to help South Vietnamese win freedom from Communist aggression and this could only be done by dynamic and positive action on our part which should not be compromised for collateral reasons. I pointed out the attack of Monday 6 had already had salutary effects on the political situation in Saigon and that if we did not move in this instance, there would be serious disappointment and disillusionment. I therefore urged not only prompt retaliation but a program of sustained action against the North, selecting targets in the southern part of NVN, and predicted that this would cause Hanoi to reappraise and very probably modify their VC and PL support policies. 6. The SPLIT stated that there was a possibility of Chinese volunteers coming in at any time and a capability to introduce them. They might do so. However, we did not believe they would introduce organized units now. At this point I said that the introduction of Chinese at this point was not considered a probable event, however, it was very definitely a possibility and in the consideration of our actions, we had to plan to take care of every single possibility, irrespective of how remote, and to be prepared to commit the forces, the resources, the money, etc., to this end. The SPLIT did not engage in this discussion as I don't believe this to be the case. I think that we can, and must, figure out some way to protect our bases and believe that a net of clandestine operations can be created by the intelligence community which would serve as '93Paul Revere's'94 to furnish warning. (CIA follow this up.) 1 'a0",military,bureaucracies_116,bureaucracies
"However, the Viet Cong had recently been building up in this area. Under Secretary :: pointed out that all the targets are in southern North Vietnam and all are directly related to North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam. He pointed out also that the targets were deliberately selected to avoid the necessity of a large operation to take out the MIG defensive forces in the North in order to permit a strike. 2. The SPLIT expressed his doubt of this and his belief in the great importance that the Vietnamese actually do participate. Mr. McNamara pointed out that the matter had been cleared in general with the GVN hitherto and would be in response to a GVN request on this occasion. Asked who the '93GVN'94 would be, he replied General Khanh. 4. The SPLIT emphasized that the objectives were mostly military, the main effect would occur in the Dong Hoi attack and that the estimated casualty rates ran in the neighborhood of 4,000 military with few civilians. 5. The :: said that if we had to destroy the MIG airplanes now in North Vietnam we would have to adopt Phase II of the December program plus additional actions. General SPLIT and General SPLIT said it was not necessary for us to conduct a raid a day but one raid each week would be enough to keep morale up in Saigon. He said the situation might not come to a head for three to six weeks. The :: then summarized the situation as follows: 1. There was no disagreement around the table that more military actions by the U.S. against the NVN were indicated. 2. Actions against NVN would soon bring a confrontation with the MIG's and we must expect that we would be obliged to take the MIG's out in 3 to 6 weeks. SPLIT then developed what he called the Y Theory, stating that we were now on the lower leg of a Y and would have to decide at some future time which branch we were to go on. Throughout this exchange there was considerable discussion as to the degree of escalation. SPLIT responded that he thought there would be some deterioration but it would not be bad because of the method that was being employed. 1 'a0 :: then raised the question: a. Should we retaliate? b. When? c. What targets? His recommendation was immediate retaliation on specified targets, including a bridge (Target 14) within 75 miles of Hanoi. Secretary SPLIT explained that there weren't. 10. SPLIT repeated his position that it is impossible. It would take at least 100,000 men, 44 battalions, and the presence of such large forces in South Vietnam would be unacceptable for a variety of reasons. (",military,bureaucracies_117,bureaucracies
"CINCPAC reports that if he receives an execute message by 10:00 p.m. tonight, his planes could be over their targets in North Vietnam at 3:00 p.m. their time. The President gave the following figures on the four recommended targets: -108 Target Troops Military Casualties Civilians -108 Dong Hoi Barracks 6,000 3,600 40 -108 Vit Thu Lu Barracks 150 90 0 -108 Chap Le Army Barracks 1,200 720 30 -108 Vu Con Barracks '97'97 No Good Estimates '97'97 Secretary Mc SPLIT A total of 132 U.S. planes will be involved, plus 22 South Vietnamese planes for a total of 154. Estimates are that we will lose no planes and the South Vietnamese will lose two planes. Bromley Smith 1 'a0 :: No exceptional enemy reactions were anticipated from either the Chinese or the North Vietnamese, although the Viet Cong was expected to step up its efforts 8. Senator :: The Chiefs believe that ground action against the North Vietnamese effort is adequate to reverse the situation. Air strikes on the three targets are not necessary from a military point of view. However, a South Vietnamese attack on their target is acceptable. Ambassador :: commented that sooner or later the MIGs would come in. As U.S. air strikes are made on targets farther north, intervention of the MIGs is to be expected. The SPLIT said yes. Secretary :: then spoke of the improving Air Defense of North Vietnam, the installation of radar and ground control equipment, the MIG's at Phuc Yen and the possibility of moving them south. Militarily, he said, the cheapest thing would be to take all the MIG's out right now. However, he agreed that a more gradual approach would probably be more feasible. SPLIT stated that security was in the hands of the SVN; long-range mortars had about a 2'961/2 mile range and the shorter range mortars about a mile or mile and a half range. He said the SVN had border patrols, but that they had been successfully evaded. He wound up by stating that in a guerrilla-type war it is impossible to protect an installation, particularly an airfield. Action, Mccone don't believe this is true. I think that the Clandestine Services might play a part here. It seems to me that we could create a net of informants in the villages around each one of the airfields and this might cost some money but would be so set up that we would be advised. I have spoken to Helms about this and wish to see if it is at all possible to work out a plan. :: said there was unanimity that we should go right now. 9. The",military,bureaucracies_118,bureaucracies
"Now, I feel I must put before you this consideration, Mr. President. We must do something drastic. There'92s no question about it. SPLIT The advantage of a blockade is that it commits us irrevocably, that after that we'92ve struck, and there'92s no turning back. That'92s a great advantage. And the other side must then do something. The disadvantage is that it confronts the Soviets most directly. SPLIT They can hardly step back from that. They may, but my Soviet expert thinks that it is more likely that they'92ll step back from a blockade than from a bombing, but'97 SPLIT But'97 SPLIT The disadvantage of the bombing is that it will trigger every goddamn peace group in this country. SPLIT And'97 SPLIT Yeah. SPLIT But it'92s hard to turn off a blockade. SPLIT I mean, for you to turn off'97you can always stop bombing for a day or two, or a week, or'97 SPLIT '97or two weeks, and therefore'97 SPLIT The bombing? SPLIT That'92s right. SPLIT No, I just wanted to put it'97 SPLIT Those are no problem. But, the Chinese are a problem, too. SPLIT But in a way, of course, it'92s always been a question of degree. A prolonged bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong'97 SPLIT '97will do the same thing. It will send the question'97 SPLIT You can, well, of course, say there'92s got to be bombing, too, with a blockade. SPLIT And you'97 SPLIT And you'97 SPLIT No. SPLIT That'92s right. SPLIT No. SPLIT Well, it'92s quiet again'97 SPLIT In terms of'97 SPLIT That'92s'97oh, yeah. That'92s'97 SPLIT Well, what it is proves two things. One is, they'92re weaker than we think. I mean, take Kontum. It shouldn'92t have taken them two weeks to go from Dak To to Kontum. If they had really a lot of stuff they would have just rolled into it. But they'92re sort of inching up to it again and taking a lot of casualties. On the other hand, they'92re doing it methodically, and they'92ll certainly attack again. And it'92s a, a tragedy. Of course, they wouldn'92t do it. If we had one American division to go into the panhandles, they'92d be finished. That'92s'97the problem is we can'92t do it'97 SPLIT Yeah. SPLIT Yeah. SPLIT But'97 SPLIT Well, the blockade has got to work. SPLIT It may not work fast enough. I mean, there'92s no way the blockade cannot work. It'92s already'97even that one bombing of Haiphong, incidentally, they'92ve got such a congestion in the port now, that there'92s one Polish freighter that has to wait a month in Hainan to be able to get into the port. I, in fact, have to say, Mr. President'97you keep talking about your instinct'97I think your instinct was right. We should have hit soon after that first strike began. And, on the other hand, we have positioned what we have to do now. SPLIT No, I'92m strongly for the bombing, too. SPLIT Another advantage of the blockade is that you can go to the American people, while you can'92t go to the American people'97 SPLIT '97about bombing'97 SPLIT And you can rally the American people for a blockade, while you cannot rally them'97 SPLIT And that'92s not an inconsiderable'97 SPLIT '97factor. SPLIT Yep. SPLIT Well, if you win the war you won'92t lose the election'97 SPLIT Oh, I think that with bombing we'92ll have them quicker'97with bombing, before they can get alternative routes organized. SPLIT Well, if you bomb enough, they'92ll break off the summit. There'92s no question about it. SPLIT That'92s right. SPLIT Sunday'97 SPLIT That makes an overwhelming difference'97 SPLIT Yeah. SPLIT No, I think they'92ll'97 SPLIT Mr. President, I think they'92re going to kill you. They'92re going to put you into the Johnson position. This is the other argument for the blockade. SPLIT They'92re going to have you as the bomber. The guy'97when I looked at that DRV statement, they wanted you to break off the peace talks, Mr. President'97 SPLIT So you'92re the guy who doesn'92t talk. SPLIT Oh, yes, it got across. But all of this is minor because the'97these peace groups are going to keep backing'97 SPLIT So that six months from now'97three months from now'97 SPLIT '97it'92s forgotten that there was an invasion, and therefore'97 SPLIT That'92s impossible; inconceivable. SPLIT But, Mr. President, they'92re more likely to draft you'97 SPLIT They will not draft Connally'97 SPLIT I agree. SPLIT No question. SPLIT The only point I disagree is we can do all of this without killing too many civilians. I said, no way'97 SPLIT Oh, God, no. SPLIT God, no. Those have to go. And'97 SPLIT Yes, sir. SPLIT Well, let'92s'97 SPLIT No. SPLIT Yes. SPLIT Yeah. SPLIT Well, we'92ll, um'97we'92ll have an exciting week next week. That'92s for sure. SPLIT I'92m raising them with you'97 SPLIT That'92s right. I'92m with you on that'97 SPLIT Unless the South Vietnamese collapse within that period. SPLIT That'92s right. SPLIT That'92s right. SPLIT That is right. SPLIT They'92re gonna lose Kontum. But to me what is so fascinating is that two weeks ago they were routed up there. They still haven'92t moved against Kontum. Now, for all I know, they may take it next week. But if they take three weeks to build up from provincial capital to provincial capital, we'92re going to kill them. SPLIT Yeah. SPLIT Well the northernmost province of South Vietnam, so if'97 SPLIT If they continue to take these losses, then every succeeding push in Military Region 3, either because they'92re regrouping'97 SPLIT '97or because they'92ve run out of steam'97 SPLIT That'97 SPLIT A blockade is better. SPLIT Yeah. SPLIT That'92s right. That'92s right. I think it is right. I think that the other big advantage'97 SPLIT They will not let us out, Mr. President, in a way that saves our dignity. [Omitted here is discussion of the President'92s schedule.] SPLIT Oh, it will affect them enormously. SPLIT Incidentally'97 SPLIT Oh, yes. And if we drop leaflets and make it clear what happened. Mr. President, one other point'97 1 'a0 :: If it is inside territorial waters it is interdiction. If we stop vessels outside territorial waters if would be a different matter. President SPLIT We have the option of only attacking the lighters. Secretary SPLIT Why can'92t you go after the docks? Secretary SPLIT The immediate operational question is that of whether you attack the lighters or the ships. Secretary SPLIT What you are doing is arguing against the present scale of air effort. Vice President SPLIT I think that if we do this there is a better than even chance that the Soviets will cancel the summit. President SPLIT The problem with all these figures is that one cannot construct a program analysis approach type model. The fact of the matter is that they would have to redirect 2.2 million tons of seaborne imports. At present they are only importing 300,000 tons by rail. We did not stop all of their rail transport in 1965'9668. President SPLIT They have a theoretical capacity but they can'92t use trains by day and if you analyze every segment of the railroad in China you will find that one segment of the railroad is apt to get overloaded. You can'92t throw these figures around without a better analysis. It is easy to say that they have a four months'92 capacity and could go all out and end the war but they would end with zero capacity. Another possibility is that they would try everything in one month or alternately cut way down on their activities. One thing is certain they will not draw their supplies down to zero. President :: If the boats have 72 hours to get out? Dr. SPLIT What about SAMs? Admiral SPLIT I don'92t think, if we just let things go, we can afford to let South Vietnam slide. When South Vietnam goes it will be utter collapse if something isn'92t done. It will be a complete loss of U.S. diplomatic credibility around the world. We must move the Soviets off center. We must move off gradualism. We should stop saying what we are not going to do. We are not in a confrontation with the Soviets. There is still the possibility of a face-saving solution in Paris. Before a confrontation with the Soviets they could go to the DRV and say let'92s find a solution. What will happen if we let South Vietnam slide into defeat? President SPLIT If there is a collapse, the Soviets will be encouraged in the Middle East, in the Indian Ocean. It will be a green flag for wars of national liberation anywhere. I personally believe in the domino theory. President SPLIT By not doing anything more we would be giving testimony to our weakness. The Europeans have let us be out in front of every fight they have. If something happens with the Soviets then let the Soviets be nervous. Politically and domestically I think it will be vicious for the Administration but, Mr. President, if I were sitting where are you I would say we have got to do something. We'92re the greatest people in the world for handcuffing ourselves. We are compulsive talkers. I don'92t think you have any option. The effect could be great in South Vietnam. It could stop the erosion of the internal structure and beat DRV morale. Mr. SPLIT Whatever we do, we should do it all. First, we should free up the air. Second, we should surprise them and third, we should lessen the domestic impact. The docks are part of this. We should go the whole route. Secretary SPLIT I think we are better off if we do it even if we lose Hue. Secretary SPLIT The media are making a big thing out of Hue. That is something we cannot help. Secretary SPLIT If we don'92t get anywhere on the Vietnam question, then we won'92t be anywhere anyway. Secretary :: '93Yeah, right at the DMZ. And the sons-of-bitches again, I made them check whether the'97of course, the weather is too bad for us to bomb.'94 SPLIT '93We must have the world'92s worst air force.'94 SPLIT '93It looks that way. It'92s'97they have attacked eight fire support bases, which is usually the way these things start. And'97'94 SPLIT '93And they are attacking within range of the SAMs in North'97'94 SPLIT '93It says they'92re doing fairly well, but, you know, the first six hours of an attack, you know, who can tell?'94 SPLIT '93Yeah. That'92s what they say. It says they'92re reacting well, but'97'94 SPLIT '93'97but you can'92t really believe them. I think if this is a real attack, we should hit the SAMs in North Vietnam'97'94 SPLIT '93'97that are protecting'97and we told them we were going to do it.'94 SPLIT '93And'97'94 SPLIT '93Well, let'92s wait until the end of the day to see whether it'92s a real attack or just a blip.'94 A few minutes further into the exchange, the two began to discuss in more detail a possible immediate response: SPLIT '93Well, I, Mr. President, before I'97'94 SPLIT '93I think it is infinitely better for us that the attack is coming now. My nightmare'97'94 SPLIT '93My nightmare was'97'94 SPLIT '93'97that they'92d do it in September and October.'94 SPLIT '93If'97we'92ll either win or lose. And I don'92t think we'92ll lose because, as I watched them in Laos, for example, there'92s no reason why they haven'92t been able to take Long Tieng yet.'94 SPLIT '93And'97except the fact that they'92re a lot weaker than they used to be. And if we'97they'92ll use up their supplies this way and we know when this is over there isn'92t going to be anything the rest of the year. I think it'92s a hell of a lot better'97'94 SPLIT '93Well, I think if this attack continues 24 hours, then we should hit them by Sunday or Monday [April 2 or 3]'97'94 SPLIT '93I think a 48-hour attack.'94 SPLIT '93And that'97'94 SPLIT '93That'92s right. Well, just north of the DMZ is the place to do it'97'94 SPLIT '93Yeah.'94 SPLIT '93Yes, sir. And that would get rid of the'97we could take out the SAMs there, plus the supplies. And then they can go in with gunships against this attack.'94 :: Situation in Southeast Asia Based on initial conversations with General Abrams and Ambassador Bunker, a personal visit to MR'963, and result of staff member'92s visit to MR'964, General Haig has made the following significant points: 2 MR'963 '97The 21st Division commander is very aggressive and impressive. His units'92 morale is very high. However, General Minh, the commanding general in III Corps is slow, unsure and definitely not up to the task. 3 '97There are some very tough days ahead in III Corps area, but ARVN will hold and by the end of the month the enemy should be driven out of III Corps with great losses. MR'964 '97Despite heavy fighting, there is broad confidence that the situation is under control. Reinforcements are enroute to the threatened areas and advisors feel there are ample South Vietnamese forces available. Conclusions '97ARVN with US help will weather what is clearly the major North Vietnamese effort of the war. '97All the serious threats are coming from main force units. '97There is a surge of nationalistic spirit evident but this is fragile. '97We have a good basis for confidence that the situation will hold together but there may be some tough moments between now and the end of the month. Following this, we will have some rebuilding to do before new enemy efforts which may come in July. Subsequent enemy efforts, however, should be far less virulent and should fail. 4 '97We should be able to proceed from a posture of confidence that the situation in South Vietnam will hold together for a long time. Events will improve during this next year with the greatest danger coming after that if there is no settlement. 5 1 'a0 :: Our decision next week will have to be, if I come back from Moscow 2 without anything'97which the odds favor that I won'92t get anything'97then are we'97 SPLIT '97are we just going to subside? SPLIT Or are we just going to bomb, or blockade, or something like that, them to smithereens? Now, I believe, Mr. President, after what we'92ve cranked up, if we simply back off'97 SPLIT I mean, that'92s a big question. Now, if they give us'97as you remember yesterday, I told you we should not lightly knock off the Russian Summit. SPLIT But'97 SPLIT No, I don'92t think we should do it. SPLIT Yeah, but we haven'92t given Hanoi a good bang yet. SPLIT That'92s right. SPLIT No, for my trip, we are in good shape. SPLIT Well, what I have to do, Mr. President, in Moscow, though, is to give them the impression that you may well have a blockade. SPLIT You'92ll never get as much'97 SPLIT You see, the trouble'97 SPLIT You see the trouble'97 SPLIT But so would they. You see, the trouble is, right now, we have a plausible force out there. SPLIT If we don'92t do something with it for two months'97 SPLIT '97we'92ll have to start pulling them out again. And'97 SPLIT I'92m afraid there may be a lot in that. SPLIT You see, they [the Soviets] are leery of a confrontation, Mr. President. They ordered all the ships that are coming into Haiphong to slow up. SPLIT And I saw'97 SPLIT No, I saw the intercept. I saw the order they sent to their merchant ships, not to proceed very [unclear]'97 SPLIT Yes. SPLIT Yeah. SPLIT Well, if you mine, then you may have the problem that they'92ll send minesweepers down. SPLIT And you have to police them. Mining avoids the problem of daily'97 SPLIT Of daily confrontation with the Russians. That takes care of shipping, also, with a lot of other countries. SPLIT The advantage of the'97if you blockade, there ought to be, you know, a week of heavy raids to run down their supplies and to reduce '92em; five days, three days of heavy raids. God, a few more days of raids like we had yesterday and they'92d be in'97they really hurt. [Omitted here is discussion of Laird and bombing North Vietnam, the effect of the bombing in the North and the ground war in the South on the negotiations in Paris, the Moscow Summit and the Vietnam war, the improvement of Air Force performance under General Vogt, and the military situation in South Vietnam. Also omitted is the President'92s brief telephone conversation with Laird about how to deal with the press vis-'e0-vis the continued bombing of North Vietnam.] 1 'a0 :: No, sir. It'92s an area that the Vietminh hold'97a Vietminh stronghold, in Binh Dinh Province. It'92s an area that we know. It'92s always been pacified the least. It'92s the toughest area'97 [Omitted here is a brief conversation with the President'92s steward.] SPLIT It'92s the toughest area. Well, that outpost, it'92s [unclear]'97 SPLIT Oh, yes, they have close air support in there. They have a hell of a lot going in there now. SPLIT And that thing is not overrun. As of this morning they'92re still fighting, but they'92re badly outnumbered. And it'92s, it'92s going to be a tough one. It'92s not as severe'97 SPLIT I'92d say about 120,000, sir. I'92ll have to get you precise figures. SPLIT An Loc. There'92s fighting in the town again. They sent an ARVN battalion of Marines down, an airborne battalion south of the town got badly hit. And they'92ve come back into the town. And also the enemy is attacking at Dau Tieng as I indicated they would. They slipped by and they hit it this morning. And that'92s a tough fight going on right now. We'92re'97we can expect this for another couple of weeks, sir. SPLIT They'92re fighting, yes, sir. They'92re fighting well. And the 21st Division is fighting well. This Minh, who'92s the Corps Commander, is just a sorry son-of-a-bitch. SPLIT And he'92s developing'97 SPLIT No. No, sir. But it got'97it got mauled. They had a lot of casualties and had to come back in. They were'97 SPLIT Pardon, sir? SPLIT Oh, yes. We had 190 air sorties in there last night alone in that one area. So, they'92ve just been banging the hell out of it. And there were 18 B'9652 strikes in support of that action. So, we'97we'92ve just got to be clobbering them. SPLIT But they fell back and used those four days to regroup and now they'92re trying to take it again. SPLIT Exactly. SPLIT No, they don'92t, sir. SPLIT Their morale goes down. The'97 SPLIT Equipment is down. They'92re still knocking out tanks there. They knocked down, I think, 13 last night. But this is going to be a tough fight and it'92s going to stay tough. But I think we'92re going to do it. SPLIT That'92s right. SPLIT That'92s, that'92s an incredible number of sorties to put in there. 18 B'9652 sorties. Geez. SPLIT 190 fighter-bombers'97 SPLIT '97and gunships that are always on station. SPLIT In a military sense'97 SPLIT '97it doesn'92t make sense'97 SPLIT For Thieu, he can'92t. He just'97Thieu is the man who has put out these orders, and for him it'92s psychologically essential that he hold. We could give up some stuff in II Corps. Hell, that place is'97if they lost Kontum or Dak To City it would be a very minor incident. SPLIT [unclear]'97 SPLIT That'92s the way'97that'92s the way the book says to do it, and that'92s the way I would do it. SPLIT Yes, but I think'97 SPLIT Psychology'92s important, especially now where Henry is. 3 The news will get to them while Henry'92s there and that'92s, that'92s good. The other thing is this thing is going to get more of a logistics exercise'97 SPLIT And what'92s going to happen is'97and I think they'92re in there to hold. That'92s their strategy, isn'92t it? They'92re sitting at a high point and then go on'97 SPLIT Stay there this time and to get their infrastructure built back and to destroy pacification and Vietnamization. And that'92s why their logistics are going to become a more'97 SPLIT And hold this for a year, with a Soviet firm guarantee in writing. God, I think you'97then they would have had the course, because you would get absolutely swept into office on the head of something like that. Kennedy and the doves would be licked. And then they'92d be faced with a four-year President who they know goddamn well won'92t put up with a second round. SPLIT That'92s right. That'92s right'97 SPLIT I'97 SPLIT That would be all right if'97I don'92t think a blockade would, would solve this thing in the short run. SPLIT In a military sense or in a political sense. In a military sense, we'92ve had several studies made now. An awful lot of this stuff can come through China, even the'97 SPLIT '97Soviet stuff. SPLIT And by air. So we, we shouldn'92t fool ourselves about that. It'92s great now to get the Soviets'92 attention. They have to'97 SPLIT Totally. Totally. SPLIT And the thing in the long run, that is going to discourage everyone, is to kill those bastards down there. Just wipe '92em out. SPLIT Yes. SPLIT Well, if they lose'97 SPLIT I think it has that effect in the short term. But this country has been through it before. They'92ve had it. I think at this point in time it'92s not so much so. They'92re just sick of it, too. And when the 1968 bombing halt came, we had run it through so long initially it did anneal them, and made them fight harder. But by 1968, when we stopped bombing, they were, they were on their knees. And that was showing, too'97 SPLIT Oh, yeah'97 SPLIT It'92s entirely different. SPLIT Hell, it was. First place, our techniques are better. Secondly, instead of Robert McNamara, as he used to do, sitting at the desk picking the targets, you'92ve allowed the field commanders'97 SPLIT '97to do this and they'92re doing it more effectively without, what I call, are debilitating these strikes. And that'92s what they had all during the '9268 period. They just constantly shifted the targets, and they were all run from here where the people didn'92t know what the hell they were doing in a close [unclear] were oriented on restraint. I think we'92ve done an awful lot in these few strikes that we'92ve put in there, especially when you put B'9652s in. That'92s just'97 SPLIT Never done. SPLIT Yes, sir. SPLIT It was a'97it'92s just a frightening weapon. It'92s a frightening weapon when you'92re on the ground. I'92ve used it close in to our troops, and I'92ll tell you it'92s'97 SPLIT God, you know, you just see these shockwaves. The whole ground trembles and you get no warning because they'92re up higher and you can'92t see them when they'92re coming. You just hear all of a sudden this whistling, an eerie whistle. SPLIT And the whole ground shakes. It does get your attention. 1 'a0",military,bureaucracies_119,bureaucracies
"(Director Helms then read the briefing paper attached at Tab A.) 5 Secretary :: Operations against North Vietnam Director Helms recommends that CIA phase out paramilitary action operations against North Vietnam and requests agreement in principle to develop deception and disinformation operations against the North Vietnamese (CIA memorandum at Tab A). 2 (2) Development of Deception and Disinformation Operations against North Vietnam North Vietnam is particularly susceptible to a carefully orchestrated covert disinformation program. The Agency believes it has the channel to convincingly move such deception material to the North Vietnamese. Close cooperation with the NSC Staff will be needed to ensure consonance with Presidential policy and the negotiating situation between the U.S., North Vietnam, the People'92s Republic of China and the USSR. Mr. Helms proposes the assignment of a member of the NSC Staff to work with the Agency to develop the actual scenarios for the deception and disinformation themes, examples of which are outlined in the memorandum at Tab A. Mr. Helms believes the deception/disinformation program has the potential for causing North Vietnam much more difficulty at much less risk than the minor paramilitary harassment achieved by CIA'92s operations to date. The objective of the proposed program is to make a negotiated settlement more attractive in Vietnamese eyes. Recommendations (1) That the paramilitary action operations against North Vietnam be discontinued. (2) Agreement in principle to develop a series of deception and disinformation operations against North Vietnam and the appointment of an NSC Staff Officer to work out the scenarios with CIA. 3 1 'a0",military,bureaucracies_120,bureaucracies
"Are you satisfied that the mining will block the channel? Admiral SPLIT What about off-shore unloading? Admiral SPLIT In effect it would be a blockade if we attack the ships. Dr. SPLIT If they off-load on the high seas? Mr. SPLIT How effective will these measures be? Do you think they are the most effective or is there something else we could do? Admiral SPLIT We would be doing all three. First maximum effort in South Vietnam, secondly the docks, third a blockade. President SPLIT If there is a failure in South Vietnam that is disastrous for our policies. President SPLIT Secondly, we shouldn'92t be carried away. I think the U.S. people think you have done enough and that you have done very well. The question, therefore, is whether there is something more you can do to be effective. I agree with Dick'92s (Helms) paper. It is a good one. We assume the effect will be good. LBJ said that it didn'92t work. Do we think it will work? It is clear that it won'92t have the effect militarily in the short term and maybe it won'92t have any effect at all. It could have a psychological effect on both South Vietnam and North Vietnam and, if so, that would be worthwhile. But it could have the opposite effect both on the battlefield and domestically. I think it'92s going to be a tough one with our people and with our allies. We will have some help from the British and a few others. As for Congress and public opinion, I think they will charge that this will have no military effect. It looks from Dick'92s (Helms) paper that most supplies can come by rail. Maybe they can'92t but I'92m assuming that the CIA paper is right on this. If we do this and fail, I think that would be worse and more damaging to our prestige. I don'92t know whether it will be effective or not. We must rely on the military. If this will strengthen the military hand and the hand of the South Vietnamese, I think we should support it. Could we wait? Perhaps a week? Is there a time factor? I learned in my discussions from the Europeans that the DRV wants to destroy the summit. 7 Secretary SPLIT The question is is it going to work or is it going to hurt us? Vice President SPLIT Is it going to work with respect to South Vietnam and North Vietnam? Is it going to work with respect to public opinion. Congress and so forth? President",political,bureaucracies_121,bureaucracies
"I will first address the mining plan. There are two kinds of mines, the large mines and the second kind are the smaller Mark 36 destructor mines'97a special mine for the interdiction of small craft. The area of concern is the Haiphong Channel. It is ideal for mining because it is a narrow channel. The green area is where we would place the big mines and any ship which hit a mine and sank would block the channel. The red area shows where we would put the destructors. 4 There are an average of 42 ships per month in Haiphong. The pier can accommodate 16 to 17 ships and there is a separate off-loading pier for POL supplies. The three mile limit is there. It'92s been put in by the International Lawyers. President SPLIT Yes. Each plane drops four mines. President SPLIT We will be using A'966'92s and A'967'92s. We will not lose many. It is not as much of a risk as our previous bombing of Haiphong. There will also be gunfire support. President SPLIT It is arriving tomorrow. With regard to the interdiction of the rail lines there are three rail lines from Hanoi to the Chinese border. We would attack the marshalling yards, the junctions, the railroad lines and the highway bridges. We have already done some good work on the lines of communication. As far as the level of effort is concerned we are already putting 200 sorties per day in the Freedom Train area. We would augment this by 100 sorties. This would leave ample assets in the South. Four additional squadrons and the Saratoga have been involved in the augmentation effort and would be used for suppression of air defenses and then to hit the rail and supply lines. The ships could withdraw or stay. If they stayed, they would block the dock area but we would continue with the attacks against warehouses. If the ships leave we would totally destroy the docks. Laying the mines will be simple. President SPLIT The ships come from two directions. Most come from South of Hainan. The Soviet ships come from the Black Sea and not from Soviet Pacific ports. The destroyers would provide a screen to warn ships that the channel has been mined and we would take steps to be sure that cargo is not off-loaded on the beach. They cannot go into the ports without a pilot and there is not a chance of them going up knowing that the channel is mined. Secretary SPLIT Mr. Helms will talk about the logistics aspects. President SPLIT Yes. In 1965 to 1968 since so many supplies were by sea the railroad was being used at 10'9615 percent capacity. Now there would be many more trains and targets and they would have to operate in the daytime. The interdiction would be much more effective now. President SPLIT We would have slightly less. In 1968 we were running at 30,000 sorties per month, about our present level. President SPLIT The advantage is that then the railroads weren'92t used to full capacity. When you get to the question of fuel there is an estimated 100,000 tons available which could last three months. It is a very different proposition to bring fuel and food in by rail. You cannot go after a logistics system one category at a time. Secretary SPLIT Yes. Secretary SPLIT They will try some off-shore loading and perhaps they will use some of the China ports. That'92s why we will be interdicting both the ports and the railroads. But we can cut down the lighters to a trickle. Secretary SPLIT We have never been able to verify whether the SAMs come in by rail or by sea. President SPLIT The additional air strikes on POL storage points and warehouses have thus far been limited to south of the 20th parallel. President SPLIT Compared to 1968 the number of DRV motorized vehicles and artillery is much higher. President SPLIT The consumption rates are much higher. Mr. SPLIT The plan will leave General Abrams with what he needs in view of the recent augmentations. President SPLIT We began with 17 destroyers, now we have 36. We began with three CVA'92s, now there are six. We have ten more squadrons of aircraft and we have doubled the B'9652 capability. Secretary SPLIT I am confident we can. Secretary SPLIT Yes, they have SAMs. They fired 250 of them on the last Hanoi raid and achieved one hit. Last night just west of Hanoi there was only light SAM firing. Secretary SPLIT The only other more effective measure would be an amphibious landing. President SPLIT Yes. We could hit the marshalling yards and the warehouses on the docks. President SPLIT We are planning to execute. President SPLIT There are enough supplies in the DRV to permit the continuation of current operations. The question is what happens next August and next year if we leave the situation as it is. President SPLIT He also has a call on the resources operating north of the DMZ. President",military,bureaucracies_122,bureaucracies
"We have the names of all the ships on the way and the cargo they are carrying. Admiral SPLIT We'92re now running 500 sorties a day or about 15,000 per month. Secretary SPLIT They'92ll use lighters. They have thousands of them. They off-loaded Soviet ships near the DMZ with 500 lighters. Secretary SPLIT You can'92t have both the mining and attacking the docks. Vice President SPLIT I'92m sure the Soviets will keep ships at the docks. Dr. SPLIT The docks must go out in any event. The military significance will be in four or five months. Most of the stuff is economic in nature and food. Almost all the military equipment comes in by rail. President SPLIT The POL comes through port facilities but they have four months'92 supply in-country. Secretary SPLIT The tanks come in by rail'97so do the SAMs. Admiral SPLIT They have four months'92 supply. If they go on ration they could stretch it to five months. President SPLIT They still have 8,000 SAMs and have fired 7,000 of them. Secretary SPLIT I have sent you a net assessment on the capabilities of North and South Vietnam. 6 President SPLIT We wanted two years. The election in 1968 was decided on the Vietnam issue. The problem is in South Vietnam'97in MRs 1, 2, and 3. The problem is not caused by equipment. In MR'961 not a single M'9648 tank has been knocked out by a T'9654. President SPLIT The problem facing South Vietnam is whether they are willing to stand and fight and search out the artillery. Their marines are doing a good job but not the others. We have the guns but we need the spotters. President SPLIT The problem is spotting artillery. The South Vietnamese spotters work within the South Vietnamese camps. The North Vietnamese spotters are better. They accurately pinpoint the South Vietnamese. The reverse is not true. We are using C'96130s with infrared against their artillery. This is becoming more effective. When the NVA put 4,600 rounds of artillery into Quang Tri on the last day it caused panic. General Lam was not so good. He had disagreements with General Abrams. We are making certain changes. The point is that the battle in South Vietnam is going to be decided on the ground. Air and naval support are important but they won'92t win unless there are improvements in the RVNAF leadership. General Minh, the Three Corps Commander, wants out. The ARVN has to change its leaders. The ground battle in South Vietnam is important. If we take the course we are contemplating it will have an effect in four to six months. I think North Vietnam will stay the course with a U.S. election coming up. These actions will give the impression of working for four to six weeks but then after that they will not. President SPLIT I agree it might help next year. We are already extended to 1.6 billion dollars. We can'92t get money from Congress. We are drawing from all over the world for this. I have seen two administrations place everything in Southeast Asia. This Administration has been able to build its strength in Europe. It has come to certain understandings with the USSR and China. If we do this, I think we will go into the campaign on the defensive and it will be a minus. We should not be on the defensive. President SPLIT I think South Vietnam can make it. Hue may go but it will not be as bad as 1968. President SPLIT It will not have a bearing now. President SPLIT Yes. But even in the future it is perhaps doubtful. President SPLIT We must hedge on equipment. We have given them everything they have asked for and will continue. If they don'92t have enough incentive, then all the equipment in the world won'92t save them. Secretary SPLIT The military equipment route is the cheapter route. Secretary SPLIT We are conducting a massive air campaign in the DRV and in South Vietnam. It runs up into tremendous amounts of money. Just to give you an example, one B'9652 strike costs 40,000 dollars in ammunition. Dr. SPLIT Abrams is dividing up his planes between MR'92s 1, 2 and 3. President SPLIT Let'92s not make so much out of Hue. We lost it in 1968. Vice President SPLIT The problem is one of assets. Dr. SPLIT I am limited to 2.4 billion dollars annually. I have put in 2.9 billion dollars already, hiding it under the table. I am taking it out of the hide of the Services. Secretary SPLIT It'92s a question of where you are next year. If you are to have a viable policy, you can'92t break down your whole force posture. You'92ve got to have the support of the people and the Congress. Vice President SPLIT I agree. Secretary SPLIT That may be so but I would only say that in the battle of An Loc, when the North Vietnamese tanks attacked, the only NVA who was not chained to his tank was the tank commander himself. Secretary SPLIT Out of 44 province capitals maybe the Communists will take five. 1 'a0",military,bureaucracies_123,bureaucracies
"said the Soviets had advised the U.S. Government that they had nothing to do with the incident and that the U.S. Government should talk with North Korea. 3 Secretary SPLIT said the problem of rescuing the ship and its crew is considerably different from retaliation resulting from an attack. The SPLIT said the North Koreans may want to trade these sailors for infiltrators who have been captured crossing into South Korea. The :: We met early tonight. We have received a message from Ambassador Porter in Korea. He thinks the Pueblo incident and the Blue House plot are connected with North Korean support for North Vietnam. Secretary SPLIT Also under consideration is sending a drone over Wonsan. However this has not been recommended to the President. If we put the Banner back on station, we must have adequate cover for it. A second incident in which we come out second best would be disastrous. The :: The North Koreans may have decided to make a try at South Korea. We must jar the North Koreans loose from the idea of taking South Korea. This call up may do just that (prevent the North Koreans from thinking about offensive action against South Korea). The SPLIT What about grabbing some of their ships? Secretary :: We cannot shoot the men out of there. The North Koreans do not have vessels on the high seas that we can seize. Ambassador SPLIT We should touch base with Sato before we do this. Walt SPLIT If North Korea goes crazy and launches an attack we couldn't do very much. General :: Grabbing anything of theirs is permitted by law in limited retaliation of this act. However, sowing mines is an act of war. This would not be considered retaliatory. Secretary SPLIT These military actions will create a sense of urgency for the U.N. to act. The only time those guys (the representatives to the United Nations) will do anything is when they have to. Clark :: Could CIA pick up on film the area where the boat is, via satellite photography? CIA Director SPLIT Couldn't we get photographic evidence showing the spot where the divers are located and also the coast line. This would be absolute proof of the ship's position and the fact that the ship was also outside territorial waters. Richard SPLIT Military action alone does not get them back. Seizing a couple of ships does not get them back. I think they are more concerned about what we may do. This is more important than taking some limited action so that they know what our response is. You are worse off when they do not know what you might do. Secretary :: We could keep their shipping and their patrol boats in the Wonsan Harbor. Secretary SPLIT The North Koreans have made gains right away. I believe they regard this action as a low risk effort. They have shown that they can do this. They may underestimate our difficulties elsewhere or place a high value on causing us more difficulties in this area. There is some indication this may be what they want to do. They are seeking to make life much more difficult for us. There is no evidence (Richard Helms also confirmed this) that the North Koreans want to start another war. They may be willing to return the crew and the ship. They may get something from the equipment aboard the ship. But this still leaves us with the fact that they took a tug at Uncle Sam's beard and got away with it. I would put a high probability factor on their returning this ship. The SPLIT I would prefer to see the screw turned on North Korea. In gradual steps we would move aircraft to South Korea. It makes good sense to move in the fighter bombers for the reasons Buzz (General Wheeler) has given, and also to show the North Koreans and the United Nations the seriousness of the situation. I would send in a squadron of aircraft tomorrow. Then send in other planes on Saturday and more on Sunday. I do have a question about the B'9652's. If you send the B'9652's to the area without any public knowledge there is not much punch that this gives to the diplomatic effort. If we send the B'9652's to the area with public knowledge that this is connected to Korea it may be too big. This may be too much. But you do increase the potential of the United Nations doing something by sending in the fighter bombers. The SPLIT I think that will get rid of the issue quicker. By moving the aircraft in gradually you will get more out of it than by doing it all at one time or by not doing it at all. The SPLIT What I believe Ambassador Thompson had in mind was that we should not say '93hand over or else.'94 They are tough little bastards. I do not think Tommy had in mind a series of steps to make North Korea know that we are about to do something and that we mean business. I think a measured show of force supports our diplomatic efforts. You can tell publicly'97I do not think it has been mentioned before'97that we are giving South Korea two destroyers. You can move in the B'9652's. In my judgment all of these actions support our diplomatic efforts. We can start by saying that no North Korean shipping will come out of two or three harbors. By blocking them off, we take reversible steps. In other words these are steps that do not require that we take additional steps. We should not let the North Koreans think that the Security Council is the way we have planned to deal with this. They must know we are prepared to take further actions, military ones if necessary. The :: -720 Pueblo Seizure'97Possible Military Options Attached are planning papers on four courses of action involving military pressure in North Korea. 2 None of these should be contemplated for employment in the current phase of negotiations. They should be reserved for possible use after the current negotiations at Panmunjom have clearly failed. 1. Air Reconnaissance over North Korea. 2. Sailing Banner into area where Pueblo was seized. 3. Seizing a North Korean vessel. 4. Limited blockade of North Korean naval vessels. 5. Polish ship. 6. Reprisal. 3 Number 3 has been cleared in the Korean Working Group; the others are still in various stages of clearance. Discussion It is clear to me that each of these contemplated actions involves risks. The numerical order in which they are listed above indicates a descending order of preference in terms of combining minimum risk and maximum pressure. 1. Air Reconnaissance over North Korea is probably first in order of preference, confined to the use of Black Shield. It would appear to the North Koreans either as a form of pressure or as a threat of more forceful action to come. They would not know which and this would increase their anxiety. The risk of loss is low. The North Koreans would resent but probably not publicize our intrusion into their air space unless they shot down a reconnaissance aircraft. 2. Sailing Banner along the North Korean coast with an escorting force demonstrates our right and our willingness to do what we were doing when Pueblo was seized. We believe the risk of North Korea seizing the Banner is zero; the risk of their attacking it with aircraft or missiles is low. The presence of the escorting force and the knowledge (or suspicion) that U.S. forces are prepared to react quickly to an attack on Banner would tend to deter such an attack and make the North Koreans apprehensive. Despite the escort, however, there is a risk of attack by aircraft or missiles with a possibility that Banner would be sunk. Like the other courses of action listed, it does not offer much prospect of producing the return of Pueblo and crew, but it does increase the pressure and tension in the area. 3. The seizure of a North Korean naval vessel is more risky since it would probably be opposed by North Korean air and naval forces. It would be a dramatic demonstration of our concern and determination, but it would probably not greatly increase our bargaining power in obtaining release of Pueblo and crew; in fact it would probably reduce prospects of this. And unless we had exhausted the machinery of the United Nations, our action could be properly denounced as illegal. If we wish to seize (or sink) a North Korean naval vessel, our best chance might come during a fracas resulting from enemy attempts to harass or sink Banner . 4. A limited blockade of North Korean naval vessels would quickly become a '93set-piece'94 operation on our part. North Korea could watch it, determine the pattern, and pick the time and place for offensive action. If they decided to do it, they could, almost certainly, sink an important US naval vessel, such as a destroyer. We stand to lose much more than we gain by undertaking actions which leave the initiative for counter-action to the enemy. There, in his own backyard, we cannot afford to maintain enough force to prevent a determined counter effort from succeeding. Even though we doubt that he would risk it, we shouldn't repeat the Pueblo incident, on a larger scale, by giving him the option of striking us again at a vulnerable point. Recommendation 1. Air Reconnaissance . Low key reconnaissance would be designed to achieve needed information and concurrently keep the opposition guessing as to our next move. This effort, limited to that reconnaissance which we really need, and which the enemy will think is compatible with a genuine military need, should be seriously considered. It should be of a nature designed to minimize the probability of loss. 2. Sailing Banner . If we conclude that we must do something visible at this time, sailing of Banner is probably as good as any other visible action. If we do it, we should do it low profile, with little or no visible force. A combat air patrol should be a safe distance away, in order of 50 miles, where it could intervene if required but where it would be less likely to create an incident. The surface escorts should be well over the horizon, clearly out of sight of any vessels approaching Banner but able to intervene. We shouldn't undertake the operation at all unless we were prepared for some significant consequences: a. If North Korea sinks or seriously damages Banner , we should be prepared to count this as an '93Act of War.'94 b. We should have plans in being, and have made a decision, in advance, to make a suitable military response to the sinking or serious damaging of Banner . c. These plans should include such actions as neutralization of the North Korean Air Force. 3. Seizing a North Korean Naval Vessel . As the attached detailed planning indicates, this course is dangerous. We might fail; we might suffer heavier losses than the enemy in the process. We probably should not undertake this action unless we are looking for a small fight and wish to use this action to cause one. 4. Limited Blockade of North Korean Naval Vessels . This action is not recommended. It would be costly in resources, would be unlikely to help retrieve the ship and crew, and leaves the US vulnerable'97NK could pick the time and place and hope to sink a significant US vessel such as a destroyer. It is unlikely that North Korea would do this; however, if it happened, our legal position for retaliation would not be particularly good and we would have suffered another blow to our prestige. 1 'a0",military,bureaucracies_124,bureaucracies
"said the alternatives included picking up units of the North Korean fleet or units of the North Korean army along the DMZ or re-enforcing U.S. troops in South Korea. He said we could fly U.S. aircraft from the states to re-enforce units currently stationed there. Secretary SPLIT said if this incident indicates any new threat on South Korea, this would be [un]desirable because North Korean air power is stronger than South Korean air power. The opposite is true of ground forces. Another alternative is to send additional naval forces. CIA Director SPLIT said he had a couple of people working on this under Paul Nitze. Secretary :: We do want moves which will buy us time. I propose the following steps: 1. Proceed to move armed forces from the U.S. and other places in the area to South Korea and South Korean waters. I propose moving about 250 aircraft in addition to those that are aboard the Enterprise . The SPLIT The Enterprise can remain off Korea without any effect whatever on our actions in Vietnam. It was going to the Gulf of Tonkin to supplant and not supplement any operations. We can keep the carrier it was to replace on station off Vietnam. The SPLIT We do have a problem, but I am reasonably confident that what General Wheeler and General Westmoreland have reported is satisfactory. The SPLIT They have approximately 400 jets compared to 200 jets in South Korea. The SPLIT Our aircraft would be superior to the bulk of their air force. We propose to send, roughly 63 Air Force F'964's; 33 Marine F'964's; 50 F'96100's; 50 A'964's; 30 F'968's; 22 F'96105's; and possibly some other aircraft. The F'964's and most of the other planes do have bombing capacity. Secretary SPLIT I propose, although there is some difference of opinion on this, that we move the USS Banner in to replace the Pueblo off North Korea. We are planning to send it into the area to join the Enterprise so that if we decide to move, it will be in position. If we decide to replace the Pueblo with the Banner we should be prepared to cover it with air and other support units. The SPLIT They can operate easily from Okinawa. Flying time is only about 2'961/2 hours. 1 'a0 :: We do need more air power in the area if we are attacked. I see no difference between us having the Enterprise already there with increased air power available and putting in what we need to have to take care of the situation. We already have built up our position with the placement of the Enterprise in the area. To do what Ambassador Thompson has suggested (not putting any additional forces in there) would mean pulling the Enterprise off station. The SPLIT I have all of that information now, Mr. President. The SPLIT The North Korean air force has substantial superiority over the South Korean air force. If we have trouble we need to reenforce. The SPLIT No, we have other units here and a number of units in Europe. In this country we have aircraft we could move to Berlin. In my opinion, we are in very good shape. The 332 aircraft that we are calling up are cats and dogs, but the 303 aircraft which are being sent to South Korea are in very good shape. The SPLIT The lowest form of military action is the minding of the coast of North Korea by air. They do have some ports of significant value, but in Wonsan. They do have patrol craft at Wonsan. Secretary SPLIT We cannot find any of their ships. They have only 4 small vessels and they aren't of much consequence. 1 'a0 :: Buzz Wheeler makes a very logical case. But it disturbs me deeply. I think the President must proceed on the basis of probabilities and not possibilities. I think the North Koreans are not able to mount a massive military activity. They are engaged in harassments. We should not send fleets of our aircraft to Korea. I think that is wrong. I think this heightens tension and builds it up. If North Korea is planning something important that could then begin the provocation for us moving. I would get the planes and crews ready here at home. But our moral posture will be better if the North Koreans move first. I am deeply sorry about the ship and the 83 men but I do not think it is worth a resumption of the Korean War. The :: Shouldn't we send a vessel to the area where the Pueblo dumped overboard its equipment to dive for it? General SPLIT The particular plane that we will fly over they will not be able to fight because of the nature of the aircraft. Of course, if there were other aircraft sent, there likely would be aerial interception. Richard SPLIT 1. We need authorization to extend duty. 2. We need authorization to call up individual reservists. The SPLIT Mr. President, we are not prepared to make a recommendation on that today. Secretary SPLIT We would like to move certain forces to the area. We need to pace ourselves. The Chiefs would like to move 26 B'9652s, 15 to Okinawa and 11 to Guam. The SPLIT I would move other aircraft to the area. The SPLIT I think for two reasons we should delay in moving the aircraft. It reduces our effectiveness of approach at the U.N. We are not contemplating any action right away. Dick SPLIT But we must remember that we have the Enterprise and that it could retaliate with substantial force. There is a place where you get into a very critical position with this build-up. The :: If the North Koreans were to release the ship and or the crew in ten to twelve days the only thing we would have suffered would be humiliation. If we decide to replace the Pueblo with the U.S.S. Banner , we will need air support to protect it. If we do not get the Pueblo back the President would want full air power there to take care of any massive response. In my judgment, mining would be the smallest increment of military action. Under Secretary SPLIT To do that we must have air cover and naval craft. Under Secretary SPLIT I agree with that, although I have no real evidence of the connection. I view this situation very seriously. The great danger that we must avoid is that the Soviets and the North Vietnamese will interpret something that we do as a sign of weakness. If we show weakness and are not firm, I think it will prolong the Vietnam war substantially. Clark SPLIT We must protect ourselves from permitting the North Koreans and the North Vietnamese and the Soviets getting the belief that we are weak. I would go back to Kosygin. I think the Soviets knew of this or if they did not they have enough influence to shape the conduct of North Korea. I would not deal in a belligerent, public way, but I would show them that it is essential to give up the ship and the men. Director :: I would like to view this matter differently. Let us assume for the moment that our only goal is to get the men and the ship back. What would be the best way to achieve that end? If we get the ship and the men back without taking substantial military action the President will get credit for restraint. We may have gotten a hair pulled from our beard. I would be ready to sacrifice that hair because our options are limited at this time. We must be ready for the next try. We have very few alternatives at this point. So, again I ask what are the best ways to get the ship and the men back. The SPLIT Mr. President, in a discussion we had yesterday at the Department of State I presented a view. Since you were not there I would like to give it here. I do not think our case with reference to the ship is a strong one. The North Koreans have a better case on where the ship was. They were there. We weren't. This was a '93spy ship'94. There is a general feeling in the world that if you catch a spy you do him in. The North Koreans can say that we invaded their waters. We do not have a clear case to support. We must not issue an ultimatum. The odds are they would tell us to go sell our papers. Like blackmail, it is no good if you publicize it. It will become public knowledge we are sending in planes. The North Koreans have indicated something more may be coming. We do want to be prepared and ready for that. I recommend that we approach the Soviets again. I recommend that we go to the United Nations. I suggest that we start a quiet build up. We should send another message to Kosygin. The North Koreans may conclude they have gotten as much out of this incident as they can. Frankly I can stand a minor set back to our position rather than to take action which may lead us into another war. The capture of a spy ship is not worth us going to war. The :: The odds are more like 60'9640 in favor of turning them loose. The",military,bureaucracies_125,bureaucracies
"Mr. President, this was not the lesson of the Cuban missile crises or the Berlin crises. Secretary :: We just received information that a North Korean aircraft is flying to Moscow with two men and 792 pounds of cargo aboard. This could be equipment taken from the Pueblo . It is suggestive that the Soviets were in on this. Secretary SPLIT Ambassador Goldberg called this an incident. What is important is the North Korean policy and what is behind that policy. We know this is new pressure against South Korea and ourselves. If we are to act we must be prepared for any action they may take. The :: Our alternatives are basically two: 1. Actions to get the ship back. 2. Actions to strike back in retaliation for this ship seizure. We should search all photographs and look for their ships. Personally I would not be opposed to seizing a Korean ship flying a Polish flag. We should strain for ways to find their ships and determine operational methods to place mines without knocking out their airfields and other facilities used for defense. Of course we must be fully prepared for what counter actions the North Koreans might be prepared to take. The SPLIT A conviction by the North Koreans that they will run into more trouble than it is worth. That will produce the ship. They think we are strained and tied down in Vietnam. Therefore a measured show of force is appropriate. I feel we should put in additional air power for the following reasons: A. We need increased air power in the Republic of Korea anyway. This incident dramatizes the deficiency of the aircraft in South Korea. It was surprising that we only had four planes there and that they were '93out to lunch.'94 B. If this effort fails and we undertake to disgorge the ship, we still need heavy air cover. The :: His initial comments were exploratory and tentative. Later he offered specific suggestions. He first asked if North Korea has much maritime trade. I told him it was limited but that they do a good deal of fishing. He then asked if any thought was given to a quarantine, commenting that this would be about the least provocative of any military action and that, if it did not suffice the Congress would then have to consider stronger action. He thought it was important to act '93while the iron is hot'94 and while the Pueblo affair is fresh in peoples' minds. He said we should be careful not to demand or threaten anything that we can't back up. Next he raised the possibility of bombing the bridges over the Yalu. I pointed out that these lie on the border with Red China, and that this action would tend to be a challenge to the Chinese. I suggested that there might be critical points on the communications routes south of the Yalu. He commented that a key question is whether we would be prepared to use atomic weapons, particularly since these would give assurance of destruction of bridges, for example, and could be utilized in places where no civilian losses would be involved. General Eisenhower said that if he were sitting in the President's place he would have the staffs consider every possible thing that might be done, not excluding anything out of hand, as a basis for top level consideration and decision. He commented that he doesn't see much danger of a nuclear holocaust arising over this affair. (I had previously mentioned to him the treaties of the USSR and the ChiComs with the North Koreans.) He thought that the Russians and the Chinese would be guided by their own interests. After further discussion he said his idea would be to take action generally as follows and generally in the order indicated: a. Quarantine b. Strengthening of defense arrangements along the DMZ (possibly including some patrolling into North Korea). c. Attack of some critical targets along the North Korean main lines of communication. d. Movement of U.S. air reinforcements into Korea; action to bring the whole command in South Korea to a feasibly high state of readiness; ground units should be brought up to strength, but without bringing in additional major units. He would intensify the bombing in Vietnam to a maximum at this time, and let it be known that this step up was related to the North Korean incident. He concluded by asking me to convey to the President his personal hope for the President's success in this matter. G Lieutenant General, U.S. Army 1 'a0 :: The group then examined the following 11 possible courses of action. 3 1. Advising Soviets of actual or possible military moves . In the light of Tommy Thompson's cable, it was agreed we should not proceed now with an informal contact, although we might consider in the future the use of the hot line with the proviso about the press, laid down by Thompson. 4 In general, it was judged, however, that communications with the USSR were in pretty good shape. 2. Conduct airborne reconnaissance . It was agreed that for the next several days no recce of North Korea should be conducted; if it were judged that recce was desirable at a later time, Black Shield, rather than Drone, photography was recommended. 3. Sail USS Banner into area where Pueblo was seized . For the time being it was felt unwise to put the Banner on station. 5 When the incident has been settled, it was agreed the U.S. would wish to assert its rights in international waters off Wonsan Bay. Depending on the situation at that time, we might wish to assert our rights in that area via an armed vessel'97perhaps a destroyer'97rather than via a communications monitoring ship like the USS Banner. 5. Mine Wonsan Harbor . The proposal presented involved 17 sorties dropping 83 mines. The operation would have to be repeated as necessary to insure full denial of harbor use. It was agreed that the impact of this operation on the North Korean economy and on North Korean military capabilities would be minor. The prospects of recovery of the Pueblo and the crew might be impeded. Air combat over the area would be likely; and the risk of escalation would increase if mining were maintained over a protracted period. 6. Seize North Korean vessels . Although our intelligence does not yet give us a firm basis for seizing North Korean vessels on the high seas, it was pointed out that should the men and the ship'97or even the ship alone'97not be returned, the seizure of North Korean vessels from the high seas was a punishment that fitted the crime; that is, the North Koreans had violated the rules governing behavior in international waters and could be legitimately denied access to international waters. It was agreed to explore this suggestion with further staff work directed to establish what North Korean vessels might be accessible to seizure on the high seas. 7. Selected air strikes on North Korea . It was agreed that such strikes would be an act of retaliation; large forces required for success might give the appearance of large-scale hostilities initiated by the U.S.; it would be unpopular internationally; and would diminish the prospects for early release of the Pueblo and its crew. 8. Raid across the DMZ . As with respect to 7, above, such punitive operations were judged to be risky, capable of leading to unsought sustained hostilities, and counter-productive with respect to the return of the Pueblo and its crew. 9. Naval blockade of Wonsan . The military and economic effects would be limited; the risks of escalation would be high; once undertaken, we would be committed for an indefinite period to inconclusive, politically awkward, and potentially escalatory operations. 11. U.S. bombing practice in South Korea . This suggestion, from a member of the group, was examined as an additional contribution to a sense of seriousness about the U.S. military build up in the area. Although it was thought that, in general, our present build up offered a satisfactory background for diplomacy, it was agreed that the technical possibility of this line of action should be staffed out and we would take a further look at it. W. W. Rostow 6 1 'a0 :: I have been speculating with the members of my staff most directly concerned with the Korea problem. We have been looking beyond the present situation to the possible failure of Panmunjom or its endless stringing out. We are conscious of the following weaknesses in all the forms of action which have been proposed: '97The Soviets have committed a high proportion of their Far East fleet to the area. They will feel their prestige is on the line if we move in on North Korean ports or attack North Korean installations with our air or naval power. '97but equally, in our message to Kosygin we have indicated that time was relatively short before some form of action might have to be taken. Nothing would damage our credibility with the Russians more than if, having put forces in the area and stated to Kosygin the urgency of the matter, we did nothing. '97it is true we can pick up some North Korean-Polish ships; but they turn out to be almost wholly Polish. Sect. Rusk is worried about possible pressure on the road to Berlin if we fuss with Polish transport, although I don't think the Poles want a Berlin crisis at the moment. But you should know that Gronouski, when sounded out, said in effect: Please don't. '97we don't have any firm fix on the possibility of a Free World denial of shipping and bunkerage in trade to North Korea, but it doesn't look like a very substantial measure. In the face of these thin prospects and our desire to avoid a second front in Korea'97at least at our initiation'97the following thought has arisen: that we now mine the Haiphong and other harbors of North Viet Nam. The advantages are: '97even if not a decisive action, it is an important action which bears upon the major battle we are fighting; '97the Russian capacity to deal with it, and the Russian commitment to deal with it on a military basis is much less than something done in the Sea of Japan; '97it would maintain our credibility with Kosygin & Company, especially if timed in relation to the indication in the letter concerning the Pueblo. If we wish to institute the policy by increments, we could start by laying mine barriers in the south of North Viet Nam and progressively but swiftly moving north, perhaps using a back channel to suggest to Moscow that if they wish to have the mining stop short of Haiphong, they had better deliver the Pueblo and its crew. 2 But it is a course which, once embarked upon, we would have to mean. As for the men and the crew, we could continue being just as patient in the Panmunjom negotiations as the other side; but we would have to accept as likely that we would not get them back for some considerable period of time. I am not recommending this course of action; but I believe it deserves careful thought if in fact the North Koreans and the Soviets are going to play this game out to extract humiliation of us. Walt 1 'a0",military,bureaucracies_126,bureaucracies
"Based on radio messages, we have information that the North Koreans are diving for it at this time. Secretary SPLIT I would agree with that. The South Korean airforce is very weak compared with North Korea. Secretary SPLIT I would like to proceed with positioning our force in South Korea as recommended. I would place 170 land-based aircraft in the area. I would proceed to station the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk off North Korea. I would put her on the coast available to us. This would give us 300 carrier aircraft and 150 land-based aircraft. This would give us ample aircraft to protect us against any eventuality. The SPLIT We can move the aircraft quickly, but we have to have at least 18 hours to give the pilots a night's sleep and to provide some time to shake down on the bases. We must move maintenance units and spare parts. It would be four to five days before all of the units are operationally ready. The 26 B'9652s will give us heavy strike capability if preemptive strikes begin. The SPLIT First I do not think we can take the B'9652s away from Vietnam. General Westmoreland faces a very serious situation. In recent cables he has asked for 120 B'9652 mission capability per month. We are doing that. We should reach that level by February 1. It would be imprudent to draw down on Westmoreland's supply of B'9652s. He is about to have the most vicious battle of the Vietnam war. B'9652s have an all-weather capability. If other aircraft area unable to fly, the B'9652s become very vital in support of our ground forces. To the larger question, all military schools teach us that military power is in existence to enhance our foreign policy capabilities and to preserve the internal security of the United States. I think that more military moves would support our diplomatic efforts that are our first order of business. But we should be prepared to move on the other front if the need arises. Some would regard this as a provocation, I am sure. I know the Soviets would. I believe that it will prove to friend and enemy alike that there is determination on the part of the United States to do everything it can on both the diplomatic and the military front if necessary. The SPLIT That is correct, sir. Also they are continuing their infiltration across the DMZ. The most symbolic act of the infiltrators was the attack on Blue House. Ambassador :: We are looking at four or five military possibilities: 1. The placement of mines in the Wonsan Harbor . This would require substantial air action to handle the situation properly and require neutralization of air fields in the area. We would have to destroy the Wonsan military facilities. It is probable that we would require naval aircraft for support. 2. Mine other North Korean ports . We would select two or three important ports. The same problems requiring the need for air support would be present. 3. Interdict coastal shipping . For this we also need heavy air cover. 4. Strike any one of a list of targets in North Korea by air or by air and naval gun fire . Hopefully we will have better photographs of North Korea after a reconnaissance mission tonight. 5. Replace Pueblo with another ship protected by ample air and naval cover. Anything else would require substantial military action. The suggestion has been made that we seize North Korean ships. But they have no large ocean going craft. And we do not know where the four small vessels they have are located. The SPLIT They would be there in the event that a decision was made to take reprisal action against North Korea in addition to their defensive value. Secretary SPLIT The ROK are eager to go into North Korea on hit and run raids like those taken into South Korea by the North Koreans. We have exercised great restraint on the South Koreans to the point where the South Koreans will no longer tell our American General the ROK plans. Walt SPLIT Here is a proposed schedule for movement of tactical air. We are talking about an order of 8 days using forces in West Pac. In the first three days you would have 28 F'96104's, 14 reconnaissance aircraft and 28 F'96105's. Two days later you would have the bulk of the U.S. strike force. This would be 28 F'96105's, 18 F'96100's and 17 F4D's. After seven days you will have initial combat readiness. Clark :: The North Koreans have 450 planes. We need at least an equivalent number in South Korea. General SPLIT We had only 24 fighters in Japan. There are 70 enemy fighters that were in the area around Wonsan. The",military,bureaucracies_127,bureaucracies
"Reportedly 6,000 refugees got off on one ship this morning and another one is loading now. :: Colby'92s estimate 2 indicates that Thieu'92s pullback was designed to put him into a position to cut his losses and stagger through until 1976. He decided to do this because he was not getting enough support from the U.S. It was due to a lack of spare parts and ammunition. The idea of pulling back was not bad but when the move began, the refugees clogged the road and the troops did not know how to move anyway. Thieu was trying to get ready. His estimate and ours was the same; an all-out attack next year would finish him unless he got more support. So he wanted to stagger through this year and hope for a change. SPLIT The move could only have been carried out by surprise. SPLIT Ky is a boy scout, a flamboyant pop-off; he can not do the job. SPLIT Thieu has shown himself far and away the most capable of all the Vietnamese leaders I have known since 1965. No one else could do as well. He holds things together. He made a mistake in ordering the withdrawal from the highlands but he had no good choice. We were unable to give him the support he needed. SPLIT The war is now being conducted against Sihanouk. If it were a question of Lon Nol leaving and then our dealing with Sihanouk, it would be easy. But the Khmer Rouge want to erase all possible political base for Sihanouk and bring him back only as a front for themselves. The French told us at Martinique that Sihanouk wanted to negotiate but was unable due to the Khmer Rouge. 4 SPLIT We have to make an evacuation decision. Ideally, from the political viewpoint, we should hold on until after your speech 5 and after Congress makes a decision on our aid request. But if we wait it could collapse all at once before we can get our people out. But if we pull out, we will surely provoke a collapse. There are about 1100 people of all nationalities to be evacuated. We may need to decide next week. General SPLIT We need a joint estimate about the unravelling in Cambodia. 6 If they can'92t hold, you need a chance to look at the situation. We need an estimate as to how long it can hold so we can decide on whether or not to order fixed wing aircraft in for evacuation. SPLIT The Khmer Rouge will negotiate only unconditional surrender. They could get a negotiated settlement anytime but they refuse it. When Lon Nol leaves, it will demoralize the country. Long Boret will try to carry on but will fail. SPLIT We are pressing them to get out. Lon Nol wanted to stay but we had to press him to get out also, to calm the situation. General :: If I may wear my hat as Secretary of State for a time, I want to take issue with the estimate of the Director of Central Intelligence regarding the impact on our worldwide position of a collapse in Vietnam. It was his judgment that the world reaction would be negligible, based on the fact that everybody had been anticipating what would happen. Let me say that, whatever their long run expectations, no country expected so rapid a collapse. I believe their reaction would also be affected if they did not even see an effort made. We have reports that the Japanese, the Indonesians, and other Asian nations are watching closely, and they are forming judgments. It is not in their interests to say this publicly. Especially in Asia, this rapid collapse and our impotent reaction will not go unnoticed. I believe that we will see the consequences although they may not come quickly or in any predictable manner. So I cannot share the judgment expressed by the Director of Central Intelligence. I believe that, even in Western Europe, this will have a fall-out. Let me now come to the options. On military assistance, the first option would be to ask for no military aid but to follow the predominant mood in the Congress and do nothing. You could say that your predecessors have put in $150 billion and that it has not worked, and that no amount foreseeable is going to work. You could say that you are concentrating on the economic and humanitarian side. You would have the advantage that you could be the first President since 1947 who will have had nothing to do with Vietnam. SPLIT The negative aspect of such an option is that it would trigger an immediate collapse in Saigon and that this collapse would be caused by the United States. It would give Saigon the least opportunity to negotiate. It would imperil 6,000 Americans, and it would make it impossible to evacuate any Vietnamese. The international implications would compound those that I have described. But, it would provoke the least dissension in this country. Between that and the $722 million that Fred has mentioned, you can about pick your own figure. You can go for $300 million saying that this is all that is immediately available. You can say that you will either try to get some more later, or you can say that you will specifically try for the $422 million later. SPLIT That is correct. The $300 million is designed to bring supply stocks up to the 60-day level. SPLIT The problem with $300 million is that it will be hard to defend. It is important to get the debate behind us and not to go on for months. So a case can be made that you either go for close to nothing or that you go for Fred'92s recommendation, since $300 million is not enough. If you say $300 million and more later, you are simply bringing about months of Vietnam debate. But you could do it that way. It is possible that South Vietnam may collapse, and then you may not need to ask for the $422 million. It is, of course, also probable that if you go for $722 million, there will still be a collapse. The advantages of the $722 million are: First, that it'92s militarily defensible; second, that it would strengthen the South Vietnamese position for inevitable negotiations'97as Fred says, South Vietnam can then negotiate with North Vietnam; and third, that it would put us in the best position to negotiate our extraction, with South Vietnam, North Vietnam, or both. So I see three viable options: -720 '97First, to ask for nothing or next to nothing; '97Second, to ask for $300 million and indicate that there might be more to come; '97Third, to ask for the whole amount. Next, we must deal with the options regarding economic assistance. SPLIT As I understand it, the $722 million would have to be followed by $1.3 billion in order to have a chance for success. SPLIT So the issue depends first on your decisions, second on identifying the persons to evacuate, third on the cooperation of the GVN, and fourth on the cooperation of the North Vietnamese. I should add that this is one area where I believe the Soviet Union and the Chinese could be helpful. In your decision you would have to deal with evacuation, with what to say to the GVN, with what you want the Department of Defense to do, and with what diplomatic efforts you want the State Department to make vis-'e0-vis these countries and others. I agree with the Secretary of Defense that it will be hairy. SPLIT My own personal view is that you would have to ask Congressional authority to take forces in. It is not like Cambodia. It will last longer. Even if we have the consent of the GVN, we will have to fight Vietnamese. If that is your decision, this will require U.S. forces. First we have to decide what to go for. Then we can talk to Thieu. Then we can get the Embassy to thin out our personnel, removing those who were assigned to I Corps and II Corps as well as dependents and the like. :: Perhaps I should talk about the political situation and Jim will discuss the military situation and the figures we are requesting. It is clear the military situation in South Vietnam is extremely difficult. North Vietnam has the military superiority. They have occupied much of the territory. It is caused in our view by too little assistance and incompetent management of the retreat. But whatever the reason, we are trying to bring about a political situation and a negotiation which would exploit the new balance of forces. We have thought that the U.S. should not be a principal agent in these negotiations but should rely on the South Vietnamese or others such as France. We are prepared to support negotiating efforts and the elements that are prepared to negotiate. This is a process which will take a few weeks to sort out in Saigon. :: Let me summarize where we are, the thoughts behind your speech to the Congress last Thursday, 2 and where we go. You know what is happening in South Vietnam now. We believe that the cuts in supplies being provided to the South Vietnamese and the upheavals in the United States, and so on, led to a North Vietnamese decision to go all out, in flagrant violation of the Paris Accords. Until January, our intelligence did not indicate this was to be an allout push. This is a case where American domestic actions influenced a foreign government. In the face of his situation, Thieu ordered a retreat into more defensible enclaves. The retreat was carried out badly and led to these tragic consequences. The one question now being asked is how the United States will conduct itself now after 15 years of support'97after even [in 1963] overthrowing a government that was suspected of wanting to deal with the North. If the President had opted just for humanitarian assistance, he would have had to do it in the knowledge that it would have created panic and negated our real commitment to the people who relied on us. The President opted for both economic and military aid, because it was the best course to take regardless of the outcome'97whether it is an evacuation, stabilization of the military situation, or a negotiation which gives them at least a modicum of opportunity to have a say about their own fate. The only figure of any viability was Weyand'92s figure. The $300 million figure, if we had simply made the same request, would have been met with the argument that it was the same as before the tragedy and thus was clearly inadequate. The issue in the Senate appropriation was not the amount but the concept. It is a matter of consequence to us and the world how we manage our exit. What is the impact on the world situation? It is often said that those who say this affects us are producing the effect; they don'92t read the cables. It has a profound impact on others'92 perceptions of our judgment, our constancy, and the wisdom of the United States. Leaders who hardly know Indochina are asking what it means. There is nothing we can do about the past, but it is important how we react to this. Will we withdraw? Will we give up our commitments and our leadership? The worst mistake we could make now is to say we are undertaking a global reassessment. What we are seeing in Vietnam are special circumstances of a commitment that was perhaps unwisely entered into, circumstances of executive weakness here, and so on, none of which could be predicted. To generalize from this would be disastrous in all areas. There can be a domino effect not related to Vietnam but to our competence in foreign policy. We must conduct our foreign policy with confidence and assurance, reiterating our commitments. The basic foreign policy of this country is sound. Our alliances are good, our relations with the Soviet Union are okay. In energy, food, raw materials, we still have the decisive voice. Our problem is getting the authority to do what is needed. If we can get the moral authority that is required, we can have a year and a half of foreign policy achievements. So long as faith in the United States'97that means faith in ourselves'97remains, we can overcome. We have had a setback but we can overcome it and have a productive period of foreign policy. :: Jim [Schlesinger] will update the military situation, but it is clearly hopeless. The North Vietnamese have the capability to force a military solution. Our objective is to achieve the most controlled situation possible for evacuation of Americans and Vietnamese. This requires the cooperation of many'97the Congress has to understand the shoals between which we are trying to navigate. We have had a steady reduction in the American presence. We have tried not to leave so many that we couldn'92t get them out, and we have avoided pulling them out so fast that we create a panic. We will be down to one lift by tonight: one batch will leave from Tan Son Nhut by C'96130 and one from Saigon by helicopter. We are evacuating the high-risk Vietnamese by trickles. The diplomatic situation is delicate and we can'92t say too much. Hanoi has continued to say that Thieu is the only obstacle. I never believed it. They will probably start trying to unravel the government, although they may want to project an air of responsibility by negotiating for Saigon. We are in touch with several countries. Unless there are controlled conditions, it won'92t be possible to get out large numbers of Vietnamese. The evacuation from Saigon will be much trickier than the one from Phnom Penh. We are trying not to trigger a panic, but also not to jeopardize Americans. We could have the refugees from Vung Tau but our purpose is not to be indiscriminate but to rescue those who would suffer the most if we left them. The trouble in the ports would be to sort out the high-risk people from the mass of refugees. Any substantial evacuation of South Vietnamese would therefore depend on negotiations. There is no question North Vietnam could take over Saigon and unravel the government by keeping to make demands for further change. The only glue holding the country together is the military. They have the only viable administrative structure. Huong will probably be replaced soon and his replacement soon after. Some of the terms of the debate on aid are no longer relevant. The thought that aid is an open commitment is no longer relevant, as is the argument that it would prolong the fighting. What it does now is give North Vietnam some incentive to say in a negotiation they have stopped our aid, and to give the government some confidence to keep things under control. We think it is important to vote some part of the aid package to give us some control over these tragic events. The President'92s objective from the outset was to achieve a controlled situation, and these events, while happening rapidly, were somewhat predictable. It is important we get out with the maximum dignity and unity. SPLIT It is not clear yet. Sometime over the next two'96three years North Vietnam will absorb it, but whether they will go through an interim PRG Government or move quickly to absorb it is not clear. The occupied areas are being administered by cadres from the North because there are no PRG cadre. My guess is they will move rapidly. The ones most unhappy over these developments will be the Chinese. SPLIT I can'92t imagine the Chinese wanting a large military power on its border, so the Chinese could be expected to want to support some sort of PRG government. SPLIT The last months of the war were being fought against Sihanouk, not the government. Sihanouk has known for a long time that we would support his return. The obstacle to his return was the Khmer Rouge, not us. The Khmer Rouge wanted to prevent Sihanouk from coming back as anything but a tool. That is why they refused even a ceasefire and that is why they are exterminating every vestige of leadership. It may be even worse than what will happen in Vietnam. Cambodia will be a total Communist-controlled state. The question is who will be in control'97Hanoi or Peking? Peking has long supported Sihanouk as a counterweight. They are aided by the hatred between the Cambodians and the Vietnamese. Over the years it is obvious that there will be a conflict between the large Communist countries and the only hope for Laos and Cambodia will be to balance between them. North Vietnam will take over as much control of Laos as they wish; that is probably true of Cambodia also. The Hanoi leaders have done nothing but fight all their lives. The :: Was that artillery or rocket fire? SPLIT I have talked to Graham Martin. 3 I think the DAO should come out anyway. I also think the Embassy should be thinned down. If we have to go to suppressive fire, then we must remove the Americans. Otherwise, it is too risky. SPLIT I think if they see air cover, it helps. SPLIT It may, of course, have the opposite effect. Even if some of their local units do not see our aircraft on radar, the high command in Hanoi will know it very quickly. I do not think that they will intensify their attacks. SPLIT I think we have three decisions: -720 '97First, how long to continue to operate, and whether the C'96130'92s should just pull out Americans or Vietnamese as well. In either event, today is clearly the last day for fixed-wing operations. '97Second, whether you want to have air cover flown over Tan Son Nhut or wherever the evacuees can be picked up. '97Third, when we order suppressive fire. In this connection, I agree with Jim that it should only be used when pulling out Americans. My concern is between balancing the risk to pull out all the stops if they have not yet decided to do so. I think if they see American air cover it would have a good effect. SPLIT I think that, if we fire, we have to pull out the entire Embassy. Maybe we should consider leaving in a nucleus of volunteers, but I would pull everybody out. The North Vietnamese have the intention of humiliating us and it seems unwise to leave people there. SPLIT But you would have air cover any way to protect the lift.",political,bureaucracies_128,bureaucracies
"He did not tell us anything at all and did not tell his own commanders. SPLIT But the army may leave some $200 million in arms and military equipment in Danang alone. SPLIT We can'92t tell whether or not the Khmer Rouge will fight us. :: We are getting the first reports that the Cambodian troops are beginning to lose their drive. They are worried about U.S. support and losing their commanders. With adequate resupply they would have lasted through the dry season. But the morale is no good. The debate in Congress has hurt them badly. It is likely to collapse in two weeks. SPLIT How long do we keep the Americans there after Lon Nol leaves? :: In any case, we cannot get the material there in time. :: They cut Route 4. SPLIT We have an intercept that says an attack on Phnom Penh may occur on Friday. 3 We do not have much time. SPLIT You should know that Mahon is marking up the $300 million tomorrow. I told him he may want to wait until after the speech. You may want to send him a signal. Secretary SPLIT It also depends on the cooperation of the North Vietnamese. They have anti-aircraft weapons. If those weapons are brought near Tan Son Nhut, they can make it very difficult. SPLIT You have the innate power to protect Americans. I think the Foreign Relations Committee is anxious to cooperate and would not object to our use of force. Moose and Meissner, who have been out there, have been cabling back favorable recommendations on this issue. 5 SPLIT I think we have a number of problems. The first one is Vietnam itself. We must recognize that it is gone. It is going now and it will go quickly depending on the North Vietnamese. With any aid we give them we are buying time, partly to get out the Americans. We must try to see what it will look like in 90 days. It is desirable to avoid fragmentation of the people and an argument with Congress. We must state clearly in closed rooms that hope is slim, and that we are moving on a strategy of 60 days to 6 months. We should say that we are doing this to save the Americans and to protect the Vietnamese. I think in your speech you should push for $300 million and say that we will ask for more later. We will use the time to get the Americans out. Fred says we just have a chance and that it depends on the North Vietnamese. So far, the South Vietnamese have not been able even to regroup the unruly people of the Second division. We may be faced with a situation that will last only 30 days. The important thing is for you to establish leadership and to give a call to the people. You could talk along the lines of Churchill'92s blood, sweat and tears. You could say that U.S. foreign policy is in the most difficult period since 1939. I would tick off Portugal and say that we insist on a free election. We should tell the Europeans we expect them to do more in their own defense. Also, we should speak of Turkey and of what must be done there. I think that if you have a fighting speech, you will have a positive impact on the Congress. I think there are two kinds of people on the Hill Those who want to get out of Vietnam and those who are just waiting for an inspirational message. :: Henry has touched the high points. There has been some improvement in the past few days. They have been fighting well in Xuan Loc and the Delta but whether it is temporary depends on North Vietnam and President'92s request. In the military area the North Vietnamese have eight divisions and the GVN seven. They are doing well but they are dipping into stocks of ammunition. Generally speaking, if the North Vietnamese bring up their forces they will have preponderance, but the South Vietnamese know the terrain and have their backs to the wall. We have requested $722 million which reflects the results of the Weyand mission. 3 The difference reflects the hope on the GVN side to equip four infantry divisions. That is $140 million. To convert the four ranger groups is $120 million. For general munitions, $190 million. If you would like more detailed data, General Weyand is here. :: Last Friday night we executed Eagle Pull in Cambodia. 3 It went smoothly. It was delayed chiefly because of the surprising decision of most of the GKR'97even those on the death list'97not to leave. Eagle Pull has been planned since 1970. Had there been an attack, we would have returned the fire. The President has that legal authority under the Constitution. The behavior of the Cambodians has been very brave. In Vietnam, the North Vietnamese keep charging this is a civil war'97that they have no forces in the South, and so on. For these reasons they may decide not to assault Saigon directly, but they probably will try to destroy the GVN army. It is fighting well but it is in a weaker position. [Jim Cannon, Virginia Knauer, and Alan Greenspan spoke.] 1 'a0 :: The situation is crumbling. The East is being pulled back. Bien Hoa will be under attack within two'96three days. The Hanoi propaganda line has always been that the PRG is doing the battle, so that they may not want to assault Saigon. We have five carrier groups in the area. We can lift 1,700 and have about 2,000 now. Any evacuation from Saigon will be risky and could be interrupted or terminated by brute force. It will be a hairy exercise. 1 'a0 :: The latest information is that there is still artillery fire against the airport. A flight of C'96130'92s is going in to take out the DAO (Defense Attach'e9 Office). They hope to be able to land, but they can be waved off by a controller on the ground if it is unwise. North Vietnamese ground forces are one kilometer from Tan Son Nhut and advancing. SPLIT About 100. SPLIT About 30 minutes ago. SPLIT Landable. SPLIT There are some on the ground. SPLIT Only one, which had been hit. We are loading weapons and bombs on aircraft in Thailand. Our aircraft are in the air for potential cover, but they are over the water. SPLIT About 400, including contractors. SPLIT It is not certain. SPLIT There is no authority now for suppressive fire, only for the chopper lift. SPLIT It is a hard weapon to counter. SPLIT There are two issues. First, once we get to the point where we have to have air cover, we should pull out anyway. SPLIT They may only be doing this shooting to bloody us. If they see fighters, they may hit us hard. SPLIT They may have pre-positioned orders to attack us. SPLIT I think we can go in over the area with less equipment. SPLIT The North Vietnamese have 4,000 sappers in Saigon. They will hit the Embassy if we attack by fire. SPLIT Should we soften up the artillery first?",military,bureaucracies_129,bureaucracies
"I agree with Colby'92s estimate about Danang. It will be hard to hold 10 days. We have gotten all the Americans out. A second ship is loading. There are two airfields, the main one is Marble Mountain and a small one. There is an ARVN battalion protecting the small one from the mobs and some C'9647 flights are getting off. The mobs took the main field and may take the second one. SPLIT The situation has changed. The outlook is bleaker. We need to decide now to take them out or we could have a major problem. There is one brigade of Marines in the Pacific. We could use U.S. forces to take out the residents and try to beat the mob out with helicopters. SPLIT If we have to use helicopters downtown, it would take one day to get 1200 out. If we have the airfield, it would take less time. They can get there on their own. This is a very difficult operation. SPLIT The mob will be hard to control. We might have to shoot refugees in front of the press. SPLIT We may need air cover. If there is any firing on our people on the ground at the airport, we will attack. We will have aircraft in the air. SPLIT We need a decision now on improving our intelligence capability. We can not wait for the Forty Committee, Mr. President. Will you authorize us to preposition intelligence collection aircraft now for us over North VietNam if we need it? :: In preparing this report, I went back and referred to the report I did on a trip I took in July, 1973, about two years ago. In that report, I said that the position of the North Vietnamese and of the PRG had been dramatically improved since the start of the ceasefire. They were shipping major quantities of supplies to their forces. On the other side, the leaders of the South Vietnamese army were aware that they were now engaged in a political struggle. General Truong'92s civic actions in MR'961 were especially impressive. The political struggle was engaged, and the GVN was determined to win it. I found this interesting in the light of recent developments. The South Vietnamese continued the concept that this was a political struggle and they organized their forces to this effect. I said then that the top South Vietnamese leaders thought the question was not if the Communists would attack but when. Those leaders were very sensitive to American support and they were counting on the intervention of U.S. air power in the case of such a Communist attack. They are still in this mood. They clearly still cherish the hope that the U.S. will help them. There are many reasons why they responded as they did; that is one of them. I found the situation critical. It is clearly going in favor of the other side. Hanoi has many options; the GVN and the U.S. have few. The South Vietnamese have suffered heavy losses. Their morale was very low when we got there, but it has been improving since then. I believe your decision to send a team, whatever may be said about its composition, is clearly vindicated. I believe the South Vietnamese are on the brink of total military defeat. I examined a plan that is intended to deal with the area that they now hold. They have been thinking of this for some time, once they saw that American support was dwindling and would continue to dwindle whereas North Vietnamese support would grow. They have been rationing arms and ammunitions for some time. They have been trying to husband their resources. They have cut down the use of rifle ammunition and of grenades very dramatically. They had made plans to complete their resources in an area which corresponds roughly to what they now have, though they had hoped to hold more of the coast, especially to the extent to which they had some expectation of finding oil. The Delta, of course, is their rice bowl and very valuable. The rest of the area, south of the present line, contains lumber and a lot of population. I told Thieu this plan was sound but a linear defense was not appropriate to the type of situation that they face. They should find enemy divisions and destroy them wherever they are, and not just try to hold the line that it is not identifiable by some geographic feature. The big question is whether they now have time to get organized. The issues they face are as follows: First, to reconstitute their forces and to create four more divisions in order to defend against the larger North Vietnamese army. Second, to upgrade their territorial forces to 27 regiments (which would have been done a long time ago if they had thought that they would face this kind of military challenge). Third, to upgrade their ranger groups. If they could do all that, they would be in pretty good shape. There is a limit to what the North Vietnamese can send down. The South Vietnamese could mass, and with the very strong air support that they have they could do a good job for a time. We all agree that the long-range prospects are just impossible for them. The issue is: can we get the stuff to them in time and will the enemy give them time? I have not tried to be too optimistic. However, there have been reports from some of the places where I testified that I said the GVN could win. They can, locally, but I do not believe they can push the North Vietnamese army back. I have said that the South Vietnamese could and would fight. I have said this in part in order to help keep the South Vietnamese together. But their leadership is very doubtful. I have talked to Thieu. If he does what he says, it can go pretty well. As for the will to fight, I have said that in March, 1972, there were 16 North Vietnamese divisions down there. And they were defeated, though with American help. General Vogt and I concluded that they had the will to fight. But they had our support. Last year they had 600 people a week killed and many wounded. So I think they have the will to fight. I do not think one should regard this panic as a sign that they have no such will. I have seen such panic in Korea in 1950 as well as in Burma. It is not pleasant, but it is not unprecedented. The 18th and the 25th divisions have been doing well. The question is the will of the people to resist or to accept a form of government that they consider alien. The other question is the support of the American people. I assume they would support more assistance, having stuck with it this long. That is the way I dealt with it in my report. I have found support on our determination not to let force prevail over the will of the people. I have recently seen some talk about secret commitments. In a visit last year to Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand, I spoke of continuing American support. It is clear that they all expected American support, although Thieu was worried about threats in the Congress. Thieu clearly believes you have done all you could. He understands the Congress. One thing that I had in the back of my mind as I wrote my recommendations was that we owe it to them to help them or at least we should not deny them the help if they need it. If I did not believe it, I would not be here. Neither, I guess, would the rest of you. The question is whether the American people would accept the burden. As I have watched the orphan program and the refugee movement, I have concluded that the American people desperately want to help the South Vietnamese. Whether this sentiment translates into military assistance it is hard to say, but I believe it exists. The price that I think it requires is $722 million which would build four more divisions and upgrade other units. This amount subsumes the $300 million that is now in the supplemental. I also had recommendations on refugee assistance and on evacuation policy. You are aware of these. SPLIT We think that the amount for 1976 that we have requested, which is $1.3 billion, would be enough to carry us from there on. :: They are regular iron bombs. The aircraft do not carry '93smart'94 bombs unless they have special equipment. SPLIT The plan is for 70 sorties, with each of 35 aircraft coming in twice. SPLIT The controller on the ground at Tan Son Nhut. SPLIT If it is artillery fire, he would wave them off. If it is rocket fire, he would bring them in. He had a message yesterday that one artillery unit was to fire on two targets. They have now hit those two targets, an apron and a gymnasium used for processing. SPLIT Yes. SPLIT What worries me more than the artillery fire is the report of an aircraft being shot down by an SA'967. Choppers or aircraft are defenseless against the SA'967. The only way to deflect the missiles is to use flares, but I am not sure whether the aircraft we are using are equipped for that. Of course, we have to do our mission, but if the risk becomes too great, we may need to turn off the lift. SPLIT We cannot do much about them. SPLIT Whenever you say. Also, tankers. SPLIT We can do that, as Jim Schlesinger says. The aircraft and the tankers are ready. SPLIT The artillery people do not. Nor do the SA'967 people. I think we should not commit the air cover until we are ready to use it. The risk is such that they should only be used for a job, rather than to be picked up on radar. SPLIT I think they have pulled out the stops. The platoons that we have spoken of are being followed by more. They came in through that same area during the Tet offensive. They are ready for the battle of Tan Son Nhut. SPLIT Within an hour. We have an open line to Graham Martin. SPLIT Regarding whether our air cover will be seen: We are putting in a Navy CAP above the air cover and Gayler has told them to jam the radar of the SA'962'92s. SPLIT No. It is heat-seeking. SPLIT Yes, if you or Ambassador Martin say so, we can have them there within an hour. SPLIT I would ignore the artillery for the chopper flight if the artillery is on the air field. But if it is on the DAO or on the Embassy, we cannot go in. In the first case, we would hope that they cannot shift too rapidly. In the second case, we may need to suppress. SPLIT I recommend that it come in when we go to a helicopter lift.",military,bureaucracies_130,bureaucracies
"The Vietnamese Government has enough to control the area around Saigon and the Delta for this dry season but they are likely to be defeated in 1976. Thieu tried to extract his troops from the highlands in time but his ploy failed. He was so afraid of leaks to the Communists that he told no one in advance, not even his own commanders who were caught by surprise. There was really only one battle. Thieu was aware of the superior comparative strength of the North Vietnamese in the highlands so he wanted to pull out of Pleiku and Kontum. He wanted to fight at Ban Me Thuot, but he could not do it. Among other problems, his C'96130s were sidelined. So the move to the coast became a rout instead of an orderly withdrawal. Then they were attacked in Quang Tri and Thieu was indecisive about Hue, first he was not going to fight and then he was and then he finally decided not to. This caused the commander of I Corps to become confused and angry. And now the airborne, their best troops, are being taken out of Danang to Nha Trang and Saigon. Thieu also wants to bring the Marine Division out of the perimeter around Danang. If so, Danang will surely fall. Originally, Thieu wanted to defend the enclaves, like General Gavin. SPLIT The refugee figures have fluctuated up and down, with the highest point coming after the Tet offensive. Now we are back up to over one million refugees. SPLIT Yes, the Delta is the big rice area. This would have been the first year of economic self-sufficiency had it not been for the suddenly deteriorating situation. The refugees are placing a big burden on the government but it is interesting to note that they are all fleeing toward the government. That shows clearly how they really feel about the Communists. SPLIT And there is some grumbling about Thieu in the army as well as in political circles. We may hear more about this. SPLIT It should fall within two weeks even if the Marine Division stays instead of being pulled back to protect Saigon. SPLIT There have been terrible mob scenes, both at the airport where they stormed loading aircraft and at the port where they jammed aboard ships. Some of the military have even shot their way on to the ships. A small number has been loaded but law and order has broken down completely and it is almost impossible. SPLIT Chief of Staff Vien and Prime Minister Khiem are possible candidates to replace Thieu. SPLIT I agree with Henry. No one else is up to Thieu. Khiem would probably be the next best bet but he is some way from being up to Thieu. General SPLIT There is little fighting in the Delta and around Saigon. Unless the North Vietnamese move their reserve divisions into the Delta from the North, Saigon and the Delta can probably be held militarily but the big problem will come when the stories about Danang start to circulate in Saigon. Concerning Cambodia, Lon Nol is going to leave for Indonesia on April first. But there is no hope of talks with the Communists. They will see Lon Nol'92s departure as weakness and will push harder. The new Communist proposal for a government would leave Sihanouk with no base at all, even if he was ostensibly the President. 3 SPLIT The Cambodian airlift is suspended. The Communists could make the airfield unusable. The Government is losing ground east of the capital and also down along the river. The wet season starts in late May but the river will not come up until late July and by then it will probably be too late. :: After a week'92s lull, the Communists have begun a new round of fighting, with Saigon as the ultimate target. East of Saigon, a North Vietnamese division supported by artillery and armor attacked Xuan Loc, the capital of Long Khanh Province this morning, and heavy fighting is reported inside the town. Xuan Loc sits astride Route 1, which links Saigon and the coastal provinces. Fighting also has increased in the delta. The heaviest attacks occurred in the northern delta provinces of Dinh Tuong and Long An. Elements of the Communist 8th division attacked Tan An, the capital of Long An Province, but have been pushed back. SPLIT They cut it, but they have been pushed back. A Communist troop buildup in Kien Tuong Province had raised the possibility that the North Vietnamese were preparing to attack the provincial capital at Moc Hoa. Late reports indicate, however, that these forces have withdrawn, apparently in preparation for attacks closer to Saigon in Tay Ninh and Hau Nghia provinces. The fighting is likely to intensify further in the near future. Our best clandestine source on Communist plans in the South has recently reported on new COSVN instructions which call for achieving final victory this year rather than 1976. According to the agent, Communist gains have far exceeded their expectations for 1975 and have created the '93most opportune moment'94 for total victory this year. The COSVN instructions call for the Communists to press the attack and expand Communist territorial holdings during April by '93liberating'94 Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia, and Binh Duong provinces. The agent also claims that when '93the time comes'94 the North Vietnamese will attack Saigon. Another clandestine source reported yesterday that the Communists are planning a three-pronged assault from the south, west and north on the capital itself. As the fighting moves closer to Saigon, the likelihood of confusion, public disorder and even panic will increase. The past week of relative inaction has given the government some chance to consolidate its military position. Nevertheless, in terms of capabilities, the strategic balance decisively favors the Communists. The North Vietnamese now have 18 infantry divisions in South Vietnam supported by numerous armor, artillery, and air defense units. Eight of these divisions are located in Military Regions 3 and 4. Moreover, there are strong indications that a North Vietnamese Army corps headquarters and three more reserve divisions are moving to South Vietnam. Two of these divisions have already reached the DMZ and could show up north of Saigon in two to four weeks. In addition, two NVA Air Defense divisions are in South Vietnam, one in MR'963 where it could soon threaten Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut airports. By comparison the South Vietnamese, at this moment, now have seven combat-ready infantry divisions. They are rebuilding three from personnel extracted from the north and plan to form two more by early summer. On paper, the GVN'92s long-term prospects are bleak, no matter how well Saigon'92s forces and commanders acquit themselves in the fighting that lies ahead. This is already beginning to become an accepted judgment within both civilian and military circles in South Vietnam. At this moment, pressure continues to build among the civilian opposition and among some military commanders for President Thieu either to exert the vigorous leadership which has been conspicuously needed and missing, or step aside. So far Thieu has shown considerable skill in keeping the opposition divided. He is aided by the fact that there is no single figure who his various political and military critics believe would provide more effective leadership. While yesterday'92s bombing of the Presidential palace was an isolated act, it underscores the ever-present possibility of a single incident that would overturn Thieu and bring on political chaos. 2 Thieu'92s new nominee for prime minister, Nguyen Ba Can, hopes to have a government formed by this weekend. Can will try to encourage representatives from the civilian opposition to join the cabinet. There is considerable reluctance, however, especially among important Buddhist and Catholic groups, to be associated with a Thieu government. In any case, we see no dramatic improvement likely to stem from this new government. Another factor is U.S. aid. A prompt and large-scale infusion would tend to restore confidence. The converse is obviously also true. The most likely outcome is a government willing to accept a settlement on Communist terms, i.e., surrender. The Communists are repeating their willingness to negotiate with a post-Thieu government, in an obvious effort to encourage a political upheaval in Saigon. At the same time, Hanoi is making it clear that it is not interested in a compromise but rather in a figleaf for a North Vietnamese takeover under military pressure. In this regard, the new COSVN instructions mentioned state that negotiations or a tripartite government are merely stratagems to isolate the GVN. We have few indications yet on how the Communists are setting up their new administration in the northern half of South Vietnam. In at least some instances they seem to be maintaining the facade of a transitional national liberation government. We believe, however, that there has been a basic downgrading of the Viet Cong'92s PRG in North Vietnamese thinking. Hanoi now sees no need for a lengthy intermediate stage of negotiation and coalition rule, and has little incentive to maintain the PRG as a separate political entity. In sum, we believe Hanoi will take whatever action is necessary to force the war to an early conclusion'97probably by early summer. The remaining questions have to do with Communist tactics and timing, and whether or not a political solution on Communist terms can be arranged prior to a final South Vietnamese military collapse. Finally, Mr. President, there is the question of how these recent events may affect the attitudes of other nations toward us. In general, the current debacle is seen not as a turning point, but as the final step on a particular path that most governments had long seen coming. They have, in short, seen the whole Indochina experience as a major setback for the U.S. Many, especially in Europe, had long questioned America'92s judgment and the propriety of its involvement. Others were disillusioned with America'92s ability to cope with an uncommonly complex situation. Still others gradually lost faith in America'92s will to stay on a difficult course. The circumstances of the Vietnamese collapse have dramatized these perceptions, but adjustments were already being made. There will, however, be apprehension over the repercussions, and the American reaction to the dramatic finale. Our allies have been disturbed, and our adversaries heartened, over trends in American attitudes toward: -720 '97limiting the flexibility of U.S. foreign policy in meeting new challenges, '97reducing U.S. support for our allies and friends, and '97reducing the share of U.S. resources devoted to maintaining our military power and foreign policy. Any signs that the American people are beginning a prolonged and bitter internal debate will heighten these concerns and intensify fear that we may be heading into a new era of isolationism. U.S. actions in the Middle East, in particular, will be closely watched in judging our future course. Levels of trust, however, will be affected mainly by perceptions of U.S. behavior on issues of direct and compelling interest to the countries concerned. Western Europeans and Japan, for example, do not expect a reduction of U.S. power relevent to their immediate concerns. And none of them consider U.S. aid to their security any less necessary than before. A number of regional powers, such as Iran and Brazil, will continue their trend toward self-reliance rather than linkage with the U.S. in anything but major confrontations with the USSR. Among those on the firing line, uneasiness will increase, and the drive toward self-reliance will accelerate. The South Koreans and Nationalist Chinese will see greater parallels to their own situation, and will put pressure for maximum support as long as possible. Southeast Asians, especially the Thai, will feel more exposed, but have long anticipated eventual U.S. withdrawal from the mainland. They may now advance their adjustment to growing Communist power. Middle East countries will see U.S. interests there as compelling continuing involvement. However, there is one particular situation on which Vietnam developments could have a direct impact. Both Prime Minister Rabin and President Sadat have been very reluctant to place their respective nations'92 vital interests hostage to any agreement which was not self-enforcing, especially any agreement that was silent on matters which either regarded as being of major concern. The experience with the 1973 Paris Agreement could reinforce this already manifest reluctance. Soviet, Chinese, and other Communist leaders, for their part, will not automatically conclude that other U.S. commitments are placed in question, unless: -720 The U.S. public reaction points to a repudiation of other foreign involvement, or Internal U.S. recriminations are so divisive as to raise doubts of the U.S. ability to develop any consensus on foreign policy in the near future. North Vietnamese leaders will exploit their victories to denigrate U.S. power, especially among third-world countries. Hanoi may increase its support to Thailand'92s insurgency. Its principal energies, however, at least for the next year or two, will be devoted to consolidating its control over Indochina. Do you wish me to go on to Cambodia now or later? SPLIT In Cambodia, it is difficult to see the government holding on for much more than another week. Communist attacks in the Phnom Penh area have weakened government defenses north and west of the capital to the degree that they could collapse at any time. Intercepted messages indicate that the Communists are calling in even more units from the countryside for an all-out attack against the capital'92s defenders. The Communists are also placing additional artillery near the capital. The insurgents will soon have their forces ready to begin the final push. Meanwhile, the time is rapidly approaching when ammunition shortages will directly affect Cambodian Army capabilities. By April 17 all ammunition earmarked for Cambodia will have been delivered. In-country stocks of some types of ammunition will be exhausted soon thereafter and all ammunition will be gone by April 25. In the face of the steady battlefield pressure and uncertainty over U.S. assistance, morale in the army is plummeting. The army high command is nearly paralyzed and is issuing only limited guidance to units in the field. A number of key unit commanders in the Phnom Penh area have expressed the belief that the end is near and the fight may soon go out of the army completely. A recent intercepted message revealed that government troops in at least one isolated enclave have contacted local Communist forces to discuss the possibility of surrender. On the political front, most Cambodians now realize that President Lon Nol'92s departure has had little effect on the prospects for meaningful negotiations with the other side. Prime Minister Long Boret returned to Phnom Penh yesterday saying that there were no prospects for a compromise solution or a cease-fire. Boret met with Sihanouk'92s son, Prince Yuvaneath, in Bangkok. Yuvaneath admitted that he was not authorized to speak for his father but his claim that Sihanouk would not negotiate is undoubtedly correct. The government may soon invite Sihanouk to return and try to tie the invitation to an agreement that Communist forces not enter Phnom Penh or hinder the flow of relief supplies to the city. At this point, this sort of an orderly surrender is the best that can be hoped for. :: I think I can. What has happened is that the Viet Cong have rejected Minh'92s ceasefire offer. They have now added a third demand, which is to dismantle the South Vietnamese armed forces. Bien Hoa is in the process of falling. The Viet Cong have cut off the road to the Delta and are advancing on Vung Tau. It is a very dangerous situation. The North Vietnamese are bringing artillery within range of Tan Son Nhut airport. At 4:00 a.m. they had a salvo of rockets against Tan Son Nhut. This is what killed the Marines. This salvo was followed by 130 millimeter artillery fire. Some of this artillery fire hit the American side, not the Vietnamese side like last night. Three aircraft have been shot down. All are Vietnamese. They include a C'96119, an A'961, and an A'9637 helicopter. The latter was shot down by an SA'967 missile. The presence of these missiles increases the risk factor greatly. SPLIT No. It'92s continuing. SPLIT Those forces are of platoon strength, perhaps one or two platoons.",political,bureaucracies_131,bureaucracies
"Shaba Situation. Now that the French are in Kolwezi, the Belgian Cabinet, after some debate, has decided to send Belgian paratroopers on Saturday morning to join the French. The French plan to remain in the Kolwezi area to reestablish order. Their forces have encountered considerable resistance since they landed this morning but have succeeded in freeing a number of hostage. They have, however, reported finding the bodies of about 40 Europeans. } :: We have also considered diplomatic steps which we might take to stabilize the Angola-Zaire border situation. Our concern is that military assistance from French, Belgian, and Moroccan sources being funneled through Zaire to UNITA ma prompt Neto to encourage a resumption of Katangan gendarme attacks aimed at Zaire. My conclusion is that we cannot dissuade the French and Belgians from their view that their long-term interests are served by an ultimate Savimbi victory. Accordingly, we will limit ourselves to again warning Mobutu against diversion of US-supplied equipment. We will also share with him our concerns that his continued interference in Angola, even as an intermediary for others, could jeopardize Congressional support for our present economic and military programs and provoke the Angolans and Katangans into stepping up their activities in Shaba. } :: Incursions into Shaba. We have just learned from the Zairian military that at least three attacks may have been launched March 14 into Shaba from Angola and possibly Zaire, allegedly by ""Katangan gendarmes."" We have had several reports that low-level activity in the border area was underway, but nothing to confirm the a major attack was in the offing. We have to check the reports from the Zairian military carefully. } :: Shaba Invasion. In light of the Zairian counter attack in Shaba and on the advice of the military command, Morrison-Knudsen, the construction firm working on the Inga-Shaba electrification project has delayed until tomorrow the evacuation of its 62 employees and their dependents now gather outside Kolwezi. Fourteen other Americans are in rebel-held section of Kolwezi, along with an estimated 2,000 Belgian and perhaps 400 French nations. Rebel indiscipline has allegedly resulted in at least ten European but no American deaths. Given the uncertainties, we are working the French and Belgians on contingency planning for the reduce of expatriates in and around Kolwezi. Zairian pleas for material assistance are so far modest, for the most part comprising FMS material already on order and in the pipeline. The categories are essential communications equipment and spares, aircraft spares, medicines and assistance with petroleum supplies which remain chronically low. DOD is stepping up pipeline deliveries. } :: Shaba invasion. Events during the course of the day in Zaire are not encouraging. We have indications that the Zairian counterattack is beginning to stall. Although 77 American citizens successfully evacuated the Kolwezi battle zone early this morning, from 9 to 12 Americans remain in the town along with up to 3,200 Belgian and French nationals. We have approached the Angolans in Brussels to emphasize our concern over the events in Shaba and the importance we attack to the safety of foreign nationals. As a contingency measure, we have also authorized EUCOM to undertake planning of a possible reduce operation with the French, the Belgians and the British. :: Shaba Operations. By early afternoon our time, 10 Americans have been reported by our Consulate in Lubumbashi as having been rescued from Kolwezi (one of the wounded, the other nine in good condition). We have unconfirmed reports that two Americans have been killed. The other American out of the total of 13 who were in Kolwezi is still unaccounted for. Belgian forces were airdropped into Kolwezi early this morning. The French report that friendly forces have control of all parts of town, that they had found almost all houses looted, and that about 60 European bodies have now been discovered. French military casualties are one killed and 15 missing with around 200 enemy killed. The Katangans are reportedly retreating toward Zambia en route to Angola in a truck convoy with an unknown number of expatriate hostages. } :: We have no evidence that Soviets or Cubans are involved in the present fighting. The Soviets, Cubans East Germans, and Angolans, however, have longstanding ties with the Katangans with arms, training, and logistical support. We also note that Soviet media have been less reticent than the TASS statement in expressing sympathy for the aims of the '93Congolese National Liberation Front'94 and in criticizing the US for allegedly planning to intervene in the crisis. }",military,bureaucracies_132,bureaucracies
"The Belgian government has asked whether we would participate in or support an international force for Shaba, with various alternatives as to international auspices and European and/or African participation. Some type of international force would help stabilize the situation in Shaba and the political and economic stability of Zaire itself. But the question is whether and to what extent we should support such a force, and whether it should be combined with a broader effort to get Mobutu to make some basic reforms. I have directed the SCC to develop and assess alternative positions on the international force for Shaba, looking to an SCC meeting on Friday as a basis for decision. } :: The SCC is developing your options for future involvement in Zaire and will be meeting Friday to consider them. These options range from (1) an ambitious program to work with the Europeans to strengthen Zaire's economy, overcome the damage in Kolwezi, beef up the Zairian government's administrative capabilities and support improvements in their armed forces, to (2) the option of continuing our present essentially marginal efforts of military and economic aid. The key problem is that Mobutu is just no good. But, equally, there appears to be no alternative national leader. Moreover, if we do not do something about the fundamental situation in Zaire, we can count on repeated Shaba incursions and continuing deterioration which is likely, I believe, to lead to greater Cuban and Soviet influence and prestige. We have through this problem before in Vietnam and elsewhere. Sometimes our support has enabled other governments to hold themselves together and, in other cases, it has been a losing proposition. }",political,bureaucracies_133,bureaucracies
"Arab-Israel Crisis 1. Middle East Scenario As you know, our scenario on the Middle East situation envisages three steps: c. Contingency planning for testing UAR interference with the right of free passage for ships of all nations through the Strait and the Gulf, and contingency planning for the use of force, as necessary, to support that right. Implementing action would be undertaken only after measures in the United Nations had been exhausted and after Congressional approval had been obtained. 4. A Military Plan to Deal With the Straits of Tiran Question A military task force may be required to support, with force, the right of innocent passage, on behalf of the international community, through the Gulf of Aqaba in view of the UAR's announced blockade. The essence of this concept is that an international force could keep the Strait open for all flags, thereby obviating an Arab-Israeli war. Such a task force should be composed of as many maritime nations as are prepared to join it in a reasonable time. In practice, only the US, the UK and possibly the Dutch and Canadians are likely to participate. Conceptually, the task force would consist of two parts. First, a protective force in the northern Red Sea which would provide a protective presence for merchantmen testing the Straits, and an escort if the UAR, should turn back or fire on unescorted ships; second, a reinforcing force in the Eastern Mediterranean which would be available for reinforcing support if the UAR fired on merchantmen and their escort. A limited protective force of four destroyers (two US and two UK), a tactical command ship (US), and a light aircraft carrier (UK) could be assembled in the northern Red Sea in about a week. If the carrier Intrepid , now in the Mediterranean, transits the Suez Canal in the next few days, together with her appropriate escorts, these could be added to the force. Application for transit of the Canal has been filed. Even with these additions, however, such a force would be devoid of adequate self-contained air cover and ASW protection and thus subject to attack and damage by UAR sea and air forces in the area (the reinforcing force could provide some air cover over the Tiran area, but the distances from the Eastern Mediterranean would limit operational effectiveness). A stronger, better balanced protective force'97augmented primarily by US naval units from CONUS'97could be assembled in 25'9630 days. US and UK forces already in the Mediterranean provide a powerful reinforcing force (consisting of 3 US carriers, 1 UK carrier, and numerous other vessels). British air forces in Cyprus may also be available. If the UAR fired on merchantmen and their escorts, aircraft from these Mediterranean forces could, and might have to, intervene in the Tiran area or strike at major air bases and installations in the UAR. The risks involved in testing the blockade with a limited or even an augmented protective force are not negligible. If Nasser is not deterred, the possibility would exist of wider conflict. This possibility is being urgently studied, both politically and militarily. Dean Rusk 4 Robert S. McNamara 1 'a0 :: for a military appraisal of the situation. The Secretary said in general that there is no substance to the Fulbright/Symington notion that the U. S. cannot manage both Vietnam and the Middle East crises at the same time. He then turned to General SPLIT saw the whole situation evolving somewhat differently. He thought the initial exchange would be a fierce air battle for air superiority which would deplete aircraft inventories on both sides. Then both the U.S. and the USSR would be faced with requests for air support. He felt that the USSR might supply Soviet-piloted aircraft. The",military,bureaucracies_134,bureaucracies
"Arab-Israel Crisis 1. Middle East Scenario As you know, our scenario on the Middle East situation envisages three steps: c. Contingency planning for testing UAR interference with the right of free passage for ships of all nations through the Strait and the Gulf, and contingency planning for the use of force, as necessary, to support that right. Implementing action would be undertaken only after measures in the United Nations had been exhausted and after Congressional approval had been obtained. 4. A Military Plan to Deal With the Straits of Tiran Question A military task force may be required to support, with force, the right of innocent passage, on behalf of the international community, through the Gulf of Aqaba in view of the UAR's announced blockade. The essence of this concept is that an international force could keep the Strait open for all flags, thereby obviating an Arab-Israeli war. Such a task force should be composed of as many maritime nations as are prepared to join it in a reasonable time. In practice, only the US, the UK and possibly the Dutch and Canadians are likely to participate. Conceptually, the task force would consist of two parts. First, a protective force in the northern Red Sea which would provide a protective presence for merchantmen testing the Straits, and an escort if the UAR, should turn back or fire on unescorted ships; second, a reinforcing force in the Eastern Mediterranean which would be available for reinforcing support if the UAR fired on merchantmen and their escort. A limited protective force of four destroyers (two US and two UK), a tactical command ship (US), and a light aircraft carrier (UK) could be assembled in the northern Red Sea in about a week. If the carrier Intrepid , now in the Mediterranean, transits the Suez Canal in the next few days, together with her appropriate escorts, these could be added to the force. Application for transit of the Canal has been filed. Even with these additions, however, such a force would be devoid of adequate self-contained air cover and ASW protection and thus subject to attack and damage by UAR sea and air forces in the area (the reinforcing force could provide some air cover over the Tiran area, but the distances from the Eastern Mediterranean would limit operational effectiveness). A stronger, better balanced protective force'97augmented primarily by US naval units from CONUS'97could be assembled in 25'9630 days. US and UK forces already in the Mediterranean provide a powerful reinforcing force (consisting of 3 US carriers, 1 UK carrier, and numerous other vessels). British air forces in Cyprus may also be available. If the UAR fired on merchantmen and their escorts, aircraft from these Mediterranean forces could, and might have to, intervene in the Tiran area or strike at major air bases and installations in the UAR. The risks involved in testing the blockade with a limited or even an augmented protective force are not negligible. If Nasser is not deterred, the possibility would exist of wider conflict. This possibility is being urgently studied, both politically and militarily. Dean Rusk 4 Robert S. McNamara 1 'a0 :: opened the meeting with a report on the current Arab-Israeli situation. He described it as serious but not yet desperate: '97We are in touch with the USSR . Privately we find the Russians playing a generally moderate game, but publicly they have taken a harsh view of the facts and have laid responsibility at Israel's door'97and by inference at ours. Syria and Cairo say publicly they have Soviet support; but our general impression is that this is somewhat less than complete. In summary, he could not promise that this crisis would be over in 24 hours; but he had the impression that no government wants war. The :: for an assessment of what is in Nasser's mind. Mr. SPLIT said that, until Nasser threatened to blockade the Gulf of Aqaba, he would have agreed with Mr. helms that all Nasser wanted was a limited propaganda victory. Now that he has gone as far as he has, SPLIT said he cannot help but wonder whether Nasser either has more Soviet support than we know about, or had gone slightly insane. He noted that it is most uncharacteristic for Nasser not to leave a door open behind him, and that is exactly what he appears to have done in this case. SPLIT sketched Nasser's problems and motives on the broader front to include internal economic trouble and a tightening food supply, his drive to regain leadership in the Arab world, and his need to recoup his position on the world stage. 1 'a0",military,bureaucracies_135,bureaucracies
"The purpose of this memorandum is to lay out a course of action for the coming week (or two weeks) which will maximize the chance that we can: (1) achieve our objectives in the Middle East without an Arab-Israeli war; and (2) should such an Arab-Israeli war come about, produce minimum damage to the U.S. position in the world and to our position in our own country, including continued support for the war in Viet Nam. I. The Situation. It is now increasingly clear that the Israelis will wait only about a week to take on themselves the forcing of the blockade at the Gulf of Aqaba. They clearly envisage forcing Nasser to fire the first shot; they will respond on a limited basis in Sinai but be prepared to fight a war against all the Arab forces arrayed against them without external assistance in manpower or other direct application of foreign military force. The plan for an international regatta to force, say, an oil ship through the Straits is unlikely to get operational support except for four countries: the U.S., the U.K., Australia, and Netherlands. The moderate Arabs'97and, in fact, virtually all Arabs who fear the rise of Nasser as a result of this crisis'97would prefer to have him cut down by the Israelis rather than by external forces. Beyond these factors the situation in the Middle East is that the radical nationalism represented by Nasser, while powerful at the moment in the wake of his breakthrough against U Thant, is waning: Arab socialism and other such doctrines have not proved successful; the moderates of the region (Turkey, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon) have done better than Egypt, Syria, and Iraq; Nasser's plans for external expansion have not gone well; in short, we are dealing with Nasser not on a rising trend but in somewhat the same as Khrushchev in the Cuba missile crisis; Nasser is trying to achieve a quick fix against an underlying waning position. II. The Israeli Case for Unilateral Action. The Israelis believe that their long-run future in the area'97including the Arab mentality'97requires that they solve the problem before them on their own. They wish in the end to be part of the Middle East. They feel that dealing with this situation on their own is necessary to achieve not merely self-respect but respect in the region. They believe taking on the blockade themselves will make it easier for the United States to support them in other ways, short of troops. They believe it easier for the U.S. to honor its commitment of 1957 to recognize the legitimacy of their forcing the blockade than to mobilize on an international basis an effective U.S. and international commitment to use force to break the blockade. Their own diplomatic soundings, like ours, make clear how small the party would be prepared to use force to assert the international interests in the Gulf of Aqaba, including Israeli interests. They perceive that the USSR is less likely to intervene with military force if they take on Nasser than for U.S. and a few friends to take on Nasser on the Aqaba issue; and they judge it would be better for U. S.-Arab relations in the long run, but also in terms of Western interests in Middle Eastern oil. III. The Moderate Arab View. Although there is some conflict of judgment, the bulk of the evidence before us indicates that the moderate Arab view'97as well as the view among our Ambassadors to the Arab world'97is that it would be wiser for the Israelis to deal with the present situation than it would be for us. IV. The U.S. Interest and Our Task. '97To open the Gulf of Aqaba to at least oil for Israel'97which has become the test of who wins this trial of will and nerve'97without war if possible. '97To do so in ways which maximize the chance of long-run peace in the area, including movement towards acceptance of Israel as part of the Middle East. '97In any case, to honor all commitments made in 1957'97even, if, in the end, an Arab-Israeli war comes about; that is, our commitment to put through a U.S. flagship; to assert the right of free passage for others; and to regard Israeli counteraction to a UAR attempt to close Aqaba by armed force as involving for Israel legitimate rights of self-defense under the UN Charter. '97To act, in general, in such a way as to unify the political base in the U.S. around our Middle East policy so that we do not weaken the political foundations for our further conduct of the war in Viet Nam. VII. USSR. In the end, whether the outcome is an Arab-Israeli war or a successful transit of the crisis depends a good deal on the USSR. If we move in the way I have indicated, I am moderately optimistic that they will, in the clutch, throw considerable weight on Cairo to accept a pragmatic deal for the following reasons: '97They would not like to see U.S. and other naval powers actually exercised to force the Gulf of Aqaba for non-Israeli ships. '97I believe they honestly fear an Arab-Israeli war because they still believe that the Israelis will win it. If they win it after more than 10 years of pouring Soviet arms into the Middle East, the whole Soviet arms game will be profoundly degraded. It has already been substantially degraded by the outcome in Indonesia. If their military men calculate, like ours, that, at considerable cost in blood, the Israelis could now beat the Arabs armed with Soviet MIG-21s and Soviet tanks, they would do a good deal to avoid that demonstration. On reflection, I suspect this factor has played a big role in their anxiety about the Israelis launching an attack. '97Finally, they have carefully not committed themselves on the question of Aqaba and left it open for them, in the end, to play a kind of Tashkent role. 3 '97Therefore, if we move down this track and assert through the Congress our willingness to back our play on all three 1957 commitments, my hunch is that they will move rather fast to come up with their own kind of formula to avoid the war and try to portray their role as frustrating the designs of American imperialists and Israeli lackeys. If it all ends up with oil going to Eilat, the forces demobilized, UN observers, talk about refugees, development, etc., that would be quite okay with us. WWR 1 'a0 :: noted that he was looking for someone to hold the Israelis back. In conclusion, the",political,bureaucracies_136,bureaucracies
"Overall Arab and Israeli Military Capabilities 1. The judgment of the intelligence community is that Israeli ground forces '93can maintain internal security, defend successfully against simultaneous Arab attacks on all fronts, launch limited attacks simultaneously on all fronts, or hold on any three fronts while mounting successfully a major offensive on the fourth.'94 In the air , the judgment is less clear: the Israelis '93probably could defeat the Egyptian air force if Israel's air facilities were not damaged beyond repair.'94 2. Those judgments rest essentially on the proposition that the quality of Israel's military leadership, its ability to organize operations and maintain its equipment in a high state of readiness, and the high morale and intelligence of the individual Israeli ground soldier will make up for Israel's quantitative inferiority in men and equipment. The Israelis have consistently stressed intensive training, with emphasis on armor, standardization of weapons, rapid and reliable communications, and a very strong tactical intelligence effort. Egyptian capabilities in these areas appear to be inferior. 3. Moreover, in the air, the Israelis have been acutely conscious of the difficulty of defending their air facilities, and have made strenuous efforts to overcome the fact that their bases are very short warning time from the Arab borders. They have '93hardened'94 their fields with dispersed pens, for example. Israeli pilots and tactics are considered superior, and, in terms of operationally assigned fighter aircraft rather than total inventory, Israel has a slight edge'97256 to 222. 4. Israeli planning is based on a short war, conducted by ground forces with air cover. If this assumption should prove wrong, Israel might well be in trouble, since the Arabs' quantitative superiority would come into play. At M+48 hours, for example, Israel would have 280,000 men vs. the Arabs' 117,000 deployed in the vicinity of the Israeli borders. But the total strength of the Arab armies is nearly 500,000, vs. the same 280,000 on the Israeli side. 5. This is not to say that the rout of the Egyptians in 1956 will be repeated. The Egyptian forces have improved substantially in the past eleven years, and they have acquired considerable operational know-how by rotating combat units in Yemen. Nevertheless, we consider that the Israeli forces have retained an over-all superiority. 1 'a0 :: was quite positive in stating there were no nuclear weapons in the area. General SPLIT noted that he had sent a recent assessment to Ambassador Goldberg but had had no response yet. Both Mr. SPLIT and General SPLIT saw any sign of Soviet calculation behind these crises, though of course both admitted that the Soviets would view them as a godsend. The SPLIT said that he felt the USSR likes the situation as it is now but is not ready to rush in. The Soviets would like to bring off a propaganda victory as in the 1950's with them as the peacemakers and saviors of the Arabs, while we end up fully blackballed in the Arab world as Israel's supporter. Mr. SPLIT said he was not as bearish as Secretary mcNamara on Israeli air capability. He said the Israelis had taken the MIG that defected from Iraq last year through all kinds of maneuvers in Israel and had demonstrated in the 7 April air battle with Syria that they had learned their lessons well. The SPLIT thought he had achieved his objective now. Secretary Fowler asked whether he might be looking for someone to hold him back. Mr. Eugene :: ] MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES Summary Israel could almost certainly attain air superiority over the Sinai Peninsula in 24 hours after taking the initiative or in two or three days if the UAR struck first. In the latter case, Israel might lose up to half of its air force. We estimate that armored striking forces could breach the UAR's double defense line in the Sinai within several days. Regrouping and resupplying would be required before the Israelis could initiate further attacks aimed at driving to the Suez Canal. Israel could contain any attacks by Syria or Jordan during this period. Discussion I. General Assessment 1. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are at a numerical disadvantage to the combined strength of Israel's Arab neighbors in terms of aircraft, armor, artillery, naval vessels, and manpower. Nonetheless, the IDF maintain qualitative superiority over the Arab armed forces in almost all aspects of combat operations. The high quality of training and maintenance, the degree of operational proficiency, and the important, but intangible, morale factor give the advantage to the IDF, which operates through a single command structure and over interior lines of communication. 2. In contrast, the Arab states are hampered by a lack of cohesiveness and by friction among Arab leaders. The United Arab Command (UAC), even at the present state of alert, is ineffective either as a command or a coordinating structure. Only the UAR, Syria, and Iraq are coordinating military activity to any extent. Jordan, with limited offensive strength, is reluctant to become heavily engaged. Iraqi participation is limited by distance and internal security needs. Lebanon has no offensive capability. The principal Arab military strength lies with the UAR, which has now mobilized and has deployed the equivalent of about five divisions for a strength of over 50,000 in the Sinai Peninsula. Though field experience acquired by Egyptian forces in Yemen has improved their over-all military capabilities, the presence of some 35,000 UAR troops in Yemen and limited reserves at home restrict the additional forces available for use against Israel. [Omitted here is more detailed discussion.] 1 'a0",military,bureaucracies_137,bureaucracies
"for a detailed run down of our military posture in the Mediterranean and the current disposition of Arab and Israeli forces. In addition to those facts widely current in our intelligence estimates today, General SPLIT indicated that it would be harder to open the Gulf of Aqaba than we had at first thought. Because of the two Egyptian submarines in the Red Sea, we would need an ASW unit, the nearest of which is now in Singapore'97two weeks away. General SPLIT suggested that if Israel does try to open the Gulf, it will attack first by air, striking initially the UAR's naval forces in the Red Sea and the air bases in the Sinai. Only after establishing air superiority would the Israelis try to take out the battery at Sharm al-Sheikh. Therefore if the Israelis move, it might not be possible to localize a strike designed simply to open the Straits. A brief discussion of possible presence of unconventional weapons followed. General SPLIT pointed out that the Egyptians have used three kinds of gas in Yemen. However, Mr. SPLIT said he was less well informed '93but more skeptical.'94 In summary, General SPLIT noted that we have a powerful naval force in the Mediterranean; that our land forces are few, limited to about 1400 Marines now ashore at Naples, three days away; that our nearest ASW unit is two weeks away, since we cannot send one through the Suez Canal; that the UAR coastal battery and naval and air forces in the Red Sea will be the units employed to blockade the Gulf of Aqaba; that we will have trouble with overflight and staging rights in Turkey, Libya and Spain if we have to introduce our own ground forces; and that the Israelis can hold their own. On the last point, the SPLIT promised to review this estimate. The SPLIT responded by saying that our first approach should be to give Israel military aid and all the support it needs for long-term military operations. If we are convinced that the Israelis can hold the Arabs, then we should back them down the line and rely on Arab inefficiency and lack of homogeneity to weaken the Arab cause. We should start immediately discussions with Israelis on their stockpiles and our replenishment capability. Our current understanding is that they are stocked for about 30 days. The SPLIT nor Mr. SPLIT noted that a long war would hurt the Israeli economy. At that point we would have to decide whether we were going to send in forces and confront Nasser directly. The SPLIT said he thought the USSR might just cut its losses and back out. Secretary",military,bureaucracies_138,bureaucracies
"referred to paragraph 9'96a of the report, calling for mobilization of our material, moral and human resources, as '93wishy-washy'94. Mr. :: briefed the members of the Council, and explained that the Planning Board believed that a policy on United States objectives in the event of war was desirable to provide a basis for planning by the appropriate departments and agencies. He pointed out that the present statement had been unanimously approved by the Planning Board, but as yet the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not been received. Admiral SPLIT explained that this statement had been inserted because we had not fully mobilized our human resources in World War II and that we should certainly be aware of the necessity of doing so in any future world war. The :: and to Mr. Streibert for propaganda and cold war purposes. That was one thing, but of course quite different from providing a basis for war plans. Mr. SPLIT stated that he simply wouldn'92t know what to do with the paper if it were sent to him as guidance for the cold war. It seemed to him '93dream stuff, and there was no conceivable way of implementing it. Secretary :: 10 -720 a. Discussed NSC 5410 in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in the reference memorandum. b. Adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 5410 subject to the following changes: -1440 (1) Paragraph 1: Delete the words following '93the United States'94. (2) Paragraph 2: Insert the word '93effective'94 before '93allies'94. (3) Delete paragraphs 6 and 8, and renumber the remaining paragraphs accordingly. (4) Paragraph 9'96a: Insert the word '93fully'94 after '93mobilize'94. (5) Paragraph 9'96g: Renumber as paragraph 8, and reword the beginning as follows: '93The United States should maintain after the . . .'94 -720 c. Noted that the :: reminded the Council of the problem which the Planning Board believed its present report on war objectives would serve. It met the need to provide the military with a general basis on which to develop war plans, and it also provided guidance for the prosecution of the cold war by the psychological warfare planners. Mr. SPLIT pointed out that the previous statement of U.S. war objectives had been written back in 1948 and that the many changes, notably in the development of atomic weapons, since that time required reconsideration of this policy. Mr. SPLIT then referred to the split views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to this paper. One position had been taken by the Chairman of the JCS, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Mr. SPLIT briefly summarized this view. A different position had been taken by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army. Mr. SPLIT also summarized this position. He then suggested that, before hearing the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he understood that the Secretary of State wished to comment on the paper. Secretary SPLIT said that this was not the intention of the Planning Board, and that the paper had no other purpose than to replace the old annex to NSC 162/2, 5 which set forth U.S. objectives in the event that a war was forced upon us by the Soviet Union. In that case, replied Secretary Dulles, the State Department was prepared to accept the paper as it stood. After reading the first eight paragraphs of the draft in order to clarify the nature of the problem and the purpose of the paper, Mr. SPLIT invited Admiral SPLIT then raised the question as to whether the president and the other members of the Council believed that there was any value whatsoever in attempting to set forth U.S. objectives in the event of global war with the Soviet bloc. The paper was by no means hogwash. It had been most carefully worked over, not only as a basis for war planning, but as a guide to propaganda and cold war programs in the near future, as was indicated by paragraphs 6 and 8 9 and by paragraph 9'96f, which set forth the principle of non-predetermination with respect to terms of surrender, border and territorial arrangements, and the forms of administration of government in enemy territory, the independence of national minorities, etc. With respect to the paragraph dealing with post-war organization, the SPLIT replied that a good example of the paper'92s concern with the cold war was provided in paragraph 9'96f, which stressed nonpredetermination with regard to the fate of the enemy territories as opposed to the call for unconditional surrender in the second world war. Mr. SPLIT then asked Admiral SPLIT proposed that the Council adopt the suggestion made by Secretary Humphrey, and the :: explained that the reason why the Planning Board had raised this '93hoary issue'94 was the view of some of its members that a state of mutual deterrence, resulting from atomic plenty on both sides, might enable the Soviet Union to avoid atomic war and nibble the free world to death piece by piece. The :: said that if the Council were to choose this view, the text should be revised to indicate that primary reliance upon our strategic nuclear capabilities should be qualified by a statement that our conventional forces should simultaneously be maintained in an appropriate form. With some heat, the SPLIT had suggested. Governor SPLIT replied that of course he understood the relationship between nuclear and conventional forces, but still thought it best that the report say something explicit on maintenance of conventional forces so that the matter would be thoroughly understood throughout the Government agencies concerned. Secretary :: said it seemed to him that the Council was in agreement on two facts of central priority'97the fact of Soviet power on the one hand, and the cohesion of our allies on the other. Our total national security policies should, accordingly, stress both centers of strength, our own confidence and our sustained power. If we manage to do this we will ultimately weaken the enemy'92s confidence in himself. When that happened, the internal opposition to Communist control will grow stronger as the peoples of these states lose confidence in the success of their system against ours. Conversely, holding our friends together likewise requires an atmosphere of confidence and success. That was why he thought we must not let ourselves get into a position where we seem to be backing away from the challenge. If we backed away from South Asia, the effects would not only be bad in Japan, but in Europe as well. Accordingly, he agreed with the position of the Secretary of State on these areas. We don'92t need to give South Asia top priority in our assistance programs, but we certainly don'92t need to refuse all assistance. Moreover, we will not need, from now on, to spend so much in Europe.",military,bureaucracies_139,bureaucracies
"explained that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been unable to agree on their views, and he therefore requested that the Council postpone action on this statement for one week. The :: to comment on the split views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral SPLIT said that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and he felt that the present draft provided adequate guidance with respect to planning for the contingency envisaged. Admiral Carney and General Ridgway, however, believed that the paper suffered from two very serious deficiencies. The first of these, said Admiral Radford, related to paragraph 3, 6 which Admiral Carney and General SPLIT felt that the views of Admiral Carney and General SPLIT expressed his own opinion that it was impractical to attempt detailed advance planning with respect to political warfare and the post-hostilities settlement. At the conclusion of Admiral Radford'92s statement, the SPLIT whether he believed the paper would be of any use to the war planners in the Pentagon. Admiral SPLIT replied in the affirmative, but Mr. C.D. :: desired to revise in order to define more precisely the degree to which measures necessary to achieve victory over the Soviet bloc should be carried out. Quoting from the portions of the memorandum which set forth the views of Admiral Carney and General Ridgway, Admiral indicated their fear that full exploitation of our nuclear capability might inflict such chaos and destruction and suffering in the Soviet Union as had not been known in Europe since the end of the Thirty Years War. Indeed, in the circumstances it was impossible to visualize how the United States could cope with the victory it might achieve over the Soviets, or how it might hope to establish a workable occupational regime. In sum, any proposed assault upon the capabilities of the USSR to wage war ought to be evaluated in terms both of its possible contribution to victory and in the light of the limiting factors discussed above. As for himself, Admiral SPLIT should not have been directed to a paper dealing with U.S. objectives in the event of war with the Soviet Union, but instead should have been directed toward current basic national security policy as set forth in NSC 162/2. The changes proposed by Admiral Carney and General SPLIT were in fact introduced in order to effect a change in our basic military planning and strategy, and it confused the issue to criticize the war objectives paper. The second major area of disagreement by General SPLIT and Admiral Carney occurred in paragraph 9'96f. 7 As presently written, they believed (and Admiral again quoted from the JCS memorandum) that political planning should not be delayed until the outbreak of war, but should instead be initiated as far in advance as possible. It was further necessary to point up the necessity for determining in greater detail and more precisely how the United States and its allies intend to enforce the terms of peace and to exercise physical control over the Soviet bloc. After quoting these views, Admiral SPLIT and Admiral Carney in their comments on this report. Again to illustrate his views, the SPLIT about their views, as expressed in the JCS memorandum, at any time they wished. It was pointed out that General SPLIT and Admiral Carney were present and prepared to discuss their views, but the :: were at least correct in accusing the United States of being much too idealistic in its relations with other nations. Whatever we may choose to say in public about ideals and idealism, among ourselves we'92ve got to be a great deal more practical and materialistic. Finally, he was not in the least afraid of co-existence. Our American system was sufficiently strong to undertake such a policy, and in competition with the Soviet Union we could certainly beat them. The SPLIT were very skeptical of U.S. negotiations with the Soviet Union unless the USSR demonstrated a basic change of attitude which would be conducive to achieving lasting settlements.",military,bureaucracies_140,bureaucracies
"said that he had a general observation to make. It seemed to him a danger that the present paper, which was supposed to develop U.S. objectives in a war against the Soviet bloc, was becoming confused with the question of ways and means of achieving such objectives. Was this paper actually designed to produce a review of the previous decisions of the NSC with respect to basic security policy and strategy? Mr. SPLIT expressed his agreement with the President'92s doubt as the practicality of any discussion of the post-war organization. Its character would depend on the kind of world that existed when the war was over. It was accordingly utterly academic to discuss such a subject in this paper. The :: said that before addressing himself to the paragraphs in question, he had a few remarks to make on the guidelines report as a whole. He believed it to be a valuable and important paper which had forced the issues up for the Council'92s attention, although, of course, none of them could be settled in an hour'92s time. He hoped, continued Secretary Dulles, to take a week off later on in the summer, after Congress had adjourned, and devote it entirely to these problems. Meanwhile, he expressed agreement with Secretary Wilson'92s position on a reappraisal of U.S. foreign policy. This, of course, ought to be continuously reappraised, but it was particularly important to do so at the present time. Certain of the pre-suppositions which the Administration had inherited seemed not to have been valid. This was particularly true of the pre-supposition of dependence of our allies on the United States. This had turned out to be not as great as had been thought at the end of the war. In some respects this greater independence was a good thing since, after all, one of our objectives had been to assist our allies to stand on their own feet. Over and above these matters, Secretary SPLIT said, we were confronting two basic problems. The first of these arose from the fact that the United States does not have an adequate defense against Communist expansion by means other than war. The Council should bear in mind that in almost every instance the Soviets have historically avoided open war in seeking to obtain their objectives. The exceptions were the winter war against Finland and the assault on Poland in 1939. In general, the Soviets prefer to use the methods of civil war and subversion, and it was through these that they had extended their domination over six hundred million people. They were engaged in this very process in Guatemala, France, and elsewhere. While we have no adequate answer as yet to these methods, we can at least be sure that we will never get an adequate answer in purely military terms. The :: indicated that he could not help but have some sympathy for the general view of the joint chiefs of staff in favor of greater dynamism in the American attitude toward the Soviet Union and Communist China. After all, during the course of the 1952 campaign he had himself called for a more dynamic U.S. policy vis-'e0-vis Communism. However, experience indicated that it was not easy to go very much beyond the point that this Administration had reached in translating a dynamic policy into courses of action, and in any case we had been more dynamic than our predecessors. stated that of course we have ruled out preventive war. In certain quarters it is suggested, however, that while we continue to have atomic superiority over the enemy, we should apply strong and forceful measures to change the basic character of the Soviet system. he assumed that this would call, in effect, for an effort to overthrow the Communist regimes in China and in the European satellites and to detach these countries from the USSR. In his opinion, the effort to implement such a course of action would involve the United States in general war. If it did not, however, and we did succeed in detaching Communist China and the satellites from their alliance with the Soviet Union, this in itself would not actually touch the heart of the problem: Soviet atomic plenty. Even if we split the Soviet bloc, in other words, we would still have to face the terrible problem and threat of an unimpaired nuclear capability in the USSR itself. Accordingly, did not think that this more dynamic and aggressive policy would in fact achieve the desired goal unless it eventuated in a general war which we could win. Moreover, while these more aggressive policies, if successful, might result in the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, they would almost certainly cause the disintegration of the free world bloc, of which we were the leaders, for our allies in the free world would never go along with such courses of action as these. In sum, he must conclude that this kind of aggressive policy was not in the best interests of the United States. Another step which it had been suggested that the U.S. might take, would be to present the USSR with an ultimatum to the effect that if the USSR proceeded to try to take over any other free nation'97such as Vietnam or Finland'97the United States would regard such an attempt as a casus belli. This was another case, said Secretary Dulles, of a step which might possibly succeed. But even if it did succeed, it would not touch the heart of the problem of Soviet atomic capabilities, and would likewise prove disastrous to the unity of the free world coalition. The remaining areas into which the Soviets could expand their powers were not areas'97 except perhaps in the case of the Middle East'97whose acquisition would notably increase the actual power of the Soviet bloc, although the prestige of the latter might gain. Basically, therefore, he felt our present national security policies were pretty generally adequate, There was, of course, great concern at the prospect of future developments in the strength of the Soviet bloc. We need not, however, be too pessimistic. Time might well bring about many changes in the Communist bloc. For example, SPLIT believed that one could properly anticipate that there will be in the future some disintegration of the present monolithic power structure of the Soviet orbit. If conditions were so changed in the orbit that no single nation (the Soviet Union) can decide upon and take sudden action without considering the views of its allies and associates, the risk and threat posed by this single nation would be greatly diminished. Nationalism, in short, may quite conceivably grow apace among the satellites, and it was also logical, from the historical point of view, to expect Communist China to reveal an increasing attitude of independence vis-'e0-vis the USSR. Accordingly, it was possible to foresee the growth within the Soviet bloc of so wide a distribution of power that no single individual could decide on a course of action which would bind all the rest. There was already some slight evidence of such a development, and the United States may itself be able to promote its further growth. In conclusion, therefore, he felt that our policies were in the main adequate to protect our national security. In any case, he could see no clear substitutes for existing policies except in Indonesia, the Middle East, and Vietnam. SPLIT also indicated again the desirability of strengthening ourselves, from an organizational as opposed to a policy point of view, in the field of action to cope with the subversion tactics of our Communist enemies. The SPLIT said that with regard to the question of U.S. assistance to foreign nations, we should recognize that there is tenable ground in between military commitment to save these nations from Communism and total abandonment of the areas to Communism. The verdict of history was that the Soviet leaders had been rather cautious in exercising their power. They were not reckless, as Hitler was; but primarily they rely not on military force but on methods of subversion. This was natural, because the Communist Party was in essence revolutionary and conspiratorial. At the present time they calculate that it is not worth their while to undermine the successful campaign of subversion by indulgence in actions of open brutality. This deterrent is not constituted by our military power, but is based on Soviet reluctance to indulge in actions of aggression which cannot be reconciled with their worldwide propaganda line in favor of peace and co-existence. Hence, if areas exposed to the Communist threat can build up governments capable of maintaining internal security and governments which can'92t be overthrown except by overt, brutal acts of aggression, it will be possible to withstand the present Soviet threat. Accordingly, it will be very much worth our while to provide to these vulnerable nations sufficient military and economic assistance as will enable them to provide for their internal security and for the bettering of their economic health. The situation in Vietnam, was not a typical case but a special case, and we should not generalize on the basis of Vietnam, where the French had messed up the situation so thoroughly. SPLIT then went on to point out that the value of our programs of economic assistance ought not to be exaggerated. The maintenance of adequate security forces in these vulnerable countries was equally important. SPLIT inquired if there was not general acceptance at least of the first two sentences of paragraph 47, which read as follows: '93The U.S. should be ready to negotiate with the USSR whenever it clearly appears that U.S. security interests will be served thereby. The U.S. should continue to take the initiative in advancing proposals for constructive settlements and international cooperation (i.e., atoms for peace) in order to put the Soviets on the defensive and win public support on both sides of the Iron Curtain.'94 If everybody could agree to these two sentences, suggested stopping the paragraph at that point. SPLIT pointed out that we did not actually desire to enter into either negotiation, but felt compelled to do so in order to get our allies to consent to the rearmament of Germany. World opinion demanded that the United States participate in these negotiations with the Communists. -720 } :: on the other hand, believed that we should actively use negotiation in pursuing our strategy, although we should do so without relaxing our defense posture.",political,bureaucracies_141,bureaucracies
"said he was concerned with this paragraph as it related to mobilization requirements. If the question of our military strategy wasn'92t settled, at least for a considerable period, the Defense Department would be unable to provide ODM with a solid set of requirements called for by the agreed strategic plans. We must at least freeze our thinking long enough to make possible a realistic estimate of our mobilization requirements for war. The :: said that he personally subscribed to the view that the threat posed to the U.S. by the USSR had not lessened, though he believed that the threat of global war had lessened. Starting from this point, he was much impressed by the historical fact that our country had enjoyed great prestige throughout the world in past generations when we had actually possessed very little real military power. Certainly, we cannot counter the Soviet threat by borrowing Soviet methods. It was much wiser to use our own methods. He said that he did not think we should announce any line which, if crossed by the Soviets, would bring on war with the United States. On the other hand, we would be wise ourselves to consider carefully those areas where we can and should make our stand. The continent of Asia has never been an area that the European powers could conquer. Hence he was, for lack of a better word, in favor of containment. We were in a position to hold on to the island chain, to the peninsulas of Korea, India and Malaya. We should therefore draw both a military and an economic line including these areas. We should also try to take the heat off certain hot spots such as was currently provided by the Nationalist-held offshore islands. When it comes to aiding these countries economically, he was at least in favor of a policy of helping them to help themselves. We must also have sufficient military strength in these areas to assure their internal security, although we should not build up their military forces to a point which would permit them to indulge in any external aggression. all of us are, of course, conditioned by our own experience. While his was rather limited in international affairs, he had nevertheless had some experience which was useful. Plainly, we must live for the time being with Communism. While we ourselves can'92t do very much externally to destroy it, he was sure that ultimately it would destroy itself. The same applied in a slightly different way to China. China had been a dictatorship for centuries; so had the Soviet Union. These countries had new kinds of dictators now, but these dictators still faced the problem of how to control their population. He did not like the word '93coexistence'94 much better than he liked the word '93containment'94, but coexistence was at least better than cohabitation. Our policy should be strong, but we could no more bully the Soviet Union than we could bully the labor unions. We should, accordingly, deal with the Soviet Union from strength and in the confidence that our own system was much the better, instead of adopting courses of action in imitation of Soviet methods. With respect to trade with the Soviet bloc, was sure that progress could be made if once again we could take the heat off of some of the hot spots. Our best course of action in this area was to return to our traditional open-door policy on the basis of the president'92s concept of net advantage. We should not, however, offer credits to the USSR or to Communist China in order to stimulate trade. The :: suggested that courses of action involving negotiation should be based on the best available intelligence estimate of what is going on in the Soviet Union.",political,bureaucracies_142,bureaucracies
"said the meeting was to enable Mr. Henderson to report and comment upon his trip to the Middle East. He had seen the top Turkish, Iraqi, Jordanian and Lebanese officials, and also our ambassadors in the area. His broad conclusion is that there is a deep concern at what is going on'97anxiety that the Soviets may be able to topple the regimes in each of these countries through their action in Syria. Lebanon is doing an effective job in picking up infiltrators, but the government feels that if something is not done to remove the Soviet-dominated regime in Syria, Lebanon will not survive as an ally of the West '85. The SPLIT said Mr. Henderson reported general agreement on two major propositions'97first, that no military actions would be taken unless there were provocations by the Syrians giving a basis for invoking self-defense; second, the objective can only be to restore Syria to the Syrians'97all disavow the objective of taking over any Syrian territory. Secretary SPLIT said that the United States has been reviewing all possibilities '85. He referred to indications that the Soviets may now be manning the communications nets in Syria'85. At this point the Secretary told the group that he had worked up a paper of findings and recommendations. 2 He circulated it but said he had certain comments to make before the group discussed it. He asked that it be considered in relation to our over-all relation with the Soviet Union. He said he thought General Twining would confirm (and he did) that there has been no military redeployment by the Soviets indicative of preparation for general war. However, political and propaganda moves of the Soviets in the last few weeks clearly indicate an intensification of the cold war, and in his judgment signify a period of the greatest peril for us since the Korean War ended. He cited as evidence of, or contributions to, this situation a sudden dropping of any interest in cultural exchanges; the Syrian take-over by rapid and flagrant measures; their naval maneuvers in the Mediterranean; the threatening tone in their announcement concerning the ICBM; the note they have just sent us on the Mid-East situation, 3 which is couched in the rudest and most provocative terms of any received during his tenure (he indicated he was considering recommending refusing to accept it); a breaking up of the disarmament talks in an atmosphere of curtness and refusal to give our proposals consideration; and accelerated and increased arms movements into the Middle East, including the Yemen in particular. He thought this probably indicated not an intention to precipitate general war, but rather an intention to step up the cold war, to make gains outside of the USSR and divert attention from the internal stresses evidenced in the struggle of last June which Khrushchev barely survived. He said he did not want to exaggerate the gravity of those internal stresses, however. He said he thought that Khrushchev was an extremely dangerous man to be at the head of the state. He is crude and impulsive rather than calculating and careful as previous Soviet leaders have been. The Secretary thought that the pendency of the UN Special Session on Hungary may have caused great Soviet bitterness on the way that situation is being used against them. He thought that many of the leaders in Russia consider Khrushchev too dangerous'97and this may have been the origin of their effort to topple him'97but he was resourceful enough to pull himself through. His policies since then are those of an egotist. He is more like Hitler than any Russian leader we have previously seen. He displays much of the same erratic quality. The SPLIT said he felt the United States should not assume the responsibility either to push these countries into action or to hold them back from actions they may deem vital'97he included Turkey among them. We certainly do not want to repeat the type of pressures that were used on Czechoslovakia to force them to accept Hitler'92s demands. He did feel that the Middle East countries are entitled to know what we will do in various contingencies, so long as we do not usurp their responsibility to make the critical decisions. The SPLIT indicated that if the Soviets pulled this operation off successfully he was afraid the success would go to Khruschchev'92s head and we might find ourselves with a series of incidents like the experience with Hitler. Speaking of the problem of Americans now in Syria, he thought we should take any excuse we can to get them out'97possibly using the mob actions and anti-American demonstrations as the basis. Mr. Rountree and General :: The President Prime Minister Macmillan Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Secretary Dulles We discussed the position in the Middle East, particularly Turkey and Syria. I said that I interpreted the extraordinary activities of the Russians in their radio, press conferences, speeches, appeals to Socialist Parties, United Nations activities and the like as being due to a genuine fear on their part that they might be confronted with either backing down or fighting in the Middle East, and that they did not want to fight at the present time. Perhaps in two or three years from now it might be different. I said this offered a tempting opportunity to force upon the Russians a serious loss of prestige. On the other hand, if this did happen it would certainly give the Russians a powerful incentive to attempt elsewhere or hereafter to regain that prestige at our expense and we might have started a cycle of challenge and response which would lead to general war. Furthermore, the situation was not conducive to military action, although, of course, it might become so as a result of Soviet-Syrian-Egyptian tactics. If Turkey were provoked into war with Syria the Arab neighbors of Syria, whatever their governments really felt, would feel compelled to rally to Syria'92s support and it would be difficult to see how Turkey could extricate itself without leaving the Arab world united and strongly backed by the Soviet Union against all manifestations of Westernism. The situation was not like Czechoslovakia where France and Britain were pressing Czechoslovakia to back down and consent to dismemberment, France doing so despite formal treaty obligations with Czechoslovakia. 2 I said on the other hand I considered it essential to take no action which could be misinterpreted by the Turks as indicating that we had lost our nerve or become frightened by Soviet bluster. The situation in this respect called for the most careful handling. I mentioned in this connection that I learned that it was planned to send our Fleet to the Western Mediterranean and that I had asked that this not be done. JFD}",political,bureaucracies_143,bureaucracies
"disagreespointing out that the off-shore islands are not essential to the defense of Formosa, and stating that he does not consider it within his purview to comment on the impact of the loss of these islands on the U.S. strategic position in the Far East from the political viewpoint. The Acting Secretary of :: of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, together with the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Chief of Naval Operations, recommend that National Policy should be changed to permit U.S. Naval and Air Forces to assist in the defense of 10 selected offshore islands. Quemoy is included among the 10. The majority opinion is to the effect that the Nationalist held offshore islands near the mainland are important but not essential to the defense of Formosa from a military standpoint. However, the majority stresses the psychological effects on the Chinese Nationalist troops and other Asiatic countries inclined to support U.S. policy, of a further loss of territory or troops to the Communists. The majority is also concerned about the number of Chinese Nationalist troops now stationed on the off-shore islands. The majority feel that perhaps these considerations are overriding. The Joint Chiefs point out that action taken by U.S. Naval and Air Forces in support of Nationalist efforts to defend these islands, and particularly those nearest the mainland, will in all probability, require some action by U.S. Forces against selected military targets on the Chinese mainland, and states that this factor must be considered if National Policy is changed to provide such support. The Chief of Staff, United States Army :: differs. :: thinks Quemoy could be held, :: did not believe that any of these offshore islands was of sufficient military importance to warrant commitment of United States forces to hold them. Moreover, General Ridgway, said Admiral Radford, did not believe that the political and psychological importance of these islands (as opposed to their strictly military importance) was a matter which the Joint Chiefs of Staff should '93take into consideration'94 in the expression of their views. At this point, General SPLIT himself intervened to observe that Admiral radford has misstated his position with respect to the last point. He said it would be correct to say that the Chief of Staff of the Army did not believe that the political and psychological importance of the islands was '93a matter for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to evaluate'94. General SPLIT said that this was an important distinction, after which Admiral SPLIT , however, believed that it would be necessary to commit at least one United States division. Mr. SPLIT would join the majority, that if there were to be restrictions against attacks on the Communist mainland the Joint Chiefs of Staff would recommend against the provision of U.S. armed assistance for the defense of the islands. Secretary SPLIT wished to add anything to the discussion. General SPLIT said he would appreciate an opportunity to read three conclusions from his paper which explained in greater detail his earlier views as presented by Admiral Radford. Addressing himself to Admiral Radford, Mr. SPLIT pointed out that as he was leaving his office that morning to come to the Council meeting, he had had a report from his G'962, General Trudeau, to the effect that the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee had reversed their previous estimate and now agreed with him that the Chinese Communists would press the attack against Quemoy even if they were aware that the United States would intervene to defend Quemoy. The Director of Central Intelligence commented, with some irritation, that it would have been useful for him to have had information of this change of view before briefing the National Security Council. Admiral :: contradicted Mr. Dulles, and said that the Quemoys had had a garrison approximately the present size ever since the abandonment of the mainland. It was, however, only a year ago last July that the United States had enlarged its program of training and assistance to include Nationalist forces on these outlying islands. This change of U.S. policy had finally permitted the rotation of Nationalist divisions. Prior to this time the garrison had been static. SPLIT replied to the Vice President'92s question by stating his belief that our prestige had been committed 100%. While we had not extended our military aid and assistance program to Chinese Nationalist forces on the offshore islands until last summer, we had actually been encouraging the Chinese Nationalist Government to hold on to these islands since 1951. This latter fact was, of course, well known to the Chinese Communists. The National Security SPLIT to present these views at this point orally to the Council. Secretary SPLIT to discuss the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the outset, Admiral SPLIT stated that the views of the Joint Chiefs on the subject were split. The majority view, which he endorsed, regarded the retention of the offshore islands as of very great importance, and recommended the use of U.S. armed forces, if necessary, to prevent Communist seizure of these islands. Moreover, the majority view recommended that if the United States did decide to provide such armed assistance, there should be no public announcement of this decision. Ten of these islands, said Admiral Radford, were regarded as really important. The remainder had little significance. Admiral SPLIT then indicated that the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Ridgway, dissented from this majority view. According to Admiral Radford, General SPLIT read to the Council from General Ridgway'92s written views. 8 Mr. SPLIT agreed that the islands were not essential to the defense of Formosa, but said that they had great importance even from the strictly military point of view. After further discussion of the strategic importance of these islands, Admiral SPLIT read the remainder of General Ridgway'92s minority opinion and also the conclusions of the majority view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. SPLIT said that of course the size of the U.S. commitment'97would depend in the last analysis on the size of the Chinese Communist effort, but it was the view of the majority of the Chiefs of Staff that initially, at any rate, the United States could provide an adequate defense of these islands with forces that were available in the Western Pacific at the present time. If the Chinese Communists enlarged their own operations, we would be obliged in turn to step up our own forces. Such a course of action, however, would apply to any kind of limited military action to put out '93brush-fire'94 wars, as outlined in NSC 162/2. 9 Mr. SPLIT replied that in the majority opinion of the Joint Chiefs, United States ground forces would not be needed. General SPLIT replied that this varied in different areas. In the case of the northern group (the Tachen Islands) a successful defense could probably be conducted without any action against the mainland. However, if the Chinese Communists threw in all their available air power against the Tachens, it might be necessary to strike against mainland air bases. In the case of the central group of islands somewhat the same situation would obtain as in the case of the Tachens. With respect to the Quemoys, however, it could be taken as certain that operations by U.S. armed forces would require some action against the mainland in order, for example, to silence the shore batteries and sink the junks. Admiral SPLIT added that it was the majority opinion that no decision to commit U.S. forces to the defense of these islands should be made unless the U.S. Commander were to be permitted to attack such mainland military installations as he deemed necessary. We do not want to repeat the mistake of the Yalu River decision, which permitted a sanctuary for Communist aircraft. Admiral SPLIT concluded that it was certainly the view of the majority of the Chiefs, and probably a view in which General SPLIT replied that in order to answer Mr. Cutler'92s inquiry it would be best to turn back into history. Something like IVAG, General Chennault'92s '93Flying Tigers'94, had been set up in the early stages of the war against Japan. 12 The existence of this group had been well known to the Japanese. Special legislation had to be enacted in order to permit United States officers to serve with the Chennault group. For the most part, also, the Chunking Government had paid the costs of the Flying Tigers. The situation today was very different. The United States would be obliged to bear all the expenses of IVAG and to furnish all the planes, and, as he had said earlier in Council discussion of the subject, he believed that these planes could be more usefully employed by the U.S. Air Force. Furthermore, continued Admiral Radford, the subterfuge of an International Voluntary Air Group wouldn'92t really work. Everyone would realize that it was sponsored by the United States. Chiang Kai-shek might well not agree to permitting Formosa to be the host country. Finally, IVAG alone could not possibly be a substitute for U.S. commitment of its armed forces. If these islands were to be successfully defended we would certainly have to provide almost all the logistical support as well as whatever naval support was required. The SPLIT said he disagreed with Mr. Dulles'92 response to the third question. He doubted very much whether we could ever induce Chiang Kai-shek to agree to evacuate his forces from Formosa, but even if he could be brought to agree to this, the result might be a revolt and the loss of control of Formosa. Formosa might even go over to the Communists. We must consider our course of action in the light of our total strategic position in the Far East. The SPLIT , speaking from the viewpoint of his former position as CINCPAC, said that there were still other advantages in holding on to these islands'97notably as a potential jumping-off point for a Nationalist invasion of the mainland. Indeed, it was precisely this threat which made the Chinese Communists so anxious to capture the islands. Admiral SPLIT also pointed out that although when he first took office president Eisenhower had publicly changed the orders of the Seventh Fleet in such fashion as to permit the Chinese Nationalists to make raids on the mainland, in point of fact we had privately informed Chiang Kai-shek that he must undertake no such actions without U.S. concurrence. Accordingly, we have had in effect a continuing veto on Chinese Nationalist raids against the mainland. Referring to Secretary Smith'92s earlier discussion of possible alternative courses of action to assist in defending the islands by replacement of Chinese Nationalist losses of aircraft, naval vessels, etc., Mr. SPLIT replied that while the Chinese Nationalists could probably make use of more aircraft than we have thus far supplied to them, this could not be done in time to have any decisive effect on the action against Quemoy. Admiral SPLIT said that the Nationalists were very reluctant to risk their prized F'9684 jets for the defense of Quemoy, since they thought these aircraft might be needed to defend Formosa itself. The Nationalists might, however, be willing to risk these F'9684'92s over Amoy if they were assured that the United States would replace losses. Admiral SPLIT then read from a message of inquiry on this subject which he had sent to Admiral Stump, and from Admiral Stump'92s preliminary reply on the Chinese Nationalist supply situation. 13 Mr. SPLIT noted that he likewise had been ignorant of this change of position. Dr. SPLIT and the majority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were adopted, it would be necessary to seek authority from Congress to carry out this course of action. The Attorney General replied that of course the SPLIT expressed agreement with this opinion, and cited the precedents set by SPLIT replied that the primary reason behind this recommendation was that if no U.S. announcement were made it would help to confuse the enemy with respect to our intention. Secretary :: said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not envisaged a stalemate situation with the U.S. forces tied down. If the Chinese Communists attacked the offshore islands we would use mostly our carriers which were in the area in normal training and rotation, provided we conducted adequate reconnaissance to be able to take care of the situation. He said that arrangements were in being whereby our forces could go down to that area and come back in case of attack. He did not feel that we would get into a general war with Communist China if we undertook to repulse attacks of the kind under consideration. On the other hand, if the Chinese Communists attacked again in Korea, we would be able to take out key communications and military targets in China and thereby tie up Communist China with the U.S. forces presently in the Far East. Admiral SPLIT felt that, from a military point of view, handling this kind of attack would not pin down U.S. forces provided we kept mobile forces available in the area. General SPLIT expressed the belief that we could prevent the loss of the Tachens and the Matsu Islands without hitting Communist China, but could not defend Quemoy without an attack on the mainland. He believed that the minute we knew that the Chinese Communists were about to launch an air attack on Quemoy, we should go after the airfields in China from which they would launch such an attack. The SPLIT said that all the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that we should not go into such a war with any arbitrary limitations on our forces. The :: was inclined to disagree with the view that the Nationalists had been caught off guard. He indicated, however, that they had lost one LST and that another LST, as well as a Nationalist gunboat, had been severely damaged. Mr. SPLIT interposed to state that the situation in the Tachens was currently such that they could not be held by the Nationalists if the Chinese Communists succeeded in interdicting the supply lines between Formosa and the Tachens. The answer to this problem appeared to be an increase in the number of F'9686 aircraft delivered to the Nationalists by the United States. The United States has already provided a certain number of F'9686'92s. General Twining, said Admiral Radford, was of the opinion that it was possible to speed up the delivery of other F'9686'92s so that they could be on hand before April 15, after which date the Nationalists believe that the real Chinese Communist effort to take the Tachens can be expected. Admiral SPLIT also thought that it would be advantageous from the point of view of the United States if the Chinese Nationalists were successful in producing attrition of the Chinese Communist Air Force. Beyond that, the delivery of an additional wing of F'9686'92s would enable the Chinese Nationalists to run an effective air patrol over the Tachen Islands on those days in which there were concentrations of vessels in the port. Admiral SPLIT also indicated the desire of the Chinese Nationalists for eight additional LST'92s. He advised that these vessels could and should be sent if the United States desires that the Chinese Nationalists hold on to the Tachen Islands. Admiral SPLIT concluded by stating that General Chase had informed him that the defenses of the Tachen Islands were very strong, and that the problem of resupply was the real key to the situation. The National Security :: briefed the Council on the military situation in the Formosa area. He began by saying that the Joint Chiefs were watching with great interest all developments at airports in Fukien Province. Three U.S. photo reconnaissance planes had been given Chiang in order to obtain current information about this area on the mainland. Admiral SPLIT added that if our commanders were unable to get information satisfactory to them by this means, they would put U.S. reconnaissance planes over this area. Admiral SPLIT indicated that the Chinese Communists would reveal their intentions to attack Quemoy and the Matsus if they moved their air force to fields in Fukien. He estimated that the Communists might attack the islands separately, or attack all of them at once. He said he was faced with the serious problem of replacing aircraft lost in combat, especially jet planes, which had been given to the Chinese Nationalists for the defense of the offshore islands. He reported that the Chinese Nationalists were now holding the Matsus and the Quemoys and Nanchi, the latter being the most northern outpost now held by the Nationalists. Secretary SPLIT responded that Nanchi did provide a radar location and it was now the most northern outpost of Formosa. He added that it was held by a small garrison, and that its loss would not be comparable to that of the Quemoys or the Matsus because there was very little U.S. equipment on the island. The Chinese Nationalists, he added, state that they cannot withdraw from Nanchi without serious loss of morale. Chiang has taken the position, he added, that he will not voluntarily withdraw from any other island he now holds. Secretary SPLIT replied that Nanchi had always been considered separate from the Tachens. He continued by calling attention to the inability of the military to stay within the programmed limitation on the replacement of U.S. equipment lost by the Nationalists in current fighting. He said adequate funds were available and that the real problem was to get airplanes into the theater quickly enough. (In response to a question asked by Dr. Flemming later in the discussion, Admiral SPLIT stated that his problem was not one of producing planes or parts, but of delivering the craft to the bases from which they were flown.) Governor SPLIT said he was concerned about the possibility of an awkward situation developing in Formosa. If the Communists attacked Formosa, military action would have to be taken very fast. Because we do not know the Communist intentions, we face an uncertain situation. Secretary SPLIT stated that the Communists were not interested in the offshore islands, but they sought to destroy the strong Nationalist forces on the islands and on Formosa. The SPLIT replied that we had told them we would not help defend Nanchi, and that it would be difficult for them to hold it. Governor :: confined himself to pointing out that the Chinese Nationalists were currently engaged in reinforcing the garrisons on the Matsu Islands. Secretary SPLIT said that he merely wanted to say that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have consistently asserted that we should have to use atomic weapons. Indeed our whole military structure had been built around this assumption. He said that he was convinced that we could not handle the military situation in the Far East, particularly as regards aircraft, unless we could employ atomic weapons. We simply did not have the requisite number of air bases to permit effective air attack against Communist China, using conventional as opposed to atomic weapons. Mr. SPLIT as to the probable timing'97that is, the season of the year'97most favorable for a Communist attempt to seize the offshore islands or Formosa itself. With regard to the offshore islands, Admiral SPLIT replied that the attempt could be made at almost any time. The most favorable season for an attempt against Formosa itself would be the interval between April and October. Mr. SPLIT stated that there was insufficient U.S. personnel attached to General Chase'92s mission on Formosa to evaluate accurately intelligence materials provided by the Chinese. As Secretary SPLIT replied that this was not necessarily the case. The matter of morale was largely a factor of the reality of hopes to return to the mainland. Such hopes were necessary to sustain these 700,000 military men. The SPLIT answered that continuing to hold these offshore islands was of immense help to the morale of the Chinese Nationalist forces, for the very reason that in these islands the Nationalist forces came into actual contact with the enemy. This tended to provide some tangible hope of ultimate return to the mainland. In a philosophical vein, Secretary SPLIT as to whether or not the intelligence available to the United States Government provided any answer to the question whether the Chinese Communists were likely to make a major attempt to seize the offshore islands prior to the Afro-Asian Conference. Admittedly, continued Admiral Radford, they had the capability to seize the islands, though they would encounter very great difficulty in the effort to take the Quemoys. The National Security :: said the principal problems facing the U.S. if we had to intervene during the next 6'968 weeks would be: -1440 1. Communications, because of language difficulties and codes. 2. The defense of the Formosan airfields against Chincom retaliation, if it were necessary to attack Chincom mainland bases. -720 SPLIT felt that all other questions, such as coordination of Naval Operations, etc., were within our capabilities (if we attack these questions vigorously and imaginatively). However, to defend Formosa from air attack, it will be necessary for the U.S. to improve fire control and warning equipment on Formosa. The Formosa airfields require local anti-aircraft defense and more skilled operating personnel. The equipment might be obtained from our stocks in Japan, but it will probably be necessary to import operating personnel from the U.S. SPLIT thought that to defend Formosa adequately from air attack, and to improve intelligence, training, and command direction, would require augmenting U.S. personnel on Formosa from something over 1,000, as at present, to around 11,000. e. Secretary SPLIT thought an attack on the Matsus would be easier to handle. He felt the Chincom attack would build up slowly, and would not come as a sudden overwhelming action; that the Chinats could hold off a slow build-up and slow attack. The :: said there was considerable Chincom mainland buildup near Quemoy and near the Matsus,'97artillery positions and tunneling. Twining said it was obvious that the Chincoms were not going to attack Formosa at this time, because there had not been a sufficient build-up of mainland airfields. U.S. surface forces could not be conveniently used to defend against a Chincom attack on Quemoy, but could be conveniently used to defend against Chincom attack on Matsu. The Chinats with our help are planning to lay a cheap type of mine field in the Quemoy Channel, which would be generally effective. We have four destroyers constantly available on Formosa patrol. c. Apparently the Chincoms are putting in some 250 guns in tunneled emplacements around Quemoy. Because Quemoy is so much tunneled for defense, there is really only one particularly sensitive enemy artillery emplacement,'97i.e., the emplacement which can fire directly on the landing beaches on Quemoy which provide Quemoy'92s logistic support. The Chinats do not have much offensive heavy bombing power. They do have two batteries of 155'92s. If these batteries were located on the high land in Quemoy, and fired at the Chincom gun emplacement which threatens the Chinat landing beaches, it ought to be possible to wreak havoc with such enemy emplacement. SPLIT thought we should encourage the Chinats to take action against this enemy emplacement. The SPLIT thought the U.S. ought to be able to set the stage so as to defer an effective Chincom attack during the next two months. SPLIT replied that Stump understood the point of view expressed by the President. h. Communication between Washington and the tactical forces off Formosa is relatively rapid. The order on the Tachens was received in Taipai one hour and 53 minutes after dispatch, and one hour later it was in the hands of tactical units. i. The SPLIT said on his last visit he had been told by a leading Chinese General that Chinat army morale was very bad. k. It was pointed out that there is a civilian population of 20,000 8 on Quemoy. SPLIT felt they would not necessarily be killed in the fighting, but could hide in caves and holes. l. Secretary :: expressed hearty agreement with the President'92s opinion on this point. Mr. SPLIT pointed out that the Chinese paid back the Russians chiefly in raw materials. [Here follow comments by SPLIT for any remarks he wished to make on the military situation in the Formosa area. Admiral SPLIT expressed the opinion that the fact that we have so little operational intelligence regarding the Chinese Communist build-up for an assault on the offshore islands, should not be taken to mean that such a build-up is not going on. For example, the mainland airfields could be made ready for use in a very few days in so far as the runways are concerned. Admiral SPLIT thought that the Chinese Communists were moving in jet fuel and other supplies to these bases, even though such activities were not actually revealed by photo reconnaissance. Accordingly, he concluded, we must assume that the Chinese Communists are getting ready just as fast as they can. The National Security :: suggested the desirability of a coordinated intelligence estimate as to the probable number of civilian casualties which might be estimated if the plans outlined by Admiral :: briefed the National Security Council on the kind of war plans which the United States might resort to if it became involved in hostilities with Communist China in the Formosa and related areas. 4 He described the status of the Chinese Nationalist forces and the change in priorities for U.S. equipment for these Nationalist forces since the situation had become serious last September. He went on to describe both the Chinese Communist and the Chinese Nationalist order of battle before going into the plans of the United States. At the conclusion of Admiral Radford'92s report, Secretary SPLIT replied that precision atomic weapons would be used, and that except in one or two instances no large cities or concentrations of civilian population were involved in the targets. Secretary SPLIT thought that these might be taken out by resort to conventional weapons, but that such a decision would have to be taken by the Commander-in-Chief. General SPLIT were to be implemented. The :: pointed out that after all, the United States had warmly encouraged the Chinese Nationalists to continue to hold all the offshore islands. The SPLIT expressed the opinion that it might be desirable to move some of our carriers toward the area of the Tachens at once. The SPLIT a question: Suppose, in the course of our movements, Chiang Kai-shek should tell us that he was prepared to abandon these offshore islands. What effect would such a move have on the U.S. strategic position in this area? Admiral SPLIT replied that he would favor holding on to these islands if we really meant to defend Formosa, because of the importance of their location at the harbor entrances of Amoy and Fuchow. To lose these islands would make the defense of Formosa a great deal more difficult, even though the U.S. Chiefs of Staff have agreed that their retention was not vital to the defense of Formosa. The islands, added Admiral Radford, were especially important for our air reconnaissance of China. The",military,bureaucracies_144,bureaucracies
"asked the president whether or not Dulles should go on to Formosa as result of invitation from Chinese Nationals. Pros and cons were discussed. SPLIT sending long report sent in by Allison 3 with regard to a confidential discussion some pro-American Japanese had with Chou En-lai. His estimate of situation serious. SPLIT and SPLIT asked about undertaking evacuation in case full-scale invasion is made. SPLIT said on his own authority he had told Nationalists that we would concur in any defensive action they undertook. :: had up to now taken the view that the United States should assist the Chinese Nationalists to defend these islands, even though they were not militarily essential to the defense of Formosa, provided these islands were militarily defensible and after talking with Congressional leaders. In a second message to Secretary SPLIT had reiterated the importance he attached to the estimate that these islands could be defended if U.S. forces were provided. If the islands were not militarily defensible we would simply be involved in another Dien Bien Phu, with all its serious implications. After thus summarizing the views of Secretary Dulles, Secretary :: said that the views that he would present were tentative, since Secretary dulles was out of the country. However, he had been in communication with Secretary dulles on the subject of the offshore islands, and would first present the Secretary'92s personal views since, of course, Secretary dulles had had no opportunity to discuss the issue with his advisers in the State Department. In any event, Secretary SPLIT on the subject, Secretary SPLIT proceeded to give his own personal views on the problem. In the first place, he was inclined to agree with the views of the G'962 member, rather than of the State member, of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, as set forth in SNIE 100'964-54, that the Chinese Communists would make a determined effort to capture the Quemoys even if they were convinced that United States armed forces would be committed in order to hold the islands. Secondly, if they were prepared to take the heavy casualties resulting from such action, Secretary SPLIT said he believed that the Chinese Communists could capture the Quemoys unless the United States committed ground forces to their defense. Thirdly, the loss of the Quemoys would have a very serious adverse effect on the prestige of the United States. If we did undertake to commit U.S. forces and these islands nevertheless were captured, the adverse effect on U.S. prestige would be even more serious. Fourth, Secretary SPLIT said he was inclined to doubt whether the Quemoys were so vitally important to the defense of Formosa that we should commit United States armed forces to their defense unless we were reasonably sure in advance of success. Fifth, Secretary SPLIT said it was in his view pretty certain that the defense of the Quemoys would involve action on a considerable scale against the Chinese Communists, and would also involve the necessity of committing U.S. ground forces. At the conclusion of Secretary Smith'92s comments, Secretary SPLIT to comment on this difference in viewpoint. Secretary Smith, again speaking personally, said he was inclined to side with Admiral Radford. He then said that he believed that there were some alternatives to either giving up the islands to enemy control or committing U.S. military forces to save them. Among the things that we might do, should we decide not to intervene in strength with our armed forces, were the following: We could certainly provide greatly needed additional long-range artillery to the Nationalist forces on Quemoy. We could keep the U.S. Fleet nearby, and we could avoid disclosing U.S. intentions. We could undertake to replace all planes and naval vessels lost by the Chinese Nationalists, and we could provide additional anti-aircraft artillery. We could keep open the lines of communication and tell the world we were proposing to do so. The Chinese Communists might well deduce that more was meant by such a statement than we had actually in mind. Finally, we could agree to take part in a '93rescue operation'94. Secretary SPLIT said that he had discussed this latter idea with the SPLIT commented that in addition to providing bases from which guerrilla raids could be launched, these offshore islands had been useful in providing a military threat to the Communist mainland which had compelled the Chinese Communists to deploy a number of divisions to guard against the threat. Indeed, when he had been Director of Central Intelligence, and after Mr. SPLIT added that in his opinion the Chinese Communists would launch the attack unless convinced that the United States would go to all-out intervention against Communist China. SPLIT added that if the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to inform the SPLIT cited certain statements of Secretary Dulles, notably at his recent press conference in Formosa, in which the Secretary of State had indicated his view that the relationship of the offshore islands to the over-all defense of Formosa was primarily a military question. 14 S. Everett Gleason} :: expressed the hope that the Council would never have to make a more difficult decision. An overwhelming case can be made on either side. We can make a case that the Communists are probing and pushing to find out where we will stop, and that any sign of weakness will not make peace more likely, but that we will finally have to fight, possibly under less advantageous conditions. There are signs that the Indochina settlement gave the Chinese Communists their head. They have shown an aggressive policy against Formosa, both by their propaganda statements and their actions, such as at Quemoy. A powerful case can be made that unless we stop them, a Chinese Nationalist retreat from the islands would have disastrous consequences in Korea, Japan, Formosa, and the Philippines. Secretary SPLIT said the other side was that to go to the defense of the offshore islands as they now stand would involve us in war with Communist China. Outside of Rhee and Chiang, the rest of the world would condemn us, as well as a substantial part of the U.S. people. The British fear atomic war and would not consider the reasons for our action to be justified. Possibly very few Americans would agree. Secretary SPLIT said that this plan needs further analysis and study, since he had only thought of it while isolated from his staff on the plane. He thought it offered the possibility of avoiding going to war alone with the moral condemnation of the world or of having the effect of the loss of the islands on the defense of Formosa. This effect, while not strictly military, would nevertheless be that the land power on Formosa would collapse. It will be important to find out if the UK will go along with this plan. If so, it might mark the beginning of our coming together on the Far East. The question of the acceptance of the plan by Chiang would have to be considered. The SPLIT said that he thought during this period of study our general posture in the Far East should be continued, particularly as exemplified by our reaction to the recent plane incidents and our naval visits to the Tachens. The SPLIT expressed the view that it would be disastrous if an impression was gained that a decision had been made either way. The :: interrupted to state that Chiang had been told that the United States would not help to defend Nanchi. Secretary SPLIT replied that it was necessary to balance the psychological disadvantage of losing Nanchi against the gain to the Nationalists if they put up a good fight. He added that the Chinese Nationalists believed that the demonstration of their willingness to fight for Nanchi was worth the possible loss of the island. He said that if the United States tried to persuade Chiang to withdraw from Nanchi, we would have to stiffen other commitments. He believed we should allow them to go their own way as regards Nanchi. Secretary SPLIT replied that NSC policy was clear as to our intention to defend Formosa and the Pescadores, and that we had made a public announcement to that effect. He recalled that the SPLIT said he was looking at his Far Eastern itinerary to see whether it would be possible for him to visit Formosa. If so, he would talk to Chiang about Nanchi. However, we assume great responsibility if Chiang withdraws from Nanchi in response to our coercion. We did not force the withdrawal from the Tachens, Secretary SPLIT added, but merely gave counsel and advice when they raised the question of whether they should withdraw from the Tachens. He said it is one thing to give advice, but beyond that, bargaining for additional commitments begins. Secretary SPLIT noted that Nanchi is not essential to the defense of Formosa, and that the same arguments apply to it as applied to the Tachens. The SPLIT recalled that in negotiations with Chiang the U.S. had asked him not to weaken Formosa by taking a disproportionate amount of U.S. equipment to the offshore islands. The SPLIT replied that the UN could not help us in this current situation. The SPLIT noted that even if the Nationalists gave up the Quemoys and the Matsus, the problem of Formosa would not be solved. He added that the Communists were worried by the Nationalist Army on Formosa, which was a threat to the middle of their coastal area. He said the Communists wanted to destroy a rival and to disband the present government on Formosa. He added that the British and the Canadians did not agree with this view of the Communist objective, but that they were wrong on this point. The :: reported to the president the conclusions from my trip. With reference to Quemoy and Matsu, SPLIT said SPLIT did not think that as things now stood we could sit by and watch the Nationalist forces there be crushed by the Communists. SPLIT felt that the reaction not only on Formosa but in other parts of Asia would be dangerously bad. On the other hand, SPLIT hoped that if there was time, Chiang might reorient his policies so that less importance would attach to these islands. SPLIT referred to my statement to Chiang which the SPLIT said that this would require the use of atomic missiles. The SPLIT asked the president to look over the last pages of my draft report 3 to be sure that the emphasis and tone met with his approval. :: began to speak, Mr. SPLIT then took the floor. He explained that he had pretty well covered the general aspects of his Far Eastern trip in his recent speech. He wanted, therefore, to confine himself on this occasion to the Formosa problem, which he had found to be critical and acute. Perhaps, he speculated, we should have taken this problem more seriously at an earlier time. It seemed to him at least an even chance that the United States would have to fight in this area before we were through. Secretary SPLIT expressed the emphatic belief that the Chinese Communists were determined to capture Formosa. As to the related problem of Quemoy and the Matsus, it bristled with difficulties. No solution to the Formosa problem would be provided if the United States determined to give up Quemoy and the Matsus to Communist China. We would still thereafter face an unmitigated threat to Formosa itself. So the question of a fight for Formosa appeared to Secretary SPLIT as a question of time rather than a question of fact. This, he said, did not necessarily mean general war, but the Chinese Communists would have to put our resolution to hold Formosa to the test before there was any chance that they would give up their determination to seize the island. Recent reports, said Secretary Dulles, indicated to him very clearly that the real resolve and the ultimate objective of the Chinese Communists was the liquidation of the Chinese Nationalist Government if this lay within their power. Their ultimate objective vis-'e0-vis Formosa was to rid themselves of a rival power close at hand. Parenthetically, said Secretary Dulles, this was the same impression which U Nu, the Burmese Prime Minister, held respecting Chinese Communist objectives. Secretary SPLIT noted that the contents of a message which Chou En-lai had sent to Sir Anthony Eden 2 substantially restated the familiar position that Communist China took vis-'e0-vis the United SPLIT said he now wished to give special consideration to certain specific aspects of this general situation. The first concerned the timing of any U.S. intervention. He earnestly hoped that the United States might avoid any armed clash with the Communist Chinese until after the ratification of the London'96Paris agreements. 3 Accordingly, in so far as it was possible without sacrificing our vital objectives, we should temporize regarding Formosa until the ratification of the WEU pacts had actually been accomplished. His second important point, said Secretary Dulles, was to emphasize the importance of making U.S. public opinion genuinely aware of the very grave prospect which the United States faced in the Formosa area. He did not believe that American opinion in general was aware of how critical the issues were. Thirdly, Secretary SPLIT called for urgent steps to create a better public climate for the use of atomic weapons by the United States if we found it necessary to intervene in the defense of the Formosa area. Conversations he had had with our military people in the area, continued Secretary Dulles, had pretty well convinced him that atomic weapons were the only effective weapons which the United States could use against a variety of mainland targets, particularly against Chinese Communist airfields which they would use to attack Formosa, against key railroad lines, and gun emplacements. Accordingly, Secretary SPLIT thought that very shortly now the Administration would have to face up to the question whether its military program was or was not in fact designed to permit the use of atomic weapons. We might wake up one day and discover that we were inhibited in the use of these weapons by a negative public opinion. If this proved to be the fact, our entire military program would have to be drastically revised and we should have to develop duplicate programs involving conventional weapons on the one hand and nuclear weapons on the other. There was indeed very great concern on the part of our military people in the Formosa area with respect to this particular problem. It was of vital importance, therefore, that we urgently educate our own and world opinion as to the necessity for the tactical use of atomic weapons. At the President'92s suggestion, continued Secretary Dulles, he had included reference to this point in his recent speech, but much more remained to be done if we were to be able to make use of tactical atomic weapons, perhaps within the next month or two. Public opinion in Asia was not at all attuned to such a possibility. His next point, said Secretary Dulles, was to point to the necessity that this country pay much more careful attention to the problem of the loyalty of the Chinese Nationalist forces on Formosa itself. Secretary SPLIT indicated his view that we had in the past been far too complacent about this matter. If even a small portion of a Chinese Communist military force succeeded in making a landing on Formosa and was thereafter met by the defection of one or more of the Chinese Nationalist armies, the situation could be very serious. Morale on the island was in general not too good and, of course, had lately been shaken by the withdrawal of the garrisons from the Tachens, etc. It was accordingly not inconceivable that with skillful bribery some of the Chinese Nationalist generals could be bought by the Communists. This had happened many times before in the history of China, and indeed one of the reasons for becoming a general in China was to get oneself bought. Chiang Kai-shek therefore faced a very difficult task to maintain or to restore morale. In the latter connection, said Secretary Dulles, he had undertaken during his visit to paint for the Generalissimo a somewhat different picture, stressing the long-term future of Formosa rather than the prospect of any early return to the mainland; but such a drastic transition of attitude obviously presented difficult problems. The problems would certainly not be settled by any methods of shock treatment. Employment of shock treatment methods would risk the loss of Formosa, and if that island were lost the entire U.S. position in Asia would be lost with it. All the foregoing, Secretary SPLIT indicated, seemed to point up the fact that in some respects our U.S. intelligence material had not been too good. The personnel of our U.S. MAAG on Formosa were too few in number and too busy to give this problem adequate attention, and Admiral Carney was now concerning himself with it personally. Along with this emphasis on more adequate operational intelligence, the Administration must see to it that we do everything we possibly can to develop the capabilities of the Chinese Nationalist Government itself to protect Formosa and the offshore islands, at least until such time as the London'96Paris pacts are ratified. On the whole, Secretary SPLIT reiterated, the situation was far more serious than he had believed it to be before he had taken his trip. He again repeated his conviction that the Chinese Communists will not call it quits on Formosa on any terms that the United States could accept. Sir Anthony Eden himself may be beginning to realize that the foregoing is the real position of Communist China. The Communist Chinese will never accept our position in Formosa until they have had demonstrated to their satisfaction that we cannot be dislodged from this position. Therefore, Communist probing will go on, and there will perhaps be no definite answer until the United States decides to '93shoot off a gun'94 in the area. We may have to demonstrate our position by deeds rather than by words. In accordance with the foregoing, Secretary SPLIT repeated his injunction that we improve our intelligence material and that we give as much mat'e8riel support to the Chinese Nationalists as possible in order to avoid the contingency of too early intervention by United States armed forces, and finally, to be ready if necessary to use atomic weapons. Admiral SPLIT had said, General Chase has only a small MAAG, with insufficient personnel to handle adequately the operational intelligence which was available. Referring to Secretary Dulles'92 comments on the state of morale on Formosa, the SPLIT replied that of course morale on Formosa depended very largely on the United States itself. To this, the SPLIT observed that of course time changes things; but at this particular moment the United States could not sit idly by and watch the Chinese Nationalist forces on Quemoy and the Matsus sustain a terrific defeat or be wiped out, without such repercussions that we would be likely to lose Formosa itself as a result. Nor, on the other hand, could we force the Chinese Nationalists to agree to evacuate these offshore islands. In this was the dilemma and the danger of the current situation, which, however, could conceivably change in, say, a year'92s time. The discussion closed with an unanswered speculation by Admiral :: cautioned that atomic weapons, if possible, should not be used during the ensuing 40'9660 days, and the U.S. also should do its best to avoid intervention of any kind on Quemoy and Matsu. The SPLIT said there are three aspects to intelligence: -1440 a . rapid communication of intelligence from the field b . coordination of intelligence in Washington c . obtaining accurate intelligence as to Chinat loyalty on Formosa. -720 The SPLIT inquired what would be the effect in Japan of U.S. intervention. He felt the Communists might try to immobilize our air power in Japan by civil disturbance. The Military felt that this danger could be coped with. m. The :: stressed the importance of an estimate of the effect on Chinese Nationalist morale of an evacuation of Quemoy and the Matsu group. Mr. SPLIT said that the situation might change after a period of perhaps ten years, when native Formosans would largely have replaced mainland Chinese in the Chinese Nationalist armies. These Formosans would be much more concerned with defending Formosa than with defending the offshore islands. The Chinese Communists, moreover, would have less fear of an attack by Formosans on the Communist mainland. Governor SPLIT inquired whether we knew with what the Chinese Communists were paying the Soviets for goods supplied to them. Mr. SPLIT concerning Vietnam and France.] Mr. :: expressed considerable concern about the political repercussions of the proposed use of atomic weapons against Chinese Communist military targets which would be used against the offshore islands and Formosa. Admiral SPLIT then inquired about ways and means of '93taking out'94 Chinese Communist artillery emplacements in areas adjacent to the Nationalist-held offshore islands. Admiral :: said that he was sorry indeed to have to inaugurate the second year of the Eisenhower Administration with a recital of serious problems. However, he had come to the conclusion, over the last few days and hours, that the situation in the Tachens and on the other islands held by the Chinese Nationalists had deteriorated so rapidly that it was very unlikely that any of these islands could be defended against Chinese Communist attack in the absence of U.S. armed support on a very considerable scale. Since the United States had not proposed to offer the Chinese Nationalists any assistance in the defense of these islands which would involve the armed forces of the United States, the time had come for a reconsideration of our policy of refusing to participate in the military defense of any of the Nationalist-held offshore islands. The loss of the Tachen group of islands would have very serious psychological effects not only on the Chinese Nationalists, but in other areas of the Far East such as Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, unless this loss were accompanied by a clearer indication than was now available of United States intentions and where we stood ourselves. If it were indicated that the Communists were free to seize all these offshore islands, the result would be very bad indeed. Accordingly, continued Secretary Dulles, it had seemed to him wise to suggest that the evacuation of the Tachen island group should be offset by a stated willingness on the part of the United States to assist with its armed forces in holding the Quemoy Islands and possibly the Matsu group. These two groups of islands covered the harbor entrance of Amoy and Foochow, respectively, whence a Chinese Communist invasion of Formosa would probably be mounted. Moreover, the Chinese Communists invariably related their attacks on these offshore islands to their determination ultimately to '93liberate'94 Formosa. So, said Secretary Dulles, the United States is faced with what is in fact a series of Communist military operations which are ultimately directed toward the capture of Formosa. He therefore concluded that it would have a very grave effect throughout all the nations of free Asia if we were to clarify a U.S. position which in effect amounted to abandonment of all the Nationalist-held offshore islands. People would of course pose the question of why it is necessary for the United States to clarify its position on these islands. We had decided not to do so up to the present in the hope of confusing the Chinese Communists as to our real intentions vis-'e0-vis these islands. This policy of obscuring our intentions had, however, begun to backfire, and the Chinese Communists were apparently confident in the belief that the United States was unwilling to fight in order to save any of these islands. Accordingly, Secretary SPLIT could see no further advantage in the policy of obscuring our intentions, and insisted that further pursuit of it would embarrass U.S. prestige in the Far East. This being so, the next question was what to do. It seemed to him, said Secretary Dulles, fundamentally unsound for the United States to try to assist the Chinese Nationalists to hold the northern groups of islands. The Tachens and the other islands in this area were simply too difficult to defend. On the other hand, Quemoy and the Matsu group could be readily protected by U.S. air power, including such air power based on Formosa. Accordingly, the Administration might well consider a new policy which would involve (1) the use of U.S. armed forces to assist the Chinese Nationalists to evacuate their garrisons from the northernmost islands, and (2) support of the Chinese Nationalists in the defense of Quemoy and perhaps the Matsu Islands, so long as the Chinese Communists professed to be preparing to attack Formosa. If we could make this proposal clear and at the same time push through quickly the mutual defense treaty with Formosa, and if we are truly determined to hold Formosa and related areas needed in order to hold Formosa, all this would be the best possible way to avoid a steady deterioration of the U.S. position in the general area, and specifically would provide the best means of defending Formosa and the Pescadores. The SPLIT then explained that he had had a discussion on this subject yesterday with George Yeh, the Foreign Minister of the Chinese Republic. He expected to receive a reply some time today, and while he anticipated that the Chinese Nationalists would profess to be greatly saddened at not being able to hold all the offshore islands, they would be quite willing to accept something less than all. The SPLIT also argued that there was greater risk of war in leaving our position unclear with respect to the offshore islands than in making it clear, as he proposed to do. Mr. SPLIT indicated that the answer to Secretary Humphrey'92s misgivings was as follows: As long as the Chinese Communists insist that they are going to take Quemoy as part of their operations for the ultimate seizure of Formosa, all this put Quemoy in a very different light. If we wait to mount our defense of Formosa until we have lost all these islands, and much of our prestige as well, we would be fighting at a terrible disadvantage. That seemed to be the choice which now confronted us. Mr. SPLIT had proposed his plan for UN action to stabilize the situation on the offshore islands, he himself had had a proposal which had appealed to him but which he had abandoned in deference to Secretary Dulles'92 UN proposal. His own idea had been that the only reasonable hope of stabilizing the situation in the Far East was a determination by the United States to hold Formosa and the Pescadores. There could be no '93cooling off of the hot situation'94 vis-'e0-vis Communist China so long as these other close-in islands remained in the hands of the Chinese Nationalists. To let them remain in Nationalist hands was simply to invite Chinese Communist military action against them. Accordingly, if we make a new move now, we should get the Chinese Nationalist garrisons off just as many of these small islands as we can, and should explain that the sole reason that we are assisting in holding any of the islands at all is that they are vital to the defense of Formosa. Secretary SPLIT had given, but for other reasons as well. As the Chinese Communists continued to build up their power and prestige and took more and more of these islands, they inevitably set in motion a deterioration of the position. He greatly feared the psychological effect on the free nations of Asia of the gradual loss of all these islands. The SPLIT explained that he by no means disagreed with the position taken by Secretaries SPLIT had indicated that we would only assist in holding these offshore islands until the UN acted to stabilize the situation or the intentions of Communist China toward Formosa had changed. Secretary SPLIT agreed with the SPLIT added that the whole policy of the Chinese Communists with regard to the offshore islands was ultimately directed against Formosa. The SPLIT suggested that the president would make such an announcement in the form of a message to the Congress, which would state in effect that it had become necessary for the Chinese Communists to regroup and consolidate their forces on these offshore islands. The precise details would not be spelled out, but the President'92s statement would convey the idea that some of these islands would be evacuated and that others would be held because they were related to our determination to defend Formosa. The Presidential statement would likewise make reference to action in the UN and to the desirability of a ceasefire. The SPLIT added that of course the United States could not forcibly remove the Chinese Nationalist garrison from Quemoy without starting a war with Nationalist China. Governor SPLIT insisted that what the SPLIT said that in any event the United States must now make its position crystal clear. We must decide now on what territories to hold, and hold them. He did not believe that we could give up all the offshore islands. We could give up the northern Tachen group and perhaps also the central Matsu group. This would leave us with the bare bones of Quemoy. This, however, we must certainly keep, or else we should be faced with a very serious situation all the way from Tokyo to Saigon. Secretary SPLIT explained to Secretary",military,bureaucracies_145,bureaucracies
"inquired whether, if the recommendations of Admiral SPLIT asked why the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended against any public announcement of a decision by the United States to commit its armed forces to the defense of Quemoy. Admiral :: or Admiral SPLIT invited Admiral SPLIT pointed out that he had been away from Washington when the issue of the defense of the offshore islands had first come up, but that he had gone over the papers relating to the problem since his return. As a result of his conversations with Chiang Kai-shek in Formosa last May, he was well aware of the great store that the Nationalists put by these islands. Nevertheless, he did not think that we should commit our forces to the defense of these islands without clear recognition that all three branches of the Services would become engaged. This would be no partial war. Thinking broadly, continued Secretary Wilson, it was his view that if we were going to get ourselves involved in a war with Communist China at all, the time to have become involved would have been during the Korean war or during the hostilities in Indochina. He was opposed to getting into war over these '93doggoned little islands'94. Rightly or wrongly, there seemed to him a great deal of difference between Formosa and the Pescadores, on the one hand, and these close-in islands, on the other. While these islands were helpful to us in some ways, they were a handicap to us in others. Quemoy presented a particularly tough problem because in order to defend it successfully the United States would have to attack mainland China. It would be extremely difficult to explain, either to the people of the United States or to our allies, why, after refusing to go to war with Communist China over Korea and Indochina, we were perfectly willing to fight over these small islands. Mr. SPLIT said that he had one more point to add to his earlier remarks. Before getting ourselves into a war with Communist China, we ought to figure out how we will wind up such a war. The United States is not a nation which is accustomed to fighting limited or undeclared wars. If we put U.S. ground forces on the Quemoys, or use our Air Force against the Chinese Communist shore batteries, we would have committed an act of war. This, said Secretary Wilson, would require the authority of the Congress, and he doubted in any case whether such a course of action was really in the interest of the United States at this time. The SPLIT had any alternative to offer, and Secretary SPLIT indicated that he had no such alternative at the present time, but hoped to present one subsequently. Mr. :: said that the defense of the offshore islands would come closer to war with China than if we had tried to save Dien Bien Phu. The :: said he agreed. Governor SPLIT recalled that at the Denver Council meeting on the subject of the offshore islands, it had been stated that actions in the UN might help us out. He wanted to know whether any help from the UN was now possible. The SPLIT said the U.S. had to get the Chinese Nationalists off the offshore islands. The SPLIT said that when Chiang loses Nanchi he will be easier to deal with. The SPLIT asked what had been our advice concerning Nanchi. Admiral :: said that while of course we did not wish to become involved in a war with Communist China over Quemoy, neither did we wish to get involved in such a war over Formosa. We therefore must be sure that in trying to avoid the first we do not bring on the second. With respect to the point made by the SPLIT also expressed the hope that the :: said that prior to the time at Denver when Secretary SPLIT added that he thought it was foolish to fight a terrible war with Communist China simply in order to hold all these little islands. It was plain that there was no hope in the world that the Chinese Nationalists could overcome and supplant the Communist regime on mainland China. He therefore repeated that our only reasonable hope of stabilizing the whole U.S. position in the Pacific was to evince our determination to hold the great offshore island chain and let the rest go. In short, we should defend only Formosa and the Pescadores and let the others go. The alternative seemed to him to be general war with Communist China. As Secretary SPLIT '93over the long period'94. However, these things are largely a matter of timing. We must now deal with a practical situation which is on our hands, and this was certainly not the moment or the occasion to inform the Chinese Nationalists that we would not assist them to hold any of the offshore islands. To do so would at present have a catastrophic effect on Chinese Nationalist morale. However, if later on the situation cooled down and the Chinese Communists renounced their intention of seizing Formosa, the United States would then be in a position to give up these other islands, as Secretaries SPLIT were recommending. The SPLIT said that on the contrary, he could not but feel that the Chinese Communists were very logical in their determination to seize the offshore islands. The Chinese Communists simply felt that they were putting the finishing touches on a victorious civil war. The SPLIT knew that in this event the Chinese Communists would stop short of Formosa. Secretary SPLIT replied that he did not know this. Secretary SPLIT inquired whether the SPLIT repeated that he was more than willing to defend Formosa, but certainly not these '93darn'92 little islands'94. The SPLIT said that he would go as far as to fight for Formosa, and at the same time would make clear that the only reason that we were holding on was to assist in the defense of Formosa. But just as soon as the Chinese Communists renounced their intention of attacking Formosa, he would abandon Quemoy. The SPLIT explained that a practical problem had arisen in his mind. If the Chinese Communists go ahead with additional military action against the offshore islands, do we or do we not supply military equipment to the Chinese Nationalists to replace their combat losses? Mr. SPLIT that it was present policy to replace such losses. Secretary",military,bureaucracies_146,bureaucracies
"4 Noted an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the situation with respect to Quemoy and other offshore islands held by Chinese Nationalist forces; and an oral summary of SNIE 100'964-54, '93The Situation With Respect to Certain Islands Off the Coast of Mainland China'94. 4. Chinese Nationalist Offshore Islands (NSC Action No. 1206-f; 5 NSC 5429/2; 6 NSC 146/2, paras. 9'9610 7 ) Mr. :: inquired how the build-up of Chinese Nationalist forces on the Quemoys had occured. Had this large garrison existed on the island ever since the withdrawal of the Nationalist forces from the mainland? SPLIT explained that the point of his question was to get some indication of the degree to which the safety of the Quemoy garrison should be considered a responsibility of the United States and how far the prestige of the United States had been committed with respect to the security of the Quemoys. Admiral SPLIT inquired whether Secretary SPLIT said that he had three questions which he would like to put to the Director of Central Intelligence, on the assumption that the United States decided not to commit the armed forces necessary to defend the offshore islands and contented itself with providing assistance for the evacuation of the islands. The three questions were: First, to what extent would the prestige of the United States suffer if we permitted these islands to be lost? Second, to what extent would Chinese Communist prestige be enhanced by the seizure of these islands? Third, what would be the effect on the morale of the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa if they lost the offshore islands? In response to the first question SPLIT then invited Secretary :: briefed the Council on its prior consideration of the offshore islands, and read the pertinent paragraphs (9 and 10) of U.S. policy toward Formosa. He then referred to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which had not been presented as yet in writing, and requested Secretary SPLIT inquired whether it was not a fact that both the majority and the minority opinion in the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in agreement on at least the following important points: First, that the Chinese Nationalists would be unable to hold these offshore islands without United States assistance, and that, secondly, from the strictly military viewpoint, none of these offshore islands was essential to the defense and security of Formosa itself. Admiral SPLIT then inquired as to the general character of the military commitment which the United States would have to make in order to defend successfully the important offshore islands. Admiral SPLIT then inquired if it would be necessary to use U.S. ground forces in a successful defense of these islands. Admiral SPLIT then inquired as to the probable character of any action which might have to be taken by U.S. forces against the Chinese Communist mainland. Admiral SPLIT then called upon the Acting Secretary of State to present the tentative views of his department. Secretary SPLIT then inquired if General SPLIT reminded him that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had at a recent Council meeting 10 presented a report 11 on the desirability of creating an International Volunteer Air Group (IVAG). It had been the view of the Joint Chiefs that while plans for such a group should be made, these plans should not be implemented at the present time. Accordingly, the Council had deferred action on creating IVAG. Nevertheless, said Mr. Cutler, did not the IVAG offer a third alternative to either doing nothing for the defense of these islands or committing overtly U.S. armed forces to their defense? Formosa might act as the host country to the Volunteer Air Group, and it could undertake armed action against the Chinese Communists without directly committing the prestige of the United States. Admiral SPLIT asked whether we could not do more than merely replace losses and actually provide promptly additional aircraft, naval vessels, etc., to the Chinese Nationalists. Were the Chinese Nationalists in a position to make effective use of additional U.S. materiel? Admiral SPLIT then asked Mr. dulles to comment on the effect of the following assumption: If Admiral radford'92s recommendations were adopted and the Executive went to Congress to seek authority to strike against Communist China (which, of course, would be public information), what effect would these moves have on the Soviet Union and on the relationship between Russia and Communist China? In answering this question, :: asked whether, if the Chinese Communists attack our carriers, we would not have to go into Communist China in retaliation. Admiral SPLIT suggested, and the :: said that he shared the views of the majority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the psychological and political consequences of the loss of the offshore islands. If we decide not to do anything we must think of an alternative. One possibility would be to announce our decision, so that we do not get a black eye from the symbol of the loss. The other possibility is not to announce any decision, to keep the Communists guessing, but take a chance on the possible consequences. The SPLIT thought the latter was the only practical choice. He did not think that the Chinese Nationalists would go along with evacuating the islands. The SPLIT noted that this meeting had been blown up publicly throughout the world. He also noted that the Intelligence Advisory Committee had agreed that the Chinese Communists would probably not risk an attack if they were kept guessing as to possible U.S. reaction. He felt that if possible we should play poker in order to keep the Communists guessing. The :: believed that the majority view of the Joint Chiefs was right. He said that in the Korean and Indochina settlements we had gone a long way to carry out the U.S. policy of trying to stabilize peace in the Far East. He thought the Communists were now trying to probe to see how tough we would be and to discount the Chinese Nationalists without a U.S. reaction. If we do not react there is not much chance of keeping the United Nations from voting in Communist China within a year, with all the deteriorating effects which will follow. If we show the Communists we are going to slap them down, we will be able to hold our position in the Far East. In answer to the President'92s comments, Mr. SPLIT felt that if we need Congressional action we should undertake to get it. He thinks that what has happened in Europe is a reflection of the Indochina settlement. He believes we have a whole cycle of deterioration in the world situation, and we have got to show strength and determination. Moreover, by holding back we have not got closer to Britain and our other allies, but have just encouraged them more along their lines. Since Indochina the free world has taken no aggressive action, and it is clearly the Communist Chinese who have opened up with violence by their artillery bombardment of Quemoy. Mr. SPLIT felt it was essential that when the Communists were probing, we not back up. In addition, the whole world knows that we have been on those islands. The SPLIT said that he did not think we would alienate the American Congress and people if the SPLIT expressed the view that war against Communist China does not necessarily mean general war. The :: noted that if the Nationalists fought and lost Nanchi, this would be bad for the United States. The SPLIT asked when did Nanchi get separated out from the Tachen grouping. Admiral SPLIT urged that the United States make known its position on Nanchi. The SPLIT said the world assumes that Nationalist forces can be safely evacuated from Nanchi. The SPLIT referred to Nanchi again, and said that this island presented us with a serious difficulty. It was a '93tag end'94 which would rise up to plague us. The National Security :: invited Admiral radford to make any comment he might wish to at this time regarding the military situation in the general area of Formosa. Admiral SPLIT inquired of Admiral :: then called on Admiral :: asked whether it would not be desirable to have a study prepared as to ways and means of destroying the big guns and gun emplacements on the Chinese mainland opposite the offshore islands. No such attempt to destroy these gun emplacements would, of course, take place until after the ratification of the Paris agreements, and the effort would be made with conventional rather than with nuclear weapons. The :: said that he was quite sure that if the Chinese Communists clearly understood the intentions of the United States they would not move. The National Security :: expressed agreement with the policy advocated by the Secretary of State, not only for the reasons which Secretary SPLIT pointed out to Secretary SPLIT pointed out that once the Chinese Communists begin their attacks, they would almost certainly expend whatever resources were necessary to seize these islands. Secretary :: at this point inquired as to the mechanics of making clear our new intentions regarding the offshore islands. Who would announce the decision of the United States to assist in the evacuation of the northern group of islands and the holding of others? In answer to the Vice President, Secretary SPLIT explained that the reason he had asked his question was that if the announcement were made in person to the Congress by the President, certain political difficulties could surely be anticipated. The SPLIT on the form of the President'92s statement, Dr. :: called on the Secretary of State to speak. Secretary SPLIT then observed that he wished to call the Council'92s attention to the exact language of the present policy of the United States with respect to the offshore islands, and thereafter to ask the Secretary of State a question. Mr. SPLIT then proceeded to read paragraph 5'96c of NSC 5429/5, as follows: -720 '93c. Ratify the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China covering Formosa and the Pescadores, and jointly agree upon appropriate safeguards against Chinese Nationalist offensive action. Pending the ratification of such a Treaty, continue the existing unilateral arrangement to defend Formosa and the Pescadores (excluding the Nationalist-held off-shore islands). For the present, seek to preserve, through United Nations action, the status quo of the Nationalist-held offshore islands; and, without committing U.S. forces except as militarily desirable in the event of Chinese Communist attack on Formosa and the Pescadores, provide to the Chinese Nationalist forces military equipment and training to assist them to defend such offshore islands, using Formosa as a base. However, do not agree to Chinese Nationalist offensive actions against mainland Communist China, except under circumstances approved by the President. Agree to Chinese Nationalist actions against Communist China which are prompt and clear retaliation against a Chinese Communist attack; provided such retaliation is against targets of military significance which meet U.S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success and which are selected with due consideration for the undesirability of provoking further Chinese Communist reaction against Formosa and the Pescadores.'94 Mr. SPLIT then put his question to the Secretary of State Would not an American commitment to employ its armed forces in the defense of Quemoy and the Matsu Islands almost certainly involve the United States in military actions on the mainland of Communist China? Would not there be inevitable hot pursuit far inland? Accordingly, it seemed to Mr. SPLIT that if the United States were to adopt the policy proposed by Secretary Dulles, we should be very clear indeed that by so doing we are greatly enhancing the risk of war with Communist China. Had the Secretary of State gone into these long-range consequences in his discussions with the members of Congress? The SPLIT repeated his insistence that if the Chinese Communists attacked Quemoy and the Matsus, and the United States assisted the Chinese Nationalists to resist the Communists, our aircraft would certainly go in hot pursuit of enemy aircraft, and the danger of one incident leading ultimately to another and ultimately to war with China seemed very clear to him. The SPLIT commented that it seemed to him that most of the members of the National Security Council were determined to look only on the rosy alternative as to what was likely to happen if this new proposed course of action were adopted. The Council was refusing to face up to the darker alternative'97namely, that war with China was a very real risk if the United States were to commit itself militarily to the defense of Quemoy. The SPLIT explained to Secretary",military,bureaucracies_147,bureaucracies
"discussed the geographic features and the strategic position of the Quemoys, indicating the likely beachheads for an amphibious landing. Thereafter, SPLIT presented a detailed review of the military power of the Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists, beginning with the former. Total CNG strength on the Quemoys was estimated at 40,000 regulars plus 11,000 guerrillas. The civilian population on the Quemoys numbered 6,000. All but one of the Chinese Nationalist divisions on the Quemoys had had U.S. training and were equipped with MDAP equipment. The Chinese Nationalist Government had alerted an additional 11,000 men on Formosa to be moved in to assist in the defense of the Quemoys if necessary. The Chinese Nationalist Air Force was estimated to be capable of 175 air sorties per day over the Amoy region. To date, the maximum number of sorties actually flown had only reached 75. Chinese Nationalist naval support available for the defense of the Quemoys consisted of two destroyers, three destroyer escorts, and additional smaller vessels. The destroyers carried 5-inch guns. The other vessels were armed with 3-inch guns. Approximately 15 days'92 supply was estimated to be on hand in the Quemoys at present. Supplies for 45 days for Quemoy were estimated to be on hand in Formosa, but all such additional supply would have to be transported. The morale of the forces, according to the latest reports, was said to be '93not low'94, but capable of improvement. U.S. military personnel on the island at the present time consisted of 10 officers and men attached to the MAAG. There were in addition eight CIA personnel now on the islands. SPLIT then turned to the strength available to the Chinese Communists. It was estimated that some 150,000 men would be required to capture the Quemoys. Well over this number of Chinese Communist troops were available within 150 miles of Amoy, and they would be combat-fit. Two Chinese Communist jet squadrons were located near Amoy, and there were four airfields available for operations. The Chinese Communist Navy, on the other hand, was of negligible strength, consisting of six small patrol boats and 400 or 500 junks. In conclusion, SPLIT gave a brief resume of operations against the Quemoys to date, and also indicated the view of the British Joint Intelligence Committee. This body had concluded that the evidence was insufficient to determine whether the Chinese Communist bombardment of the Quemoys was a propaganda gesture designed to embarrass the Manila negotiations for SEATO, or actually portended a Chinese Communist attempt to seize these islands. SPLIT also referred to the National Intelligence Estimate respecting the offshore islands, noting key pages and notable dissents in the document (SNIE 100'964-54, filed in the minutes of the meeting). At the conclusion of Mr. Dulles'92 lengthy and detailed briefing, the SPLIT replied by stating that except for one undermanned division which had been on Quemoy since the loss of mainland China, the forces now on the islands had been put there largely as a result of U.S. encouragement. Admiral SPLIT went on to point out that one of the major uses of the Quemoys had been to provide bases for guerrilla raids against the Chinese mainland. In the last year there had been no such raids because experience had shown that they were not very profitable. The SPLIT replied that the prestige of the United States would suffer much less if we completely evacuated the islands, including civilians as well as military personnel, as opposed to a simple abandonment of these islands and their populations to the enemy. With respect to the second point, SPLIT said that undoubtedly the prestige of the Chinese Communists would greatly increase if they succeeded in capturing the Quemoys. In part, at least, the prestige of the United States is already involved with these islands. As regarded the Vice President'92s third question, SPLIT said that he did not believe that over the long run the loss of the offshore islands would have a very grave impact on the morale of the Chinese Nationalist Government and the forces on Formosa. Admiral SPLIT pointed out that one of the chief uses of the offshore islands in the past had been to provide a base for guerrilla operations. There had been no guerrilla operations against the mainland for about a year; hence the islands no longer really served this purpose. Secretary SPLIT had taken over, this had been the original objective in holding on to the offshore islands. Neither he nor SPLIT had at that time seriously considered the possibility of any last-ditch defense of these islands. Doubtless Chiang Kai-shek has come to take a quite different view of the importance of the islands. Admiral SPLIT said he wanted to make clear in the first place that the majority of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, with the exception of G'962, had expressed the view that if the Chinese Communists became convinced that the United States would commit its armed forces, the Chinese Communists would not actually press the attack against the Quemoys. He gathered, said Mr. Dulles, that Secretary smith disagreed with this majority view. Secretary SPLIT then went on to add that in the event that the United States did push the attack into China proper, beyond the local Amoy area, the Chinese Communists would certainly try to invoke the Sino-Soviet pact. Apropos of this discussion, General :: resumed his briefing with comments on the attack by the Chinese Communists on the Tachen Islands, which he described as the heaviest action by the Communists against the Nationalists since the attacks on Quemoy in September. Between 60 and 100 Chinese Communist aircraft had participated in the attack on the Tachens, and the engagement had lasted nine or ten hours. Mr. Dulles believed that the Chinese Nationalists had been caught somewhat unprepared for the attack, which indicated to him good Communist intelligence with respect to the rotation of Chinese Nationalist troops in the Tachens. Admiral SPLIT resumed by pointing out the serious morale effect on the Nationalist garrisons in the Tachen Islands if the Chinese Communist attacks were to continue. Continuation of the attacks would also present the Generalissimo with the problem of determining whether or not to engage a considerable sector of the Nationalist armed forces to defend the Tachen Islands. Admiral :: read a Special National Intelligence Estimate entitled '93Review of Current Communist Attitudes Toward General War'94 (SNIE 11'964'9655). He said this agreed estimate was one of the most important the intelligence community had written in some time. Admiral :: said that he desired to state to the Council that, apropos of Secretary Dulles'92 observations regarding the shortcomings of our intelligence, nothing had been said in the course of the discussion which had come to him as a surprise. The CIA had long since been pointing out all these facts on the basis of intelligence available to it. However, Admiral :: felt that Chiang Ching-kuo was a key figure, and that the Generalissimo was losing stature. :: as the first part of his briefing, read the conclusions of NIE 100'964'9655 on '93Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to the Offshore Islands and Taiwan through 1955, and Communist and Non-Communist Reactions with Respect to the Defense of Taiwan'94. In the course of Mr. Dulles'92 reading of these conclusions, Secretary SPLIT replied that this was rather a special problem, and he would be glad in a short time to present a special estimate on the subject for Council consideration. 3 There then ensued a brief discussion of the probable timing of a Chinese Communist attack on Quemoy and the Matsus. In the course of this discussion, Secretary Humphrey inquired as to the likelihood that the Chinese Communists might eventually renounce their attempts to seize these offshore islands. The SPLIT resumed his intelligence briefing with a brief resume of petroleum shipments to Communist China during the year 1954. Secretary SPLIT replied that it was apparently done by a lend-lease arrangement. Admiral :: began with a prediction that the loss of Ichiang Island in the Tachens group to the Chinese Communists would shortly be followed by Chinese Communist attacks on the main group of the Tachen Islands. In the action against Ichiang, SPLIT said that the Communist forces had consisted of one regiment and two battalions of Chinese Communist troops, numbering between 3000 and 4000. Against this force the Nationalist garrison on Ichiang had consisted of just under 1000 guerrillas. The island had been captured after about two hours of fighting. The Communists had handled the action with considerable skill. They had had very careful cover so that there had been little warning, either of the landing forces or of the Communist air sorties, which had numbered 60. All U.S. personnel on the Tachens, numbering eight, had been evacuated except one individual. With the capture of the island, SPLIT pointed out, the Chinese Communists were in a good position to shell the main Tachen Islands, which were only seven and a half miles distant from Ichiang. The Nationalists were obviously preparing to risk further losses of naval vessels in order to support the garrison on the main Tachen Islands. This move was necessary, however, if the morale of the garrison, which was not very good in any case, was to be kept up. According to other reports, the Generalissimo was now considering the desirability of evacuating the Chinese Nationalist forces from the remainder of the Tachen Islands. Unfortunately, there was some question as to whether he would be able to withdraw these garrisons even if he desired to, except in the unlikely event that the Chinese Communists voluntarily permitted these forces to be evacuated. In any event, the loss of the Tachen Islands would have a very unfortunate effect on the morale of the Chinese Nationalists. SPLIT indicated that the Nationalists had retaliated yesterday for the attack on Ichiang, by a series of air strikes on Communist ports and shipping, especially in Swatow, where they had apparently sunk a British flag vessel of some 1700 tons. From Quemoy the Nationalists had yesterday bombarded two adjacent islands held by the Chinese Communists. There had been no substantial Chinese Communist attacks on Quemoy during the last few days. At the conclusion of Mr. Dulles'92 briefing, Mr. SPLIT interrupted this exchange by pointing out that the most probable Chinese Communist action, if the United States determines to hold Quemoy, would be to resort to constant artillery pounding of the Quemoy defenses until these defenses had been pulverized. Admiral Radford, however, said that such pulverization of Quemoy'92s defenses by the Communists would not be possible in the face of Chinese Nationalist air attacks on the surrounding Chinese Communist areas. The SPLIT described it as '93rather poor'94 as a result of the January 10 attack. Admiral Radford, on the other hand, thought that morale seemed very good when he had discussed it on his recent trip, and he believed that the defense position on the Tachen Islands was so strong that it would cost the Communists a lot to take it. Governor",military,bureaucracies_148,bureaucracies
"said that the Chiefs had been considering the situation in China, in the Formosa Straits area. They have started the preparation of contingency plans, and have alerted commanders in the area, but have directed no specific action. He understood the matter would come up for consideration in the NSC this week, and commented that the situation is unclear, perhaps intentionally so, with respect to the objective of defending the offshore islands. The SPLIT commented that the military authorities are concentrating on getting the F'9686s on the islands into operational status quickly. [Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.] G. Brigadier General, USA} :: stated that the Joint Chiefs views on these questions were as follows: 1. The U.S. should support Chinese Nationalist forces, if necessary with U.S. forces, in resisting a Chinese Communist blockade of Quemoy and Matsu (hereafter referred to as the off-shore islands). 2. U.S. forces should be used, if required, to assist the Chinese Nationalists in defending against a major Chinese Communist assault on the off-shore islands. [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ] 3. The U.S. should not state publicly its policy on 1 and 2 above, but should continue the so-called practice of '93keeping them guessing'94, partially because the Chinese Nationalists, if they know we are committed to the defense of the off-shore islands, may start something on their own. The SPLIT thought they would. The SPLIT said that the Joint Chiefs were presently working out the details of the type of operations we would undertake in this contingency. The SPLIT said he did not think there would be any retaliatory attack on Taiwan. Secretary :: submitted a redraft of an operational immediate instruction to the Commander Taiwan Defense Command 2 regarding certain U.S. actions to be taken in anticipation of continued Chicom action against the off-shore islands. After discussion, the :: remarked that as result of the Chinese commitment of the '93heart'94 of their defense to the islands, they now had acquired a strategic importance which they had not had previously. Governor SPLIT agreed and added that one should not get into the question of naming or not naming islands. The :: inquired if we should lose a ship or have American casualties, were the American people and the Congress adequately prepared? Was such a contingency covered? The :: read several supplemental sections of the directive which had not been previously discussed with the State Department, one which related to '93atomic strikes if ordered'94 was deleted as unnecessary in the light of the directive agreed upon at the earlier White House meeting. The question of adequate artillery for use on Chinmen to silence the Communist batteries enfilading the beach was discussed with the SPLIT indicated that very possibly 8 inch howitzers on Okinawa now would be transferred to insure rapid delivery. The SPLIT and Governor SPLIT said that he greatly favored the State Department alternative proposal which read '93escort and protect GRC supply ships en route to Off Shore Islands to extent you feel it militarily necessary and Chinese Navy unable to carry out this task.'94 General SPLIT pointed out that this could be done by massive fire of destroyers passing by at high speed. The discussion then turned to the fact that Chiang Kai-shek, despite our advice, had put such a large proportion of his strength on the Off Shore Islands and now came '93whining'94 to us. It was not clear just what he was doing. Admiral SPLIT and Governor SPLIT said that this had been done deliberately and in fact made Taiwan virtually a hostage. Mr. SPLIT pointed out that Chiang only had a couple of destroyers and a couple of destroyer escorts and that his convoy capability was weak. In response to the President'92s question the Admiral replied that Chiang had a few PT boats but that they were not the answer. It was clear the SPLIT pointed out the practical situation with respect thereto. As the beaches were under accurate fire at night, it was necessary to utilize small landing craft which could run in and out quickly and which were being provided. The",military,bureaucracies_149,bureaucracies
"said that the MAAG Chief thought that the Chinese Nationalists would try to reinforce their position on the off-shore islands. Secretary SPLIT reiterated that this was part of the psychopathic attitude of the Chinese Nationalists toward these off-shore islands. The :: said that the MAAG chief, who is back here in Washington, thinks that a Chinese Communist blockade of the off-shore islands is very likely. He said that the Chinese Nationalists had only about 45 days'92 to two months'92 supplies on the islands unless they kept them resupplied. He also thought that Chinese Communist blockade of the off-shore islands could not be stopped unless U.S. forces intervened. The :: pointed out with reference to paragraph 2(c) of the draft order that statements designed to curb the Chicoms risk inciting the Chinats to go too far for purposes of their own. During discussion of this point The SPLIT said it appeared that the Communist intention was to blockade the off-shore islands and force the GRC out of them in that way. There followed discussion of the way in which U.S. action to escort Chinats supply vessels would be handled. Presumably these would leave Taiwan at midday and Chinat navy vessels would take over from US escorts at dark in the vicinity of the islands. :: opened the discussion saying that as background for the actions which the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed, he would like to point out that they were discussed in the present somewhat limited phase of operations, that is to say a period in which no clear attempt to capture Quemoy or Matsu has been made. Later if there were massive attacks on the main Off Shore Islands it might be necessary to move into Phase B which would still envisage avoidance of nuclear weapons and of actions beyond the local tactical area but might well include direct assistance by U.S. forces. However, if the Communists themselves extended the area of attack out in the Straits or on the Penghus or Taiwan, which would be a third phase, it would be necessary to seek further instructions. The SPLIT pointed out that there was not much likelihood that we would wish to bring our naval vessels into coastal waters where they would be under fire from shore based batteries. There would be no advantage in moving in so far. He therefore suggested that we should define the area of escort activities as '93within international waters.'94 The SPLIT added that Chiang'92s policy in this respect was designed to put leverage on us. After discussion as to the location of American naval vessels and their activities in the Straits, the SPLIT again spoke of international waters, the",military,bureaucracies_150,bureaucracies
"said that it looks as if Chiang would if necessary put everything he had into the defense of the off-shore islands. This would have a direct effect on the defense of Taiwan if Chiang sent in all his air and whatever army troops he could get there by junk or navy. The SPLIT said that he understood that if we assisted in the defense of the off-shore islands, we would not only have to bomb nearby airfields but also go up as far as Shanghai deep into the Chinese Communist mainland. General SPLIT said that the new Chinese Nationalist Ambassador Mr. Yeh had suggested that the U.S. might make a formal statement that a Chinese Communist attack on the off-shore islands would be a grave threat to peace in that area. Such a statement would be very general and not a specific commitment. In answer to a question by Secretary SPLIT said there was a question as to whether this would be a firm enough statement to stop the Chinese Communists. The SPLIT asked [ 4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ]. The :: said he believed the meeting should first know clearly what islands were included in the scope of discussion. He proposed that this meant the two main Chinmen (Quemoy) Islands, and the five larger islands in the Matsu area. This was agreed to and that in other words the United States was concerned only with the major islands which the GRC is seriously committed to hold against attack. 1 Noting that while in 1954 we were mainly concerned with Taiwan and the Pescadores, the SPLIT informed the president that subject to his authorization State and Defense had approved the transfer of the USS Essex and four destroyers through the Suez Canal to join the Seventh Fleet. The :: both pointed up the danger from ChinCom PT boats was greater at dark, that the turn-over would be a difficult operation, that it would leave our vessels to wait around in the Straits for some hours and, more important, would appear as weakness on our part to the Chinese Communists, while to the GRC it might seem that we were going up to the point of danger and then leaving that to the Chinese Nationalists. Admiral SPLIT both indicated that Chiang was seeking to find out if we were really behind him. The :: reported SPLIT was back on the job and that SPLIT had just finished an extensive conference with Mr. Herter, Mr. Parsons, and Mr. Marshall Green 1 about the Taiwan Straits situation. SPLIT expressed the view that we were not getting adequate reliable information about the position there; for example, whether there was really interdiction of supply. The SPLIT said that SPLIT would try to get more fully informed about the situation but that certainly on the basis of the briefing reports made to me so far, there seemed to be considerable confusion about some of the vital facts. JFD} :: directed attention to the point regarding atomic weapons, recalling that we have geared our defense to the use of these in case of hostilities of any size, and stating that, if we will not use them when the chips are down because of adverse world opinion, we must revise our defense setup. The memorandum undertook to bring out this point. The :: told the president in general terms of the activities which the Chinese Nationalists have conducted from the offshore islands as described in Taipei'92s telegram 357 2 of which SPLIT left a copy with General goodpaster. SPLIT suggested that we should gradually try to get such activities stopped. The SPLIT showed the president Ambassador Drumright'92s report (Taipei'92s 363) 3 of the current jitters on Formosa. The SPLIT said that even if this be the case in the Soviet Union it is not, according to our information the case in Communist China, where the people'92s morale is indeed so bad that the regime has just cancelled the visas of all foreign newspapermen and ordered them out of the country, apparently to prevent reports of how bad the situation is. JFD}",military,bureaucracies_151,bureaucracies
", who was obviously very concerned over this increased military activity, complained that he hadn'92t been able to find that the State Department had had any report from representatives of the Department resident in the area, with respect to the Communist shelling of the offshore islands. 3 Secretary SPLIT went on to ask whether we did not get reports on such events, and as to what is going on in the Quemoy area, from representatives of the Department of Defense . . . . :: continued that it was his own view that it would be a major disaster to our whole position in the Far East if we did change these missions. Secretary SPLIT said it was not for him to state that we must agree to maintain certain GRC force levels, but certainly we should not change the missions of the GRC armed forces. Particularly, we should not change these missions by cutting out reference to the possibility of a Nationalist return to mainland China. It was indeed only this hope of a return to mainland China that sustains morale on Taiwan, even if the hope was remote. Secretary SPLIT then pointed out that the general situation from the U.S. point of view is quite different in Asia than in Europe. The Western European countries are much more solid in depth and strength, both militarily and otherwise. The reason these small island and peninsula countries maintain their will to freedom is because of their hope that Communist China will one day blow up. Nor was this to be thought altogether a forlorn hope, as Hu Shih had recently pointed out in his address before the United Nations. What had happened in Hungary and Poland could conceivably happen in Communist China. If a blow-up occurred, Chinese Nationalist troops might find the great opportunity which they had been seeking. While we can all have our own views as to the likelihood that such things will come to pass, the fact remained that the Chinese Nationalists believe that this chance may be offered, and it is precisely this belief that sustains them in their resistance to Communism. If, by changing our policies, we destroy that Chinese Nationalist hope, we will at the same time destroy the capacity of the Chinese Nationalists for the defense of Taiwan itself. Beyond this, such a change in our policy would mean the abandoning of our whole Far Eastern position. The",political,bureaucracies_152,bureaucracies
"then analyzed the increased Chinese Communist military activity in the Amoy-Quemoy area. In the course of their shelling of the Nationalist-held offshore islands, the Chinese Communists had apparently fired 9350 rounds in a single day recently, 2 the heaviest such bombardment ever recorded and directed against the Quemoy island group. Secretary SPLIT expressed the view that now that the Chinese Communists had completed their new railroad into Amoy, they wanted to open up the Port of Amoy to shipping. Accordingly, they might wish either to seize or to neutralize the small islands'97Little Quemoy, Tatan and Ehrtan'97which could block entrance to the Port of Amoy. It was suggested that the absence of official U.S. reports on this stepped-up shelling might indicate that our people in this area regarded the matter as no great departure from the routine artillery exchanges between the Communists and the Nationalists. SPLIT went on to comment on the movement of a light bomber group of Chinese Communist IL'9628s in the direction of the Amoy area. He closed his comments on the general topic of the offshore islands by stating that there existed no real evidence that the Chinese Communists were about to try to seize these offshore islands at the present time. He pointed out, however, that there were plenty of Chinese Communist troops in the general area if a decision to move were made. 1 'a0",military,bureaucracies_153,bureaucracies
"THE NSC PLANNING BOARD TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE REVIEW OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD FORMOSA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA a. An interpretation of U.S. policy such as set forth in paragraph 4'96b would state an unrealistic objective. Even though the GRC armed forces have received substantial U.S. support in recent years, they are incapable without U.S. intervention of defending even their own territory. Changing strategic concepts together with the problem of increasing age (now averaging over 35 years for the mainland Chinese) and lack of technical preparation of the Chinese forces, will further reduce the possibility of a contribution beyond that of assisting in defending their own territory. The experience of the past decade has indicated that there would be practical difficulties in the utilization of the Chinese forces elsewhere in Asia. The increasing ratio of Formosans (now over one-third) in the GRC forces will decrease the readiness of the forces to fight elsewhere. GRC Force Levels and Personnel Strengths b. The possibility that the US'96GRC Mutual Defense Treaty (under which we are bound to go to Taiwan'92s aid if she is attacked) reduces the requirements for GRC forces . This, it was felt, might be of particular significance in view of the great importance of naval and air capabilities, which the United States must largely supply, in the defense of GRC territories against an attack by Communist Chinese forces. 14 c. The advancing age of members of the GRC forces born on the mainland requires the GRC to recruit an increasing percentage of native Taiwanese in the armed forces . (The proportion is about one-third at present, and will probably not go beyond 42% for the next two to three years. Beyond that date the ratio will climb steadily for an indefinite period.) The GRC fears that induction of Taiwanese will reduce the efficiency of its forces for offensive action against the mainland because of the lack of interest in such an operation on the part of the Taiwanese. Also, the Taiwanese are said to dislike the mainlanders. Thus, it was suggested that the GRC may soon be faced by a dilemma'97either to eliminate the military objective of return to the mainland, or gradually to cut the overall size of their forces in order to retain a satisfactory ratio between the Taiwanese and mainlanders. 1 'a0 :: , could find, he had come to the conclusion that it would be disastrous now to change our present policy with respect to Taiwan, though he said he did not know the precise limitations with respect to available appropriations for carrying out our policy in Taiwan. If, because of such limitations, any reductions have to be made in our assistance to Taiwan, such reductions should be made in a world-wide context and in terms of the Congressional Resolution (Public Law 4, 3 84th Congress). The Nationalists, continued Mr. Richards, had urged on him the view that discontent in mainland China might offer the opportunity for armed intervention by the Nationalists at some future time. Mr. SPLIT thought that we should take this view into account, as well as taking heed of the general situation in the Far East. Again he said it would be disastrous everywhere else in free Asia, and particularly in Southeast Asia, if the United States drastically changed its policies in Taiwan. Whether in fact the Generalissimo will ever be able to return to the mainland was certainly a question. Nevertheless, if there was even one chance in ten of his successfully doing this, the United States should be in a position to take advantage of the opportunity. Secretary SPLIT said he doubted whether anyone in Southeast Asia seriously believed that the Generalissimo would ever successfully return to mainland China, but he believed that the Generalissimo himself was genuinely sincere in his own belief that he would. What particularly bothers the Generalissimo is the sense of frustration now current on Taiwan. Accordingly, if the United States now acts further to destroy the hope of a return to the mainland, the effect will be to increase this sense of frustration. It was in this context that Chiang Kai-shek had asked him to tell the president of his hope for assistance in the training of Chinese Nationalist paratroopers. Such training would constitute visible proof that the United States had not given up hope of an eventual return of the Nationalists to the Chinese mainland. Chiang apparently had in mind a force of some 5000 paratroopers. This was, of course, a matter for the",military,bureaucracies_154,bureaucracies
"I have no comment on anything. I really just have been learning tonight. General :: There are two matters that need to be looked into in this study: 1. The question of North Vietnamese Reserves. There are two schools of thought on this. Some believe they can put additional men into battle easily, and match our forces. Some think they are limited. 2. I think we should cast aside the generalities about military solution vs. diplomatic solution; or population strategy vs. real estate protection. I agree we must build up the ARVN and the GVN. They are the reason we are there. Ought to bring them along on the Southern solution. That is, we need to talk candidly with them and develop a frank dialogue about the matters between us. We need to look for a fresh summary of the reasons for mining Haiphong. There may be additional military steps to resolve the matter sooner. The Russians really have not had difficult choices. We should look at a course of harder as well as softer policy. :: Suppose you turn it around. Say you can't stop bombing without their doing something. Idea of getting something started is good. SPLIT Aren't you better off if you do this privately? 7 SPLIT That's OK. M. SPLIT President is not about to escalate like you say. But what do you lose. Bombing that far north doesn't do that much good. SPLIT I agree with you on a full suspension. SPLIT If we lost at Khe Sanh while stopping bombing we would be in a hell of a shape. :: Criticism (should be Critics) of our position believe we're intent on creating a constitutional and democratic government by pursuing last VC until he is dead. They see capacity of VC to hit the cities. I do not think we can move Thieu to a Greek solution'97offer of VC coming into govt. Part of peace thing: '97Communists have tried to overthrow GVN and ARVN. They failed. We are seeking one-man, one-vote constitutional system. We need to turn war to the ballot box. SPLIT In world opinion, bombing of Hanoi-Haiphong has impact. One Soviet indication, he made distinction between bombing battlefield and around H'96H. :: 2. U.S. military offensive actions. I attach, to refresh your memory, Westy's plan to go on the offensive in I Corps in April. 4 I believe he should be encouraged to move out, if anything, at an accelerated pace. You should be aware that at this particular time, enemy units seem to be pulling back in a number of places, including Khe Sanh. We do not know what their intention is: '97to regroup for later attacks? '97to avoid casualties which their forward positions have permitted us to impose upon them? '97to let McCarthy and Bobby Kennedy fight the war for them? But the fact is there and, for the first time since the Tet offensive began, enemy casualties and ours are falling back toward the average levels of 1967. I do not believe we should wait to see what their next move is: I believe Westy should go out and face them. In any case, it is important that over the next month or so the military news from Vietnam shows that we have the military initiative and they are not simply hunkered up waiting for another enemy blow. In particular, we should consider three strategies: '97a continuation of our strategy of 1966'9667; that is, regaining our position in the countryside, extending pacification, and grinding along on the basis of slowly reducing the VC manpower base in the South, which we are doing at the rate of about one million per year through movement to the cities, plus refugees from VC areas, plus extended control in the countryside. '97a so-called population control strategy in which we would keep U.S. as well as Vietnamese forces in a position to give more regular and steady protection to the South Vietnamese population centers rather than grappling with the North Vietnamese units at the frontiers. Westy would defend his policy of 1966'9667 as a population protection strategy in the face of North Vietnamese pressures across the frontiers. But it is conceivable that, after very careful analysis with Westy on the scene, some practical difference could be identified between the policy that he has been following and a policy of so-called population protection. As you know, I am skeptical of any abstract debate of this proposition until it is tested against actual force distributions and utilization on the spot in detail. '97a policy of forcing a decision from Hanoi and its allies. The latter strategy involves adopting one or more of the following three courses of action: '97mining the North Vietnamese harbors and trying to interdict the transport routes from China; '97invading the southern part of North Vietnam and blocking the transport routes from, say, Vinh, to both the Mugia pass into Laos and the roads to the DMZ; or '97moving into Laos on Route 9 and blocking on the ground the Laos transport routes into South Vietnam just south of the 17th parallel. In different ways, any one of these three actions could put a very tough set of decisions to Hanoi and to its allies. I happen to believe that if the South Vietnamese government is on its feet and tolerably effective; we are moving forward militarily in the south, even if slowly; our terms for a settlement remain modest and legitimate; that neither the Soviet Union nor Communist China would escalate the war and that we would have a chance of bringing it more quickly to an end. I feel in my bones that after the Tet offensive, things can never be quite the same, and that a simple return to the 1966'9667 strategy will not wash. What I am recommending is simply that we carry out the most careful staff work on these alternatives from the present forward, so that you can make a rational judgment as to which way we go if the May peace offensive envisaged here should fail. Walt 1 'a0 :: said Hanoi would know full well that we were taking advantage of the bad weather. He said it might have some effect on doves and some effect in Europe, but would not succeed and would cause them problems. Secretary :: You may wish to give some time today to consider the key questions you may well put to the Advisory Group tomorrow morning. 2 Question 1 . Should we send more troops to South Vietnam? Do you suggest any change of military strategy or tactics in South Vietnam? Question 2 . With respect to the North, should we: Continue what we are doing? Mine the ports and plan to take down the dikes when the water is high? Unilaterally reduce or eliminate bombing of North Vietnam? Question 3 . In the light of our experiences with negotiating probes over the past year, should we: '97remain passive, awaiting a signal from Hanoi? '97initiate negotiations? '97if so, what formula of initiation do you recommend? '97when should we take the initiative? Question 4 . Taking into account all that you know, do you believe we should, in one way or another, get out of Vietnam and leave it to the Communists? W.W. Rostow 5 1 'a0 :: I am shaken by the position of my associates. The interpretation given this action by Saigon would be bad. This is a '93give-away'94 policy. I think it would weaken our position. General :: People in the country are dissatisfied. We do need to stop the bombing if we can get the suggestion to come from the Pope or U Thant, but let's not show them that we are in any way weakening. We should send only support troops. Bob :: We should change the emphasis. I agree with Acheson. The briefing last night led me to conclude we cannot achieve a military victory. I would agree with Lodge that we should cease search-and-destroy tactics and head toward an eventual disengagement. I would send only the troops necessary to support those there now. George :: There is a very significant shift in our position. When we last met we saw reasons for hope. 2 We hoped then there would be slow but steady progress. Last night and today the picture is not so hopeful particularly in the country side. Dean Acheson summed up the majority feeling when he said that we can no longer do the job we set out to do in the time we have left and we must begin to take steps to disengage. There were three of us who took a different position: General SPLIT On troop reinforcements the dominant sentiment was that the burden of proof rests with those who are urging the increase. Most of us think there should be a substantial escalation. We all felt there should not be an extension of the conflict. This would be against our national interest. The use of atomic weapons is unthinkable. Summary 4 :: I agree. All of us got the impression that there is no military conclusion in sight. We felt time is running out. Dean SPLIT Agree with Bundy's presentation. Neither the effort of the Government of Vietnam or the effort of the U.S. government can succeed in the time we have left. Time is limited by reactions in this country. We cannot build an independent South Vietnam; therefore, we should do something by no later than late summer to establish something different. Henry Cabot SPLIT The issue is not that stated by Fortas. The issue is can we do what we are trying to do in Vietnam. I do not think we can. Fortas said we are not trying to win a military victory. The issue is can we by military means keep the North Vietnamese off the South Vietnamese. I do not think we can. They can slip around and end-run them and crack them up. 7 1 'a0",political,bureaucracies_155,bureaucracies
"We should study moving away from the geographic approach of Vietnam strategy to a demographic approach. Dick SPLIT We could stop the bombing during the rainy period in the North. :: Major peace proposals aren't promising unless there is a cessation of bombing. There are serious political and military risks to bombing halt. We have been exploring bombing limitations in North, leaving open bombing above the DMZ. It also would look bad to segments here at home to have bombing halt at same time as calling up reserves. We are being divided by rejections by Hanoi. (Rusk read statement he proposed that the President use.) 4 Unless we are prepared to do something on bombing, there is no real proposal for us to make. We put two ideas to Bunker 1) San Antonio formula without any indic. from other side 2) limited cessation in northern part of NVN He was negative on both. 5 You can't couple a reserve callup with a bombing cessation. Let's make a generalized speech without a major move. SPLIT We would expect them to stop bombing in DMZ. 6 M. SPLIT Why shouldn't they talk. They get talks and put in men and a sanctuary. [Unattributed comment]: I never said anything about Laos. SPLIT Moscow cares more about what is happening in NVN than what is happening in South. :: Our problem is profoundly serious. I am going to talk frankly. I have a different approach. If a peace move is to be made without hope '85 You have tried to use both hands. It has not been successful in convincing world opinion or domestic opinion. Peace move must be realistic one. Say I cannot offer you the prospect of anything better. Let's don't go with a proposition which will not be acceptable. Let's be realistic. Only thing Hanoi wants is suspension of bombing. Where it will lead nobody knows. Hanoi sees it as a possibility for starting talks. I think we should do that. M. SPLIT I thought militarily we could do it. Cessation doesn't mean '85 Khe Sanh would be unprotected. Reinforcements could continue. No departure from San Antonio. To move this way would be a meaningful thing. You yourself have made this point. Hanoi said they wanted government in South to settle issue. We could put on agenda '97Hanoi stop aggression against South '97U.S. stop bombing against North. 9 SPLIT It won't be seen in good faith if you couple it with troops. SPLIT Doesn't use '93permanent'94. SPLIT It is my hope. I think talks '85 should talk. SPLIT I would double sorties around troops. Use more effective sorties in South. :: said that in Bunker's judgment this would cause major difficulties in Saigon. He said he would be skeptical of the idea but had no alternative. Walt :: said this would be alright if there were no hard conditions on the enemy. He did not believe Hanoi would reciprocate. SPLIT said a critical time for a peace offensive is later after the winter fighting has subsided. He said that if we do this and the enemy hit Saigon, we would have to be prepared to hit Hanoi very hard in retaliation. George Christian 1 'a0 :: We should shift from search and destroy strategy to a strategy of using our military power as a shield to permit the South Vietnamese society to develop as well as North Vietnamese society has been able to do. We need to organize South Vietnam on a block-by-block, precinct-by-precinct basis. 5 Douglas :: I share Acheson's view. I have felt that way since 1961'97that our objectives are not attainable. In the U.S. there is a sharp division of opinion. In the world, we look very badly because of the bombing. That is the central defect in our position. The disadvantages of bombing outweigh the advantages. We need to stop the bombing in the next six weeks to test the will of the North Vietnamese. As long as we continue to bomb, we alienate ourselves from the civilized world. I would have the Pope or U Thant suggest the bombing halt. It cannot come from the President. A bombing halt would quieten the situation here at home. General",political,bureaucracies_156,bureaucracies
"We must get into negotiations some time soon. These fellows are not necessarily the key (the contacts such as the Rumanian or the Shah). We must make up our own minds when we want to cease the bombings and see what happens. SPLIT It may be possible to supply all ARVN with M'9616s, and grenade launchers and machine guns. We have armed personnel carriers on the way out to Westmoreland now. 1 'a0 :: Paul Nitze and I started to work on this Friday night. 3 As you could understand, with the time pressure we placed upon ourselves there still may need to be refinements and adjustments to the program I will discuss. We have tried to make this document clear and understandable. (Undersecretary Nitze passed out prior to the meeting copies of a '93Draft Memorandum for the President.'94 A copy of that document is attached.) 4 The subject is a very profound one, and I consider it advisable to outline the difficulty we face and the central problem which your advisers see you facing. As you know, from time to time, the military leaders in the field ask for additional forces. We have, in the past, met these requests until we are now at the point where we have agreed to supply up to 525,000 men to General Westmoreland. He now has asked for 205,000 additional troops. There are three questions: 1. Should the President send 205,000? 2. Should the President not send any more? 3. Should the President approve a figure somewhere in between and send an alternative number? Your senior advisers have conferred on this matter at very great length. There is a deep-seated concern by your advisers. There is a concern that if we say, yes, and step up with the addition of 205,000 more men that we might continue down the road as we have been without accomplishing our purpose'97which is for a viable South Vietnam which can live in peace. We are not convinced that our present policy will bring us to that objective. As I said before, we spent hours discussing this matter. For a while, we thought and had the feeling that we understood the strength of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. You will remember the rather optimistic reports of General Westmoreland and Ambassador Bunker last year. Frankly, it came as a shock that the Vietcong-North Vietnamese had the strength of force and skill to mount the Tet offensive'97as they did. They struck 34 cities, made strong inroads in Saigon and in Hue. There have been very definite effects felt in the countryside. At this stage, it is clear that this new request by General Westmoreland brings the President to a clearly defined watershed: 1. Do you continue to go down that same road of '93more troops, more guns, more planes, more ships?'94 2. Do you go on killing more Viet Cong and more North Vietnamese and killing more Vietcong and more North Vietnamese? There are grave doubts that we have made the type of progress we had hoped to have made by this time. As we build up our forces, they build up theirs. We continue to fight at a higher level of intensity. Even were we to meet this full request of 205,000 men, and the pattern continues as it has, it is likely that by March he (General Westmoreland) may want another 200,000 to 300,000 men with no end in sight. The country we are trying to save is being subjected to enormous damage. Perhaps the country we are trying to save is relying on the United States too much. When we look ahead, we may find that we may actually be denigrating their ability to take over their own country rather than contributing to their ability to do it. We recommend in this paper that you meet the requirement for only those forces that may be needed to deal with any exigencies of the next 3'964 months. March'96April'96May could be an important period. We recommend an immediate decision to deploy to Vietnam an estimated total of 22,000 additional personnel. We would agree to get them to General Westmoreland right away. It would be valuable for the general to know they are coming so he can make plans accordingly. This is as far as we are willing to go. We would go ahead, however, and call up a sufficient number of men. If later the President decides Westmoreland needs additional reinforcements, you will have men to meet that contingency. The SPLIT The strategic reserves in the United States are deeply depleted. They must be built up. Senator Russell has said this. We do not know what might happen anywhere around the world, but to face any emergency we will need to strengthen the reserve. Out of this buildup you can meet additional requests from Westmoreland in the event you decide he needs more than the 22,000 later. The first increment will meet his needs for the next three to four months. We also feel strongly that there should be a comprehensive study of the strategic guidance to be given General Westmoreland in the future. We are not sure the present strategy is the right strategy'97that of being spread out all over the country with a seek and destroy policy. We are not convinced that this is the right way, that it is the right long-term course to take. We are not sure under the circumstances which exist that a conventional military victory, as commonly defined, can be had. After this study is made'97if there is no clear resolution in the actions of the next 3'964 months except long drawn-out procedure'97we may want to change the strategic guidance given Westmoreland. Perhaps we should not be trying to protect all of the countryside, and instead concentrate on the cities and important areas in the country. There will be considerably higher casualties if we follow the Westmoreland plan. It just follows that if we increase our troop commitment by 200,000 men, there will be significantly higher casualties. We may want to consider using our men as a '93shield'94 behind which the government of South Vietnam could strengthen itself and permit the ARVN to be strengthened. Under the present situation, there is a good deal of talk about what the Arvn '93will do'94 but when the crunch is on, when the crunch comes, they look to us for more. When they got into the Tet offensive, Thieu's statement wasn't what more they could do but that '93it is time for more U.S. troops.'94 There is no easy answer to this. If we continue with our present policy of adding more troops and increasing our commitment, this policy may lead us into Laos and Cambodia. The reserve forces in North Vietnam are a cause for concern as well. They have a very substantial population from which to draw. They have no trouble whatever organizing, equipping, and training their forces. We seem to have a sinkhole. We put in more'97they match it. We put in more'97they match it. The South Vietnamese are not doing all they should do. The Soviets and the Chinese have agreed to keep the North Vietnamese well armed and well supplied. The Vietcong are now better armed than the ARVN. They have: '97better rifles '97better training '97more sophisticated weapons (mortars, artillery, rockets). I see more and more fighting with more and more casualties on the U.S. side and no end in sight to the action. I want to give a whole new look at the whole situation. There is strong unanimity on this. If it were possible, we would want to look at the situation without sending more troops to him. But we should send the 22,000'97that is, until a new policy decision is reached. And that 22,000'97that will be it until that decision is made. We can no longer rely just on the field commander. He can want troops and want troops and want troops. We must look at the overall impact on us, including the situation here in the United States. We must look at our economic stability, our other problems in the world, our other problems at home; we must consider whether or not this thing is tieing us down so that we cannot do some of the other things we should be doing; and finally, we must consider the effects of our actions on the rest of the world'97are we setting an example in Vietnam through which other nations would rather not go if they are faced with a similar threat? It is out of caution and for protection that we recommend these additional forces. Now the time has come to decide where do we go from here. I can assure the President that we can reexamine this situation with complete protection to our present position. We should consider changing our concept from one of protecting real estate to protecting people. We need to see if these people are really going to take care of themselves eventually. I am not sure we can ever find our way out if we continue to shovel men into Vietnam. Secretary :: Could say Hanoi would withdraw its men from DMZ. M. SPLIT Value of it is psychological. They are not likely to accept any proposition. Kennedy and McCarthy aren't coming up with much. '93Let's try something like this.'94 M. SPLIT If that was fruitless, would that interfere with an all-out effort later on? SPLIT Is it your feeling that the President could make this proposal of stopping the bombing '85 SPLIT Is it your belief they would talk? SPLIT As of now, would not have an appreciable effect. By mid-April weather will improve. Would mean giving up more then than now. SPLIT It is not a clear-cut case. Military thinks it adds to difficulty of NVN getting supplies to South. Airpower is not proving to be very effective in this war. M. :: suggested that de-escalation be started by a limited cessation of bombing above the 20th parallel, with reciprocal action by the enemy by stopping shelling from the DMZ or just north of the DMZ. Secretary",political,bureaucracies_157,bureaucracies
"If we could provide Westy with the troops he wants I would recommend they be sent. They cannot be provided. This (the 22,000) is what we can do by 15 June. I find nothing wrong with going along with this track. I recommend these additional forces: 4 battalions of infantry; 3 tactical fighter squadrons; an additional 6 tactical fighter squadrons (2 by 1 April; 3 by 1 May; 1 by 1 June); 1 Marine RLT of the 4th Marine Division; and 1 Battalion of Seabees (700 men). This is all we can do by 15 June. Walt SPLIT They are planning to crank up a new offensive. I told Westy that combined operations would draw the ARVN out. :: General Westmoreland told me today that with the forces he now has available he does not fear a general defeat. However, the lack of adequate reserves could permit the enemy a tactical victory. General Westmoreland says the enemy has the capability to reinforce over the next two months with two divisions. The SPLIT In the period from late December to late January, they moved in 30 battalions of North Vietnamese or about 18,000 new combat troops not including support. The total with support would be about 30,000 to 35,000 not including fillers. The SPLIT 50,000. The SPLIT There are 16 radio terminals coming down toward the DMZ. The best intelligence estimates these as fillers, not troop units. One group is 600 strong'97it could be a battalion or replacement group. The enemy needs replacement because the casualties have been high. The SPLIT The enemy has 200,000 men in the north to protect against amphibious attack. He also has anti-aircraft and rocket units. His reserves are not unlimited. General Westmoreland thinks they can put two divisions (25,000 men) in for reinforcements. It could give the enemy a tactical victory. He doesn't think it will be Khesanh. It will be Hue or Quang Tri or in the Central Highlands. The SPLIT He got clobbered with air and artillery. He is now going after Hue and Saigon. The SPLIT No. General SPLIT General Westmoreland is there in South Vietnam. He has complete authority. He can't go across the DMZ. There are limits on Laos and Cambodia. The SPLIT Our basic strategy is sound. We can't fight a war on the defensive and win. Westmoreland has tried to go on the tactical offense. In certain places he must defend'97such as Cam Ranh Bay. Within our strategy there are tactical variations. General :: General Westmoreland has turned this around. They are now out in offensive activities. General Westmoreland told me in Manila '97Do not fear a general defeat with the forces we now have. '97There could be a tactical victory. '97The morale of the South Vietnamese is good. '97ARVN are now on the offensive. The North Vietnamese army force in South Vietnam is now increased by 50,000'9660,000 men. The enemy can reinforce with two divisions in 30 days. It could give the enemy greater chance for a tactical victory. General Westmoreland believes that replacement packages are coming down from the North. The enemy has suffered great casualties. Khesanh has served a useful purpose. It held two enemy divisions around it and one enemy division in support. The enemy has been badly battered. He has withdrawn one unit to the south and one moved to the east. I do not think the enemy has the intention of attacking Khesanh now. We face additional hard fighting. He has sanctuaries. I see no reason for all the gloom and doom we see in the United States press. There were setbacks during Tet'97mostly psychological and two military. The most setback was here in the United States, which was one of their objectives. The",military,bureaucracies_158,bureaucracies
"Probable Communist Reactions to Certain US or US-Sponsored Courses of Action in Vietnam and Laos PROPOSED COURSES OF ACTION 2 Category 1 . Air raids upon key supply centers along the Viet Cong supply and infiltration corridor in the Laos Panhandle, these raids to be conducted by the VNAF, possibly using napalm and possibly augmented by Farmgate. Category 2 . Ground force cross-border raids on the same targets by GVN units up to battalion in size and perhaps accompanied by US advisors. Category 3 . Limited air strikes against specific military and transportation targets in North Vietnam by unmarked planes flown exclusively by non-US aircrews. 1. In response to the first or second categories of action, local Communist military forces in the areas of actual attack would react vigorously, but we believe that none of the Communist powers involved would respond with major military moves designed to change the nature of the conflict. Rather than risk escalation, which must appear to them unnecessary and potentially disastrous to long-term achievement of their objectives, they would be more likely to rely on a continuing war of attrition and on intensive propaganda and political maneuvering aimed at isolating the US and building up pressure for an international conference to '93neutralize'94 South Vietnam. In any event, the intensity of Communist response to Category 1 and 2 actions would depend to some extent upon the scale and manner in which such actions were executed. 2. Air strikes on North Vietnam itself (Category 3) would evoke sharper Communist reactions than air strikes confined to targets in Laos, but even in this case fear of escalation would probably restrain the Communists from a major military response. Though we think it unlikely, they might attempt isolated air raids on Saigon and other South Vietnamese cities hoping quickly to shatter South Vietnamese morale. 3. There are various local military or semi-military actions, short of major change in the character of the conflict, which should be considered among possible Communist responses: (a) Improvement of local air defenses (probably with additional AA equipment from North Vietnam and China), dispersal of supplies and troop concentrations, and movement discipline designed to hamper effective air attack. Such measures would be likely. (b) Intensification of Viet Cong ambushes and attacks, accompanied perhaps by the more or less covert introduction into South Vietnam of some additional personnel from North Vietnam. This response also would be likely. (c) Sabotage attacks on airfields in South Vietnam to damage their communications facilities, POL depots, etc., and if possible to cripple planes on the ground. We believe such attacks likely. (d) A widespread campaign of terrorism against Americans, including civilians and dependents, in South Vietnam. We think the chances of such a campaign would be less than even. (e) Communist forces now in Laos could attempt to seize one or more of the Mekong towns. We believe such an attempt would be unlikely. (f) Fighter aircraft would be introduced into North Vietnam. We think this unlikely if US/GVN air strikes are confined to targets in Laos (Category 1). However, if attacks are initiated against North Vietnam itself (Category 3), chances of the Communists introducing some defensive air capability in North Vietnam would increase appreciably, mounting as the scope and intensity of the attacks increased. 4. The influence of the USSR on the Communist camp in the Indochina situation is limited, and it wants to avoid too direct involvement. Moscow would certainly want to show itself no less strong than the Chinese in opposition to the US-sponsored moves. It would almost certainly consider that an intense international campaign against the US could damage US interests considerably, to Soviet world-wide gain, and would not necessarily jeopardize Soviet d'e9tente tactics on issues of US-Soviet relations other than Vietnam. Accordingly, the Soviets would give Hanoi vigorous political and propaganda support, and would probably place themselves in the forefront of those calling for an international conference'97and might accompany this by leading A move in the UN to condemn the US. John A. McCone 1 'a0 :: The proposed U.S. reprisals will result in a sharp North Vietnamese military reaction, but such actions would not represent a deliberate decision to provoke or accept a major escalation of the Vietnamese war. (The text of Mr. McCone's estimate of probable North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist reactions to our reprisal is attached.) 3 The SPLIT No. The North Vietnamese are reacting defensively to our attacks on their off-shore islands. They are responding out of pride and on the basis of defense considerations. The attack is a signal to us that the North Vietnamese have the will and determination to continue the war. They are raising the ante. The :: began with a brief report on the intelligence situation. He mentioned the report of a U'962 pilot over North Vietnam to the effect that missile bursts had been sighted and indicated his own inclination to discount the pilot's report. He reported existing intelligence on air and ground movements and mentioned the possibility that we might now face increased Communist air activity over Laos or intensified infiltration. It was also reported that there might be a meeting of the three Laotian factions in Paris in August. The Secretary of",military,bureaucracies_159,bureaucracies
"The North Vietnamese PT boats have continued their attacks on the two U.S. destroyers in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin. No enemy aircraft was involved. Our efforts to learn the exact situation and protect the Patrol have been complicated by a very low ceiling. One of the two destroyers was fired on by automatic weapons and was lit up by search lights. Secretary SPLIT We have agreed to air strikes on two bases in the north of North Vietnam and two base complexes in the south of North Vietnam. A fifth target has been deleted because it is close to Communist China. In addition, any North Vietnamese PT boats and Swatows found off Vietnam outside the three-mile limit will be attacked as part of an armed reconnaissance program. (The execute order as actually set is attached-JCS 7720.) 2 CIA Director SPLIT Our intelligence officers report that a Chinese Communist air regiment is moving to North Vietnam. USIA Director SPLIT We will know definitely in the morning. As of now, only highly classified information nails down the incident. This information we cannot use and must rely on other reports we will be receiving. Secretary SPLIT In addition to the air strikes, we plan to send major U.S. reinforcements into the area. These include ships, men and planes. (A detailed listing of these forces is attached.) 4 Bromley Smith 1 'a0 :: indicated that our side was well prepared for a response to any likely form of escalation. The",military,bureaucracies_160,bureaucracies
"The Dominican Republic You have inquired regarding the assertion that the elimination of the Dominican Republic's windfall sugar quota will lead to the downfall of Trujillo and his replacement by a Communist-oriented regime. 2 Political Aspects In spite of economic difficulties there is no solid evidence that Trujillo's fall is imminent. Trujillo rules by force and will presumably remain in power as long as the armed forces continue to support him. While there is evidence of dissatisfaction on the part of a few officers there is as yet no cogent evidence of large-scale defection within the officer corps. The underground opposition to Trujillo composed of business, student and professional people is believed to by predominantly anti-Communist. They have substantially increased in numbers in recent years but have been unable to move effectively against Trujillo. In addition to opposition groups in the Dominican Republic, there are numerous exile groups located principally in Venezuela, Cuba, United States and Puerto Rico. In some cases these groups have been infiltrated by pro-Castro or pro-Communist elements. In the event the Trujillo regime should fall the degree of danger of a communist takeover would, according to our intelligence, depend on whether the domestic or the exile groups succeeded in gaining dominance. The danger would be less if the domestic opposition gained power, and it would be increased substantially if infiltrated exile groups should emerge as the next government. Finally, account must be taken of the adverse effect on our position of leadership in the hemisphere if we support tyranny in the Dominican Republic. Our ability to marshal Latin American support against the Castro dictatorship would be impaired; Venezuela has made it clear that action against Trujillo is a condition precedent to Venezuelan support of collective action against Castro. Comments have also been requested concerning the progress which has been made in assuring an orderly takeover by anti-Communist elements should Trujillo fall. With respect to Dominican exile groups, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] has established useful working relationships and attempted to distinguish between democratic and undemocratic elements. Conversations with them continue. These exile groups have received limited financial assistance and propaganda assistance in the form of certain radio broadcasts. Should the underground leaders with whom we are in contact fail to obtain the support of the Dominican armed forces and should they call on the United States for assistance, a question arises as to whether the United States would be prepared to intervene militarily either unilaterally or collectively with other American States. This question needs study and a review of the entire plan is desirable. It is recommended that Mr. Berle's Task Force be assigned this task. 4 Dean Rusk 1 'a0",political,bureaucracies_161,bureaucracies
"estimates that this diplomatic activity is not likely to show clear results for 36-48 hours. It may have to be supplemented by further diplomatic activity. It is the State Department's judgment that public pressure will only provoke greater counter-action by Amin and may well make him less flexible. If we can keep Amin faithful to what he has said thus far -- that is he is merely calling people in to Kampala to choose whether they wish to go or stay -- we might get through this without too much trouble. Military Actions :: Cubans in Angola? After receiving a report this afternoon from the Honorary Swiss Consul in Uganda that Kampala is ""swarming with Cubans"" I asked the intelligence community to check this. Until now we have seen no evidence that there are substantial numbers of Cubans in Uganda. There was a Cuban military delegation in Kampala at the time of the January 21-28 independence celebration but this group has apparently left the country. There may be, however, as many as two hundred Palestinians in Uganda. We have several reports dating back to 1973 -- just after Amin broke with Israel -- that Palestinians were training protection units for the President, training Ugandan Air Force, acting as economic and political advisors, and instructing Ugandan commandos on intelligence communications. We have no idea, however, to what extent the Palestinians are behind Amin's recent action against Americans. The Charge answered that he assumed it was due to the tremendous amount of unfavorable publicity and that his government had perhaps decided to postpone the meeting to reduce tension. We noted that the Americans were still prohibited from leaving Uganda until the meeting with Amin, now postponed. The Charge said that they were free to leave. } :: Uganda - Because of the continuing uncertainty in Uganda, I have authorized our taking some discreet steps to reduce the number of Americans in that country. We estimate that there are approximately 240 Americans in Uganda. I believe that we can take these steps without giving Amin a pretext to single out Americans as principal targets again. } :: Uganda Amin will cancel his Monday morning meeting with americans, but we have no confirmation of this. Kampala radio this morning continued to broadcast announcements concerning the meeting. In the message received this morning from its representative in Washington, the Ugandan government was at pains to be reassuring. However, all Uganda Army field units were placed on standby alert as of late February 25, possibly because of a fear that the US intends to invade Uganda Amin told his ministers yesterday that during the Monday meeting he wishes to check on whether any Americans had been involved in plots to overthrow him. Our reading of the current signals is that Amin may wish to cool the situation and simply make the most of the worldwide publicity he is receiving. However, given his temperament, Amin could change drastically and rapidly, particularly if he should believe that he is threatened. Moreover, nothing in this apparent change in mood guarantees the safety of americans en route to Kampala, or the good behavior of ugandan soldiers in the capital. }",political,bureaucracies_162,bureaucracies
"The Situation There are no new developments that we are aware of in Uganda except the letter which President Amin has directed to you, Secretary General Waldheim and a number of others. That letter essentially responds to charges of human rights violation in Uganda and make some counter charges concerning the U.S. It makes no threats against the U.S. nor does it mention his order to have all Americans assemble in Kampala on Monday. It does contain the ominous note that the United States was involved in a recent plan to invade Uganda, ""based on information from 16 people involved in the plot"" who were arrested yesterday. The State SPLIT agrees that military actions should be understand in extremis and that we should avoid preparations now which would become public and create a crisis atmosphere. However, the aircraft carrier Enterprise and some other supporting cruisers are in the general area. They have been directed to proceed to a positions 100 miles off the coast of Kenya. At the current rate of advance (20 knots), the Enterprise will arrive at noon tomorrow. Secretary SPLIT believes it is only prudent to move the Enterprise into the area although it would have no value in helping us evacuate Americans. It is capable only of offensive operations. It is probably desirable therefore to slow the carrier down or alter course slightly so that its mission is not so evident in the next 24 hours. Military options are not attractive for reasons that are fairly obvious. To move in force we would employ elements of the 82nd Airborne which would take 2-1/2 dyads for the lead elements to arrive. Major readiness steps could not be taken without public notice although there are some smaller steps that could be undertaken with minimum risk if you should so order. We do not have a realistic military option of moving in force before Monday. After we see what happens then, we will reassess the situation. } :: The special coordinating committee working group reviewed the situation in uganda this morning and noted no significant changes. reports tend to corroborate the judgment that the assembling of americans in kampala on monday will be benign, but they do not confirm it. state department diplomatic actions are showing some results. Mobutu has weighed in heavily with the Ugandans and the other african and muslim countries are being helpful. the working group anticipates that amin may ask for an emissary. we hope that this will not come to pass, but we are developing a list of possible names. The Enterprise will arrive at a point 300 miles from the kenya coast by noon set tomorrow (sunday). your order will be required by 10:00 am EST tomorrow in order to move it within 100 miles of the coast by dawn monday (ugandan time), which is the maximum distance from which military actions could be carried out against Uganda. }",political,bureaucracies_163,bureaucracies
"There's more smoke than fire in Joe Alsop's reputed line that Nasser is going to invade Saudi Arabia and that the Pentagon is raring to use the Sixth Fleet but the softheads in the State Department are opposed. We've already done a lot to deter the UAR from escalating. We've had destroyers visit Saudi port, bombers flying in, now a Special Forces team is there. We've warned Nasser again not to step on our toes. True, Nasser may still try greater pressure on Saudis, but Faysal is asking for it. We've consistently estimated (dead right so far) that Nasser would escalate rather than quit in Yemen. He's already resumed bombings, and we discovered UAR parachute drop of supplies to presumed partisans in Hejaz. Some in CIA think UAR may try to promote a revolution in the Hejaz or a raid on Saudi supply dumps. But to commit ourselves to take on Nasser in defense of Faysal's right to intervene covertly in Yemen seems folly: (1) it would be unpopular with most Arabs except Faysal and Hussein'97it would outrage Iraqis and Algerians; (2) it would thrust Nasser back on the Soviets'97and he can cause a lot more trouble if he's against us than if we have an ""in"" with him; (3) it would only confirm Faysal in his idea that we'll bail him out if his scheme to bleed Nasser in Yemen leads to retaliation. Painful and uncertain as it is, I see no alternative to our present effort to damp down the Yemen affair, by working on Faysal as well as warning off Nasser. Bob Komer 1 'a0 :: We have reached the decisive stage in our effort to damp down Yemen affair before it blows up. Faysal finally seems aware that he's losing and was receptive to Bunker proposals (though still trying to get UAR tied down first). Nasser and Sallal also seemed most reasonable with Bunche. Our next moves must be two-fold: Biggest risk here is that if Faysal keeps running guns to royalists, Nasser may resume attacks. He agreed to hold off in response to your flat warning, but only for an indefinite period. True, odds are against Nasser upping the ante again; he's winning anyway, he doesn't want to jeopardize our aid, and he's well aware of risk he'll end up fighting us (we've moved new DD's to Red Sea, etc). But at some point he could decide we're merely shielding Saudis. If so, US would almost have to react, having told Nasser we're on a collision course. We could try to meet this risk by stringing Nasser along, telling him we're making progress with Faysal while warning him not to resume attacks. We could lend credibility to this by further precautionary naval movements (part of Sixth Fleet to Eastern Med), and perhaps intelligence signals. But our best assurance against Nasser upping the ante would be if we could tell him that Faysal has quietly suspended aid to the royalists . Here we could capitalize on Faysal's own fear (expressed to Bunker) lest Nasser resume attacks before our air cover arrives. I see two options here (both of which could be tried): A. Go back and tell Faysal that if he'll quietly suspend aid right now (and let us verify it) we'll send squadron. Risks of this course are that if Faysal buys it we get ensnarled in a military commitment of indefinite shape and duration to rickety Saudi regime. What happens if there is a revolution while US squadron is there, etc. But we are already committed to send a squadron under Bunker proposal . We want to buy time for Faysal on grounds a bird in the hand worth an unknown in the bush. Finally, Saudi Arabia aside, we must worry about Jordan, Libya, and other places at a time when trend is against the ""monarchies'94. So we want to show Nasser we mean it when we say we have certain interests we're determined to defend. Having done so we can then disengage with less risk that Nasser will test us in future cases. B. If we hesitate to send air squadron now, alternative would be appeal to Faysal to suspend aid temporarily in return for private assurance Nasser would similarly continue to hold off attacks on Saudis. We would negotiate this out, using rationale with both sides that it essential to give mediation time to succeed. Faysal might not buy either of the above options since they offer him less than the Bunker proposals. But if he's running scared they at least offer him reassurance against UAR attack. They also cost us nothing if they're rejected. The risks and loopholes involved in these proposals seem to me less than those of failing to follow up fast on your warning to Nasser plus Bunker's mission, thus risking renewed escalation by Nasser to which we'd almost have to react. R.W. Komer 2 1 'a0 :: suggested that the immediate problem was to keep Nasser from upping the ante while the mediation effort was underway, which in turn required that we make every effort to get Faysal to suspend aid. :: We are convinced that Nasser's renewed small scale bombing of the two Saudi towns is a carefully calculated answer to the leak that we warned him and he agreed to lay off. 2 Rusk's public warning Friday about our concern over Jordan and Saudi Arabia probably also helped. 3 AR answer will no doubt be that they assumed ""mediation"" over since both Bunche and Bunker were back here. They will also say (and correctly) that Saudi supply effort to royalists is still going full blast. But we think UAR will stop now and watch our reaction. Both sides are trying to force our hand, Faysal to get us to defend him and Nasser to get us to turn Faysal off. Despite our warnings to Nasser, main thrust of our effort still must be to get Faysal to disengage before he commits suicide. Faysal urging him strongly to suspend aid immediately, and reinforcing Bunker's pitch to him that we cannot help him unless he does so. Question is whether we can get him to do so unless we at least offer him the token air squadron. R. W. Komer 1 'a0 :: Meanwhile, despite repeated Saudi affirmations that they turned off aid to the Royalists a month ago, we have hard evidence some arms are still getting through. So the UAR reacted the other day with a single plane ""warning"" raid on a Saudi supply point. Odds are that neither Saudis nor UAR want to start a war again, but there's always a risk. Yet if our Yemen effort collapses, it will add mightily to our woes in the Middle East. 2 R.W. Komer 1 'a0 :: Worse still, the Egyptians seem to be preparing new reinforcements for Yemen; if sent, these could undo everything. R. W. Komer 1 'a0 :: So unless we send the fighters promptly, Faysal may again accuse us of breaking promises. Our Ambassador is very worried about further delays. We've already deployed practically everything but the fighters themselves, holding latter in Spain till UN observer teams could deploy to border area. Main UN element is arriving in Yemen 3 July and scheduled to deploy on 5 July. There may be some delay in this God-forsaken area but I share State/DOD feeling that we had better finally go ahead. To reassure you, rules of engagement permitting us to fire on aircraft committing hostile acts (e.g. bombing) are strictly standby and not to be authorized without your express approval. The only authority our aircraft now have is standard one of firing back in self defense if they themselves are shot at. To further limit risk of any confrontation, we're telling Cairo about squadron and will do so again with Nasser personally within the week. UAR did conduct one ""raid"" (last Sunday) after disengagement officially in effect, but UN observer believes after viewing scene that pilot jettisoned bombs by error. Meanwhile, YAR fortunes again seem on upgrade and Royalists weakening. Sign of times is that UK met Yemeni terms for release of 16 servicemen. In sum, we are still moving slowly, haltingly, but distinctly toward a successful exercise. R. W. Komer 1 'a0 :: Without being foolhardy, or discounting the painful and unpredictable obstacles which keep cropping up, I believe I can reassure you that the Yemen affair is slowly being brought under control. On plus side, we think that Saudis have finally turned off aid, and their knowledge our squadron will be withdrawn if they start cheating again acts as a deterrent. UN observers, now in place, are another deterrent. Problem now is to get the UAR to start carrying out its end of the bargain. Nasser's assurance that UAR planes will stay well clear of border (Cairo 121) 2 is welcome response to our warnings. Meanwhile, the back country war in Yemen continues to seesaw back and forth. SPLIT I'm convinced that if we can keep the Saudis turned off and the Egyptians from being stupid, we have a controllable situation which can be gradually damped down. In sum, though it's folly to be too optimistic, I think we're getting Yemen under control. It's taken a lot longer than initially expected, but we are on way to achieving our basic objectives of preventing Yemen war from spreading into full-fledged intra-Arab conflict (with risk of overt US/USSR involvement), and protecting our Saudi clients from their own folly while still not compromising our overall UAR policy. R. W. Komer 1 'a0 :: Yemen Round-up. It finally looks as though, we've gotten Nasser to start public disengagement. He's undoubtedly been stalling till he felt reasonably confident he had civil war under control. But he's again assured UN and us that UAR is pulling several thousand troops out (not rotating); he'll give a big ""victory"" speech Sunday which we hope will commit him publicly again. But now Saudis may be acting up. UNYOM says it discovered two Saudi truck convoys heading into Yemen loaded with mortar shells. We will hit Saudis hard on this, armed with above indications Nasser is coming through. Faysal has been getting edgy, but we think he'll back down. However, we'll no doubt have to keep our eight F-100s there a while longer'97a pullout now would destroy our credibility with the Saudis. Both sides seem tentatively willing, which is a good sign. R.W. Komer 1 'a0 :: Meanwhile, both Saudis (gun-running) and UAR (one-plane raid on border village'97casualties one camel) have been caught violating, though actual facts generally turn out less damning than early intelligence reports. Also, despite this leaking at edges, UN buffer is working; UAR is slowly pulling out and Saudi flow of arms is down to a trickle. Our problem is to keep it under control a while longer, so we're going back at both Saudis and UAR. Bob Komer 1 'a0 :: THE NEXT ROUND IN YEMEN The interesting questions are why it's dragging, and what to do? Why hasn't disengagement worked? Basically, we and Nasser both miscalculated how long and how much it would take to subdue and pull together this non-country; it was easy to seize all the towns, but another matter to control the mountain tribes (this was the case under the old Imamate too). Saudi gold and arms have kept the tribal pot boiling; while Saudi aid was cut back when UNYOM got in, some is still going in (which is why the UAR kept bombing the supply routes). Faysal may even be conning us, or at least turning a blind eye. Worse yet, the UK may be at least covertly encouraging the Saudis and the royalists. Where do we stand? Nasser is trapped in Yemen. It's bleeding him, but he can't afford either the sharp loss of face in letting go or (we hope) the risk of confronting us by starting on the Saudis again. But as Cairo 631 attests, 2 the UAR probably thinks we're either being hoodwinked by Faysal or conniving with him behind the screen of disengagement. On top of this, Nasser has deep economic trouble at home, and now an open fight with the Baath. Nasser cornered is a dangerous animal, and we want to be mighty careful how we handle him. We've real problems with Faysal too. Saud is back and may try to knife him. His advisers (and the UK) must still be telling him royalists can ""win"" in Yemen if Saudis only keep it up a bit longer. And he's got our squadron to protect him if Nasser goes too far. Finally, the Yemen regime we recognize is a non-government. As Nasser told Diefenbaker (attached), 3 the UAR has to run the whole show. If the UAR pulled out precipitately we'd have chaos. There is little likelihood that any quasi-royalist regime would be more stable than the YAR. Yemen will be a mess for a long time to come. Where to from here? No one has a viable solution to, or a firm grip on, this mess. Not Nasser, not Faysal, not us. But there are roughly three ways we could influence the short-term outcome: (1) Let disengagement collapse, UNYOM withdraw and Saudis resume all-out aid, while we warn Nasser off Saudi Arabia. This is what the Saudis and UK have wanted from the start. Now the SYG wants to pull out too. Big risk here is that a desperate Nasser would react, not by cutting his losses but by upping the ante. He might resume bombing (which would force a US/UAR showdown or make us look like paper tigers). To protect himself, he might invite a much greater Soviet presence in Yemen and the UAR. These are the very things we've tried to forestall from the beginning of the civil war. (2) Go all out in backing Nasser and YAR, insisting Faysal really cut off aid or we'll withdraw our squadron and leave him to Nasser's mercy. We could subsidize the YAR economically, and beat up UK to stop shafting us and recognize YAR. True, Saudis have nowhere else to go and might cave, but Faysal (or Saud) is just as likely to rise up in righteous wrath and take his chances with Nasser, meanwhile harassing us on oil. (3) Keep plugging away at disengagement, trying to keep UNYOM in place as the indispensable buffer while we (a) press Saudis to halt remaining covert aid; (b) make clear to Nasser the cost to him if he resumes bombing; and (c) seek some form of compromise reshuffling of YAR regime which both Nasser and Faysal (as well as YAR and royalists) might buy. NEA in State sees this as our best bet. It won't be easy to patch up a regime acceptable to UAR as well as Saudis, since each will be jockeying to load the dice in its favor. The same goes for the various royalist and republican factions; there is nothing remotely akin to a cohesive political grouping on either side. I think State is right. 4 It's always easier to come down on one side or the other than to steer a middle course (especially when each side sees this as meaning you lean toward the other). But what happens in Yemen itself remains far less important to us than to protect our Saudi investment, maintain decent relations with Nasser, and keep the USSR from making real gains. The middle course best serves these multiple interests. It also keeps our commitment limited by minimizing the risk we'll get dragged into the fray. Finally, it plays on Nasser's desire to reduce his overcommitment in Yemen without losing face by deserting the YAR, and Faysal's fear that if he goes for broke in Yemen the US might desert him. Nonetheless, this road will be a rocky one. It will be hard to get Nasser to keep withdrawing rapidly enough to give some color to idea that disengagement is proceeding, however slowly. It may be even harder to keep Faysal signed on to disengagement unless we get at least such minimal compliance (though air squadron gives us some leverage). And we'll have to stem the SYG's desire to wash his hands of Yemen mess, since the UNYOM buffer between the UAR and Saudis is indispensable for buying time until some political settlement can be patched up. My only reservations about the way we've handled Yemen have been tactical; on occasion I've favored leaning harder on whichever party was backsliding. But I think all would agree that to keep disengagement alive until we can promote a political settlement will now take even fuller exercise of all our leverage than before. Unless we prescribe clearly the limits of our tolerance this affair can easily flare up again. So I recommend that: (1) We make very clear to Nasser personally (a) our bona fides to date in Yemen'97we've not tried to snooker him; (b) our plain view that disengagement plus political settlement, which presupposes UAR/Saudi rapprochement, is in his best interest; (c) if he disagrees we will be compelled to reassess our policy; (d) if he agrees, then the minimum we expect from him is gradual withdrawal plus absolutely no bombing raids; (e) if he plays ball we intend to press the Saudis and UK to do so too. We need to clear the air with Nasser, removing mutual suspicion to the extent possible and banking on his own desire to reduce his Yemen commitment at a time when he has so many other troubles. We simply have to readjust for a longer pull, be willing to accept continued UK sniping and other criticism, and play for the breaks. But so far we've kept Yemen from blowing up into something far more painful; with luck we can keep it that way until some deal can be worked out. R. W. Komer 1 'a0 :: If the Saudis resume aid to the Yemeni royalists, Nasser will no doubt resume bombing Saudi supply bases, in which case Faysal will scream for help. The British, who strongly disagree with our policy of pouring oil on troubled waters, have been at us hard to unleash Faysal, even at the expense of our relations with most other Arabs. We assume that your own feeling about the Middle East is the same as your view on the Malaysia issue last week, i.e. we certainly don't want another war on our hands for at least two months. R. W. Komer McG. B. 1 'a0 :: Saudi/ UAR tension over Yemen is heating up. The worried Saudis have asked us to send a fighter squadron to scare off the Egyptians, who have increased minor crossborder activities from Yemen into Saudi territory. Fortunately, we've told the Saudis repeatedly we couldn't send another air unit to deter Nasser, if it would only serve as an umbrella for renewed secret aid to the Yemeni royalists. Should the Egyptians unexpectedly launch a full-scale attack on Saudi Arabia, however, that would change the name of the game (and we'd reconsider). To protect your freedom of action on the above, I've said no air deployment without Presidential OK. I've taken the same precaution with another step State and Defense are considering--a long planned exercise to stage a 500 man rifle team into Dhahran for a two week exercise demonstration--as a quiet reminder to the UAR to lay off. This isn't as risky, or as expensive as an air squadron, but I think State and DOD ought to get your express approval before starting down this Yemen road again. 2 R.W. Komer 1 'a0",political,bureaucracies_164,bureaucracies
"commented that we were not faced with a ""military"" threat. We don't think Nasser would attack but we want a plate glass window to insure that this is the case. The SPLIT thought so. The :: explained how Faysal was hurting because of the attacks on him. He was also unhappy about the Iraqi coup. Meanwhile, the Egyptians were running a major offensive and claimed they would win in three weeks (he described the attack on a map). While they had resumed bombings and made a paradrop, we saw no evidence that they actually would invade Saudi Arabia. But they had the capability to do so. SPLIT said Faysal took the position of the Royalists as part of the defense of Saudi Arabia and said we couldn't ask him to turn it off. The SPLIT replied that we did not think it vital since the Yemen was far from the center of power in Saudi Arabia and would probably be fully occupied with its own internal affairs. Mr. SPLIT then described the State Department's proposals (as outlined in the Brubeck to Bundy memo on ""Review of Policy on the Yemen Conflict"" of 24 February 1963). 4 Mr. SPLIT pointed out that we had already given Nasser certain warnings; the need was to make them credible. If Faysal suspended aid to the royalists, further UAR aircraft incursions would be highly unlikely. Mr. SPLIT then briefly described the second step in our proposals which would be to assist Saudis to develop a better air defense capability of their own. At this point, Mr. SPLIT indicated our hope that we could get Nasser simultaneously to withdraw a contingent from Yemen as part of a reciprocal disengagement process. The :: Meanwhile, the UAR has resumed air attack against towns well within Saudi Arabia, some of whose targets cannot be construed as military. In these circumstances Faysal, who has repeatedly emphasized that he places his primary reliance on and faith in the United States rather than the U.N., has concluded that the United States has let him down and is failing to live up to its assurances of protection. Your response of June 9 to Faysal's latest message, which indicated inter alia that the United States does not back out on its promises and will dispatch an air squadron to Saudi Arabia once disengagement is fully in effect, should help to assuage his feelings and hopefully for the moment prevent him from taking some ill-advised action. However, I believe that unless the United States air squadron is moved to Saudi Arabia as soon as the first detachment of U.S. observers arrives in Yemen'97whether or not disengagement is construed to be ""fully in effect"" at this point'97there is real danger that already seriously deteriorating United States-Saudi relations will reach a dangerous low point. I believe that establishment of a U.N. presence in the border area between Yemen and Saudi Arabia will minimize the risk of further UAR penetration of Saudi air space and confrontation with USAF aircraft. Dean Rusk 3 Attachment 4 REVISED ""MISSION"" AND ""RULES OF ENGAGEMENT'94 a. Mission : The mission of the deployed air unit is: (2) To provide a limited air defense capability to Saudi Arabia to deter UAR air operations over Saudi Arabia should such air operations be resumed. In the event the UAR resumes air operations over Saudi Arabia and UAR aircraft are detected and/or intercepted by operational USAF fighter aircraft in Saudi Arabia during the accomplishment of the mission as outlined in paragraph ""a"" above, this information will be reported by highest priority precedence message to the JCS. Pending receipt of instructions from the JCS, the employment of the U.S. air unit will continue to be in accordance with the terms of the mission set forth in paragraph ""a"" above. b. Rules of Engagement : The following rules of engagement may be made effective only if directed by the JCS after the decision has been made at the highest government level: (1) USAF fighter aircraft, within their capability, will intercept and identify all unidentified aircraft violating the territorial air space of Saudi Arabia. (2) Upon interception and failure to identify as friendly, the aircraft will be considered a hostile intruder and USAF fighter pilots will exert every measure, short of actual firing at the ""intruder,'94 to induce it to land or alter course to exit Saudi Arabian territory. These measures may include maneuvers, tactics, and signals, as well as commands on international radio frequencies. If these measures are successful, USAF fighter aircraft will escort the ""intruder"" aircraft to the Saudi Arabian border or to the nearest suitable airfield. (3) If the foregoing steps to induce ""intruder"" aircraft to either land or depart Saudi Arabian air space are not successful, USAF fighter aircraft will escort the ""intruder"" aircraft, continuing harrassment, until one of two situations occurs, i.e., either (i) the ""intruder"" follows directions to land or depart Saudi Arabian air space, or (ii) the ""intruder"" is observed to commit a ""hostile"" act. In this event, USAF fighter aircraft will destroy the ""intruder.'94 1 'a0 :: sense is that Saudi cessation of aid is gradually strangling Royalists, and that war will gradually subside to the level of tribal bickering which has always characterized Yemeni scene. Saudis and our other critics will keep pressing us to keep the Egyptians withdrawing. We'll face recurrent flak on this over next 6/18 months,",military,bureaucracies_165,bureaucracies
"explained the Defense Department concerns over such a proposal. ""Let's not start down the toboggan until we know where we might land.'94 He feared that we would lose the whole of the Middle East if we attacked the UAR. This would be highly unpopular with most Arab states, including the new Iraqi regime. Yet the only militarily effective course would be to attack at the source, i.e. to counter against the airfields in the UAR from which UAR bombers were flying. The SPLIT view, was how we could do anything short of attacks at the source which would be militarily effective. Air defense of an area as large as Saudi Arabia was exceedingly difficult. The smallest even semi-effective program would cost about $60 million in capital outlays, largely for the necessary radar and ground environment. Gen. SPLIT indicated that DOD might be willing to go in if it were sure Faysal would suspend aid in return. He wanted to be mighty sure that the proposal turned out the way we saw it. He commented on the difficulty of policing whether Faysal did in fact cease aid. Mr. SPLIT again opposed unless Faysal clearly disengaged, and queried how we could make sure he was doing so. The :: pointed out the difficulty of knowing whether Faysal had actually suspended aid if he promised to do so. the",military,bureaucracies_166,bureaucracies
"again brought to the president's attention the seriousness of the Yemen problem. I extended the discussion to express my worries over the entire Middle East because of the Yemen conflict over the northern tier of Africa, the continuing problems with the Israeli border, the Iraq-Syria situation and finally the problems between the oil companies and the producing states which resulted in a planned meeting of the eight producing states in mid-December. Nasser's wave of influence was on the upsurge and we could expect further efforts on his part to consolidate his position in these two countries. [Here follow items 4'968 on unrelated matters.] 1 'a0 :: However, when Nasser moved in troops in substantial numbers, military officers who overthrew the Imam became discouraged. A great many of them defected and returned to their old tribal leaders; others became neutral. As a result, Nasser was required to send in increasing numbers of troops and his forces now totalled 30,000 to 32,000. This is about one-third of his total armed forces. The costs to Nasser of the Yemeni operation are very high. They are estimated at about $50 to $75 million dollars. The situation now was difficult because the only military forces sustaining the Yemen Republic Government were the Nasser forces and the Egyptians were really running the country with the Yemen political authorities acting in a subservient position and with little authority. As a result, dissension was growing among the Yemen Government officials who resented the control and authority exercised by the UAR presence. 7. The problem now was whether Faisal and Nasser would agree to further extension. If they did not it was highly probable that Faisal would again start to supply arms to the royalists, and that Nasser would escalate military activities against the royalists and into Saudi Arabia. I pointed out that this was an extremely critical matter, not because of the importance of Yemen, but because of our entire relationship with the Saudi Arabian Government and the importance of Saudi oil reserves to our national interest. 1 'a0",political,bureaucracies_167,bureaucracies